The japanese road to singapore japanese perceptions of the singapore naval base, 1921 41 2

I would like to express my gratitude to librarians and archivists of following libraries and archives in Japan, Britain and Singapore: the Library of the National Institute of Defense St

Acknowledgements

It is my great pleasure to express my gratitude for people who supported me while preparing this thesis If there is something good in this thesis, it is due to their help while all mistakes and shortcomings are entirely mine First and foremost, my greatest debt is to my supervisor, Associate Professor Brian Farrell He gave me invaluable comments and suggestions since I first sent him an e-mail from Japan five years ago I would also like to express deep gratitude to my co-supervisors: Associate Professor Teow See Heng and Associate Professor Malcolm Murfett At various stages, they gave me encouragements, support and advices I am grateful to Mr Peter Lugg for proof-reading this thesis, to Ms Kelly Lau, a management officer of Department of History, for giving me help and support since I came to Singapore, and to Professor Hirama Yōichi and Associate Professor Ito Shinya for kindly replying to my questions via e-mails Thanks are also due to my friends in Singapore Without them, it was impossible for me to complete this thesis In particular, I wish to convey thanks to Zhang Jing, Orihara Minami, Grace Mak, Hu Wen, and Ho Chi Tim

I would like to express my gratitude to librarians and archivists of following libraries and archives in Japan, Britain and Singapore: the Library of the National Institute of Defense Studies of the Japanese Ministry of Defense,

Academy in Yokosuka, the National Archives in Kew, the Library of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, and the Central Library and the Chinese Library of National University of Singapore In particular, I would like to mention Mr Kitazawa Noritaka, a former archivist of the Library of the National Institute of Defense Studies, who helped me to locate documents which I needed, and Ms Tham Wai Fong, a librarian of the Chinese Library of National University of Singapore, who always gave me support and help

My study in Singapore and researches in Japan and Britain was supported by NUS Research Scholarship Without this scholarship, it was impossible for to complete this thesis

YAMAMOTO FUMIHITO

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements i

Summary vi

List of Abbreviations viii

Introduction 1

Historical Background 5

Previous Studies 13

Japanese Military Organisations 29

Chapter 1

Japan, Britain, the Singapore Naval Base

and Naval Disarmaments 1921-36 35

Preparation for the Washington Conference 36

The Washington Conference and the Article 19 of the Washington Treaty 43 The Aftermath of the Washington Conference 56

Chapter 2

The Singapore Naval Base and the Japanese Public 90

The First Perceptions of the Singapore Naval Base 94

Cancellation of the Plan 100

Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy over the Singapore Naval Base 106

The Singapore Naval Base in the Japanese Public in the late 1920s 112 The Vogue of War Scare Literature and the Singapore Naval Base 121

The Singapore Naval Base in Anti-British Movements 131

Conclusion 140

Chapter 3

The Origin of the Plan to Attack Singapore 143

The Origin of the South-bound policies 146

Revising Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin 157

Advocates of South-bound Policies 160

Evolution of Operation Plans to Attack Singapore 1936-1940 165

Conclusion 191

Chapter 4

The Road to Singapore 197

Influence of the European War on Japan 198

The Road to the War 227

The Army’s Preparations to Attack Singapore 251

Conclusion 267

Conclusion 272

Bibliography 293

Appendices 320

Maps 326

Summary

The British government decided to establish the Singapore Naval Base to defend its Eastern Empire from Japan in June 1921 Until 1939, however, Japan did not have any plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore Throughout the period between the two world wars, the Japanese Navy did not examine seriously any plan to attack Singapore from the sea side The origin

of the plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore was an operational plan against Britain included in the “Annual Army’s Operational Plan for 1939” designed by the Japanese Army In this plan, the Japanese Army would land in Singora in southern Thailand, go down the Malay Peninsula, and attack Singapore from the land side From the very beginning, the Japanese Army considered attacking Singapore from the land side

From the Washington Conference in 1921/22 to 1936, the Japanese Navy had a unifying view on the Singapore Naval Base It was not desirable but acceptable on the condition that Britain agreed to Article 19 of the Washington Treaty which prohibited the United States from establishing naval bases in Guam and the Philippines For the Japanese Navy which regarded the United States as its only hypothetical enemy, prohibiting American bases in Guam and the Philippines was far more important than the British Singapore Naval Base With the termination of the Washington Treaty, the Japanese Navy lost its reason to accept the Singapore Naval Base in 1936

In 1939, the Japanese Army drew up its first substantial operational plan to attack British Malaya and Singapore However, it was not until

Germany dominated European continent in May and June 1940 that the Japanese Army examined a possibility of attacking Singapore seriously

Mesmerised by the German Blitzkrieg, the Japanese Army turned its eyes to

the south for the first time in its history For the Japanese Army, which had regarded the Soviet Union as its principal hypothetical enemy, it was a complete turnabout in its policy It supposed that it could capture natural resources areas in Southeast Asia concurrent with German attack on Britain But Britain drove the Germans back by the Battle of Britain

The traditional policy of the Japanese Army against the Soviet Union

revived when the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet

Union on 22 June 1941 Suddenly, a great chance to attack the Soviet Union came Accordingly, the Japanese Army mobilised its force to Manchuria to prepare war against the Soviet Union But on 9 August, the Japanese Army judged that it would be impossible to finish war against the Soviet Union by the coming winter Rather, it would be better to use the coming winter to capture natural resources in the south to prepare war against the Soviet Union which, the Japanese Army supposed, might happen in the spring of 1942 The primary reason why the Japanese Army considered it would be necessary to attack British Malaya and Singapore was to capture natural resources the Japanese Army needed to prosecute war against the Soviet Union

List of Abbreviations

BBKS: Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshibu (The Military History Department,

the Agency of Defence), Japan

DRO: Diplomatic Record Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan MOFA: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

NIDS: Library, the National Institution of Defense Studies, the Ministry of

Defense, Japan

NGB: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents Series)

TNA: The National Archives, Kew, UK