Transethnic networks and mon identity ies in sangkhlaburi, thailand

Sangkhlaburi, Thailand is one of a few areas in Thailand where the Mon language is actively promoted and where Mon nationalist organisations are allowed to operate.. However, Karens or p

I had just crossed the wooden bridge and was looking for a spot to station my bicycle It was about one o'clock in the afternoon, and as I locked my bicycle, I was mulling over my plans for the remainder of the day Finding lunch was the most important task at hand at this moment As I looked to my left, the friendly aunty

smiled at me as she said, as she always did, “Mangeura-ow” ('Hello' in Mon) I

responded, “Mangeura-ow” Then she repeated in Burmese, “Minglaba shin”

('Hello') I responded, “Minglaba kamya” (the male equivalent) The motorbike taxi driver who normally awaits customers at the end of the bridge greeted me, “Beh thwa maleh” (“Where are you going?” in Burmese) I pointed over to the raan aahaan mon

(“Mon restaurant”, written in Thai), where the portly, dignified owner smiled at me

and, in his usual playful tone, greeted me: “Basaaaaaaaaaaamaleh” (“What will you eaaaaaat?” in Burmese) He then suggested pat grapow ('fried basil', a very popular

Thai dish prepared with pork), which was one of the better items available at his restaurant I accepted his suggestion, which I washed down with a glass of ice water After lunch, I cycled up the hill to the barber shop, as it had been a long time since my last hair cut The barber was not there and when I enquired about his whereabouts, his

neighbour responded, “Kao mai yuu Paya thwa deh.” (“He is not here,” in Thai,

followed by, “He went to the pagoda,” in Burmese)

This was a typical day during my stay in the Mon village of Wangka, a few hundred metres from the Thai border town of Sangkhlaburi As the use of different languages might suggest, Burmese and Thai influences remain strong in this

community The population of Wangka includes Mons who have lived in Thailand for several generations along with those who have migrated from Myanmar more

groups For most Mons, recent history has been marred by a violent élite led

nationalist struggle for independence coupled with Myanmar's struggling economy which has led many to seek a better life in Thailand Many Mons residing in

Myanmar and Thailand have become monolingual speakers of their respective

country's national language (Foster 1973, South 2003) Sangkhlaburi, Thailand is one

of a few areas in Thailand where the Mon language is actively promoted and where Mon nationalist organisations are allowed to operate A small number of Mons, typically university-educated in Myanmar1, work in these organisations which

function under the auspices of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), a nationalist

political party which claims to represent Mons in their fight for self-determination These aspiring nationalists live alongside Mon-speaking villagers, of whom many have lost interest in issues of Mon nationalism At the same time, Sangkhlaburi is at the crossroads of many different peoples, including locals and travellers This local dynamism leads to social networks and patron-client ties which go beyond ethnic backgrounds It is in this context that this research has sought to understand the nature

of and reproduction of the nationalist Mon ethnic identity Specifically, this thesis has sought to answer how networks which transcend ethnic and geographical boundaries simultaneously produce and contest the Mon nationalist ethnic identity Put another way, how has the dynamic setting of Sangkhlaburi influenced the development of the Mon nationalist movement?

1.1 Theoretical Discussion: Ethnicity and Nationalism

Early 20th century anthropologists such as Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard,

1 Based on conversations, the most common alma mater is Mawlamyaing University in

Mawlamyaing in the part of Mon State under the Myanmar government's control Graduates from Rangoon University in Yangon were also common.

ethnicity as primordial, i.e., a person was born into a particular culture which defined his/her identity and determined his/her world views Malinowski (1922: 19, original emphasis), for instance, sought to understand “the native's point of view[ ] to realize

his version of his world”, implying that there was a (singular) point of view among

the native community Such anthropologists took for granted that a group of

individuals living in the same community would form a 'tribe' with little internal

difference in identity, typically paying little attention to gender or class issues

Edmund Leach (1954), with his seminal Political Systems of Highland Burma,

was a pioneer in the anthropological study of ethnicity Based on ethnographic

research conducted during the late colonial era, Leach's work detailed a system by which individuals constantly lived in flux between idealised Shan and Kachin

political-social systems The former was a hierarchical feudal political system

traditionally characteristic of lowland societies in Southeast Asia, whilst the latter represented a more egalitarian system similar to that of many other highland peoples throughout the region What is significant about Leach's work is that it has shown

how individuals could shift their ethnic identity and become 'like' Shans or Kachins,

regardless of their biological ancestry In abiding by the respective political

organisation, one adopted customs associated with that particular group In short, Leach's work has established that ethnicity is dynamic and not set in stone

In response to this, Lehman (1967) critiqued Leach for his theory's crudeness and simplicity He did not dispute the fluid and dynamic nature of ethnicity as

according to Leach's model; rather, he suggested that Leach underestimated the

dynamism of ethnicity To Lehman, instead of oscillating between two different

the over-arching social structure In other words, the attributes of a particular ethnic group were prone to change and were in themselves actually irrelevant (see also Barth 1960); instead, all of the ethnic groups were connected to each other in a system of relations These rôles can describe how groups of people related to each other, for instance, economically, or in terms of political power Then, according to Lehman, by identifying with a particular ethnic group, one identified with a particular social rôle

in society In other words, one's 'ethnic' affiliation was more about one's relationship

vis-à-vis the rest of society as opposed to intrinsic attributes of said ethnic affiliation.

Such anthropologists as Judith Nagata (1974) and Charles Keyes (1979) have continued this deconstruction of the notion of ethnicity Nagata, studying in

Georgetown, Malaysia, argued that individuals could change their ethnic identities, for instance, between Arab and Malay, based on the particular context For Keyes (1979: 6), “ethnic identities serve as adaptive strategies for people faced with certain types of social experiences” In other words, not only could an individual manipulate his/her belonging to one or another ethnic group, but certain individuals (although

Keyes does not specify who they are) could change the nature of the ethnic group in

order to adapt to a particular situation or crisis For example, ethnic groups are

traditionally thought to distinct based on shared religion and/or language Among Karens of the Thai-Myanmar border, however, there is unity in neither language nor

religion However, Karens (or perhaps more accurately, nationalist Karens) perceive their language as distinct, thus justifying their position as a distinct ethnic group, which Keyes suggests may be more related to structural divisions vis-à-vis other

peoples with more wealth and/or access to political power (such as the Thai and

Taken together, anthropologists such as Keyes and Nagata supported the

instrumentalist approach to ethnicity, as opposed to considering ethnicity as an

inherent part of social life (primordial) In the 1970s, anthropologists debated whether

the nature of ethnicity was instrumental or primordial By the 1990s, however, the instrumental-primordial debate ceased to be contentious Contemporary

anthropologists have generally accepted that ethnicity is instrumental- at least to some extent More recent issues have been the rôle of ethnic élites and the degree of

cohesion or unity within a supposed ethnic group

Toyota (2003) has reminded scholars that to see globalisation as destroying the 'genuine' nature of a particular group's culture is to misunderstand the historical and contemporary realities of extensive social and trade networks which transcend(ed) ethnic boundaries Instead, she has suggested that researchers focus on an individual's social networks as a more accurate indicator of his/her (ethnic) identity Expressions

of (ethnic) identity within a particular group, in Toyota's case the Akha of northern Thailand, vary greatly among individuals based on their personal experiences and

networks This shows a problem with assuming a priori the salience of ethnicity as

determiner of identity, or of social reality

Robinne (2008: 125) takes this further, suggesting three main paradoxes about the concept of ethnicity Firstly, the expression “ethnolinguistic” implies the existence

of some cultural and 'ethnic' continuity among groups with similar languages Given the linguistic context of Southeast Asia, where language families are scattered

seemingly haphazardly throughout the region without any apparent contemporary cultural coherence, there may be no real correlation between linguistic and cultural

space which implies, thirdly, that ethnicity is used similarly by people in different social classes This ignores vast differences within communities, based on class, gender, occupation, etc Robinne suggests that all of these assumptions should be

questioned and, as such, ethnic categories should not be understood as existing a priori, but, rather, resulting from various levels of social interaction

Despite the abundant deconstruction of ethnicity in academic literature, human rights organisations have called for the protection of 'ethnic rights', including 'ethnic' nationalist movements2 Such well-intentioned declarations ignore the fluidity and dynamism that has long characterised identities (and languages), according to the anthropologists I have cited But, if what anthropologists such as Toyota and Keyes theorise is accurate and ethnic identity is contingent and contextual, then whence arise

the numerous ethnic nationalist movements which become causes célèbres for several

people in ethnic communities? While anthropologists have insightfully deconstructed ethnicity in mainland Southeast Asia, those I have cited are relatively silent on the issue of ethnic nationalism Eriksen (1993: 118) has defined nationalist ideology as

“an ethnic identity which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group” Benedict Anderson, perhaps the most famous scholar on the topic, has declared nationalism to

be “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 1991: 3) Nationalism, according to Anderson, developed in Renaissance-era Europe, greatly aided by the development of print capitalism and proliferation of literacy in standardised “national” languages Anderson has argued that, among other means, states use re-interpretations of history in order to construct and perpetuate a coherent

2 'Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.' Available http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/minorities.htm 18 December 1992 Accessed 5 August 2011.

generally understood as the Northerners being the 'good' side (Anderson 1991) Had

the Southerners won, this interpretation would probably differ (ibid.) Ernest Gellner

(1983), another scholar on nationalism, has described pre-industrial societies

originally as being dependent on strict systems of stratification (for instance, caste systems, as in premodern France and India) Sacred languages, such as Latin or Sanskrit, were used by élites, ensuring a large social distance between them and the masses As societies industrialised, state economies depended on the skills and

productivity of the masses, necessitating a reduced social distance between them and their rulers No longer socially separated to the same extent, it became necessary to forge a cultural homogeneity to incorporate the masses as part of a productive society, whereas their inclusion was previously not desired, as it was largely irrelevant to the functions of the feudal state Gellner has argued that in order to accomplish 'national' integration, states promote one particular high culture, typically that of the élites,

which they present as the national culture, actively displacing numerous low cultures

which had existed (and, to a certain extent, continue to exist) over a dispersion of time and geographical space The goal of the state, then, is to promote this particular high culture, which it accomplishes, for instance, through institutionalised education and promotion of a particular standardised written and spoken language In so doing, they seek to unify a public which was previously divided by a plethora of low cultures For the first time in history, then, people form bonds of solidarity with others whom they have never met; this is what Anderson has termed the “imagined community”

Anderson's and Gellner's works are important as they remind future scholars to

critique and problematise the concept of the nation, much like many anthropologists

entrench their nationalist ideology through re-interpretations of history and the

promotion of a high culture They have inspired a number of scholars to deconstruct

particular nation-states in this way, such as Thongchai (1994), who has analysed Siamese/Thai nationalism Thongchai (1994) argued that, in the late 19th century, the Siamese court re-interpreted their own history in terms of territory and mapping Whilst, according to Thongchai, strict definitions of mapped territory did not exist in pre-modern Siam, the European colonial scramble quickly inspired the Siamese court

to define their boundaries clearly Most research of this type has focused on particular nation-states in their construction of nationhood Very seldom, however, have ethnic stateless nations, or aspiring nations which are not (yet) officially recognised as states, been considered in this way

Rajah's (1990) work on Karen nationalism is an important exception He has argued that the Karen nation is an “imagined community”, and has shown how Karen nationalist élites have attempted to promote a particular understanding of history and religion in their own construction of a nationalist narrative In this case, they promote

a unified, 'pure' Karen identity based on belief in Christianity (Rajah 1990: 115)

Nationalists “play down” the fact that only a minority of Karens is Christian (Rajah

1990: 121, original emphasis) in their efforts to promote an image of “national” unity Rajah has suggested that Karen nationalists are trying to forge a supralocal identity, which he has termed an “imagined community” By contrast, according to Rajah, most meaningful social relationships primarily occur at the local community level, making the national “imagined community” an artificial construct which does not resonate with many Karens in Thailand This work is important for its analysis of a

missionaries, in Karen nation-building, showing how it no longer makes sense to understand nation-building as a strictly local phenomenon However, Rajah's research has become outdated due to rapid changes in communication technology Rajah was unable to analyse the influential role of the internet and borderless mass

communication in stateless nation-building

To summarise, I have given a brief theoretical discussion of two important, closely-related concepts Anthropologists have so frequently questioned the notion of ethnicity, that its problematisation is no longer an issue In other words, many

anthropologists now take for granted that ethnicity is a social construct, which can be actively manipulated by individuals or groups (Lilley 1990, Fenton 2003) Current issues about ethnicity include the rôles of ethnic élites and the degree of unity within

an ethnic group, especially with regards to class Whilst contemporary anthropologists have discussed this in illuminating ways, they have tended to ignore issues of

separatist nationalism among such ethnic groups and have focused on mainly

localised contexts Such movements can have profound impacts on the stability of the nation-states in which they are situated In addition, my research has taken place in a globalised context, with attention to the recent explosion of cyber infrastructure

For my theoretical framework, I will adapt Robinne's (2008) concept of

transethnicity Transethnicity refers to a hybridised social coherence which results

from interactions - matrimonial, religious, economic, etc - which transcend

ethnolinguistic groups Robinne has argued against assuming the a priori existence of

particular ethnic groups Instead, his focus has been to investigate links and networks which exist at the community level, considering the cultural and economic

Robinne worked in a rather localised context in rural Myanmar I will adopt Robinne's framework to fit a much more cosmopolitan and globalised setting, including patron-client links which occur with the assistance of the internet I will also add on to

Robinne's framework through my engagement with issues of ethnic nationalism My approach is unique in that whilst analysing an ethnic nationalist movement which seeks to be very local in nature, I investigate social and economic networks which transcend any type of border In short, my research will seek to show that (ethnic nationalist) identities are products of co-operative networks which transcend cultural, ethnic and geographical boundaries

1.2 Research Questions and Arguments

With these contexts in mind, this research project has sought to answer the following questions Firstly, how can the concept of transethnicity contribute to an understanding of the lived realities of a particular geographic community? Secondly, how can transethnicity help us to understand the nature of ethnic nationalism? Thirdly, what are the implications of increased mobility and internet technologies on the construction of ethnic nationalism?

Regarding these questions, this thesis will make the following arguments Firstly, by focusing on patron-client networks as the initial point of analysis, the

salience of 'the' ethnic group will be challenged Instead, several different identities

can exist within the same geographic and 'linguistic' community I will suggest that distinct sets of patron-client links have led to very different cultural identities within the community I have studied Secondly, I will show that Mon ethnic nationalist identity simultaneously results from and caters to patronage ties to internationally

between ordinary Mons and Thai tourists contest the importance of Mon nationalism among the former Thirdly, this thesis will argue that it no longer makes sense to understand either ethnicity or nationalism as localised Rather, global networks and flows of capital and information are becoming essential to the production of

(nationalist) ethnic identities

1.3 “The” Mon(s) of Sangkhlaburi: a case study

This research project has chosen to analyse the ethnic identities of Mon

speakers in the border town of Sangkhlaburi, Thailand Many of those who identify as Mon originally come from Southeast Myanmar, where they live as one of the largest ethnic minority groups, at roughly 2.4% of the population (Steinberg 2006: 272), concentrated in Mon State3 Although no reliable census data exist in Myanmar, the Myanmar government's tourism website recognises eight “major races”, some of which, like the Shan, themselves contain up to “35 races and tribes”4 Ekeh and Smith (2007) claim that Myanmar contains over 100 ethnic groups, many of which are or have been involved in violent conflict against the state The civil strife caused by Mon and other nationalist groups' wars for independence coupled with the country's

self-struggling economic position have led many to seek a better life in Thailand Due to its proximity to Mon State, Sangkhlaburi has become the destination for many Mons leaving Myanmar Due to an “understanding” with local authorities, it has also

become a haven for nationalist Mon political and civil society organisations (personal communication)

3 Myanmar is divided into various 'States' and 'Divisions' The 'States' are named after the ethnic minority community most heavily concentrated there.

4 'Major Races' in People @ Myanmar.com Available http://www.myanmar.com/people/index.html

2006 Accessed 4 June 2011

transethnic networks Outside of Mon State in Myanmar, Sangkhlaburi- with its large Mon-speaking population, Mon-language school and nationalist Mon organisations- is

an important hub for the (re)production of Mon ethnicity In fact, it is the only part of Thailand where Mon political organisations can operate on such a scale Other border towns such as Mae Sot have other Burmese exile organisations, including Karen nationalist organisations At the same time, Sangkhlaburi is cosmopolitan to an extent disproportionate to its size The presence of young Western NGO volunteers, middle-class Thai tourists from Bangkok and other groups results in many social and

economic links which transcend ethnic ties Two such links which abound in

Sangkhlaburi result from the evangelistic human rights movement and the flourishing domestic tourism industry Such a setting has proven particularly rich for research as

it has allowed insightful observations of how transethnic links simultaneously

produce, consume, undermine and contest Mon ethnic nationalism

1.4 Mon Studies: A literature review

The Mons have generally been studied in three ways: in terms of their history,

in terms of their politics and in terms of their culture and language The study of Mon history was particularly important due to the colonialists' perceptions of the special status of Mon as 'civilisers' of Southeast Asia Indeed, present nationalist rhetoric, along with the works of such scholars as Coedès (1989) and Guillon (1999) have claimed that Mons were the first Buddhists in Southeast Asia, as well as among the earliest to have achieved literacy Western scholars and nationalist Mons alike have written in such a way as to imply that Mons 'civilised' their neighbours, particularly the Burmese, until the Burmese unceremoniously conquered them centuries later This

it has not gone without criticism Lieberman (1978) has written that, as late as the mid

18th century, although the idea of Mon culture existed (for instance, Mon language,

styles of clothing, etc.), people did not identify with Mon ethnicity In other words,

being Mon was more about how a person lived and did not reflect any sort of

primordial loyalty Instead, loyalties were first and foremost to individual patrons- élites who offered protection and other forms of assistance Assuming this,

conquering “the Mons” was not about ethnic conflict at all, but rather a feud between competing élites whose supporters transcended ethnic boundaries Aung-Thwin (2005) has presented the more scathing critique, suggesting that Mons did not civilise the Burmese at all, but rather it was the other way around

A number of more recent works have focused on political issues surrounding Mons, particularly the question of national sovereignty Hazel Lang (2002) has

analysed politics in the context of Mon nationalist armed conflict and Thailand's inundation with refugees, including Mons, who originated in neighbouring strife-ridden countries, particularly Myanmar Ashley South's (2003) work on Mon

nationalism is undoubtedly the most substantial work written within the last decade related to Mon nationalism In his work, he has conducted a detailed analysis of the Mon nationalist movement, from its infancy (including premodern antecedents) until the present, including the post-ceasefire era which started in 1995 Whilst both Lang and South offer important insight on élite discourse and politics, neither scholar makes any attempt to understand the views of ordinary Mons

In addition, there have been a number of works more related to Mon culture Robert Halliday has been called the “Father of Mon Studies” (South 2003: 51) for his

His most significant work, The Talaings 5 (1999), originally published in 1917, sought,

in colonial anthropological fashion, to document the culture and life ways of the

Mons His work is a rich account of Mon traditions from the colonial era and serves

as an interesting point of comparison to the present Also, his translations of ancient Mon texts offer insight into classical Mon cosmology However, like many

ethnographic texts from this period, it is crude in its descriptions of the Mons as a simple, exotic and unified people He took great detail in describing certain dances, rituals and customs, few of which remain Christian Bauer (1990) is perhaps the foremost linguist who has specialised in Mon language His research is rather

specialised, however, and of little interest to those not focusing on Mon language studies Smithies (1972) and Foster (1973) were the first anthropologists to have published detailed ethnographic research on Mons in Thailand Both focused their work on Mon villages near Bangkok in central Thailand They sought to understand how Mons distinguish themselves from Thais, with the conclusion that they are rapidly assimilating to an extent where it may become difficult to maintain a distinct identity In a later essay, Smithies (1986) became more optimistic about the survival

of Mon ethnic identity, owing to the rise of Mon élites in Thailand, and their relative lack of antagonism from Thais Both Smithies and Foster, despite writing during the active Mon conflict for independence in Burma, did not seem to reference the issue of ethnic nationalism, instead focusing on a population that has been in Thailand for as long as several centuries Nevertheless, their research, although outdated, offers another interesting point of comparison, but has a context which is very different than

5 Talaing is a perjorative word used by the Burmese to describe Mon people Its origins and

etymology are unclear Despite Halliday's use of the term for his book's title, however, it is not clear

if he meant to express ill will towards the Mons.

Thai state, my field site is at the intersection of three states: Thailand, Myanmar, and a hypothetical Mon State Thus, while their research can offer an understanding of ethnic identity, it cannot appreciate the important influence of Mon nationalist politics which operate along the borderlands.

Apart from the historical works I have discussed at the beginning, the texts I

have reviewed so far have considered either the issue of Mon politics from above, or

the issue of Mon identity from below A number of Thai researchers (Wongpolganan

2005, Sujaritlak and Prapasri 2006) have conducted recent ethnographic research on the Mon community in Sangkhlaburi and have attempted to address this gap

However, their conclusions are seemingly contradictory: Wongpolganan claims that Mons are trying to uphold their identity to their utmost, while Sujaritlak and Prapasri claim that many Mons, particularly youths, no longer want to be Mons I believe that both conclusions are overly simplistic, even if they contain some basis of truth In both cases, the analyses do not go into serious depth The former merely describes the

“invented traditions” present in Sangkhlaburi without questioning the extent to which Mons actually resonate with, let alone participate, in them She also does not specify which groups of Mons (based on class, age, etc.) Mons are trying to uphold their identity The latter conducted very short-term research which limited their abilities to establish significant rapport with informants In addition, they conducted research as Thai government officials, perhaps skewing the extent to which people might show their Mon identity Neither piece considers in much depth the Mon political

organisations based in Sangkhlaburi and the context of the armed separatist

movement

Mons Like Lieberman and Aung-Thwin, I seek to critically engage with existing assumptions of the Mon nationalist narrative As with the most recent Thai studies,

my methodological perspective is ethnographic Ethnographic methods offer a unique insight into everyday concerns of ordinary people, going beyond politicians' rhetoric

as well as distinguishing what informants say from what they believe ('front stage' vs 'back stage') An ethnographic approach has allowed me to compare multiple levels of discourse: nationalist representations of Mon-ness to the outside world, nationalists' articulated and unarticulated views on Mon identity and ordinary villagers' articulated and unarticulated beliefs My study is unique in its particular attention to patron-client networks which transcend borders Although South very briefly mentioned the role of Westerners in Mon nationalism, none of the studies I have mentioned have gone into any depth as to the significance and implications of Western support or of élite

manipulation of online content

1.5 Methods

I chose Sangkhlaburi as my field-site for several reasons On the one hand, it

is one of a few remaining areas with a sizeable Mon-speaking community On the other hand, its strategic location in Thailand offers the researcher several advantages Specifically, Thailand is a much more open country than Myanmar Not only is

entering Thailand for an extended period of time in order to conduct research much easier than in Myanmar, but many of the border areas in Myanmar remain

inaccessible to virtually all foreigners The openness of Thailand also affords a more internationally connected population than in Myanmar, which allowed for an

interesting approach to the issue of transethnicity Sangkhlaburi is unique due to its

state which maintains some local influence, namely through political organisations and the instruction of Mon language As such, I believe Sangkhlaburi offered a

fruitful forum in which to analyse Mon ethnicity

The methodological approach to this research was ethnographic My three main methods have been participant-observation, interviews and content and

discourse analysis My goal was to understand the meanings and world views of my informants (Agar 1984) I spent a total of four months in Sangkhlaburi During the first month, I rented a room from a Mon woman living on the 'Thai side'6

Subsequently, I moved to the heart of the 'Mon side', also referred to as Wangka, where I spent the remaining three months of my fieldwork In Wangka, I stayed at a Mon-Thai owned guest house whose other tenants were Thai migrant workers from another town in the province

By establishing rapport with a select few informants rather than attempting to make representational claims about the community, I have sought to understand holistically the mentality of ordinary individuals Informants were chosen on a

random basis, but skewed towards those aged 18-35 The reason for this is that they will more accurately reflect the future trend of the community However, some more elderly informants were also included in this study, enabling me to recognise patterns based on generation Indeed, I hope that through the presentation of my data, which I have collected through a variety of methods, I can show the diverse viewpoints which exist within the Mon community in Sangkhlaburi

6 The town of Sangkhlaburi is divided into what locals refer to as “Thai side” and “Mon side” Despite its name, “Thai side” contains people of many different ethnic backgrounds- mostly Karen and Thai, but also Mon, Burman, Muslim and Western “Mon side”, by contrast is relatively homogeneous

study in Burmese The vast majority of informants comfortably spoke either Thai or English (rarely both), with Burmese used when informants could speak neither

English nor Thai comfortably7 My inability to speak Mon was a limitation that

hindered communication to some extent, however, due to the linguistic dynamism of the area, Thai, Burmese and English are all widely used among many in Sangkhlaburi Therefore, my lack of knowledge of the Mon language did not hinder mutual

understanding since virtually everyone was able to communicate well in either Thai or English For interviewees unable to speak Thai or English, I was able to use

interpreters

1.5.1 Participant-Observation

The idea of participant-observation is to live and interact among local

populations In so doing, I sought to establish rapport with several individuals as well

as to observe the interactions among them I selected three sites where I regularly conducted participant-observation The first site was at the souvenir market near the

golden pagoda (Image 1) Two Thai-speaking sisters, whom I have named Hla and Nee May, kindly allowed me to conduct observation at their stall almost every day In

addition to observing the interactions between these two vendors and their Thai and

Western customers, they accepted me as their friends and invited me to interact with

their network of friends They also allowed me to follow them and their friends during religious festivals and invited me to their home for dinner This type of participant-observation gave me an insight into the lifestyles of some ordinary residents in

Wangka

7 There was only one case of an informant who would speak neither Burmese, English nor Thai Although he was fluent in Burmese, he refused to speak it In this case, I used a Mon-English interpreter.

Image 1: Wat Wang Wiwekaram, in Wangka village The adjacent souvenir market- the largest in Sangkhlaburi, make it a central spot for tourists At the same time, it is the location of monthly Full Moon festivals among the Mon community

My second site of participant-observation was at one of the Mon nationalist organisations Due to purposes of anonymity, I will refer to this organisation only as

“the Office”, which is also the term many informants used I served as a volunteer to help edit their online content into idiomatic English There, I was able to establish networks among the English-speaking nationalists as well as their Western interns In addition to establishing rapport with a few individuals, I was able to observe the dynamics at the particular office where I conducted extensive participant-observation

In contrast to my first site, conducting participant-observation here gave me insight into the more nationalist segment of the local population

and religious festivals, which typically took place at the grounds near the golden pagoda (see Image 1) and adjacent to the souvenir market These festivals tended to transcend class divisions among the local Mon community Although my lack of religious knowledge of Theravada Buddhism prevented me from appreciating the spiritual and traditional significances of many of these rituals, I was able to observe demographic dynamics and types of interactions among those present.

This is not an exhaustive list of the participant-observation I conducted I undertook less intensive observation at other sites The nature of ethnographic

research entails always being open to new information, and my routine required an extent of flexibility This meant, occasionally, changing the plans for my day on a moment's notice It also meant being observant at all times, including during meals I conducted regular visits to other Mon nationalist organisations, occasionally

volunteering on a very short-term basis I spent time with some of the Western interns

in an attempt to understand their motivations for working in Sangkhlaburi I also interacted with many tourists- Thai and foreign- although their transient nature

prevented any development of rapport Lastly, my room's location directly across from the market allowed me to observe the economic centre of the village In the market itself (as well as at coffee shops and other places), I regularly engaged in informal conversation with locals

1.5.2 Interviews and Focus Group

I conducted a number of semi-formal interviews with a range of informants Several of these interviews involved several people I conducted two interviews with Western interns involved with Mon nationalist organisations (n=3 informants)

Sangkhlaburi to work, their knowledge and perceptions of the Mon nationalist

movement and Mons in general, including culture and history In addition, I

conducted nine interviews and one focus group with Mons involved in nationalist organisations (n= 19 informants) I asked them questions about Mon identity (for instance, what does it mean to be Mon? What knowledge of Mon history do they have?) as well as their relationships with other groups, particularly Thais, Burmans, Karens, Muslims and Westerners The vast majority of these interviews took place in English, with a small number of informants responding in Thai or Burmese

I conducted 22 interviews with “ordinary” Mons (n= 22 informants) The term

“ordinary” (Thai: “thamadaa”) was used by many informants to describe themselves

in contrast to Mon nationalist leaders I asked them most of the same questions I asked the nationalist Mons, particularly about their understanding of Mon identity, Mon nationalism, their view of Thailand and their relationships with other

neighbouring groups I conducted these interviews in Thai, for which four

respondents required a Mon-Thai translator to be present

1.5.3 Content and Discourse Analysis

My last method consisted of archival research I read through the archives of three Mon news agencies: Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA), Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) and Kaowao News Agency I conducted

discourse analysis on many of the English language articles published online I sought

to analyse how the leaders of these agencies understand, construct and promote the Mon nationalist cause through the rhetoric posted online This was important as it reflects how Mon nationalists represent Mons and Mon nationalism the international

the relatively narrow range in topics Whereas Kaowao and IMNA focus on many issues of concern to the Mon community, HURFOM's niche is human rights I was able to go through every article from the earliest available archives in 2007 until the end of my fieldwork period in December 2010, categorising it based on who was depicted as violating human rights The results of this analysis will be presented and discussed in later chapters.

1.6 Prospectus

The next chapter- chapter 2- will attempt to contextualise my study I will give

a description of the field-site as well as the history of Mon nationalism In chapter 3, I will unpack the Mon nationalist narrative I will discuss the symbolic significance of this narrative as well as the influential role which colonial officers played Chapter 4 will elaborate in which ways Mon leaders promote and construct the nationalist identity There, I will show how they attempt to “sell” it to Western donors Chapter 5 will mainly serve as a counter-example to chapters 3 and 4 There, I will show how

“ordinary” Mons have constructed a different, non-nationalist identity, which instead reflects a dependency on Thais, particularly tourists Chapter 6 will offer a concluding discussion

I had ordered- in rudimentary Burmese- a bowl of noodles and a cup of black coffee Then I prepared to walk across the wooden bridge Although aesthetically picturesque from a distance, pedestrians must contend with gaping holes and protruding nails resulting from the haphazard construction of the bridge After a slow walk across the bridge, I arrived at the “Mon side” I had the initial impression that I was in a different town, almost a different country The mixture of Thai, Burmese and Karen languages I had heard on the other side transformed into very different sounding Mon This was

my first taste of a place where I would spend a lot of time

2.1 Sangkhlaburi and Wangka: An Orientation

Ban Wangka, or Wangka village- also known locally as “Mon side”, is a

subdivision of Amphoe Sangkhlaburi, or Sangkhlaburi District The wooden bridge,

which has become the area's land-mark and main tourist draw (see Image 1), joins Wangka to the town of Sangkhlaburi, locally known as “Thai side” Sangkhlaburi is located approximately 400 km Northwest of Bangkok, in the province of

Kanchanaburi near the Myanmar border at Three Pagodas Pass8 (see Images 2 and 3)

8 Three Pagodas Pass ('Chaedi Saam Ong' in Thai; 'Payathonsu' in Burmese) is both the name of an

historical monument consisting of three small pagodas and a modern-day town on the Myanmar side of the border.

According to Thai government census data published online, the district of

Sangkhlaburi contains approximately 38,761 people9 Although quiet, the town of Sangkhlaburi is the only significant town in the district and contains the bulk of this population (see Image 4) Unlike many parts of Thailand, it generally has no traffic, or even traffic lights It does, however, have basic amenities such as a hospital, bank, wet market and even a 7-eleven store, typically ubiquitous throughout the Kingdom of Thailand

Image 1: The 'Wooden Bridge' [สะพานไม/ Saphan Mai] also known as 'Mon Bridge'

[สะพานมอญ/ Saphan Mon].

9 'อาเภอสงขละบร ' in www.aphoe.com Available http://www.amphoe.com/menu.php?

mid=1&am=18&pv=2 17 September 2009 Accessed 6 June 2011.

Images 2-4: Map of Thailand 10 , map 11 showing region and map 12 showing

Sangkhlaburi and area

On weekends and holidays, Sangkhlaburi becomes more bustling with an influx of a few hundred tourists, mostly hailing from Bangkok or other more affluent parts of Thailand The influence of tourism on the local economy is noticeable, as the streets are dotted with little coffee shops geared mainly towards Thai tourists and accommodation which ranges from basic guest houses and house boats, to small-scale resorts

For a town of its size, Sangkhlaburi is disproportionately diverse The main groups are Mon, Karen and Thai Within these groups, some have been in the area for

10 US Central Intelligence Agency Available

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia10/thailand_sm_2010.gif 2010 Accessed 26 May 2011.

11 Image Available http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/thailand_provinces_88.jpg

Accessed 26 May 2011.

12 This map was created by author.

several generations- before the borders of Siam/Thailand were officially drawn- whilst others have migrated more recently The border checkpoint at Three Pagodas Pass is near the intersection of Thailand on the one hand, and Mon and Karen Statesin Myanmar on the other Consequently, the region has historically had Burmese, Mon, Karen and Thai cultural and linguistic influences In addition, war and economic difficulty since Burmese independence in 1948 has encouraged a number of recent migrants to settle in Sangkhlaburi, where they can find work and a better life A number of Thais have migrated to Sangkhlaburi from many parts of the country Middle-class Thais from such areas as Bangkok and Phuket are attracted to

Sangkhlaburi for what they perceive as its quaint, calm atmosphere as well as the growing tourist industry In addition, Isaan Thais have settled in Sangkhlaburi In some cases, Isaan women have met and married Mon men whilst both were working

in Bangkok Ethnic Burman and Burmese Muslim migrants add to the local diversity, although in relatively small numbers Lastly, there is a small but highly visible

Western (locally known as farang13) population Although not as abundant as their Thai counterparts, many Westerners do come as tourists Others come as volunteers, for as short as two weeks to as long as many years Volunteer opportunities range from teaching English at a local school, helping the local orphanage or working for one or several Mon nationalist organisations

Sangkhlaburi becomes Wangka upon crossing the bridge (see Image 5)

Wangka is heavily concentrated with Mons According to a somewhat outdated Thai website (2000), the village of Wangka contains 1,79514 inhabitants, although a more

13 'Farang' [ฝรง] is the word Thais use to refer to foreigners, particularly of Western descent It's

etymology is unkown, but the same word also means 'guava' In Burmese and Mon, the word for

'English' [inglait and ingloit, respectively] is used to denote all Western foreigners, regardless of

mother language or nationality.

14 'ตาบลวงกะพ ', in ThaiTambon.com Available http://www.thaitambon.com/tambon/ttambon.asp? ID=530106 2000 Accesed 6 June 2011 Personal communication with a Thai police officer, along with estimates by Sujaritlak ad Prapasri (2006: 59) suggested that the current number is 10,000, but

accurate estimate would be between 4,000 and 6,000 A road which continues from the bridge has a few coffee shops and souvenir stores which are geared towards Thai tourists After 400 metres the road ends at a T-junction with the main road Turning left onto the main road will eventually, after about 600 metres, lead to the golden pagoda (via the dry market) which, along with its adjacent souvenir market, forms the nexus of tourist activities and Mon religious festivals in the village The other

direction heads out of the village, back to Sangkhlaburi and other nearby settlements

Image 5: Map of Wangka

2.2 A Brief History of Wangka, Sangkhlaburi and Three Pagodas Pass

Owing to its location at the borderlands, Sangkhlaburi has been at the

confluence of different cultures and 'civilisations' for centuries These included the ancient Mon Dvaravati Kingdom in the first millennium, the various Thai and

Burmese Kingdoms, and an historical Karen presence Three Pagodas Pass (see Image 6), a monument which still stands approximately 20 km from the modern town of Sangkhlaburi, was built in the 16th century as a symbol of peace between the Siamese

based on estimates from my own observations, I question if that number is greatly exaggerated.

and the Burmese Kingdoms It was only officially defined as part of Siam15 during its struggle to remain independent from Great Britain (Thongchai 1994) It became an official border marker at the end of the 19th century, firmly under Siamese control until and except during the period of Japanese occupation throughout the Second World War Independence across the border in Burma led to a number of ethnic

separatist groups in the area – most notably the Mon and Karen armed forces Until

the 1990s, the Karen and Mon armies competed with each other and with the

Burmese/Myanmar state for control of the Three Pagodas Pass checkpoint (South 2003) In the 21st century, Myanmar and Thailand have been able to maintain peaceful control over the checkpoint, although the border remains contested, fluid and prone to occasional insurrections, particularly by the Karen armies16 At the time of research, tourists could not enter Myanmar via the checkpoint at Three Pagodas Pass

Image 6: Three Pagodas Pass at the Thai-Myanmar border checkpoint, 20 km north

of Sangkhlaburi

As this description might have shown, throughout history various peoples have contested the immediate region of Sangkhlaburi and Three Pagodas Pass, which accounts in part for its present-day diversity It is in this context that we find the

15 Thailand was known in English as 'Siam' prior to the Second World War

16 One such insurrection occured during my research.

present village of Wangka Wangka was originally founded as a Mon village

following the war between Mon forces and the Burmese army in the late 1940s Local Mons still widely revere the late Reverend Uttama (see Image 7) and he even earned royal patronage, as shown by the Thai Queen Sirikit covering his final medical

expenses17 This suggests that Mons are in a privileged position compared to other Thai minority groups (such as “hill tribes” in the north) and other migrants from Myanmar

Image 7: Wax Statue of Reverend Uttama.

Indeed, Mon immigration to Siam began as early as the 17th and 18th centuries Due to a mutual enemy in the Burman military, coupled with relative similarity in culture (particularly in the observance of Theravada Buddhism), Mon adjustment to Siamese society was generally smooth (Halliday 1913) In fact, Mons enjoyed a degree of prestige in Siam not shared by other minority groups; many Mons worked

in high positions in the state bureaucracy (ibid.) Ever since, high degrees of

inter-marriage and miscegenation have left many Thais with some degree of 'Mon blood' and many Thais are aware and respectful of Mon historical achievements (Wong 1998) Most Mons in Thailand, particularly near Bangkok, have adapted the Thai

17 'Abbot Luang Phor Uttama dies at 97,' in The Nation 19 October 2006 Available online

http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=52,3316,0,0,1,0 Accessed 7 June 2011.

language and many other aspects of 'Thai life' (Foster 1973).

However, Myanmar's internal strife along with its economic struggles has led

to an influx of refugees and migrant workers of many ethnic backgrounds (including the Burman ethnic majority) into Thailand Recent migrants from Myanmar are often seen by Thais as backwards and polluting (Koetsawang 2001, Lang 2002) and Thais normally do not distinguish among the different ethnicities Instead, at both the

official and colloquial levels, many from Myanmar, regardless of mother tongue or

ethnic identification, become 'khon phamaa' ('Burmese') (Jirattikorn 2007) Indeed,

despite the extraordinary respect the Queen has shown for Reverend Uttama, most Mons in Sangkhlaburi are not yet citizens of Thailand and instead have a “coloured” identity card Although Thai authorities have recently become more inclusive18, which suggests that the situation may continue to improve, Mons in Sangkhlaburi are still generally categorised as Myanmar nationals (Sujaritlak and Prapasri 2006: 55) and are not given a specific status as Mons In short, the position of Mons in Thailand is one

of contradiction On the one hand, the perception of their historical prestige coupled with their cultural similarity to Thais afford them a relatively privileged social

position among the ethnic minorities in the Kingdom On the other hand, many Mons, particularly those who have relatively recently migrated from Myanmar, are more strongly associated with poverty, social backwardness that characterises a country many Thais have been taught to hate (Chachavaopongpun 2005)

Wangka as a village owes its existence to Reverend Uttama, who lobbied for land where Mons fleeing from Burma/Myanmar could live freely and safely In the early 1980s, the Thai government constructed a dam roughly 80 kilometres to the south near the market town of Thong Pha Phum, which resulted in the flooding of

18 'Mons born in Thailand approved for Thai citizenship', in Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA)

online 10 January 2006 Accessed 12 November 2010 Available

http://www.kaowao.org/News.102.php?#7

Wangka In response to the flood, Reverend Uttama procured new land about a

kilometre north where Wangka is currently located Subsequently, he commissioned the construction of the wooden bridge to connect Wangka to Sangkhlaburi town

Local employment opportunities in the area include light construction, small factories (particularly textile) and tourism, in addition to a number of Mon political organisations However, local unemployment remains a problem Those unable to procure local employment either migrate to Bangkok (or other cities such as

Kanchanaburi) or remain in Wangka, where unemployed youth regularly consume alcohol and narcotics on the wooden bridge (personal observations, see also Sujaritlak and Prapasri 2006) The local economic status varies greatly Some live comfortably

by any standards, whilst others live in jerry-built shacks with no or limited access to basic sanitary facilities such as running water As mentioned previously, Thai

citizenship is still rare among the Mon population and generally requires a certain level of wealth and/or social connections Even some people born in Sangkhlaburi do not (yet) have Thai citizenship Instead, the vast majority have a non-citizen identity card Having one of these cards enables the card holder to travel and work throughout the Kingdom, provided they request 'special permission' (even just to leave

Sangkhlaburi District) and to report regularly to authorities Although having these cards does not provide all the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, virtually all Mon children in Wangka have access to government-provided primary and secondary education in the village and highly subsidised healthcare In addition, as mentioned before, the Thai government has recently shown signs of increasing inclusiveness

2.3 Historical Narratives of “Mon Civilisation” Discourses

This section will present Mon history as Mon nationalists and Western

historians have generally represented it This thesis takes an anthropological approach

to history, which does not seek the 'historical truth', but rather how contemporary actors manipulate and interpret history (Eriksen 1993: 72) The generally accepted consensus among Western historians (Coedès 1989, Halliday 1999, Guillon 1999, South 2003) and educated Mons (IMNA 2004, Mon Unity League n.d., personal communication) is that Mon history began in the 6th century AD with the founding of the Dvaravati Kingdom in what is now the western part of Thailand, and the

Hongsawatoi Kingdom in present-day southern Myanmar More important is their assertion that Mons were the earliest Buddhists in Southeast Asia and had developed the region's first system of writing In short, according to the discourse of 19th and 20th century Western historians, as well as online publications by, and personal

communication with, contemporary Mon élites, the Mons were among the first

“civilised” Southeast Asians As Guillon (1999: 90) has written, classical Mon art

“enriched the entire region” South (2003: 3) similarly has noted that “Mon

civilisation was among the most distinctive and influential in precolonial Southeast Asia” and its “golden age[ was] a source of inspiration and legitimacy”

According to these historians, the first significant turning point in Mon history occurred in AD 1057 with the Burman King Anawratha's conquest of the Mon city of Thaton (presently a quiet town in Mon State, Myanmar) As I will elaborate in chapter

3, this conquest is understood and remembered as the beginning of a millennium-long rivalry between Burmans and Mons According to historians, King Anawratha

subsequently captured Mon intelligentsia, relocating them to the Burman capital of Bagan (now a popular tourist site in northern Myanmar) The “numerous prisoners brought from Thaton taught the Burman their literature, their art, and, above all, their writing” (Coedès 1989: 275, my translation) – i.e., they “civilised” their captors This suggests that the Burmese script owes its existence to Mons The emphasis of the

narrative of the early phase of Mon history – i.e., from approximately the 6th century until the years immediately following the battle of Thaton in the 11th century – is on

Mons as civilised, particularly compared to their neighbours, most notably Burmans

Not only is it important that Mons were civilised, but most historians put an emphasis

on the influence of their civilisation on their neighbours in the region.

Although the Burman conquest of Thaton halted the development of Mon 'civilisation', Mon kingdoms were able to re-emerge following the Mongol conquest

of Bagan in the 13th century The period from approximately the 14th through the 16th centuries is known as the 'golden age' for Mon 'civilisation' By 1539, however, the Mon city of Pegu (present-day Bago, not far from Yangon, Myanmar) fell once again

to the Burman forces The Mon kingdoms were never able to recover fully from this defeat, with a brief exception starting in 1740 The 1740 renaissance, however, would prove to be short-lived, as it culminated in what Mon nationalists depict as the most traumatic event in Mon history: the 1757 Burman (re-)conquest of Pegu, along with the pillaging and “genocide” which ensued (Mon Unity League) This event is

extremely significant to the Mon nationalist movement and will be analysed in greater detail in chapter 3

What I have shown so far is the Mon historical narrative as generally depicted

by Western historians and Mon educated élites The concern of this thesis is not the historical accuracy of this narrative, but how it is used by Mon nationalists Recent scholars, most famously Michael Aung-Thwin, have critiqued this narrative

Nevertheless, Aung-Thwin's remarks have led to occasionally hostile reactions19 which have questioned his character and motives Aung-Thwin's critiques

notwithstanding, the narrative which I have presented remains the truth in the minds

19 Personal communication See also 'Mon Paradigm Fallacy Blog', Available

http://mythsinburmesehistory.blogspot.com/ Accessed 7 June 2011.

of Mon nationalists In chapter 3 I will discuss how this narrative, whose accuracy Mon nationalists do not seek to question, serves as a driving point for the Mon

nationalist cause

It is, however, important to discuss critical elements of this historical narrative One issue present is the conflation of an ancient kingdom's prosperity with the living standards of its people Ashley South (2003: 49), for instance, makes the following observation: “Today the people of the Mon heartland in Burma are less well-off [than

in the ancient era]” This quote suggests that there is a direct relationship between the prestige of a kingdom (or 'civilisation') and the welfare of people living within those boundaries There is no historically proven relationship between the size of influence

of a kingdom and the actual standards of living among peasants The reality is that there are few documented or archaeological remains of the lifestyles of the majority

of ordinary peoples, most of whom lived a peasant existence perhaps not dissimilar to the present day, and probably had little to gain from the aesthetic developments of 'civilisation' In fact, notwithstanding Myanmar's status as a Least Developed Country, modern technologies such as electricity (however intermittent it may be in most parts

of Myanmar) and motorised vehicles would suggest that livelihoods have surely improved since the ancient era In short, it makes little sense to suggest that the

average individual's livelihoods depended on whether Burman and Mon kingdoms had influence in a particular area

Recent scholarship in classical Southeast Asia in general (Scott 2009) and precolonial Burma in particular (Lieberman 1978) emphasise the lack of static ethnic labels among ordinary people prior to the arrival of Europeans Lieberman has argued that identity was more based on patron-client ties, meaning that individuals were loyal

to particular patrons who provided them with military protection in return for their

loyalty Consequently, social ties and identities were specific neither to a particular geographic location nor to a perceived ancestry If we accept this understanding, then even the 1757 battle of Thaton was not a battle between rival ethnic groups, as

commonly understood Rather, according to Lieberman, it was a battle between rival

élite individuals, who happened to speak different languages, but whose supporters

oscillated between 'ethnic' boundaries

Aung-Thwin (2005) has questioned the very assumption that Mons were the 'civilisers' of the region He posits that the Burmans were 'civilised' first- having learnt their culture from another group, the Pyu- and then, in turn, 'civilised' the Mons Aung-Thwin laments that Mon primacy in history is taken as an unexamined

assumption This assumption has roots in the colonial era, as Aung-Thwin suggests it was in the interest in British colonial rulers to drive a wedge between the powerful Burmans and the potential rival groups, including Mons 'The' Mon, then potentially allies for Great Britain to help conquer the existing Burman kingdom, could become objects of favour in the eyes of potential colonial masters This coupled with a

European ignorance of the dynamism of Southeast Asian history, or, what Lieberman (1987: 163) has termed the “orientalist cliché of the unchanging East”, resulted, according to Aung-Thwin, in an inaccurate understanding of ancient Mon-Burmese history In addition, they attempt to interpret premodern documents in a chronological fashion, which ignores the ethereal, allegorical quality of much classical literature in the region (Aung-Thwin 2005)

The aforementioned issues culminate in perhaps the most significant point of this historical narrative: the perpetuation of a (false) dichotomy between Burman20 (or

20 'Burman', or oficially 'Bamar', is the English name used to denote the ethnic majority population of Myanmar 'Burmese' is the most commonly used English denonym for nationals of Myanmar, as well as the language spoken by Burmans, which is the national language of Myanmar The Thai

word for both 'Burman' and 'Burmese' is khon phamaa, or “Burma person” Except for the more neutral term myanma lumyo ('Myanmarese' or 'Myanma' in English), the Burmese language does not strictly distinguish between Burman and Burmese (both are bama lumyo).

Burmese) and Mon South (2003: 76) has written that as early as 1601, the Mon language had shown “the growing influence of the Burmese language” By the

modern era, Lehman (1967: 116) has observed that “[t]he Mon are actually for the most part quite indistinguishable from the Burmans in culture and language as well as religion” Both historically and presently, the distinctive defining features of Mons as compared to Burmese (or Thai) have been fluid, with language being the most visible Aung-Thwin and Lieberman have both questioned the precolonial categories of 'Mon' and 'Burman', suggesting that opportunistic colonialists and equally opportunistic 'ethnic' élites have attempted to construct and historicise such a distinction As I will elaborate in chapter 3, Mon nationalists actively co-opt the colonial discourse of Mons are distinct and superior, particularly vis-à-vis Burmans This sense of

superiority has become essential to justifying their fight for ethnic nationalism

2.4 The Mon Nationalist Movement

Great Britain gradually colonised Burma throughout the 19th century The British, who struggled somewhat to establish control of the country, allied themselves with minority groups, such as the Karen and Mon, in order to defeat the Burmans in power and facilitate subjugation of the territory In return for their alliance, British officials left 'ethnic' leaders with a fair degree of benign neglect, leaving local leaders with regional autonomy By the onset of the Second World War, a nationalist impetus had started in Burma among western-educated Burmese, and Great Britain had

relinquished control of the country by 1948 The self-proclaimed leaders of many ethnic groups saw this as a threat to the power they enjoyed during colonisation and subsequently sought to declare independence from Burma (Anderson 1996: 328) Mon leaders were no exception to this and shortly after Burmese independence from Great Britain embarked on their own struggle for independence Over the next 50

years, the Mon armed forces enjoyed support from local allies, such as Karen soldiers involved in a similar struggle against a common enemy, “support from powerful US interests” (South 2003: 130) which opposed the socialist regime in Myanmar, and assistance from a Thai government seeking to prevent Burmese communism from spilling across the borders By the late 1980s, the ill fate of the Mon nationalist

struggle was quickly coming clear On the one hand, a petty trade dispute with their Karen allies over control of Three Pagodas Pass did little for the international

legitimacy of their cause, particularly in 1988 when a global audience was observing Burma following the infamous 8888 protests, during which thousands of non-violent protesters were killed by state soldiers On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the onset of Burma/Myanmar's21 transition to a market economy obviated

Thailand's fear of communism, transforming the two countries' relationship into one

of economic cooperation The official end of the war came in 1995, when army

leaders from both the Myanmar State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA, representing the New Mon State Party, or NMSP) drafted a cease-fire agreement (South 2003)

The Mon leaders won some concessions from the Myanmar government, including a degree access to local resources, a monthly subsidy payment of

approximately 4000 USD and a small autonomous region in Mon State, where they enjoy control over healthcare and education (South 2007) Tensions continue to exist

on both sides For its part, the Myanmar government is frustrated that the Mon army would not convert itself into a Border Guard Force (BGF) and would not participate

in the National Convention Mon leaders claim that doing so would undermine their own legitimacy as leaders of their people22 Additionally, Mon leaders assert that the

21 The official English name of the country changed from “Burma” to “Myanmar” in 1989 The name change remains controversial to many This thesis has attempted to eschew the name debate.

22 'Mon politicians proclaim support for NMSP's decision', in Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA),

Burmese military continues to commit extensive human rights violations in Mon regions By the time of my research in late 2010, war had not broken out for 15 years since the signing of the cease-fire agreement However, that year would see an

escalation in the level of rhetoric Mon news agency articles from April, for instance, describe the Mon army as it “gears up for conflict”23 due to “New War and

Tantamount Danger in Monland”24 An interview with one of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) leaders based in Sangkhlaburi showed that they were not ready to give

up their fight:

RLO: Do you believe there will ever be an independent Mon State?

Nai Mon: Sure We believe Yes

RLO: When do you think that will happen?

NM: In my life [ ] I believe strongly So I still

go into work […] We have to use other tactics to keep fight

RLO: For example?

NM: Maybe we will fight in the towns Maybe other tactics [ ] We can use the, maybe snipers

Many tactics

(interview, Nai Mon, 50+, English25)Significantly, as with the discourse with ancient kingdoms and 'civilisations', discussions of Mon nationalism typically conflate the would-be Mon nation with Mon individuals Mon nationalists and well-intentioned Western spectators alike generally take for granted that all Mons would naturally want a Mon nation-state South (2003:

6, original emphasis) although admitting that most ordinary Mons lack knowledge of history or high culture, writes, “The Mon have not merely sought to protect their

rights and establish a Mon nation; they have been fighting to re-establish Monland”

South's style of writing, through his use of the unqualified definite article attributes

26 April 2010 Accessed 19 May 2011 Available http://monnews.org/?p=272

23 'MNLA gears up for conflict', in IMNA, 29 April 2010 Accessed 15 February 2011 Available

the actions of a select group of Mon nationalists to all Mon

Today, the vast majority of the Mon population lives in Myanmar The exact population size is uncertain, due to high rates of assimilation, particularly in

Myanmar, but Steinberg (2006) and South (2003) have both estimated there to be over

1 million Mons Thailand has the second-largest population of Mons This amount is also difficult to deduce due to the assimilation of many Mons who are

indistinguishable culturally and phenotypically from Thais as well as the illegality and illegibility of recent Mon migrants, many of whom, like other migrants from

Myanmar, are undocumented Joshua Project, a Christian Missionary organisation seeking to “reach” all of the world's ethnic groups, claims that the total Mon

population is around 867,000, of which approximately 749,000 lives in Myanmar and 118,000 in Thailand26 A small but occasionally vibrant diaspora community exists in many Western countries, such as Australia, Canada and the United States

2.5 Status of the Mon language

As I discussed in the last section, most historians consider the Mons to have been among the first literate peoples of Southeast Asia Assuming this to be true, Mon language would have had a relatively high degree of influence throughout the region,

due to its status as a lingua franca of trade and its alphabet upon which the Burmese

alphabet is based However, their demise at the hands of the Burmans would mean a

decline in the influence of their language Quoted in an article published in Irrawaddy News Magazine, Nai Kasauh “estimates that only 20 percent of the Mon vocabulary is

used by people in Mon State Words borrowed from Burmese and Thai are

increasingly common” (Zin 2003) Anthropologists working with the Mons have been pessimistic about the future of the Mon language (Smithies 1972, Foster 1973,

26 'Mon, Talaing Ethnic Peoples in All Countries', in Joshua Project Accessed 19 May 2011

Available http://www.joshuaproject.net/peoples.php?peo3=19086

Thianpanya 2002) Foster (1973: 75), for instance, declared, “as a written language Mon is virtually dead in Thailand,” whilst Thianpanya (2002: 6) suggests that spoken Mon “may be said to be in the last stage of extinction” In my own interactions with Mons in Sangkhlaburi, they were often unable to tell me the Mon equivalent for basic words, which they only knew in Burmese and/or Thai Sangkhlaburi and parts of Southwest Myanmar are the last strongholds of the Mon language Linguist Christian Bauer (1990: 37) writes “[i]n Burma Mon will continue to be a major regional

language” and Thianpanya (2002: 6) notes that Sangkhlaburi is one of the only

communities in Thailand where Mon children still speak Mon “in their daily life”, even if they regularly code-mix with Thai

In summary, although there are mixed predictions about the future of the Mon language, it certainly is no longer a powerful or influential language Apart from those living in areas of Mon State in Myanmar, and a few places in Thailand, mainly

Sangkhlaburi, large portions of Mons are monolingual in either Burmese or Thai Even in Mon-speaking areas of Myanmar or Thailand, the national languages remain dominant in trade and media However, Mon National Schools and the Thai

government school in Wangka formally teach the Mon language, which makes it unlikely to disappear entirely What is important about these speculations is not so much the reality of whether Mon will or will not actually remain a distinct language Instead, this shows the concern of scholars and nationalists of an idealised form of spoken and written Mon, under siege by neighbouring languages It also reflects an implicit assumption that all members of a supposed ethnic group, in this case Mon, share the same language However, based on personal observations, many Mon-speakers unconsciously adapt to their circumstances in using a hybridised lexicon, owing to the influence of Thai and/or Burmese (and/or English), particularly in