The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 5

Chapter 2 The Singapore Naval Base and the Japanese Public Chapter 1 of this thesis examined how the Japanese government, especially the Imperial Japanese Navy, perceived and considered

Chapter 2

The Singapore Naval Base and the Japanese Public

Chapter 1 of this thesis examined how the Japanese government, especially the Imperial Japanese Navy, perceived and considered the Singapore Naval Base from the time of the Washington Conference in 1921/22

to 1936 Later chapters will investigate how the two Japanese armed forces planned and prepared for attacking British Malaya and Singapore But how did the Japanese people, who were outside the decision-making process of the government, view the Singapore Naval Base? This chapter analyses Japanese attitude towards the Singapore Naval Base expressed by the Japanese commercial publishing media in the period between the two world wars

The Japanese society in this period had already become a highly literate society Thanks to a universal compulsory primary education system, literacy rates were high even the most economically marginal group In the late nineteenth century, the middle and upper classes provided the core readership for an expanding newspaper industry By the 1920s, however, the reading habit spread to the labouring classes in urban and rural areas According to a survey in 1919, among workers household in the Tokyo working-class neighbourhood of Tsukishima, 80 per cent of 659 workers subscribed to newspapers, and 18 per cent took two or more papers In a Kyūshū mine, about half the workers surveyed subscribed, and in farm

villages near Tokyo the subscriber rate was 87 per cent Surveys of Tokyo working women (nurses, teachers, clerks, typists, shop attendants, and tram workers) revealed that 88 per cent subscribed a paper Readership was, of course, higher than subscriber rates In 1922, the male population of day labourers in a Tokyo slam, 92 per cent of the single residents and 89 per cent

of the heads of household could read and write By 1927, the circulations of

two Osaka-based most circulated dailies, Osaka Asahi Shinbun and Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, were over a million Nine other dailies boasted circulations

of between 100, 000 and 500, 000 The Japanese in this period－regardless of social classes, genders, living areas, or ages－informed themselves through the expanding commercial publishing media.1 It is worth examining how these people perceived and considered the Singapore Naval Base through the commercial publishing media

The stereotype image of Japan in the 1930s was a militaristic police state which exercised unlimited powers of political repression to coerce unwilling but helpless people into cooperating with the army’s expansion programme But, as a historian, Louise Young, examined in her study of Japanese public perceptions of the Manchuria Incident, this stereotype exaggerated the reality too much Since the introduction of the Peace Preservation Law in 1925, censorships were conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but only extreme views, mostly communists, were restricted

by them In reality, imperial jingoism was the product of the commercial mass

1 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp.58-61

media Dissident views were not silenced by government repression, but were drowned by louder voices in the mass media In fact, the commercial publishing media－newspapers, magazines, and books－played a central role

in promoting war in Manchuria without any urging from the government.2 It

is worth considering whether the same media played a role in promoting war against Britain

In Britain, the Naval Estimate which included the budget for a new naval base in Singapore was presented to Parliament by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Leopold Amery, on 12 March 1923 From then onwards, the British plan was no longer a secret It had been widely reported not only in the British Empire but also in Japan in the period between the two world wars In Japan, from the time of the Washington Conference to the mid-1930s, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Imperial Japanese Navy had a unifying policy on the Singapore Naval Base It was not desirable but was acceptable on condition that Britain supported Article 19 which prevented the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines However, for the Japanese public, not knowing the navy’s secret approval of the Singapore Naval Base at the Washington Conference, its construction right after the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a confusing act of the former ally They could not understand why the former ally would construct a new naval base against them From May 1923 onwards, the Japanese media paid attention to debates on the base in the British Parliament and the British

2 Ibid, pp.55-114

media: the Labour party and the Liberal party opposed the Conservative plan

of establishing a new naval base For Labour and Liberal, the plan went against the current of the new era exemplified by the League of Nations and the Washington Treaties They questioned why Britain needed a new naval base in this new peaceful era In May and June 1923, all leading Japanese newspapers expressed critical views on the naval base Francis Piggott, who was the British Military Attaché stationed in Tokyo, recollected in his memoirs: “The decision to build the base, then to suspend work, and then to start again, during 1922 [sic] and subsequent years was followed with close attention in Japan, and “Singapore” was a frequent headline in the Japanese press”.3

This chapter analyses major trends in Japanese public perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base by examining typical articles and books which appeared in the Japanese commercial publishing media in the period between the two world wars How did the Japanese people who were outside the policy making process perceive and discuss the topic?

3 F S.G Piggott, Broken Thread, (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1950), p.197 He was a British Army officer who had lifelong relationships with Japan and close relationships with the Imperial Japanese Army He stationed in Tokyo as a language officer from 1904 to 1906 and from 1910 to 1913, as Military Attaché two times: from 1922 to 1926 and 1936 to 1939 Before that, he spent his childhood years in Tokyo As for the year the British government suspend works on the Singapore Naval Base, he mistakenly wrote as 1922 instead of

1924

The First Perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base Scheme

The Singapore Naval Base became a debating issue in the British Parliament in May 1923 Labour and Liberal opposed the Conservative plan of establishing a new naval base in Singapore For Labour and Liberal, the plan would go against the current of the new era exemplified by the League of Nations and the Washington Treaties They demanded to know why Britain needed a new naval base in the new peaceful era In Japan, on 3 May 1923,

one of the leading newspapers, Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, reported the debate in

the British House of Commons under the title “Debate in the British House of Commons: The Singapore Naval Base Plan: Oppositions Asks Against Whom Britain Builds the Base?”, in which a Labour MP asked: “Against whom does Britain need the new base?” Another Labour MP asked whether the hypothetical enemy was Japan or the United States He claimed that if the hypothetical enemy was Japan, Japan would regard it as British defiance A Liberal MP, Lambert, asked whether the government had informed Japan of the plan, if not, he claimed it meant Britain insulted the League of Nations.4From then on, Japanese newspapers continued to report the British Singapore Naval Base debate in Britain

Later that month, on 23 May Tokyo Asahi Shinbun expressed anxiety about the naval base plan in its leader entitled “Ayaururu Kafu-Jōyaku No Seishin (The Spirit of the Washington Treaty is in Danger)” It argued: “The

establishment of the naval base, therefore, as explained by Mr Amery, First

4 Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 3 May 1923, p.2

Lord of the Admiralty, in the House of Commons, does not conflict with the Treaty from a legal point of view But is the establishment of a powerful base

in the Pacific only one year after the Naval Treaty was signed in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty?”5 Another paper, Kokumin Shinbun wrote on 3

June that “At any rate the establishment of the Singapore naval base is not in contravention of the Washington Treaty and Great Britain is at liberty to do it Yet what we must bear in mind is that the Singapore base will become the centre of activity for the Anglo-Saxons in the West Pacific and it is an indisputable fact that that race will rule the world The country that would feel oppressed between the two Anglo-Saxon peoples is Japan While there are naval bases of the United States on the other side of the Pacific, Britain is going to establish the Singapore base on this side.”6 All other Japanese newspapers expressed similar views There was a unified view on the Singapore Naval Base among Japanese newspapers In May and June, they criticised two points First, it could only be aimed at Japan Second, even though the British plan did not violate the letter of the Washington Treaty, it infringed on the spirit of the treaty They expressed regrets for the British plan

to establish a new naval base in Singapore

At that time, for the Japanese, Britain was not just a foreign country Since the Meiji Restoration, Britain had been the symbol of modernisation and Western civilisation To become a country like Britain and gain equality with

the Western powers were the consistent national imperatives.7 When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ratified in 1902, the Japanese rejoiced over the news There were celebration parties all over Japan so that the prices of the national flags of Britain and Japan as well as those of champagne doubled.8 A

newspaper, Jiji Shinpō, wrote: “It was only forty or so years since Japan had

opened its doors to the world community, and barely five or six years earlier that it had demonstrated its power to the world in the Sino-Japanese War; it was now able to attain, quite suddenly, full status as a world entity among the most powerful nations It looks as though it is but a captivating dream.”9 The Japanese dream had come true They recognised Japan had finally become a country which could associate with Britain on equal terms During the time of the Versailles Conference and the Washington Conference, the Japanese media

widely used the word, Go Taikoku, which meant the five great powers: Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy By using the word, Go Taikoku, the

Japanese media tickled Japanese vanity that Japan had truly become a country which was regarded as equal to Western powers The League of Nations and the Washington Treaties became the symbols of the new era for many Japanese

in which Japan participated as one of the great powers

The British announcement of a plan to build a new naval base in

7 Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of

1919 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p.2

8 Kiyoshi Ikeda, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, in Fraser, T.G and Lowe, Peter (eds), Conflict and Amity in East Asia: Essays in Honour of Ian Nish (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), p.30

9 Jiji Shinpō, Editorial “The Effect of the Anglo-Japanese Accord”, on 14 February 1902, cited from Ikeda Kiyoshi, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, p.30

Singapore came totally out of the blue for the Japanese Even though their government substantially approved the British plan, it had been decided secretly When the ordinary Japanese first knew of it, they were disappointed For them, to propose a new naval base plan right after the enactment of the Washington Treaties was a confusing act Was the new era of World peace not coming? Why did Britain need a new base in the Pacific? All the leading Japanese newspapers claimed that the plan violated the spirit of the Washington Treaties Even though it did not violate any article of the Washington Treaties, it violated the spirit of the new era The Japanese government, however, could not criticise the British plan owing to the fact that

it had substantially approved it at the Washington Conference

The British Embassy in Tokyo perceived a media campaign against the Singapore Naval Base and reported it to London Captain Colvin, the British Naval Attaché stationed in Tokyo, submitted a report to the British Embassy in Tokyo on 29 June 1923, in which he compiled several articles which were critical of the Singapore Naval Base with English translations The report was sent to the Foreign Office on 2 July He commented that: “All the articles are unfavourable to the contemplated Naval Base at Singapore mainly

on the ground that it is a breach of the spirit of the Washington Treaties and can only be aimed at Japan Official Naval opinion is naturally better informed

on this point and while not viewing the Singapore base project with much favour, realises that Great Britain has not infringed in any way the letter or

spirit of the Washington Treaty in this matter.”10

At the Washington Conference, the Japanese delegates accepted the British plan to build a new naval base in Singapore on condition that Britain accepted Article 19 of the Washington Treaty which prevented the United States from establishing advanced naval bases in Guam and the Philippines However, this acceptance was a secret decision The Japanese public did not know about it On the other hand, France had not yet ratified the Washington Treaties due to domestic reasons, so that the treaties were not put into effect, which exacerbated Japanese anxiety.11 Yomiuri Shinbun wrote on 29 June that

“Japan was being seriously inconvenienced internally and diplomatically owing to the delay in the ratification of the naval Treaty by France.”12Newspapers spoke for the Japanese who welcomed the new era symbolised by the Washington Treaties It is highly likely that the readers were disappointed

by the British Singapore Naval Base plan and the French non-ratification of the Washington Treaties Real-Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō, told Colvin, at

an informal luncheon at Colvin’s house, that “the non-ratification of the treaty

by France created a very serious situation for Japan―not only from the naval point of view but also politically”13

Although all the leading Japanese newspapers expressed regrets for the Singapore scheme, the Japanese government officially avoided direct

10 TNA, FO 371/9225, 118, “Report No.13 of 1923 by Captain Colvin, Naval Attaché, dated on 29 June 1923”

11 France finally ratified the Washington Treaties in August that year

12 Extracted from English Translated version in TNA, FO 371/9225, 131

13 TNA, FO 371/9225, 141-142, Report No.14 of 1923 by Captain Colvin, Naval Attaché, dated on 1 July 1923 There was no mention of the Singapore Naval Base in this report

criticisms In an interview with The Times correspondent, Count Uchida

Yasuya, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that “It [Singapore Naval Base] conflicted in many ways with the spirit of the Washington Treaty, but it was a British internal affair, and Japan could not interfere.”14 Admiral Takarabe Takeshi, the Minister of the Navy, said that “Japan must now look to national defence since Singapore is two days only from Formosa.”15 They intimated regrets or expressed some indirect critical views as public statements, but did not criticise the British plan directly On 1 September, the Great Kantō Earthquake hit Tokyo Approximately one hundred thousand people died It was the second greatest disaster in modern Japanese history, next to the Second World War For several days after the earthquake, newspapers in Tokyo stopped printing After that, reports of the Singapore Naval Base totally disappeared from newspapers for a while

Later that year, on 4 December, Tokyo Asahi Shinbun claimed the

necessity of a counter-scheme to the British plan to establish the naval base It stipulated: “Singapore being outside the zone where the status quo as regards naval bases and fortifications are to be maintained under the Washington Treaty, Britain is at liberty to establish a naval base there… Since, however, from a national defence point of view, the Ministry of the Navy cannot overlook the matter, it will consult other ministries concerned and frame some counter-scheme.”16 However, the government and the Imperial Japanese Navy

14 The Times, 23 July 1923

15 Ibid.

16 Tokyo Asahi, on 4 December 1923; An English translation of this is in TNA,

FO 371/10299, 33-34, Report No.20 of 1923 by Captain Colvin, Naval Attaché,

could do nothing because they had substantially approved it

Cancellation of the Plan

In Britain on 22 January 1924, the Labour party came to power forming the first Labour Government in British history Although the new government demonstrated the continuity of the political system, disarmament was the area in which Labour could show its difference from the previous government

After Labour took power, there was a revival of the press campaign in Japan on the subject of the Singapore Naval Base scheme hoping that the new

British government would drop the project Yomiuri Shinbun claimed in its

leader, “We do not say that the Singapore naval base plan is in contravention

of the stipulations of the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty on disarmament, but we say that it is violating the spirit of those stipulations It is doubtless that Japan is regarded as the probable enemy of that plan Such a plan is not only destroying the friendly relations that have existed for many years between Britain and Japan but it is a threat to this country that prevents

us from our disarmament on a more comprehensive scale Our militarists and reactionaries are afforded an unusually good opportunity A threat to Japan will also incite an anti-British feeling among the Chinese The British plan at Singapore is the revival of the principles of “might is right.” Provocation

dated on 21December 1923

against Japan is the provocation of racial war For this reason we declare that the Singapore question is the Far Eastern problem in which the interest and safety of Japan and China are involved.”17 Colvin commented in his report that “The “Yomiuri” is a sensational paper without much influence, but it is in the habit of getting up “scares” and sometimes succeeds in stampeding a portion of the press.”18

Vice-Admiral Okada Keisuke, the Vice-Minister of the Navy,

commented in an interview with an English language paper, the Japan Advertiser: “To speak frankly, no other international issue of recent times has

so hurt the feeling of the Japanese people as the British Government original proposal regarding a naval base at Singapore Never since Japan opened her ports to world trade has she dreamed of war with England The very name of Britain has inspired us only with sentiments of warm friendship Since its abrogation, we greatly miss the Anglo-Japanese Alliance And now the Singapore business has loomed up to our great surprise Whatever may be the ultimate end of the matter, it is most unpleasant for us to be compelled to think that our own friendship has come to the point of thinking of conflict with us

On our part, we never considered such an eventuality until aroused by the vague challenge the Singapore scheme implied If Britain finally abandons the Singapore project, the traditional feeling of unsuspecting friendship for her will be restored in Japanese breasts Such a decision would give the world

assurance that Great Britain is pledged to abide by the spirit of the Washington treaties and afford other nations her splendid example Great Britain has nothing to fear from Japan If Britishers will remember what Japan did during the war, they should realize that the expenditure contemplated at Singapore would only a waste If Japan had held any ambitions inimical to British interests, the war would have afforded her a rare opportunity to carry them out

We believe, however, that our relations with Great Britain will continue to be characterized by unwavering friendship”.19 He spoke for the Japanese expressing the expectation that the new Labour government would abandon the Singapore Naval Base scheme

An announcement was made in the British Parliament on 18 March

1924 to the effect that no expenditure would be approved for the development

of the Singapore Naval Base scheme in the 1924-25 estimates It substantially suspended the scheme On 24 March, Charles Eliot, the British Ambassador to Japan, met Matsui Keishirō, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsui said that although his own Ministry recognised that the scheme did not conflict with any Anglo-Japanese engagements and also believed the scheme was not directed against Japan, they felt glad because a possible cause of irritation and misunderstanding was removed.20 Undoubtedly, the Japanese welcomed the decision to suspend the plan However, some considered it was only a temporary suspension

19 The Japan Advertiser, 4 March 1924

20 TNA, FO 371/10288, 67, Telegram No.78(R) of 1924 by Sir C Eliot (Tokyo) dated on 24 March 1924

Baron Sakamoto Toshiatsu, a member of the House of Peers and a former naval officer retired as Vice-Admiral, made a speech regarding the British Singapore Naval Base at a gathering of business leaders on 3 April

1924 Sakamoto welcomed the British decision to suspend the naval base plan, but pointed out that this suspension was temporary and Britain could not abandon the base After the First World War, with the extinction of the German Navy and the opening of the Panama Canal, the centre of the sea power struggle was moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific But, Britain had no maintenance facilities for capital ships east of the Suez Canal, because docks

in Singapore were too small for capital ships fitted with bulge protections.21Therefore, Britain had to rectify this situation, otherwise it could not send its fleet to East Asian waters when necessary For this purpose, Singapore, which stands between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, was the best place for Britain

to establish a new naval base with docking facilities for capital ships fitted with bulge protections Britain was planning to establish one dry dock and one floating dock in Singapore For Britain, Sakamoto explained, to abandon the Singapore Naval Base scheme was equivalent to abandoning its presence in East Asian waters This was unacceptable to the British.22

In Britain, there were discussions over the Singapore Naval Base Those who supported the scheme－Conservative－claimed that Britain had to

21 Bulge protection was water-tight, air-filled compartments added on to the hulls of capital ships at and below the water line to minimize the damage from torpedo-hits, introduced during the First World War

22 Toshiatsu Sakamoto, “Shingapōru Kaigun Konkyochi Mondai ni Tsuite (Discussions on the Singapore Naval Base)”, in Dai Nihon Kokubō Gikai Kaihō, Vol 82 (Sep, 1924), pp.1-28

secure its eastern trade and, to secure eastern trade, it required a fleet, and accordingly this fleet required the base Sakamoto commented these were reasonable and practical arguments On the other hand, those who opposed the scheme－Labour and Liberal－claimed that the Singapore Naval Base was against the spirit of the Washington Treaties Sakamoto pointed out that this argument was emotional and groundless It was unclear what the spirit of the Washington Treaties meant The Washington Treaties were practical agreements and it was totally wrong to discuss the Washington Treaties spiritually and emotionally.23

Sakamoto argued that what was lamentable was that British political strife between Liberal, Labour and Conservative made political capital out of Japan The Japanese felt annoyed by discussions about an Anglo-Japanese war

in both houses of the British Parliament right after the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: whether there would be an Anglo-Japanese war; whether Japan would attack Australia Sakamoto maintained it was not easy to judge whether the Singapore Naval Base would be a threat to Japan or not, because naval bases could be used either as defensive bases or as advanced bases Britain needed the Singapore Naval Base for securing the route between Britain and Australia, however, there was a possibility that, if the political situation changed, the same base could be used as an advanced base against Japan In this case, it, together with the Hong Kong Naval Base, would become threats to Japan Whether it would become a threat to Japan or not

23 Ibid

depended on future relations between Japan and Britain, not on the construction of the base itself He explained that, contrary to what was discussed in the general public, the Imperial Japanese Navy had not become nervous about the base It was wrong for the Imperial Japanese Navy to react hastily It would keep a close watch on the base and would adopt necessary policies when needed Finally, he paid tribute to the British Prime Minister, Ramsey McDonald Even though the suspension of the plan was temporary, it contributed greatly to the Anglo-Japanese relations.24

We can know from Sakamoto’s speech how naval circles in Japan perceived the Singapore Naval Base Compared with what was discussed in the mass media, the contents of his speech, which was delivered at an exclusive gathering of business elites, were more lenient to Britain and not hostile towards the plan, although he was critical of the British Parliament’s discussion of it What he argued was that it was reasonable for Britain to establish a new naval base in Singapore considering the geo-political importance of Singapore after the First World War Washington Treaties were practical agreements, so that it was wrong to criticise the plan by claiming it violated the spirit of Washington Treaties However, even though it was temporary, the suspension of the base was welcome news for cordial relations between Japan and Britain

24 Ibid

Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy over the Singapore Naval Base

When Stanley Baldwin returned to power on 4 November 1924, Shidehara Kijūrō, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, congratulated Charles Eliot, the British Ambassador to Japan, on the return of the Conservative Government Shidehara told Eliot that the defeat of the Labour party was a great satisfaction to the Japanese government, because it showed that there was at least one country in Europe where Socialism and Communism were not making progress However, Shidehara viewed the change of government with regret for the probable renewal of the proposal to the Singapore Naval Base Eliot pointed out to Shidehara that the real motive of the proposal was to give Britain a naval base of some kind in the vast Pacific area Such a base was not necessarily directed against Japan; it was possible to imagine circumstances, such as an attack by the Soviet government on China, in which Japan might desire the naval co-operation of Britain Shidehara admitted this, but pointed out the fact that many British speakers defended the Singapore project on the grounds that it was a safeguard against aggression by Japan in the Southern Pacific In fact, Lord Grey had said that the only justification of the scheme was apprehension of Japan’s designs Eliot commented in his correspondence

to London that Japanese officials like Shidehara were willing to accept the explanation which he had given, but the press and the army would not believe

it.25

Kato Takaaki, the Prime Minister, referred, at the banquet of the

25 TNA, FO 371/10299, 120-123, F4257/123/61, Correspondence No.434 of

1924, Sir C Eliot to Mr Austen Chamberlain dated on 5 November 1924

Seiyūkai Party on 18 December evening, to the British proposal to construct

the Singapore Naval Base He said that, while as an individual Japanese he did not welcome the base, since it had been contemplated for twenty years and was outside the scope of the Washington Treaties, its construction was inevitable The British authorities, he added, had given assurances that the base was purely a national affair and was not intended to influence international relations.26 Eliot wrote in a telegram to London that “Both Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs have told me that reason why they do not like Singapore base is that great majority of Japanese think that it is directed against Japan and that this seriously affects good feeling between the two countries They admit that we can justify base for domestic reasons but point to fact [sic] that many speeches and articles have openly stated that it is directed against Japan Neither has ever said anything which could be called a protest or request that project be dropped.”27

Shidehara and Eliot discussed the Japanese feelings against the Singapore Naval Base several times in November and December Shidehara insisted to Eliot that it was hard to drive out of the heads of ordinary Japanese the idea that, as soon as Britain gave up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain began to devise measures to protect herself against Japan and even to enable Britain to attack Japan When Eliot asked Shidehara if he could suggest any means of removing this impression other than abandoning the idea of the base,

26 The Times, 20 December 1924

27 TNA, FO 371/10299, 129, Telegram No.302(R) of 1924 by Sir C Eliot

(Tokyo) dated on 19 (D.) and 20 (R.) December 1924

Shidehara replied that he would think the matter over Several days later, Shidehara informed Eliot that he had two suggestions The first was that, when necessary appropriations were asked for in the British Parliament, the minister introducing the measure should state in language suitable for reproduction in the Japanese press that the motive for the base was not fear of Japanese attack still less of desire to attack Japan Shidehara hoped that a clear statement would be made of the special friendship still existing between Britain and Japan The second was, Shidehara explained, that while the alliance lasted, British and Japanese naval officers were accorded special treatment in the two countries and were allowed privileges not accorded to other nationals Then Shidehara asked Eliot; “Could not this arrangement be renewed?” Eliot replied that he would communicate Shidehara’s suggestions to London, but he added that, as there was now a quadruple instead of a dual alliance, any such privileges would have to be extended to French and American officers and this might not be convenient Shidehara remarked that what was needed was some sign that Britain regarded the Japanese as still being its friends in special sense.28

Eliot sent a telegram to the Foreign Office in London on 29 December

in which he explained Shidehara’s suggestions On receiving this telegram, Ashton Gwatkin, a member of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, thought that the first of Shidehara’s suggestions was a good one, and the second one should be transmitted to the Admiralty, even though he

28 TNA, FO 371/10299, 135-137, Telegram No.311 of 1924, by Sir C Eliot (Tokyo) dated on 30 December 1924

considered it would be turned down.29 Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was most anxious to do all in his power to dispel the anxiety which had arisen in the Japanese public regarding the policy of the Singapore Naval Base, and he wished to give effect to Shidehara’s suggestions.30

On 13 February 1925, the Admiralty rejected Shidehara’s second suggestion by sending a reply to the Foreign Office under the name of Oswyn Murray, the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty He wrote that “Under present conditions, as was pointed out by our Ambassador [Eliot], it would not

be possible to renew the arrangement without either causing serious offence to France and the United States, or giving equivalent facilities to these nations There can be no question that we should lose far more than we should gain thereby”.31 He even wrote that; “In point of fact, during the years when, as an inevitable accompaniment to the alliance, we adopted a policy of free interchange of information with Japan, it caused the Admiralty grave embarrassment It was found that the advantage of arrangement lay invariably with the Japanese, from whom we seldom ourselves obtained any information

of value.”32

Shidehara’s first suggestion was put into effect on 23 February 1925

in the House of Commons:

Mr Cecil Wilson asked the Prime Minister whether he has received any representations expressing the feeling of any portion of the Japanese people regarding the execution of the naval base at Singapore, and, if so, whether

he can state their nature?

The Prime Minister (Mr Baldwin): It is, I believe, the case that certain sections of opinion in Japan have felt some suspicion that the works at Singapore indicate a lack of confidence on our part in the peaceful intentions

of our former allies; but in Japanese official and other well-informed circles

it is fully realised that improvement of the Singapore dockyard is a normal development of naval policy Its immense distance from Japan―about 2,300 miles―prevent it from being considered as a treat; moreover, the two countries are firmly united by their common interest in the preservation of peace, by the treaties signed at Washington, and by the special bond of an historic and valued friendship.33

Austen Chamberlain mentioned in his letter to Eliot that the Prime Minister had already paid tribute in this connection―Shidehara’s first suggestion― to the British special friendship with Japan.34 On 6 April 1925, Eliot met Shidehara communicating the consequences of Shidehara’s

suggestions with the printed extract of parliamentary proceedings on 23 February Shidehara resigned himself with regret to the decision of the Admiralty that special facilities could not be given to Japanese naval officers, but expressed lively satisfaction at Chamberlain’s statement respecting the speech which had been made by the Prime Minister.35 Eliot reported to Austen Chamberlain that: “I have already called your attention to the fact that what pleases the Japanese most is a reference to the special friendship between our two countries without any allusion to America The idea of co-operation between America, Great Britain and Japan has no sentimental attraction for them I think that much of the feeling against the Singapore dock, which undoubtedly still exists, is connected with the conviction…that war with America is a contingency to be reckoned with in the future and with the apprehension that Great Britain might not be on the side of Japan In the course of such a war Japan might, for instance, wish to take the Philippines and be prevented from so doing by the Singapore fleet”.36

Since Japanese first knew the British plan to establish a new naval base in Singapore, there had been regrets for the plan in Japan on the grounds that Britain constructed the base aiming at Japan and the plan violated the spirit of the Washington Treaty One year later, the Singapore Naval Base plan which had been suspended from March 1924 was finally approved and endorsed by the Cabinet on 3 August 1926 Subsequent to the Conservative’s

35 TNA, FO 410/78, 98, F 1712/9/61, Sir Eliot to Mr Austen Chamberlain, dated on 10 April 1925

36 Ibid.

returning to power, Shidehara and Eliot, confronted with this regret, exerted themselves to the utmost in order to mitigate the regrets Shidehara was known

as a pro-Anglo-American and pro-Chinese diplomat It was typical Shidehara Gaikō (Shidehara Diplomacy) Shidehara and Eliot got along together for the

same purpose Shidehara’s second suggestion was finally rejected by the Admiralty However, the Foreign Office had conveyed the suggestion to Austen Chamberlain and the Admiralty This anecdote exemplified the different stances between the British Foreign Office and the Admiralty towards Japan But what is interesting is that diplomatic channels between Japan and Britain pursued a coordinated policy to assuage the Japanese public For them, critical opinions against the Singapore Naval Base within the Japanese public should be rectified for cordial Anglo-Japanese relations However, the effect of the Shidehara-Eliot diplomacy to appease Japanese sentiments about the base was doubtful One of the most influential opinion leaders at that time on naval matters, Itō Masanori, published a book expressing critical views on the Singapore Naval Base in 1926 He was also critical of the Japanese government’s stance against it

The Singapore Naval Base in the Japanese Public in the late 1920s

After the media campaign from 1923 to 1925, the British Singapore

Naval Base plan became a fait accompli in the Japanese public, so that

newspapers paid less attention to it in the last part of the 1920s Discussions were taken over by magazines and books Newspapers just reported the

progress of the plan and discussions in Britain about it in small articles

The most renowned naval journalist in Japan at that time, Itō

Masanori, published a book Sōtei Tekikoku (Hypothetical Enemies) in 1926, in

which he discussed the Singapore Naval Base.37 He claimed that it was a great threat to Japan In comparing Lüshun in 1905 at the time of Russo-Japanese War and Singapore in 1926, Singapore in 1926 was nearer to Japan than Lüshun in 1905 The distance between Nagasaki and Singapore － 2,500 nautical miles－was four point five times farther than the distance between Nagasaki and Lüshun－550 nautical miles However, the cruising radius of British battleships in 1926 was more than five times the cruising radius of Russian battleships in 1905 Therefore, the increase in the cruising radius offset geographical distance In truth, he continued, from Singapore Royal Sovereign Class battleships could attack Nagasaki and return to Singapore without refuelling Nelson Class battleships could even do attack Tokyo.38 In addition, the distance between Nagasaki and Singapore was 900 nautical miles less than the distance between Yokohama and Honolulu The naval base in Singapore was a greater threat to Japan than the naval base in Hawaii Furthermore, Britain could use Hong Kong as an advanced base of the

doubtful whether they could stay in the vicinity of the Japanese islands long enough to impose threats Therefore, it could be said, what Itō claimed in this book regarding cruising radius of British battleships was armchair theories The Imperial Japanese Navy did not examine even a possibility of British attacks from Singapore at that time

Singapore Naval Base The threat of Hong Kong was negligible as an independent naval base However, it became a great threat to Japan when used

as an advanced base of Singapore.39

Itō questioned: “Against whom the Singapore Naval Base was aiming?” He wrote that the British government always replied “Against nobody”.40 But, to construct a naval base with a huge budget against nobody was total nonsense No country spent a huge budget on a naval base without a hypothetical enemy Obviously, the hypothetical enemy of the British plan was Japan Considered from the Japanese point of view, the British Singapore plan insulted pro-British feelings of the Japanese It was inconceivable for the Japanese that the relations with the friendliest nation which had continued for more than twenty years would end in this way Britain would teach the Japanese the cruel reality of international relations by constructing the Singapore Naval Base Some people in Britain claimed that Britain needed the Singapore Naval Base to defend Australia or New Zealand: but why in Singapore? If the purpose of the Singapore Naval Base was to defend Australia or New Zealand, Itō refuted, it was more reasonable to construct a naval base in Sydney.41 He claimed that the purpose of the base was not for defence, but for offence against Japan.42 The geography of Singapore was more suitable for offence than defence If the conflict between Japan and Britain should break out, it was inconceivable that Britain would wait for the

Japanese to come attacking Singapore In this case, Britain would attack Japan from Singapore using Hong Kong as an advanced base.43

How should Japan react to the British Singapore Naval Base plan? Itō explained that it was wrong to counter it militarily because it would result in military conflict Japan should solve the problem diplomatically The British Labour party criticised the Conservative Singapore Naval Base plan Why did the Japanese not support the British Labour party? He claimed that the Japanese people should support British friends to criticise the Conservative plan It was the Conservative plan which reversed the current of naval disarmaments and World peace He also criticised the Japanese government

He argued that the Japanese government neither opposed nor criticised the base When the British government stated: “The Singapore Naval Base was not aiming at Japan.” The Japanese government always accepted the British explanation But, he questioned, was it not the duty of diplomats to defend national interests and the peace of the Pacific? Why did our diplomats pander

to Britain? Their attitude was unbearable Finally, he concluded that Japan should solve the problem at the next naval conference It was the Singapore Naval Base which would disturb the peace of East Asia It should be the first

on the agenda of the naval disarmament policies of the Japanese government.44

Considering Itō Masanori’s influence as an opinion maker at the time, his arguments should not be overlooked He was not a war-mongering journalist, but a supporter of naval disarmament and the Washington Treaties

43 Ibid., pp.323-325

44 Ibid., pp.325-346