According to Lin and Ho, this expansion of land for construction had taken place at the expense of agricultural land and unused land, among which the loss of cultivated or arable land ge
Trang 11 Introduction
China saw rapid expansion in the area of land used for human settlements, industrial and mining sites from 1949 to 1996 According to Lin and Ho, this expansion of land for construction had taken place at the expense of agricultural land and unused land,
among which the loss of cultivated or arable land (gengdi) was most acute Based on
an analysis of the 1996 nation-wide land survey results, it was estimated that around
80 percent of newly acquired land for construction was converted from arable land.1
In addition, much of the converted arable land was requisitioned from peasant
collectives Of the 2.26 million hectares of arable land converted to non-agricultural use from 1987 to 2001, it was estimated that 70 percent or 1.58 million hectares were collectively-owned land requisitioned by the government.2 As of 2007, China’s arable
land per capita had fallen to 1.39 mu or 0.093 hectare, which is only a third of the
world’s average.3
The depletion of agricultural land was accompanied by a rise in proceeds from land leasing In 2006, total revenue from the leasing of state-owned land swelled to 767.7
billion yuan, a jump of 30 percent from that of 2004.4 The lucrativeness of land
leasing, constitutes a strong revenue imperative for governments at various levels, propelling a host of intractable and unlawful government behaviour in the use of land Since 1999, there had been over one million instances of unlawful land practices.5
1 George C S Lin and Samuel P S Ho, “China's Land Resources and Land-Use Change: Insights from
the 1996 Land Survey,” Land Use Policy, No 20 (2003), pp 97.
2 “Shui guanxin shidi nongmin de mingyun?” (“Who will care for the fate of landless farmers?”),
Zhongguo jingji shibao (China Financial News), 9 May 2003 One mu is equal to 0.067 hectare In this
thesis, I use “cultivated land” and “arable land” interchangeably to refer to “gengdi.”
3 “Woguo tudi jiadi zhi duoshao?” (“How much do you know about our country’s land assets?”),
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guotu ziyuan bu (The Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C.),
http://www.mlr.gov.cn, 20 November 2007, accessed 12 February 2008.
4 “Zhongguo guotu ziyuan gongbao” (“China’s national land resources bulletin”), 2006, Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo guotu ziyuan bu (The Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C.),
http://www.mlr.gov.cn, accessed 2 December 2007.
5 Zhang Xiaosong, “Tudi weifa xingwei chengxian san da xin tedian” (“Three new characteristics of
unlawful land practices”), Jingji cankaobao (Economic Reference News), 17 April 2006, pp 003.
Trang 2According to the law enforcement bureau of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), almost all severe cases of land offences involved government officials.6
From September to mid November 2007 alone, the MLR uncovered 32,000 cases of illegal land use involving 233,450 hectares of land The majority of the cases had to
do with using and occupying land before obtaining approval, often for key
construction projects at the national and provincial levels Usual violators include cadres and political leaders at the prefecture-level and below, of various government departments such as the court, land and housing management bureau, construction bureau, and land resources bureau.7 More often than not, government officials at different levels and departments collude to take hold of collective land through
unlawful means In a typical case highlighted by the MLR, for example, one
company’s illicit acquisition of land in a county of Henan was facilitated by a network
of government officials including the county-level land and resources bureau chief, the county head and vice head, the former vice head of the county’s Standing
Committee of the People’s Congress, the town party secretary, and village cadres.8
Some may contend that the extensive conversion of agricultural land for construction
is hardly surprising given China’s rapid urbanization since the late 1970s In under a decade, urban population increased from in 215.7 million in 1982 to 314.4 million in
1990, after which it boomed further to nearly 470 million or 37 percent of the entire
6 Zhang Xiaosong, “Tudi tiaokong xinzheng jianzhi defang ‘tudi caizheng’” (“Macro-control of land
targeted at ‘land financing’”), Xinhua meiri dianxun (Xinhua Daily News Bulletin), 6 September 2006, pp
001.
7 “Quanguo tudi zhifa bairi xingdong tongbao de ba qi dianxing tudi weifa anjian chachu qingkuang” (“Report on the nation-wide hundred-day enforcement of land laws: investigation and prosecution of
eight typical cases of land laws infringement”), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guotu ziyuan bu (The
Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C.), http://www.mlr.gov.cn, 10 December 2007, accessed 13
December 2007; Yu Zeyuan, “Zhongguo jianchabu: jiang baochi gaoya chachu tudi weifa’an” (“China Ministry of Supervision to keep up unrelenting investigation and prosecution of unlawful land practices”),
Lianhe zaobao (United Morning Post), 11 December 2007.
8 Yu Zeyuan, “Zhongguo jianchabu.”
Trang 3population in 2000.9 The demands of a growing population have fuelled the taking of agricultural land for urban development such as housing and other infrastructure
Yet alongside this urban spatial expansion propelled by demographic changes, a different path of urbanization has been observed since the mid-1990s Instead of being driven by the needs of a bigger urban population, city expansion is motivated
by land finance (tudi caizheng), whereby local governments raise revenue and attract
investment through land leasing and land development that necessitate the extensive conversion of agricultural land.10 In other words, land is primarily used as an
instrument to enhance the government’s fiscal situation rather than to accommodate
a growing urban population
In view of these two concomitant processes of urbanization in China, it may be argued that attributing the conversion of agricultural land to the demands of
urbanization only tells part of the story The other part of the story revolves around the supply of agricultural land for conversion and what determines this supply Since
local officials are the key decision-maker empowered to manage and regulate the supply of land within the constraints of central policy, how local officials benefit from land use conversion and the ways in which their incentive structure is shaped by the institutional context are important to understanding the supply side of the story The central role of local state agents in supplying land is further augmented in the context
9 See Shen Jianfa, “Estimating Urbanization Levels in Chinese Provinces in 1982-2000,” International
Statistical Review, Vol 74, No 1 (2006), pp 95 The figures are calculated based on the 1982, 1990
and 2000 censuses and have been adjusted to include a non-hukou population.
10 Refer to George C S Lin, “Reproducing Spaces of Chinese Urbanization: New City-Based and
Land-Centered Urban Transformation,” Urban Studies, Vol 44, No 9 (2007),pp 1832-33; Liu Mingxing, Tao Ran, Yuan Fei and Cao Guangzhong, “Instrumental Land Use Investment-Driven Growth in China,”
Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol 13, No 3 (2008), pp 313-31 See also Lin Jiabin, “Dui
‘chengshi jingying’ re de toushi yu sikao” (“Insight and reflection on the ‘urbanization business’ fever”),
Chengshi guihua huikan (Urban Planning Forum), No 1 (2004), pp 10-13; Liu Shouying, “Jingti tudi
jingying chengshihua de caizheng he jinrong fengxian” (“Be wary of the financial risks in using land
deals to promote urbanization”), Lilun tantao (Theory Exploration), No 9 (2005), 46-47; Zhang Meng
and Miao Jie, “Chengshi tudi jingying zhong de yige yidiyangdi moxing de fenxi yanjiu” (“The land
financing model in urban land transactions: an analysis and study”), Quanguo shangqing (Nation’s
Business News), No 12 (2007), pp 32-33.
Trang 4of China, where the State monopolizes the supply of agricultural land for users who intend to utilize it for non-agricultural purposes.11
The central question this study asks, therefore, is: what determines local
governments’ capacity in supplying agricultural land for conversion? The quest to answer this question begins from an investigation of the general incentives for and constraints on local officials in supplying land before delving into local variations This thesis first raises the following query: in what ways does the supply of agricultural land for conversion serve as an instrument to local governments in fulfilling their objectives? Through a case study of a county-level city in Guangdong, it then poses the question of how this general incentive structure that shapes officials’ behaviour interact with local conditions, such as the local fiscal situation, path of development
or industrialization, the availability of land resources and other resources, quality of governance etc., to determine local patterns of land use conversion Since a crucial,
if secondary, theme that runs through this study is the consequences of land use conversion, some attention shall also be devoted to answering these questions: What are the externalities of instrumental land use conversion? Under what conditions is it beneficial or detrimental for the society under local governance?
Defining Land Use Conversion in this Study
Under China’s Land Administration Law, land is classified into three categories
according to usage: land for agriculture (nongyongdi), land for construction (jianshe
yongdi), and unused land (wei liyong di) Land for agriculture is further subdivided
into arable land (gengdi), forest (lindi), pasture (caodi), land for irrigation and water conservancy (nongtian shuili yongdi), and water surfaces for aquaculture (yangzhi
shuimian) Of the categories of agricultural land, arable land is the core of the State’s
concern Land for construction refers to land on which buildings and other structures
11 There are, of course, illegal means of getting agricultural land directly from rural collectives or
peasants through the black market.
Trang 5are erected, including land used for housing in urban and rural areas, for public utilities, for industries and mining, for communications and water conservancy, for tourism and military installations and so on Unused land refers to all land other than those for agriculture and construction.12 Figure 1.1 depicts how land is currently used
Orchards 1.24
Cultivated land 12.81 Unus ed Land
27.45
Grass land 27.54
Source: “Zhongguo guotu ziyuan gongbao,” 2007.
In addition, land is also classified by ownership Under the Land Administration Law, land in the urban areas of cities is owned by the State whereas land in rural and
suburban areas is owned by peasant collectives (nongmin jiti), with the exception of
that owned by the State as provided for by the law Housing sites and private plots of cropland and hilly land are owned by peasant collectives.13
Land use conversion in this dissertation refers specifically to the process whereby land for agriculture is converted into land for construction According to the Land Administration Law, Chapter 5, Article 43,
12 Refer to the Land Administration Law (Tudi guanlifa), Chapter 1, Article 4.
13 Ibid., Chapter 2, Article 8.
Trang 6all units and individuals that need land for construction purposes shall apply for the use of state-owned land in accordance with the law, with the exception
of those who have lawfully obtained approval to use collectively-owned land
of their own collective economic organizations to start town and township enterprises and build houses for villagers, or those who have lawfully
obtained approval to used collectively-owned land to build public utilities and public welfare undertakings in a town(ship) and village.14
Since agricultural land is likely to be located in rural and suburban areas, land use conversion often involves a change of ownership from the peasant collectives to the State.15 After land use conversion is approved, collectively-owned land has to be first
expropriated or requisitioned (zhengshou) from peasants, effectively transferring
ownership to the State before it can be conveyed to potential users.16
Land use change, however, often takes place without going through the proper procedures outlined above In 2005, the MLR’s surveillance of 16 cities through satellite remote sensing reveals that close to 50 percent of newly added land for construction were acquired unlawfully.17 A common way of violating the law is to convert agricultural land without a change of ownership.18 While maintaining
collective-ownership, agricultural land is converted to land for construction through leasing, shareholding, transfer and exchange Peasants lose their land use rights in the process and no land conveyance fee is paid to the State in the process.19 In other instances, local governments occupy arable land without accounting for the
adjustment in their respective land use plan; they may also convert land for urban
14 In general, though, the land use rights of collectively-owned land are not to be sold, transferred or leased for non-agricultural construction See the Land Administration Law, Chapter 5, Article 63.
15 For a detailed analysis of land-use change based on the 1996 land survey, refer to Lin and Ho,
“China’s land resources,” pp 87-107 For land use change in China’s coastal region, see Ho, Samuel P
S and George C S Lin, “Converting Land to Nonagricultural Use in China's Coastal Provinces:
Evidence from Jiangsu,” Modern China, Vol 30, No 1 (2004), pp 81-112.
16 Refer to the Land Administration Law, Chapter 5, Article 45 Land expropriation has been a major cause of conflicts between villagers and officials, often because of low or unpaid compensation and other mis-implementations in the process Refer to a case study in Chapter Six of this thesis.
17 Zhang Xiaosong, “Tudi tiaokong,” pp 001.
18 With the exception of township and village enterprises (TVEs) and other undertakings specified in Article 43 of the Land Administration Law.
19 Yuan Ying and Kong Xiangzhi, “Nongcun gongyehua guocheng zhong tudi feinonghua moshi yanjiu” (“A study on the models of non-agricultural land use conversion in the process of rural industrialization”),
Shanxi caijing daxue xuebao (Journal of the Shanxi University of Finance), Vol 28, No 1 (2006), pp
53-55.
Trang 7construction in the name of village building or collaborate with real estate developers
to build properties on villagers’ land; others covertly approve or condone the illegal use of land.20 In short, land use change may be unlawful in two respects: non-
agricultural activity is undertaken on collectively-owned agricultural land without the formal transfer of ownership from the collective to the State and/or without acquiring formal approval for conversion
Individual peasants may also violate land laws either by directly converting
agricultural land to residential and other non-agricultural purposes or transferring land use rights to other non-agricultural users The illegal conversion of land by peasants
is driven by profits, especially in comparison with the returns from farming and other agricultural activities In Shenzhen, for instance, villagers started building private houses and apartments to meet the housing demands of migrant workers from the 1980s Rental income of villagers was estimated to be between 4,000 to 7,000 million
yuan per year.21 The motivations for peasants are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis, which focuses on explaining motivations for local state agents
The Evolution of China’s Land Management System
Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in the late 1970s, China embarked on a series of economic and political reforms with far-reaching consequences The adoption of the open-door policy, the promotion of rural industrialization and private
entrepreneurship, and the decollectivization of agriculture had transformed China’s economy Although reform was accompanied by a new set of problems including
20 “Guotubu dui shiliu chengshi jiance” (“The MLR monitors 16 cities”).
21 See Wang Ruyuan, “Shenzhen tequ chengzhongcun tudi shouyi de lilun tantao” (“Land proceeds in
Shenzhen’s villages-in-city: a theoretical analysis”), Guotu jingji (China Land Economy), No 11 (2003),
pp 17-18; Tan Gang, “Chengzhongcun jingji zhuti, jingji huodong ji zhuyao tezheng” (“The economic
entity, activity and characteristics of villages-in-city”), Kaifang daobao (Open Economy Herald), No 3
(2005), pp 51-56.
Trang 8corruption and regional inequality, China achieved remarkable growth Within a decade from 1978 to 1988, real GDP per capita more than doubled.22
Along with rapid economic development was the evolution of China’s land use
trends Reforms unleashed the pent-up demand for better infrastructure, housing and other modern amenities that led to the widespread conversion of agricultural land for construction purposes In the 1980s, industries and warehouses occupied as much
as 30 percent of the area in Chinese cities and rural industries in the form of
township and village enterprises (TVEs) took land extensively in the countryside The rapid expansion of roads also depleted large areas of agricultural land, particularly in eastern China where population density was high and the economy was fast
land management Capital construction (jiben jianshe), TVEs and village collectives
were highlighted as responsible for taking most of the agricultural land, often
unlawfully.24 This observation is affirmed by statistics on the land taken for agricultural purposes in Guangdong from 1987 to 1995, which show that an average
non-of more than 60 percent were used for national construction projects and more than
22 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York & London: W W
Norton & Company, 2004), pp 129.
23 Samuel P S Ho and George C S Lin, “Non-Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China,” China
Quarterly, No 179 (2004), pp 762-65
24 Zhongfa document no 7 (1986), “Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang tudi guanli, zhizhi luanzhan gengdi de tongzhi” (“Notice from the Party Central Committee and the State Council on strengthening control on land and stopping the indiscriminate taking of cultivated land”).
Trang 920 percent for township and village collective construction, whereas less than 10 percent were taken by the building of rural housing.25
While the demands of urbanization triggered by the reforms were driving land use conversion at the macro-level, the institutional contexts in the first decade of the reform era and that from 1988 onwards are different, thereby influencing the set of incentives and constraints that structure cadres’ behaviour in the process of land use change Prior to 1988, state-owned land was allocated to local users at virtually no
cost whereas local-foreign joint-ventures paid an annual fee of five yuan to 300 yuan per square metre for the use of site (changdi shiyongfei).26 In 1988, the Constitution
of the PRC and the Land Administrative Law were amended to legalize the paid transfer of land use rights.27 Furthermore, the collection of land use tax in cities and town was implemented in the same year, superseding the collection of the land use fee.28 Payment for the use of urban land was not fully implemented till 1988 although advocacy for doing so began in the early 1980s.29
The Land Administration Law provides the basic legal framework governing China’s land system Enacted in 1986, the Land Administration Law was revised in 1988,
1998 and underwent minor amendments more recently on 28 August 2004, at the
11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress.30 The
25 Guangdong dizheng dichan nianjian 1996 (Yearbook of Guangdong Land Governance and Land
Resources 1996) (Guangdongsheng ditu chubanshe, 1996), pp 278-79.
26 Guofa document no 201 (1980), “Guowuyuan guanyu zhongwai heying qiye jianshe yongdi de zanxing guiding” (“The State Council’s provisional regulations on the use of construction land by sino- foreign joint ventures”); See also Zhu Jieming, “Local Growth Coalition: The Context and Implications of
China’s Gradualist Urban Land Reform,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol 23,
No 3 (1999), pp 534-48.
27 Refer to the 1988 Land Administration Law, Article 2; Zhang Chuanjiu, “Shouwang dadi 20 nian”
(“Watching over the land for 20 years”), Zhongguo tudi (China Land), No 6 (2006), pp 4-8.
28 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzhengan” (“Amendment to the Constitution of the PRC”), 1988; Guofa document no 17 (1988), “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengzhen tudi shiyongshui zanxing tiaoli” (“The PRC’s Provisional regulations on land use tax in cities and towns”).
29 Anthony Gar-On Yeh and Wu Fulong, “The New Land Development Process and Urban Development
in Chinese Cities,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol 20, No 2 (1996), pp
334-35.
30 The 2004 amendments involve changing the Chinese term for requisition from “zhengyong” to
“zhengshou.” For the reasons behind this change, refer to Sun Xiaohong, “Xi tudi ‘zhengshou’ yu
‘zhengyong’” (“An analysis of the ‘zhengshou’ and ‘zhengyong’ of land”), Zhejiang guotu ziyuan
Trang 10Land Administration Law that exists today took shape in 1998 Among the main changes were the imposition of the land use plan from top-down; the classification of land into agricultural, construction and unused land and an approval system for the conversion of agricultural land; and the upward concentration of approval authority for land requisition into the hands of the central and provincial governments.31
Today, the existing law contains eight Chapters and 86 Articles codifying land
ownership and land use rights, land use plan, protection of cultivated land, land used for construction, supervision and inspection of land use and so on.32 The leading government agency overseeing land management is the Ministry of Land and
Resources (MLR), established in 1998 through the merger of the former State
Bureau of Land Administration, the State Oceanic Administration, the State Bureau of Survey and Mapping, and the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources.33
Both the Land Administration Law and the former State Bureau of Land
Administration were established in response to the alarming rate at which cultivated
land was disappearing in the 1980s From 1980 to 1985, around 37 million mu of
cultivated land were lost nationwide, with rate of disappearance peaking at over 15
million mu in 1985.34 Massive land enclosure occurred after Deng Xiaoping’s
southern tour in 1992, which led to the development zone and real estate fever.35 So
(Zhejiang Land and Resources), No 10 (2004), pp 48-49; Wang Zhenzhong and Wang Kai, “Qianyi tudi zhengshou yu zhengyong zhidu” (“A preliminary discussion of the zhengshou and zhengyong of land”),
Henan guotu ziyuan (Henan Land and Resources), No 2 (2006), pp 16-17.
31 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanlifa” (“The Land Administration Law of the PRC”), revised on
29 December 1988, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan gongbao (The PRC State Council’s
Gazette), No 27 (1988), pp 873-82; Mao Donglin, “Weile women de shengmingxian – ‘tudi guanlifa’ xiugai pingshu” (“For the sake of our lifeline – Assessing the revision of the ‘Land Administration Law’”),
Kuangchan ziyuan kaifa (Mineral Resources Exploitation), No 10 (1998), pp 15-17; Zhu Daolin, “Falü,
wei tudi shichang huhang” (“Safeguarding the land market with law”), Zhongguo tudi (China Land), No
6 (2006), pp 9-10.
32 Refer to the Land Administration Law For more information on the evolution of China’s land system,
see Ding Chengri, “Land Policy Reform in China: Assessment and Prospects,” Land Use Policy, Vol 20,
No 2 (2003), pp 110-13.
33 The State Bureau of Land Administration was set up a month after the promulgation of the Land Administration Law in 1988 See Zhang Chuanjiu, “Shouwang dadi,” pp 5.
34 See Zhang Chuanjiu, “Shouwang dadi,” pp 4.
35 Zhang Xiaojing and Sun Tao, “China’s Current Real Estate Cycle and Potential Financial Risks,”
China & World Economy, Vol 14, No 4 (2006), pp 59-60; Carolyn Cartier, “‘Zone Fever’, the Arable
Trang 11far, the State had taken drastic measures in the form of moratoriums to arrest the loss of cultivated land On 20 May 1997, a moratorium on non-agricultural
construction taking up cultivated land was imposed and its one year duration was subsequently extended in 1998 till the revision of the Land Administration Law was complete.36
However, not long after the tightening of control over the approval of land use
conversion, land requisition and others in the revised law, the area of arable land
used for construction began to rise again, soaring to 3.4 million mu in 2003 from 2.4 million mu in 2000.37 From 2001 to 2005, the area of arable land decreased by 92.4
million mu at an annual depletion rate of 18.48 million mu.38 On 18 July 2003, the State Council issued a notice to suspend the approval of all development zones, together with complementary measures to remove illegal development zones.39 For half a year till November 2004, all approval for the conversion of agricultural land to construction land was also shelved.40 Yet again, presumably due to the pent-up demand for land use conversion whilst the moratorium was in effect, the arable land used for construction picked up with a vengeance after the ban was lifted, rising over
Land Debate, and Real Estate Speculation: China’s Evolving Land Use Regime and Its Geographical
Contradictions,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol 10, No 28 (2001), pp 468; Zhang Chuanjiu,
“Shouwang dadi,” pp 6.
36 Guojia tudi guanli ju and Guojia jihua weiyuanhui, document no 6 (1997), “Dongjie feinongye jianshe xiangmu zhanyong gengdi guiding” (“The regulation on freezing the taking of arable land for non- agricultural construction items”); “Guojia jiang jixu dongjie feinong jianshe zhanyong gengdi” (“The State
to continue the moratorium on the taking of arable land for non-agricultural construction”), Xin nongcun (New Village), No 5 (1998), pp 2; “1998: tudi guanli dashiji” (“1998: major events in land
management”), Renmin ribao (Peoples’ Daily), 26 June 1998, pp 9.
37 “Zhongguo guotu ziyuan gongbao” (“China’s national land resources bulletin”), 2001-2006, Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo guotu ziyuan bu (The Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C.),
http://www.mlr.gov.cn, accessed 2 December 2007.
38 Zhang Chuanjiu, “Shouwang dadi,” pp 7.
39 Guoban faming dian document no 30 (2003), “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zanting shenpi gelei kaifaqu de jinji tongzhi” (“An emergency notice from the State Council on the temporary freeze on the approval for all types of development zones”); Guotuzifa no 45 (2003), “Guotu ziyuanbu guanyu qingli gelei yuanqu yongdi, jiaqiang tudi gongying tiaokong de jinji tongzhi” (“The MLR’s emergency notice regarding the cleaning up of all types of zones and strengthening control over land supply”); Fagaiwaizi document no 2343 (2003), “Guotu ziyuanbu guanyu qingli zhengdun xianyou gelei kaifaqu de juti biaozhun he zhengce jiexian” (“The MLR on specifications and policy limits on the administration and restructuring of all existing development zones”).
40 Guoban faming dian document no 20 (2004), “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu shenru kaizhan tudi shicahng zhili zhengdun yange tudi guanli de jinji tongzhi” (“An emergency notice from the State Council
on deepening the administration and restructuring of the land market and tightening land management”).
Trang 1270 percent from 2.2 million mu in 2004 to 3.9 million mu in 2006.41 From 2007, the provincial government has taken on the responsibility of auditing all requests for the conversion of agricultural land and land requisition under their jurisdiction before submitting them for the State Council’s approval.42 The arable land taken for
construction subsequently declined to 2.82 million mu in 2007, rising slightly to 2.87 million mu in 2008 (see Figure 1.2).43
Figure 1.2 Trends in China’s Non-Agricultural Land Use
6866
2053 2037
1568 2.08
No of Developm ent Zones Arable Land Occupied for Cons truction (m illion m u) Sources: “Zhongguo guotu ziyuan gongbao” (“China’s national land resources bulletin”), 2001-2008,
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guotu ziyuan bu (The Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C.),
http://www.mlr.gov.cn, accessed on various dates; Zhang Pu and Li Xiaowen, “Fangzhi kaifaqu weifa quandi xinsikao” (New thoughts on preventing illegal land enclosures by development zones),
Zhongguo tudi (China Land), No 2 (2007), pp 15; “Guojia fazhan gaigewei quanwei jiedu kaifaqu qingli
zhengdun gongzuo” (“The State Development and Reform Committee’s authoritative interpretation of
the reduction and restructuring of development zones”), Zhongguo touzi (China Investment), No 5
(2007), pp 20.
41 “Zhongguo guotu ziyuan gongbao”; Guotuzifa document no 45 (2003), “Guotu ziyuanbu guanyu qingli gelei yuanqu yongdi, jiaqiang tudi gongying tiaokong de jinji tongzhi” (“The MLR’s emergency notice regarding the cleaning up of all types of zones and strengthening control over land supply”) The moratorium on the approval of land use in State-level development zones was subsequently lifted in
2005 See Guobanfa document no 15 (2005), “Guowuyuan bangongting zhuanfa shangwubu deng bumen guanyu cujin guojiaji jingji jishu kaifaqu jinyibu tigao fazhan shuiping ruogan yijian de tongzhi” (“A State Council Office’s notice on the circulation of some suggestions by the Ministry of Commerce and others on advancing the development of State-level economic technology development zones”).
42 Guotuzifa document no 320 (2006), ‘Guanyu tiaozheng bao Guowuyuan pizhun chengshi jianshe yongdi shenpi fangshi youguan wenti de tongzhi” (“A notice on the issues related to the adjustment of the verification method for urban construction land to be submitted to the State Council for approval”).
43 Zhongguo guotu ziyuan gongbao.”.
Trang 13Table 1.1 Chronology of Events in China’s Land Management 44
1980-1985 • Loss of around 36.8 million mu of arable land
1986 • Enactment of the Land Administration Law (LAL)
• Establishment of the State Bureau of Land Administration
1987 • The first paid conveyance of land use rights took place in Shenzhen
1988 • Amendment of the Constitution of the PRC to legalize the paid transfer of land use
rights
• Amendment of the LAL to legalize the paid transfer of land use rights
• Implementation of the collection of land use tax in cities and town, superseding the collection of the land use fee
1990-1996 • Loss of 72.77 million mu of arable land
1990 • Enactment of new legislation to legalize the secondary transfer of land use rights
of state-owned land in towns and townships and that by foreign investors
1992 • There were 1,951 development zones all over China with a total planned area of
15,300 square kilometres
1992 • The State Council issued an urgent notice to stop the indiscriminate encroachment
and use of arable land
1993 • Enactment of “provisional rules on the levy of land appreciation tax on the profits
from the transfer of land use rights and buildings and other attachments on land”
1997 • There were 4,210 development zones in China with a total planned area of 12,400
square kilometres
1997 • Imposition of a moratorium on non-agricultural construction taking up cultivated
land
1998 • Extension of the 1997 moratorium
• Amendment of the LAL
• Establishment of the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR)
2001-2005 • 13.1 million mu of arable land were taken for construction purposes
2003 • The number of development zones in China hit 6,866
2003 • Imposition of a moratorium on the approval of all development zones, together
with complementary measures to remove illegal development zones
2004-2006 • The number of development zones fell from 2,053 to 1,568
2004 • Amendment of the LAL
• Imposition of a moratorium on the conversion of agricultural land for agricultural construction from April to November
non-• The MLR issued specific guidelines on the restructuring of development zones
2005 • Moratorium lifted for State-level development zones
2006 • Arable land taken for construction purposes soars to 3.88 million mu from 2.08
million mu in the previous year
2006 • Provincial governments delegated with greater responsibility in auditing requests
for the conversion of agricultural land and land requisition under their jurisdiction
2007 • Arable land taken for construction purposes fell to 2.82 million mu
Significance
The choice of research topic is justified in a few respects Firstly, the significance of land use in China is self-evident with regard to the scarcity of land Despite having the third largest land mass in the world, China’s land per capita is but a third of the world’s average.45 How land is managed to mitigate the consequences of its scarcity
44 For the data on arable land loss and the number of development zones, refer to Zhang Chuanjiu,
“Shouwang dadi,” pp 4; Lin and Ho, “China’s Land Resources,” pp 96; “Zhongguo guotu ziyuan gongbao,” 2001-2005; Zhang Pu and Li Xiaowen, “Fangzhi kaifaqu,” pp 15; “Guojia fazhan gaigewei,”
pp 20; “Zhongguo kaifaqu fenbu tubiao” (“The distribution of development zones in China”), MLR website, http://www.mlr.gov.cn, accessed 14 June 2008 For other sources, refer to footnotes 26 to 42 in this chapter.
45 “Woguo tudi jiadi zhi duoshao?”