Chapter FourLand Development and Urbanization 4 Land Development and Urbanization Urbanization in China has been transformed from a centrally-controlled phenomenon to a contentious proc
Trang 1Chapter Four
Land Development and Urbanization
4 Land Development and Urbanization
Urbanization in China has been transformed from a centrally-controlled phenomenon
to a contentious process among local states.1 In 2005, Wang Guangshou, Minister of China’s Ministry of Construction censured local governments that set unrealistically high targets in city building Whereas the Chinese capital of Beijing had positioned
itself as only a “modern international city” (xiandaihua guoji chengshi) in its
city-building plan, there were 183 cities all over China that proposed to turn themselves
into “modern international metropolis (xiandaihua guoji dadushi),” a target that even
the capital had yet to achieve.2 Furthermore, the Ministry of Construction also
disclosed that around 20 percent of China’s 662 cities and over 20,000 designated
towns were culpable of “image engineering projects” (xingxiang gongcheng) such as
huge squares, wide roads and luxurious office buildings.3
The city building fever that the Ministry described has been commonly termed as
“chengshi jingying” or “city building as a business” by Chinese media and experts.4 It
is characterized by the inordinate expansion of a city through the extensive
requisition of land for property development and infrastructure construction, financed
1 For an overview of the process, definition and measurement of urbanization in China, refer to Zhang L
and Simon X B Zhao, “Re-examining China’s ‘Urban’ Concept and the Level of Urbanization,” The China Quarterly, No 154 (1998), pp 330-81; Zhang Li, “Conceptualizing China’s Urbanization under Reforms,” Habitat International, Vol 32, No 4 (2008), pp 452-70; Shen Jianfa, “Estimating Urbanization
Levels,” pp 89-107; Chan Kam Wing, “Economic Growth Strategy and Urbanization Policies in China,”
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol 16, No 2 (1992), pp 275-305.; Chan Kam
Wing and Hu Ying, “Urbanization in China in the 1990s: New Definition, Different Series, and Revised
Trends,” The China Review, Vol 3, No 2 (2003), pp 49-71; Zhou Yixing and Laurence J C Ma,
“China’s Urbanization Levels: Reconstructing a Baseline from the Fifth Population Census,” The China Quarterly, No 173 (2003), pp 176-96; Eric J Heikkila, “Three Questions Regarding Urbanization in China,” Journal of Planning Education and Research, Vol 27, No 1 (2007), pp 65-81
2 “Jianshebu buzhang henpi jianshe xitong bingzheng, nuche ‘zhengji gongcheng’” (“Minister of
Construction reproved the ills of the construction system and denounced ‘political achievement
projects’”), Chengshi guihua tongxun (City Planning News), No 4 (2005), pp 2.
3 Xie Jianchao and Gong Chengyu, “Weifa kaifashang he guanyuan weihe wusuo guji” (“Why unlawful
developers and officials are fearless”), Zhongguo jingji shibao (China Economic Daily), 11 April 2007,
pp 016.
4 Sun Yongzheng, “Chengshi jingying de fengxian” (“The risks of running a city like a business”),
Shidachao (Trends of the Time), No.2 (2003), pp 36-37; Lin Jiabin, “Dui ‘chengshi jingying’ re,” pp
10-13.
Trang 2through bank loans, land leasing, or the collection of ad hoc fees from enterprises and the society.
In explaining what drives land use conversion in China, therefore, part of the story is that urbanization in the sense of a shift from agricultural to industrial activity is
accountable for the expansion of Chinese cities at the expense of rural land This chapter shall focus on telling the other part of the story It argues that China’s
urbanization is also a spatial expansion that may proceed independent of urban population growth or a sectoral shift The engineers of this land-centred urban sprawl are the local states As an expert on China’s urbanization suggests,
Urbanization, if achieved by urban spatial expansion and infrastructure
upgrading, is regarded as a sign of modernization and a means to enhance local competitiveness In this context, urban transition is effectively
facilitated by many untrammelled developments at the local level from extensive land use change to lure investment, redundant construction of infrastructure and duplication of projects with less concern directed towards the development plans of neighboring jurisdictions, and conversion of rural areas into designated cities to widen the development space.5
This urge to stimulate local competitiveness through urbanization is closely related to the way officials are graded by their superiors under the Cadre Target Responsibility System In the process of spatial expansion, local governments have taken
agricultural land for construction with alacrity because it fulfils multiple objectives critical to their career and other interests Besides fiscal incentives and legitimate or illegitimate monetary gains described in the previous chapters, land development fuels GDP growth and conjures up highly visible political accomplishments – mega-
scale construction projects labelled aptly as “political achievement projects” (zhengji
gongcheng) Local officials may sell land use rights at high prices to increase coffers
or offer land at low prices to attract investments and promote industrialization; they
may also expand the urban built-up area (jianchengqu) under their territorial
5 Zhang L., “Conceptualizing China’s Urbanization,” pp 466.
Trang 3Chapter Four
Land Development and Urbanization
jurisdiction and build infrastructure to expedite “urbanization." In short, land use change effectively allows the government to “kill many birds with one stone.” The following section outlines the way local cadres are appraised before elaborating on the nature of urbanization and the business of city building in China
The Cadre Target Responsibility System
The performance of China’s government officials at the county level and below is
measured and supervised through a system of quota (zhibiao), which is a legacy of
the planned economy era.6 In 1995, the Central Organization Department
(zhongyang zuzhibu) issued tentative measures on the appraisal on county level
cadres and leaders, which consisted of over 20 quotas falling under three categories: economic construction, social development and civil construction, and party
construction (see Table 4.1).7 These include highly specific and measurable targets such as local fiscal capacity, birth control as well as those under party construction that generate less tangible results
Through this political institution of performance appraisal, each level of government signs responsibility contracts “objectives, evaluation procedures, and remuneration” with its immediate subordinates one level down.8 In this way, higher-level objectives cascade to lower levels through the administrative hierarchy and the completion of important tasks translates into direct incentives for individual cadres For instance, county leaders seek to include their priorities and responsibilities in the contracts of
6 Yang You-Ren Daniel and Wang Hung-Kai, “Dilemmas of Local Governance under the Development
Zone Fever in China: A Case Study of the Suzhou Region,” Urban Studies, Vol 45, No 5 & 6 (2008),
pp 1048 For a brief history on China’s cadre evaluation system, see Lang Youxing, “Zhongguo ganbu
kaohe zhidu zai bianlian” (“The changing face of China’s cadre evaluation system”), Renmin luntan (People’s Forum), No 3 (2008), pp 10-11.
7 Wang Jun, “Zhongzubu shixing xian(shi) dangzheng lingdao banzi gongzuo shiji kaohe biaozhun” (“The Central Organization Department tests the evaluation standards for the actual work achievements
of county(city) party and government leaders”), Beijing tongji (Beijing Statistics), No 1 (1996), pp 7-8,
26.
8 Kevin J O'Brien and Li Lianjiang, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China," Comparative Politics Vol 31, No 2 (1999), pp 172.
Trang 4township leaders, who in turn convey these to village cadres.9 The contracts quantify and attach numeric values or weights to targets that subordinates are to attain within
a specific period of time.10
While lower level governments have some room in defining their targets, economic quotas still predominated.11 As seen from Table 4.1, economic items have better-defined quotas, in comparison to those of the other two categories It is also more difficult to verify the results of environmental protection, and other social
developmental goals This accentuates the over-emphasis on GDP, revenue and other growth indicators.12 Tasks subsumed under economic and social development are more heavily weighted and thus are naturally given more attention by the local governments and cadres to be assessed.13
Under certain circumstances, a cadre’s failure to meet an important target may render all his other accomplishments futile and deny him of the opportunity to be
promoted The types of targets that have veto power (yipiao foujue) over the rest had
increased gradually, extending to areas such as clean and honest governance, social stability, birth control, and others.14 The amount of revenue, in particular, is often a
9 Susan H Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp 103; Maria Edin, “Local State Corporatism
and Private Business,” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol 30, No 3 (2003), pp 281.
10 See Tsui Kai-yuen and Wang Youqiang, “Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal
Decentralization in China,” China Quarterly, No 177 (2004), pp 78.
11 Yang and Wang, “Dilemmas of Local Governance,” pp 1048.
12 See Wang Qiang, “Ruhe pingjia defang guanyuan de zhengji” (“How to evaluate local officials’ political
achievements”) Juece zixun (Policy Consultation), No 12 (2003), pp 34-35; Gu Jinglei and Yao Rong,
“Zhengfu lingdao ganbu kaohe zhidu yanjiu” (“A study on the evaluation system of government leaders
and cadres”), Jiaxing xueyuan xuebao (Journal of Jiaxing University), Vol 17, No 5 (2005), pp 93-95;
Zhang Zhanbin, “'Difang zhengfu gongsihua' fansi” (“Reflections on the corporatization of local
governments”), Juece (Decision Making), No 11 (2006), pp 32; Zhu Jiangping, “Xiankai xin
zhengjiguan de honggaitou,” (“Unveiling a new concept of political achievement”) Nongcun gongzuo tongxun (Village Work News), No 7 (2006), pp 33-34; Xu Wenjun, “Ganbu kaohe ‘shizhen’de beihou” (“Behind the ‘sham’ of cadre evaluation”), Zhejiang renda (Zhejiang Deputies to the People’s Congress),
No 10 (2007), pp 26-27.
13 Tsui Kai-yuen and Wang Youqiang, “Between Separate Stoves,” pp 75-79; Zhang Jiliang, “Jiyu quyu lingdao ganbu kaohe tiaojian xia shuju zhiliang de xin zhidu jingjixue fenxi” (Data quality resulting from the appraisal of regional leaders and cadres: an analysis using the new institutional economics
approach), Tongji yanjiu (Statistical Research), No 10 (2004), pp 25 For a detailed illustration of how a county grades the performance of township subordinates, see Whiting, Power and Wealth, pp 106.
14 Han Qiang, “Dui jianli de wanshan dangzheng lingdao ganbu kaohe pingjia zhibiao tixi de ruogan sikao” (The appraisal of party political leaders and cadres: reflections on developing and improving the
criteria of the evaluation system), Zhengzhixue yanjiu (Studies in Political Science), No 4 (2003), pp
Trang 5Chapter Four
Land Development and Urbanization
“hard target” for towns and townships and all other achievements may be discounted upon the failure in meeting the quota set by the county government Some counties may even cut their subsidies to townships as a penalty In desperation, some towns and townships resort to tax-buying, or appropriating other financial sources to make
up for the deficiency.15
The defects of the appraisal system have been widely covered in the Chinese
literature The way it is structured and the focus on economic goals have given rise to
a warped perception of what constitute political accomplishments Beneath the façade of impressive growth and investment figures often lies a reality that is far less rosy Opportunistic local governments take advantage of information asymmetry and seek the most beneficial outcome for themselves through high, if superficial,
economic growth targets It has also been suggested that the handing down of
targets or quotas from upper levels (ya zhibiao) constituted a strong motivation for
lower ranks officials to seek investments through extensive land use conversion The violation of land use regulations is driven by the link between cadres’ promotion or evaluation and the system of economic indicators at below the county level.16
de fenxi yu tantao" (“The ‘tax-drawing’ behaviour of town and township governments: an analysis and
exploration”), Shenji yuekan (Accounting Monthly), No 8 (2006), pp 28-9; Li Dezhi, "'Maishui jiaochai' shui lai zhizhi" (“Who to put a stop to ‘tax-buying to fulfil duty’”), Jingji yanjiu cankao (Study and
Research of Economics), No 87 (2006), pp 27; Qing Shan, "'Maishui' wu zong zhui" (“The five
commandments of ‘tax-buying’”), Xin xibu (New West), No 10 (2006), pp 53-4.
16 Yang and Wang, “Dilemmas of Local Governance,” pp 1049.
Trang 6Table 4.1 The Cadre Target Responsibility System
Evaluation Item Indicator Qualitative Requirement
1) Economic construction
i Economic aggregates, growth
and per capita levels GDP and growth; GDP per capita and growth In accordance with the State’s overall management and control targets, taking into account the patterns of the socialist market economy as well as objective
circumstances, determine local development targets and shift the focus to restructuring, improving the quality of economic growth and results.
ii Tax revenues and local
governments’ fiscal capacity Central tax revenue and growth; local financial revenue and growth To improve the tax sharing system, increase central and local financial revenues and achieve a balance in expenditure and revenue iii Urban and rural living standards Villagers’ gross income per capita; population
lifted from poverty; urban cost of living per capita, income and growth; social retail price index; urban consumer price index
Gradually increase urban and rural income; steadfastly control the price inflation rate and ensure market supply
iv Agricultural production and
village economic development
Cultivated land area preservation; output of food and main agricultural production and growth;
cropland irrigation area
Increase agricultural investment; improve the conditions of agricultural production; promote advanced technology; increase unit production and total output; improve agricultural structure; increase supply of agricultural produce
v Management of state-owned
assets Appreciation of state-owned assets Build a sound responsibility system and a value-preservation/appreciation evaluation system for the management of state-owned assets to prevent loss.
vi Enterprise management and
development State-owned enterprise profits; state-owned enterprise tax turnover rate; TVE profits; TVE tax
turnover
Transform the management mechanism of state-owned enterprises and enhance economic results; actively promote TVEs; reasonably introduce and utilize foreign capital
vii Traffic, energy,
telecommunication, urban
construction, cropland water
conservancy and the level of other
basic infrastructures
Level of investment in basic infrastructure Improve production and living standards, enhance security for industrial and
agricultural production
2) Social development and civilization construction
ii Social stability and security Crime rate reduction; rate of solving major cases Strengthen the integrated management of social security, forbid pornography,
gambling drugs and backward, superstitious activity, ensure social stability and a stable life for the people
Evaluation Item Indicator Qualitative Requirement
iii Education, scientific technology,
culture, public health, and sports Spread of the nine-year compulsory education; reduction in youth illiteracy; technological
innovation and contribution; spread of village level medical treatment and prevention safety net
third-Implement the development strategy of prioritizing education, increase investment in education, promote the transformation of technological results, improve the health of the people
Trang 7Chapter Four
Land Development and Urbanization
iv Environmental and ecological
protection Reducing and regulating the “three wastes” (waste water, gas and residue); Forests and vegetation
coverage
The simultaneous planning, implementation and development of environmental and economic construction, control and reduce environmental pollution
3) Party construction
i Ideological and political
construction Cadres of the organization and party members learning and understanding of the Party’s fundamental theories, direction and knowledge, enhance ideological
and political calibre
ii Building of leadership and cadre
Trang 8Urbanization: the Business of City Building
In countries where all urban land is owned by the public sector, land is by far the most valuable asset on the municipal balance sheet Urban land values are created in part by public investment They reflect the capitalized value of access to road networks, water supply, schools and other services made possible by municipal investment It is economically appropriate
therefore for municipalities to capture part of the land-value increment they create through their investment There are various ways that increases in urban land value can be captured, but the sale of land or land rights has the advantage of producing revenue quickly and being easier to administer 17
The above passage aptly sums up the attractiveness of urban land as an asset for governments, as well as how public improvements boost land prices Revenue from land sales is used to finance urban infrastructure, which contributes to a further hike
in land prices According to a World Bank report, many China cities have financed half or more of their urban infrastructure investment through land sales while using land as a collateral to finance the remainder.18 Local governments capitalize on land value increment through the construction and development of basic infrastructure First, they may lease land use rights to buyers after improving public infrastructure Land use rights are mortgaged to banks to obtain loans for financing capital
construction.19 After investing in and improving public infrastructure, bringing about
an appreciation in land price, land use rights are then conveyed or transferred
through auction, tender and so on Part of the economic gains are again invested on enhancing urban facilities to further drive up land prices and so on Alternatively, local governments may lease land use rights before improving public infrastructure The projected appreciation in land price draws private sources of funds from
investors to participate in the development of public infrastructure.20
17 Peterson, “Land Leasing and Land Sale,” pp 3.
18 Ibid More than 60 percent of China’s cities had borrowed form banks or had outstanding loan
applications to finance infrastructure construction by 2001 The total debt incurred by the government for
urban infrastructure amounted to 74.2 billion yuan in 2001 Refer to Su Ming and Zhao Quanhou, “The
Fiscal Framework.”
19 Capital construction refers to “new construction projects or extension projects and the related activities
of the enterprises, institutions or administrative units mainly for the purpose of expanding production capacity (or improving project efficiency), covering only projects each with a total investment of 500,000
RMB yuan and over.” For the full definition, refer to the “Explanatory notes on Main Statistical
Indicators,” http://www.stats.gov.cn, accessed 24 January 2008.
20 Wang Jun, “Zengzhang quxiang de shiyingxing tiaozheng: dui defang zhengfu xingwei yanbian de yizhong lilun jieshi” (“Adjusting growth inclinations to external changes: a theoretical explanation of the
change in local governments' behaviour”), Guanli shijie (Management World), No 8 (2004), pp 54;
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Land Development and Urbanization
This practice of infrastructure-financing to spur urban development is also observed
by other researchers Lin, for one, suggests that land sales, or the leasing of land use rights, which constitute 30 to 70 percent of local revenue in many cities, have
become a vital source of capital for urban development “This new ‘land-centred urban politics’,” he argues, “has been correctly identified by many urban researchers
as one of the most important driving-forces operating behind the spectacular
expansion of cities, particularly large cities, and the upsurge in city-forming
urbanization since the mid 1990s.”21
China’s “spectacular” urban expansion is evident in the rapid growth of its fixed
assets investment Investment in capital construction went up by 1433.8 billion yuan
or 167 percent from 1996 to 2003 whereas investment in real estate more than
trebled over same period, growing from 321.6 billion yuan to 1015.4 billion yuan (see
Table 4.2) The following statistics illustrate what the burgeoning investments had materialized into: total floor space of buildings more than doubled from 1996 to 2003, expanding from 6.1 billion square metres to 14 billion square metres; the length of paved roads almost doubled from 1996 to 2005 while area of paved roads increased from 1.4 billion square metres to 3.9 billion square metres (see Table 4.3)
Another indicator of China’s urban development is the urban built-up area, which reflects the size of the urbanized area in China’s cities Specifically, the urban built-
up area refers to the non-agricultural area in an urban district which is developed through land requisition and construction, and is well-equipped with public
infrastructure and facilities It is a more accurate indicator than city area since a city
in China is an administrative concept and may encompass large areas of villages and agriculture, meaning that the area of a Chinese city is often larger than its urbanized
Zheng Meng and Miao Jie, “Chengshi tudi jingying,” pp 32.
21 Lin, “Reproducing Spaces,” pp 1832-33; See also Lin Jiabin, “Dui ‘chengshi jingying’ re,” pp.10-13; Liu Shouying, “Jingti tudi jingying,” pp 46-47; Zhang Meng and Miao Jie, “Chengshi tudi jingying,” pp 32-33.
Trang 10area.22 Through improvements to public infrastructure in the manner described above, a city’s urban built-up area is expanded, thus driving up land prices From
1996 to 2006, China’s urban built-up area increased from 20,214 square kilometres
to 25,972 square kilometres Land and real estate prices had increased more rapidly after 2001 On average, prices of residential and non-residential properties had risen
by 3.7 to 9.7 percent annually from 2002 to 2005 while land prices grew by nearly 7
to 10 percent annually over the same period (see Table 4.4) At the same time, significant areas of rural land were requisitioned in the process of city building In a decade from 1996 to 2005, the total expansion in urban built-up area amounted to 12,306 square kilometres, of which 12,014 square kilometres were land requisitioned for state construction projects (see Table 4.3) An estimation claims that the
encroachment of urban space onto rural China has given rise to 1.5 million landless farmers each year in the last decade.23
Zhejiang urban development exemplifies the experience of China’s coastal
provinces From 1996 to 2002, the urban built-up area in 33 percent of Zhejiang’s 61 county level units (cities and districts) had doubled in size From 2002 to 2005, among 59 county level units, 15 percent underwent a 100 percent expansion in their urban built-up area while 2 of them saw a threefold enlargement Comparing 1996 and 2005 statistics, the urban built-up area in 20 percent of 54 county level units had expanded by more than threefold; that of 15 percent grew by twofold while that of 37 percent doubled.24
Moreover, the expansion of a city maximizes the local government’s tax revenue For instance, one of Zhejiang’s counties had redrawn its boundaries three times since
22 Li Jianying, "Guangdong chengshihua de xianzhuang, wenti yu zhidu yuanyin fenxi (The urbanization
of Guangdong, its problems and systemic causes: an analysis"), Dongya lunwen (East Asia
Dissertation), No 50 (2005), pp 3.
23 Tan Minghong et al., “Urban Land Expansion,” pp 188.
24 Dai Wenzhuo and Ding Han, “Zhejiangsheng xianji yishang chengzhen jianchengqu guimo kuozhan
yanjiu”, Guotu ziyuan (Land and Resources), No 7 (2007), pp 12.
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Land Development and Urbanization
1998, expanding its urban built up area by 30 to 40 square kilometres The income from land taxes and indirect taxation (not including miscellaneous fees) brought about by city expansion constituted 40 percent of the county government’s within budget revenue while land sales income made up 60 percent of its extra-budgetary revenue.25
25 Wang Jun, “‘Tudi caizheng’,” pp 27; Liu Shouying and Jiang Xingsan, “Tudi rongzi yu caizheng he
jinrong fengxian” (“The financial risks of using land to finance local coffers”), Zhongguo tudi kexue (China Land Science), Vol 19, No 5 (2005), pp 4.
Trang 12Table 4.2 Total Investment in Fixed Assets in China (100 million yuan)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total Investment 22913.55 24941.11 28406.17 29854.71 32917.73 37213.49 43499.91 55566.61 70477.4 88773.6 By
Trang 13Table 4.3 City Building in China
Developed Area (km 2 )
Land Requistioned for State Construction Projects (km 2 )
Urban Population
Non-Agricultural Population (10,000)
Population Density in Urban Districts (persons per
km 2 )
Total Floor Space of Buildings (100 million m 2 )
Length of Paved Roads (10,000 km)
Area of Paved Roads (100 million m 2 )
construction statistical bulletin”), 1996-2002.
Trang 14Table 4.4 Price Indices of Real Estate and Land (preceding year = 100)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Selling Price Indices of Real Estate 101.4 100.0 101.1 102.2 103.7 104.8 109.7 107.6
Sources: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002, pp 314; Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2006, pp 336.
Table 4.5 Composition of GDP and Employed Persons by Industry (Total = 100)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 GDP
Trang 15Chapter Four
Land Development and Urbanization
The Nature of “Urbanization”
Using Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei region as case studies, Tan et al conclude that
“high economic growth rate (the GDP growth rate touched 11.2%) was one of the main forces that led to urban land expansion and the increase of urban land per capita in the 1990s, especially in large cities.”26 Although the observation of high growth rate and urban sprawl can hardly be faulted, the relationship between the two variables is debatable While economic progress and affluence lead to growing demand for living space per capita and others, it may be argued that in China’s urbanization, which is predominantly government-led, urban land expansion is a means to drive up GDP In other words, the causal relationship may not be one-directional as some scholars propose The following elaborates on this argument
Government-led urbanization, driven by the pursuit of revenue-maximization and GDP growth, has led to a distorted form of “urbanization” characterized by physical expansion and infrastructure construction In certain instances, the pace of urban sprawl has even overtaken that of urbanization understood as the “shift from rural-agricultural activity into urban industrial activity.”27 The urban built-up area in China, for example, had increased 28.5 percent from 1996 to 2006 whereas the composition
of employed persons by industry had not changed significantly over the decade The percentage of employed persons in the agricultural industry had decreased by less than 6 percent over the period; the percentage employed in secondary industry in
2005 was about the same as that in 1996 while that in tertiary industry had gone up
by 5.4 percent Moreover, the GDP composition of primary industry in 2005 was about 7 percent lower than that in 1996 while that of tertiary industry grew by the 7 percent (see Table 4.5) In short, there is a discrepancy between China’s
26 Tan Minghong et al., “Urban Land Expansion,” pp 194.
27 See James C Davis and J Vernon Henderson, “Evidence on the Political Economy of the
Urbanization Process, ” Journal of Urban Economics, No 53 (2003), pp 99 See also Dai Junliang,
“Zhongguo xiandaihua de jingxian zhi 'yue'” (“An alarming 'leap' in the modernization of China”),
Liaowang xinwen zhoukan (News Watch Weekly), No 41 (2006), pp 28.
Trang 16urbanization in physical/spatial terms and that in terms of a sectoral shift As the following sections explain, this is a result of the government’s urbanization strategies
of infrastructure construction and administrative adjustments
Infrastructure Construction
A 1996 nationwide survey authorized by the central government found widespread duplicate construction of basic infrastructure and industries, taking up vast areas of cultivated land Under the nationwide land use plan, the land use quotas of railways,
airports, industrial and mining sites should not exceed 7.05 million mu, 0.38 million
mu and 30.4 million mu respectively by 2000 However, these constructions had
already exceeded their quotas by 1995.28 Along Yangtze river, there were 31 bridges
in 2000, which nearly quadrupled that in 1995 Yet by 2010, the number will further increase to 60, with 23 bridges in Chongqing, 18 in Hubei and eight in Jiangsu This means that there will be one bridge every 50 kilometres along the river, a record that
is unprecedented in the world.29 Another survey reveals that coastal provinces had exceeded the quota for non-agricultural land use, with some cities using up their
2010 quota by the year 2001.30
The maximization of political achievements and self-interests during one’s tenure has contributed to over-zealous urban development at the expense of excessive land use conversion Within their short tenure – between three to five years per term for
government leaders at the county-level and below – local officials rack their brains to produce “visible” political achievements, which take the shape of extravagant,
ostentatious and often unproductive projects.31 Such large-scale infrastructural projects are perceived as symbols of “modernization” by different levels of
28 Baohu gengdi wenti zhuanti diaoyanzu, “Woguo gengdi baohu,” pp 2-11.
29 Li Bin and Wu Jingjing, “Da le zheme duo daqiao, yao ba Changjiang ‘kunsi’ le” (“Too many bridges
‘binds down’ River Yangtze”), Xinhua meiri dianxun (Xinhua Daily News), 5 October 2005, pp 2.
30 Deng Dacai, “Zhidu shiling,” pp 36.
31 Visible achievements or xianji is contrary to qianji, i.e latent achievements that are less tangible and
measurable, and take longer to produce results.
Trang 17Chapter Four
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government, and are not exclusive to affluent localities and capitals.32 The
prevalence of zhengji gongcheng is such that underutilized “landmarks” of all sorts –
luxurious village bungalows, wide roads, oversized shopping malls, massive squares, stadiums, and palatial government buildings– can also be seen in obscure villages, small towns, and less developed counties.33
In some regions, governments resort to bank loans, levies and compulsory
fundraising to finance wasteful constructions, leading to growing debts and burdens
on residents and villagers.34 In a Henan county, for instance, the county government undertook infrastructure building on a grand scale in every village, incurring a debt of
more than 40 million yuan Not only did the sparse population resulted in
underutilization of the facilities, every village was burdened with debts as high as 15
million yuan.35 Some villages in areas such as Sichuan, Fujian and Zhejiang were revamped by local governments and touted as “model villages” while in reality, the cost of building luxurious villas were passed on to villagers.36 In Anhui Buyang, the
320 million yuan invested to construct an airport, which ultimately did not
materialized, were raised by collecting a few hundred yuan each from villagers and
residents.37 As seen in Table 5.1, the bulk of fixed assets investment in China was funded by domestic loans and self-raised funds, which together constituted 75.5 percent of total sum of investment in 2005
32 Mo Yongbo, “Lun difang zhengfu 'xingxiang gongcheng' de tuibian ji qi zhili” (“On the evolution and
control of local governments’ ‘image projects’”), Lilun daokan (Introduction to Theory), No 12 (2006),
pp 15-7.
33 Huang Ran, Zhou Mingjiang, Ruan Yisheng, Xia Shiying, Li Yan, and Wang Xing, "Jiyu gonggong caizheng shijiao de tudi churangjin yanjiu” (“A study of the land conveyance fee from the perspective of
public finance”), Jingji yanjiu cankao (Reference for Economic Studies), No 94 (2006), pp 29; Sima
Long, “Toushi zhengji gongcheng,” pp 52; Zhou Wenshui, "‘Zhengji gongcheng’,” pp 34-35; Qu Jingyao and Qi Haishan, "Bierang ‘xingxiang gongcheng’,” pp 46-47; Renmin luntan diaoyanzu, "Zhengji gongcheng,” pp 12-13.
34 O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Selective Policy Implementation,” pp 175; Zhou Wenshui, "‘Zhengji
gongcheng’,” pp 34-35; Liang Peng and Gu Lilin, "Lushi xian de zhengji gongcheng yihuo" (The
troubles left behind by political achievement projects in Lushi county), Xiangzhen luntan (Forum of Towns and Townships), No 6 (2004), pp 26-27.
35 Liang Peng and Gu Lilin, “Lushixian,” pp 26.
36 Renmin luntan diaoyanzu, “Zhengji gongcheng,” pp 12-13.
37 Zhou Wenshui, “‘Zhengji gongcheng’,” pp 35.
Trang 18True to a popular saying that “one party secretary builds a street, one term of
government builds a city,” government officials responsible for these white elephants are often promoted and transferred to other offices once their term ends, or even before that In a Henan, for instance, the average tenure of the county party
committee secretary was less than two and a half years when the official tenure should be five years One county even saw a change of four party secretaries within five years.38 The lack of accountability further enforces the practice of “roving
banditry” whereby debts and losses incurred through lavish projects are passed down to unfortunate successors.39
Administrative Adjustments
“Urbanization” – via the reclassification of counties into cities, or townships into towns and the encroachment of the city into the suburbs – is a convenient way for local governments to enlarge the land area under its jurisdiction.40 Apart from
improving city infrastructure to expand the urban built-up area, many local
governments used administrative adjustments such as merging townships into towns, removing counties to set up districts, merging counties and cities to seek “instant” urbanization.41
38 Jiang Jie, “Ganbu duiwu jianshe: ‘gan man renqi’ fang ‘zhengji gongcheng’,” (“Building cadres’ teams:
completing the tenure to prevent projects of political achievements”), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 12
October 2004.
39 Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review, Vol
87, No 3 (1993), pp 568; Cheng Huairu, “Xiao chengzhen jianshe yao zouchu ‘zhengji gongcheng’ wuqu” (“Avoiding the mistake of ‘political achievement projects’ in the building of small towns and
cities”), Nongcun jingji (Village Economy), No 8 (2002), pp 49; You Bengen, “Buneng gei xiaren liu
‘kulong’”(“Do not leave ‘holes’ for successors”), Lingdao kexue (Leadership Science), No 17 (2006), pp
47.
40 China’s urban population comprises the population in cities as well as designated towns, jianzhi zhen
Unlike the western notion of a city or a town as a place where a population engaging in non-agricultural activities congregate, a designated city or town in China is but an administrative concept This is to say that the latter does not preclude an agricultural population, and that the distinction between the function
of towns and villages can be rather obscure For instance, there may well be numerous villages and up
to 50 percent agricultural activity within the boundaries of a designated city in China Therefore an increase in the number of such cities does not necessarily reflect a rise in the level of urbanization For the official definition of urban population in China, please refer to Shen Jianfa, “Estimating Urbanization Levels,” pp 89-107 See also Wang Hongxia, "Zhongguo jiujing xuyao shenmeyang de chengshihua?
(What kind of urbanization does China need?"), Shehui guancha (Society Watch), No 12 (2005), pp 13;
Li Jianying, "Guangdong chengshihua,” pp 3.
41 Bu gengdi baohu yu jingji fazhan guanxi diaoyan zu, “Tudi liyong zongti guihua shishi ji youguan zhengce zhixing qingkuang de diaoyan baogao” (“A survey report on the implementation of the land use
master plan and related policies”), Guotu ziyuan tongxun (Land and Resources News), No 12 (2002),
pp 32.