This study deals with Japanese perceptions of the British Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” in the period between the two world wars.. Nevertheless, as yet, there
Trang 1Introduction
On 8 December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army landed in Singora,
Patani and Kota Bahru in the Malay Peninsula Two days later, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk by Japanese bombers in the South China
Sea On 15 February 1942, Singapore fell into Japanese hands The Malaya Campaign ended in tremendous disaster for Britain But why did the Japanese attack British Malaya and Singapore? How did the Japanese plan and prepare for attacking British Malaya and Singapore? And, how did the Japanese perceive the Singapore Base before the Second World War?
This study deals with Japanese perceptions of the British Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” in the period between the two world wars In this period, relations between Japan and Britain turned from allies to enemies There are a large number of studies on the British side history of the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” These studies have searched for reasons as to how the fall of Singapore and
the sinking of HMS Price of Wales and HMS Repulse happened primarily by
using western sources Nevertheless, as yet, there has been no study of how the Japanese perceived the British Singapore Naval Base and the British
“Singapore Strategy” during the period from the Washington Conference 1921/22 to the outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941, with the exception of Ikeda Kiyoshi’s short article, “The
Trang 2Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain 1922-41”.1 Consequently, there are serious gaps in studies of the history of these areas between the British side and the Japanese side As a result, we do not know the full story of how the Japanese perceived the naval base, how Japan prepared and made plans to attack British Malaya and Singapore, and why Japan attacked British Malaya and Singapore The purpose of this study is to fill these gaps by studying the history from Japanese side primarily using Japanese sources
There are four reasons explaining why there are these gaps The first reason is that, for most Japanese, the Second World War was principally a war against the United States and China Even the fall of Singapore and the sinking
of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, which inflicted tremendous
impacts on the British Empire, were minor events, compared with the impact
of the Pearl Harbour attack, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan’s final defeat in August 1945 Japanese historians who study Japanese history have explained the origin of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region by giving domestic reasons: how militarism came to control the government and its policies Historians who study international history have explained the origin(s) by examining American-Japanese relations2 or Sino-Japanese relations3 Japanese historians tend to neglect
1 Kiyoshi Ikeda “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain, 1922-41”, in T.G Fraser and Peter Lowe (eds.), Conflict and Amity in East Asia: Essays in Honour of Ian Nish (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp.30-46
2 Akira Iriye, After Imperialism (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1965), etc Iriye Akira’s work contributed tremendously to the history of American-Japanese relations
3 Katusmi Usui, Nitchū Gaikō Shi: Hokubatsu no Jidai (Diplomatic History between Japan and China: The Era of Northern Expedition) (Tokyo: Hanawa Shōbō, 1971); Motoei Satō, Shōwa Shoki tai Chūgoku Seisaku no Kenkyū:
Trang 3British factors The second reason is that historians who study Anglo-Japanese relations have focused their interests on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance4 or conflict between the two Empires in China.5 The third reason is that those who study the history of the Singapore Naval Base and the “Singapore Strategy” tend to limit their scope to the British side history by using Western sources, searching for the reason(s) why and how Britain was easily defeated
by Japan in Malaya and Singapore.6 The fourth reason is that there were a great number of conflicts or reasons of conflicts between Japan and other countries in the period between the two world wars: Japanese militarism, Chinese nationalism, internal wars between warlords in China, discrimination against Japanese Americans in California, the spread of Communism in China, the clash of interests among powers in China, the changing political situation
on the European Continent and the Soviet Union’s Revolutionary Diplomacy Compared with these, so far, the Singapore Naval Base has not acquired the Japanese historian’s interest
(Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003)
4 Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23
(London: Athlone Press, 1972), etc Ian Nish’s work illuminated the history of Anglo-Japanese relations greatly
5 Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995); Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002)
6 James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); W David
McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 19191-1942
(London: Macmillan Press, 1979); Ian Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981)
Trang 4This study is the first approach to examine the history of the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” from the Japanese point of view In English speaking countries, some believe that Japan had prepared to attack British Malaya and Singapore for many years Others suppose that Japan made the plan to attack Singapore from scratch just before the war However, so far, Japanese perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy” have been unexplored
More specifically, this study examines the following questions First: how did the Japanese government, especially the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army, perceive the Singapore Naval Base and the British “Singapore Strategy”? Second: how did the Japanese commercial mass media - newspapers, magazines and books - perceive and discuss the Singapore Naval Base? Third: when and how did the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff make operational plans to attack British Malaya and Singapore? And, fourth: why did the Japanese attack British Malaya and Singapore?
This introduction is followed by four chapters and a conclusion Chapter 1 examines policies of the Japanese government - the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army-towards the Singapore Naval Base from the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936 Chapter 2 considers the views of the Singapore Naval Base as expressed in the Japanese commercial publishing media Chapter 3 examines the Japanese south-bound policies from 1936 to 1940 In particular, it analyses the history of two different but related aspects First, why the Imperial Japanese Navy proposed
Trang 5the south-bound policy and how it became the national policy? Second, when and how the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff made operational plans to attack British Malaya and Singapore? Chapter 4 deals with the period from the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe in September 1939 to the outbreak of the war in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941 and examines the following aspects First, why Japan attacked British Malaya and Singapore? Second, how the Japanese conducted final preparations to attack British Malaya and Singapore?
Historical Background
The history of Anglo-Japanese relations in the Modern period could
be traced back to the Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854 When Japan ended its seclusion and opened its doors to the rest of the world, it was the height of the Victorian Age The Japanese looked upon Britain as the symbol of modernisation and the Western civilisation To become a country like Britain and gain equality with Western powers became Japan’s national objectives The Imperial Japanese Navy was constructed on the example and teaching of the Royal Navy while the Imperial Japanese Army was constructed on the example and teaching of the German Army When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was ratified in 1902, the Japanese rejoiced over the news They considered their dreams had come true Japan became a country which could associate with Britain on equal terms From 1902 to the Washington Conference in 1921/22, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the pillar of Japanese
Trang 6diplomatic and military policies
After Japan checked Russian south-bound advancement by winning the Russo-Japanese War in 1904/05, Japan became the leading naval power in the western Pacific Consequently, the two rising Pacific naval powers, Japan and the United States, faced each other over the Pacific As a result, the American fears of Japan heightened Both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Navy started regarding each other as their future hypothetical enemies At that time there was also a racial issue between them Japanese immigrants in California faced racial discrimination In 1906, Japanese children were segregated in special schools in San Francisco The Japanese at home were disappointed by the discrimination against their fellows in California As a result, the seeds of Japanese-American antagonism were planted The Americans also began to look at the Anglo-Japanese Alliance suspiciously because they found the United States stood between Japan and Britain From Russia, Japan took over Lushun, Dalian and the South Manchuria Railway by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 To defend the South Manchuria Railway, Japan gained the right to station its forces Accordingly, the Imperial Japanese Army deployed its force to protect Japanese interests in Manchuria From then onwards, defending Japanese interests in Manchuria against Russia became the most important objective of the Imperial Japanese Army Its force stationed in Manchuria was named as the Kwangtun Army in
1919 To formalise its post-Russo-Japanese War defence policies, Japan
enacted its national defence policy, the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin (Imperial National Defence Policy), for the first time in 1907 In the Teikoku Kokubō
Trang 7Hōshin, Russia was singled out as Japan’s principal hypothetical enemy The
United States, Germany, and France were also included in the hypothetical enemies list The Imperial Japanese Army would make defence preparations against Russia while the Imperial Japanese Navy would make defence preparations against the United States Britain was the ally
The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 greatly facilitated the transfer of the American fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific That year, the First World War broke out Japan entered the First World War on the Allies side, in which it attacked and occupied German leased territory in the Shandong Peninsula In 1915, Japan expressed its ambition to China by addressing Twenty-One Demands, which raised suspicion of the United States and Britain against Japan After the First World War, Japan participated in the Versailles Conference as one of five great powers At the Versailles Conference, the League of Nations was established The Japanese delegates to the conference proposed a racial equality clause to be inserted into the League
of Nations Charter However, it was rejected by the United States and delegates from the British Empire The Japanese were disillusioned by this They realised it was not easy to be accepted by Western powers as an equal partner On the other hand, Japanese support for Indian independence movements further aggravated Anglo-Japanese relations Japanese nationalists, such as Tōyama Mitsuru, Ucida Ryōhei and Ōkawa Shūmei, sheltered and encouraged Indian seditionists, such as Rashbehari Bose Britain was
Trang 8dissatisfied with this.7 The efficacy of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance declined
as a result of these events Mutual suspicions between Japan and the Western powers were growing during the First World War However, in Japan, affection for Britain still remained, especially within the Imperial Japanese Navy, even though it became weaker For the British, the external powers in the Asia-Pacific region which had the capability to impose threats on the British Empire were Japan and the United States An Anglo-American war was an unlikely possibility But the Japanese intention was unclear The British Dominions in the Pacific-Australia and New Zealand-wanted a security policy because they anticipated the possibility that Japan would invade them The British government had to present a plan to reassure its Dominions
The British government decided to build a new naval base in Singapore on 16 June 1921 The British strategic intention was that, if any conflict should break out in the Asia-Pacific region, Britain would send its fleet from Europe-home waters or the Mediterranean-to the Asia-Pacific region to defend its Empire there This fleet required a naval base in the Asia-Pacific region, otherwise it could not operate there Singapore, which stood between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, was chosen as a place to build the naval base for this fleet This British plan to send a fleet from Europe to Singapore to defend its Empire from the Japanese threat has been called the
“Singapore Strategy” Until 1924, however, the British government did not set
7 Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp.184-185, p.241; Harumi Goto-Shibata,
“Internationalism and nationalism: Anti-Western sentiments in Japanese foreign policy debates, 1918-22”, in Naoko Shimazu (ed.), Nationalisms in Japan (London: Routledge, 2006), p 70
Trang 9about constructing the base Since the end of the First World War, all defence spending of Britain, including the construction plan of the Singapore Naval Base, was controlled by the “Ten Year Rule” It stated that the services should base their plans on the assumption there would be no major war for ten years.8
From 12 November 1921 to 6 February 1922, the Washington Conference took place among countries which had interests in the Asia-Pacific region to discuss naval disarmament and bring stability to East Asia In the Washington Conference, three major treaties were enacted The Washington Treaty commonly known as the Five-Power Treaty determined capital ships9ratio between the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy as 10:10:6:3.5:3.5 Article 19 of the Washington Treaty prohibited the United States from strengthening fortifications in Guam and the Philippines, Britain in Hong Kong but allowed strengthening fortifications and establishing new bases in Hawaii and Singapore The Four-Power Treaty was a treaty for mutual agreement of territorial rights in the Pacific between the United States, Britain, Japan and France The Nine-Power Treaty affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China between all participants in the Washington Conference: the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands Portugal and China The Washington Conference cleared mutual suspicion between Japan and the United States to some degree But the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated at the Washington Conference Japan
Trang 10and Britain were no longer allies
Generally, the Japanese government attempted to keep good relations
with Britain and the United States in the 1920s by the Shidehara Gaikō
(Shidehara Diplomacy) Shidehara Kijūrō served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs twice: from June 1924 to April 1927 and from July 1929 to December
1931 His policies, known as the Shidehara Gaikō, emphasised cooperation
with Britain, the United States and China rather than military means to further Japan’s economic interest However, in 1924, the Japanese American issue re-erupted with the Alien Immigration Act It substantially excluded Japanese immigrants from American citizenship The Japanese public were infuriated by the American treatment of their fellows in California In China in the 1920s, as Chinese nationalism gained support from the Chinese people, relations between Chinese people and Japanese residents in China became strained As American-Japanese relations and Sino-Japanese relations became strained, the
Shidehara Gaikō was losing the support of the Japanese people However,
compared with Sino-Japanese relations and American-Japanese relations, Anglo-Japanese relations in the 1920s were stable Even though there were several seeds of conflict between the two countries, they did not develop into buds They were the white Australia policy, export of Japanese cotton goods to India, and economic competition in China
The Japanese public was first informed of the British plan to establish
a new naval base in Singapore in May 1923 when the British Parliament discussed the budget for the base In March 1924, soon after site preparation began in Sembawang in Singapore, the Labour Government announced the
Trang 11cancellation of the project The debate for the project in Britain resumed when the Conservatives returned to power in November that year, but even after that, the British government did little until Anglo-Japanese antagonism became clearer in 1932 The construction of the Singapore Naval Base hardly progressed during the 1920s Throughout the 1920s, the base was no more than a construction site The “Singapore Strategy” was mostly for securing Dominion loyalties to the British Empire by promising to protect them by establishing the Singapore Base, rather than an actual defence strategy for securing the British Empire from Japanese attack The Japanese threat in the Asia-Pacific region was not imminent for most British
In September 1931, there was the Manchuria Incident When considering international relations in East Asia in the period between the two world wars, the Manchuria Incident was a watershed It became clearer that Japanese interest in China and the Chinese Nationalist movements was incompatible In January 1932, conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces broke out in Shanghai: the centre of the British sphere of interest in China It was the Shanghai Incident After that, British distrust of Japan was heightened Until then, the Japanese sphere of interest in Manchuria and the British sphere
of interest in the Yangtze valley had been separated and coexisted together But Japan’s mobilisation of forces in the area Britain regarded as its sphere of interest aggravated British feelings As a result of the Manchuria Incident and the Shanghai Incident, the British government decided to abolish the “Ten Year Rule” in March 1932 and accelerated the construction of the base
On 1 March 1932, Manchukuo was established But the League of
Trang 12Nations did not approve the establishment of Manchukuo To protest the non-recognition of Manchukuo, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in March 1933 In a press conference on 17 April 1934, Amō Eiji, a spokesman
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China, may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations: but it must be realised that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.”10 This became notorious in China, the United States and Britain Thus relations between Japan and the Anglo-American powers further deteriorated The United States and Britain perceived it as a declaration of “Asia Monroe Doctrine” However, it is doubtful whether the Japanese government had any unified national policy on China at that time
In 1936, Japan regarded Britain as one of the hypothetical enemies in
its national defence policy for the first time in its history In the Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin of 1936, Britain was listed as the fourth hypothetical enemy,
following the United States, the Soviet Union and China In July 1937, the Sino-Japanese War broke out, which spread to Shanghai and Nanjing later that year In February 1938, the Singapore Naval Base was formally opened In September 1939, the Second World War broke out in Europe In May and June
1940, Germany conquered the Low Countries and France Consequently, a power vacuum was generated in the French and Dutch colonies of Southeast
10 Gendaishi Shiryō, Dai 8 Kan,Nitchū Sensō 1 (Documents on Modern History, Vol.8, Sino-Japanese War 1) (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1964), p.27
Trang 13Asia In June 1940, after the fall of France, the Imperial Japanese Army started regarding Singapore seriously as its military target for the first time The situation in Europe gave Japan the opportunity of a war against Britain, France and the Netherlands as a way of seizing control over rich natural resources in their colonies The Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region broke out on
8 December 1941 with simultaneous Japanese attack on British Malaya, the
Philippines and Hawaii Two days later, two British capital ships, HMS Prince
of Wales and HMS Repulse, were sunk by Japanese bombers in the South
China Sea Singapore fell into Japanese hands on 15 February 1942 The British “Singapore Strategy” ended in total disaster for the British
Previous Studies
The authority on Anglo-Japanese relations, Ian Nish, once wrote:
“Clearly the building of the base reflected a lack of confidence in Britain’s relation with Japan but it is doubtful if ordinary Japanese, as distinct from naval lobbyists, saw much that was sinister in its dilatory construction during the 1920s”.11 However, some historical facts contradict this conclusion After the British Parliament’s discussion over the construction of a new naval base
in Singapore, the Japanese public expressed concern about the base Japanese newspapers reporting the British Parliament’s discussion showed regret in
11 Ian Nish “Echoes of Alliance, 1920-30”, in Ian Nish and Yōichi Kibata (eds.)
The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations,Vol 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), p.271
Trang 14their leaders For instance, the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun wrote on 23 May 1923,
“The establishment of the naval base is therefore, as explained in the House of Commons by Mr Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, does not conflict with the Treaty in legal point of view But is the establishment of powerful base in the Pacific only one year after the Naval Treaty was signed in accordance with
the spirit of the Treaty?” in a leader titled “Ayaururu Kafu Jōyaku No Seishin
(The Spirit of the Washington Treaty is in Danger)” All other newspapers expressed similar opinions
With regard to Japanese naval history and naval disarmament conferences in the period between the two world wars, Asada Sadao made great contributions to the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy and American-Japanese naval history He has continued publishing studies on naval disarmaments and the origin of the Pacific War from the viewpoint of naval history In these works, Asada has focused on the Imperial Japanese Navy’s perceptions of naval disarmaments treaties and the relations between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States He pointed out that the internal conflict between the “treaty faction” and the “fleet faction” within the Imperial Japanese Navy could be traced back to the differences of opinions against the Washington Treaty between two Katōs: Admiral Katō Tomosaburō and Vice-Admiral Katō Kanji.12
12 Sadao Asada, Ryōtaisenkan no Nichi-Bei Kankei: Kaigun to Seisaku Kettei Katei (Japanese-American Relations between the Wars: Naval Policy and Decision-Making Process) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993); Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Sadao Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays (Columbia and
Trang 15Asada stated that, since the Washington Conference, two rival groups emerged within the Imperial Japanese Navy The first group was the group of naval officers who considered Japanese acceptance of the Washington Treaty, which enforced the 10:10:6 capital ships ratio between the United States, Britain and Japan, was necessary to avoid war against the United States and to save Japan from financial bankruptcy This group consisted of Katō Tomosaburō and his successors: Yamanashi Katsunoshin, Nomura Kichisaburō, Kobayashi Seizō, Sakonji Seizō and Iwamura Seiichi Most of them had long working experience in the Ministry of the Navy The second group was the group of officers who considered that at least 70 per cent naval forces ratio against the United States was necessary to defend Japan from the United States Accordingly, this group opposed the 60 per cent capital ships ratio at the Washington Conference This group consisted of Katō Kanji and his successors: Suetsugu Nobumasa and Takahashi Sankichi They were staff officers who worked for the Navy General Staff The former group was called the “treaty faction” and the latter group was called the “fleet faction” after the First London Naval Conference in 1930 when the division between these two groups became clearer After the “fleet faction” won the power struggle between these two rival groups, it negated naval disarmaments in the Second London Naval Conference in 1935 American-Japanese relations deteriorated
by this negation and defiant policies carried out by the “fleet faction” By analysing the conflict between the “treaty faction” and the “fleet faction”
London: University of Missouri Press, 2007)
Trang 16within the Imperial Japanese Navy and how it affected American-Japanese naval relations, Asada’s works greatly contributed to the understanding of Japanese naval history and Japanese-American naval history However, his works did not cover how the Imperial Japanese Navy perceived Britain
Among several works which dealt with Anglo-Japanese relations, Ikeda Kiyoshi, in his short article, “The Road to Singapore: Japan’s View of Britain 1922-41”, touched on how the Imperial Japanese Navy perceived Britain in the period between the two world wars He was a former naval officer, a Sub-Lieutenant at the end of the Second World War who subsequently became an historian afterwards He claimed that the turning point of Anglo-Japanese relations in the period between the two world wars was 1936 In 1936, the Imperial Japanese Navy started regarding Britain as its hypothetical enemy Before that, although the “fleet faction” regarded both Britain and the United States as its hypothetical enemies, the “treaty faction” took the leadership of the Imperial Japanese Navy Therefore, the Imperial Japanese Navy, as an organisation, did not regard Britain as its hypothetical enemy Ikeda also pointed out that the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the enforced inferior ships ratio of 10:10:6 between the United States, Britain and Japan at the Washington Conference, and the construction of the Singapore Naval Base were manipulated in Japan as symbols to arouse anti-British feeling in the second half of the 1930s
Ikeda discussed briefly the relations between the anti-British feeling
and the construction of the Singapore Naval Base in his book, Kaigun to Nihon (Navy and Japan) He maintained that traditionally there was a strong
Trang 17pro-British feeling in the Imperial Japanese Navy However, anti-Anglo-American feeling rose after the First World War In Japan, there was resentment against the rejection of the racial equality proposal at the Versailles Conference and the treaties enacted at the Washington Conference What offended radical young officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy most was the fact that, right after the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain started constructing the Singapore Naval Base The Japanese who did not have
a long experience of association with the Western world and attached great
importance to girininjō (duty, honour, and obligations) regarded the Singapore
Naval Base as “Anglo-Saxon betrayal”13 For English readers, he summarised
what he claimed in Kaigun to Nihon in an article “Japanese Strategy and the
Pacific War, 1941-5”.14 He wrote: “Anti-British feeling among Japanese had been growing since the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1923 One cause of this feeling was the intense Japanese concern over Britain’s policy of fortifying the naval base at Singapore Japanese people in general kept Singapore under very close scrutiny as Britain started the construction of that base, a development which often made headlines in the Japanese press.”15
In the book Gaigun to Nihon, Ikeda Kiyoshi listed several things as factors for
anti-British feelings in Japan, but in this article, he mentioned only the construction of the Singapore Naval Base
15 Ibid., p.127