Construction land represents 5.7 percent of Xiamao’s land area while unused land, which comprises of grassland, ridges between fields and tidal land, makes up another 2.8 percent.2 Ther
Trang 16 The Predatory State in Land Use Conversion
In examining officials’ motivations and incentives to convert agricultural land to agricultural uses, the preceding chapters have sporadically touched on the
non-consequences of indiscriminate land use conversion, which extend beyond the loss
of agricultural and arable land This chapter juxtaposes local officials’ benefits against the social costs or externalities of land use conversion to highlight the repercussions
of their self-serving and opportunistic behaviour
The following case study of Sihui’s Xiamao town shows how land use conversion and the promotion of industrialization translate into direct gains for local cadres The importance of economic targets in the evaluation of cadres’ performance and the provision of cash rewards for fulfilling the goals induced local cadres to actively draw industries and capital to the town, even at the expense of converting land illegally to bypass land use quotas
While the conversion of agricultural land in the name of industrialization appears to have benefited local officials, the process of using land as an instrument to drive urbanization had given rise to various externalities – rural disputes over land issues, environmental degradation, and idle land The health hazards posed by heavy
pollution industries relocating to Sihui and the questionable sustainability of this path
of industrialization are adverse to the long-term development of the society An analysis of the local government’s expenditures further reveals that little had been spent on collective goods despite the substantial revenues from land described in the last chapter This, together with local accounts and evidence of poor governance,
Trang 2suggests that the Sihui government had been predatory in manipulating land
resources to its advantage and to the detriment of the society
About Xiamao Town
Xiamao town is located in the hilly region of central Sihui In 2005, it has a total population of 31,748 and an agricultural population of 30,154 spread over 13 villages and two neighbourhoods.1 This population composition is reflected in Xiamao’s land use distribution Over 90 percent of Xiamao’s total land area is agricultural land, of which arable land makes up 23.5 percent and forests 51.6 percent Capital farmland
constitutes 28,800 mu or more than 80 percent of the total arable land Construction
land represents 5.7 percent of Xiamao’s land area while unused land, which
comprises of grassland, ridges between fields and tidal land, makes up another 2.8 percent.2
There are three industrial parks in Xiamao town, which has a total land area of
160,470 mu after its merger with the adjacent Longwan town in 2003 The 1,010 mu Fulong industrial park and the 500 mu Xiamao industrial park were set up in 2002.3 Till date, both had drawn a number of non-ferrous metal, metal processing, and electroplating plants.4 Construction of the 10,000 mu Longwan ceramic industrial
park, part of the Longwan new construction materials industrial zone, began in 2003
as a key project of the Xiamao town government.5 In 2003, the town government
claimed to have drawn ten enterprises and leased over 4,000 mu of land to
1 “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen jiben gaikuang” (“General situation in Xiamao town of Sihui”), available at http:// www.xiamao.gdsihui.gov.cn, accessed 6 June 2005.
2 Sihuishi Xiamaozhen renmin zhengfu (Sihui city Xiamao town government), “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen tudi liyong zongti guihua (1997-2010)” (“Land use master plan of Sihui city’s Xiamao Town, 1997-2010”), March 2006.
3 Sihui nianjian 2004, pp 213-15.
4 “2005 nian Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi luoshi qingkuang rending biao” (“Confirmation of the
fulfilment of investments drawn to Xiamao town in 2005”); “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”).
5 Sihui nianjian 2004, pp 213; “Sihuishi (shengji) minying kejiyuan” (“Sihui (provincial level) non-state
scientific technology zone”), available at http://www.gdsihui.gov.cn, accessed 2 September 2005.
Trang 3investors.6 As with the other industrial zones in Sihui, the Longwan ceramic industrial park had attracted industries relocating from nearby regions such as Foshan, which
is renowned for its ceramic industry as well as the pollution caused by the ceramic manufacturing plants.7
Promoting Industrialization in Xiamao Town
As part of its industrialization drive in response to upper level governments, Xiamao town meted out additional rewards for the offices and Villagers’ Committees (VCs) under its supervision in 2005: two percent of land proceeds would be allotted to each individual who successfully brought in an investor to set up a factory in the town’s industrial zone; for attracting an investor to set up a factory in other areas within Xiamao town, individuals would receive a one-time payment amounting to ten
percent of the town’s economic gains (excluding taxes) arising from the investment in
that year; individuals who secured investments ranging from below 500,000 yuan to above one million yuan would be awarded a percentage of the government’s
economic gains, ranging from four to ten percent To further entice local cadres and officials, cash rewards are meted out promptly within three days upon the receipt of payment for land and other expenses.8
Economic development as the top priority of the Sihui government, specifically the drawing of investments and businesses, had been built into its cadre target
responsibility system and tasked to subordinate departments since 2003.9 Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 show the targets and how they are weighted in the evaluation of Xiamao’s departments and VCs Although only 20 points were allotted to the target of
6 Sihui nianjian 2004, pp 213.
7 “Foshan taoci yaolu wuran Zhusanjiao jushou” (“Pollution from Foshan ceramic kilns is the worst in
Pearl River Delta”), Nanfang dushibao (Southern City News), 25 April 2007.
8 Xiafu document no 8 (2005), “Guanyu yinfa Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi jiangli banfa de tongzhi” (“Regarding the notice to promulgate Xiamao town’s measures for rewarding the attraction of business and investment”)
9 Zeng Guohuan (Sihui city mayor), “Sihuishi 2004 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (“Sihui city
government work report 2004”), speech at the third meeting of Sihui city’s 13 th People’s Congress, 3 March 2004.
Trang 4drawing investments, the 30 points allotted to fulfiling the remittance target hinged on the department’s revenue too While specific departments were tasked with bringing
in investments, this did not preclude other departments from doing the In Xiamao, a
manufacturer of clothes-hangers with an investment of three million yuan was
brought in by the bureau of classified documents (baomiju) and the bureau of
archives (dang’anju).10
Table 6.1 Evaluation System for Xiamao Town’s Departments
30 5 points deducted for failing to fulfil the
town’s requirement every half-yearly
2 Fulfil the task of drawing 180 million
yuan of investments; proper follow-up of
the execution of the investment items of
the previous year and this year
20 2 points deducted for incompletion of task; 2
points deducted when brought-in businesses fail to invest within the same year; 5 points added for every 10% increase in sum of investment with a cap at 10 points
3 No occurrence of major safety incidents 20 5 points deducted for every major safety
incident
4 Improve the management of Xiamao
development zone and its enterprises,
ensure the timely resolution of labour
disputes and collective incidents
20 5 points deducted for every case of
compensation, labour dispute or collective appeal to upper levels
5 Expand the taking out of social labour
es 1 Meet the required sum of remittance to
the town 20 5 points deducted for failing to fulfil the town’s requirement every half-yearly
2 Fulfil the task of drawing 180 million
yuan of investments; proper follow-up of
the execution of the investment items of
the previous year and this year
30 2 points deducted for incompletion of task; 2
points deducted when brought-in businesses fail to invest within the same year; 5 points added for every 10% increase in sum of investment with a cap at 10 points
3 No occurrence of major safety incidents 20 5 points deducted for every major safety
incident
4 Improve the management of the
development zones and their enterprises,
ensure the timely resolution of labour
disputes and collective incidents
20 5 points deducted for every case of
compensation, labour dispute or collective appeal to upper levels
5 Expand the taking out of social labour
insurance by enterprises 10 3 points deducted for incompletion of taskSource: “2007 nian xianban kaohe shishi xijie” (“Evaluation details of departments, 2007”)
10 “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment
of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”) This is not an isolated case Economic targets had been assigned to various non-related departments such as the meteorological bureau, statistical
bureau, civil affairs bureau, central organization bureau etc See Liu Zhihua and Huang Xinjian,
“Qiantan difang zhengfu zai zhaoshang yinzi zhong de juese dingwei” (“On the role of the local
government in attracting businesses and investment”), Zhengfu yu jingji (Government and Economy),
No 8 (2004), pp 36.
Trang 5Table 6.2 Evaluation Criteria for Village Level Cadres of Xiamao Town
1 Birth control 15 0.1 point deducted for each percentage short of the town’s
target
2 Attracting businesses
and investments
10 5 points deducted for incompletion of task; no additional points
for bringing in agricultural items, 3 points given for each additional industrial item
3 Social order and
governance 10 2 points deducted for every collective incident (5 persons and above) that bypasses the village; 1 point deducted if incident
reaches town-level; 2 points deducted for deteriorating public order
4 Medical co-operative 10 1 point given/deducted for achieving 5 percent above/ below
target; no ceiling for adding points
5 Military work 10 3 points deducted for incompletion of task; 3 points given for
every additional enrolment
6 Progressive increase
in village fixed
revenue
7 3 points deducted for failing to reach target; 3 points given for
each additional base amount; 3 points deducted for failing to hand over the village’s accounts on time
7 Party building 5 2 points deducted for failing to fulfil the town’s requirement
8 Village hygiene 5 2.5 points given for completion of task, beyond which 2 extra
points are given; 2 additional points for winning the title of the city’s exemplary village or the province’s hygienic village
9 Party newspaper and
journal 5 3 points deducted for incompletion of task
10 Agricultural irrigation 5 3 points deducted for failing to fulfil the town’s requirement
5 2 points deducted for each case of production safety lapse; 2
points deducted for each case of serious mountain fire
13 Civil affairs 5 2 points deducted for failing to fulfil each of the town’s
requirement
14 Blood donation 3 1 point deducted for incompletion of task, 1 point given for
each additional name Source: “2007 nian cunji kaohe shishi xize” (“Year 2007 implementation details of village-level
evaluation”)
The 13 VCs of Xiamao were ranked according to their performance and scores in various arenas as shown in Table 6.2 At the village level, ten and seven points were allotted respectively to the drawing of businesses, investments and growth in village revenue That all VCs outperformed themselves by scoring 15 points in drawing investments, beyond the ten points allotted for this task, attests to the effort and attention given to attracting businesses and investors to Xiamao.11 Although scholars
have suggested that certain targets such as birth control have veto power (yipiao
11 “Xiamao zhen 2005 nian cunji kaohe xiangxi biao” (“Detailed table of Xiamao town village-level evaluation in 2005”) On the predominance of economic targets in the cadre target responsibility system, refer to Wu Xun, “Tudi jiage,” pp 12-13; Li Hongbin and Zhou Li-An, “Political Turnover and Economic
Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of Public Economics, No 89
(2005), pp 1743-62 See also O'Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Selective Policy Implementation,” pp 172; Edin, “Local State Corporatism,” pp 278-95; Tsui Kai-yuen and Wang Youqiang, “Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu,” pp 71-90; Wang Jun, “Zhongzubu shixing,” pp 7-8, 26; Susan H Whiting,
Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp 101-19.
Trang 6foujue) over the rest, rendering a cadre’s other accomplishments futile, lapses in birth
control appeared to be of no consequence for Xiamao’s VCs.12 Of the four villages that were granted additional three merit points for overall performance, three had underperformed in birth control, registering the lowest scores ranging from 7.9 to 12.1 among all 13 villages.13
There are also further awards and accolades for the danwei which excelled in
drawing investments, as specified in a document released by the Sihui’s Party
committee and government in 2006:14
In accordance with the regulations in “The 2005 Target Responsibility System for Towns (Street Offices), Departments under the City’s Direct Jurisdiction and Vertical Departments,” the Party committee and city government have
decided to commend and reward the danwei that have received following
awards in 2005: the target responsibility system appraisal award; award of outstanding contribution to national and local taxes of towns (street offices); special award for being in the country’s top one thousand towns in small town integrated development; award for attracting foreign capital; award for
exceeding the quota in attracting businesses and investment.15
Xiamao town was one of the few danwei that received a total of four awards, a
testament to the town officials’ priority and zest in promoting economic development
In 2005, the Party secretary of Xiamao town single-handedly procured more than 300
million yuan of investment while other local leaders such as the town mayor and vice mayors attracted a combined investment sum of 22 million yuan.16 Both the town’s Party secretary and assistant Party secretary scored the full ten points for drawing investments to Xiamao in the appraisal of their work performance.17
12 Han Qiang, “Dui jianli he wanshan,” pp 41
13 “Xiamao zhen 2005 nian cunji kaohe xiangxi biao.”
14 Zeng Guohuan (Sihui city mayor), “Sihuishi 2007 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (“Sihui city
government work report 2007”), speech at the second meeting of Sihui city’s 14 th People’s Congress, 23 March 2007.
15 Siweiban document no 3 (2006), “Guanyu 2005 niandu gongzuo mubiao zerenshi kaohe jiangli de jueding” (“Regarding the decision on the 2005 target responsibility system and rewards”)
16 “2005 nian Xiamaozhen banzi chengyuan, xianban zhaoshang yinzi huizongbiao” (“Year 2005 summary of Xiamao town teams’ and departments’ results in the attraction of business and
investment”)
17 “2006 nian xianban, banzi, ganbu wancheng zhaoshang yinzi qingkuangbiao” (“Completion of the drawing investments by teams, departments and cadres in 2006”)
Trang 7As with many other towns and townships, the tax-sharing system between Sihui city and Xiamao town is a hybrid of “dividing taxes, contracting at different levels.”
According to a town official, most of the township revenues are remitted upwards to the county, which then allocates funds for township expenditures While the town manages its own surpluses and deficits, it may request for additional funds from the city government in times of emergencies Town cadres have the incentive to collect more tax revenue than the target set by the upper level government as the town is entitled to a 20 percent tax return for the revenue collected in excess This helped to ease the town’s finances.18 From 2005 to 2006, the town attracted a total of 1.36
billion yuan in investments, with an annual output of 1.22 billion yuan.19 The town’s tax contributions were equally impressive In both 2005 and 2006, it exceeded its tax
quota by more than 75 percent, collecting 11.2 million yuan and 21.2 million yuan
respectively.20
Excessive Land Use Conversion
The frenzy to industrialize in Xiamao comes at a cost: the excessive conversion of agricultural land This section verifies the actual area of land converted for industrial use in Xiamao against the planned land area for industrial sites as drawn up in its land use plan It suggests that the extent of land use conversion undertaken by the town government belies the land use quotas laid down on paper in Xiamao’s land use plan
18 Fieldwork in Xiamao town, Sihui, October 2007.
19 “2005 nian Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi luoshi qingkuang rending biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investments drawn to Xiamao town in 2005”); “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”).
20 “Xiamaozhen gecunwei 05-06 nian gexiang zhibiao tongjibiao” (“Statistical table of performance indicators of VCs in Xiamao town”).
Trang 8Table 6.3 Land Use in Xiamao Town, Sihui (mu)
between 1996 and 2010
Residential, industrial & mining 6900 6899 6127 -773
According to Xiamao’s land use plan, agricultural land area in the town registers an
increase of 1,530 mu from 1996 to 2010 with a corresponding reduction in the area of
land for construction and unused land The reduction in construction land area is mainly due to a fall in the area taken up by rural settlements in villages Arable land
even witnesses a slight gain of 30.2 mu during the period though the increase is
attributed to the reorganizing and tidying up of wasted grassland, water surfaces, river, forsaken orchards and even a brick kiln as substitutes for arable land, casting doubt over the suitability of these land parcels for cultivation.21 Of the area of land for
residential, industrial and mining sites, only 395 mu was devoted to industrial and mining sites in 1996 This area expands by only 50 mu to a modest 445 mu in 2010
(see Table 6.3)
In actuality, however, the town government had expropriated 2,756 mu of land to
make way for 29 industrial enterprises from 2005 to 2006 (see Table 6.4) Moreover, the extent of land expropriation in Xiamao has defied its claim that the increase in
21 Sihuishi Xiamaozhen renmin zhengfu, “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen tudi liyong zongti guihua (1997-2010).”
Trang 9industrial land shall be derived mostly from existing idle land in the town and villages,
as well as from a planned reduction of residential land by 80 mu.22 For instance, the
4,000 mu of land requisitioned from villagers for the construction of the Longwan
ceramic industrial park includes orchards, fish ponds and arable land in eight of Xiamao’s natural villages.23 Moreover, the total area of the three industrial parks in
Xiamao is 11,510 mu, which has exceeded the town’s 2010 quota of construction land of 8,438 mu
Local informants disclosed that out of the 4,000 mu of land expropriated for the Longwan ceramic industrial park, only 1,000 mu were legal The town government
had leased the rest of the land from villagers instead of going through proper state
requisition (yizu daizheng) A total of 900 mu of land in the Xiamao and Fulong
industrial parks were also illegally leased from villagers in this manner.24
22 Sihuishi Xiamaozhen renmin zhengfu, “Sihuishi Xiamaozhen tudi liyong zongti guihua, 1997-2010.”
23 Interviews with villagers in Xiamao, October 2007.
24 Fieldwork in Xiamao town, Sihui, October 2007.
Trang 10Table 6.4 Industrial Enterprises Drawn to Xiamao Town, 2005-2006
investment (10,000
yuan)
Investment
in place (10,000
yuan)
Annual output value (10,000
yuan)
Area of land requisitioned
(mu)
Longwan Ceramics Industrial
Park
Jinpeng Copper Limited Company 30,000 20,000 45,000 250
Loulan Brick Accessory Factory 1,000 30 2,000 55
Xingtai Ceramic Limited Company 5,000 1,500 3,000 120
Fulong Industrial Park
Jianxing Electroplating Plant 2,000 2,000 2,000 30
Gaoshu Textile Fibre Limited
Xiamao Industrial Park
Yunxin Non-Ferrous Metal Limited
Shangshou Industrial Metal Limited
Non-Ferrous Metal Limited
Fengge Clothes-Hanger Limited
Other Locations
Sihui Ciji Recycling Limited
Company
Sources: “2005 nian Xiamaozhen zhaoshang yinzi luoshi qingkuang rending biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investments drawn to Xiamao town in 2005”); “2006 nian Xiamaozhen yinjin xiangmu luoshi qingkuang queren biao” (“Confirmation of the fulfilment of investment items drawn to Xiamao town in 2006”).
Trang 11Figure 6.1 Satellite Map of Longwan Ceramic Industrial Zone
Source: Available at http://uemap.com/window/moon/sihui.html, accessed 14 May 2009.
In seeking to maximize careers and other self-interests, therefore, local officials were not averse to violating laws The next section probes into a case of land expropriation and illegal land use conversion in Xiamao town and traces how it had become a contentious issue for villagers and the town government, eventually resulting in the demotion of the town’s Party secretary in 2007
Land Expropriation in Village S
Village S is a natural village in Xiamao town of Sihui As with most other villages in the town, village S relies on fish rearing for a livelihood More than 100 villagers, or one-third of its population, have jobs outside the village According to the VC
governing village S and seventeen others, the average annual income of a villager is
5,362 yuan, which is higher than the average annual income at both the town and
county levels.25
25 Interview with Nantang VC, October 2007, Sihui See also Sihui nianjian 2005, pp 26.
Trang 12In 2002, Xiamao town government commenced to expropriate land for the
construction of the Longwan ceramic industrial park To erect the industrial park, the
town government requisitioned 4,000 mu of land from eight natural villages including
village S At that time, there were no village group leaders representing village S The town government took advantage of this and forced villagers to consent to
unreasonable terms In giving up their rights to use the land over the next 50 years, villagers were supposed to receive, through the village collective, land compensation, resettlement subsidies, and compensation for young crops and attachments on the
requisitioned land The amount of compensation was as follows: 400 yuan per mu for fish ponds and cultivated land; 130 yuan per mu for hilly land; 120 yuan per mu for each fruit tree and an annual compensation of 400 yuan for the next 50 years
A town official said that a villagers’ meeting was held to announce the requisition and compensation scheme, which was attended by 80 percent of the villagers, out of which the majority agreed to the compensation amount Despite the meeting,
villagers said they had no idea of how the compensation amounts were derived They also had not seen any official notice on the requisition.26 However, villagers later
learned that factory owners paid 80,000 yuan for every mu of land This price alone was already higher than the 20,000 yuan which each dispossessed villager was
supposed to receive in instalments over 50 years.27
26 A survey conducted in 2006 and spanning 30 provinces and 1,538 landless farmers shows that more than 95 percent of the villagers had not seen any government documents and notices on the requisition
of land; over 85 percent had not participated in any meeting pertaining to land expropriation whereas more than 70 percent were unclear about the exact sum of compensation offered by the government Li Yanqiong and Jia Rongmei, “Chengshihua guocheng zhong tudi zhengyong yu guanli wenti de lixing fansi” (“A rational reflection on land expropriation and management issues in the urbanization process”),
Jingji xuejia (The Economist), No.5 (2006), pp 84-90.
27 The payment of compensation by instalment is not rare in China Despite the relatively low
compensation price as compared to land appreciation value and the high returns accruing to the local government, dispossessed peasants are often deprived of their deserved compensation According to China’s Land Administration Law, “the total land compensation and resettlement subsidies shall not exceed 30 times the average annual output value of the requisitioned land for the three years preceding
such requisition.” Based on this, if a farmer owned one mu of land with an average annual output value
of 1,000 yuan, the highest compensation he or she may get is but a mere 30,000 yuan See Zhang Hong, “Tudi zhengyong guocheng,” pp 67 A nationwide survey conducted by Renmin University and
the Rural Development Institute (RDI) in 2005 also reveals that among villagers who received
compensation in 70 percent or 353 out of 507 instances of land expropriation, 272 received one-time payment, 65 received payment in instalments, and 16 received both one-time payment and instalments See Ye Jianping et al, “2005 nian zhongguo nongcun tudi shiyongquan diaocha yanjiu” (A survey and
Trang 13Villagers’ grievances over land and compensation terms were heightened by
pollution from factories built on expropriated land Those who did not sign the land expropriation agreement were gradually coerced into doing so The authorities forcibly detained villagers who refused to comply on the pretext that the latter had
“hampered their work.” Thus reluctant as they were, villagers had no choice but to give in and sign the agreement From the past experience of nearby villages,
villagers were concerned that the factories in the industrial park might pollute the underground water they consumed For instance, in 2005, a metal processing factory polluted villagers’ fish ponds resulting in the death of fishes while others caused severe air pollution Years ago, there was a “cancer village” in which many villagers contracted cancer, supposedly due to pollution from a nearby factory.28
To placate the villagers, Xiamao town government agreed to supply running water to every household in the village Predictably, this promise did not materialize even when the first factory began operating in 2007 Villagers soon found that their well water had turned darkish in colour Alarmed, they sought assistance from the VC, town mayor and other officials, who pushed the responsibility to other authorities After three months of having to draw water from a distant well a few kilometres away, frustrated villagers blocked the only road to the industrial park with rocks, denying factory operators and workers access to the sole operating factory in the park
For over 20 days from July to August 2007, tens of villagers took turns to guard over the road block The town Party secretary’s “offer” to make each household pay 1,000
yuan for the supply of running water was rejected by the villagers, who also
demanded the return of some expropriated land After villagers repeatedly replaced road blocks that were removed by police authorities, the town government
study of land use rights in China’s villages in 2005”), Guanli shijie (Management World), No 7 (2006),
pp 79 The survey spans 17 provinces, 1,773 villages and 1,962 rural households.
28 Interview with Nantang villager, July 2007, Sihui.