An examination of the state of nation building in myanmar

... distinction between official rhetoric on the one hand and actions of the Myanmar state on the other hand The rhetoric of the state often is a good expression of the state s mindset and analysing it helps... Accordingly, the term nation -state is the product of the attempt of governments to create an overlap between the concepts of state and nation In particular in the study of Myanmar the concepts of state, ... Abstract This thesis explores the issue of nation- building in Myanmar It focuses on the post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the state to mould the Myanmar nation according to the state s

An Examination of the State of Nation-Building in Myanmar

Revised edition

Inga Gruss (MSc Contemporary Asian Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts (Southeast Asian Studies)

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences National University of Singapore

2008

Contents

Abstract ii

Preface and Acknowledgements iii

Illustrations v

List of Acronyms vi

Introduction 1

Main Arguments 2

Theoretical Concerns and Definitions 4

Fieldwork, ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Research 8

Chapter Outline 12

Chapter 1: “Nurturing the Soul of a Nation:” Nation-Building in Post-Colonial Myanmar 15 “We, the People of Burma:” Nation-Building in parliamentary Burma 16

“Unity & Socialism:” a second Revolution, 1962-1988 21

“The Enemy who is more destructive than Nargis”, a Nation under Threat: Myanmar since 1988 27

Summary and Conclusion 38

Chapter 2: Shattered Visions: Veteran Politicians’ Perspectives on Nation-Building 40

Economic Stagnation and failed Political Reforms: Myanmar in inexorable Decline 41

Strong Man, Constitution and armed Struggle: the Way forward? 47

Summary and Conclusion 51

Chapter 3: Pragmatism rules: engaging Nation-Building from below through social Development 53

Nation-building and civil engagement 53

Creating Opportunities for Participation in Nation-Building 54

“They learn to overcome their Fear” 58

Creating Bonds, creating Divisions 63

Summary and Conclusion 65

Chapter 4: Together, Apart?: a Nation put to Test 68

Fighting Elites and apathetic Masses: constitutional Referendum 2008 69

Cyclone Nargis: a State in Torpidity 77

A Nation stands up 81

Sometimes, somewhere, united they stand 85

Summary and Conclusion 89

Bibliography 94

Websites 99

Abstract

This thesis explores the issue of nation-building in Myanmar It focuses on the post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the state to mould the Myanmar nation according to the state’s notions and ideology The perceptions of veteran

politicians and civil society actors on the nation-building project will be compared with de facto experiences about the state of nation-building in Myanmar The conduct of state and society during the relief work in the early phase of the cyclone Nargis is used as case study to put assumptions, opinions and propaganda about nation-building in

Myanmar to test The main question guiding my research relates to the ideological reach

of the state How far does the reach of the state go, in particular when it enjoys little domestic public support and popularity, in influencing its population ideologically? Which role can a state play in a case like Myanmar in forming and building a nation?

It is argued that the contemporary state’s project of nation-building is build

around fabricated notions of a need for national unity This strong emphasis on national unity is based upon concern over both the multi ethnic composition of Myanmar and the imminent threat of foreign nations that linger to endanger the Myanmar state’s

sovereignty The military is portrayed as a strong unified body that can overcome

divisions inside the country and protect the country from foreign invasion

Most interviewees reject the state’s nation-building project Nevertheless, the state’s endeavour has resulted in the creation of a sense of nationhood Yet, it is not the content of the project itself that has yielded fruit, but it is the performance of the state while delivering the project that has created a common sense of nationhood The state has repeatedly acted in a hostile way towards society in its nation-building project The contents are meaningless and aim at glorifying the role of the state The state shows little skill in approaching its citizens and has offered no ideological national platform for people to identify with Although this ideological platform has failed to materialise the state has provided itself as the necessary platform for creating a sense of nationhood During the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis the state showed little respect or concern for the victims and thereby enforced what lingered for a long time, an expression of nationhood that is centred around a common dislike of the state

Preface and Acknowledgements

My interest in Myanmar has accompanied my life for the last five years and will hopefully stay with me for many more years In far away Europe it seemed difficult to study and learn about a country that meant little to most people Driven by curiosity about Southeast Asia and Myanmar I quit my job as a psychologist, packed my bags and boarded a flight to Bangkok in January 2006 and have since called this part of the world my abode It is the place where I have met many interesting people who became close friends and Southeast Asia now feels more home than any other part of the world

My time at the Southeast Asian Studies Programme at the National University of Singapore was marked by ups and downs The programme has provided a great

platform to interact and learn from my fellow students, maybe more than articles or books can teach Wonderful teachers teach at the Programme who I would not have met otherwise While I am grateful for the opportunity to have met these people, other

experiences I would have preferred to miss By any standards, the power of

administrative structures at times seemed unreasonable and the programme’s

commitment to support their students in their intellectual development questionable Repeatedly, I experienced that my opinion in my role as a student with regard to the programme’s performance was not appreciated As of today, I remain confused and do not understand why any department that wants to take pride in the intellectual

performance of their students does not appreciate student’s criticism, although, as any student knows, only through constructive criticism one can learn and improve

This thesis marks the end of my time in Singapore that despite personal

challenges was a time of great personal and intellectual encounters I have been

fortunate to meet many creative minds and the friendships of extraordinary people have accompanied me during my studies in Singapore Beng Hui, Ermita, Mei Feng, Simon and Thiru, you have been friends as one can only wish to meet Xin Mei, your patience

to endure my all too often complaints has been amazing and your interest in my

endeavours an incredible support, thank you

In Yangon, I thank K Your home has provided serenity and peace of mind C., our conversations over another portion of French fries and beer or at a musical

restaurant and fashion show helped me stay sane in times of insanity Your critical

remarks about my work have challenged me to seek alternative trains of thoughts Yu

Yu, you are not just a great friend and teacher, but the best guide to your country

With great respect I thank the many veteran politicians who so kindly shared their views, ideas and life stories with me during my field work in Yangon It was a humbling experience to meet these wonderful men who have stood up for their ideals and dreams without faltering for so many years I owe gratitude to all my respondents for their trust in

me Without the contribution of my anonymous interviewees this thesis would not have been possible

My family in Europa has never stopped to encourage and support me, thanks

Dr Pattana Kitiarsa has not only introduced me to the anthropology of Southeast Asia, but has been a supportive, encouraging supervisor Your support during the thesis writing process made it easier to successfully pursue what at time’s seemed impossible Your critical and constructive comments throughout the MA trajectory have helped me to intellectually mature

The two professors and friends who deserve the most heartfelt words of thanks are Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Dr Michael J Montesano You have supported me

throughout my studies and research, encouraged me to pursue my dreams and helped

me to belief in myself My wonderful future prospects I owe to both of you Dr Michael J Montesano, your empathetic supervision and teaching has provided intellectual

challenges that I wish for every student to experience Your witty remarks have opened many new exciting horizons Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing, your commitment to help me

understand Myanmar has been as demanding as rewarding My field work would not have been possible without your support

Illustrations

1.1 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, August 13, 2000 32

1.2 Signboard opposite the former American embassy, Yangon 33

1.3 Father and son statue in People’s Park, Yangon 34

1.4 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2008 36

4.1 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, April 27, 2008 71

4.2 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, April 22, 2008 72

4.3 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, May 11, 2008 78

List of Acronyms

ABSDF All Burma Students Democratic Front

AFPFL Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League

BBC British Broadcasting Company

BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DVB Democratic Voice of Burma

INGO International Non Governmental Organisation

KBTS Karen Baptist Theological Seminary

KIO Kachin Independence Organisation

NLD National League for Democracy

NDUF National Democratic United Front

NGO Non Governmental Organisation

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council

SPDC State Peace and Development Council

YMBA Young Men Buddhist Association

Introduction

“The entire national people are striving energetically hand in hand with the Tatmadaw for the emergence of a peaceful, modern, developed and discipline- flourishing democratic nation The stability of the State, community peace and tranquillity, prevalence of law and order, uplifting of education standard and raising the living standard of the people are essential for the multi-party democratic system.” 1

References to the need to build a strong nation are found in countless speeches and publications issued by the Myanmar government, often resembling each other in a hard to distinguish manner The central government portrays nation-building as one of the foremost activities that the state, represented by the ruling government, is engaged

in Central to the rhetoric of the Myanmar government concerning its nation-building efforts is the role of the Tatmadaw (or armed forces) as the preserver and protector of a unified Myanmar According to the Myanmar government, one is led to believe that the country is threatened by “internal and external anti-government elements”2 who aim to destroy not only the government, but also peace and unity in Myanmar

Peace and unity are elusive concepts in a country where the government’s right

to rule the country has been challenged over many decades by various parties The early years after independence in 1948 were characterised by armed clashes between communist factions and the army Communists questioned the legitimacy of the central Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government to rule the country These violent clashes were soon intensified by armed ethnic minority insurgent groups who joined the armed efforts to contest the rule of the central government Civil war

dominated the perception of state – minority relations under the Revolutionary Council (RC) and its Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) This one-party government ruled between 1962 until 1988, outlawed any other political parties and tried to impose autarkist Socialist rule on its population Political performance and legitimacy of the BSPP government were repeatedly challenged in demonstrations and armed attacks and culminated in 1988 in popular demonstrations The demonstrations were quelled violently by the army and resulted in a power take over by the military under the name

1 Than Shwe, excerpt from address delivered at the 61st Anniversary Armed Forces Day Parade,

New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2008

2 New Light of Myanmar, June 16, 2008

State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) The shift of name from SLORC to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 was a mere change of name aided by a foreign consultancy and further manifested the nation-building project that was in place since 1988 The government considered it as their foremost task to restore law and order Law, order, peace and unity have emerged to be dominant topics in the rhetoric of the government since 1988 The contemporary Myanmar governments’

publications or speeches by government representatives have often been ridiculed and portrayed as mere propaganda because of the widespread ill-reputation of the

government and its utmost ineptness in presenting its point of view However, despite these flaws the impact of the state’s nation-building campaign should be taken seriously

as an object of study Years of intensive nation-building efforts have left their traces upon the population and exploring its impact and implications can contribute to a better understanding of contemporary Myanmar society

Main Arguments

This thesis explores the issue of nation-building in Myanmar It focuses on the post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the Myanmar government to mould the Myanmar nation according to their notions and ideology The perceptions of veteran politicians and civil society actors on the nation-building project will be compared with de facto experiences about the state of nation-building in Myanmar The conduct of state and society during the relief work in the early phase of the cyclone Nargis is used as case study to put assumptions, opinions and propaganda about nation-building in

Myanmar to test The main question guiding my research relates to the ideological reach

of the state How far does the reach of the state go, in particular when it enjoys little domestic public support and popularity, in influencing its population ideologically?3

Which role can a state play in a case like Myanmar in forming and building a nation?

3 It should be acknowledged that there might be a discrepancy between the popularity of the government in popular discourse and day-to-day interaction Nearly every person in Myanmar will have friends or family who in one way or another are part of the government body and their otherwise declared dislike of the government will not be reflected in their interaction with these people Research demonstrating the nuances under which the government gains legitimacy in the

eye of the public has been done by Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Behind the Teak Curtain:

authoritarianism, agricultural Policies, and political Legitimacy in rural Burma/Myanmar (London:

Kegan Paul Ltd.): 2004 There is, however, numerous research that indicates the overwhelmingly

contested, negative perception of the government (see for example Ashley South, Ethnic Politics

in Burma: States of Conflict (New York: Routledge): 2008 or Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma under the Military Rule (New York: Zed Books): 2001)

It is argued that the reach of the state does not necessarily depend on its

effectiveness or popularity The Myanmar state has in its very peculiar way influenced and shaped its citizens, although possibly not in the way as originally intended By

means of analysing the nation-building project this argument will be illustrated I will argue that the state’s contemporary project of nation-building is built around fabricated notions of a need for national unity This strong emphasis on national unity is based upon concern over both the multi ethnic composition of Myanmar and the imminent threat of foreign nations that linger to endanger the Myanmar state’s sovereignty The military is portrayed as a strong unified body that can overcome divisions inside the country and protect the country from foreign invasion The state attempts to evoke

loyalties and a common national feeling by emphasising these factors An important component in the nation-building process is constitutional reform that the government uses as a milestone to achieve a prosperous, democratic nation

Most interviewees perceive this project as a sham and strongly reject the

governments’ attempts to create national sentiments in this manner Although most respondents clearly felt strongly patriotic about their country and experience a strong responsibility to contribute to the betterment of the country, I argue that their loyalties to their peer/interest groups supersede their sentiments of national loyalty A strong

factionalism has developed over the decades that hamper cooperation between different societal groups who all share a common concern to improve the circumstances of life for Myanmar citizens I suggest that the relief operations carried out by ordinary citizens in the aftermath of Nargis can be understood as evidence for a common sense of

responsibility towards largely unknown fellow national citizens Thus a certain sense of national obligation is alive and drives people to act in societal responsible way However, the factionalism mentioned earlier emerges here again Many people rather provide assistance within the confinements of their social groups than to anonymous fellow citizens

This sense of nationhood is not a result of the nation-building efforts of the state, but I interpret this sense of national identity as a shared “anti-response” to the state’s nation-building project and the state more generally It is suggested that the state was not successful in building a common sense of nationhood through the content of its campaign, but ironically created a common sense of national identity through providing a potent object of strong negative sentiments among the population These anti-state sentiments are often directed towards the abstract notion of a state and are not

necessarily due to first hand experience, but more often based on public behaviour of the state and shared negative stories about the state

The argument presented above should not be considered an argument that attempts to establish a causal chain of evidence, but rather is of interpretative nature It

is a personal reading of texts, events, interviews and observations By suggesting this line of argumentation I do not claim to offer the only possible understanding of the

materials presented in this thesis It is, however, one way to analyse the materials that provides a meaningful interpretation that opens new venues for further research rather than providing a conclusive statement on the state of affairs I recognise that my

argument is based upon my interpretation of interviews with people who represent only a small fragment of the Myanmar population and who do not provide a representative sample However, while it is a weakness of the argument, it does not make the

perspectives of those people interviewed less valid or truthful from their perspective

Theoretical Concerns and Definitions

Within the Southeast Asian context, which has in the pre-colonial context been characterised as a “state-averse archipelago”4, nation-building remains a topic of

relevance and the nation-state a meaningful unit of analysis.5 In November 2007

Malaysia was afflicted with protests of members of the Indian community who expressed their discontent with their current standing within the Malaysian society, the south of Thailand has for many years now been the setting of violent clashes between the

minority Muslim community and the Thai state, the dominance of the Philippine state continues to be challenged in Mindanao and in Myanmar the hegemony of the state has been challenged from many sites for nearly 60 years now Although many of these conflicts are closely linked to the existence of networks beyond national borders and the notion of individual or social groups to be part of these networks, these conflicts need to

be understood within specific historical trajectories that particular nation-states took Nation-state formations need to be analysed within greater political orders, but remain a useful and necessary unit of analysis

4 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), 13

5 See for example Charles Keyes, Helen Hardacre, and Laurel Kendall (Eds.) Asian Visions of

Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of

Hawaii Press): 1994

The term nation as used in this thesis is considered to be “a distinctive group of people who feel a communal bond on the basis of culture, history, religion, geography,

or linguistics.”6 This communal bond can be nurtured through various activities, for example top-down processes by the state or bottom-up processes by non-governmental actors Nation-building in turn entails different components On the one hand, it means to strengthen the structure of the state and political processes, and on the other hand it attempts to build a common national identity whereby “community development and personal relationships are the core elements when it is understood as the effort to

develop a consciousness of shared destiny.”7 Accordingly, “nation-building thus

combines two objectives: state-building, which relates to the development and extension

of administrative function; and identity-building, which refers to the creation of a

communal identity.”8 This communal identity can be achieved through economic, political and social development In this thesis the emphasis is on the creation of a common ideological perspective through concrete developments of economic, political and social nature The first chapter of the thesis focuses on the attempts of the state, while the latter chapters focus on the ways in which these attempts are perceived and responded

to

Both the terms nation and nation-building are social constructs As mentioned above, part of the nation-building project is a top-down process driven by the state It is necessary to be critical of an “exaggerated belief in the powers of elite manipulation of the masses”9, and not to overemphasise the potential of the state to manipulate the masses like mindless puppets, one must not ascribe too much ideological dominance power to the state Furthermore, some scholars have remarked that there is more to the understanding and working of the nation-state than official ideology.10 Here, I use official ideology as the point from where to start my analysis I follow the state’s perspective by analysing the channels and contents they choose in order to influence public perception and imagination However, once the state has laid out their game plan it is up to the public to react This reaction can have many faces, and only some of these faces will be presented here, bearing in mind the existence of multiple reactions

6 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “The two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and

Identity,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17.3 (2004): 559

7 Ibid, 559

8 Ibism 559

9 Anthony Smith, The Nation in History (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), 3

10 Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1

One must draw clear conceptual distinctions between the terms state, building, nation, nation-building and nation-state The state is defined as “the

state-governmental and administrative institutions of a society, and […] the ideological claim

as to the sovereignty of those institutions.”11 State-building refers to the creation and strengthening of these institutions According to the definitions provided here, the term state is a political concept, whereas the term nation can be considered a cultural

concept The concept nation-state in turn is "the result of marrying a new cultural

concept of the nation to an older legal and political concept of the state."12 Accordingly, the term nation-state is the product of the attempt of governments to create an overlap between the concepts of state and nation

In particular in the study of Myanmar the concepts of state, military and

government have come to be perceived as identical and been used in a conflated way.13Although the terms state and government denominate different concepts, throughout this thesis I use the two terms interchangeably In general, the concept of the state should not be regarded to entail a monolithic entity that acts uniformly within different settings and contexts.14 In the case of Myanmar, nonetheless, the state has been perceived as a closely-knit unit that appears relatively united Likely differences between people

representing the state are not acted out in public and although “It is said that there are hard-liners and soft-liners in the Burmese armed forces but in reality there is not much difference between them.”15 Thus, possible differences in opinions and stances are not apparent to such an extent that for the purposes here I consider it necessary to

represent them in my choice of words when talking about the ruling authorities in

Myanmar

The processes of state and nation-building can be closely interlinked, but

generally are independent of each other Tarling argues that a nation can be built without building a state and vice versa a state can be build without a nation However, he adds

11 David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London, Routledge, 1994), 2

12 Kenneth H.F Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980),

129

13 “There has not even been a distinction between the state, the government and the armed

forces, which have all been conflated.” Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without

Glory (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2002)

14 See for example Derek Sayer, “Dissident Remarks on Hegemony,” Everyday Forms of State

Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in modern Mexico Joseph, Gilbert M and

Daniel Nugent (Eds) (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994): 367-377

15 Lessons for Burma, Interview with Kyaw Yin Hlaing for BBC Burmese

http://www.bbc.co.uk/burmese/learning/story/2005/09/050916_transition_prog19.shtml

that the latter is only possible on a theoretical level: “Building a state without building or maintaining a ‘nation’ is conceptually possible, and has been attempted in the past, but it

is no longer possible in practice Imperial powers created colonial state, but they faced nationalist movements that they helped to create.”16

In contrast, the number of communities considering themselves a nation without

a state is listed as more then 60 by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples

Organisation.17 These are groups, most often formed around an assumed common ethnic ancestry, that have not been granted a sovereign state in the existing political order, but who lay claim to the right to form a separate state In the Myanmar context, there are writings about the Karen as “nation of intent”18 and the Kachin as “a stateless nation”19 which are widely used terms to describe such nations who have aspirations to become independent sovereign states

It has been suggested that the nation-state “is a precarious structure, merely one

of several options for organising human communities, and a venture that has always been vulnerable to contest and subversion.”20 Although it is correct that the nation-state

as form to organise people has been contested, it nevertheless has emerged as the dominant organising political principle The strength of the nation-state lies in its potential

to be emotionally meaningful to people Its appeal must be recognised by the ruling elites, but also by society Nationalism has little ideological appeal, but it allows leaders

to mobilise this emotional potential to gather citizens behind their leadership.21

This thesis contributes to the discussion of the ideological reach of the state It highlights the contestations of the nation-building project and how resistance has been employed to reject the prescribed ideology of a state In the Myanmar case, the ill-repute

of the state is often highlighted This reputation is assumed to result in ideological

immunity to the state’s narratives I want to question the assumption that dislike of the

16 Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2004), 11

17 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, “UNPO Brochure”,

http://www.unpo.org/downloads/UNPOBrochure.pdf

18 Ananda Rajah, “A ‘nation of intent’ in Burma: Karen ethno-nationalism, nationalism and

narrations of nation,” The Pacific Review 15.4 (2002): 517

19 Karin Dean, “Spaces and Territorialities on the Sino-Burmese Boundary”, Political Geography

24 (2005): 816

20 Anthony Milner, “Historians writing Nations: Malaysian Contests.” in Nation-building: Five

Southeast Asian Histories, ed Wang Gungwu (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 117

21 Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2004), 9

state needs to result in rejection of the state’s rhetoric First of all, why should one

assume that people either need to fully reject or blindly disobey to a certain ideology? It

is reasonable to assume that people might be able to identify with some messages of the state, while they find it more difficult to see their thoughts and feelings reflected in other statements Furthermore, there are ample examples that indicate that the

separation between state and society is not as strict as one would think according to the assumption that dislike of the state results in complete rejection of the state’s rhetoric State – society interaction takes place on many levels and creates in one way or another way linkages It is very unlikely to assume that all personal encounters with state officials will be of negative nature In addition, even if one is convinced that it is possible fully to reject the state’s message, it is questionable to assume that people’s minds might not be influenced subconsciously

Myanmar studies, which have become a regrettable contentious field, are morally laden It is often assumed that one party possesses greater moral authority than another and thereby has the right to attempt to influence others Through examining nation-building in Myanmar I reject the assumption that the mobilisation of the concept of

morality should guide one’s analysis The claim to greater moral authority is subjective, and it is premature to assume that one party has a greater ideological influence than another party The analysis of nation-building in Myanmar can help to unfold different point of views on the state and its ideological project It can reveal different mechanisms that are at play and show the reader that many factors influence the workings of the state

I see my scholarly contribution in particular to the field of Myanmar studies and the understanding of state – society interaction in Myanmar While in disciplinary

programmes theoretical questions often drive the research, in this case an “area studies” approach encourages more sensitivity towards regional issues and predicaments By engaging with the topic of nation-building in Southeast Asia in 2008 I will show that its study is not an anachronistic endeavour, but an enterprise that helps to shed light on regional realities and challenges

Fieldwork, ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Research

I conducted fieldwork for this thesis in Myanmar between April 17 and June 18,

2008 I spent most of the ten weeks in Yangon and made one short trip to Sittwe and Myau-U in Rakhine state During these ten weeks I collected printed materials

(newspapers, books), visited public sites such as museums, monuments and other places that are relevant to the understanding of nation-building in Myanmar and

conducted interviews The interviews were held with various veteran politicians, ethnic political leaders and members of ethnic community based organisations In addition to the fieldwork in Myanmar I did additional research at the ISEAS library in Singapore

Conducting research in Myanmar is subject to various restrictions The current government tolerates the presence of researchers and their work to a limited extent, although it is very difficult and challenging to obtain official research permission Any research that could be considered political is unlikely to obtain tacit or open approval by the authorities Most researchers enter the country on tourist or business visas and do not state their intentions to conduct research in any official documentation required by the government While this raises an obvious ethical dilemma concerning deceiving the authorities about the actual purpose of the stay, it can have larger safety implications for the researcher and his/her respondents In case unauthorised research comes to the attention of the authorities, the researcher might be denied visa for future visits or will be expelled from the country However, the greater risk is being taken by people granting interviews to researchers Interviews with researchers (in many cases non-Asian

researchers) will often attract unwanted attention, no matter what the content of the conversation is It is the responsibility of the researcher to take all necessary precautions

to conceal the identity of the respondents and to protect them from possible harmful consequences Throughout my thesis I will refer to respondents either by titles or

invented names The necessity to conceal the identities of the respondents makes it impossible to locate their current standing in society within their biographical trajectories here in my thesis While I will frame the political and historical context within which the responses of my interviewees should be understood, I will refrain from providing too many biographical data in order to make it impossible to identity individuals

However, it is not only Myanmar authorities who impose restrictions on research

in Myanmar Burmese exile media groups do not hesitate to report on research activities

by researchers whom they consider not in line with their ideological approach Research has become politicised beyond reason, and one cannot hope to not avoid the unwanted attention of both the authorities and exile media groups Part of the politicisation of research on Myanmar is the choice of name given to the country in one’s writing The country carried the name Union of Burma from 1948 – 1974, from 1974 – 1988 it was called the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma and in 1989 it was renamed into

Union of Myanmar In particular the last change of name into Union of Myanmar

triggered hostile responses by some parties The SLORC government changed the name of the country in 1989 without holding a referendum or consulting popular opinion

in any other ways Since the SLORC government is considered an illegitimate

government by many parties, one that seized power by force, its actions are disapproved

of in principle Parties who call themselves pro-democracy forces22 and reside to a large extent in exile in Thailand, but inside the country as well, strongly disapprove the change

of name and have campaigned for many years to keep the name Burma in usage In the rhetoric of the pro-democracy forces the usage of the name Myanmar implies tacit

approval of a government that is widely considered repressive and authoritarian This name controversy has sparked manifold discussions and angry exchanges I distance myself from any political implications that either name has and use the name Burma when referring to the period until 1989 and thereafter the name Myanmar.23

The scope of my research is limited The timeframe for fieldwork within the

National University of Singapore Master’s degree programme is short and ten weeks barely allow more than a glimpse and the formulation of a first impression and ideas I had spent a considerable amount of time in Myanmar before embarking on the fieldwork; thus I was familiar with living and working conditions in Myanmar The National

University of Singapore does not provide language training for graduate students and the little Burmese knowledge I possess, I had acquired on earlier trips My basic

knowledge of Burmese does not allow me to interview people in Burmese, instead all the interviews were conducted in English Most respondents were comfortable speaking English, some had learned English under British rule or in missionary schools and have

a higher level of English proficiency than I have Two respondents did not speak English,

22 The term pro-democracy movement is a self imposed label It has become a widely used term

among people involved in Myanmar related issues when referring to groups and parties who are involved in anti-government activities I use the term for the convenience of the reader, but want

to emphasise that I do not take any political stance in favour or against any parties involved The term pro-democracy movement is loaded with positive connotations and/or implies goals and activities that many people consider desirable However, I want to remind the reader that a label

such as pro-democracy movement does not ensure the ethically responsible behaviour of people

involved in the movement and should not automatically be assumed to possess greater moral authority than other parties involved in Myanmar politics

23 The name Myanmar is not less linked to the Myanmar government than the name Burma to the pro-democracy movement Therefore the usage of either name could be interpreted as a political statement and I consider the association of my person with the political pro-democracy movement

as undesirable as the association with the current Myanmar government I am fully aware that the usage of the term Myanmar invites criticism and accusations of political naivety

so here I asked other respondents who were present during the conversation to

translate Some of the interviews were conducted in a group setting which partly

hampered the flow of the conversation Some of the issues discussed during the

interviews were politically or ideologically contested and it can be assumed that

individuals did not always express their true sentiments, so as not to offend others or to cause friction within the group All the interviews were conducted informally; questions and topics varied from interview to interview All respondents are part of the educated political/civil elite and mostly live in Yangon Their point of views cannot be generalised

to other parts of the populations or be considered common public opinion

I am aware that as a female, European researcher I elicit different responses and reactions from my respondents than for example domestic researchers Two of my respondents were female, and all other respondents were male The time constraints did not allow me to revisit respondents and to conduct second or third interviews Some of the interviewees are highly media trained and will in a first conversation not go beyond certain stereotypical utterances or portrayals Nevertheless, certain topics were recurrent and came to dominate all the interviews thereby indicating a particular relevance All respondents spoke under the guarantee of anonymity, and I conceal their organisational affiliations if they asked me to do so

The published materials I collected are largely written in English Some of them are translations from Burmese into English, while other books were exclusively

published for an English speaking audience The New Light of Myanmar, the

government issued daily newspaper, publishes many speeches delivered by government spokespersons and thereby providing a rich source of government perspectives

Editorials that engage with international public opinion about the Myanmar government show a surprising awareness among the authorities of their international standing and are also a rich source for research purposes I am aware that I missed out on many publications, books, newspaper and magazines due to my limited knowledge of the Burmese language

All the limitations outlined above were predictable and could be taken into

account when planning/conducting research However, some events during my research period were not predictable and changed the course of research During the night from 2 – 3 May the cyclone Nargis hit Yangon and the Irrawaddy delta and caused immense destruction Many lives were lost, and huge material damage was caused Lines of communication broke down for some days, electricity was cut off and movement across

Yangon was rendered difficult The extent of the natural disaster became apparent after

a few days and it appeared as if my research had come to an end In Yangon and the Delta, people were struggling to rebuild their lives, were mourning the loss of loved ones and facing the hardship of economic losses In such a situation I considered it ethically unacceptable to conduct further research Within the first week after the cyclone an opportunity opened up for me to volunteer with a local organisation that conducted relief work in the Delta I took the opportunity and thereby gained an unexpected perspective

on the topic of my research Parts of my personal experiences and observations from my volunteer work entered my research and are used here to provide perspective on nation-building in Myanmar

Chapter Outline

In chapter one I will review nation-building policies and actions in Myanmar since independence in 1948 When analysing nation-building endeavours in Myanmar one needs to make a distinction between official rhetoric on the one hand and actions of the Myanmar state on the other hand The rhetoric of the state often is a good expression of the state’s mindset and analysing it helps understand reasoning or argumentation I will argue that the nation-building project has been contested from the start of independence

in 1948 and these contestations have resulted in divisions and factions that have

become more pronounced over the years The creation of viable political and social

institutions outside the military and sangha failed and left the state in a fragile position

No common national ideology was created, but ideology drove people apart The

Socialist government was heavily guided by socialist ideology in their nation-building project and paid little attention to other issues The post-1988 state has adopted a

different stance towards nation-building from earlier governments In the absence of a guiding political ideology, the state adopted a nation-building vocabulary that describes a country under threat No political or philosophical ideology is offered to appeal to the creation of a new ideological overarching commonality, but instead mistrust and the impression of a lingering danger are nurtured among the population The state has more and more turned to promoting the role of the military as the defender of the unified

country Chapter one demonstrates that the government has failed to provide a unifying basis that would allow people with competing visions about nationhood to be united in the government’s nation-building efforts In the absence of presenting a unifying national

ideology the government has presented itself as an object of dislike that provides a platform of identification

Chapter two presents the perspective of veteran politicians on the nation-building attempts of the government as gathered in personal interviews The age and experience

of this respondent group broadened the scope of my research Most of the respondents were involved in political activities in the 1940’s, 1950’s, and 1960’s and their

perspective reflected a unique long term acquaintance with politics and nation-building in Myanmar Many of the former politicians have been sidelined in national politics during the course of time and bear personal grudges against the current government This is not to say that their statements are less valid or useful The respondents made it clear that I can’t understand contemporary Myanmar unless I am willing to engage with the past I will argue that from the point of view of veteran politicians, the nation-building project in Myanmar is considered a failure The contemporary state and its attempt to build a nation are seen in the light of 60 years of failed political reform The basis for successful political reforms is constitutional reform From the veteran politicians’ point of view a constitution would provide the heart of the project around which a nation could be built Any attempts of the government or progress with regard to civil societal structures are ridiculed and declared irrelevant With the recent approval of a new constitution, that

in the eyes of this respondent group is mocking the population, the nation-building

project has been rendered impossible The future is seen as bleak and the prospect of creating any viable form of community as impossible The interviewees represented the interests of different political factions and had competing visions about nation-building strategies Yet, they presented themselves willing to overcome their individual

differences in possibly joining armed struggle against the government which suggests that the actions and campaigns of the government have not yielded any fruit, but the government has presented itself as a readily available platform of unification

The third chapter deals with the perspective of young social and/or politically active figures from urban backgrounds Besides presenting the accounts of my

respondents, I use secondary literature to locate these respondents’ activities within post-colonial civil societal developments Similarly as among the veteran politicians, the nation-building project by the government is discarded as meaningless by these figures However, many respondents have actively taken up opportunities that opened under the SPDC government I will argue that their rejection of the government’s nation-building endeavour does not prevent them from engaging and interacting with government

officials Civil society has been strengthened, in particular in ethnic-minority states, and although the central government is largely despised, many people have chosen to

engage with government officials in order to enhance the well-being of the population Many interviewees felt obliged, in the light of the inadequate actions of the government

to respond to the needs of underprivileged citizens, to fill in the role that otherwise a government would fulfil Thus, it is the commonly perceived failure of the government to enhance the citizen’s welfare that brings ordinary citizens together in their wish to

contribute to betterment of the nation Yet, within this wish to contribute to the

advancement of fellow countrymen, many actors operate within the confines of their ethnic or religious boundaries, thereby reflecting a deeply imbedded factionalism in society

The fourth chapter uses the unique situation created by cyclone Nargis to study nation-building in a post-disaster context The national outcry to help and support fellow citizens in need was immense Large financial sums were mobilised, human resources made available and time and moral support offered The citizens of Myanmar responded

in an empathetic unified way in their relief efforts In contrast, the central government did only gradually develop a common approach Disagreement among various levels of high ranking officers surfaced and, though in the end curbed by the head of state, revealed ideological factions within the government That this empathetic societal response

reflects a strong national spirit that can be considered an effect of the nation-building project It is curious that despite the rejection of the nation-building project that all

respondents echoed, nevertheless a national identity has been created

Overall, based upon similar observation in chapters one to four I suggest that this sense of national loyalty has its root in the state’s nation-building project However, while

I reject the assumption that the nation-building project has not left any traces in the national memories of citizens, I interpret the performed national spirit as an unintended reaction to the nation-building project The state’s growing ideological disorientation and increasingly hostile nation-building vocabulary have turned themselves into a potent image of national identification Not the rejection of the nation-building project, but the dislike of the state accelerated by the nation-building project, provides an object that allows the imagination of a common national suffering and thereby creates a common national identity

Chapter 1: “Nurturing the Soul of a Nation:”24 Nation-Building in

Post-Colonial Myanmar

Myanmar gained independence from British rule in 1948 The state and builders faced great challenges Contesting calls for state power, an ethnically diverse population, various religious groups and remnants of colonial rule were important issues that called for attention Successive post-colonial governments have adopted different nation-building strategies to meet these diverse challenges Successive trajectories were contested by various parties and raised the political stake of the nation-building project considerably

nation-This chapter reviews the nation-building policies of the post-independence

regimes It demonstrates that the immediate post-independence years were coined by emerging contestations of the state’s nation-building project As a consequence,

factionalism among different groups developed into an enduring feature of the Myanmar political landscape The immediate post-independence regime attempted to implement a political system leaning towards a socialist ideology The government hoped to gather support among its citizens by attempting to implement a socialist welfare system and to provide increased spiritual guidance by centre-staging Buddhism With colonial rule having ended only recently, socialism and nationalism were ideologies appealing to policy-makers as base for building a post-independence nation The attempt to build the nation around a moderate socialist political and economic system was interrupted by a regime change The autarkist Socialist regime that took over power concentrated in their nation-building efforts heavily on implementing the Burmese Way to Socialism, stressing the equality of all citizens and abolishing exploitative capitalist structures The failure to provide economically for the population led to the abortion of this project After 1988 the military in the form of SPDC focused more and more on emphasising elements of unity

in diversity against a common enemy threatening the nation

I suggest, that this attempt at nation-building has not led to a common national spirit, but has rather led to a stronger common anti-government sentiment that in turn has created a shared sense of common suffering Although all respective post-colonial governments have employed an anti-foreign element vocabulary, the SPDC has

24 Than Nyun, Keynote Address to Human Resource Development and Nation Building in

Myanmar, by Office of Strategic Studies Ministry of Defence (Yangon: Office of Strategic Studies

Ministry of Defence, 1997), 6

intensified this project greatly In the absence of a guiding political ideology anti-foreign battle cries have turned into hollow meaningless phrases A schism emerged between the state and society The state offered little ideological guidance, but instead

increasingly attempted to manifest itself as the only eligible holder of power and exploits the population for economic and political gains, while the latter experiences continuous material hardship in the absence of a meaningful political ideology

“We, the People of Burma:” 25 Nation-Building in parliamentary Burma

Many theorists of nationalism and nation-building debate whether these concepts are a product of modernity or have their roots in pre-modern times For present purposes this question is not of central relevance However, Reid26 argues that the modern state had a stronger need to justify its rule than the pre-modern state and therefore nation-building and state nationalism gained greater importance after the end of colonial rule than before Monarchs and other feudal rulers were not under pressure to justify their right to rule before their people, but “ruled by divine right”27 With the demise of colonial rule in Southeast Asia the expectations developed that national governments should

“rule in the name of a people and therefore to define and mould that people”.28 State nationalism and nation-building became more powerful in the light of this development

In a similar vein, the nation-building project in Myanmar was intensified after the end of colonial rule The AFPFL government that took power in 1948 was an alliance of several political factions It had not been formed on the basis of a common political ideology, but

on its common goal to end colonial rule.29 The AFPFL government advanced two main nation-building policies: the creation of a welfare state and the implementation of

Buddhism as state religion

The government appealed to the collective trauma that the country had

undergone under British Colonial rule The British had believed in economic progress and introduced a competitive market economy Participation in the market economy as entrepreneur was difficult for people without capital and largely had excluded Burmese from participation in the profit economy While many Burmese had not been able to profit

25 Opening words of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, approved on 24 September 1947, effective 4 January 1948

26 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)

27 Ibid, 4

28 Ibid, 4

29 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and factional struggles in post-independence Burmese governments,”

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39.1 (2008): 155

from the competition, Indian and Chinese migrants had easier access to capital and profited to a greater extent This exclusion of Burmese people from the economy and the onset of social disintegration created dissatisfaction with “Western” political systems and Socialism and Marxism gained greater appeal in the light of colonial rule The

introduction of a socialist economy would render impossible capitalist enrichment and exploitation of the under-privileged.30

The 1948 constitution did not define Burma as a socialist state, but included articles that emphasised the socialist stance that the post-independence nation-builders hoped to implement The government assigned itself the core role in structuring the post-colonial economy Industrialisation of the economy was one of the foremost goals, partly stemming from the experience during the Pacific war where Burma had greatly suffered under the need to import textiles and other goods Furthermore, colonial rule had left bitter memories of being a raw material-producing country that had to rely on imports of most processed goods Besides wanting to modernise the Burmese economy, land nationalisation enjoyed a high priority in the post-independence economic planning.31

First steps to nationalise land were successful in a way as land was put from the hands of Indian land owners into the hands of Burmese farmers, but resulted in a

budgetary deficit in 1949 largely due to the lack of land revenues The civil war

additionally put a heavy strain on the financial situation of the state As a consequence,

Nu, the first prime minister of the Union of Burma and a former Thakin,32 invited foreign investments and aid to Burma: “Since we do not possess either the capital or the

technical resources necessary for industrialisation, we must enlist the help of foreign capital and technicians.”33 Foreign economic aid advisors developed an economic plan that the Burmese government consulted and used in order to develop their own future economic plans These economic schemes were presented in 1952 at the first

nationwide welfare state conference The notion of the welfare state that was elaborated upon at this conference was subsumed under the Burmese term pyidawtha, a "country

30 David Steinberg, Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1982), 66

31 Frank Trager, Building a Welfare State in Burma: 1948 – 1956 (New York: Institute of Pacific

relations: New York, 1958), 90

32 The term Thakin was the Burmese term for master and Burmese people had been required to refer to the British colonial rulers by this title The independence movement initiated by young Burmese student’s referred to each as Thakin’s in reference to the colonial usage The term Thakin has come to be stand for the heroic deeds of young freedom fighters and is still held in high regard

33 Nu cited from Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: a Study of the first years of independence

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 96

of peace and prosperity.”34 The core of the welfare state creation was the introduction of further central economic planning and social welfare schemes

However, in the light of an ill-equipped administrative apparatus, problems

related to the agricultural sectors and continuing insurgency, the welfare plan was

overambitious and destined to fail The number of civil servants who according to the

1952 economic plan had to work in the civil service to fulfil its entire tasks was

impossible to achieve Not enough qualified people entered the civil service to perform necessary tasks such as policing, taxing, postal services, trade control or land

redistribution Through the emphasis on industrialisation the agricultural sector had not been given as much attention as in earlier years The rice production declined and at the same time the international market price for rice dropped This led to a severe stagnation

of the export economy and resulted in further financial shortcomings of the state

Combined with an increased need to finance anti-insurgent activities of the state, the financial burdens on the state made it impossible to invest into the economy as

planned.35

The implementation of a successful economy was further complicated by a neglect of the government to create peaceful domestic conditions The government did not sufficiently invested into the creation of law and order which was necessary to allow further investments into economic sectors The failure of the state to create a functioning domestic economy disappointed many Burmese citizens whose hopes and expectations for the period after independence were neatly summarised by Furnivall:

On the eve of independence I attended a modern Burmese play

Successive scenes depicted typical incidents of the old regime: the cultivator making over his cattle to the Indian moneylender; the wife abandoning her loom; the foreign capitalists, European, Indian, and Chinese, counting their gold; and the Burman middlemen helping them to pile it up The play ended with the people filling their pockets in a shower of gold and silver That is what Burmans

expected as the result of independence Now, of course, they are impatient.”36

Nu made a last attempt to gain popular support for the implementation of the government’s pyidawtha state and called on the support of the army to implement the economic plans in order to ”free the Union from the ravages of both internal and external

34 Mya Maung, “The Burma Road from the Union of Burma to Myanmar,” Asian Survey 30.6

(1990): 604

35 John Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 617 and Frank Trager, Building a Welfare State in Burma: 1948 – 1956 (New York: Institute of Pacific

relations: New York, 1958), 104-105

36 J.S Furnivall, “Burma, Past and Present,” Far Eastern Survey 22.3 (1953): 26

enemies.”37 With the realisation that the introduction of the welfare state would remain

an elusive notion, the state’s promotion of Buddhism gained greater importance

Myanmar was initially founded as a secular state, but Buddhism immediately played an important role after 1948 The re-centralisation of Buddhism by the state started in 1949 with the passage of several acts that intended to strengthen the sangha and its role in society Nu played an important role in promoting the role of Buddhism in the young nation He was a deeply religious person who was able to influence state politics with his personal, religious convictions The government sponsored the Sixth Great Buddhist Council that took place between 1954 and 1956 Nu announced his intention to make Buddhism the state religion at the conclusion of the Sixth Buddhist Council His huge electoral success in 1961 had made him believe that he had the support of a wide range of the population and let him pass constitutional amendments by the parliament to give Buddhism an overarching role in the state.38

The appeal of Buddhism as a unifying national ideology might have been

personal to Prime Minister Nu, but had its deeper historical roots and was suitable for emotional mobilisation of the masses With the onset of colonial rule, the last monarch of the Konbaung dynasty Thibaw had been deposed and sent into exile to British India Under the monarchy Buddhism had played a central role and the king presented himself

as the defender of the faith Monks had a superior social status and were greatly

venerated Under colonialism the decline of the Buddhist sangha had set in Its social status was incomparably lower and people gave less alms to monks who relied on the financial support of the population for their survival Monks had been at the forefront of the independence movement, bewailing colonial suppression and the loss of their social status In 1917, an incident at Shwedagon Pagoda that entered history books as the

“shoe question” occurred While in Myanmar it is common to take off one’s socks and shoes before entering a pagoda, it was British custom to not take off one’s shoes when visiting pagodas The Young Men Buddhist Association (YMBA) mobilised popular support against this British habit The shoe question developed its very own dynamic At

37 Burma Weekly Bulletin, September 22, 1995 quoted from Mary P Callahan, War and State

Building in Burma (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004):180

38 Donald E Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University

Press, 1965): 117-120

its very core was an expression of Buddhist identity which developed into the epitome of anti-British feelings.39

Nu re-mobilised these existing sentiments by blaming the colonial rulers for the decline of Buddhism in Myanmar and emphasised his intention to restore the former glory of Buddhism.40 Furthermore, people were familiar with the Buddhist belief system and it was easy to identity with, at least for the 85 % of the population who were

followers of Buddhism Buddhism was closely intertwined with the Burman nationalist movement It stood for national pride, represented deep-rooted values and might provide

a bedrock in times of modernisation Its mobilisation as the unifying core value of the struggling young nation might have seemed all too natural.41 However, not all parties were equally thrilled by the prospects of Buddhism as state religion

As mentioned, the AFPFL government was a coalition of different ideological factions Once the “anti-imperial nationalism”42 that had provided a strong enough

catalyst to hold these opposing factions together faded ideological conflicts emerged within the AFPFL Conflicts about the right political ideology, foreign policy strategies or domestic economic development strategies in the end culminated in a split into “clean” and “stable” factions of the AFPFL in 1958 The military used this split to advance its claim to political power The clean AFPFL faction held on to power for five more months, but then handed over power to the military for an agreed period of six month, after which elections were supposed to take place The rule of the military was extended from six into 18 months and ended with elections that returned Nu and the clean AFPFL faction

to power

The interregnum by the military in 1958 sowed further distrust among competing political factions The rational behind the military take-over was to re-establish central state dominance that had been hampered by intra-political conflicts, to curb armed insurgent movements and to hinder the increasing religiosity of the state Ethnic

populations were increasingly distrustful over the role and attitude of the government towards the minority populations A feeling of neglect in national budget allocation,

39 Donald Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World: A Sourcebook (New

York: The Free Press, 1971): 106-109

40 Bruce Matthews, “The Legacy of Tradition and Authority: Buddhism and the Nation in

Myanmar,” in Buddhism and Politics in twentieth-century Asia ed Ian Harris (London, New York:

Pinter, 1999): 33

41 Manning Nash, “Buddhist Revitalisation in the Nation State: The Burmese Experience,” in

Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia, ed Robert F Spencer (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1971): 105-106

42 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), 6

regardless of the actual financial capacities of the central government, led to further polarisation of opinions The increasing role of Buddhism in state considerations did not contribute to appeasing the sentiments of many non-Buddhists citizens who happened to live primarily in the border regions Even though the total number of insurgents

decreased during the first military reign between 1958 and 1960, various insurgent groups formed the National Democratic United Front (NDUF) during this period Informal peace talks with the Karen National Union (KNU) occurred under the aegis of the military caretaker government, but they failed to find any common ground between the parties

Nu’s return to power in 1960 was characterised by his campaign to make

Buddhism the state religion if he was returned to power in that year’s elections The fulfilment of this promise after the elections took place and was the fatal blow to Nu’s rule Not only did more insurgent groups join the armed movement since many of them

as non-Buddhist adherents considered Buddhism as state religion a threat to their

religious freedom, but the military also used it in 1962 as one of the reasons to stage a coup d’état.43

The government attempted to mobilise concepts that widely resonated among the citizens and had a strong emotional appeal The promotion of social justice and spirituality were in line with the nationalist ambitions and the dominant Socialist ideology However, the attempts of the central government to promote the “we, the people of Burma”44 spirit that had been promoted in the opening words of the constitution was on the one hand thwarted by the failure of the state to realise its economic vision and on the other hand made difficult by many citizens who could not identify with Buddhism as state religion

“Unity & Socialism:” 45 a second Revolution, 1962-1988

In 1962 the Revolutionary Council (RC), under the leadership of Ne Win, staged

a coup d’état and appropriated state power Ne Win had been one of the Thirty

Comrades,46 commander of the Burma National Army (BNA) and prime minister from

43 Bruce Matthews, “Religious Minorities in Myanmar – Hints of the Shadow,” Contemporary

South Asia 4.3 (1995): 289

44 Opening words of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, approved on 24 September 1947, effective 4 January 1948

45 Working People’s Daily, February 12, 1974

46 The term “Thirty Comrades” describes a group of young Burmese men who left Burma in 1941 and obtained military training by the Japanese army to fight the British colonial rulers These Thirty Comrades constitute the core of what later emerged as the Burma National Army,

Myanmar’s first national defence forces

1958 to 1960 The military considered the takeover necessary since in their eyes the Union government “represented the interests of feudal elements; exploiting landlords; national and foreign capitalists who wielded their influence on public affairs; bureaucrats, political opportunists who acknowledged their allegiance to such capitalists.”47 Ne Win and the RC introduced the Burmese Way to Socialism The BSPP was founded to

implement the Burmese Way to Socialism Most of the party and the RC were dominated

by military personnel In particular, the early years of the RC were characterised by an intensification of the ideologies that had dominated the Burmese political scene in the preceding years already: nationalism and socialism

The RC considered socialism the way adequately to build a young nation: “We are in the throes of a social revolution under the leadership of the RC and the BSPP Eighteen years of independence under the former political governments had not brought

us any nearer to our ultimate goal – socialism, to which Bogyoke Aung San had pledged

to march all along our struggle before his untimely death.”48 An important reason why the earlier parliamentary government had failed in the eyes of the RC to achieve an

appropriate form of socialism was the political divisions that characterised the central government.49 In order finally to achieve socialism as a goal set during the struggle for independence, radical nationalisation of the economy was to be introduced:

“[…] the next stage, as important and in some practical respects more problematical than confusing, is to consolidate the independence won and

effectively utilise it to serve the national weal With this sameness of purpose binding them all, it is also unique in this decade of rapid growth of newly-

independent states that their leaders by and large favour socialism as scientific nation-building Socialism is their avowed ideal, even though it varies in labels and degree of implementation This trend is particularly noticeable in under-developed countries […] The attraction of socialism for the new nations is

understandable from their refusal to be naively satisfied with purely symbolical trappings of sovereignty For it is socialism which convincingly teaches that political independence must be equated with economic independence.”50

Emphasis was placed on a strategy of central economic planning and a large scale nationalisation of the economy It aimed at putting back economic power into the hands of the Myanmar people From 1963 on, all banks, industries and large business

47 Quoted from Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Reconsidering the Failure of the Burma Socialist Programme

Party Government to eradicate internal economic Impediments,” South East Asia Research 11.1

(2003): 6

48 Working People’s Daily, January 4, 1970

49 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and factional struggles in post-independence Burmese governments,”

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39.1 (2008): 151-157

50 Working People’s Daily, January 4, 1966

were nationalised, independent newspapers outlawed, and trade unions and political parties other than the BSPP declared illegal The largest currency denominations at that time, 50 and 100 kyat notes, were declared worthless and those persons who still owned private business, mainly Chinese and Indians, became poor overnight and had to sell their businesses to the government During these years many migrants of Chinese and Indian descent returned to their home countries.51 The government took pride in driving away foreign businesses and foreign nationals: “Out of 50 foreign technicians serving with the Burma Oil Company (1954) limited on January 1, 1963, when it was taken over

by the state, only 3 foreigner geologists will remain with the nationalised Bama Yenan Company limited The remaining 3 will leave in April.”52

This nationalisation of the Myanmar economy and related measures that aimed

at putting Burmese people back in charge of Burmese affairs has widely been referred to

as Burmanisation of the economy The state attempted to restore Burmese dominance

in the civil service by replacing Indian citizens who worked as civil servants with

Burmese civil servants,53 and “to place what remains of private enterprises in the hands

of Burmese citizens and to eliminate foreign economic control”54 by “nationalisation of existing assets, by reserving certain economic functions to Burmese citizens or the State, by direct competition of the State with alien enterprises, by giving economic

advantages to Burmese nationals vis-à-vis aliens, and by measures to limit the number

of alien residents.”55 According to Golay, the introduction of economic nationalism as the guiding force behind any economic policy implementation resulted in the failure to

implement more apt economic policies that would have been more suited to adequately stimulate the economy

Socialism undergirded the rhetoric of the government Even the issue of national identity and ethnic nationalities was addressed through socialist vocabulary The Union day spirit was celebrated emphasising the unified nature of peasants and workers no

51 David Steinberg, Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1982), 77

52 Working People’s Daily, February 8 1964

53 Albert D Moscotti, British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma 1917-1937 (Hawaii:

University Press of Hawaii, 1974), 101-107

54 Robert A Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Politics: The Politics of Burmanization,” Asian Survey

7.3 (1967): 211

55 Frank Golay et al., Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969): 211

matter which ethnic nationality they belonged to.56 One advertisement, though not issued

by the government, but in a funny way imitating government rhetoric was published by Nissan proclaiming that “Nissan-Datsun Vehicles are serving for all the peoples of the Union of Burma even in Shan, Kayah, Karen, Kachin and Chin States as people’s car Fills your every need for tough dependable service.”57 Reality looked slightly different to what was celebrated in the Union spirit speeches by the RC

Formed in 1961, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) turned out to be one of most formidable ethnic armies The BSPP had initiated peace talks in 1963 Little will to compromise among all parties made a peaceful settlement impossible The RC and BSPP focused in their earlier years more on implementing socialism and only later tried to address issues of political dissent more intensely In 1974 a new constitution was introduced with the goal to implement socialism in the law and at the same time to

address some of the issues of contention between the central government and ethnic nationality groups Nevertheless, the focus of the 1974 constitution was on providing a legal framework to implement socialism.58

The constitution allotted seven states the names of ethnic groups (and seven divisions Burman names), but re-distribution of central state power did not take place This symbolic gesture had little meaning for the ethnic parties seeking greater political autonomy The failure to end armed conflicts and to instigate sustainable economic policies contributed to the BSSP government’s failure to achieve “performance

legitimacy,”59 which in turn contributed to the final downfall of BSPP government in 1988 The ensuing violent clashes between the central government and ethnic nationality armies have come to dominant the understanding of many people and scholars of state

56 See for example Working People’s Daily, February 12, 1966

57 Working People’s Daily, February 12, 1964

58 See for example a mock dialogue that was published in the Working People’s Daily, January 29

1974 in order to explain the connection between socialism and the constitution: “What is the use

of the rule of law? Can it bring down prices of commodities so that I can eat two square meals a day?” asked an anxious Mg Tun Aye, who is my next-door neighbour, over a cup of plain tea at his house recently “It can,” replied U Ba Aye, his father, assertively “There will be some kind of law definitely, as in other civilised countries, forbidding such anti-social crimes as hoarding of the staples and profiteering thereby.” “Exactly,” I nodded approvingly “In that case,” inquired Mg Tun Aye, “will the government proceed against the peasants if they are found hoarding up their paddy for a very high return of profits?” ”It will certainly,” U Ba Aye answered […] “But in a socialist country like ours it is not a wise thing for the government to quarrel with the peasants.” Mg Tun Aye expressed his doubt in a plain manner ‘In Socialism, the law does not make a difference between a peasant and a potter They are equal,” said U Ba Aye.”

59 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in

Myanmar (Burma),” in Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia eds Kusuma Snitwongse and W Scott

Thompson (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005), 76

– minority relations in the Socialist period in Myanmar Many scholars argue that the BSPP government, besides violently fighting armed insurgents, introduced cultural Burmanisation initiatives towards ethnic nationalities.60

Although it is not correct to say that ethnic nationalities were denied any cultural

or religious rights, it might be more appropriate to assume that the notions of a unified socialist Burmese culture were based upon cultural elements of the Burman majority:

“the prevalence of Burman chauvinistic elements in the national building discourse and activities undertaken by post-colonial Myanmar governments”61 can be acknowledged

Language policies were a contentious issue Burmese was declared the only official language of instruction in all university and pre-university classes Teaching of minority languages was partly restricted, but primarily did not receive any official support

or endorsement A request by the Shan student organisation in the late 60’s to introduce

a new Shan script was turned down by the Shan state council since in their eyes the new script was associated with Shan nationalism and consequently the insurgent

movement Local teachers nonetheless taught the new script in schools; this practice in turn led to the complete suspension of teaching in Shan language at public schools under the jurisdiction of this Shan state council The Mon cultural organisation initiated

an attempt to re-introduce Mon language classes at public schools This request to make Mon language an official part of the curriculum at public schools was turned down by government actors The official reason was that this would have disadvantaged Mon students since Mon language classes would have meant additional workload for the local students and might have led to minority students lagging behind in the education systems.62

The bans on these particular language initiatives must not be understood as the complete refusal of the state to allow these organisations to function and exist Rather, government officials prohibited potentially controversial activities under their tutelage and granted these organisations permission only to engage in purely non-controversial

60 See for example Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press) 1980, Bruce Matthews, “Ethnic and Religious Diversity: Myanmar’s unfolding

Nemesis,” ISEAS Visiting Researchers Series No 3, 2001 or Alan Collins, “Burma’s Civil War: a

Case of Societal Security,” Civil Wars 5.4, 2002

61 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imagining togetherness,

practising difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia, ed Lee Hock

Guan and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 150

62 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imagining togetherness,

practising difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia, ed Lee Hock

Guan and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 164-166

welfare activities for the benefit of the local communities There are several reasons why such little space for cultural and political organisations was granted The BSPP

government’s lack of full sovereignty created insecurity among party members and any form of organised communal life constituted a possible threat to their dominance Even though social and cultural grass-root spaces were not ruled out by law, any usage of these spaces was subject to negotiations with reluctant BSPP officials In particular initiatives related to minority languages were controversial since they were regarded as avenue for expressing nationalistic sentiments and anti-government protest In addition, social, cultural and political spaces and organisations were often conflated in the eyes of government officials Many were unable to make a distinction between such initiatives or considered them to closely related to insurgent activities Accordingly, their existence was tolerated, but their functioning highly restricted

In contrast to language issues, religious affairs were treated more carefully The promotion of the Union government of Buddhism as state religion had contributed to its downfall and the BSPP adopted religious policies that changed the endorsement of Buddhism into a private matter again and not a matter of the state The government ceased financial support for any religious institutions and monks were banned from any political activities The government intensified its secularisation policies and by 1965 the sangha had lost its political relevance and a large part of its influence on daily life

Because of the changing economic situation the sangha not only lost its institutionalised role, but it also suffered further material decline as the population was not able any more

to provide the sangha with the same financial support through donations as earlier.63

The government attempted to subsume all issues by and large related to building under the header socialist endeavour No matter whether it concerned health issues64 or questions of the right way to lead the revolution65, Socialism was presented

nation-as the appropriate way to address all issues

65 “We are now in the throes of a social revolution But this can only be achieved, as in the

previous case, with the co-operation of the ludu Hence the importance of mass organisation cannot be minimised Workers and peasant form the basis of that mass organisation That should

be well understood They must prepare themselves for the leading role they are to play in the building up of a Socialist society If they are not co-operative, the goal set for them can never be realised Now, of course, the Army leads But it leads for the preparatory period But what is

In a nutshell, the RC had initiated radical policies of socialism through in

particular economic nationalisation They considered constitutional reform as a way to achieve their socialist goals The RC distanced themselves from parliamentary period politics and saw them as dominated by bourgeois and divisive party political interests Issues of ethnic insurgent movements were rather addressed through combat than political or institutional reform

“The Enemy who is more destructive than Nargis” 66 , a Nation under Threat:

Myanmar since 1988

By the late 80’s BSPP government had lost control of the economic development

of the country Stagnation accompanied by impoverishment of the population,

demonetisation of certain currency notes and the announcement that Myanmar had reached Least Developed Country status by 1987 resulted in the nadir of popularity for the BSPP government The demonstrations held by students and the civilian population

in August and September 1988 triggered by these developments led to the downfall of the BSPP and a military takeover of state power Attempts of the BSPP to appease the demonstrating public by announcing multi-party elections were unsuccessful, the

government had lost trust among the population and their announcements of multi-party elections were greeted with disbelief

Dr Maung Maung of the BSPP saw handing over power to the military as the only way out of the prevailing conflict He had been appointed chairman of the BSPP and president of Burma in August 1988 in a last attempt to solve the tense political situation peacefully Earlier in his career he had served as judge, judicial minister,

member of the council of state in 1974 and the central executive committee of the BSPP

He believed in constitutional reform and had hoped to facilitate a peaceful constitutional transition of power by serving as president.67 His political experience did not help him in negotiating a political settlement The military not only ended the economic policies of the BSPP government, but also abandoned socialism completely and entered an

altogether new ideological era

leadership without a following? And whom will one follow in the absence of leadership?” Working People’s Daily, March 27, 1966

66 New Light of Myanmar, June 8, 2008

67 Robert H Taylor (Ed), Dr Maung Maung: Gentlemen, Scholar, Patriot (Singapore: ISEAS,

2008), 526

The new government, called the SLORC until 1997 and then renamed into the SPDC, announced its plan to hold on to power only until peace and order were re-

established in the country The takeover was not prepared or planned beforehand In

1958 the takeover of the military had been planned and the army was equipped to deal with the pressing issues In 1988, the loss of power for the BSPP government came by surprise and no initial plan was drawn on how to address the prevailing concerns or which ideology to follow.68 The political situation demanded restoration of law and order and precisely these issues became the main concerns of the military government

The SLORC/SPDC quickly developed a nation-building strategy and vocabulary By November 1988 they adopted the practice to publish pro-military slogans on the front paper of the Working People’s Daily, the government-run newspaper (after 1992

renamed into New Light of Myanmar).69 Soon, not only the front page was decorated with propaganda slogans, but many publications and speeches were dominated by text passages that glorified the role of the military in building the post-independence

Myanmar nation The military pledged their “Noble Desire”70 in the newspaper, described their achievements and reminded citizens of their duties daily.71 These slogans and

“Our three main national causes”

68 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and factional struggles in post-independence Burmese governments,”

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39.1 (2008): 163

69 On November 8, 1988 the following slogan appeared for the first time on the front page of the

Working People’s Daily: “Only when the rule of law and order and peace and tranquillity prevail

would the lives, homes and properties of the people be safe and secure; only then would they be able to earn their livelihood in peace and freedom The Tatmadaw is carrying out this duty and all nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task.”

70 The “Noble Desire” was printed for the first time on the front page of the Working People’s Daily

on February 19, 1990: “Although the State law and order Restoration Council has had to take over, due to unavoidable circumstances, the sovereign power of the State to prevent the Union from disintegration and for ensuring the safety and security of the lives, homes and property of the people, it wishes to retransfer State power to the people, in whom it was initially invested, through democratic means within the shortest time possible Therefore, the entire people are urged to give all their co-operation to ensure the rule of law and for prevalence of peace and tranquillity.”

71 The following slogans are the most common quotations in the Working People’s Daily/New Light of Myanmar after February 1990: “Only when the people are able to enjoy convenient and easy livelihood would they be physically and mentally at peace The Tatmadaw is carrying out this duty and all nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task;” “The Tatmadaw has been sacrificing much of its blood and swear to prevent

disintegration of the Union All nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task;” “The interest of the state cannot be served and promoted by

disturbances and instability, join hands with the Tatmadaw in preventing disturbances and acts of instability;” and “Only when there is security and efficiency in transportation and communication would there be convenience in travel, commerce and earning of livelihood The Tatmadaw is carrying out this duty and all nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task.”

 Non-disintegration of the Union - our cause!

 Non-disintegration of national sovereignty - our cause!

 Consolidation of national sovereignty - our cause!72

culminated in the formulation of the 12 national goals The 12 national goals first

appeared on the front page of the New Light of Myanmar on July 6, 1995, were printed somewhere daily in the newspaper for another six month and ever since January 1996 are printed daily on the front page of the New Light of Myanmar The 12 national goals encompass the following political, economic and social objectives:

Four political objectives

 Stability of the State, community peace and tranquillity, prevalence of law and order

 National reconsolidation

 Emergence of a new enduring State Constitution

 Building of a new modern developed nation in accord with the new State Constitution

Four economic objectives

 Development of agriculture as the base and all–round development of other sectors of the economy as well

 Proper evolution of the market-oriented economic system

 Development of the economy inviting participation in terms of technical how and investments from sources inside the country and abroad

know- The initiative to shape the national economy must be kept in the hands of the state and the national peoples

Four social objectives

 Uplift of he moral and morality of the entire nation

 Uplift of national prestige and integrity and preservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage and national character

 Uplift of dynamism of patriotic spirit

 Uplift of health, fitness and education standards of the entire nation

72 Working People’s Daily, March 26, 1990

These goals described the appropriate way “towards a modern nation through all-round development.”73

In the absence of a particular political vision that formed the basis of military rule and a need to legitimate one’s rule, the military turned its immediate September 1988 crisis vocabulary into a long-term strategy The notion of non-disintegration of the Union and national sovereignty formed an important bedrock of SLORC/SPDC ideology In order to feel compelled to prevent the disintegration of the Union and national

sovereignty a tangible threat needed to be produced Whether this threat is tangible or realistic in the Myanmar case can be doubted, but more important here is, that the

military created this threat in their propaganda like writings and speeches Saw Maung (SLORC chairman, 1988 – 1992) and Khin Nyunt (intelligence chief 1984 - 2004 and later prime minister 2003 - 2004) published books in 1989 that contributed to the notion

of dangerous conspiracies towards the Myanmar nation Khin Nyunt elaborated on an alleged Communist Party of Burma (CBP) – Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

conspiracy in his publication According to Khin Nyunt the CBP and CIA had initiated the

1988 demonstrations and were controlling the National League for Democracy (NLD) Saw Maung elaborated on the role of British Broadcasting Company (BBC), Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) and the lies they were spreading to cause unrest and instability.74 During the last 20 years not much has changed in the approach

of the government to create and portray enemies The statement “Skyful liars attempting

to destroy nation: BBC lying, VOA deceiving, RFA setting up hostilities Beware! Don’t

be bought by this ill-wisher,”75 was published in a June 2008 issue of the New Light of Myanmar, can be found on many other days throughout the last 20 years regularly in the New Light of Myanmar

The army declared martial law and annulled the constitution in September 1988 Democratic elections were promised by SLORC and political parties were allowed to register Elections were held in 1990 and won by the NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin

Oo and Aung Gyi Political power was not handed over to the NLD, but stayed in the hands of the military The SLORC announced that a national convention was about to

73 New Light of Myanmar, January 28, 1996, Sunday supplement

74 74 James F Guyot and John Badgley, “Myanmar in 1989: Tatmadaw V”, Asian Survey 30.2

(1990): 189

75 New Light of Myanmar, June 11, 2008

convene that would draft a new constitution The new constitution was to ensure the

“non-disintegration of the Union; non-disintegration of national sovereignty; consolidation and perpetuation of sovereignty.” 76 The military government has a liking for portraying in particular Burmese political groups as subversive elements They are discredited for undermining stability of the state, to invite chaotic situations or to defy any government activity:

”11 expatriate destructive elements including former ABSDF member Ko Oo (a)

My Oo arrested “At a time when the government is endeavouring for building tasks to bring about better foundation for future State after laying down political, economic and social objectives for emergence of a democratic state, expatriate NLD anti-government organisations outside the country and terrorist groups are committing destructive acts in various means to disparage the dignity

nation-of the government and to incite civil uprising.”77

A more recent example that illustrates the same objectives locates NLD in latest political events in Myanmar:

“As is known to all, NLD sticks to the policy of disturbing the State and people Maybe it has laid down a policy “Oppose whatever the government does” in addition to the mottoes such as “utter devastation”, “confrontation” and “defy every order” […] NLD issued a special announcement dated 10 June 2008 The theme of the announcement was to oppose the already-approved State

constitution (draft)(2008) […] The State constitution (2008) was approved with the support of 92.48 per cent of the voters or the support of more than none of every then voters […] Traumatized by nearly cent-per-cent of the people

nodded, NLD made various accusations saying it was unfair, the people were forced and threatened and the government abused the power […] So, NLD should choose the way in which the party is to stand for the 2010 election in accord with the already approved constitution so as to continue its survival.”78Besides accusing political parties of inciting unrest and civil disobedience, a repeated charge of the government relates to receiving outside financial support

According to Myanmar law it was illegal for political parties to receive financial support from funding agencies outside Myanmar The government portrays domestic political parties to function as puppets of outside funding organisations, more specifically

Western organisations and governments

76 Working People’s Daily, October 3, 1992

77 New Light of Myanmar, July 13, 2000

78 New Light of Myanmar, June 16, 2008

Figure 1.1 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar August 13, 2000

The image above illustrates the accusation of being (financial) dependent

puppets in a vivid manner On the club of the left baseball player the letters ABSDF (All Burma Students Democratic Front) are written The ABSDF was formed in November

1988 along the Thai – Myanmar border as a result of the demonstrations in August and September 1988 Many students had fled to Thailand to escape the grip of military In order to continue the political struggle that had been taken out into the public by students and concerned citizens in mid 1988 some of the political refugees decided to organise a formal organisation that would continue its political struggle by way of armed force and political activities

The batter is branded “neo-colonialist”, the pitcher has written the words NGO on his shirt and is labelled “runaway, fugitive” and the field player is the “internal axe-

handle” Their thought clouds are illustrating their intentions The “neo-colonialist” is attempting to interfere in internal affairs, the “internal axe-handle” is his subservient domestic intermediary who executes whatever the outsider plans and the runaway fugitive throws instructions at the neo-colonialist ABSDF and the internal axe-handle are tightly held by the neo-colonialist who does not let go of the club, or allegorical spoken of the influence on Burmese political activists

Figure 1.2 Signboard opposite the former American embassy

The government does not only communicate the idea of the necessity to be aware of enemies of the nation through newspapers or speeches, but in other public ways as well Signboards are placed in strategic positions to remind the public of who the enemy is Above is a photograph of a signboard that proclaims the:

 Oppose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State

 Crash all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy

This signboard was placed opposite the former American embassy on Merchant Road in Yangon However, it was destroyed during the cyclone Nargis and only

shattered pieces of the “people’s desire” were to be found on Merchant Road after the storm Similarly, an identical signboard that had been placed at the corner of University Avenue and Kabe Aye Pagoda Road close to the house of Aung San Suu Kyi was destroyed by Nargis

Complementary to the notion of needing to fear the nation’s enemy is the strong call for national unity by the government The call for unity has played an important role throughout post-colonial Myanmar and is not a new feature of the SPDC government