Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites 3

Therefore, they must adopt village elections, which may become models for the other provinces and then major political elites in charge of village self-governance affair can craft and su

Chapter 3 Delivery1: Roles and Strategies of Provincial Elites2

Regarding policy implementation in China, a common practice is that once the law, rules and regulations, policies of village elections and self-governance were established and publicized, they should become effective in all the provinces at roughly the same time However, the implementation of village self-governance did not occur at the same time all provinces at This chronological disparity poses an interesting question: What are the causes for this phenomenon? There are three factors that could be decisive

as to whether or not a locality would adopt a policy, and how it should be implemented: intrinsic properties of the policy, a local politics, and the pressures from upper and low levels of the Chinese government The diffusion or implementation of policy among provinces in China is naturally a complicated phenomenon3, and one factor alone cannot offer a complete explanation

This chapter focuses on the role of political elites at the provincial level, an intermediate level of government in China4, on their networks in the process of village

1

Frederick Teiwes has noticed the importance of province level elites as the critical point of interface between policy-makers and policy-implementers See Frederik Teiwes, “Provincial Politics in China:

Themes and Variations,” in China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, ed John Lindbeck (Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 1971), 116-192

of village self-governance Political elites at the intermediate play a role of diffusing, but diffusion would encounter some difficulties as it proceeds

4

“Local” does not always refer to a small area This term can be applied to anywhere outside the political

democracy, and particularly on their crafting strategies Provincial elites play an important role in conditioning institutional environment of village self-governance, which

is crucial to the spread of the central government’s policy The key point is whether these actors can succeed in activating some vital governmental agencies within their own administrative zone to put village self-governance mechanism in action Therefore, they must adopt village elections, which may become models for the other provinces and then major political elites in charge of village self-governance affair can craft and supply more democratic institutions and policies for village democracy

self-Before putting forward and explaning key questions, it is necessary for us to weigh the democratic quality of village elections by some measures However, it is

center and below the national level of interaction In Chinese political terms, “local” political units include all subdivisions of a political system hierarchically inferior to the national state and party, usually referring

to the township, county (city), and the provincial levels Further, as Goodman said, although provinces are often referred to as “local” in China, “they are more accurately regarded as an intermediate level of government” See David S.G Goodman, “Structuring Local Identity: Nation, Province and County in

Shanxi during the 1990s,” The China Quarterly 172 (2002): 839-840

5

International Republic Institute, “China’s Village Elections Law Improved,” IRI Working Paper (Winter 1998), at <http://www.iri.org/pub.asp?id=2689935565> (accessed: 20/12/2003)

somewhat difficult to measure the degree of democracy The Ministry of Civil Affairs introduced four criteria for democratic elections at the village level: (a) that the chairman, vice chairman, and members of village committees be directly elected by the villager themselves, (b) that the number of candidates exceeds the number of positions, (c) that voting be conducted by secret ballot, and (d) that the winning candidates receive more than half the votes.6

Yet some questions naturally arise here Why in terms of village elections are some provinces more democratic than others? Why can the institution of village self-governance and village elections be successfully implemented in some areas whereas in others areas it can’t? A further question can be asked in view of the fact that 30 provinces

in China were granted equal rights to establish village self-government by the Chinese Constitution of 1982 and the Organic Law of 1987 One may ask why some village elections have won praise and approval from the central government, foreign observers as well, from the villagers, while others elections have not Can this new institution really grow and develop at various paces in different areas with similar political background? In Robert D Putnam’ words, what makes democracy work?

6

Larry Diamond and Ramon H Myers assert that to be democratic, elections must not only be regular, competitive and meaningful, they must be also free and fair See Larry Diamond and Ramon H Myers,

“Introduction: Elections and Democracy in Greater China,” in Elections and Democracy in Greater China,

eds Larry Diamond and Ramon H Myers (Oxford University Press, 2000), 2-3 Robert A Pastor and Qingshan Tan assess the democratic quality of village elections by three objective criteria: openness of nomination and selection of candidates, choice among candidates, and secret ballot They further pointed out that one should judge an election within the context of a country’s history See Robert A Pastor and

Qingshan Tan, “ The Meaning of China’s Village Elections,” in Elections and Democracy in Greater China,

eds Larry Diamond and Ramon H Myers (Oxford University Press, 2000), 142-143 Wang Zhenyao et al once present seven criteria: (1) the harmonious extent between township governments and village committees; (2) the standardization of township governmental guidance to village committee’s work; (3) enlargement and institutional insurance of villager’s democratic voting (4) the development and institutional insurance of democratic policy-making; (5) fulfillment and institutional insurance of democratic management; (7) self-governance and democratic culture See Wang Zhenyao, Bai Gang and

Wang Zhongtiao eds., Zhongguo cunmin zizhi qianyan (The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance)

(Beijing: China’s Social Sciences Press, 2000), 291

Using the above criteria, it seems that Fujian, Jilin, Liaoning, Sichuan, Hebei, Shanxi, Hunan, and Yunan (after 2000) are ranked as top eight, while Guangxi (before 2000), Guangdong, Yunan(before 2000), Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui etc are ranked as the bottom ones in village self-governance at provincial level.7 Additionally, Lishu County of Jilin Province, Qianxi County of Hebei Province, Linyi County of Shanxi Province, Xuchang County of Hennan Province, Linli County of Hunan Province, and Longyang City of Fujian Province are ranked as top six at county level.8

3.1.2 The Modernization Model and Empirical Facts

The modernization model here simply means “modernization breeds democratic development” In other words this model is defined as economic development giving rise

to a democracy in a given society, and there may be a correlated relationship between the level of economic development and democratic operation and quality In Chapter 1, this study reviewed the literature in English and Chinese on China’s village elections and economy, finding it mostly focusing on the relationship between economic development

at village level and village election, and only in a few cases on the relationship between regional or provincial economy and village elections An empirical fact is that the locality shares the same political system, whereas the central government has applied the same institutional arrangement to every province, both coastal areas and interior provinces

7

In Village Elections: Roots of Democratization in China, Emerson M.S Niou ranked Jilin, Liaoning,

Xinjiang, Fujian, and Sichuan as the top five, while Yuan, Shanghai, Henan, Anhui, and Guangxi as the bottom five This ranking is different from my findings It seems that there are two main reasons for this difference: one is the difference in criteria of assessment; another reason is that Niou’s research was done in

1998, but since that year, village self-governance has developed rapidly, and its nature has changed greatly

See Emerson M.S Niou, “Village Elections: Roots of Democratization in China,” in How Asia Votes, eds

John Fuh-sheng Hiseh and David Newman (New York: Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), 19-31

8

In The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance, Wang Zhenyao et al describe the details of village

self-governance in these counties

However, the quality of village elections vary greatly by province, so the progress each provincial government can make following this institutional arrangment is going to be different, and not necessarily successful

The questions are then “Does economy matter” in village democracy and are modernization approaches suitable to explain the above empirical facts? Theoretically, in poor provinces, officials are not interested in or do not see the value of village elections, and may pay little attention to increasing transparency and competitiveness of the elections Villagers in these provinces should focus their concerns on securing food and shelter, not on methods of improving local governance Conversely, in some wealthier provinces, prosperity should lead villagers to increase demands for popular control and autonomy, and officials can promote the development of village elections and self-government However, the reality challenges the modernization model The truth is different from the theoretical assumptions For instance, Gansu, a poor province, and Guangdong, a wealthy province by Chinese standard, are two typical examples In Gansu, provincial and local leaders spearheaded efforts to increase the democratic nature of village elections, but in Guangdong, one of China’s most wealthy areas, there was the greatest resistance to instituting electoral reforms until 1998

According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs officials, the provinces at the middle level of economic development, like Fujian, Lianing, Jilin and Hunan, have developed village elections most vigorously and have been the most successful From the following three tables, we can clearly see that there is not a linear or casual relationship between the economic development and democratic quality of village self-governance at the provincial level Table 3.1 shows that among the top 7 provinces with village self-governance, in 1990 when China began to enter a real stage of development in village

Table 3.1 Average Income of Rural Residents (Unit: yuan)

2048.59 (7)

3091.39 (7)

3230.49 (7)

3380.72 (7) Jilin 413.74

(9)

803.52 (8)

1609.60 (12)

2260.59 (11)

2022.50 (17)

2182.22 16) Liaoning 467.84

(7)

836.17 (7)

1756.50 (9)

2501.04 (9)

2355.58 (10)

2557.93 (10) Hebei 385.23

(15)

621.67 (19)

1668.73 (11)

2441.50 (10)

2478.86 (9)

2603.60 (9) Hunan 395.26

(13)

664.24 (16)

1425.16 (17)

2127.46 (15)

2197.16 (13)

2299.46 (12) Shanxi 358.32

(19)

603.51 (21)

1208.30 (21)

1772.62 (22)

1905.61 (22)

1956.05 (22) Sichuan 315.07

(25)

557.76 (24)

1158.29 (23)

1843.47 (21)

1903.60 (21)

1986.99 (19) Second is the top five in economic development but lower rank in village self-

governance

Shanghai 805.92

(1)

1907.32 (1)

4245.61 (1)

5409.11 (1)

5596.37 (1)

5870.87 (1) Beijing 775.08

(2)

1297.05 (2)

3223.65 (2)

4226.59 (2)

4604.55 (2)

5025.50 (2) Zhejiang 548.60

(4)

1099.04 (3)

2966.19 (3)

3948.39 (3)

4253.67 (3)

4582.34 (3) Guangd-

ong

495.31

(5)

1043.03 (5)

2699.24 (4)

3628.95 (4)

3654.48 (4)

3769.79 (6) Jiangsu 492.60

(6)

959.06 (6)

2456.86 (5)

3495.20 (5)

3595.09 (6)

3784.71 (5)

* (1) (2)…are ranks of provincial economic development levels

Sources: (a) Rural China’s Statistics Yearbook (1991-1995) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1996); (b) 1986 Chinese Statistics Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1987)

elections In some provinces (Fujian, Jilin, Liaoning) peasant income is above the national average, and in the rest province (Sichuan, Hebei, Hunan and Shanxi) it is below that In 1999, the first year when the new Organic Law of Village Committee was enacted, some provinces’ (Fujian, Liaoning, Jilin and Hebei) peasant income is above the national average, some (Hunan, Shanxi, and Sichuan) below, whereas at the

corresponding period Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangsu were the top 5

in terms of peasant’s income across China, but the lower ranks in terms of village governance, and furthermore the first village elections in Guangdong did not occur until

self-1998 One conclusion that can be drawn from this information is that there is not a direct relation between provincial economy and village self-governance development level and quality

Emerson M.S Niou compared village elections’ quality and economic development among provinces in 1998 (see Table 3.2) After comparing, he argues that

no final conclusion has yet been reached on the relationship between economic elements and village self-governance According to Niou, the political element is a main force to switch on village self-governance, while the economic element is at most just a motive force.9

Again, I choose Zhejiang, the richest province after Shanghai and Beijing in terms

of rural resident income, and Fujian, one of the most successful provinces in village governance, to make a comparison Table 3.3 well illustrates that from 1995 to 2002, for many years Zhejiang was better than Fujian in terms of net income of rural resident and per-capita GDP But according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the former has lagged behind in village self-governance, being on the verge of the lower ranks, while the latter has been ranked as one of the top provinces in democratic quality of village elections and self-governance Actually even within the same province or same prefecture, some counties with better economic development do not necessarily have better village self-governance We can draw the conclusion that at least within the past 20 years there is not

self-9

Emerson M.S Niou, “Jingji yinsu dui cunmin zizhi fazhan de yingxiang” (“The Influence of Economic Elements on Village Self-governance”), at <http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk.asp> (accessed: 20/12/2003)

Table 3.2 Village Elections’ Quality and Economic Development among Provinces in

Table 3.3 Main Indicators of National Economy In Zhejiang and Fujian (1995-2002)

Per-capita GDP (yuan) Net Income of Rural Residents

(yuan) Year

ZJ Ranking FJ Ranking ZJ Ranking FJ Ranking

1995 8074 5 6787 7 2966 3 2049 7

1996 9455 5 7990 7 3463 3 2492 7

1997 10515 4 9179 6 3684 2 2786 7

1998 11247 4 10066 6 3815 3 2946 7

1999 12037 4 10797 6 3948 3 3091 7

2000 13461 4 11601 7 4254 3 3230 7

2001 14655 4 12362 7 4582 3 3381 7

2002 16838 4 13497 7 4940 3 3539 7

ZJ: Zhejiang province FJ: Fujian province Sources: Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook (1996-2003) (Beijing: China Statistics Press), and Fujian Statistics Yearbook (1996-2003) (Beijing: China Statistics Press)

3.1.3 Focus on Provincial Political Elites’ Roles and Strategies for Delivery

Hence, the modernization model alone cannot explain why village elections work well in some provinces but not in others.11 This question then arises: Why is China’s case a little different from the general pattern at least in the short terms? There are two elements that may help to explain it On the one hand, as a kind of reform, village self-governance is a policy from top to bottom Thus how to implement this policy is directly dependent on the officials at the intermediate zone On the other hand, compared with economic development, the village self-governance is a secondary task under the currently pressured political hierarchy

Lang Youxing, Xunzhao minzhu yu quanwei de pingheng: Zhejiangshen cunmin xuanju jingyan yanjiu (In Search of a Balance between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Study on the Experiences of Zhejiang Province in Village Elections) (Central China Normal University Press, 2002), 152-180

11

Actually this model cannot explain the democratization in East Asia See Gerald L Curtis, “A ‘Recipe’

for Democratic Development,” in Democracy in East Asia, eds Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner (The

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 219

From the point of the cost-benefit calculus of the implementation, village self-governance

is not beneficial at least to local leaders as economic development is Thus, one strategy many local leaders probably adopt is “bandwagoning”, because the cost of

“bandwagoning” is the smallest The lower cost of implementing village self-governance

is also not a rigid task as are those of economic development, family birth plan and social stability Bandwagoning is a gradual process as it refers to not implementing village self-governance too fast or too slowly, too actively or too passively, for pushing ahead or lagging too far behind meant potentially political risk While village election is just a soft task to local leaders, conversely, to a great extent its situation depends on local leaders’ attitudes, cognitions and democratic ideas, and performances In other words, it depends

on how political elites craft rural democracy At the provincial level, provincial leaders’ understanding of and attitudes to village elections from Party Committee, government and the People’s Congress, the Civil Affairs department director’s ability to organize village self-governance affairs and the supervision from the department of local governance are the basic forces putting forward village elections This study assumes here that since there

is no direct relationship between economy and village democracy at the provincial level, the quality of village elections is then directly relative to attitudes, cognition and democratic ideas, and performances of political elites Thus, we can further assume that if the provincial leaders are more active in promoting village elections and self-governance,

if the provincial civil affairs agency is closer to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and if more provincial civil affairs elites can gain support from provincial top leaders, then the political elites in charge of village self-governance have a higher capability of crafting village democracy and the village elections are more likely to be successful

Scholars and many political elites in charge of village self-governance have taken note of this trend Two American scholars made a hypothesis to “explain why some elections conform to the norms of free elections and others do not: leadership in the provincial civil affairs ministry.”12 In one report, MCA argues that “If leading officials of the province support village self-government and the provincial civil affairs bureau adopts effective measures, the election of villagers committees in that province will be effectively organized In a few localities where individual leaders do not endorse villagers’ self-government, not only the implementation methodologies for the ‘Organic Law of the villagers Committees’ will not be adopted, but the election itself will be hard

to implement ”13 In an interview, Mr Yan Mingfu, a former Vice Minister of MCA who was in charge of village elections and self-government, argued that although both structural elements such as economic development and persons are equally important to village elections, people must admit that persons or leaders are indeed very important Why are some village elections and self-governance conducted well and others not? Mr Wang Zhenyao’s answer focuses on local leaders’ attitudes and understandings Zhan Chengfu, incumbent chief of the Division of Rural Work, Department of Basic-level Governance in MCA, pointed out that this was due to two factors, the trial nature of the first Organic Law and the independence of provincial government in China He illustrated his point with Fujian province, which was leading the nation in institutionalizing competitive village elections while Guangdong province did not even have real village

12

Robert A Pastor and Tan Qingshan, “The Meaning of Village Elections,” 136

13

Department of Basis-Level Government Construction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Guanyu

1995-1996 niandu quanguo 24 ge sheng zizhiqu zhxiasi cunweihui huanjie xuanju gongzuo fenxi” (“An Anlysis

of Village Committees’ Elections in 24 Provinces in 1995-1996”), MCA Report: no.16 (September 1996)

elections until late 1998.14 Liu Yudong, the director of the Department of Grassroots power and Community Construction of Jilin’s Civil Affairs, and other officials interviewed attribute the uneven democratic quality of village elections in China to several factors, but they argue that the role of civil affairs departments is directly related

to it.15

We can draw a conclusion that a majority of the development of village elections

is dependent on provincial officials’ support and crafting One official report summarizes this point well: “Rural democracy in China needs propaganda, propagating the laws and regulations concerned and then let peasants know them very clearly is fundamental to conduct village elections and implement village self-governance in accordance with the law Chinese rural democracy needs support, the strong supports from party and government, and People’s congress at different levels is a political condition to perform village elections and self-governance well Rural democracy needs instruction, for the specific instruction can promote rural democratization process Rural democracy legal institutions’ guarantee, the Organic Law, local laws and regulations, and institute guarantee the development of rural democracy healthily.”16 However, elite-driven democratization is a double-edged sword One of its defects is that the process of rural

16

Journal of Township Forum and Rural Desk of Department of Grassroots Administration of the Ministry

of Civil Affairs, 1999 niandu nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jaishe ziliao huibian (1999’ Excerpts of Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy) (Beijing, 2000),162-163

democratization will change or be affected with alternations in the leadership or in the views or focus of the attention of any leader.17

3.2 Key Actors and Networking

It is evident that the crafting of political elites’ matters for the elections’ success Then, we find that there are three aspects to consider when we examine what has shaped the political elites’ crafting: the key political elites, their network, and the strategies they employed to promote village democracy This section and the following two will analyze them respectively

3.2.1 Institutional Space: A Prerequisite for Local Political Elite’s crafting

17

Zhejiang’s case is a typical one for indicating that in rural China, elite-driven democratization is a double-edged sword Zhejiang’s case also shows the important role of leading political elites in law formulation and the implementation of the law and policies concerned In terms of the provincial implementation methods of the Organic Law, Zhejiang is in the leading position as the second province, a result of top elite’s contribution In the first half of 1987 just before the Organic Law was passed, Peng Zhen organized one forum in Hangzhou to collect ideas and suggestions for the coming bill of the Organic Law in the legislature It was at this meeting that pushed Zhejiang Provincial leaders went a step further in formulating the provincial implementation methods Obviously, timing was of the essence for Zhejiang to formulate this law In 1988, just a year after the Organic Law was passed, Zhejiang passed the Methods of Implementation of the Organic Law This law formulation was not devoid of Peng Zhen’s influence However, during the 1980s, few local leaders recognized the meaning of village self-governance, even though the Organic law had passed in 1987 Many leaders in Zhejiang did not hold identical views on this issue, and local leaders did not willingly implemented the law Particularly after the 1989 Tian An Men’ incident, some provincial leaders argued that the Organic law was one cause of this incident and Zhao Zhiyang’s legacy The central committee held one meeting in Liaxi of Shantong Province in 1990, named the “Laixi Meeting” While relaying the spirit of the “Laixi Meeting” the secretary of Zhejiang provincial Party Committee at that time thought this law was ahead of its time, while other leaders also argued too that

it was like “Letting primary school students read the book meant for college students” Further, he became the Zhejiang’s secretary of the CCP in 1997, Zhang Dejiang (who was the former vice Minister of Civil Affairs and Jilin’s secretary of the CCP which was one of the leading provinces in village self-government) was not interested in village elections but instead focused his attention on Zhejiang’s urbanization Unlike the other provinces such as Fujian and Jilin, no leading political elites in Zhejiang paid attention to the issue

of village self-governance As a result, according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, despite being the second province formulating the provincial implementation methods, Zhejiang has lagged behind in terms of village self-government for some time The source is from He Zhiquan, a formal head of Department of Grassroots Government and Community Construction of Zhejiang Bureau of Civil Affairs, interviewed by the author, Hangzhou, August 2, 2002

Institutional space here mainly refers to the emergence of local autonomy and decentralization, which has created the conditions for the political elites to craft, to manipulate, or to thwart village democracy in China

The emergence and enforcement of local autonomy resulted from two factors The first is decentralization Since the beginning of the 1980s, China has gradually started to decentralize However, “Initiatives by central governments to decentralize significant responsibilities to local government are growing worldwide”.18 Decentralization is beneficial to institutional innovation With decentralization the local government is granted some opportunities to carry out experiments in policy, which may promote new ways of working and thinking And the competition among locales is helpful for the dissemination and acceptation of new institutions Decision-making and policy implementation now become more pluralist and complex with the decentralization

The second is local economic development and expansion, which provide local governments with more bargaining power in management of public affairs with the central government The transferring power to a lower level government resulted in local economic development and the emergence of local economic powers Economical localism, on the other hand, may possibly be accompanied by political localism.19 In

Selective Policy Implementation, Kevin O’Brien and Jianjiang Li analyses how local

cadres selectively implement central polices.20 In a word, the decentralization of the

system means more decision-making power is given to the local units of government, and more autonomy for political elites to act on local affairs

The Organic Law leaves political elites room to craft village democracy, but the law also leaves them a margin for their manipulation The Organic Law is vague in some articles, resulting in different interpretations and implementations Even after the formal issuing of the Organic Law in 1998, provincial level laws and regulations are not treated

as mandatory On the other hand Article 20 of the Organic Law also empowered the People’s Congress of the provinces, autonomous regions and centrally-administrated municipalities to formulate implementation methods of this law, which gives provincial governments some leeway to address issues in the light of local conditions What is more, numerous institutions and policies in China seem to be ambiguous in one way or another

An ambiguous policy leaves room for more choices and adaptations at the provincial and lower levels, and room for local political players to act more freely

In the final analysis, autonomy of local leaders is a double-edged sword for village democracy The autonomy or discretion has a variety of consequences and implications, which are not all positive It is argued that the autonomy may lead to an increase in control or manipulation of village elections, thus actually thwarting the implementation of village self-governance It may also lead to the emergence of political localization Despite its possible drawbacks, however, we would like to see the decentralization in a more positive light, viewing it as necessary for local political elites’ crafting of village democracy

3.2.2 Key Actors: Roles, Motives and Attitudes of Political Elites within Provincial Civil Affairs System

Since the basic institutional design, rules and regulations, and policies supplied by the central government are practically the same for all the regions and local governments, what make a difference are the political elites at the intermediate zone, the provinces Here we will look at the political elites in terms of three dimensions: democratic ideas, motives and elite structure or network

The Elites of the Civil Affairs System as the Elite Core and Their Roles

Provinces have traditionally been important political and administrative units in the Chinese bureaucratic state, located at the middle level that is sandwiched between the central government and the grassroots government Provincial elites primarily design rules and regulations, set policies, investigate the enforcement of laws We should remember, however, that Civil Affairs system is in an exceptional position in village self-governance, while its elites are regarded as the core of crafting village democracy

Yunnan province’s case is typical for illustrating the importance of the roles played by the civil affairs officials at the provincial level Yunnan is one of several provinces that did not implement the Organic Law and thus did not conduct village elections until 1998 when the New Organic Law was passed In 1987 when the Provisional Organic Law was enacted, the provincial leaders argued that Yunnan was an exception because of the significant number of ethnic minorities living within its borders, and refused to implement this law Moreover, the leaders of the Department of Civil Affairs and local governments were not active in village self-governance However, things began to change in 1999 when the branch of grassroots power had a new leader With great interest in village self-governance, the new leader actively made a draft of Yunnan’s implementation methods of Villagers’ Committee Election and other relative

rules and regulations, learning from the experiences of other provinces The province began to conduct village elections in 2000, and is now becoming a pioneer of village self-governance

As an institutional arrangement, village self-governance is a top-down imbuing process, a bestowal from external actors In this sense, we can say that village self-governance is an essentially “distributive politics”, a process of diffusion and mediation, while political elites at provincial level take on the role of “transmission belt” By distributive politics here we mean that political elites at the intermediate zone distribute and diffuse the central laws, regulations, and policies We can thus say these elites are activators, inducers, mediators, integrators, and promoters of village elections To a great extent whether they can effectively and skillfully or creatively play these roles above determine the quality of village elections

The elites are not only activators, inducers, mediator, integrator, a promoter of village elections and self-governance, but they are craftsmen too Based on their opportunities and willingness, we can use “crafting model” to illustrate how some elites can creatively or skillfully implement and promote village democracy and offer more democratic institutions and relevant policies for villagers They are possibly the most significant craftsmen of village democracy Of course, these elites also have some opportunities to manipulate village elections

The provincial civil affairs system is designated to be in charge of the routine work on the construction of the grassroots governance and guide the work of village self-governance The civil affairs’ organ therefore plays a crucial role in promoting village democracy The functions of the Civil Affairs Department at the provincial level mainly include: (1) determine election dates; (2) arrange for legislation and work out

implementation methods of laws concerned; (3) determine the basic process of elections; (4) summarize and spread the advanced experiences and models; (5) supervise election proceedings and correct violations

Attitudes and Motives

As Montesquieu argues, leaders craft one institution during the process of new regime emergence, while the institution conversely crafts its leaders later on Probably basing his ideas on this logic, Shi Tianjian argues that the key to democratic development lies on the values and attitudes of ruling elites, thus paying attention to cultural orientation of political elites and particularly the key roles in the transitional process played by them.21

The attitude towards grassroots elections of local bureaucrats at the provincial level can be different, and the attitudes of the same bureaucrats may shift over time The first type of attitude is “bandwagoning”, also named “wait-and-see.” The second is

“pioneering.” By using the word “pioneering” here we refer to going far ahead of others

in carrying out the central policy There are some possible factors for explaining pioneering behavior One is that pioneering may represent voluntary local innovations, which are probably rooted in personal convictions and democratic ideas Another is that these elites may possess very favorable local conditions to experiment with village self-governance The third is “resisting”: local leaders do not comply with the central government by way of either delaying the execution of village self-governance or bending

21

Shi Tainjian, “Political Culture: A Prerequisite for Democracy?” American Asian Review 18, no.2 (2000):

82-83

it to serve parochial interest Rural instability, low literacy and damaging policy implementation are the main reasons for opposition

Democratic practices have changed the political elites’ ideas and particularly the Civil Affairs system elites’ ideas Many leaders have gradually come to see their role, regarding it as a full time job In fact, Civil Affairs officials and villagers were initially much more sceptical, but their doubts have gradually been replaced by modest optimism More importantly, village elections have transformed political elite’s political culture Village elections have made elites more willing to accept democratic ideas, coupled with

a strong tread toward a more pragmatic approach to village democracy

The pace of implementation of village elections and self-governance is indeed associated with relative distribution of the above three attitudes and the ideas of political elites at the intermediate level In another word, elites’ attitudes and ideas are an important catalyst for their choices: pioneering pattern, resisting pattern, or bandwagon pattern There is no doubt that the governing elites’ values and attitudes are of importance

to village democracy, but it seems that their position is of more importance The following topic is comprised of this issue

Internal driving force

Internal driving force here involves two main actors: first are the officials of provincial civil affairs system, and second are local party and government chief leaders

Every division in governmental system has both its own motive and a social function One should ponder how village self-governance forms or alters the incentive structure for the actors involved, in particular, the willingness of political elites toward this and the costs and benefits of the implementation of village self-governance In a

sense we can say that the endeavors of these elites to implement village self-governance and promote village democracy are completely a by-product of their own motive, which

is to attain the divisions’ interest By differentiating organizations or agencies in power and advantages, institutions help shape various organizational interests and organizations’ collective identities, which facilitate mobilizing resources and taking collective action.22Actually, the MCA argues in a report that since the central government has empowered the civil affairs system with the charge of the spread of village self-governance, the developed approach to this is why don’t we do it with perfect assurance? The MCA encourages the civil affairs system to skillfully make use of its own administrative functions to promote village self-governance

The Civil Affairs officials at different levels constitute a team based on their common goals They wield influence upon village self-governance by virtue of their exceptional access to resources and particular control over this affair; it is village self-governance affairs that promote this position in government hierarchy During the 1950s, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the predecessor of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, was very powerful in China; for this ministry was in charge of many affairs, including public security, but it was later reorganized The Civil Affairs system is not currently an important department in government However, since being brought to international and the Central government’s attention, village elections have become a resource for promoting the Civil Affairs organization’s status This situation is one of the intrinsic motives for the elites from the Civil Affairs organization to push this project forward as far as possible

22

Local situation is logically similar to the MCA This study was mentioned in chapter 2

This study assumes here that those pioneering provinces can improve their reputation and receive benefits from the speed at which they promote village elections or innovations in crafting village democracy Fujian Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs, for example, claims in a work summary report that Fujian has won several “Number ones” in village elections and self-governance all over China We can understand why from one conference on analyzing village elections held in Ningbo City of Zhejiang Province in November 2002 A total of 11 provincial bureaus of Civil Affairs (Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Henan, Hunan, Jilin, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shanxi, and Sichuan) emphasize in their summary reports innovation in laws (procedures) or institutions of village elections and self-governance, while Zhejiang and Hubei’s reports do not use the term “innovation”, but their use of “Growing with Time” contains the same meaning, Through these terms in the summary reports the work of the Civil Affairs system is evident to chief leaders at the provincial level and then its status in government can be promoted

Because provincial bureaus of Civil Affairs are under dual leadership, they have

to answer directly to local governments Provincial Civil Affairs leaders must thus get strong supports from provincial chief leaders The next question is have these chief leaders been willing to support village elections in their own regions? In order to get this support, provincial civil affairs’ motives must be consistent with those of chief leaders and these two sets of motives should combine, which can explain why the pioneering regions in village self-governance do not have the best in economy in their regions or in all of China According to previous experiences, it should be more difficult to implement village elections in some backward regions, because local governments and particularly township governments’ fiscal interests depend mainly on agriculture and peasants’

incomes Here, the government is more willing to intervene in rural affairs In reality this

is not always the case The upper level governments usually worry about peasants’ protection and social instability due to the heavy burden on peasants, resulting in the high cost for political control of rural areas After weighing the advantages and disadvantages, earnings and cost, the provincial governments in some undeveloped regions, may actively promote the grassroots democracy This result is from the struggle for power between upper level government and grassroots and particularly township governments This calculation explains most of the upper level leaders’ efforts to push for expanding and deepening the rural democratic reform

In all, those who view village self-governance as highly beneficial would opt for pioneering while those who regard it to be damaging would resist, all of which is dependent on cost-benefit calculations Whether provincial officials would pioneer or resist or bandwagon is based on their own interests Position or role among the governmental system tends to affect their behaviors through its impact on interests as well

as attitudes and cognitions, which in turn facilitates village self-governance Hence, village self-governance is both political and bureaucratic

3.2.3 Setting up Elites’ chain: Functional Elite Networking

David Knoke pointed out, “If a point removal results in a disconnected graph, that

actor represents a cut point in the network, and the actor appears to play a liaison or

broker role in the social system Removal of a line without deleting its points may also

disconnect a network Such a line represents a bridge between system actors.”23 In the

23

David Knoke, Political Networks: the Structural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

process of rural democratization in China, the civil affairs system is a bridge linking among governmental agencies, while its elites are playing the broker role

Although political elites’ initiative and innovation are a political precondition to the development of village self-governance, they need some groups to implement concerned policies Whether this type of network exists and how strong it is, in a sense, is also important to the democratic quality of village elections Many Civil affairs system officials have acknowledged that they need to unite structurally by extensive formal and informal networks, either with other elites or with the masses/villagers, to enable them to influence and promote village elections Therefore, these elites have to construct contacts based on personal relationships To broaden their base of support for implementing village self-governance, they have to depend on informal institutions and particular personal relationships

There are some elite networks for crafting village democracy, which are mainly attached to or centered on the civil affairs system This network is multi-layered, with links between the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs, between the Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs and the County’s Bureau of Civil Affairs, between Civil Affairs and People’s Congresses at the provincial level, between Civil Affairs and the Party Organization Department at the provincial level and even county level In this network, the relationship between the MCA and the DCA constitutes an important element of local responses to village self-governance If the relationship is stable and strong enough, it will encourage local elites to pioneer, while localities lacking such a network would prefer to bandwagon

1990), 238

There is potential for elites to become united in the pursuit of common goals through this network Being embedded in the network can provide some common views

of reality, definitions of what is politically correct and wrong, and goals they ought to pursue with respect to them Network ties are conduits, or channels, through which a partner can get richer information, and at the same time “possesses considerable legitimacy or status”.24 Actually, the actors embedded in this network can get more information and support Furthermore, these elites can get more information through this stable and strong relationship

The following table (Table 3.4) is the major staff of the Provincial Bureaus of Civil Affairs in 1994 during a crucial stage of deciding whether or not to implement

village self-governance At that time an uneven democratic quality of village elections among regions was also displayed For example, Mr Zhang Zhenlang, the director of the bureau of Civil Affairs, strongly supported the promotion of village self-governance Interestingly the outstanding achievements in village elections Fujian had made at that time were strongly related to the efforts of his personnel and colleagues.25

The MCA’s model counties have strong leadership with provincial support and an excellent network with the provincial bureau of civil affairs For example, Lishu County

of Jilin Province has formed an excellent network to supervise this work Mr Fei Yongcheng (a vice secretary of Lishu party committee), Zhou Lianjun (director of Lishu bureau of Civil Affairs), Zhang Chunjiang (vice director of Civil Affairs), and Zhang

24

Joel M Podolny and Karen L Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review of Sociology,

no.24 (1998): 62-65

25

China’s Rural Village Self-governance Research Group, China’s Research Society of Basic-Level

Government, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu: zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi zhidu yanjiu baogao 1993 nianjuan (Study on the Election of Villagers Committees in Rural China )

(Beijing: China’s Society Press,1994), 112

Jianwen ( a cadre of Civil Affairs) make up the core of this group More importantly, this network has established either close work or personal contacts with Jilin’s provincial government; in particular, the department of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Foreign NGOs help nourish Lishu’s grassroots democracy It is this elite group that has propelled Lishu’s village self-governance forward, becoming a pioneer of village self- Table 3.4 The Major Staff of Provincial Departments of Civil Affairs in 199426

department

Heads of the division of the grassroots government

Fujian Zhang Zhenlang Zhang Xiaogan Zhan Xiangrong

Guangdong Xu Daosheng Huang Xianqing Lin Liqiu

Guizhou Long Yingyu Zhang Qingting Deng Xling

Hebei Zhao Zhenxing Liu Zhenqi Guo Xigui

Hubei Zhang Zhixiong Yang Zhicai Liu Chujiang

Hunan Xiao Wenhuan Cao Yuhua Yang Ze’an Li Peiwei

Inner Monolia Li Shulian Yang Jingming Wang Shoujian

Jiangsu Cheng Shaoyun Wang Jialong Xu Naibin

Jiangxi Liu Shengliang Liu Xiangsui Wang Jifeng

Liaoning Li Zhongtian Ji Lijia

Shandong Zhang Jianjun Qi Hangjian Zhang Xiqi

Shanghai Zhang Wanbin Xu Linlong Shen Yunliang Zhu Manyao Shanxi Zhao Shengping Yu Weiliang Zhang Zhenye

Sichuan Shi Jiaping Zhao Changjian Wang Zhijun Zhang Hong Tianjin Wang Shuyin Xing Shijie Wang Yansheng

Xinjiang Zhang Tong Jia Dongsheng Wang Supu Yan Peng

26

China Research Society of Basic-Level Government and China Rural Villagers Self-government

Research Group, eds., Zhongguo nongcun cunmin dabiao huiyi zhidu: zhongguo nongcun zizhi zhidu yanjiu baigao 1994 nianjuan (The Report on Villagers’ Representative Assemblies in China) (Beijing: China’s

Society Press, 1995), 108-109