The pitfalls of a state in transition myanmar 1974 2000

Chapter I : Introduction: Toward An “In-Sense” Of Myanmar 1 Chapter II : Misunderstood Myanmar 11 On Narcotics: Victim or Aggressor 34 Chapter III : The Milieu Interieur Part 1 45 Impres

MISUNDERSTOOD MYANMAR:

AN INTROSPECTIVE STUDY OF THE

VICISSITUDES OF A SOUTHEAST ASIAN

STATE IN TRANSITION

( 1974 – 2000 )

KOH KIM SENG

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAMME FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

2009

Chapter I : Introduction: Toward An “In-Sense” Of Myanmar 1

Chapter II : Misunderstood Myanmar 11

On Narcotics: Victim or Aggressor 34

Chapter III : The Milieu Interieur (Part 1) 45

Impressions of a Former First Lady, A Seasoned

“A perspective from the General’s Aide” 74

En-route to Democratizing Myanmar 120 Oversight of Governance 125

Chapter IV : The Milieu Interieur (Part 2) 134

The Junta and the International Pressure 145

Conflagration: The Role of the Universities and

The Great Political Divide, Myanmar-style 177

“Hpon, Awza and Ana,” and the Sangha Order 190

On the Other Side of the Free World 211

Chapter VI : Reeling Under a Colonial Past 223

Myanmar in the Early Years:Autocracy and the Struggle 223 British Annexation: Diarchy, Alienation and More

Struggle 230

Japanese as colonizers: Friend or Foe - more struggle 239 Narcotics Problem in Myanmar: A British Implant -

Chapter VII : Myanmar: International Relations Calculus 250

Asean “Non Interference” an Exception 269 Prognosis for Intending “Predators” –

Chapter VIII: Epilogue 278

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Government of Myanmar, considering the many “distortions” contained

in foreign accounts, in recuperating its history set up the Myanmar Historical Commission in the 1950s to delve into the past by way of what is commonly known

in Myanmar as “living history” To this end, those who have had the opportunity to work closely with the past power or stakeholders and who can faithfully narrate the

actions and the raison d’etre thereof of such power or stakeholders based on

interviews, are the most likely to reveal the “inside story”

Oral history becomes even more crucial because access to the National Archives in the sanctums of which lie the most secret of State documents which are extremely difficult if not impossible for locals to get access into not to mention for foreigners There are “layers of safeguard and control” according to one of my key respondents, whom I shall call Brother, a former government Minister in charge of the National Archives in which documents such as the ‘Side Letter’ pertaining to the

“dispensation” of the 10-year Secession Clause sought by the Minorities during the Panglong Talks over the formulation of the 1947 Constitution for presentation to the British for Independence, are kept” Brother mentioned that he saw the ‘Side Letter’ once when the then Senior General Saw Maung in the course of discussion over an issue with him, instructed the then Chief of the Archives, Ltc Than Maung, a historian formerly from the History Department of the Defense Services Academy, to get hold of the ‘Side Letter’ Nevertheless, for this thesis, wherever possible, oral (and apocryphal) accounts will be authenticated with documentary evidence

Thus to say the obvious, because the Myanmar Government lets out nothing practically, undertaking research in Myanmar is a gargantuan task This is well documented and every researcher so engaged, will indubitably attest to this For this reason, most “modern” writings on Myanmar are based on secondary sources, so that even academics within Myanmar are enthusiastic over the fact that someone who has had exposure to the power/stake-holders over an extended period of time and who can assess and document the “Myanmar Story” from an inner perspective, is researching the pitfalls which have caused the country’s vicissitudes, in its transition to a modern democratic state

This need for extreme secrecy inspite of the usual Official Secrets Act being in place, understandably represents a throwback of Myanmar's unduly “checkered” historio-political development; the “let-downs” of what Myanmas1 unmistakably and positively appear to attribute to the “trickery” of its past colonial masters – the British

and Japanese — or in their words, their abomination of lu — yon — thut — lo — the

The disputes over territorial and autonomous rights with the Minorities/National Races have not been totally resolved either so that any unnecessary exposure of state secrets may cause the “unravelling” of the existing system just as it is in the throes of overall national ethnic integration, stabilization and transition to democratization and modernity

1 “Myanmar” represents both the country as well as its citizens according to Myanmar etymologist, U San Lwin, who opines that depending on context, “Myanmar” could be a noun, pronoun or adjective The use in more recent time of “Myanmese, Myanmarese” to denote Myanmar citizens is unknown For expediency, in this thesis, I shall use “Myanmar” to denote the Country and “Myanma” its citizens See also page 24

This Thesis is the product of some four years of intensive painstaking research, both desk and field, not to mention some twenty years of personal exposure

to, and experience of, members of the Government, bureaucrats, academics, locals of all strata of society – in the private and public sectors – the politically influential

Sangha and the layman, apart from seeking input from foreign Myanmar scholars,

watchers and analysts

The task has proved to be infinitely more daunting than originally envisaged and it would have been impossible to achieve but for the assistance, in particular the encouragement provided by many, both inside and outside Myanmar Often enough I have come up against a blank wall which was fortuitously demolished with the assistance of the many kind and helpful, knowledgeable and wise souls who are not only steeped in academe but also in Myanmar governance and the Government

In particular, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Daw Ni Ni Myint (Former Director General, University Historical Research Commission; Member Myanmar International Commission), whose pearls of wisdom “not to be too greedy

in writing” should, in retrospect, have been followed to the ‘T’; U Tun Aung Chain (Former Professor, Department of History, Yangon University, Secretary, Myanmar Historical Research Commission); U Maung Maung Aye (Former Associate Professor International Relations Department, Yangon University); Joanna MM Hoogvelt Drs (former Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Sheffield University); Brig Gen David O Abel (Retd.) (Former Minister of Finance, Trade & Planning/Minister in the Chairman, SLORC/SPDC’s Office); Lt Gen Kyaw Ba (Retd.) (Former Member SLORC/SPDC and Minister of Hotels & Tourism); Vice Admiral Maung Maung

Khin (Retd.) (Former Deputy Prime Minister/Chairman Myanmar Investment Commission; Member SLORC/SPDC,) Former Chief of Myanmar Navy; Lt Gen Tin Tun (Retd.) (Former Deputy Prime Minister, Member of SLORC/SPDC,) Former Chief of Myanmar Air Force; Brig Gen Myo Thant (Retd.) (Former Minister of Information); Brig Gen Saw Lwin (retired Minister of Telecommunications/Hotels and Tourism); Col Ko Lay (Former Mayor of Yangon City Development Committee/Minister in Prime Minister’s office); Dr Than Nyun (Former Rector, Institute of Economics, Yangon; Deputy Minister of Higher Education/Currently Chairman, Civil Service Selection & Training Board); U Pan Aung (Former Minister

of Education & Transport); Col Aung Phone (Former Ambassador to Italy and Former Minister of Forestry); Dr Hla Pe (Pro-Rector, International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University); The Venerable Ashin Nanissara (Chancellor, Sitagu International Buddhist Academy) U San Lwin (formerly Director General of the Department of the Myanmar Language Commission and currently Member of the Commission) Dr Chee Kuan Tse, Professor of Psychiatry, Institute of Medical Health, Singapore, without the assistance of all, it would not have been possible to gather information and conduct this research

The abovementioned people together with many “unmentionable” senior bureaucrats and private sector individuals assisted in piecing together the very complex historio-econo-political development of Myanmar and gave me invaluable first hand knowledge of the past and the ebb and flow of events of Myanmar in its

“developmental/ modernizing process,” not to mention their critiques, encouragement and suggestions, resulting in the crystallization of this Thesis

It would be superfluous to say how grateful I am to my supervisor at the National University of Singapore (NUS), Professor Reynaldo C Ileto, whose academic credentials are most intimidating and whose exacting standards are difficult

to meet but fortuitously this is compensated by his humane understanding of having to supervise what by local standards is a “geriatric” candidate, who, to boot is lumbered with a full-time job and therefore his provision of guidance and tender loving care Above all, it was his encouragement and supreme confidence that he could yet excoriate the latent and nascent goodness of an experienced (albeit not academically trained) mind that was the decider and was crucial to my embarking on this exercise

My grateful thanks also go to the members of my thesis committee: Assistant Professor, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto who stimulated great interest in me about ASEAN,

in particular Indonesia during my ASEAN Country Module for my Masters degree and Assistant Professor Kyaw Yin Hlaing, who is a Myanma and a Myanmar scholar and an active researcher on Myanmar himself His “guidance” at my PhD studentship time and my Thesis Proposal Defense was helpful I found their own research output inspite of their other responsibilities somewhat inspirational, encouraging me to continue with the research

I must perforce not forget my dedicated secretarial aides Salmah K and Linda Lim who had to pour through my many draft manuscripts over and over again following my interminable corrections, most conscientiously and patiently, despite their heavy normal work load as well as my wife, Alice who had to suffer night after night of my writing with the table lamp switched on when she is so used to sleeping without light, not to mention her having to forego holiday trips I must also not

forget to mention my daughter, Gillian who rather like the Honourable Lord Chevalier

de Rohan who wanted Voltaire punished for having the audacity to answer his query

“unanswerably” and who consequently got a band of ruffians to assault Voltaire by night, however with the caution “Don’t hit his head; something good may come out of that yet,” and who seemingly unwittingly put her judgment in jeopardy by her supreme confidence that this head would yet make the grade This was

encouragement par excellence In any event, the outcome of this Thesis, will tell

My thanks also go to the many administrative staff members of SEASP Office shuffling papers to and fro between me and my supervisor

This Thesis represents my own work and as is evident from the footnotes and bibliography, the relevant sources and information which form the basis of this work have been duly acknowledged Unfortunately, it has not been possible to attribute many of the information and philosophy behind the policies/moves made by the

Government to specific individuals albeit on a strictly confidential basis and after years of quanxi building in Myanmar, individuals—including certain “unmentionable’

members of Government, senior bureaucrats and private sector individuals—were quite prepared to share their thoughts on a strictly confidential and friendly basis on government motivations or reluctance, for undertaking certain actions to ensure (the Official Secrets Act is not breached) and heads do not roll For this reason, I have

perforce had to resort to the use of pseudonyms/nom de guerre especially in the

revelation of the more sensitive areas of Government thinking in policy formulation and action or inaction, for that matter

Hence, any errors, inadequacies and untoward interpretation of facts which may or may not go down well with governmental members especially those in Myanmar or with any scholars in the same field or foreign governments for that matter, are deeply regretted and for any such “transgressions,” I and only I would be held fully responsible Perhaps, the only fault if at all, of those who rendered me assistance, is that they did not write this Thesis for me!

KOH KIM SENG

PREFACE

Generally, this thesis covers the period 1974 to 2000 The Year 1974 was chosen because it represents a change in the governmental system: a change from the Revolutionary Council (military) Government to a directly elected government

formed in the main by civilians, albeit still a uniparty government The Burma

Socialist Peoples’ Party (BSPP) Government was formed and indeed the new Parliament Building was inaugurated in the year with fresh hope and inspiration of a renewed future for all

On the other hand, 2000 represents the end of the millennium and the beginning of a new one and within Myanmar, there was the air of expectancy of new changes One was that the George W Bush government might respond more “positively” to Myanmar by changing the US policy of sanctions towards Myanmar However, instead of this, the 9/11 incident caused the US policy to Myanmar to be even more

“chronic”

George W.Bush got rather riled over the incident and started talking of the ‘axis of evil states’, classifying Myanmar, along with other countries like North Korea and Iraq As such, according to one of my research respondents Brother, “the Myanmar

sense of optimism over the possible impact of the new millennium turned out déjà vu,

and the position became worse for Myanmar” Another respondent, Cousin added,

“this therefore represents yet another turning point in the more modern history of Myanmar It is therefore interesting to see how changes in both the internal as well as the external factors have impacted Myanmar over the period, especially in the backdrop of Myanmar’s past colonial experience and cultural setting

This thesis deals with Myanmar, the locus being the nation’s “trilemma,” that is, the social, economic and political “pitfalls,” which have given rise to the disparity between on the one hand, current world market-driven dictates and social impositions, and on the other, Myanmar’s inimitable and endemic approach to politics, governance and economy at the structural level This thesis attempts to contribute to the epistemology of the truth or falsity of the general perceptions of many Myanmar scholars as well as to provide an analysis of the military Junta’s ostensible

“inexplicable” behaviour – what I would term the “Myanmar Exceptionalism” – by presenting and analyzing information emerging from the deep recesses of the Myanmar generals’ psyche, motivations, and cultural and historical experience, which this thesis will show to be squarely responsible for much of the Government’s action

or inaction and behaviour

This thesis attempts to unveil how Myanmar’s pitfalls and consequently its

vicissitudes are the product of kampf between on the one hand, the milieu interieur comprising a proud and somewhat ethnocentric people – the military Junta especially

– being fiercely independent, who hold the view, against the backdrop of their unpleasant colonial experience, that progress at a slow and measured pace is the

correct way to go On the other hand there is the milieu exterieur comprising the

United States and its allies the European Union (including some foreign states and the

Myanmar diaspora), which in their hegemonic and prejudiced ways feel that they have every right to force Myanmar to conform to their every wish In the milieu

interieur, in part because of its “Myanmar Exceptionalism” no single constituent must

be more “misunderstood” than Myanmar’s governing elites, past and present, in terms

of their ideological orientations, their role in the politics and economics of nation

building; their strategic mentality or even “subterfuge” which seem to have been

imbued in them In the milieu exterieur, we find incompatible and irreconcilable sets

of ideological as well as economic and geopolitical agendas inevitably clashing against each other

This thesis also elucidates how an already overwhelming situation as indicated above

is exacerbated by overpowering religio-cultural sentiments and considerations such as

the Junta’s subservience to the principles of karma and the unyielding belief in its superiority, collectively and individually, and the consequence of the Junta Generals believing in their being such, by virtue of their high karma and therefore of being

quite “untouchable.”

As far as being a sovereign state, this thesis shows, through the words of its ruling elites wherever possible, that Myanmar is thrice victim Firstly, that the trauma and spectre of a colonial past still linger in the collective memory of the old and elderly people, even if the younger set such as the “post -1974ers” may be less aware, as by the time of their adolescence, autocracy and autarky had kept many aspects of the old colonial history and of the development of the State under wrap

Secondly, that Myanmar is the victim of by no means gentle or considerate external forces pumping “pro-democracy” fuel into its mainstream econo-political complex, which against its “unsavoury” colonial experience unwittingly caused it to paradoxically withdraw

Thirdly, that it is the victim of its own political edification, which is as diverse as it is disorganized, insofar that historically Myanmar has always existed in a “mandala state” environment1, taking on its neighbouring states with impunity and at will, as in the days of its early history when King Bayinnaung “brought Siam to its knees” or having pillaged the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya, frequently invaded Laos and even India.2 Then, perhaps in the euphoria of it all, it met its political coup de grace in its

engagement with the superior British forces, then again fighting and regaining its independence and sovereignty But now it appears that for various geopolitical and geo-strategic reasons Myanmar finds itself at the wrong end of the stick

Many Myanmar scholars, academics, analysts and the foreign press and media have offered a number of explanations for the “dire situation” Myanmar is in They have also provided analyses of the conundrum and suggestions for resolving this, but to no avail In my view, essentially there seems to be a lack of understanding, no thanks to the Junta’s conduct - the “Myanmar Exceptionalism” it exhibits - arising in part from its trauma of having been back-stabbed “by its past colonialists – a historical impedimentum, quite apart from what Lucien Pye terms its “Burmicentricism”

It seems that Myanmar’s problems have become a case of “pride (in the case of the

military Junta elites) and prejudice” (in the case of the US/EU, the milieu exterieur

1 Mandala: an Indo-Tibetan concept made up of two elements viz a core (manda) and surrounding element (la)

commonly applied to Southeast Asian polity and economy, which Tambaiah labels “galactic polity” Kautilya refers to a geopolitical concept representing friendly and enemy states spatially from the point of view of particular kingdoms

2 Donald M Seekins, Burma and Siam Since 1940 From Co-prosperity to Quiet Dialogue NIAS press, Denmark,

year 2007, p.49

which supports the milieu interieur faction), clashing This being brought about by the US applying sanctions ad nauseum in the view of the Junta and the Junta taking

exception to it being labelled an “axis of evil” state as with North Korea, etc

This label in the view of Cousin is just an extreme form of the generally negative representation of Myanmar most foreign scholars, analysts, and academics have offered There are others who do not seem prepared to concede realities on the ground For example David Steinberg holds the view that “political liberalization must be driven both internally and externally with foreigners playing important roles

in bringing transparency and information to a closed and isolated country3 Yet, it is generally known that very little if at all will come out of this suggestion when the Junta members hold dearest in their hearts is what is contained in the “Five Principles

of Peaceful Co-existence” endorsed by Nehru, Zhou En Lai and U Nu in 1954; the key element being non interference in the internal affairs of member states For this, ASEAN, more in sync with the shared cultural and historical aspects especially since Myanmar’s entry in 1997, had to trot a most circuitous path trying to push Myanmar into political liberalization with the involvement of the NLD, only to find that even the friendly ASEAN’s originally mooted concept of “Constructive Engagement” with Myanmar, which metamorphosed into “Constructive Involvement”, (Anwar, 1998), then to “Constructive Intervention” (Surin, 1998), to “Flexible Engagement” (Thai Government Amendment) and finally to “Enhanced Interaction” (Ali Alatas) without Myanmar emerging from the chrysalis as the beautiful butterfly to date, after some 20 years

3Robert Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future Washington, D.C Brookings

Institute Press 1998., p.7

How has Robert Taylor’s clairvoyant comment that if “Ne Win dies he takes Burma with him” or of Selth’s view that the demise of Ne Win would bring about a split in the top echelons of the armed forces, played out?4 Or has any Myanmar analyst or watcher taken note of the validity or otherwise of Rotberg’s view that the SLORC indulges in collective decision making and that “most decisions are made by consensus”, and not that it is so autocratic.5 Or for that matter, what can we make of Silverstein’s claims that, “there is little tradition of democracy in Myanmar including

during the period of British administration” when trying to push it into democracy

a’la (the) West?6 What is the validity of claims like Myanmar having been caught in a

“time warp”.7 What of Myanmar being a “pariah”8 or that the Government is a

“repressive regime”; that it is a hermit state9 and is “guilty of human rights abuse”?10

In this thesis I am well aware of the above questions, representations and assertions raised by professional Burma scholars and observers However, rather than address them head-on I will assume an alternative tack by drawing on my exposure over many years to the “inner circle” of the Myanmar political and business elite as a foreign direct investor (FDIer) in that country I will let the responses to the above questions emerge from the oral interviews I conducted for this research

4 Robert H.Taylor, “Myanmar: Military politics and the prospects for Democratization,” Asian Affairs: Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, Vol XXIX, Part 1, p 3

9 Barbara Skinner, “Myanmar Time Warp,” National Geographic News Service, March 27, 1994

10 United States Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 (Report Online available from http://www.state.gov/www/global/human rights /1966 _hrp_report/burma.html;internet)

This thesis will try to capture the “view from the inside”; of the pitfalls and the vicissitudes of Myanmar, the former oftentimes the cause of the latter, as it trudges through its “roadmap to democracy” and progress Given that adequate confidence building measures are put in place and that changes in the US international relations stance are altered as is expected with the new US Presidency, positive changes leading to a more modern democratic Myanmar would occur

SUMMARY

Chapter I

This chapter sets out the overall direction of the thesis and of what I perceive are some of the “shortfalls” in the existing body of literature on Myanmar Of how, after

some twenty years of exposure to and association and quanxi building with influential

members of the ruling military elites, I would by experiential endeavour, ascertain what have been the pitfalls which have led to the vicissitudes of Myanmar, over the period 1974 – 2000 This, considering that in the mid-1950s Myanmar was a state which was given a good developmental prognosis by the World Bank and yet by

1988, it became for various reasons, some outside their control, virtually a basket case

for which one of my key respondents Brother, asserts the military Junta makes no

apologies because this occurred in the course of the nation’s socio-political vivisection but, he says, “neither of the key elements of sovereignty nor autonomy has

been lost” Generally, thematic narratives have been utilized, for the purpose

Chapter II

This chapter illustrates how Myanmar is mistakenly perceived by the milieu exterieur which is made up in the main of the US/EU, the Myanmar diaspora (including

foreign press, scholars, civil service organizations, non-government organizations

vis-a-vis the milieu interieur, that is, the military elites’ own problems and their

perceptions of the situation on the ground Of the measures the elites have undertaken

to solve some of the inherited historical problem, inter alia, narcotics

Chapter III

This chapter records interviews held with members of the ruling elite as well as with

that of a former First Lady to expose the milieu interieur members’ perceptions of the

changes that occurred in the earlier period post independence and to locate the position of the Government in 1988

It documents the transition Myanmar went through in the immediate post independence period under a so called “democratic system” and the subsequent corrective measures undertaken by way of the change of governance to military administration, the Caretaker Government in 1958 (for 18 months) then of its return to civilian “democratic” rule This again proved unsuccessful and by 1962, under what

was erroneously termed a “bloodless coup”, the armed forces (Tatmdaw) under

General Ne Win stepped in and formed the Revolutionary Council Government and subsequently this again metamorphosed to a democratically elected uniparty Constituent Assembly General Election Government, under a new Constitution Over

the period, General Ne Win instituted both autocracy as well as autarky applying a

cordon sanitaire a’la Myanmar because of the country’s unsavory experience with

one of its former colonialists carving the country up into two separate “political entities” causing them to become anglophobes not to mention the incessant interference from a number of disaffected, disenfranchised and disgruntled (the “3 – D”) Myanmas – former generals who had been sidelined not forgetting the bourgeoisie who had their assets nationalized, however with compensation though not full measure

It documents the structure origin, role, philosophy/doctrine of the Tatmadaw and of

the esteem military officers are held culturally, for which reason, in part, the state –

sangha relationship is always held by the military elites on an even keel

Of how the 1990 Election loosely tagged “General Election” brought about political pressure from many “operatives”, local and international on the government, ever since

Chapter IV

This chapter illustrates how the military Junta is resistant to change preferring to follow precedents inspite of the Junta being perfectly aware of theories of political

economy and economic history

Members of the Junta provide the raison de’tre of the moves they made and of events

leading to and during the 1988 Conflagration Here the role of superstition, culture and religion is elaborated in the resolution of problems as was the role of students in bringing about the Conflagration

Post 1988, the moves made by the military to govern in a move “inclusive way”

incorporating the needs of the Sangha, students and the general populace, are clear

Chapter V

Details the setback Myanmar was saddled with prior to the SLORC Government of

1988 and attempts by it to move, post 1988, away from the long-held dirigisme of centrally planned economic system to a market economy with all the perks

Concomitantly to move governance from an autocratic mode to a more modern

democratic system

Of how though this worked well initially, inspite of Myanmar not taking advantage of international financial institutions’ aid packages; how economic sanctions imposed by the US derailed the whole planned development trajectory

Chapter VI

This chapter endeavors the task of locating Myanmar in history especially it deduces from the introspective narratives of key players of government how events in Myanmar’s past could have worked for or against it during the period it was reeling under colonialism, both British and Japanese

Of Myanmar’s “paradise lost” and its attempts at “Paradise Regain”, trying to return

to its former pole position in a “mandala” setting, in the Region

exterieur which is incessantly pushing for quick change of a particular nature will be

bridged, leading to the comprehension of the action and/or inaction of the military

Junta Indeed, that this understanding would lead to the formulation of a new modus

vivendi to solve the current “stalemate” to the benefit of both parties – milieu exterieur and milieu interieur

Chapter VIII

It is hoped that this chapter which represents the distillate of some twenty years of observation and study of Myanmar adequately answers the question posed at the Introductory part of this thesis That it has contributed in some small way to the epistemology of Myanmar’s development trajectory, 1974 to 2000 (and beyond) It is hoped that all parties generally interested in enhancing Myanmar’s future will be able

to formulate a new “middle road” in their relationship with Myanmar, towards the

crystallization of a joie de vivre, not only for the most part of 53 million Myanmas but

also for themselves, in the new millennium

LIST OF TABLES

Table I : Indicating Destruction of Poppy Fields During 1988-1994 42

Year Destroyed Poppy Fields in Acres Supply reduction in tons

Table II: Seized Narcotic Drugs and related substances destroyed by 43

CCDAC in Yangon before Military Attaches and Diplomats from 1990 to 1995 March

MISUNDERSTOOD MYANMAR:

AN INTROSPECTIVE STUDY OF THE

VICISSITUDES OF A SOUTHEAST ASIAN

STATE IN TRANSITION

( 1974 – 2000 )

KOH KIM SENG

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

2009

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: TOWARD AN “IN-SENSE” OF MYANMAR

Numerous accounts on Myanmar have already been archived, yet many still are in the process of being documented to be attuned to the fast changing times But much of Myanmar in the collective memory of the people who helped, in one way or the other, to sculpt its political, economic and socio-historical landscape have tended

to evade documentation By “In-sense” of Myanmar I mean an experiential endeavor

“to make sense or meaning” of the hard facts, the events and the people who unfold them right before their very eyes Many writers have viewed Myanmar through the lens of a postcolonial academic; as a hard-hitting critic; as a journalist however with a disguised agenda; as a world development analyst; or as a post-conflict reconstructionist However, there are few who have dared to view Myanmar from the obverse side of what they consider the “retrogressive Myanmar coin,” so to speak,

that is, from the eyes of the Military Junta − or from the perspective of the country’s

“governing elites.” “Such documenters and researchers have neither the gall nor the information to prop their writing”, commented Brother, to my above observations

“In-sense” here implies making sense from within this taciturn, low profile and

“elusive” Myanmar group From this point of view is the group trying to apply Lapham’s “gag rule”, namely that the absence of evidence does not imply the evidence of absence1

1 Lewis H.Lapham, Gag Rule-On the Supression of dissent and the stifling of democracy, New York, The Penguin

Press, 2004,p.88

Interpreted through my participant observations, having spent 20 years of my lifetime there, as well as through some exchange of communication, and collated

random notes following many a tete-a-tetes, "microscoping" domestic events as they

were being magnified in the international arena, the “In-sense” of Myanmar is a compilation of thematic narratives on the pitfalls and vicissitudes of Myanmar in the context of the wide expanse of varying world views The “In-sense” derives in large part from the importance I give to personal accounts by Myanmar’s current and [not so-distant] past officials relating to my sojourn in the Country What seems obvious from my research is that the perceived “RipVan Winkle” State – Myanmar – unlike Abu Ben Adhem who “awoke one night from a deep dream of peace (but did not find)

an angel writing in a book of gold” but instead was disillusioned to find its ego bruised In addition attempts were being made to deprive it of its sovereignty with its past colonial masters applying fabian tactics on its development, faustian-wise, in the view of Brother

Before I commence, it is imperative that I first elaborate my subject position

on Myanmar As a regular visitor and a foreign direct investor2 in Myanmar for some

20 years, I have had opportunities to associate with leaders who were very much involved, directly or indirectly, with government policy formulation not only in the post-1962 socialist era formative years of Myanmar but also earlier, as well as with senior academics, particularly those who were involved in the Myanmar Historical and Language Commissions not to mention those involved in Buddhism studies A number of such people who were then inducted into the State Law and Order

2 As a 49% foreign direct investor in a “Build, Operate and Transfer” joint venture operation with the Directorate

of Hotels & Tourism, in the Mandalay Swan Hotel (Mandalay) and 100% FDIer in the Swan Building, an storey “mixed development” building, which was constructed on a “Build, Operate and Transfer” basis, in Yangon

eight-Restoration Council (SLORC) and its derivative, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) consented to contribute their views to this thesis project as my participants, contributors or key respondents – however one wants to call them

In the years following what I term the “1988 Conflagration”, I observed the government making attempts towards the Country opening up, both politically and economically Prior to the SLORC days commencing late 1988, I could hardly discuss any business proposals or meet socially with any Government official without prior written appointment and approval, and it did not matter what level of friendship or the

equivalent Chinese, quanxi, 3 had been attained

Conduct of Meetings

These could not be held without any senior government member or official having a whole retinue of subordinates furiously taking minutes of whatever transpired and having the meetings photographed, ostensibly to honor the visitor and/or for record purposes but which, I suspect, was for security reasons - a throw back, perhaps, to the Aung San assassination debacle4 Indeed it was difficult, if not hazardous, for me and more so for my business colleagues even to endeavor a social visit to officials’ homes as it was well known that invariably there would be the anticipated “prying eye” of the Military Intelligence (MI) looking from unknown

3 The term quanxi is most properly associated with China, or those countries with a predominantly Chinese culture such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Singapore and extends throughout East Asia Quanxi is the Chinese term for the

construction of close family relations, or a joined network of relationships with the emphasis on the individual and

informal groups rather than formal organizations Building quanxi means building relationships This is achieved

through socializing within ones group, and also among members of different groups in order to expand ones web

of relations

4 On 19 th July 1947 while Aung San was chairing an Executive Council Meeting of the Interrim

Government, at about 10.30am, in the Secretariat Building, 4 men burst into the Chamber and shot him

along with 7 other Members They died (Shelby Tucker, Burma the Curse of Independence, Pluto

Press, London, 2001, p.139.)

quarters On probing, I ascertained that at that stage of development, government members/officials/bureaucrats were not permitted to meet foreigners privately

Rather anecdotal to this, in 2000, one expatriate who was on an eight-month assignment in Mandalay and who, over the period lived in the Mandalay Swan Hotel,

in his profound sense of observation felt that his loyal, punctual and most obliging taxi driver could have been a government spy – a Military Intelligence, “MI”, plant Apart from this, he was perfectly happy with the people and his assignment was

carried out successfully as far as he was concerned This was how Orwellian the

Country was perceived to be This perception is where we shall take-off discussing whether Myanmar really is Orwellian or it is only perceived to be so

At the time, telex and telephone calls were the fastest mode of communication and this had to be done past midnight, Singapore time, because the lines were jammed and in any case, senior government officials would be available in their offices practically 24 hours each day Even for preliminary “sounding out” appointments, telephone calls had to be done past midnight as there were only three into-country telephone lines for general use

My visits from early 1988, revealed infinitely more stringent checks through customs than had been in 1986 It appeared that officers were instructed to go through all luggage with a fine-toothed comb, so to speak What normally took about

an hour and a half to clear the airport, went on for nearly three hours People appeared fidgety and I discreetly enquired from my contacts if there was any problem The reply was that the situation was a little “unstable” Since I usually do not see

civilian policemen around, I assumed that the military (Tatmadaw) men, who

enforced law and order, had taken charge of the airport at this time I was able to verify subsequently from sources at the Ministry of Defence back then, that the

civilian police force’s principal duty is for the maintenance of law and order and that they do not have any role in “crisis” management as was the case in controlling the

“1988 Conflagration.” This being so, and not noting any particular increase in the

usual ubiquitous Tatmadaw men, I again enquired why this was so The short reply from my contact (a very senior government official) was that the Tatmadaw couldn’t

intervene in any domestic local issue of the Country (apart from national defence) unless requested officially and specifically by the Government, in line with the legislation on “Aid to Civil Authority” embodied in the 1974 Constitution

In my subsequent visit sometime in July 1988, the situation in the Country appeared “tense,” and I decided not to visit the Country thereafter until a more appropriate time because information gleaned by me revealed that “small scuffles” had broken out here and there in the Country after my last trip

Right about the first quarter of 2002, I immediately tapped the minds of core SLORC/SPDC members, whom I had bumped into here and there in the course of my business affairs, and with the caveat that all information exchanged would be kept in utmost confidence, we freely thrashed out fundamental conceptions of Myanmar’s many moves and major events in its history, face-to-face as well as through the telefax and telephone, the most convenient means of communication at that time To put it in another light, this might well be “history writing/recording” in postmodern times

After accomplishing my extensive research and being fully acquainted with the events as the “secondary literature” on Myanmar today provides, I made discreet communication regarding my thesis to a handful of Myanmar friends, including senior Myanmar government members and academics – some of my “research

collaborators” One in particular, who we will refer to as my “Brother5,” or so we call each other, a distinguished man schooled in a very prestigious British university as well as a top British professional Defense Institution6 and holding high political position during the SLORC days including the SPDC time, gladly responded and contributed much to the research, especially pertaining to views from the “inside.” These comprise insightful views of his own as well as from the “collectivity” of the generals, including some of the top ones, especially General Ne Win, Brig Gen San

Yu, and others to whom he used to report

Brother (among others who I would term “key respondents”) and I had the primary aim of “clarifying some historical facts,” which are written or published already in the rich literature on Myanmar/Burma and to “uncover” others which have thus far been practically inaccessible to past scholars Make no mistake, however, that this “rich literature” largely comprises examples of what Michael Aung-Thwin explains as the “historically periodized” manner of studying developments in a nation’s distant and not-so-distant past, which according to him is the reason for a

“disconnected” history telling7 Instead, as we attempt to gain an “In-sense” of Myanmar, the following elaboration has been deliberately memory-induced; it makes

a full 360-degree turn Now history becomes personal, intimate and real to the person/s telling and hearing it

The structure of this thesis is as indicated in the Summary but for expediency

of the record, I would briefly restate that following the present Introduction, in

5 One sample of a reply to my inquiry from (a respondent among others), is annexed See ANNEX “B”

6 Members of the armed forces are not permitted to reveal their personal details and this may have contributed in part to the perception that they are lowly educated

7 Michael Aung-Thwin, “Myth and History in the Historiography of Early Burma”, p.152

Chapter 2, I discuss how Myanmar is perceived in the international arena by the foreign press and scholars, by non-governmental organizations both local and international, by other states and by the Myanmar diaspora itself – all of which in this

Thesis comprise the milieu exterieur Such perceptions have more often than not been

inaccurate, or at least, they must be reconsidered and/or substantiated The only too

well known disproportionate criticism from the milieu exterieur, as will be unveiled,

in itself impels a great amount of reckoning and understanding

Chapters 3 and 4 narrate my interviews and discussions with the “insiders” of Myanmar, the members and former members of the Myanmar government, including those within the immediate vicinity of that “inner circle” who I will call my “key respondents.” In the entire Thesis, I shall refer as my “key respondents,” those Myanmar nationals who have, in one way or the other, served the Myanmar SLORC/SPDC Government, or those who are currently serving the SPDC, including those who served as aides to Gen Ne Win, Gen Brig Gen San Yu and other Myanmar “progenitors”, as mentioned earlier Indeed, the observation by Shelby Tucker8 regarding the great difficulty of obtaining information in Myanmar could not

be more accurate because these personalities who immensely contributed to this Thesis “volunteered” with one caveat - that their identities remain strictly confidential, unless given permission to otherwise reveal a portion of their identities

In addition to government personalities (among whom are academics / scholars), I narrate my meetings and conversations with influential members of the

Sangha, as well as private sector individuals, both in business as well as general

workers These are individuals I met in the course of my 20 years of professional /

8 Shelby Tucker, Burma the Curse of Independence, Pluto Press, London 2001, p.185

business sojourns in Myanmar as well as for the research specifically or purposely

conducted for this study This chapter also exposes the perceptions of the milieu

interieur by utilizing metaphors, which my respondents themselves have availed of, to

capture the significance of the events and/or people they allude to The chapter then moves to a discussion of their views regarding the misconceptions (or the lack of

them) of developments, and the rampant stereotyping, by elements of the milieu

exterieur or, as Government members often put it, by the “hegemonic Westerners

with their own agenda.”

Chapter 5 serves to portray the nexus between the view of the Developed

North (Western) countries – the milieu exterieur – and that of the Government – the

milieu interieur – the latter being the obverse side of the milieu exterieur’s “Free

World” coin The chapter discusses whether or not the “ international community’s views” - of Myanmar having been caught in a “time warp,” or that progress/developments made are “cosmetic” or that it is a “repressive regime,” including the imposition of trade and other sanctions − are flak or if these are the result of the Government’s moves and intents having been misunderstood / misconstrued or simply if it is a method for foreign elements to denigrate and castigate the Government The chapter also covers the political/economic philosophy

of the Government behind measures undertaken (or allowed to lapse) by it, inspite of

offers of aid towards development made by the milieu exterieur, as comprehensively

as is possible It inter alia attempts to demonstrate whether or not the popularly held

scorn that “putting 4 generals together would not add up to Standard Three (education)9” is purely a myth

Chapter 6 endeavors the task of locating Myanmar in history, and most especially, deduces from its narrative an introspection of how events in Myanmar’s past could have worked for or against it during the times it was reeling under colonialism

Chapter 7 deals with mapping out issues on the domestic and international plane, which pervade Myanmar in the present time, explaining its pitfalls and vicissitudes that it has encountered, thus far It is hoped that, in the light of the

perceptions and views held by policy makers in the milieu interieur as revealed in the earlier chapters, and the parallel (mis) comprehensions of those in the milieu exterieur

who are incessantly pushing for rapid change of a particular nature, the rationale of the response (or lack of it) made by the powers-that-be in Myanmar can be better

understood and utilized as the basis for formulating a new modus vivendi in the push

by the milieu exterieur for a more democratic and open Myanmar the latter of which,

in their ethnocentricity, – americentricity on eurocentricity – they opine is the only way ostensibly to a “prosperous” and “stable” Myanmar Indeed one of the objectives

of this exercise is to ascertain and verify the validity of the “concept” so that the going course of development of Myanmar could be changed for the betterment of the

on-dramatis personae in this play

Chapter 8 Conclusion – Quo vadis Myanmar? puts forward some suggestions

on how this Thesis, the distillate of some 20 years of observation and study of

9 Reportedly asserted by Aung San Suu Kyi and is generally very well known in Myanmar, as some kind of a

“joke.” In his time, Brig Gen Aung Gyi had attributed the sorry state of the country to it having been led by

“former privates and sergeants of the 4 Burifs” (4 th Burma Rifles) c/f The 1988 Uprising in Burma, Dr Maung Maung, Monograph 49/Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1999, p.152

Myanmar, might contribute in some small measure to the epistemology of developments in Myanmar, positive or negative The hope is that all parties interested

in enhancing Myanmar’s future will be ableto formulate a new “middle road” in their

relationship with Myanmar, towards the crystallization of a joie de vivre not only for

the most part of 53 million Myanmas but also, for themselves, in the new millennium

CHAPTER II

MISUNDERSTOOD MYANMAR

Spin the globe Which way does the world turn on Myanmar 1?

Zenith and Nadir

Myanmar is the largest state on the contiguous land mass of Mainland Southeast Asia and the second largest in South East Asia and the Greater Mekong Sub-regional (GMS) grouping2, having a land area of 262,000 square miles Once the rice basket of Asia, it was under the British regime and immediately afterwards, it was one of the wealthiest in terms of natural resources and the most prosperous and developed country in the Region, after achieving independence from Britain3 Indeed, its standards of living (were) higher than in most other parts of Asia even up to the late first half 1940s4 Pairing it with the Philippines in the mid-1950s, the World Bank (WB) gave Myanmar a good prognostication of its development and trajectory for the future But it seems that none of these hold true today as the application of perhaps

“inappropriate” econo-political systems post-independence caused by its “traumatic” past colonial history led Myanmar to rank among the list of the United Nation’s (UN)

50 poorest countries5 in the world - an unmatched or unparalleled dramatic irony notwithstanding the vast renewable and non-renewable resources that Myanmar is endowed with and takes pride in

1 To be understood, would Myanmar need to have a “hit” like for a toto/lottery draw, to be understood, some Myanmar military generals wonder

2 GMS comprises Cambodia, Yunnan Province (PRC), Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam

3 Priambudi Sulistiyanto, Thailand, Indonesia and Burma in Comparative Perspective, Ashgate Publishing

Having been around in Myanmar for the better part of 20 years and having visited and done business with Nepal and the Maldives among others, I have seen the differences between the standard of living in these so called Poor/Third World/Least Developed Countries (LDC) or even Lowest of Least Developed Countries (LLDC) and Myanmar I thus posed the question to my key respondents of what they felt about Myanmar having been classified as one of the 50 poorest countries by the UN

and whether this was an assessment which ought to be taken cum grano salis Cousin6

as with Brother responded with a small grin stating, “you know after World War II, international organizations such as the World Bank, UNDP and others set up certain indices to grade development: e.g., high income / highly developed; middle income / middle developed; less income / least developed The indices include economic, social and political measures such as GNP, GDP, social inequality (percentage rich and poor,) life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy rate, human development index, Human Rights index (number of political prisoners,) etc Needless to say, there are other measures of ‘poverty’

“Now as you know,” continued Cousin, “what is ‘universally’ known is that simple or comparative data on and from Myanmar is dismally absent and difficult to obtain (hence research in and on Myanmar is extremely difficult) and if at all, available data are at best ‘estimates.’ Inspite of this many such Bodies / Institutions are able, in their discursive writings, to make definitive judgements about Myanmar’s position in the world ranking, to conclude that we are among the 50 poorest countries

6 Cousin is another one of my ‘key respondents’ being a pukka professional having been schooled in England and being close to one of the members of the “Triumvirate” since before the “Triumvirate” was formed who like the

others, is au fait with past events

being able to qualify as an LDC or even LLDC, though it was a fact that it was we who voluntarily applied for LDC status”

Cousin said, “let me quote you some examples because as you can see I have taken the trouble to make notes on these since you had pre-empted me about this This

is anyway down my street You may check the references I will indicate.”

Cousin continued with, “The World Bank in its annual World Development Reports does not provide a figure for our GDP, yet it states that the long term gross average annual growth figure of our GDP is 0.6% for 1980 – 1990 and an impressive 6.3% for 1990 – 1998 Again in the publication ‘Myanmar at a Glance” the World Bank without any data for the GDP gave a slightly different figure of minus 1.8% average annual growth per capita from 1983 – 1993 and an even more inspiring turnaround figure of plus 6.4% per capita from 1993 – 20037.”

“The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook claims Myanmar’s GDP (at purchasing power parity) is USD74.3 billion (USD1,700 per capita (20048) This low figure sets us at number 185 out of 232 nations worldwide and on par with North Korea but just below Bangladesh, Cambodia and Laos.”

“If these figures are to be believed we started the decade of growth at a very low baseline Simply, when we shifted from [the] agricultural into [the] industrial sector, there was a percentage growth of GDP from 47 in 1980 to 59 in 1998 On the other hand, industry declined from 13 to 10 and manufacturing from 10 to 7 with value added in services declining from 41 to 319 This beats all notions and logic of their own (Western) development model It is possible however that presumably,

7 World Bank : World Development Report, various years: New York; and The World Bank Group, Myanmar at a Glance, June 2003 http.//www.worldbank.org/data/country/data/aag/mmraag.pdfdownload/aug2005

8 c/f www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bm.html downloaded / August 2005

9 c/f World Bank, World Development Report, New York: 1999/2000, p.253

economists can explain this by the growth of our export sector funnily over the period when the US and EU were trying to screw us down for political reasons Or could the growth in value added in agriculture be perhaps because of a substantial improvement in food production?”

“You will find that our food production index from 1995 – 1997 stood at 133.5 – that is practically one–third up from the base line of 100 in 1989–9110 Now this is much higher than that recorded for many of the other LDC countries So from these very few examples which I have cited, I hope you and all the others who read can draw their own conclusion.” Cousin concluded: “I realize you are not a trained economist but with your years of exposure and experience, I can see that you comprehend what I am saying On the statistics which I had compiled for you since you requested for them earlier, I can see that you have made notes on the numbers which I have cited However if you still have problems with figures I provided just contact me and I will be happy to provide you the figures again.”

Brother added, “this ‘distortion’ to create a misunderstanding of Myanmar is not new If you were to read Woodman, you will see that someone no less than Dr G.T.Bayfield wrote that the then British Resident in Rangoon (1796-1798), Captain Hiram Cox labelled the Burmese Court an assembly of clowns and their followers (as being) ungrateful, rapacious, cruel, treacherous and lazy till it was subsequently debunked by Dr D.G.E.Hall11 Likewise, how one Captain Michael Symes in Rangoon, on 31st May 1802 thought King Bodawpaya a “half mad bigot” who had little regard for the Laws of the nation inspite of the fact, in his own words that he

“enjoyed unlimited freedom”, with the Burmese Government having “paid (attention)

10 c/f World Bank: World Development Report, 1999/2000, Table 8

11 Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma, Burma Before Colonial Rule, p.44