Making democracy work the crafting and manipulation of chinese village democracy by political elites 4

This chapter examines the role of county and township authorities in Chinese village elections: how local leaders craft or manipulate village elections for their utilitarian purposes, an

Chapter 4 A Multifaceted Role: Political Elites at the County

and Township Levels 1

Classical elite democratic theory mainly focuses on the roles of national elites, and says very little about local elites Local elites and local democracy are perceived as part of the small picture from the point of view of elite theory Moreover, the media tends

to focus on the big picture, paying very little attention to what it sees as the relatively minor issues of local elites and local democracy This chapter attempts to fill in this research gap through an examination of the important role played by local elites in the context of Chinese village elections

This chapter examines the role of county and township authorities in Chinese village elections: how local leaders craft or manipulate village elections for their utilitarian purposes, and how they perceive village elections It will explore the strategies and attitudes of local leaders toward village elections in terms of active or passive support, resistance, and strategies of manipulation The chapter comprises four sections and a conclusion The first discusses the various roles played by local leaders in implementing village election law The second discusses their different attitudes towards village elections The third discusses the corresponding strategies The fourth discusses how some local officials intervene, influence and even manipulate village elections And finally there is a conclusion

1

The township or town government is at the lowest administrative unit of the Chinese governmental

pyramid Township (xiang) and town (zhen) are administratively of equal rank For simplicity, township is

hereafter used to refer to both of township and town In addition, we use the term ‘township authorities’ in a general way It includes both party and government leaders at the township level And county and county-

city (xian ji shi) are administratively of equal rank, and for administrative purpose a county-city is

organized as a city in China

4 1 A Multifaceted Role

Generally speaking, “village self-governance model counties” (cunmin zizhi

shifanxian) in where village self-governance conduct and develop more successfully are

those that have got leading officials’ strong support and their success is inseparable from key actors’ efforts Fei Yongcheng, deputy secretary of Lishu County’s Party Committee, Zhou Lianjun, director of Lishu’s Bureau of Civil Affairs, Liu Zhenlong, secretary of Linyi County’s Party Committee and Zhang Zonghu, director of Linyi Bureau of Civil Affaires, are typical supporters and political actors at the county’s level.2

4.1.1 A Connecting Link between Leadership Above and the Mass Down Below

As an authority of a locality, county and township governments have responsibilities for practically every aspects of local life In the current political system, they are described as a key linkage between governments and villages, particularly township leading officials are considered critical for policy implementation Provinces have traditionally been important political and administrative units in the Chinese bureaucratic state There are some differences in roles between province and county Provincial elites mainly offer rules and regulations, the policy setting, and investigation of enforcing the laws, while a county is a unit that directly organizes the implementation of village elections and self-governance And the county civil affairs system and in particular, its section of grassroots governance construction, is designated to be in charge

of the routine work on the construction of the grassroots governance and guide the work

of village self-governance Compared with township government, county government has

2

Wang Zhenyao, Bai Gang and Wang Zhongtiao eds., Zhongguo cunmin zizhi qianyan (The Frontier of China’s Village Self-governance) (Beijing: China’s Social Sciences Press, 2000), 289-290

more governmental functions as well as power to assign township leaders With the county’s effective administrative control, county, as a direct participant, is thus a major force to launch village self-governance.3 On the other hand, since county government has more scope for action than township government, the county may take a more detached attitude towards village self-governance

As the lowest level of the state administration, township authority is responsible for implementing national, provincial, and county level policies and specific directives Their intentions, working style and methods, understanding, and attitudes towards village self-governance naturally have a direct bearing on village elections

Obviously, local authorities, namely county and township governments, play a role of a link between the authorities above, the national and provincial governments, and

the masses down in the villages (cheng shang qi xia) They are an important link in

political elites’ chain of crafting village democracy, operating as a “hinge” at the meeting point of state and society If the national and provincial elites are the makers and providers of the laws and institutions concerned, the officials at county and township levels are the carriers As carriers, they pass around the instructions, policies, and laws from higher authorities

4.1.2 Coordinators, Arbitrators and Troubleshooters

The village election is sometimes accompanied by the rise of the clan forces, which may account for some of the irregularities in vote seeking When conflicts occur among villagers, a timely intervention by the township is necessary Take for example

3

Ibid., 445

what happened in Zhejiang province The vote seeking once led to violence in the election in Xijie Village of Hongqiao Township, Wenzhou municipality The township government, with the help of police force, came out and put an end to the conflict Only then was a village committee elected.4 In some villages of Shangyu city, clan forces were

so strong that the government there felt it necessary to merge these villages with their neighbors, so as to weaken the clan forces.5 On the eve of the 1999 village election, the party secretary of Laofanqiao Township, Yuyao city, Zhejiang province, warned that he would not allow any disruption to the election To ensure a smooth election, the township election committee, with assistance from the township general office of social order and security and the police, kept an eye on a number of influential local religious, factional, clan or business leaders This close scrutiny effectively prevented any disorder that might have come from any of the above sectors.6

Peasants also need the township government to act as an arbiter As we will see, the township authorities’ role of coordination and arbitration is also important in the dismissal of village committee members According to Article 16 of the Organic Law, when a village head has proved to be unfit for the post, “village committee should at the earliest stage hold a meeting of villagers and vote for the dismissal proposal” This means that the village committee should chair the dismissal meeting But when the charged village head refuses to hold such a meeting, who will then be responsible for holding the

4

Dept of Civil Affairs of Wenzhou Municipality, “Guanyu dangqian Wenzhou nongcun shehui zhian zhuangkuang de diaocha baogao” (“A Report on Current Social Order and Security in Rural Wenzhou”) (May 1994)

meeting? According to Article 4 of the electoral law, the township government should

“direct, support and assist the work of the village committee.” In the implementation of the national law, the provinces have made more concrete regulations The 1999

“Regulations for the Village Election in Zhejiang Province” stipulates that “When village committee has received the dismissal proposal for a month but has not hold the villagers’ meeting for voting, township government should help to hold the meeting for voting”

Without township’s support, it would have been impossible to remove the heads

of Bailian villages of Ruian city, Zhejiang province, which happened in 1999 and it is said that this was a first dismissal case In the dismissal cases, township authorities would try to give the impression of fairness and impartiality, which serves to strengthen their leadership Moreover, the role of township government in the dismissal process once again points to the feasibility of Chinese rural democratization through a combination of authority and democracy When some liberal intellectuals reject the role of authority in democracy, their appeal for democracy seems to be unrealistic and of little avail Villagers need local authorities to create favorable conditions for a fair and democratic election to be conducted

However, as a troubleshooter, the county authority is more crucial in handling some troubles than township government is Because under the current political system, villagers usually do not trust township government to deal with some illegal cases happening in village elections, while the People’s court does not accept those cases.7

7

Indeed, local officials are often required to play a role of final arbiter because of the lack of an independent judiciary in Chinese cultural traditions By contrast, in Australia, for example, local government elections are conducted under the auspices of an electoral commissioner and a deputy, both of whom hold independent statutory appointments, and are responsible for the impartial administration of electoral law Such a system prevents local government from intervening in and manipulating the electoral process

Additionally, according to national laws and local regulations, although People’s Congresses at different levels bear the responsibilities for accepting cases of petition and accusation from villagers, there are still some obstacles, either legislatively or operatively, for them to deal with the cases As a result, villagers or villager leaders choose appealing

to the higher authorities for help as means to solve them, and then some agencies of provincial government and county government and particularly departments of civil affairs become major agencies for villagers’ petitions Consequently, civil affairs organs play an important role in handling villagers’ petitions and conducts detailed investigations into the allegations, correcting violations

4.1.3 Institutional Crafters

We cannot ignore the role of local political elites as institutional crafters With the devolution of real authority to lower levels, local political elites can initiate policy reform Some reform-minded local leaders have actively done some important institutional innovations for village self-governance Particularly, since 1998, more and more local officials have displayed their interest in institutional innovation and made some tests on how to develop village democracy

Since the passing of the New Organic Law in 1998, more and more villages have presented the cases of dismissing their village committee members However, due to the ambiguousness and over-simplicity of either the national Organic law or provincial laws, many problems have appeared For example, when one village committee is not willing to launch the dismissal procedure, what to do then is not clear in the relevant laws If an attempted dismissal is not successful, after how long an interval the villagers can launch another dismissal is not clear, either In the face of these problems, Xinxiang County of

Henan province especially makes a basic procedure of dismissing village committee members This procedure offers very specific and detailed ways for villagers to dismiss village committee members It is composed of six parts: (a) putting forward a dismissal motion; (b) accepting the motion; (c) rescinding the motion; (d) confirming the dismissal meeting and holding it; (e) passing the motion, and (f) supplementary articles.8 This procedure design enables villagers to dismiss those corrupted or incompetent cadres smoothly

Li Guomin, a director of Ruian City Justice Bureau, Zhejiang province, crafted a so-called “village head’s responsibility system” To him, the crux of village self-governance is on the elected village leaders’ responsibility Therefore, he designed a detailed institution named “village head’s civil compensation system” at the beginning of

2002 just before the city would conduct the village elections This institution makes it possible to taking legal proceedings against the wrongdoings committed by village committee leaders during their term of office During the term of village committee, if the head of the village committee commit a serious mistake, resulting in the loss of village property, the head of village financial affairs surveillance group, a legal representative empowered by the village self-governance Charter, will appeal to People’s court for legal proceedings against the faults; if other members of the committee commit wrong-doings, resulting in the loss of village property, the head of village committee as a legal representative empowered by the village self-governance Charter will appeal to People’s

8

See the detail of this procedure in “Henansheng Xinxiangxian bai mian cunmin wei yuan hui cheng yuan

di jiben chengxu” (“Xinxiang County’s Basic Procedure of Dismissing Village Committee Members”), in

2001 zhongguo nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzi jianshe nianjian (Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China), ed Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots

Construction in China (Beijing: China Society Press, 2002) (Beijing: China Society Press, 2002), 406-407

court for legal proceedings against the faults This is completely a new model of village self-governance with some new contents There are several hundred such “contract village committee heads” who are bound by such contracts during the 2002 village elections of Ruian city.9

Local officials’ innovation has been proved as a main way or channel for further promoting and deepening village democracy Of course, many inspirations of local elites’ crafting new political mechanism came from the masses’ practices, and these elites only summarized and absorbed the village elites and masses’ initiative to improve the quality

of village elections and self-governance But the role of the officials is important For

instance, although Lishu villagers originally invented “sea election” or haixuan, it was

Lishu county officials as well as Jilin provincial officials that refined this method and finally spread it nationwide as a model for village elections Furthermore, when kinds of innovations prove to be feasible, they are not simply adopted by more localities, but will encourage more local political elites to innovate in rural democratic institutions

4.1.4 Manipulators

Local leaders, particularly township leaders, often have an “ill reputation” for controlling or manipulating village elections Higher authorities like the Ministry of Civil Affairs criticize local leaders for any manipulation, while villagers complain of it Many studies have dealt with the issue of how local leaders controlled and manipulated village elections In China, state policies are transmitted through documents and normally only

9

Ruian City Justice Bureau, “Shenhua yifa zhicun, qianghua cunguan zeren” (“Deepen Governing Villages according to Law, Strengthen Village Officials’ Duties”) (July 20, 2003)

local bureaucrats have access to these documents and the authority to interpret.10Therefore, local officials can often manipulate state policies to serve their own interests The overwhelming roles and powers of local governments often provide county officials and particularly township leaders with many opportunities to control and manipulate elections In practice, it is easy for a craftsman to turn into a manipulator in village election, whereas control or manipulation is obviously a negative act This issue will be discussed in the fourth section of this chapter

These four roles, outlined above, demonstrate the power of local governments and the penetration by local administrative authorities into the process They have played a multi-faceted role in village democracy development

4.2 Attitudes towards Village Elections11

Local leadership is usually regarded as an obstacle to rural democratization, being always imaged to manipulate, interfere and control village election through various ways and measures However, the story is not completely true The roles and functions of local political elites are much complicated As a whole, the local leader’s attitude towards village self-governance usually is dependent on three factors: position in political system, personal interest, and personal idea Each coin has two sides Local authorities are no exception

4.2.1 Opposition

The first attitude is opposition Those who hold such an attitude think village elections and the notion of autonomy make the implementation of party policies in rural areas more difficult and they fear these may intensify or trigger clan conflicts in the village thereby causing chaos Also some leaders give priority to economic development and treat local democracy as a “soft task” In this case, it has been difficult to get the issue

of village committees on the agenda

There are conceptual as well as practical reasons for the opposition to elections among local leaders In conceptual terms, two views are common among the opposition group First, they think it is too early to conduct elections at this stage Most township leaders whom I have interviewed thought the electorate law was premature and would not bring about the desired results They even thought the laws unnecessary, because as local organizers of previous elections they were familiar with the former ways of holding elections and the peasants seemed to have no objection.12 My own survey indicates that 20.9 per cent of the respondents (township leaders) held such a view (see Table 4.1)

Table 4.1 Is It Too Early to Hold the Election?

These leaders think the election is premature because villagers are not capable of participating in democratic elections, particularly direct elections, because they are unqualified Some leaders think it ridiculous to start democracy in rural areas, where the lack of qualified voters is a more serious problem than elsewhere.13 A township leader in Hubei province said to the official Chinese Xinhua news agency, “At this stage, the villagers do not know how to manage affairs by themselves They do not even know what

it means by autonomy Then how should we grant them autonomy?”14

The second conceptual issue is that village elections would clash with party leadership, meaning that it would be detrimental to the dominant status of the Communist Party People with this view think that the 1998 Organic Law means “more democratic rights to the rural rank and file”, but “detriment to the party and government’s authority”.15 Such worries are not without grounds For one thing, in some villages, the peasants would like to get rid of the party branch once there is a democratic election and village self-governance The implication is that there might be two power centers: the party branch and the village committee, which may conflict with each other Some villagers would rather have the party branch hands off village affairs.16 In other cases, former convicts are elected to the village committee, much to the concern of township authorities In 1996, for example, an addicted gambler was elected village head of

13

Several cadres of Tangxia Township, Ruian city, interviewed by the author, Tangxia, Nov 1998

14

Bao Yonghui, “Cunmin zizhi fuhe bu fuhe zhongguo guoqing?”(“Is Village Self-governance in line with

the national conditions?”), Xiangzhen luntan (Journal of Township Forum), no 6 (1991): 12

Nanyang village of Ruian City, Zhejiang province, and the elected village head of Hongguang village was a former convict.17 To avoid such unwanted results, township leaders would try to manipulate the nomination and further interfere with the election to ensure that the election would stay on track

Although the worries and concerns of these local authorities are not totally groundless, they have failed to see a crucial reality that village elections would not and could not significantly weaken the party leadership After all, many peasants realize that a Communist Party with power and authority is in their interest, without which new bullies may well appear in the village, a genuine cause of fear and concern.18 The challenge posed by the election is not that peasants want to get rid of the party leadership, but that the Communist Party needs to change its form of leadership so that it will retain its vitality and gain new support from the people

Apart from conceptual reasons, the negative attitude of local leaders towards village elections is also related to their own leadership role, a concern about their own interests and their working style In theory, local leaders are better informed and educated than the rank-and file villagers, therefore they should have a better understanding of the worth and significance of democracy In reality, however, the role of local leaders and particularly township leaders is more likely to bring them face to face with problems arising from the election, which they can neither dodge nor defer In this case, their attitude is influenced by the official roles they play As I learned from some officials,

personally they would support democracy, which in their words, “is a good thing” However, their official positions and functions tell them the elections might not be so good Township leaders are particularly concerned that the elected village leaders may not be very cooperative and thus make their work more difficult

In addition, the attitudes of local leaders are also influenced by general Chinese social conditions, in the sense that the Party and the government, as well as society in general, emphasize economic development as the measure for all work A study in 1994

by the Ministry of Civil Affairs finds that “Some leaders regard economic development as the most important and treat the construction of democracy at the grass-root level as only secondary Such thinking makes it unlikely that the building of village committee will be

on top of agenda.” 19 Five years later in 1999 such thinking was still popular My study and analysis of a number of township government reports over the past few years found that while there are specifications about the present economic conditions as well as about future plans, little emphasis is given to the issues of village elections and self-governance.20

In summary, opposition to village election on the part of local political elites is out

of fear that: (1) village elections would weaken the party position in rural China; (2) the elites themselves would lose power over villages; (3) elections may trigger clan conflict, resulting in social chaos and political instability in the countryside; (4) peasants do not

19

Department of Grassroots Government of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Guanyu quanguo nongcun cunweihui jianshe de diaocha baogao” (“A Report on the Contruction of the Village Committee across the County” (August 1994)

20

These reports are from the townships of Tangxia, Wuyan, Liuao, Laofangqiao, Chengdong, Chengguan and Wuyun, which are in various parts of Zhejiang province

have the necessay qualities; and (5) village elections will make it harder for township officials to perform their duties

4.2.2 Reluctant Supporters

Next we have a group of people who may support the election, but never heartedly For theses people the national “Organic Law” is a law that has to be carried out,

whole-but they do not embrace it and sometimes they only pay lip service to it

After 1990, when village elections and village self-governance were re-affirmed

by the CCP Central Committee, very few local officials would publicly criticize and oppose the election, but some county leaders still muddled through their implementing

the Organic Law (fuyan liaoshi), and many township leaders simply did not launch

village elections.21 Some township leaders lack genuine interest in the election During

my survey in Chengdong Township of Shaoxing municipality, Zhejiang province, some leaders told me that they were never against the election, and would do nothing to violate the national Organic Law of Village Committee However, they did not think much of the election, whose significance they thought had been overrated, and whose results were far from satisfactory In their view elections could not solve all the rural problems and therefore it should not be regarded as the most important issue Hence their involvement

in the election process was passive and perfunctory 22 Such indifferent attitudes towards elections sometimes produce negative results In some cases, a candidate may withdraw

21

Li Lianjiang and Kevin J.O’Brien, “Village Self-governance: Ideas and Practices,” in Liangan jicen xuanju yu zhengzhi shehui biaquian (“Grassroots Elections and Political and Social Change in both Sides of Taiwan Strait”), eds Mintong Chen and Zheng Yongnian (Taipei: Yuedan Publisher, 1997), 332-333

22

Several cadres of Chengdong Township, interviewed by the author, Chengdong, Nov 1998

from an election after s/he sees signs of disapproval or even pressure from township leaders In other cases, the authorities take advantage of loopholes in the electoral laws and regulations and limit the rights of voters in choosing candidates Some township leaders and governments make rules that enable them to exercise effective control over the election All are manifestations of a passive and indifferent attitude on the part of the authorities

4.2.3 Active Supporters

However we can also find a supportive attitude among the authorities Some local leaders have positive attitudes towards village elections Such views derive from an understanding of the idea of democracy on the part of these leaders, which in turn provides a driving force for rural democratization More and more county and township officials begin to see the positive side of village elections, and therefore actively support the elections

This group of local leaders does not agree with the view that the quality of Chinese peasants is so low that they are not fit to participate in democratic elections They seem to understand and sympathise with the villagers’ demands for democracy A democratic election, democratic management of village affairs and effective supervision are some of the things they want Realizing a villager may not know the system at the national level, they nevertheless believe that the villager is certainly capable of understanding the essentials of rural grassroots democracy They also know that peasants now have a higher consciousness as well as a better knowledge of the law What is more, with the improvements of the rural economy and peasants’ living conditions that have followed from the reform and opening up of Chinese society, peasants now have new

demands In a political context, they seek more information, more opportunities to voice their opinions and greater participation Moreover, peasants are now much better informed than before

Positive views may also be the result of a kind of pragmatism According to some local leaders, if village elections are conducive to rural autonomy, then the township government should support it For many years Zhejiang used to be well behind Jilin and other provinces in terms of the three yardsticks that measure elections, set by the Ministry

of Civil Affairs, namely, a larger number of candidates than the number of available positions, competition and secret ballot.23 However, I found in 1999 that the attitudes of township leaders such as those in Shaoxing, Fenghua, Yuyao and other counties of Zhejiang province had changed dramatically For instance, in 1999, the elections were to

be held in all the villages of Ningbo municipality Leaders of the party organization

department there supported the practice of haixuan

The previous highly manipulated election had been unpopular among villagers, with the result that there was a lack of support on the part of villagers for village work

Now with haixuan in the election, villagers are happy with their chosen committee as are

the leaders who ultimately want a committee that is capable of fulfilling the various tasks set by the township government Having compared the haixuan-elected committee with

the previous handpicked, township leaders find that haixuan is good for producing a more

competent village committee In some cases, township authorities even “imposed”

haixuan on the peasants during the election These authorities found that governance is

23

Wang Zhenyao, interviewed by the author, Beijing, September, 2001

made easier by the increased popularity of haixuan.24 In November 1998, during my investigation in Chengdong Township of Shaoxing municipality of Zhejiang province, some township leaders admitted that village elections proved to be the most effective way

to solve tough problems in the village Without a village election, these problems would just pile up.25

Another factor that contributes to the supportive attitude among local leaders has to

do with their age and level of education: they tend to be younger and better educated than their predecessors, while few veteran cadres remain in key positions A younger and better educated group is typical of today’s township leaders, as I found in my study of Wuyun Township of Jinyun County, Zhejiang, in November 1998 (See table 4.2) In terms of education, all of them had secondary or tertiary qualifications The average age

of the party secretary, township head and deputies is 42.5 years old Hu Zhengxin, the township head, was only 36 and was the youngest at the time of my survey in 1998 Only the two leaders of the people’s congress are senior in age, as is the case in China, where posts of the people’s congress are honorary ones normally held by ex party secretaries and township heads Compared with the veterans, whose careers began in the period of land reform, these younger and better-educated leaders are more likely to favor village elections The younger and better-educated officials in China are much more supportive

of reform than the old and uneducated,26 which greatly help the implementation of village self-governance and the promotion of village democracy

Table 4.2 Education and Age of Leaders in Wuyun Township27

of birth

Education Starting

work in

Present position Work

here since

G

8 Tao, J L 1956 Secondary 1975 Head of military dept 1992

9 Nai, J H 1949 Secondary 1969 Party com member No clear

J

relative level of dominance changes And even local political elites’ passive support or resistance does not mean that they are conservative and backward

4.3 Crafting Strategies and Measures

Crafting mainly consists of county or township leaders’ positive acts, though manipulating is often taken as a negative one Local leaders in general are capable of a more positive role, and can be a necessary and indispensable driving force for rural elections and democracy However, many scholars who have not done in-depth studies on this question seem to have overstressed the negative role of county or township leaders by arguing that manipulation in village election is widespread They forget that the manipulation should be best studied under the framework of current Chinese political system

4.3.1 Strategies

How did local elites craft village democracy? The question largely depends on the strategies and measures adopted

(1) Putting the Laws and Regulations into Effect

As mentioned above, implementing the relevant laws, rules and regulations is one

of the roles of local leaders Many local leaders have realized that following the stipulations of the law is a precondition and guarantee to smooth village elections Therefore, “Conducting village elections in accordance with the law” is a widely seen slogan For example, Linyi County of Shanxi province made detailed rules and flow diagrams of village elections regarding voter registration, voting meeting, “certificates of

the elected”, etc Particularly, the county asked the grassroots cadres not to replace the laws with leaders’ speeches and instructions, and simplify the election procedure. 28 “No

step left behind” (yi ge bu neng shao) has become a trend of local leaders’ attitude toward

the relevant laws and rules of village elections

In electoral practices, various places have summarized some ways to effectively put the laws and regulations into effect Lishu County of Jinlin province, for example,

insists on “wu gongkai” (five issues that need to become public) and “san bu san zhijie” (three don’ts and three does) in order to strictly abide by the laws and rules “Wu

gongkai” stipulates the following to be made public: the voter registration list, the number

of village committee positions and the requirements for candidates, the candidates list and their backgrounds, electoral procedure and regulations, the candidate’s votes, and the

result of the voting “San bu san zhijie” refers to not run the whole show and replace but

let villagers nominate and elect the village election committee to be in charge of the election affairs; not designate the persons for village committee but let villagers directly

nominate candidates (haixuan), and; not set pattern but let voters directly vote in

accordance with the law.29 Linyi County particularly focuses on two steps: strictly restrict vote by proxy and roving ballot boxes or simply cancel these boxes.30 In Bazhong City of

Province”), in Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 461-462

30

Linyi County Government, “Yifa tuijin cunmin zizhi cujin rongcun wending fazhan: Shanxisheng Linyixian cunmin zizhi baogao” (“Push on Village Self-governance in Accordance with the Law, Promote Rural Stable Development: A Report of Linyi County’s Village Self-governance in Shanxi Province”), in

Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 479

Sichuan province, the relevant laws and rules were specified into “ten steps of village elections”.31

Since the laws and rules have played and will continue to play a key role in the launching and consolidating of village democracy in China, the enforcement of the laws and regulations is still an important strategy to promote village democracy

(2) Setting up Examples

The CCP’s emphasis on experimentation should be noted Although the precise effect of those pilot projects on policy implementation cannot be determined, they apparently are influential and perform important functions In China, setting up typical examples and then spreading their experiences to other places is a traditional and important way to implement a policy or to build an institution Authorities at all levels would use this method Village self-governance is not exceptional No.19 Central Government Circular (1990) orders “every county to choose a few or more villages to launch village self-governance, so as to find out some experiences and set up some typical cases” Accordingly, at the end of 1990, Taicang City of Jiangsu province chose Yuewang Town, Taixing Village, Wangxiu Village, Zhuqiao Village, and Yangqiao Village as testing grounds for village self-governance in terms of township’s responsibility to instruct village committees’ work, village self-governance charter, villagers’ representative assembly, village self-governance charter, and village affairs transparency Experiences were summed up and later spread to other parts of the

31

Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 403-404

province.32 Gutian County of Fujian province consciously set up various kinds of typical cases and then extend them to other places: Xixi Village of Fengpu Township and Xisan Village of Hubin Township for villagers’ representative assembly, Songtai Village of Songjin Township for the standardization of village affairs management, Guanjiang Village of Songjin Township for democratic supervision, Xinfeng Village of Hubin Township and Lingli Village of Shayang Town for villagers’ team construction, Fuquan Village of Fengpu Township for socialization of service management, and finally Dongji Village of Hetang Town for assessing village cadres.33 In a word, finding typical cases and setting them as examples are a common strategy to promote village democracy

(3) Development Strategy

China’s local leaders are always development oriented, and this orientation is also reflected in village self-governance The local officials who willingly promote village democracy always emphasize and highlight the significance of village self-governance to rural economic development, although world democratization and Chinas’ village self-governance’s experiences demonstrate that there is not a direct casual relationship between economic development and democracy, and democratic institution introduction cannot naturally result in economic developing Economic development is often an important item in list of village self-governance’s achievements For example, all of ten

village self-governance demonstration counties’ reports set out economic achievements.34The Civil Affairs system sees it as an indicator of choosing village self-governance demonstration county / township/village In fact, village self-governance was designed to

be an institution to develop rural economy However, the local officials who are in charge

of implementing village self-governance affairs regard economic development as a means

to decrease or break all kinds of obstructions to further promote village self-governance

(4) Balancing Relationships

Three relationships are crucial if local leaders intend to overcome all kinds of obstructions to effectively implement village self-governance, namely the relationships between township and village, between implementation of government affairs and autonomy, and between the party leadership and village self-governance or village party branch and village committee Only by properly handling these relationships can villagers stick up for their democratic voting rights and their right to manage their own affairs, and promote rural democracy

In a sense the relationship between township and village is similar to the relationship between government affairs and village affairs, which is mainly balanced by county authority A common practice is that county officials and particularly county leaders of civil affairs bureau ask township leaders to abide by the Organic Law, respecting the legal status of village committees, instructing and supporting village committees’ to do their duties In the meantime, these officials educate and guide village cadres and villagers to actively fulfill tasks assigned by higher authorities and meet their

34

See the detail of Sixth Section of Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction

in China, 451-493

obligations, while properly exercising autonomous rights For example, Linyi County chose some township governments as models in abiding by the Organic Law and instructing village committees’ work, and then demonstrated that the townships and villages where village self-governance goes well can also take the lead in fulfilling state’s

assignments and collecting collective levies (ti liu).35

A common concern of local officials is whether village elections and governance would weaken the party leadership in rural areas Thus, the key is how to dispel this doubt, guaranteeing the party leadership position The situation of the relationship between village party branches and village committees is similar too Various places have accumulated experience in how to handle this relationship, to convince people that the implementation of village elections and self-governance will not weaken, but on the contrary, will improve and enhance the party leadership in rural China

self-The officials think it is crucial whether the party leadership position can be maintained and government order can be implemented unimpeded The village self-governance can be promoted through artistically balancing these relationships

4.3.2 Measures

Yet it is not enough to have good strategies, for only when these strategies are translated into more specific measures or activities can local officials effectively implement village self-governance and promote village democracy The followings are the main measures adopted by the officials

35

Editorial Board of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, Yearbook 2001 of Democratic and Political Grass Roots Construction in China, 480

(1) Propagandizing, Mobilizing and Organizing Elections

As the authority responsible for village elections, the Ministry of Civil Affairs argues, “Election mobilization is an important part of election preparation Its direct impact is reflected in the villagers’ attitude toward election - whether they are enthusiastic, serious and cooperative toward elections, which directly affects the smooth implementation of village elections or even the success or failure of the elections.”36 The propaganda and mobilization make the villagers mentally prepared for the village elections The low level of Chinese peasants’ political participation points to the need of mobilization.37 Hence, Bai Gang, a political scientist at China’s Academy of Social Sciences, viewed it as a “mobilized political participation” “Different from the western election system, Chinese village election has a preparation stage, namely election mobilization stage”.38

A county is an important level of authority in China that directly organizes village elections Almost all counties establish temporary leading bodies for village elections, usually headed by leading officials of the county party and government or department heads, to coordinate and organize village committee elections in the county.39 Members

36

China’s Rural Village Self-governance Research Group, China’s Research Society of Basic-Level

Government, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu: zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi zhidu yanjiu baogao 1993 nianjuan (Study on the Election of Villagers Committees in Rural China)

(Beijing: China’s Society Press, 1994)

37

Journal of Township Forum and Rural Desk of Department of Basic-Level Governance of the Ministry of

Civil Affairs, eds., Nongcun jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jiashe ziliao huibian (1999’ Excerpts of Important Documents on Construction of Rural Grassroots Democracy) (Beijing, February 2000), 586

of county leading body usually consists of (1) Members of leading group are mostly the chief officials from the party, government and people’s congress; (2) the officials from Civil affairs; (3) other members from the party sector including party committee administrative office, organizational department, propaganda department, agriculture and industry committee, and government sector including administrative office, public security bureau, justice bureau, personal organization, and congress sector including administrative office and legal affairs office, and other sectors such as women’s association and communist youth league This structure has a rather wide representation Table 4.3 is one case of the 1997’ village elections leading group of Fuyang city of Zhejiang province.40 Naturally, as the authority responsible for the construction of basic-

Table 4.3 the Name List of 1997’ Village Elections Leading Group of Fuyang City

Leader Position Wang Jinsui Deputy secretary of the City party Standing Committee Deputy

Leaders Zhong Xiping Deputy director of the City People’s Congress

Zhang Haogeng Deputy mayor of the City Government

Ge Shengfa Deputy head of city civil affairs bureau

Zhao Naxian Director of justice bureau

Wang Xishun Deputy secretary of the city commission for inspecting discipline and

Director of supervisory bureau Lang Changhua Deputy head of city public security Bureau

Fang Zige Deputy secretary of the City agriculture and industry Committee

Shen Yongxiang Deputy head of legal affairs office

the administrative zone Type two, when the elections at the county, township and village levels are held simultaneously, the county does not establish a special leading body for village elections, namely, ‘one

election leading body with dual functions’ (yi tao renma, liang kuai banzi).This arrangement is aimed at

unifying leadership and simplifying the administration Type three, a few counties entrust the responsibility

to some other departments to lead and organize village elections within the administrative zone Most counties of Zhejiang Province adopt type one See China’s Rural Village Self-governance Research Group,

China’s Research Society of Basic-Level Government, Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju zhidu: zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi zhidu yanjiu baogao 1993 nianjuan (Study on the Election of Villagers Committees in Rural China) (Beijing: China’s Society Press, 1994), 15

40

Fuyang City Bureau of Civil Affairs, Fuyangshi 1997 nian cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju gongzuo shouce (Fuyang City’s Handbook for 1997’ Villagers’ Committee Elections) (Fuyang, 1997)