The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 4

The Japanese delegates demanded 70 per cent capital ships ratio against the United States, but accepted 60 per cent ratio in exchange for maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifica

1 Capital ships are battle ships, battle cruisers and aircraft-carriers larger than 10, 000 tons

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chief plenipotentiary was Katō Tomosaburō

At the conference, the Japanese delegates proposed the maintenance

of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific and this was enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty The Japanese delegates demanded 70 per cent capital ships ratio against the United States, but accepted 60 per cent ratio

in exchange for maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific However, Article 19 did not restrict Britain establishing a new naval base in Singapore Article 19 imposed on Britain maintenance of the status quo

of the fortifications in Hong Kong, on the United States in Guam, the Philippines and Aleutians, and on Japan in Amami-Oshima, the Bonin Islands, Taiwan, the Kurile, the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands, and the Pescadores The Japanese delegates did not include Singapore and Hawaii in the proposed restricted area Consequently, Article 19 did not restrict establishing a British base in Singapore and an American base in Hawaii But, why did the Japanese delegates not include Singapore in its proposal? Did Japan intentionally not include Singapore? Did Japan regard the Singapore Naval Base as a threat in the period from the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to the expiration of the Washington Treaty in 1936? This chapter examines relations between Japan and Britain regarding the Singapore Naval Base and Article 19 of the Washington Treaty

Preparation for the Washington Conference

Two years before the British decision to build a new naval base in

Singapore, a former First Sea Load, Viscount Jellicoe toured the Dominion countries－India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada－from 1919 to 1920 and submitted a report known as the Jellicoe Report in which he proposed a Pacific Fleet composed of eight battleships and eight battle-cruisers, to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy’s eight-eight fleet He supposed the base and the headquarters of this fleet would be in Singapore In order to maintain the British naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region, he worried about the vulnerability of the Pacific Dominions－especially Australia－to Japan He recognised that the only external threat to the British Empire in the Far East was from Japan But for the British government at that time which confronted financial difficulties, the Jellicoe report, which would necessitate immense cost, was unacceptable In addition, the content of the Jellicoe Report was too hostile to the ally: Japan Even though the efficacy of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been declining, the British government at the time did not yet finally decide whether or not the alliance would be renewed The Japanese Consul General Office in Sydney obtained a full copy of the Jellicoe Report and sent it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 November 1919.2 In Japan, the Jellicoe Report was also reported in news reports.3 But, whether or not the Imperial Japanese Navy studied it closely is unclear Some naval documents made in the period between the two world wars mentioned the Jellicoe Report

2 DRO, 1-6-3, “Kakkoku Naisei Kankei Zappen, Eikoku-no-bu (Domestic Policies of Foreign Countries Files, Britain) Vol 6” This file includes a full copy of “Naval Defence Report of Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia (May-August, 1919)” submitted to the Australian government during the tour

3 Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 29 October, 1919, p.2

as the first proposal of the plan to construct a new naval base in Singapore

Since the arrival of the American invitation to the Washington Conference on 11 July 1921, the Imperial Japanese Army had been preparing for it The Imperial Japanese Army’s preparation committee discussed fortifications in the Pacific on 10 August 1921 Although it considered naval fortification in the Pacific was basically a naval issue, it adopted the army’s standpoint: Japan should request the removal of the fortifications from Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Tongking, Singapore and Java If each country removed fortifications from these places, Japan could remove their fortifications from Lushun, Dalian, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima and the Taiwan Islands in exchange In accordance with this standpoint, the committee proposed three plans The first plan was that, if the United States and Britain removed fortifications from Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong, Japan would remove them from the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, Keelung and the Pescadores The second plan excluded Hawaii and Singapore from the first plan In this plan, the committee considered that Japan could remove fortifications from the Bonin Islands or Amami-Oshima, but not from both The third plan excluded the Philippines and Hong Kong from the first plan In this plan, Japan could remove fortifications from Taiwan, Keelung and the Pescadores If removing fortifications was impossible, the second-best plan was to demand maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in these areas.4 According to

4 NIDS, Army Documents, Rikugun-shō Kafu-Kaigi, T10-1-61 “Kafu-Kaigi Junbi-Syorui (Preparation Documents for the Washington Conference)”,

the first and third of these proposed plans, Britain could not build a new naval base in Singapore If the second plan of their proposal was adopted, Britain could build a new naval base there, but in this case, Japan would have removed fortifications from, or maintained the status quo of fortifications in, either the Bonin Islands or Amami-Oshima, but not both.5

The Imperial Japanese Navy began its preparation for the Washington Conference from June 1919 in a special research committee in anticipation that a conference to discuss naval disarmament would take place in the near future.6 In this committee chaired by Real-Admiral Abo Kiyokazu, Chief of the Operations Division of the Navy General Staff, naval officers who would play important roles in policy-making within the navy in the period between the two world wars participated; namely, Yamanashi Katsunoshin, Nomura Kichisaburō, Kabayashi Seizō and Suetsugu Nobumasa, who were all Captains

at that time After the invitation came from the United States, this committee submitted a report as a resolution embodying the consensus of the navy on 21 July 1921 to Katō Tomosaburō, the Minister of the Navy He would also be Chief of the Japanese delegates to the Washington Conference This report stipulated two important things First, Japan did not insist upon in building the eight-eight fleet as long as it could keep a balance with the Anglo-American powers Second, Japan absolutely required a naval ratio of 70 per cent or

0023-0024, 0060-0061, 0454-0459

5 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai (Washington

Conference: The Problem of Naval Limitation). (Tokyo: MOFA, 1974), p.239

6 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho, Daihon’ei Kaigunbu, Rengō Kantai, 1: Kaisen Made (The Imperial Headquarters, Navy Combined Fleet, Vol 1, Up to the Outbreak

of Hostility), (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1975), p.182

above vis-à-vis the United States Navy reconfirming the navy’s long-standing consensus.7 The origin of the concept of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s requirement of 70 per cent of the United States Navy and its eight-eight fleet

dated back to 1907 when the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin (Imperial National

Defence Policy) was first sanctioned This policy consisted of three fundamental guidelines: (1) the need for a 70 per cent naval fleet ratio as a strategic imperative against a hypothetical enemy; (2) a building plan for an eight battleships and eight battle cruisers fleet; and (3) the United States was the navy’s hypothetical enemy.8 The Imperial Japanese Navy was imbued with this policy when the invitation arrived from the United States It is extremely difficult to abandon deeply imbued considerations The 70 per cent ratio against the United States Navy became the Imperial Japanese Navy’s fundamental policy for the Washington Conference But what is important for our purpose is that this 70 per cent ratio was a ratio against the United States The navy had no particular policy against Britain

Far more interesting and relevant to our argument is that the demand for a 70 per cent ratio against the United States required a prerequisite: the prohibition of further fortifications in Guam and the Philippines The research committee report stated that any build-up of American bases on these islands would eliminate Japan’s geographic and strategic advantage At that time, American bases in Guam and the Philippines were not yet adequately

7 Sadao Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays (Colimbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2007), p.112; Asada Sadao, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp.60-61

8 Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations, p.107

equipped to repair and maintain ships, much less to accommodate a large fleet

It stipulated: “Should this problem fail to be satisfactorily resolved, naval arms limitation would not only be meaningless but may conceivably prove suicidal

to Japan”9 But if the United States could not build up bases in Guam and the Philippines, badly damaged ships would have to return to Hawaii to be docked and sailing such a long distance for damaged ships would be highly risky Katō Tomosaburō agreed with this conclusion.10 Shidehara Kijūrō recalled in his memoir: “Katō Tomosaburō took much more importance on fortifications

of the Pacific－maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific－than the warships ratio That is to say, if the United States had constructed well fortified bases in Guam and other places in the Pacific as impregnable as Heligoland in Germany, it would have become impossible for Japan to wage any war But if the status quo was agreed on Pacific fortifications, it would not be impossible to wage war with the 5:5:3 ratio.”11

A historian, Asada Sadao, points out: “Apparently he [Katō Tomosaburō] regarded the fortification problem as more crucial to Japan than hair-splitting bargains over fleet ratios If the United States built impregnable fortresses in the Philippines or Guam and obtained footholds in the western Pacific, Japan’s fleet ratio would become meaningless.”12

Although both the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy considered that de-fortification or maintenance of the status quo of

9 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p 61

fortifications in the Pacific was necessary, there was disparity between their policies For the army, general de-fortification, or at least maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in a large area in the Pacific, was desirable On the other hand, for the navy, to prohibit strengthening of fortifications in Guam and the Philippines was a strategic imperative to prevent the construction of American advanced bases there It did not care much about other places With regard to Singapore, the army considered that de-fortification or the maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in Singapore was desirable, while for the navy, which regarded only the United States as its hypothetical enemy, de-fortification or maintaining the status quo of fortifications in Singapore was not an urgent need As a compromise agreement, the instruction for the Japanese delegates to the Washington Conference stipulated:

“Whenever the opportunity shall arise, the Japanese Empire, in the light of maintaining the peace, will make a proposal that fortifications of the Pacific area should be removed or at least maintain the status quo and will endeavour

to conclude it as a treaty of Pacific fortifications.”13 But there was no complete understanding between the two armed forces

Britain prepared for the Washington Naval Conference in the Committee of Imperial Defence meetings It also understood the interlocking nature of fortifications in the Pacific and naval disarmaments The Royal Navy hoped that Japan would accept no naval base further south than Taiwan.14 But

13 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.239

14 Eric Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Washington Conference,” in Eric Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.), The Washington Conference, 1921-22 (Ilford; Frank Cass, 1994), p.23

what was imperative for Britain and its navy, which decided to construct a new naval base in Singapore on 16 June that year, was to exclude Singapore from any agreement British documents stipulated: “That no agreement should be reached at the Conference which will in any way interfere with the development of Singapore as a British Naval Base, since such development is purely defensive in character and is already overdue”.15

The Washington Conference and the Article 19 of the Washington Treaty

The Washington Conference began with American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes’s bombshell proposals which broke all diplomatic protocol His proposals were: (1) a ten-year “naval holiday” during which each power would cease construction; (2) limitation of the fleets of the great powers

by tonnage according to the naval forces ratio of 10:10:6 between the United States, Britain and Japan; and (3) an itemised plan for scrapping ships in accord with a “stop now” formula.16 Hughes’s proposals were a shock for the Japanese delegates which did not and could not anticipate such bold proposals But Katō Tomosaburō, deeply moved to see the audiences excited by Hughes’s proposals, considered: “It is simply impossible to oppose the American plan If

we oppose it, we’ll have to pay a heavy price World public opinion would not

15 TNA, CAB 5/5; CO 537/1045, 197-C, “Establishment of Naval Base at Singapore and its Effect upon the Foreign and Naval Policy of the Empire”, 6-8

16 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.73

2 Accept the 10:6.5 ratio in return for retention of the Mutsu;

3 Accept the 10:6 ratio in return for retention of the Mutsu;

4 Accept the 10.6 ratio and the scrapping of the Mutsu.19

Katō Tomosaburō wrote: “Taking a larger view of the conference, if Japan should clash with the United States on naval limitation and thus cause its miscarriage, it will be as clear as day the onus will fall on us” and urged that he be authorised to opt for Plans 2 or 3 and, if absolutely necessary, Plan

4.20 The government reply came on 28 November to Kato Tomosaburō directing him to make a final effort to carry through Plan 1 But if it failed, he was to negotiate on the basis of Plan 2 If further concession became necessary, the delegates must take a broad consideration of Japan’s interests and accept the 10:6 ratio, provided the Anglo-American powers agree to reduce or at least maintain the status quo with respect to fortifications in their Pacific island

17 Ibid

18 The Mutsu was a post-Jutland battleship mounting eight 16-inch guns with good armour protection, which had earmarked for scrapping in the American plan

19 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai., p.239; Asada From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.79

20 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.79

possessions The government reminded the delegates: “The paramount consideration is to retain a naval balance by reducing the operational power of the American fleet in the western Pacific.”21 The Japanese government, especially the Imperial Japanese Navy, became sensitive to news-reports that the United States would construct new naval bases in Guam and the Philippines.22 If the United States did construct these bases, they would have become direct threats to Japan

After the technical naval subcommittee failed to resolve the Japanese-American impasse over the capital ships ratio on 30 November, Arthur Balfour, Chief of the British delegates, approached Katō Tomosaburō

on 1 December asking for the Japanese standpoint of the capital ships ratio Katō Tomosaburō, avoiding answering Balfour’s question directly, broached the question of naval fortifications of the Pacific islands He explained to Balfour with pointing to Hawaii, the Philippines and Guam on a map of the Pacific: “if the United States, as reported in the press, was spending a colossal sum to build mighty bases in the Philippines and Guam, Japanese people would be greatly threatened Fortifications of the Pacific could not be considered separately from naval limitation Japanese people will be greatly relieved if there was some kind of agreement on fortifications of the Pacific.”23Katō Tomosaburō also pointed out the locations of Hong Kong and Singapore

on the map Balfour listened to Katō Tomosaburō’s explanation attentively and

21 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, pp.239-240; Asada,

From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.80

22 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.240

23 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.240; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.81

asked for Kato’s consent to tell Hughes what Kato told him After obtaining Katō Tomosaburō’s consent, Balfour told Katō Tomosaburō that to remove the Pacific fortifications was difficult but maintaining the status quo was pertinent

He also told Katō Tomosaburō that he personally considered it was difficult for the United States to include Hawaii in an agreement When Katō Tomosaburō, Balfour and Hughes met on the next day, Hughes told KatōTomosaburō that he had heard of Katō Tomosaburō’s proposal on the naval fortifications from Balfour.24 Hughes said that the United States did not wish

to take up the non-fortification issue unless Japan would agree to a 60 per cent ratio and it was difficult to discuss Hawaii.25

The discussion over naval fortifications in the Pacific was carried forward by uniformed personnel Real-Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin26, following the instruction of Katō Tomosaburō, visited Real-Admiral Ernle Chatfield on 8 December afternoon to sound out the British standpoint on fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific Japan approached Britain before formally presenting its proposal This meeting was extremely important, when considering relations between Japan and Britain regarding the Singapore Naval Base, and the non-fortification agreement Yamanashi told Chatfield

24 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.240

25 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.241; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.81

26 Yamanashi Katsunoshin was promoted to Real-Admiral on 1 December He visited and stayed in Britain several times before that During the First World War, in 1914, he spent four months with the British Command in Singapore served as staff and liaison officer under Vice-Admiral Jerram For his personal interaction with Britain and the Royal Navy, see Haruko Fukuda “The

Peaceful Overture: Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin (1877-1967)” in Hugh Cortazzi and Gordon Danniels (eds.), Britain and Japan 1859-1991: Themes and Personalities (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp.198-213

that he came to talk about naval fortifications in the Pacific Then Chatfield asked his aid to bring a chart of the Pacific Yamanashi noticed there was a red line on Amami-Oshima on Chatfield’s chart He considered that Chatfield had already examined the issue He explained to Chatfield the positions of Japanese principal naval bases: the Pescadores, Keelung in the north of Taiwan, Amami-Oshima and the Bonin Islands He said the Pescadores had a naval base where five light cruisers could be anchored and a light cruiser docked Keelung was a mercantile harbour, but it was defended with some guns, and a fleet could be anchored there Amami-Oshima was practically undeveloped

No naval money had been spent on it and Japan did not wish to do so The Island in the Bonin group had some military fortifications in it put by the army, but nothing of a naval nature Japan would be willing to remove the guns from the Bonin Island if necessary Then, Yamanashi asked Chatfield whether he thought, if Japan consented to maintain the status quo of these bases, the United States would consent to maintain the status quo of Manila, Guam and Hawaii? Chatfield replied, the United States would agree as regards Guam and Manila, but he doubted American agreeing as regards Hawaii Yamanashi then asked Chatfield: “What about Hong Kong and Singapore? Would you be willing to maintain the status quo there also?” Chatfield replied that he had had no instruction on this matter from the British delegates, but as regards Hong Kong, Britain would undoubtedly be affected by what Japan did in the Pescadores and Taiwan, and that he had no doubt Britain and Japan should reach a satisfactory agreement Yamanashi then asked again: “What about Singapore?” Chatfield replied that the British fleet had been reduced so much

that it did not cover British strategic requirements and this would have to be taken into consideration when considering the future of Singapore Singapore was the entrance to the Indian Ocean and Britain might require taking some action there Yamanashi said: “Of course, Japan has no objection” and then asked: “Would the United States agree as Singapore was not very far from the Philippines?” Chatfield replied, “I have no idea” to that question Yamanashi carried away from the meeting the impression that, if Japan did not include Singapore in the Japanese proposal, it could preserve British agreement for it and reported what he had discussed with Chatfield to Katō Tomosaburō.27

After the Yamanashi-Chatfield meeting, Katō Tomosaburō considered,

if Japan would not include Singapore to the Japanese proposal, Britain would agree to it He explained in a telegram to Tokyo that, if Japan would include Hawaii and Singapore, the United States and Britain would disagree with the Japanese proposal.28 Within several days, he would completely abandon consideration to include Singapore On 12 December, in the meeting between Katō Tomosaburō, Hughes and Balfour, Katō Tomosaburō told them that Japan would accept the 60 per cent capital ship ratio on condition that the

27 TNA, ADM 116/2149, Note by Admiral Chatfield on 8 Dec 1921, 158-160; Katsunoshn Yamanashi, Rekishi to Meishō: Senshi ni Miru Rīdāshippu no Jōken (History and Great Admirals: The Conditions for Leadership as Seen in Naval History) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1981), p.163; Yamanashi

Katsunoshin Sensei Kinen Shuppan Iinkai (ed.), Yamanashi Katsunoshin Ihōroku (Legacies of Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin) (Tokyo: Suikōkai, 1968), pp.86-88; Telegram from Katō Kanji to Vice-Minister of Navy, Ide Kenji, and Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, Abo Kiyokazu, dated on 12 Dec 1921

in MOFA NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō (The Washington Conference Vol.1)

(Tokyo: MOFA, 1977), pp.395-396.

28 Telegram from Katō Tomosaburō to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uchida Kōsai, dated on 12 Dec 1921 (sent on 10 Dec) in MOFA NGB, Washinton Kaigi

Jō, pp.396-397

United States and Britain would agree to maintain the status quo of naval fortifications in the Pacific Katō Tomosaburō told them: “I would like to obtain from you a clear understanding in regard to the principle of maintaining the status quo of the fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific If the Pacific Islands and especially advanced naval bases such as the Philippines and Guam are allowed to be fully developed, without any restrictions, into bases where the entire fleet can be concentrated and properly supplied”, they would become great threats to Japan.29 Hughes said that if the non-fortifications agreement included Hawaii, the United States, especially the Senate, could not agree, because the defence of Hawaii was for purely defensive purposes and the distance between Japan and Hawaii was far enough not to pose a threat to Japan However, if Japan would accept the 10:10:6 ratio, he could agree to the Japanese proposal and guarantee the maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in Guam and the Philippines Balfour said he would agree to the Japanese proposal and include Hong Kong.30

Three days later, at 11 am on 15 December, when they met again, Balfour told them that Britain could agree to include Hong Kong, but no other place, in this agreement At this meeting Katō Tomosaburō filed a statement to define the non-fortification area: “Maintaining the status quo in regards to fortifications and naval bases in the outlying insular possessions in the Pacific region, including Hongkong [sic], but excluding Hawaiian Islands, Australia,

29 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, 245

30 Ibid

New Zealand and the Islands composing Japan proper.”31 On both occasions,

on 12 and 15 December, Katō Tomosaburō intentionally did not refer to Singapore That afternoon, the three countries reached a provisional agreement

on the 10:10:6 capital ships ratio and on maintenance of the status quo of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific.32 On 22 December the Japanese government asked in a telegram to Katō Tomosaburō whether there was clear understanding or not over excluding Singapore from the non-fortification agreement.33 Katō Tomosaburō replied on 29 December that, as a result of meetings with Balfour and himself and the Yamanashi-Chatfield meeting, he understood that Singapore was clearly excluded from the non-fortification agreement.34

For Katō Tomosaburō, to enact a non-fortification agreement to prevent American advanced bases in Guam and the Philippines was more important than to include Singapore in the agreement He considered that, if he had mentioned Singapore in the meetings between Hughes, Balfour and himself, he could not enlist Britain’s support to the non-fortification proposal

he made By 15 December, he completely abandoned the intention to include Singapore into the non-fortification agreement After that, the Japanese

31 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.247

32 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, pp.245-248;

“Telegram from Katō Tomosaburō to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uchida Kōsai”, dated on 27 December 1921, in MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō,

delegates did not bring Singapore into discussions, but they had the unified view that Singapore was excluded from the non-fortification area even though

it was not stipulated in the agreement finally enacted as Article 19 of the Washington Treaty on 6 February 1922 They intentionally avoided stipulating Singapore to procure British support In Article 19, Britain had to maintain the status quo of the fortifications in “Hong Kong and the insular possessions of the British Empire situated in the Pacific Ocean and east of 110°east longitude, now possessed or hereafter acquired except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) the Dominion of New Zealand.”35 Even though Singapore was not stipulated in Article 19, it was stipulated in some Japanese documents.36 A British document stipulated: “The territory specified in Article 19 was a matter of prolonged consideration at Washington, and the other parties to the Treaty fully appreciated that Article 19 as finally drafted left Great Britain to develop [Singapore] as a Naval Base.”37 There was substantial agreement between Britain and Japan over Singapore

Vice-Admiral Katō Kanji, Chief naval adviser, and Captain Suetsugu Nobumasa, a naval adviser, who opposed strongly the 60 per cent capital ships ratio against the United States, did not impose any opinion to exclude Singapore from the non-fortification agreement In a telegram he sent to Tokyo

on 9 December, Kato Kanji just reported the gist of the Yamanashi-Chatfield

35 Cited from the Article 19 of the Washington Treaty

36 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, p.263

37 TNA, CAB 5/5; CO 537/1045, 197-C, “Establishment of Naval Base at Singapore and its Effect upon the Foreign and Naval Policy of the Empire, 6-8

meeting.38 In addition, Katō Kanji bitterly discussed the definition of Japan proper－which islands composed the Japanese Islands－with Lord Lee, a British delegate, but even at that time he did not mention Singapore.39 In Japan, Katō Kanji and Suetsugu have been well known as

“anti-Anglo-American” naval officers Some previous studies suggested that they had had “anti-Anglo-Saxon” feelings since the time of the Washington Conference.40 It is true that, on 4 December Katō Kanji wrote in a telegram that “The United States and Britain are banding together in oppressing Japan.”41 However, there is no clear evidence that Katō Kanji and Suetsugu had any particular anti-British policy at the time of the Washington Conference

He wrote the 4 December telegram when facing the rejection of his claim for the 70 per cent capital ships ratio by the United States and Britain At the end

of his 1921 diary, Katō Kanji wrote: “Unless the guarantee that there shall be

no war between Japan and the United States, it is impossible to compromise with American proposal”42 For him, the 60 per cent capital ships ratio the Japanese delegates led by Katō Tomosaburō accepted was still an American proposal, so he definitely could not accept that However, he did not express such strong feelings against Britain solely at Washington He added at the end

38 Telegram from Katō Kanji to Vice-Minister of Navy, Ide Kenji, and

Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, Abo Kiyokazu”, dated on 12 December

1921 (sent on 9 December) in MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō , pp.395-396

39 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Gunbi Seigen Mondai, pp.252-253

40 Ikeda, Kiyoshi “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”,

in Fraser, T.G and Lowe, Peter (eds.), Conflict and Amity in East Asia: Essays

in Honour of Ian Nish (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp.31-32

41 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.87

42 Kanji Katō, Zoku Gendaishi Shiryō Dai 5 Kan: Kato Kanji Nikki (Second Series of Documents of Modern History, Vol 5: Kato Kanji Diary) (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1994), p.51

of the telegram he reported the gist of the Yamanashi-Chatfield meeting, “Do Not Reveal This to the United States for a while”.43 Here he clearly distinguished between Britain and the United States In conclusion, it is true that Katō Kanji did express “anti-Anglo-American” feelings sometimes in the Washington Conference, but, it is wrong to consider that he had coherent anti-British thoughts What is important for our purpose is that he did not oppose excluding Singapore from the non-fortification area If he had had any different opinion, he would have definitely expressed it He was a very outspoken man.44 At the Washington Conference, he was occupied with how

to confront the United States

Opposition to the Japanese proposal to maintain the status quo of fortifications came from the Imperial Japanese Army, which considered more general non-fortification agreement for a larger area was desirable The Minister of War, Yamanashi Hanzō, claimed at a Cabinet meeting on 10 December 1921 that, if Hawaii was a continuation of the American mainland, the Bonin Islands and Amami-Oshima were continuations of the Japanese archipelago, and maintenance of fortifications was difficult to watch, therefore

he was against such a defective proposal But Katō Tomosaburō and the Imperial Japanese Navy overwhelmed the army’s opposition.45 They could not accept the argument which did not take the navy’s strategic imperative into

43 Telegram from Katō Kanji to Vice-Minister of Navy, Ide Kenji, and

Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, Abo Kiyokazu, dated on 12 December

1921 (sent on 9 December) in MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō , pp.395-396

44 Sadao Asada, Ryōtaisenkan no Nichi-Bei Kankei: Kaigun to Seisaku Kettei Katei (Japanese-American Relations between the Wars: Naval Policy and Decision-Making Process) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993), pp.78-79

45 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho: Daihon’ei Kaigun-bu: Rengō Kantai 1, p.189

consideration On the other hand, Major-General Tanaka Kunishige, the army’s delegate to the Washington Conference, was dissatisfied with the navy’s decision that excluded Hawaii and Singapore but included most of the Japanese islands in the adjoining seas He considered: “Britain only includes Hong Kong but excludes Singapore, which is the base situated on the communication route between the British homeland, Australia and its colonies

in Nanyō (Southeast Asia), as well as the seas of Australia and New Zealand

This is grossly unfair compared with Japanese non-fortification areas which include most of the Japanese islands in the adjoining seas But, in effect, these British territories were irrelevant to the operational plans of our navy”46 Even though he was not satisfied with the navy’s indifference to Singapore, he reluctantly admitted it was the navy’s business in the end But the navy’s indifference to Singapore was inexplicable for the army Contrary to the navy which focused its attention only on the United States, the army could view naval fortifications of the Pacific from a broader perspective

What is important for our purpose is that, at the Washington Conference, Japan succeeded in preventing the strengthening of fortifications

in the Philippines and Guam The Imperial Japanese Navy considered it was a strategic imperative In the process, Britain obtained Japan’s substantial approval of the Singapore Naval Base at the Yamanashi-Chatfield meeting Yamanashi told Chatfield that Japan had no objection to British action to

46 NIDS, Army Documents, Rikugun-shō Kafu-kaigi, T11-1-54 “Kafu-kaigi Rikugun Zui-in (The Army Delegate to the Washington Conference) Kōtaishi Denka Gozen Kō-en no Tame Kafu-kaigi no Gaikan (Overview of the

Washington Conference, Draft for the Lecture for Prince Hirohito)”, 0014

rectify the situation that the British fleet could no longer fulfil British strategic requirements Unlike Britain which started regarding Japan as a future military threat or its hypothetical enemy, Japan did not regard Britain as its hypothetical enemy There was no reason for the Imperial Japanese Navy to oppose the British plan to build the base in Singapore to improve the British Imperial defence The British delegates stated in the press conference: “A real defensive base for Australia and New Zealand is Singapore Singapore is of course is not in the Pacific It is a naval base now and has been for generations

No question has been raised about it by anybody in the Conference”47 The Japanese delegates did not mention Singapore in any formal meeting in order

to guarantee British support for the non-fortification proposal For the Imperial Japanese Navy, the British policy to construct a new naval base in Singapore was acceptable on condition that Britain would agree to the Japanese proposal which would prevent the building of American advanced naval bases in Guam and the Philippines What is more, there was complete understanding among naval officers in the Japanese delegation on this point Katō Kanji and Suetsugu opposed the 10:10:6 capital ships ratio but accepted the policy to exclude Singapore from Article 19

In conclusion, at the Washington Conference, both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Royal Navy completely accomplished their original plans for naval bases The Royal Navy succeeded in excluding Singapore from any agreement The Imperial Japanese Navy succeeded in preventing the

47 MOFA, NGB, Washinton Kaigi Jō, p.435

development of American advanced bases in Guam and the Philippines, which guaranteed Japan naval supremacy in the western Pacific Singapore was not included in its original plan As a result, the enactment of the Washington Treaty created a multilateral balance of power in combination of naval forces ratio and naval fortifications between Japan, Britain and the United States For these three Pacific powers, naval forces ratio and naval fortifications were inseparably linked to each other

The Aftermath of the Washington Conference

In the spring of 1923, the British government revealed its scheme to build a new naval base in Singapore.48 This news was a shock for the Japanese public However, the Imperial Japanese Navy had substantially approved the new Singapore Naval Base at the Washington Conference It intentionally excluded Singapore from the non-fortification area even though it knew the British intention to rectify its Imperial defences by building the naval base

On 12 June, Katō Tomosaburō was appointed to be the Prime Minister serving concurrently as the Minister of the Navy What he had to do

was to reform the Imperial Japanese Navy and revise the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin (The Imperial National Defence Policy) to accommodate to the treaties

he enacted at the Washington Conference But unfortunately for him and Japan,

48 Before that, the plan to build a new naval base in Singapore was a secret plan

his health did not allow him to conduct this task He suffered from late-stage colon cancer and passed away on 25 August 1923 Katō Kanji was promoted

to Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff in May 1922 Ever since the Washington Conference, the United States had become an immense threat rather than a hypothetical enemy for hard line naval officers like Katō Kanji and Suetsugu.49 Katō Tomosaburō accepted the Washington treaties to avoid war against the United States Ironically, however, the revision of naval

policies in the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin was conducted by Katō Kanji and

Suetsugu, Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff and Chief of the Operations Division of the Navy General Staff respectively, on the understanding that hostilities against the United States would become unavoidable in the near future.50 For the first time, the United States was singled out as the number one hypothetical enemy of Japan by strong assertions of Katō Kanji and Suetsugu Before that, the number one hypothetical enemy was Russia (the Soviet Union) Asada mentions: “A supreme irony of the Washington Treaty was that Japan’s National Defense Policy adopted the idea of inevitable war precisely when that treaty reduced the Japanese and American navies so that neither could conduct offensive operations.” 51 For Katō Kanji, the Washington Treaty “was a humanitarian veil to hide America’s desire for domination over East Asia”.52 He had an original reading of history: “the westward advance of American civilisation, with poisonous effects on Japan,

49 Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations, p.116

50 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho: Daihon’ei Kaigun-bu: Rengō Kantai, 1 , p.199

51 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.102

52 Ibid., p.178

was the culmination of four centuries of expansion of “materialistic Western civilisation” since the battle of Lepanto in 1571, from its Mediterranean origin

to the Atlantic, then across the American continent, finally to the Pacific.”53

He considered that the clash between American materialism and Japanese spirituality was inevitable.54 The revised Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin was

sanctioned on 28 February 1923 His original view of history was reflected in

the revised Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin It stipulated that: “To solve

Japanese-American imbroglios arising from economic problems and racial prejudice which has continued over a period of years is a task of extreme difficulty Conflict of interests and estrangement of feelings between people of the two countries shall become increasingly serious in the future If the United States, which has strong military strongholds in the Pacific and in the Far East, continues its current Asian policy, it will inevitably clash with the Empire.”55Katō Kanji considered that the Japanese-American clash would be inevitable

in the near future so Japan had to prepare for it before it was too late, otherwise Japan would have to bow to the United States

However, the revised Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin was not hostile to Britain Compared with the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin’s description of the

United States, there was a striking contrast It stipulated that “Even though the Anglo-Japanese Alliance terminated with the enactment of the Four-Power Treaty, cordial relationships between the two countries are not only mutually

53 Ibid

54 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor., p.178

55 BBKS, Senshi Sōsho: Daihon’ei Kaigun-bu: Rengō Kantai, 1 , p.198

advantageous for our economies and national defence but also they will contribute greatly to World peace There is little possibility that the two countries would clash as a consequence of small conflicts of interests existing locally.”56 This was written by the Navy General Staff－Katō Kanji’s group－and the Army General Staff There were no “anti-Anglo-Saxon feelings” in this description On the other hand, the Imperial Japanese Army did not share the navy’s view The army regarded the Soviet Union as the principal hypothetical enemy But it also considered that, even though it was a fairly remote possibility, if Japan fought a war against the United States, there would

be a possibility that Britain would join the American side Contrary to the navy which focused its attention only on the United States, the army admitted the possibility that a war against the combination of countries would come in the future But it did not suppose a war solely against Britain.57 In the following year, soon after the site preparation to construct the new naval base began at Sembawang in Singapore, the first Labour Government announced the cancellation of the project The debate for the project to construct it was resumed when the Conservatives came to power again in November 1924

From 1923 onwards, the Imperial Japanese Navy expected that the United States would propose a second naval conference at an early date to restrict auxiliary ships－cruisers, destroyers and submarines－which were not restricted at the Washington Conference To prepare for this, the navy

established the Naval Research Committee on Arms Limitation This committee submitted its final report in May 1925 The committee discussed whether enlargement of the status quo of the fortifications area to Hawaii and Singapore was advantageous to Japan or not It considered that, to enlarge it to Hawaii and Singapore was desirable, but Japan did not wish to enlarge it to any Japanese island If Japan proposed to enlarge maintenance of the status quo of the fortifications area to Hawaii and Singapore, Japan would have compensated anything, to accept the maintenance of the status quo of naval fortifications in any Japanese island which was not restricted by Article 19 or

to accept other disadvantageous agreement, otherwise the United States and Britain would not agree to it In conclusion, to enlarge it to Hawaii and Singapore was not too crucial to the defence of Japan to obtain at any price.58Because, Hawaii and Singapore were too far away to impose direct threats to Japan In addition, Britain was not a hostile power The committee considered that the current Article 19 of the Washington Conference, which prevented the development of advanced American advanced bases, was advantageous to Japan and disadvantageous to the United States If Japan had proposed anything regarding naval fortifications, there was a possibility the current agreement would be changed to become less advantageous to Japan

The objective of the Imperial Japanese Navy for the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 was to achieve a better ratio against the United States Navy than 60 per cent, desirably 70 per cent For this purpose, naval members

58 NIDS, Navy Documents, ①Gunbi Gun-syu-ku 112, “Gunbi Seigen ni Kansuru Kenkyū (Studies of Naval Disarmament)”, 49-51

of the delegation considered close co-operation with Britain was desirable.59But, the Geneva Naval Conference ended in failure because of Anglo-American disagreement over the cruisers question The United States required heavy cruisers capable of transoceanic passage for operations against Japan across the Pacific, whereas Britain demanded a large number of smaller cruisers to defend its bases and colonies spread around the world.60 These two requirements were incompatible

After the Geneva Naval Conference, the Imperial Japanese Navy continued studies of naval disarmament On 15 December 1927, it established

a new committee chaired by Vice-Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō to discuss naval disarmaments This Nomura committee mainly consisted of successors

to Katō Tomosaburō, naval officers who considered naval disarmament treaties were necessary to avoid a war: Yamanashi Katsunoshin, Kobayashi Seizō, Sakonji Seizō and Iwamura Seiichi This committee submitted a final report to the Minister of the Navy, Okada Keisuke, in September 1928 It was written on the understanding that the Washington Treaties were on the whole strategically and financially advantageous to Japan It reported how to defend Japan under existing conditions What is interesting is that this committee supposed the Royal Navy as well as the United States Navy to be its hypothetical enemies It was written at the beginning that: “The principal supposed enemy of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the United States Navy

59 Tadashi Kuramatsu, “Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921-1936”, in Ian Gow, Yoichi Hirama and John Chapman (eds.), The History

of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 Volume Three: The Military

Dimention (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2003), p.131

60 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.112