A critical defense of animal liberation

The first chapter of Animal Liberation is aptly entitled ‘‘All Animals Are Equal…or why the ethical principle on which human equality rests requires us to extend equal consideration to

CHAPTER ONE

Animal Liberation

In the preface to his 1990 edition of Animal Liberation, Singer recollects

that just 15 years ago, notions such as ‘‘animal liberation’’ and ‘‘animal rights’’ would have been ridiculed and dismissed with immediate skepticism 15 years later in 1990 and even more so now because of the progressive development of the animal liberation movement, that kind of attitude towards animals belongs to

‘‘a world half-forgotten’’.1 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to dig up antiquarian ideas in order to appreciate what has happened as a result of a period of

development for those very same ideas More importantly, the effort might help

us to appreciate Singer’s views on a concept that is so crucial to his case for animal liberation – the principle of equality This is so especially when we are aware of what he is responding to in the first place

Singer is responding to two things The first is cruelty This is the cruelty that happens to animals on an everyday basis It occurs on an unbelievably large scale because of modern-day practices of intensive factory-farming, scientific experimentation, hunting, the slaughtering of animals to feed the fashion and fur trade, and capturing and imprisoning them in zoos and circuses to entertain us The list goes on It is the kind of cruelty that continues to happen because most

of us do not see that the interests of animals are important enough for us to take any serious stand on what we have to do to stop such cruelty

Secondly, Singer responds to the way the principle of equality has been understood, especially in the way that equality between different races or gender groups has been argued for and against In order to correct our present treatment of animals, he has to correct our commonly-held conceptions of equality Such a move is both reasonable and necessary since present cruelty to

1

Singer, P Animal Liberation New York: Harper Collins Publishers 2002 p.xv

animals is largely due to the belief that it is morally permissible for us to witness and ignore such cruelty as its victims are not worthy of our concern and have no real interests In other words, one finds that he or she has no reason to believe that the principle of equality, as it rightly applies to human beings, should be extended to apply to non-human animals too That is the explanation for the lack of awareness and moral obligation to prevent cruelty to animals on the part

of a majority of the human race

The first chapter of Animal Liberation is aptly entitled ‘‘All Animals Are

Equal…or why the ethical principle on which human equality rests requires us to extend equal consideration to animals too.’’ Quite a mouthful for a chapter

heading but a rather concise formulation of Singer’s entire case In Animal Liberation and almost all of Singer’s publications on animal ethics, he mentions

reasons why one would normally consider social ills such as racism and sexism

to be wrong The point made from these references is that racism and sexism are forms of inequality and the basis upon which this is argued for requires us to recognize that our treatment of animals is also a kind of gross inequality To be

racist or sexist is to be wrong in the same way that being speciesist is wrong:

Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests

of those of another race Sexists violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests

of their own sex Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species The pattern is identical in each case 2Hence, the human equality that is absent in racism and sexism rests on a similar ethical principle as the equality that is violated when speciesism is

2

Ibid p.9

prevalent At this point, one may ask: but what justifies this equation made between the three –isms especially when the two parties concerned in speciesism involve beings of such divergent biological, emotional and intellectual characteristics? On the other hand, racism and sexism are clear cases of prejudice made on the basis of race or gender membership No matter what race

or gender one belongs to, the tyrants or the victims of inequality are both similar

in several ways (emotionally, intellectually, biologically etc.) and it is this similarity which entitles everyone to similar rights and similar treatment This appears to be one prevalent view of why equality is upheld and why forms of inequality like racism and sexism are condemned Another commonly-held view

of equality assumes a factual equality that exists among individuals This says that all individuals should be treated equally because they are all equally endowed with abilities like those to do with communication, being charitable, possessing certain talents and so on If one were to discriminate against a person on the basis of gender or race, that would be disregarding his abilities Such a form of discrimination fails to recognize that both race and gender are not true indications of a person’s abilities In response to these two notions of equality, Singer presents his challenge to them by pointing out the flaws with each and offers a more consistent and adequate account We shall begin by discussing the first

Equality does not imply equal rights and equal treatment but

equal consideration

If one were to consider a typical defense made on behalf of the view that the equality between men and women cannot be validly extended to non-human

animals, the rationale of this would be that there are many ways in which men and women are similar In contrast, human beings and animals differ greatly Hence, the implication is that men and women, as similar beings, should have similar rights and this warrants similar treatment On the other hand, human beings and animals as different beings, should not have similar rights and this would not necessitate similar treatment.3 For example, this makes sense when voting rights are attributed to those who have the capability to make rational decisions about the future Both men and women possess this capability and all regardless of gender difference should have the equal right to vote Since animals

do not have this capability, they cannot have the right to vote – an offspring of the seemingly sensible notion that similar beings should be entitled to similar rights and similar treatment

As Singer rightly points out, this kind of reasoning on which equality is based seems to present a huge obstacle to extending the basic principle of equality to non-human animals But Singer argues that even purportedly similar beings (like men and women) will have ‘‘slight differences’’, and this suggests that it does not make sense to accord both groups identical treatment Even feminists would be willing to concede the undeniable differences between men and women These differences would then have to ensure that different rights and treatment be given Granting women the equal right with men to, say, volitional circumcision (assuming a society in which circumcision was enforced upon all men) would be no cause for celebration in the progressive development

of the feminist movement The same goes for granting men the equal right with

3

An upholder of this view is Thomas Taylor and such a notion of equality is reflected in his

comments to Mary Wollstonecraft after the latter’s publication of Vindication of the Rights of

Women Ibid p.1

women to abort on request Hence, it is as futile to speak of an animal’s right to vote as it is to consider men’s right to abortion since both rights obviously do not apply to animals and men respectively What this shows is that extending the principle of equality ‘‘does not imply that we treat both groups in exactly the same way or grant exactly the same rights to both groups.’’4 It only shows that equality does not warrant that all individuals be entitled to the same treatment,

but it does acknowledge that all concerned are attributed a consideration of interests

in exactly the same way:

The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights 5

And so, this way of conceptualizing equality manages to firstly acknowledge the undeniable differences between human beings and non-human beings, and secondly, to lift the barrier that prohibits the extension of the principle of equality to non-human animals The latter makes sense since even though animals do not get the same rights or treatment as human beings, they can certainly enjoy equal consideration with human beings This means that their interests are given equal weight to those of human beings

The Principle of Equality is a Prescription, not a Description

Singer considers that forms of inequality such as racism and sexism are also often defended on the basis of factual equality A common egalitarian argument is that there is factual equality in the form of attributes like the ability

to communicate effectively, to be charitable or sensitive to the needs of others

Every person would at least possess some of such abilities Yet, neither a person’s sex nor race is truly indicative of these abilities Hence, it would be unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex or race Singer wants to challenge this idea of equality as it is inadequate for two reasons First of all, it fails to provide a good reason for rejecting another kind of discrimination – where the interests of the stupid count for less than the interests of the intelligent People may be endowed with different abilities and attributes When

it comes to intelligence, it is a fact that everyone possesses different I.Q levels

To posit factual equality as the foundation for the principle of equality would not protect those who fall in the former category of less intelligent people and it

is reasonable to assume that a society based on such a structure would not be desirable at all Secondly, positing this strong link between the principle of equality and this kind of factual equality incorrectly assumes that all concerned are endowed with the same abilities to the same extent Abilities and talents are not present in all individuals equally Would we then be forced to conclude that those who are more well endowed with such abilities have interests which are more highly regarded than those who possess them to a lesser extent? Singer thinks not and I believe most of us working towards an egalitarian world would

be inclined to agree

Hence, against the commonly held belief that it is factual equality that constitutes the principle of equality, Singer rightly points out that ‘‘the principle

of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged equality among

humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings.’’ [Emphasis

mine.] 6 In stating what sort of a prescription this is exactly, Singer makes a

6

Ibid p.5

reference to Jeremy Bentham’s main utilitarian contention, that each individual is

to count for one and none for more than one.7 This is the principle of the equal consideration of interests and it means that when an action or moral decision takes place, firstly, that the interests of all beings affected are to be taken into consideration Secondly, the interest of each being is attributed the same degree

of importance as the like interest of any other being.8 The implication we can draw from this, says Singer, is that:

[The] taking into account of the interests of the being…must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman 9

In the same school of thought as people like Thomas Jefferson, who included the principle of equality of men in the American Declaration of Independence, and Sojourner Truth, a black feminist from the 1850’s, Singer asserts that neither intelligence nor any ‘‘degree of talent’’ constitutes a barometer for the recognition of equal rights and treatment Just as cases of racism and sexism fail to acknowledge that the interests of all beings concerned are to be considered equally, speciesism commits the same violation of moral equality by attributing greater importance to the interests of members of one species (namely, the human species) than to the interests of members of other species (other nonhuman animals) This phenomenon has been a shameful feature of the long history of human civilization when one calls to mind ancient Roman games, the extensive hunting of animals for sport and the capture and

7

Ibid p.5

8

Singer concedes that even though this requirement for a moral theory is mostly agreed upon

in contemporary philosophy, many writers still cannot agree on ‘‘how this requirement is best formulated.’’ For the purposes of Animal Liberation and this thesis however, I shall assume Bentham’s formulation of the principle of the equal consideration of interests to be accurate and general

9

Singer, P Animal Liberation New York: Harper Collins Publishers 2002 p 5

sale of ‘‘exotic’’ pets Speciesism has not ceased to prevail in modern society When it comes to the killing of animals for food – and the technology of this has far surpassed the more primitive days of hunting and gathering – factory farming and the unimaginable amount of suffering inflicted upon them can only point out to us that it is indeed time to recognize how some of their most important interests are explicitly considered for much less that ours All this is being done on the basis of our prioritized human species membership Sadly, this bias we take in favour of our own interests runs even deeper, not just in the way we eat, but also in the way we buy our products, wear our clothes and pass

on our flawed attitudes to the next generation – all in support of the cruelty that happens everyday and extensively to animals Once again, Singer questions this violation of moral equality committed because we attribute greater importance

to our interests over the interests of nonhuman animals:

If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how can it entitle humans

to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose? 10Hence, to summarize, Singer’s case rests on two main aspects of Bentham’s moral philosophy The first is the latter’s formulation of the principle

of the equal consideration of interests The second is that this principle should rightfully be extended to apply to members of nonhuman species In other

words, it cuts across all race-defined, gender-defined and species-defined boundaries Instead, what does define a being – human or nonhuman – as one to

which the principle of equal consideration of interests applies is the being’s

capacity to suffer What follows is the passage from Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation that Singer constantly refers to:

10

Ibid p.6

The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor It may one day come to be recognised that the number of legs, the

villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os

sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for

abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate

What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is

not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? [Emphasis in original]11The capacity for suffering or for enjoyment, says Bentham, is what determines a being’s eligibility for the principle of equality It is the ‘‘vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration.’’ The reason why this characteristic is so different from others like intelligence, rationality or capacities for activities such as language or mathematics, is because the capacity

to suffer is ‘‘the pre-requisite for having interests at all.’’12 It is a necessary and sufficient condition for the attribution of interests, and hence the rights to specific kinds of treatment to any being To illustrate the point, Singer gives the example of a stone of which it is ridiculous to speak of having an interest not to

be kicked or crumbled to bits In the first place, the stone cannot suffer and cannot have interests By contrast, both a human being and a horse are vulnerable to suffering and pain At the very least, both would have interests in

not having to suffer or experience pain As a result of this primary interest, having the interest not to be kicked, or having the interest to be well-fed and so avoid hunger would constitute secondary interests which exist because of that primary interest

Since nonhuman animals, just like us, can and do suffer, there is simply

no morally justifiable reason why we should choose not to take that suffering into consideration It is in recognizing this that we must ethically respond to the extensive practice of animal cruelty

Two Possible Objections To Animal Liberation And

Singer’s Replies

One argument that speciesists will tend to make to defend their continuing support of the practices that contribute to animal suffering is to deny that animals have interests Since animals have no interests, human beings are not morally reprehensible for ignoring them when they partake in activities that purportedly neglect those interests This is simply because one cannot ignore something that is not assumed to be there Hence, speciesists cannot be apportioned blame for ignoring something that does not exist A possible way of arguing for this is to assert that animals are not capable of suffering They fall under the Cartesian category of beings which have no thoughts or mental life whatsoever, operating on the same level as unconscious automata An animal’s body is essentially a machine, ‘‘which like, ‘clocks, artificial fountains and mills,’ has the power to operate purely in accordance with its own internal principles, depending ‘solely on the disposition of [its] organs.’’ 13 The same applies to human beings, with the exception that we are distinguished by our faculty of thought which enables us to have a ‘‘rational soul.’’ This anti-animal liberation argument is a direct objection to Singer’s contention that we cannot ignore animal suffering because they possess the capacity to suffer and they too have interests If animal suffering is allowed to continue to the extent that it does today in order to feed human needs and wants, it means that we are prioritizing our interests over and above theirs This is speciesism at work Hence, if the contrary is true, that animals certainly do not possess a capacity for suffering and

13

Cottingham, J ‘‘The Meditations and Cartesian Philosophy’’ in Descartes, R Meditations

on First Philosophy UK: Cambridge University Press 1996 p xxv

do not therefore have interests, then Singer’s case for animal liberation fails This

is because it shows that we are indeed justified to neglect the purported interests

of animals

Singer has a few responses to this kind of speciesist defense Firstly, it is

‘‘obvious’’14 that animals do suffer and that they have interests At the very least, they have interests to avoid experiences that cause suffering Just stick a knife into a dog’s flank he says and the external behaviour of the dog reveals in a myriad of ways that the dog is undergoing pain Examples include trying to move away from the source of pain or producing sounds like whining and yelping

Secondly, Singer considers how and when we are aware that other human beings suffer In the first place, pain is not an observable phenomenon

It is simply a ‘‘state of consciousness’’ or a ‘‘mental event’’.15 We come to know

of it happening to other human beings as a result of the external behaviour they exhibit (eg facial expressions, body language etc) When we see our friends or strangers, who are victims of traffic accidents or crises, exhibiting such

indications, most if not all of us do not doubt that they are truly experiencing

pain Similarly, why should we doubt that animals are also truly suffering when they exhibit behavioural symptoms that are often tell-tale signs to us of their pain?

Singer supports his argument further by pointing out that a lot of the physiological responses human beings make to pain-stimuli are highly similar to those of animals who have nervous systems very much like ours.16 These include

‘‘dilated pupils, perspiration, an increased pulse rate’’ and changes in blood pressure Although it is true that human beings have brains that are more complex than those of animals, basic functions and impulses such as those to do with response to pain-stimuli are fairly uniform and commonly possessed by both human beings and other animals

Besides physiological similarities, Singer acknowledges that animals, just like human beings, have bodies which have evolved to survive through the ages:

…the nervous systems of other animals were not artificially constructed…to mimic the pain behaviour of humans The nervous systems of animals evolved as ours did, and in fact, the evolutionary history of human beings and other animals, especially mammals, did not diverge until the central features of our nervous

systems were already in existence A capacity to

feel pain obviously enhances a species’ prospect

of survival, since it causes members of the species to avoid sources of injury 17 [Emphasis mine]

Hence, as a result of all these factors, there is no logical reason for why

we should deny the capacity for suffering and to have interests to nonhuman animals when we do not deny these to human beings This is a clear instance of the need to recall Ockam’s razor and seek the simplest explanation rather than

to go at length to invent different and more complicated theories to understand animal behaviour when so much of it is similar to ours:

It is surely unreasonable to suppose that nervous systems that are virtually identical physiologically, have a common origin and a common evolutionary function, and result in similar forms of behaviour in similar circumstances, should actually operate in an entirely different manner on the level of subjective feelings 18

Another speciesist argument which is often invoked is: the fact that human beings have language whereas animals do not shows that the latter do not suffer This assumes an essential link between language and the capacity to suffer In other words, a being’s lack of ability to communicate through language suggests the improbability of that being possessing the capacity to suffer Human beings have language while animals do not The concession may be made that animals do communicate, but this is to a much lesser extent in comparison with the more complicated and highly developed system that human beings have Hence, as Descartes so simply put it, ‘‘while humans can tell each other about their experience of pain…other animals cannot.’’19 This means that animals do not experience pain Such a line of thought stems from the Wittgensteinian notion that states of consciousness cannot be attributed to beings without language Singer considers this incoherent Even though language

is certainly required for the expression of abstract ideas, it is not crucial to the expression of more basic mental states such as pain

Alternatively, a more obvious way in which one can formulate a direct link between language and a being’s capacity to suffer is that we come to know

of that being’s pain because we are told of it Yet again, Singer is quick to point

out the implausibility of this kind of reasoning While it only suggests that we do not have sufficient reason to believe that non-language users can suffer, it does not mean they are totally incapable of suffering.20 Even though language may be very helpful in providing proof that the speaker is suffering, it is ‘‘not the only

19

Cottingham, J ‘‘The Meditations and Cartesian Philosophy’’ in Descartes, R Meditations

on First Philosophy UK: Cambridge University Press 1996 p xxv

20

Ibid p.14

possible evidence, and since people sometimes tell lies, not even the best possible evidence.’’ 21 As Jane Goodall’s studies have shown from her close work with chimpanzees as part of the Gombe Project during the 1960’s, language is less relevant than other forms of communication such as that evinced by body language and social behaviour in the expression of feelings, emotions and mental states like pain

If the above two replies are still not convincing enough for speciesists who still insist on postulating the necessary link between language and suffering, Singer argues that they would not want to conclude that human infants who still have yet to acquire the use of language, cannot feel pain In the same way, speciesists subscribing to this link should not consider language a crucial indication of an animal’s capacity to suffer

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

So far, this chapter has sought to provide a presentation of Peter Singer’s pro-animal liberation case This has included the initial impetus for Singer’s case, his definition of equality, what it demands of us and the basis of that definition

of equality on Benthamite ulititarianism This was followed by a discussion of the utilitarian principle of the equal consideration of interests and a coverage of the reasons why this principle should be extended beyond the human scope to apply to animals Two commonly invoked speciesist objections to animal liberation were then examined, coupled with Singer’s responses to them All this has been directed towards Singer’s ultimate conclusion: ‘‘there can be no moral

21

Ibid

justification for regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans.’’ 22Speciesism occurs as a result of human beings putting their interests over those

of animals especially when we would not be prepared to do the same to other human beings, like infants or the mentally retarded, when the interests of both parties are in conflict At the beginning of this chapter, it was mentioned that social ills and moral wrongs like racism and sexism operate on the same lines, in the way that the interests of the party considered to be inferior because of race

or gender, are compromised to promote the interest of the other party Hence, Singer’s case aims to highlight this in trying to point out the explicit wrongfulness of what the majority of us human beings do or allow to happen to animals Animal cruelty, our indirect or direct involvement in it, and our neglect

of animal interests happen because of the speciesist way of thinking many of us subscribe to, sometimes even without being aware of it We must not disregard the pain of an animal just because it is an animal Pain and suffering, be it to a human being or an animal, is equally bad If the same amount of pain were to be administered to both a human infant and an adult horse, it would be reasonable

to suppose that the baby would be adversely affected to a greater degree since the horse exceeds it in strength, size and the ability to withstand pain Yet, understanding the situation in this way fails to illuminate the real point Causing wanton pain to a baby is not more wrong than causing wanton pain to a horse Causing wanton pain is simply wrong in itself And to only consider it wrong when it affects a human baby worse than it does an animal, is speciesist

22

Ibid p.15

Considering some Practical Consequences of Singer’s Conclusion

The previous example of the horse and the baby brings up a few issues that need to be addressed Actual differences between human and nonhuman animals, especially the differences in their responses to pain and suffering, can result in qualitative and quantitative problems in our ethics towards other animals For instance, there will be some situations where human beings will suffer more than animals if both were in the same circumstances The case of the same slap given to a human baby and a horse is one Alternatively, performing a cruel act of setting fire to a human being whilst alive (as in cases of lynching during pre-civil war America) would be worse than the same thing done

to a dog because while both suffer tremendous pain, the dog would not experience the further suffering of knowing that its future plans cannot be actualized as a human being would experience Singer gives his own example of planning a series of random kidnaps of normal adult human beings from parks

to be used in ‘‘extremely painful or lethal scientific experiments.’’ 23 They would suffer more because on top of the physical suffering experienced during the experiments, they undergo the additional suffering of the ‘‘anticipatory dread’’ of being kidnapped, or the perennial paranoia and fear of going out of doors Nonhuman animals on the other hand, would not feel all this in addition to the pain incurred during the experiments Hence, would a speciesist then be correct

in justifying cruelty to a nonhuman animal rather than to a human being?

Singer’s answer is no Firstly, if this argument worked, then we would be

23

Ibid

allowed to kidnap human infants or retarded adult human beings to be used in these experiments rather than normal adult human beings They too, like nonhuman animals, would not feel the additional suffering that afflict normal adult human beings Obviously, this is something none of us would want to condone In one of the most powerful observations in his case for animal liberation, Singer points out that if we allow suffering upon animals, then we must also be prepared to allow suffering upon human infants and retards This is because both groups do not possess the same developed mental capacities as normal adult human beings which enable them to experience the additional suffering of ‘‘anticipatory dread’’, knowledge of the loss of future opportunity or heightened awareness of what is about to happen If we are not prepared to do this, then it means that we are acting upon a speciesist point of view As Singer notes, that would be equated to nothing other than ‘‘a bare-faced – and morally indefensible – preference for members of our own species.’’ 24

Secondly, speciesists who would condone animal suffering but not human suffering, do so on the pretext of normal adult human beings possessing more developed mental abilities These include ‘‘anticipation, more detailed memory, greater knowledge of what is happening and so on.’’ These cause us to experience greater suffering than normal adult animals when undergoing the same circumstances and thus justify us in placing greater importance on the prevention of human suffering However, Singer reminds us that because animals are less aware or understand to a limited extent, they do indeed suffer more in some situations His hypothetical example of both human and nonhuman animal prisoners being captured but made aware that imprisonment

24

Ibid p.16

would only be temporary and that they would not be killed, proves this The latter would not be able to understand that they are only captured temporarily without their lives being in danger In fact, the nonhuman animal captives would experience a greater amount of fear due to ignorance or to seeing the otherwise harmless capture as the worst threat to their survival I too cannot help but think

of my dog who I adopted from previous owners when he first arrived He was rather close to his caretaker and not only felt deprived of her love and care, but worse still also experienced the additional fear and helplessness of not knowing what to expect in a new and strange environment which may or may not provide the love and care he needed For days on end, he kept whining and staring at the door through which his previous owner had walked through leaving him behind

I am sure there was the ‘‘additional suffering’’ of not knowing, and observing his behaviour spoke louder that words ever could

In the first place, it is difficult to quantify the difference in suffering experienced by human beings and other animals As a result, it is almost impossible to explain who suffers more or less Speciesists may invoke this idea

to argue that the principle of the equal consideration of interests just does not give adequate guidelines as to what to do in such situations Singer’s response is that it may be true to say that ‘‘comparisons of suffering cannot be made precisely, but precision is not essential.’’25 It would suffice for us as ethical agents

to try to stop animal cruelty when we see it happening A possible guideline as to when we should respond can be that when doing so would not result in human suffering to the same degree as animals I refer to Singer’s example from his essay ‘‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’’, of seeing a child about to drown in a

25

Ibid

shallow pond If making the effort to save the child does not amount to any great inconvenience or suffering on my part (ie if it means getting wet and this

is insignificant) and assuming that the resultant death of the drowning child is a

‘‘very bad thing,’’ then I ought to save the child This example can be understood

in the light of the following principle:

If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it 26

In other words, (and one can take this to apply to nonhuman animals as well) if preventing a moral wrong such as cruelty to animals does not affect us in any detrimental way, or it adversely affects us to a lesser degree than it affects the animals, then we are obliged to prevent such cruelty from happening The massive amount of animal suffering that occurs on a day-to-day basis in modern factory farms for instance, can be protested against (a small, but nevertheless important step to eventually lessening or putting a complete stop to the suffering) by a simple sacrifice of meat-eating which we partake in for reasons of taste or gastronomical pleasure Extensive development of and current accessibility to nutritional information should be sufficient reasons to persuade

us that the responsible vegetarian does not suffer any health risks This sacrifice may not be so simple or easy for some of us, but it is definitely a small lack we experience as compared to the pains animals go through to a much larger extent

in factory farms These include the lack of adequate space to move around, the pain of separation between mother and infants, overfeeding, the stress or loneliness felt at being confined and the physiological consequences of this

26

Singer, P ‘‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’’ in Unsanctifying Human Life ed Kuhse, H

Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 2002 p.147

Hence, it is not as important to know who suffers more or less than to respond

to suffering ethically We should try to prevent suffering regardless of whom it happens to, what species that being is, or how much more that being is suffering

as long as such a response does not disadvantage us in any significant manner This is not to say that we cannot choose to make the same response should the result be that we would be disadvantaged in a significant way We can, but if we

do not, we are not morally despised because of our inaction since it is perfectly

understandable why we did not do so But we are certainly obliged to if the loss or

sacrifice we incur as a result of preventing another’s suffering is minimal I believe Singer would go so far as to assert this

Suffering Is Wrong What About Killing?

Up till this point, only the wrongness of animal suffering has been discussed and the case made for animal liberation on this basis has been fairly straightforward This can be summarised as follows: suffering is not good and should be protested against regardless of race, gender or species membership This is an application of the principle of equality and it should be extended to apply to nonhuman animals as well However, when the same principle is applied to the wrongness of killing, things get more complex Before we embark

on a brief examination of the relation between the principle of equality and the wrongness of killing, it is significant to remember that Singer has no need to explore this in order to prove his case The human causes of animal suffering suffice as adequate grounds for animal liberation

All along, Singer has argued that human beings are speciesist in the way they cause or neglect animal suffering It is bad and to not do something about it and we are speciesist if we would have responded to it had it been human suffering Yet it is less easy to conclude that one is similarly speciesist in causing

or neglecting the killing of animals when he or she would not have caused or neglected the killing of human beings Singer reflects that there are two main reasons for this Firstly, to say when it is morally acceptable to kill a human being is an issue still under contention Abortion and euthanasia are cases in

point There are still no hard and fast moral rules that stipulate the absolute

wrongness of abortion due to different reasons that people use to justify abortion These could include sexual promiscuousness and involuntary rape Secondly, we have yet to answer the question of what it is exactly that makes it wrong to kill a human being Is it because the sanctity of life is violated? Or that

one’s intrinsic value is forsaken? Or do utilitarian or contractarian theories hold true instead? A philosophically sound and coherent answer has yet to be found

On the one hand, when given a choice to save either the life of a human being or that of an animal, it is speciesist to choose the former on the basis of species membership On the other, if we were to save the life of a human being because of certain characteristics he possessed that the animal did not, then this would not be speciesist since the choice made is not based on species membership The human being’s life is more valuable than the animal’s given that the former has greater intelligence, more acute self-consciousness, is able to enjoy meaningful relations with others and projects desires and plans for the future Given a choice between saving his life or that of a mouse that does not possess any of the above to the same extent, it is reasonable to hold that it is neither wrong nor speciesist if we were to allow the latter to die Hence, in order

to ‘‘avoid speciesism, we must allow that beings who are similar in all relevant respects have a similar right to life – and mere membership in our own biological species cannot be a morally relevant criterion for this right.’’27 Instead, human attributes such as greater self-consciousness, the potential for a richer quality of life and the ability to project plans for the future are morally relevant criteria At the same time, it is also possible that these same attributes can differ

in normal adult human beings, mentally retarded human beings and normal adult animals As a result, lives are not of ‘‘equal worth’’ 28 when these attributes are taken into account One has to be impartial in respecting a being’s right to life and avoid speciesism In accordance with this, just as we would be prepared to

choose to save the life of a normal adult human being over that of a less developed nonhuman animal, we must also be prepared to choose to save the life of a normal adult nonhuman animal over an incapacitated human vegetable

I believe that is as far as Singer can go in applying the principle of equality to the killing of animals However, as I have mentioned above, he has no need to go further in order to argue in favour of animal liberation Animal suffering is, so to speak, ‘‘bad enough.’’

CHAPTER TWO

The External Enemies

Carruthers on Singer: Invalidity and Imbalance

In Peter Carruthers’ book on animal ethics The Animal Issue: Moral Theory

In Practice, there are two misgivings towards Singer’s case for animal liberation

The first goes something like this: the principle of the equal consideration of interests only works within the utilitarian framework of thinking Once an alternative theory is substituted in place of utilitarianism (and this alternative is both real and coherent), one finds that the principle of the equal consideration

of interests cannot be validly extended to apply to non-human animals After this is established, there would then be no such thing as the wrongful neglect of the interests of animals when they suffer since animals rightly do not enjoy equal moral standing with human beings Under this view, there are no moral rights ascribed to animals and it is not speciesist to put our interests above theirs on the basis of species membership

Carruthers’ point is that the principle of the equal consideration of interests requires the moral agent to assume the role of “the impartial benevolent observer.” This is an observer “who is aware of all the conflicting interests in a given situation, and of the consequences that different policies would have for those interests, and who is equally sympathetic towards all of the parties involved.” In other words, utilitarianism, for it to work, relies heavily on this “imaginary construction.” 29 As a result of the specifications for this role demanded of the moral agent, species-membership cannot be a morally relevant criterion in moral decision-making If it were, the utilitarian would be

29

Carruthers, P The Animas Issue: Moral Theory In Practice Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press 1992, p 25

committing a wrong act Against this, Carruthers proposes an alternative theory

in the form of contractarianism which, in its most basic form, stipulates that given any ideal situation where there exists “no ignorance, no inequalities of power enabling one party to force unjust solutions upon another, no malicious ambitions,” society is defined in terms of rights and obligations as if they were established in a social contract 30 According to Carruthers, the sufficient condition for a contractarian is for him to be a rational agent Hence, to be a rational agent has largely to do with possessing intelligence; that is, human intelligence Species-membership then becomes a morally relevant criterion in ethical decision-making as the social contract is established on the assumption that all contracting parties rationally agree upon the stipulated rights and obligations within the invisible contract The extension of the principle of the equal consideration of interests is thus not valid as it is in utilitarianism and in Singer’ case when it comes to contractarianism Animals are not rational, they cannot enjoy equal standing with human beings and we are not obliged to take their interests or their suffering seriously

My first reply to Carruthers is that just as he accuses utilitarianism of being unrealistic in the way that it relies on the “imaginary construction” of “the impartial benevolent observer” to work, so does contractarianism In the case of contractarianism, it can similarly be said to rely on an ideal, and perhaps unrealistic or “imaginary” situation, which must be in existence before societal rights and obligations can be assumed to be established as in a contract

Secondly, according to Carruthers, animals are not to be included within the sphere of moral consideration because they are not rational agents and hence

30

Blackburn, S Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy New York: Oxford University Press 1994

not capable of understanding or accepting contractual formed moral obligations and rights Such an explanation purports to provide a justification for why our human interests should be protected while those of animals are not At the same time, it is a justification for why we do not have to protect and be concerned about the interests of animals, even in instances where cruelty is administered upon animals by human beings The contractarian approach, as expounded by

Carruthers, cannot explain why we should have the duty not to be cruel to

animals when it should, as an ethical theory One does not have to be a utilitarian to recognize such a duty Even common sense morality accepts this duty

Carruthers’ second objection to Singer’s case for animal liberation concerns the lack of the latter’s compliance with the principle of reflective equilibrium This principle expresses a fundamental relationship between moral theory and common sense Carruthers bases his understanding of this on a Rawlian formulation of reflective equilibrium:

The business of constructing an acceptable moral theory must take its start from common sense, in that our considered pre-theoretical judgments provide the data to be either accounted for or explained away, yet a particular moral belief, in its turn, will only be justified if it can be integrated into an acceptable moral theory 31

In other words, moral theory should be brought into reflective equilibrium with common sense Negative or unsatisfactory aspects of common sense are then tested against the hypothesized theory and thrown out At the same time, unacceptable aspects of the moral theory are discarded should they not cohere with common sense With respect to Singer’s contention that the

31

Carruthers, P The Animals Issue: Moral Theory In Practice p 7

principle of the equal consideration of interests should apply too to non-human

animals, Carruthers replies that our common sense tells us that animals do not

enjoy equal moral standing with human beings Singer’s argument is going against the grain of common sense and moral intuition and this is to such a severe extent that his theory cannot work as reflective equilibrium is not maintained An example is given where a human being and a non-human animal are imprisoned and tortured If the moral agent had only a single opportunity to rescue one captive, choosing to save the animal would violate our common sense morality It is more in line with our natural moral intuition to rescue the human being Yet, Singer’s idea of animals enjoying equal moral standing with human beings does not oblige us to do what common sense would warrant And this, says Carruthers, does not fit in correctly with the procedure of proper moral theorizing

I have three responses to Carruthers The first is that Carruthers has a rather misplaced insistence on common sense moral intuition Even in his own

quotation of Rawls’ definition of reflective equilibrium, he mentions the balance

made between both common sense and moral theory – the implication given by

the word equilibrium Yet, in his criticism of Singer, he seems to place more stress

on the common sense half of reflective equilibrium by faulting Singer for going against common sense In accordance with Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, I think it reasonable to discard aspects of common sense which can be flawed or which are built upon prejudices or attitudes that may not necessarily be appropriate in changing times and contexts Carruthers’ emphasis on common sense disregards this The equal moral standing of animals with human beings may have been uncommon to common sense all this while, but perhaps it is also

the role of moral theorizing to correct flawed attitudes like these against animals present in our intuitive morality

Secondly, in addition to common sense morality being flawed, it is possible that common sense can be outdated In insisting on maintaining our current moral intuitions towards animals, Carruthers fails to acknowledge that

common sense morality can be renewed and improved upon in the light of modern

practices which lead to the extensive suffering endured by animals These include factory farming and the use of animals in scientific experiments I am sure the correction of outdated aspects of common sense morality would contribute both positively and tremendously to moral theorizing

Thirdly, Carruthers makes an unqualified assumption about the general

common sense attitude towards animals He considers that this is largely not in

favour of animals and Singer’s proposition to place their interests on par with ours is going against this common sensical view of animals Yet, how can Carruthers assert that we would all intuitively accept that there is nothing wrong with the modern day practices which subject animals to cruelty? If a person were

to be taken for the first time for a walk through a modern day factory farm and bore witness to the industrial processes of how the whole place was run to the detriment of animal welfare, it may be possible for that person to complete his tour and be indifferent to all he had seen However, it would also be possible for him to have been deeply affected by all observations, breathing in the pungent, toxic smell of animal faeces, seeing animals confined to small spaces, and coming to know of the highly unnatural and unhygienic conditions the animals have to live in His intuitive common sense response would have been that it was clear that animal suffering to this degree was unacceptable The point is,

different people may intuitively react to animal suffering differently and Carruthers is wrong to assume that prevalent moral attitudes go towards an acceptance of processes contributing to animal suffering In fact, many people who have read and accepted Singer’s writings may have found it to be in line with common sense morality to not disregard suffering whether it happens to human or non-human animals I too, do not see anything in his work about animal ethics that is too demanding or radical for our common sense

One may say that this objection is not warranted as Carruthers is essentially asserting that common sense morality is against animals sharing equal moral standing with human beings, and not that it supports animal cruelty My reply is that many people may sympathize with the plight of animals, and that is

as far as they would go However, to continue holding on to “common sense” beliefs of animal interests being counted for less than ours is what contributes to such minimal human efforts devoted to the promotion of animal interests Having the belief that animals do not deserve equal consideration of interests is likely to result in not doing anything to improve animal welfare and would lead

to support for the continuation of practices that go towards animal cruelty

The progressive growth of the animal liberation movement can be largely accounted for by our changing attitudes towards animals Human beings are probably more concerned now than they ever were a century ago about animal welfare and the prevention of animal suffering We can be more optimistic about the future for animal liberation because more and more people

seem to be better able to respond intuitively and sympathetically to the treatment

of animals when it comes to factory-farming, vivisection, the fur trade and hunting, amongst many other practices This optimism reflects a positive change

in our common sense morality and Carruthers’ assumption about our present general attitudes towards animals is not entirely correct

Scruton : The Diminishing Importance of Metaphysics

Roger Scruton is a philosopher and freelance writer who has, alongside people like Carruthers, made a stand against the notion that animals belong to the same sphere of moral consideration as human beings He asserts that philosophers in the likes of Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Richard Ryder are wrong in placing their “single-minded emphasis” on shared features of both non-human and human animals Singer in particular, is so focused on the shared feature of the capacity to suffer, that he has neglected the other features human

and non-human animals do not share According to Scruton, this is a failure on

Singer’s part to recognize and be reminded of the very real and profound differences between human and non-human animals As a result, Singer makes the false conclusion that non-human animals belong to the same sphere of moral consideration as human beings – a sphere in which moral concepts such

as equality apply Scruton is firm in his belief that we, as human beings, are moral beings, and non-human animals are not To establish this, he asserts that

an analysis of the features unique to human beings is paramount – an analysis of great philosophical importance that Singer has lost sight of

Human beings are metaphysically different from non-human animals Scruton lists rationality, self-consciousness and the ability to use language as the core features human beings possess which set them apart as higher-functioning creatures from non-human animals With regard to rationality, this is the

distinctive feature of our mental life as compared to animals To say that human beings are rational means that we have the capacity to make choices, judgments about the past, present and future and to engage in long-term planning We also participate in highly complex social relations, in which mutual practical reasoning and dialogue take place and we recognize each other’s rights to property, assignable duties or claims to sovereignty Human beings further deviate from animals in possessing the faculty of imagination in order to speculate about possibilities There is also aesthetic sense, our “disinterested contemplation of the world”32 and our reservoir of passions that are not as limited as those of animals Lastly, since we are language-users, we are able to have more complicated thoughts, feelings and dispositions that are contingent upon language for their physical and verbal expression or mental organization

All these constitute our human rationality and Scruton points out that all the above features go together to form this They cannot be exemplified individually apart from each other Hence, even though non-human animals may possess the ability to say make choices just like human beings, this does not mean that they are rational creatures on the basis of one or a few of the above traits However, Scruton does not state his exact justification for this

Human beings are also very different from non-human animals because

we are self-conscious entities Animals may be conscious or unconscious A horse is conscious in the way that it is mindful of its surroundings and reacts to

it This is opposed to when it is in an unconscious state in the case of sleep or being under the effect of anesthesia However, this is all very different from saying that animals may be self-conscious, which they certainly are not Scruton

32

Scruton, R Animal Rights and Wrongs London: Demos 2000.p.19

establishes this by pointing out that human beings, unlike non-human animals,

“knowingly refer to themselves as ‘I’ and are able to describe their own mental states for the benefit of others as well as themselves.” 33 For us, we are not just aware of our sensory perceptions of the environment, but also of our experiencing of what is experienced Human beings are conscious of themselves and their own mental states

Thirdly, human beings are language users With animal researchers such

as Jane Goodall and Monty Roberts, there has been an increasing tide of opinion towards the view that many animals are known to communicate True as this may be, Scruton believes that the language system employed by human beings is far more complex and sophisticated than the primitive modes of social interaction which prevail even among higher-functioning mammals like chimpanzees, horses or dolphins We human beings use language in a way that reflect our adept ability to “represent the world through signs.”34 We not only communicate our thoughts about things that are at hand or real, but also imaginatively about things that are absent or improbable Animals merely convey the “here and now of perception”, according to Scruton The language system of human beings allows the “construction of abstract arguments,” “scientific inference,” “syntactic categories and logical connectives.” 35 It also fosters participative dialogue and enables us to have a much more pervasive scope of emotions that rely on language for their definition

Thus, on the basis of these three core characteristics possessed by human beings, Scruton asserts the distinctiveness of human beings In not even

pausing to mention any of this with regard to the crucial differences between human and non-human animals, Singer has forgotten how important and relevant these differences are in according to individuals the status of moral beings Non-human animals are metaphysically different from us These differences are crucial in determining the moral status of animals and this is that they do not possess the metaphysical structures human beings have in order for them to belong within the same moral community as we do Hence, since they

do not participate in this moral community, the operating concepts functioning

in this sphere that include justice, the recognition of interests and equality,

should not apply to them Metaphysical characteristics are relevant to the moral

equation of animals and human beings and Singer has chosen to ignore this

One line of defense I can propose on behalf of Singer against Scruton’s claim has to do with the issue of marginal human beings There are human beings among us that do not possess either rationality, self-consciousness or the ability to use language These would include the mentally disabled, the physically impaired who are not able to communicate via verbal or body language, and even infants Is Scruton to concede that this class of human beings does not rightfully belong to our moral community? In order for him to remain consistent with his line of reasoning, he is forced to accept that moral concepts such as equality and the recognition of interests, do not apply to marginal human beings

to be excluded from the moral community This is because even though they cannot function as active members of this moral community at the time of their infancy, they are still “pre-moral” human beings Their current infancy does not cancel out their membership within the moral community They still hold claims

on the rest of this community to apply the operating principles of justice and equality to them Then, there are the group of marginal human beings which include senile or brain-damaged people who are not members anymore, and the group which comprises mentally handicapped people They constitute “post-moral” and “non-moral” members of the human moral community Even though the human beings mentioned in these two groups do not possess rationality, self-consciousness and the skill of using language to the same degree

as that of normal human beings, and even though they may be said to be similar

to non-human animals in this respect, they are still to be considered as members

of the same moral community as normal human beings For Scruton, marginal human beings who are either “post-moral” or “non-moral” and exist on a metaphysical level similar to that of non-human animals rather than human beings, must, unlike animals, rightfully be accorded the benefits of being a part

of the moral community His justification for this is as follows:

It is in the nature of human beings that, in normal conditions, they become members of a moral community governed by duty and protected by rights Abnormality in this respect does not cancel membership It merely compels us to adjust our response [Human]

infants and imbeciles belong to the same kind

as you or me: the kind whose normal instances are also moral beings It is this that causes us

to extend to each other and which is built collectively through out moral dialogue 36

36

Ibid p.54-5

What this passage really reflects is a contradiction committed on Scruton’s part Earlier on I quoted him as saying that it is the metaphysical make-up of human beings in the form of their rationality, self-consciousness and ability to use language that defines and qualifies them as participative members

of the moral community Now in this passage above, Scruton has expressed a second and different view He clearly specifies that it is more the “nature of human beings” and the fact that “infants and imbeciles belong to the same kind

as you or me” that makes up the qualifying factor This second approach to arguing that human beings are the only members of the moral community is essentially speciesist in character It states that it is actually species membership and kinship and not the three core characteristics of rationality, self-consciousness and language-using ability that justify an individual’s acquisition of the benefits and duties conferred by the moral community To support my objection against Scruton further, he also mentions that animals like dogs and

bears “are not the kind of thing that can settle disputes, that can exert sovereignty

over its life and respect the sovereignty of others, that can respond to the call of duty or take responsibility on a matter of trust.” 37 [Emphasis mine] Well, neither are human infants or imbeciles! Of course, Scruton would argue that human infants and imbeciles are the kind of beings that can have these abilities But Singer’s point is that we should not determine the moral status of a being on the basis of its kind There is no reason other than a bias prefaced upon exclusive species membership offered by Scruton to explain why moral justice and equality

do not apply to non-human animals

37

Ibid p.55

Burdens & Benefits

A stronger objection from Scruton centres on Singer’s neglect of the real and deep differences between human beings and animals Now, let us examine another reason why Scruton says Singer cannot justifiably argue for equal membership of the moral community between human beings and animals

Notwithstanding talk of a moral community, human beings inevitably co-exist with each other in social communities This could be the family, circles

of close friends, colleagues and so on In each of these kinds of communities, there are possibilities for conflict and resolution, negotiation, dialogue, mutually consenting parties to come to agreement or disagreement and the recognition of mutual autonomy All these are able to take place because human communities

are made up of persons For Scruton, the concept of personhood only applies to

human beings Human beings are persons because they are rational in the way that they engage in dialogue They are free, autonomous and intentional in making decisions In addition, they recognize that other persons are also autonomous and sovereign over matters concerning their own existence In other words, persons have both rights and obligations to others Scruton bases this concept of a person on Kant’s categorical imperative This expresses the view that each individual has an inherent good will that guides a person to act in

a way that can be willed to become universal law He or she is also to treat another person as an end, and not as a means, in itself The whole idea of a human person having rights, duties and being able to recognize another’s rights

as understood in this light cannot be said to apply to non-human animals These are rights and duties “only a person could have.” 38 Animals have no concept of

38

Ibid p.27

the categorical imperative or of rights and duties Their relations to one another are based on “affections and needs.” 39 They cannot possibly enter into the same kind of relations as human beings which are founded on rights, duties, dialogue and the mutual recognition of sovereignty Hence, animals cannot be moral beings because we cannot impose the “burdens” of a moral being upon them Such burdens are constituted by duties, obligations and one’s adherence to the categorical imperative At the same time, since animals are not able to carry the burdens of moral beings, they similarly cannot enjoy the benefits of moral beings These would include having rights, having others respecting their lives and volition as sacrosanct and “accepting them as objects of the higher emotions.” 40 Not having the burdens implies not having the benefits:

There are great benefits attached to the status

of moral beings, and also great burdens Unless

we are in a position to impose the burdens, the benefits make no sense – for they are benefits only to those who know how to use them, in other words, to those who regard themselves as bound by moral duties and answerable for their acts 41

Scruton’s linking of benefits and burdens in the manner suggested can

be challenged Singer would argue, along with Bentham, that the crucial issue is whether a being is sentient and can have interests For example, infants, the mentally retarded, and animals, all have interests in avoiding pain, and can therefore benefit from not being cruelly treated This benefit can be conferred

on them by normal adult human beings even though infants, the mentally retarded, and animals are not moral beings “who regard themselves as bound by moral duties and answerable for their acts.” We do not have to go so far as to