The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 8

The origin of the plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore was an operational plan against Britain included in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1939” designed by the Operations

Conclusion

This thesis examined Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base in the period between the two world wars, by analysing how the Japanese perceived the Singapore Naval Base, how the Japanese planned and prepared for attacking Singapore, and why the Japanese attacked British Malaya and Singapore It also made a small bridge over the gap between Western scholarship and Japanese scholarship on the study of Japanese history by examining the Japanese decision making process to the war, by using Japanese sources and studies of Japanese historians which have not been used by Western historians

The British government decided to establish the Singapore Naval Base to defend its Eastern Empire from Japan in June 1921 Until 1939, however, Japan did not have any plan to attack Singapore Throughout the period between the two world wars, the Imperial Japanese Navy did not examine seriously any plan to attack Singapore from the sea side The origin

of the plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore was an operational plan against Britain included in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1939” designed by the Operations Section of the Army General Staff In this plan, the Imperial Japanese Army would land in Singora in southern Thailand, advance down the Malay Peninsula, and attack Singapore from the land side From the very beginning, the Imperial Japanese Army considered attacking Singapore from the land side

In the period between the two world wars, the Singapore Naval Base did not impose a threat to the Imperial Japanese Navy From the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936, it had an agreed policy on the Singapore Naval Base It was not desirable but acceptable on condition that Britain agreed to Article 19 of the Washington Treaty which prohibited the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines The Japanese delegates to the Washington Conference accepted the British plan to establish a new naval base in Singapore in exchange for the British agreement for the Japanese proposal to maintain the status quo of fortifications in the Pacific The Imperial Japanese Navy considered before the conference that, if the United States established naval bases in Guam and the Philippines, they would become direct threats to Japan, so it was imperative to prevent the United States from establishing bases in there On the other hand, the distances

to Hawaii and Singapore were great enough not to impose direct threats to Japan Therefore, the Japanese delegates proposed to maintain the status quo

of fortifications in the Pacific to prevent the establishment of American bases

in Guam and the Philippines Before the Japanese delegates formally proposed the plan, Real-Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin approached Real-Admiral Ernle Chatfield on 8 December 1921 to sound out the British standpoint on fortifications in the Pacific The Japanese delegates knew from the meeting that the British delegates could agree to the Japanese proposal on condition that Japan did not include Singapore in the Japanese proposal Six months earlier, on 16 June, the British government decided to establish the Singapore Naval Base For the British delegates, to exclude Singapore from any

restriction was imperative After the Yamanashi-Chatfield meeting, the Chief

of the Japanese delegates, Katō Tomosaburō, decided that they would not include Singapore in the Japanese proposal

Strategically, for the Imperial Japanese Navy, to prohibit American naval bases in Guam and the Philippines was a more important issue than the capital ships ratio in view of the fact that, with American advanced bases in Guam and the Philippines, it could not have waged any naval battle against the American fleet in the Pacific Meanwhile, the American delegates demanded Japan accept the 60 per cent capital ships ratio and expressed disapproval of restricting fortifications in Hawaii In the end, the Japanese delegates agreed to accept the 60 per cent ratio in exchange for American acceptance of the Japanese proposal to maintain the status quo of naval fortifications in Guam and the Philippines Finally, the Japanese proposal was enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty Article 19 imposed on Britain the maintenance of the status quo of the fortifications in Hong Kong, on the United States in Guam, the Philippines and Aleutians, and on Japan in Amami-Oshima, the Bonin Islands, Taiwan, the Kurile, the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands, and the Pescadores But, it did not restrict the strengthening of the fortifications in Singapore and Hawaii

At the Washington Conference, all delegates from Japan, Britain, and the United States accomplished what they considered to be their most important requirements The Japanese delegates succeeded in preventing the development of American advanced bases in Guam and the Philippines, which guaranteed Japan naval supremacy in the western Pacific The British

delegates succeeded in excluding Singapore from any agreement The American delegates succeeded in imposing the 10:10:6 capital ships ratio between the United States, Britain, and Japan As a result, the enactment of the Washington Treaty created a multilateral balance of power in combination of capital ships ratio and naval fortifications in the Asia-Pacific region between Japan, Britain and the United States The naval forces ratio and the naval fortifications agreement enacted at the Washington Conference were interconnected

Unlike Britain, which started regarding Japan as a future hypothetical enemy, Japan did not regard Britain as its hypothetical enemy The Imperial Japanese Navy had no policy against Britain and focused all its attention on the United States As Asada Sadao examined in his works, there was disagreement over naval forces ratio within the Imperial Japanese Navy since the Washington Conference Katō Kanji’s group advocated that it was impossible to defend Japan by a naval forces ratio lower than 70 per cent against the United States and thus opposed accepting the 60 per cent capital ships ratio at the Washington Conference On the other hand, Katō Tomosaburō and his successors considered it was necessary to accept the 60 per cent capital ships ratio to avoid war against the United States and save Japan from financial bankruptcy But what is important is that they agreed on the most important point: the hypothetical enemy of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the United States Navy Their disagreement came from disagreement over how to defend Japan from American threats and avoid war against the United States

From the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to the Second London Naval Conference in 1935, the Imperial Japanese Navy kept its standpoint that the Singapore Naval Base was not desirable but acceptable on condition that Article 19 of the Washington Treaty prohibited the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines Within the Imperial Japanese Navy, there was complete agreement over this Both successors of Katō Tomosaburō－the “treaty faction” after the London Naval Conference of 1930－and Katō Kanji group－the “fleet faction”－accepted this policy The successors of Katō Tomosaburō considered that Article 19 guaranteed Japan naval supremacy in the western Pacific On the other hand, Katō Kanji group considered that Article 19, which prohibited American bases in Guam and the Philippines, was advantageous in the event of war against the United States Before the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 and the First London Naval Conference in 1930, the Imperial Japanese Navy reconfirmed this policy The Imperial Japanese Army, which considered maintenance of the status quo over

a larger area was desirable, disagreed with the navy’s policy It considered it was better to enlarge the restricted area of naval fortifications to Singapore But the naval fortifications issue was basically a naval matter, so that the Imperial Japanese Navy forced the Imperial Japanese Army to accept its view

From the Washington Conference to the mid-1930s, the British

“Singapore Strategy” worked reasonably well as a peace time defence policy During this period, Britain maintained the prestige of its overstretched Empire

by promising to provide security for its Dominion countries－Australia and New Zealand － under scarce resources without greatly harming

Anglo-Japanese relations What was important was that the Royal Navy succeeded in getting the Imperial Japanese Navy’s substantial approval for the Singapore Naval Base at the Washington Conference As was written in the Nomura committee report in 1928, the Imperial Japanese Navy accepted the British explanation that Britain needed the Singapore Naval Base as a promise

to provide security to the globally stretched British Empire Moreover, even though Britain had the plans to establish the Singapore Naval Base, the construction of the base hardly progressed during this period This dilatory construction contributed to the non-exercise of the Japanese navy’s caution towards the development of the base

When considering Japanese domestic political history in the period

between the two world wars, the Tōsuiken Kanpan Commotion over the

ratification of the London Naval Conference in 1930 was a watershed After that, it became difficult for the government to control the two armed forces From then onwards, the broad interpretation of the Meiji Constitution of 1899

that the Tōsuiken was not restricted by the government or the Diet became a fait accompli The two armed forces found rationalisation for pursuing their

own policies without outside interference Consequently, when Japan was drifting into war in 1940 and 1941, it was difficult for the government to coordinate its policies with those of the two armed forces, and for the two forces to coordinate their policies between them Furthermore, it became hard for the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy to rein the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff respectively In the critical period from the

commencement of the German Blitzkrieg in May 1940 to the outbreak of the

Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army, the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursued their own policies but there was no agreed national policy between them

Generally, in the period between the two world wars, the Japanese commercial publishing media were far more hostile to the Singapore Naval Base than the Imperial Japanese Navy, and even more than the Imperial Japanese Army The Japanese government－the Imperial Japanese Navy－accepted the naval base at the Washington Conference However, it was a secret decision and ordinary Japanese public did not know it When the Japanese public knew the British plan to establish it, newspapers criticised it

as being against the spirit of the Washington Treaty Facing critical opinion in Japan towards the Singapore Naval Base, Shidehara Kijūrō, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Charles Eliot, the British Ambassador to Japan, considered it was harmful to Anglo-Japanese relations, and tried to appease the Japanese public But whether they succeeded in this was doubtful

In the latter half of the 1920s, negative attitude towards the base calmed down but did not disappear Some pointed their spears at the Japanese government’s policy towards the base They could not understand why the government did not object to the British plan which appeared to regard Japan as a hostile power During the 1920s, the Japanese commercial mass media claimed Japan should solve the problem at naval disarmament conferences But the government had no intention to discuss the Singapore Naval Base at naval disarmament conferences, because it regarded Article 19 as being

advantageous to Japan

In the 1930s, the Japanese commercial publishing media became more jingoistic After relations between Japan and the Western powers deteriorated as a result of the Manchuria Incident in 1931, the Shanghai Incident, the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, and the withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, there was a boom of war scare literature Books on future war(s) against the United States, the Soviet Union or both became very popular Some of them talked future war against Britain In these books, the Singapore Naval Base was no longer a threat the British imposed

on Japan but was a military target Japan should attack Popular Authors of war scare literatures, Ishimaru Tōta and Ikezaki Tadayoshi, claimed in their books that, if the Anglo-Japanese war did break out, Japan could easily attack and occupy Singapore The Singapore Naval Base was described as the last bastion

of the sinister British Empire remaining in East Asia After the Sino-Japanese War became deadlocked, anti-British movements gained momentum The Japanese public criticised Britain for backing the Chinese Nationalists This Anti-British movement reached its peak during the Tientsin Incident in the summer of 1939 In brief, the Imperial jingoism in the late 1930s produced by the Japanese commercial publishing media played a central role in nourishing hostility towards the Singapore Naval Base and jingoistic Anglophobe atmosphere in Japan This atmosphere laid the foundations for policy-makers

to take more aggressive policies towards Britain after the Germans dominated continental Western Europe in May and June 1940

The year 1936 was a watershed when considering Japanese policies

towards the British Singapore Naval Base At the end of 1936, the Washington Treaty, including its Article 19, formally expired With the termination of the Washington Treaty, the Imperial Japanese Navy lost its reason to accept the base As the cruising radius of naval ships in every category increased, the geographical advantage that Japan enjoyed in the western Pacific began to disappear As a result, there appeared a possibility that Britain would become a

hostile power in the future In the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin of 1936, Japan first regarded Britain as its hypothetical enemy To counter Army’s Hokushin Nanshu Ron (Advance to the North, Hold in the South Policy), the Imperial Japanese Navy set Hokushu Nanshin Ron (Hold in the North, Advance to the

South Policy) The Imperial Japanese Navy feared that, unless it established a south-bound policy, the Imperial Japanese Army, which advocated precedence

in the allocation of the budget and matériel to pursue its north-bound policy, would snatch its budget and matériel from the Imperial Japanese Navy The government, which could not decide priority between the army’s plan to the north and the navy’s plan to the south, settled on a compromise by enacting the

“Fundamentals of National Policy” It approved both arguments which were contradictory with each other by stipulating expansion toward both north and south In other words, it failed to formulate either strategic priority, or coordinated military policy between the two armed forces By the enactment

of the “Fundamentals of National Policy”, the Japanese government approved south-bound expansion as its official national policy However, it is wrong to consider that these policies led Japan directly to the Malaya Campaign in 1941/42 South-bound expansion stipulated in the “Fundamentals of National

Policy” was south-bound expansion by economic means

Since Britain was first regarded as a hypothetical enemy in the

Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin of 1936, the Operations Sections of the two General

Staffs started studying to make operational plans against Britain However, it took more than two years for the Operations Sections to prepare their first operational plans They could not draw up substantial operational plans until

1939 The Operational plans against Britain in the Annual Operational Plans for 1937 and 1938 were “Operational Plans” without any substantial operational plan There was no description of how to attack and how many forces would be required This also shows the important fact that the Operations Sections did not examine any plan against Britain before 1936 Otherwise, they could have made their operational plan against Britain earlier

The origins of Japanese plans for attacking British Malaya and Singapore were operational plans included in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1939” and the “Annual Navy’s Operational Plan for 1939” The Imperial Japanese Army examined the possibility of attacking Singapore more seriously than did the Imperial Japanese Navy Basically, the attacking plan against British Malaya and Singapore was designed by the Operations Section

of the Army General Staff as the army’s operational plan In its plan, the navy took only a supportive role by convoying army landing forces to the landing sites This came from the sectionalism of the two armed forces The Operations Section of the Army General Staff designed the plan as an army operational plan For the army, which could not rely on the fire power of naval ships, to land on Singapore from the sea side was out of question Considered