Forging a regional security community a study of the driving forces behind ASEAN and east asian regionalism 2

A possible rise of a regional security community in East Asia should be approached by combining the insights of both the Deutschian and constructivist perspectives.. According to Fawce

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

Synopsis

The basic goal of forging a regional security community (SC) is to prevent

wars among its members, an unconventional but timely aspiration given the

dangers inherent in an age of weapons of mass destruction The security

community notion is closely related to the concepts of political integration

and regionalism The Deutschian security community is one where its members have become integrated, through deepening socio-economic and political transactions, such that the threat of war among them becomes

unthinkable Its two core features are a common ‘we-feeling’ identity, and a

‘non-war’ community among its members This study re-examines these two

core criteria to analyze the main driving forces behind the rise of security

regionalism in East Asia The Cold War antagonisms enhanced the dominance of realism and reduced the attractiveness of the Deutschian model

for scholarly research from the 1960s to the mid-1990s In 1998, Emanuel

Adler and Michael Barnett revived interest in security community studies by

taking a constructivist approach, focusing on the role of norm-socialization of

peaceful interstate behaviour and identity building among elites in the forging

of security communities Since then, other constructivist scholars have applied the security community concept to examine its relevance for East

Asia The rise of a security community in Western Europe in the post-World

War Two era was the result of both material (fundamental changes in the

distribution of power at the regional and global systems) and ideational factors In the former category would include the fear among European elites

of the region’s marginalization with the rise of the two superpowers, and the

threat of Soviet expansionism The ideational determinants would include a

new, strong determination among a remarkable group of visionary European

elites of the need for political reconciliation leading to European unity and

political integration, especially between France and Germany A possible

rise of a regional security community in East Asia should be approached by

combining the insights of both the Deutschian and constructivist perspectives

Both material and ideational factors are important in giving us a more comprehensive understanding of the unique dynamics of the evolution of security regionalism in different regions of the world

2.1 Introduction

What is still missing in Asian community building is a common set of political values Asian governments exemplify every category of governance known to the modern world They range from democracy to dictatorship, from transparency to secrecy, from efficiency to near- paralysis, from dedication to the public good to outright exploitation….Until these gaps are significantly narrowed, a true East Asian Community is beyond reach.1

Regionalism has over the past twenty years seen a surge of renewed interest in different parts of the world The regionalist phenomenon is the result of a number of inter-related developments According to Fawcett and Hurrell, these factors include:

the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the Cold War alliance

systems; the recurrent fears over the stability of the GATT and the

multilateral trading order during the long drawn out negotiation of

the Uruguay Round; the impact of increasing economic integration

and globalization; changed attitudes towards economic development

in many parts of the developing world; and the impact of democracy

and democratization.”2

Over the past half century, the regionalist project is often the result of push-and-pull factors, as national leaders calculate the costs and benefits of forging closer regional economic, political and security cooperation How then do we conceptualize regionalism? Most observers would agree that Western Europe today has the most advanced form of a regional security community Is the European model applicable

1 Ellen Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p

199

2 Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell eds Regionalism in World Politics: Regional

Organization and International Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p 1,

cited in Kjell A Eliassen and Catherine Borve Arnesen, “Comparison of European and Southeast Asian Integration”, in Mario Telo ed European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era,

England: Ashgate publishing limited, 2007, p 204

to East Asia, and if so, to what extent? What are the similarities and variations between the European and East Asian forms of regional integration? How should these regional variations be explained?

Regionalism and national integration are closely linked They represent different stages in a spectrum involving the development of states in an anarchical international system Regionalism is a higher order form of political integration compared with the latter Intuitively, regional integration can take place only after potential members have achieved a level of state and nation building Only self-confident and strong states are in a position to begin the process of establishing a genuine and durable security community Weak or ‘failing states’ are unlikely to have the resources or the political will to successfully meet the rigorous demands necessary to forge a security community The notion of a security community starts from an assumption that states are the major driving force in shaping the international system From a state-centric approach, many government elites in the post-colonial multi-ethnic states in East Asia are still grappling with the delicate task of state- and nation-building, that is, the forging of a ‘strong state’ Unlike their counterparts in Western Europe, many East Asian states have still not become integrated into stable, self-confident entities with a strong sense of national identity and cohesion.3 In contrast, West European states have moved beyond the post-Westphalian stage of national socio-economic and political development.4

3 Benjamin Miller has argued that the “state-to-nation balance” and the level of state

strength affect its “war proneness” See his States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007

Hence, sovereignty remains an

4 Richard Cooper, “Worldwide Regional Integration: is there an Optimal Size of the

Integrated Area?” in Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, eds., Asia Pacific Regionalism, Pymble: Harper Educational, ANU, 1994

obsession for most East Asian states This is one factor we need to bear in mind as

we ponder the question of why sovereign states would want to come together to forge regional community-building and institutions: what are the driving forces, their motivations? A general answer can be seen in the explanation offered by Craig Synder: “Throughout the history of the twentieth century, states have looked to their immediate and near neighbours as well as key external or regional powers as potential sources of threat or of protection.”5

In terms of a theoretical framework, the idea of a ‘security community’ (SC) runs counter to the dominant school of realism The realist perspective in IR argues that war is an inherent part of inter-state relations given an anarchical international system Advocates of the security community idea disagree: they argue that pacific feelings and preferences can be learned so that states will realize that it is ultimately

in their self-interest to turn away from the use of armed violence Supporters of the

SC idea see it as a unique pathway to eliminate war from inter-state relations

It is clear that state actors play a major role in driving and thereby determining the nature and dynamics of regionalism

From the earliest times, tribes and then states have fought and destroyed one another, thereby helping to shape the political contours of the world Two thousand four hundred years ago, the ancient Greek strategist Thucydides wrote about the

Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta, an account which inspired modern

Realist thought in International Relations.6

5 Craig S Synder, Contemporary Security and Strategy, New York: Palgrave

MacMillan, 2008, p 227

In the non-Western world, the ancient

Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote a timeless manual on the Art of War, that is, on how

6 Joseph S Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and

History Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2006 (6th edition)

to defeat your enemy and stay in power The ancient Indian strategist Kautilya7

From a realist perspective, the notion of a “security community” would appear

to be misplaced For a long time, scholars have speculated about how war can be minimized or eliminated from international relations There is no shortage of ideas Such ideas have ranged from setting up a liberal-Kantian ‘World Federation of Free States’

is remembered today for his quotation, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” The two most catastrophic wars in human history, World War One and World War Two, occurred in Europe basically because of bitter national and imperialistic rivalries for global dominance and hegemony among the European Powers The resulting destruction of Europe was, however, largely self-inflicted

8

to using Balance of Power mechanisms like military alliances to deter potential enemies from committing aggression, the “democratic peace” thesis9 (that democracies do not wage war against one another), to the notion by Karl Deutsch and his associates of a “non-war” security community where war among its member-states

is unthinkable.10

The implication here is that these states had a history of

7 Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society: An Introduction to the Study

of International Relations, London and New York: Continuum Books, 2000 (2nd

edition)

8 John O’Neal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of

Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organisations”, 1885-1992”, World Politics 52 (1) October 1999: 1-37

9 Sorpong Peou, “Security community-building in the Asia-Pacific” in William T Tow

ed Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp 145-46

10 Karl Deutsch et al Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International

Organization in the light of historical experience Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1957

interstate conflicts and war, and now want to turn away from war towards durable peace

As states are the key driving force behind the evolution of a security community, it is important to note that ‘regime-type’ would be a relevant factor to consider According to Sorpong Peou, “the type of ‘state-centric’ groups that collaborate to form regional security communities is a critical aspect of overall international security politics.”11 There are three distinct groups of states that may bind for security cooperation: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.12 Hobbesian states are prone to forge alliances of ‘collective-defence’; states are assumed to exist in the

‘state of nature’, and only the ‘fittest’ states survive Military power remains the most important means of national security and balance-of-power or military-alliance systems the basic mechanism for ensuring national survival.13

11 Peou 2009 op cit., p 146 The points made in this paragraph are adapted from Peou’s

chapter

Contemporary North Korea is arguably a Hobbesian state; it faces an acute security dilemma from internal state weakness and what Pyongyang calls the ‘US threat’ Alternatively, states may form Lockean collective-security regimes: here, states have a more relaxed view of their national security They do not treat each other as enemies, but as partners who are capable of entering into social contracts with each other to enhance their common prosperity Lockean states ‘are less anxious about their national survival and thus more secure than those under Hobbesian anarchy They also tend to be pro-status quo and only respond to others’ threats defensively…The collective-security regime rests upon the preponderance of collective power exercised by members of the

12 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1999; cited in Peou 2009, p 147

13 Peou 2009 op cit., p 147

international community.14 ASEAN in the early 21st century can plausibly be regarded as a regional grouping of Lockean states In contrast, Kantian states “can go beyond forming collective-defence and collective-security regimes to construct

‘security communities’ States instead see one another as ‘friends’ or ‘team players’ whose collective norms – namely, non-violence and altruism – guide their mutual relations.”15

There is still no fail-proof way to eliminate interstate wars from international relations Yet in the nuclear age, the idea of eliminating interstate wars remains as relevant as ever It is in this sense that the ideas of Karl Deutsch, a US political scientist who fled Hitler’s Germany as a youth in the 1930s, of forging a security community becomes truly significant Deutsch and his associates asked a basic question in their 1957 study: why did the West European states stop fighting one another? A logical question arises: To what extent can the idea of a Deutschian security community be applied to the non-Western world? What are the driving forces and independent variables which affect the rise of a security community? Is it desirable and practical for East Asia to become integrated into such a regional security community?

The EU can be considered as an example of a Kantian community

In the post-Cold War era, the East Asian strategic environment is uncertain Both the driving forces of regional integration and fragmentation are present at the same time Whether East Asia will remain peaceful and stable will depend to a great extent on the complex interaction between these two broad driving forces On the one hand, there were initial fears in the early-1990s of a lessening of the US commitment

14 Peou 2009 op cit., p 147

15 Peou 2009 op cit., pp 147-48

to stay engaged in Asia, the implications posed by a ‘rising China’, North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, and tensions over Taiwan arising from attempts by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led pro-independence forces on the island from 2001 to early-2008 At the same time, the number of ASEAN-centered regional integration organizations has accelerated since the mid-1990s The Australian-initiated APEC was formed in 1989 to promote greater regional economic ties across the Asia-Pacific region In 1990, then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed an Asians-only East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) made its debut in 1994, the first and only Asia-wide regional security grouping The APT was formed in late-1997 in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis to promote greater intra-East Asian economic and financial cooperation in order to prevent a repetition of the financial crisis The first EAS summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in December 2005

There are, however, also signs of underlying great power tensions in the region, especially among the US, Japan, and China At the Shangri-La Dialogue held

in Singapore in June 2005, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld16 publicly raised concerns about China’s rapid military modernization, especially its focus on developing offensive power-projection capabilities China’s defense budget was reported to have increased by double-digit growth rates for the past fifteen years (up

to 2005) The Taiwan Issue17

17 See Christopher R Hughes, “China’s membership of the ARF and the emergence of an East Asian

diplomatic and security culture”, in Jurgen Haacke and Noel M Morada eds., Cooperative Security

in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, pp

54-71

few years, China-Japan relations have been soured by rising nationalist rivalry in both countries Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made it a point to make controversial annual pilgrimages to the Yasukuni Shrine (which honors Japan’s war-dead, including fourteen Class-A World War Two war criminals)

There are very fundamental conflicts between North and South Korea over the reunification issue.18 Basic Pyongyang-Tokyo disagreements exist over the abductees issue and the North Korea nuclear proliferation problem since 2002 There has been

no major progress at the Six-Party Talks (SPT) in Beijing The main reason for this failure is basic differences between the US and North Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions In October 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb It was only in 2007 that an agreement was reached in which Pyongyang again promised to stop its nuclear weapons program in exchange for US economic and technical aid For Stalinist North Korea, the development of nuclear weapons is an option that Pyongyang is unlikely to give up easily.19 The nuclear option is North Korea’s only bargaining tool Unless these intractable issues are sensitively managed by the Great Powers, it could escalate into war

18 The security challenges posed by the Korean Peninsula are covered in greater detail in Chapter Four

19 Marianne Hanson and Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Nuclear weapons: Asian case studies and global ramifications”,

in William T Tow ed., Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp 228-246

2.2 Aims of this Chapter

This chapter has a number of aims First, it will examine the meaning of key concepts like ‘region’, ‘regionness’, ‘East Asia’, ‘security’, ‘political community’, and

‘regionalism’, as well as the approaches to understanding regionalism and regional integration This is important to prevent confusion Second, it will analyze the concept of ‘security community’, especially the arguments of Deutsch, Adler/Barnett, and Acharya Third, the origins and the driving forces of post-World War Two European integration will be highlighted Fourth, it will evaluate the various international relations (IR) approaches to the understanding of the rise of regional security communities, that is, realism, liberalism, and constructivism Fifth, a conceptual framework will be proposed to analyze the rise of regional security communities in Western Europe and East Asia, highlighting their similarities and variations

2.3 Definition of key concepts: ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’

It is vital to be clear about what is being explained - processes of social or

economic regionalization; the growth of regional identity; the formation of

interstate regional institutions or state-promoted economic integration; or the

emergence of politically cohesive regional blocs…20

In the study of international relations, the concept of ‘region’ is contested The concept of ‘region’ can range from being a purely geographical concept to that of Ben Anderson’s ‘imagined community’.21

20 Andrew Hurrell 1998, cited in Jason Ralph, Beyond the Security Dilemma: Ending America’s Cold War, England: Ashgate, 2001, p 95

In the traditional meaning, the term ‘region’

21 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism

London and New York: Verso, 1983

denoted merely a geographical context without any links to political or policy relevance in the study of regionalism At a very basic level, a region is a group of states in geographical proximity to one another, as in the case of West European states like France and Germany on the European continent But geographical proximity is only one consideration In the post-Cold War era, the ideas of ‘region’ and

‘regionalism’ have become politicized; it now includes an ideational-political dimension Another criterion is that people and states need to have a common set of cultural values, social bonds and historical legacy For Katzenstein, ‘regions are social and cognitive constructs that are rooted in political practice’, while Pempel argues that ‘regions are fluid and complex mixtures of physical, psychological and behavioral traits continually being re-created and redefined.’22 Robert Jervis argues that a region (or system) can be defined as groups of interconnected states where a change in any relationship within the group will influence the others and where the region as a whole develops characteristics and behaviours that are distinct from those

of the individual states Louise Fawcett has pointed out that ‘regions’ are more than mere ‘territorial definition’, and should ‘incorporate commonality, interaction and hence the possibility of cooperation.’23 But ‘regions’ can also be socially-constructed Katzenstein argues that regions are ‘social and cognitive constructs that are rooted in political practice and are open to change’.24

22

Cited from Takashi Terada, “Japan and the evolution of Asian Regionalism: Responsible for three

normative transformations”, in Heribert Dieter, The Evolution of Asian Regionalism: Economic and Security Issues London and New York: Routledge, 2008: 59

Katzenstein sees a ‘region’ as a grouping

23 Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism from a historical perspective”, in Mary Farrell eds., Global Politics

of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, UK: Pluto Press, 2005, p 24

24 Cited in Craig Synder, Contemporary Security and Strategy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008

(second edition), p 228

of states that share a communal identity, not necessarily geographic proximity.25 The terms ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ are also being used as a political tool to define

‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ For example, in November 1990 Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the formation of an exclusively-Asian East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) which would comprise only geographically East Asian nations, and excluding Australia, New Zealand and the US Mahathir’s proposal arose in reaction to the formation of potentially exclusive trade blocs like the

EU and NAFTA Specifically, Mahathir’s EAEG proposal was an alternative to the US-led APEC (formed in 1989) Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi advocated in January 2002 for the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand as core members of an East Asian community with the aim of counter-balancing China’s growing influence in East Asia At the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit in December 2005, Australia, New Zealand and India were included as core members

In 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also proposed the establishment of a

‘concert of democracies’, together with India and Australia, again to counterbalance the rise of Chinese power in East Asia In contrast, Beijing regarded the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) to be its preferred vehicle to establish an East Asian community Within the APT, China would clearly be able to play a dominating role.26

In my view, there is a direct relationship between ‘regionalism’ and

‘integration’ Broadly, ‘regional integration’ involves intensive forms of regional, inter-state cooperation/interactions in the socio-cultural, economic, and political-security fields But ‘regionalism’ is something more than ‘regional integration’: it

25 Cited in Synder 2008, ibid p.228

26 Yu Hyun-Seok, “Explaining the emergence of new East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and

Interest-based approaches”, Asian Perspectives, 27 (1) 2003: 261-288; He Baogang, “East Asian ideas

involves a combination of ‘integration’ and, more importantly, a strong sense of

‘regional identity’ or regional bonding Here, the ideational-identity dimension of

‘regionalism’ is critical For example, in this study, East Asian regionalism involves both an enhancement of greater regional cooperation (from cultural, economic, to political-security fields) plus the forging of a strong sense of East Asian identity and solidarity, or what Karl Deutsch calls a ‘we-feeling’ community In this study,

‘regionalism’ is usually state-driven, but can also involve the activities of sector groups (a process known as ‘regionalization’) But in practice, many analysts tend to use ‘regionalism’ and ‘integration’ interchangeably

private-The ideas of ‘Europe’, ‘European integration’, ‘Asia’, and ‘Asian integration’ are contested.27 The key issues to be examined are: Is there a sense of regional identity in East Asia? Do the East Asian elites and mass publics share a common strategic vision? East Asian states have different responses and relationships with the

US, the world’s sole superpower

_

of regionalism: a normative critique”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58 (1) March 2004:

105-125

27 George Wiessala, The European Union and Asian Countries London and New York: Sheffield

Academic Press, 2002, pp 1-3 See also David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond,

International Organisation in World Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 (3rd edition),

pp 141-154 Hari Singh, “Hegemons and the Construction of Regions”, in Sarah Owen

Vandersluis ed The State and Identity Construction in International Relations, London:

Macmillan Press, 2000, pp 129-154

Concept of ‘Security’

In the study of IR, ‘security’ is a contested concept It is necessary to make a clear distinction between “traditional-security” and “non-traditional security” In this study, I focus on traditional-security Security and insecurity are closely related concepts In general, ‘security’ can be conceptualized as the sense of ‘being safe’ from threats to existential survival The underlying assumption here is that the threat and use of force in East Asian interstate relations remains real This in no way suggests that non-traditional security is unimportant Indeed in an increasingly globalized world, non-traditional security has become more high-profile Non-traditional security issues like diseases, environment, over-population, poverty, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation are transnational challenges which increasingly are beyond the ability of individual states to deal with A sovereign state (or government) feels ‘secure’ to the extent that it is confident of being able to maintain its independence and sovereignty from internal and external threats, especially those linked to the threat or use of armed violence.28 Mutual trust in interstate relations is hence critical to the forging of security communities

28 Preston King, and Graham M Smith eds Friendship in Politics, London and New York:

Routledge, 2008 Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal, and Jusuf Wanandi eds Europe and the Asia Pacific, London and New York: Routledge, 1998 Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 Andrew H Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, Princeton & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 Douglas Webber has pointed

out: “As in Western Europe, so too in Southeast Asia, regional integration or cooperation first became possible when the integrating or cooperating states no longer felt seriously threatened

by each other but rather by a common other state or bloc.” See Webber, “Trade and security

in East Asia”, in Heribert Dieter ed The Evolution of Regionalism in Asia: Economic and Security Issues London and New York: Routledge, 2007

“Non-traditional security” (e.g the war against terrorism; the threat of extremist-Islam; under-development and poverty in “failing” and “failed” states in the developing world; diseases like HIV and AIDs; drug-trafficking; money-laundering; trafficking in women; environment degradation) is becoming more important Human security issues are certainly growing in importance One assumption of this study is that the threat and/or use of force by states in settling interstate disputes, amid economic growth and prosperity in East Asia, remains a potentially serious threat that cannot be discounted with a high degree of confidence The East Asian region continues to see determined efforts by governments to enhance their military forces and preparedness, with some observers arguing that there is an ongoing regional arms race.29

In recent years, the idea of “comprehensive security” has become widespread

29 Business Times (Singapore), 6 April 2009 Friedberg 1994, op cit Denny Roy, “Hegemon on

the Horizon? China’s threat to East Asian security”, International Security 19(1) Summer 1994: 149-168 David Capie and Paul Evans eds The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (2nd

edition) Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2007

30 Amitav Acharya, “A regional security community in Southeast Asia” In Regionalism and

Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific Singapore: Eastern

Universities Press, Marshall Cavendish, 2003

socialization norms of peaceful inter-state behaviour.31 First, security measures should seek to promote reassurance, rather than deterrence or the balance of power Realists would disagree with Acharya on this point Realists emphasize the fundamental importance of generating greater power resources in order to deter potential rivals or to prevent a hegemon from emerging that could threaten a state’s vital interests of survival and international influence Second, security should be pursued multilaterally, emphasizing the principles of inclusiveness and openness, compared with the unilateral pursuit of security Third, cooperative security envisages a broad agenda of cooperation, encompassing military confidence building

as well as political dialogue and other forms of functional cooperation In the East Asian context, cooperative security is seen as having a more comprehensive and mainly political agenda For example, the ARF was set up in 1994 as an exercise to promote greater regional confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region The idea of cooperative security, as it applies to the relevance of the ASEAN Way of cooperative security in the promotion of Northeast Asian security regionalism, is covered in greater detail in Chapter Four

31 Amitav Acharya, “Common Security”, in Martin Griffiths ed., Encyclopedia of international

relations and global politics London and New York: Routledge, 2005: 98-99

Concept of ‘political community’ and ‘regional integration’

The notion of a political community is closely linked to the ideas of cooperation, interests, identity, and integration A sovereign state is an example of a national-level political community The modern sovereign state first emerged in Western Europe with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.32 The concerns of a national political community would focus on unity, beliefs, values, identity, and interests The features

of a strong domestic political community would include internal trust, friendship, mutual responsiveness, and a cohesive national identity among its citizens.33

Beyond the national level of analysis, the concept ‘integration’ refers to a very intensive form of interstate cooperation, at the regional and international levels

32 Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society: An Introduction to the study of

International Relations (second edition), London and New York: Continuum Books,

2000, pp 89-105

33 Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 Robert

Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1994

34 Jackson 2007: 43

subject with its own identity, an actor with capability, and the structures to facilitate region-wide decision-making.”35

There are three different levels of political integration: domestic, regional, and global Intuitively, the domestic level of national integration must be consolidated and completed first before a state can logically proceed to the next level of regional integration If such states, for example, in the Third World, face a high level of internal social-political conflicts and instability, it is doubtful that they will be able to focus their attention and energies in fostering closer regional economic and political integration.36 In contrast, states in Western Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War Two were already essentially consolidated national states with centuries

of tested state-hood and nationhood Most of them did not face the internal challenges of multiethnic diversity In terms of foreign policy, they had basically resolved their territorial disputes In a sense these West European states were ‘ready’

to seriously envisage the quest to forge closer regional economic and political integration for the mutual benefit of all its members, large and small.37

A Deutschian security community is a subset of a regional ‘political community’ (See Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 below) A regional political community, forged through the process of concerted community-building, consists of like-minded sovereign states It can be located within a specific geographical region Since the late-1990s, a security community is increasingly seen as a mental construct: where the

35 Mary Farrell, “The EU’s promotion of regional integration: norms, actorness and geopolitical

realities”, in Valeria Bello and Belachew Gebrewold eds A Global Security Triangle: European, African and Asian interaction, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, p 16

36 Cited in Ralph 2001 op cit., p 95 There are exceptions to this general statement An

example would appear to be the case of Belgium within the EU

37 Some scholars, e.g Alan S Milward, argue that European integration ‘rescued’ the nation

state See his The European Rescue of the Nation-State London: Routledge, 2000

member-states share common norms, values, interests, and identity In such a

‘socially constructed’ community, member states need not be geographically contiguous (an example of the latter would be the US and Western Europe forming the North Atlantic security community) The concept of a regional political community refers to nations situated in a geographical area or sharing common values and identities Its members can cooperate with one another through a limited-membership organization to meet military, political, and functional problems As Ziring and Plano38

The formation of a regional political community implies that the states are able to transcend the mentality of being a mere nation-state It is a higher-order form of political organization and governance, which can be in the form of supranational governance (as in the case of the European Union) Alternatively, it can stay at an inter-governmental level, as in the case of ASEAN, where the vital national decisions are still decided by the sovereign states themselves This would appear to

member-be a key difference member-between the evolution of regionalism in Western Europe and that

of ASEAN in the Southeast Asian region Intuitively, the three different levels and stages of political integration are path-dependent A state can only proceed to the next and second level of regional integration if it has successfully consolidated itself socially and politically into a ‘strong state’ ‘Weak’ or ‘failing’ states, as found in many Third World countries, faced with the urgent tasks of state and nation-building challenges (ethnic-communal tensions; secession, poverty, poor governance like serious corruption and nepotism problems) are likely to be distracted and hence have

have pointed out, regionalism provides states with a middle-level approach to problem solving, between the extremes of unilateralism and universalism

less time and energy to focus on regional community-building and identity This would appear to be the situation facing quite a number of the ASEAN states even today In the case of Western Europe, Alan Milward has advanced the thesis that weak states used ‘European integration’ to strengthen their capacities.39

Most of the ASEAN states are still in the delicate stage of promoting and consolidating state and nation-building They are faced with the potentially destabilizing challenges of fighting poverty and corruption, communal and secessionist threats, and the urgent need to attract foreign investment in order to create jobs for their burgeoning populations In his 2009 study of political authoritarianism

in Southeast Asia, William Case put the critical challenges facing the ASEAN states

in the following manner:

In the Philippines, the progenitor of ‘people power’, democracy has been

diminished by electoral cheating and gross human rights violations In

Thailand, though the former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, scored

successive electoral victories, he so committed executive abuses that he

served up the pretext by which royalist elements in the military might mount

a coup, one that even gained favour with the new middle class And in

Indonesia, lauded today as the region’s only democracy still standing, the

government’s writ over the security forces has remained weak, with military

commanders nestling in unaccountable domains, there to conduct their

shadowy business dealings Elsewhere, dominant single parties persist in

Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, while a military junta

perpetuates its brutal control over Burma.40

_

38 Lawrence Ziring and Jack C Plano International Relations: A Political Dictionary

Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO Inc., 1995

39 Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State London: Routledge, 1995

40 William Case, “Low-Quality Democracy and Varied Authoritarianism: Elites and

Regimes in Southeast Asia today”, Pacific Review 22(3) July 2009: 255-269 See also Robert Dayley and Clark D Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era,

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010 (5th edition), pp 1-21

Concept of ‘regionness’

Regionalism can be conceptualized in terms of the four inter-related dimensions of cultural, economic, political, and security integration From a political viewpoint, the concept of regionalism is closely linked to Hettne’s idea of ‘regionness’ (The following discussion of Hettne’s ideas was taken from Synder, contemporary security and strategy, 2008) Hettne defines ‘regionness’ as the degree to which a particular region like East Asia constitutes a coherent unit The degree to which a particular region achieves this distinct identity varies from region to region depending on various factors.41

41 Hettne 2000: xviii; cited in Synder 2008, p 232

From an analytical viewpoint, Hettne divided regionness into five distinct levels Hettne’s theoretical innovation is useful as it can aid us in coming up with new typologies of different types of regional security communities The first

Figure 2.1: Three different levels and stages of regional political integration

Source: Author’s conceptualization

Figure 2.2: Three Main Levels of Regional Political Integration

and the detailed components

a) Social Systems

Degree of national

Unity affected by:

Diversity in terms of religion,

ethnic background, and cultural

beliefs

a) Regional economic Cooperation Functionalist Idea of ‘spillover’

Idea of an International Society (Hedley Bull & the English School)

Governance: levels

of corruption (often a symptom

of internal political malaise)

Threats to internal unity: ethnic

conflicts; Secession; ideological

challenges (communist

ideology)

FTAs, followed by Common Market, Economic Community, Monetary Union

Assumption: gains from regional economic cooperation would be distributed equally among its members

b) Political-Security Cooperation: Regional ‘security regimes’ and ‘regional security complexes’ Common Foreign

& Security Policy Regional Political Constitution Supranational Political Union

International Order maintained

by commonly-agreed institutions & rules (Balance of Power, Diplomacy;

International Law; Management

by the Great Powers; and War) Formation of a ‘Global Security Community’

level is the simple geographic unit of states that exist in a natural physical collection.42 At this first level, states have limited or no interconnection with each other, especially in regards to security collaboration The second level involves a more complex set of social interactions among the states in the region, through what Barry Buzan43 describes as a ‘security complex’: here the regional states are interconnected and interdependent on each other regarding their own security Such interactions can be either direct or indirect Informal institutions or norms to help govern security relations across the region may also exist at this level The third level

is “where any form of organized cooperation exists through the establishment of formal regional institutions such as a collective defense organization.”44

The fourth level of regionness “exists when the relationships among the states have developed to such a degree that a civil society has been developed throughout the region.” The organizational framework of the regional institutions facilitates social communication and convergence of values throughout the states and people of the region Here the region attains the status of a Deutschian security community, where ‘we-feeling’ is developed throughout the region Tensions and disputes can still exist within a Deutschian security community, but its defining characteristic is that the disputants will seek only peaceful means to resolve these disputes Hettne’s fifth and final level of regionness occurs when a ‘region-state’ is developed: “A region-state has its own distinct identity, capability and legitimacy In addition to being a collection of states with common objectives, ideas and policies, there is a need

42 Synder 2008 op cit., pp 232-234

43 Barry Buzan, Waever, O and de Wilde, J Security: A New Framework for Analysis

Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998

44 Buzan 1998, ibid.

for the region itself to have a decision-making structure independent of the member states for conflict-resolution for issues not only between the member states but also within them.”45 In effect, Hettne’s ‘region-state’ acquires supranational dimensions

It becomes a “super-state”.46

The contested nature of regionalism is seen in the different definitions given

by scholars One area of contestation is between those who see regionalism as geography-oriented, and those who argue that ‘region’ is a mental construct Fawcett falls into the latter category Fawcett argues that an understanding of regionalism requires us to move beyond a geographical definition, to include commonality, interaction and the possibility of cooperation.47

a multidimensional form of integration embracing economic, cultural,

political and social aspects, thereby extending the understanding of regional

activities beyond the creation of free trade agreements or security regimes

Regionalism is also considered to have a strategic goal of region-building, of

establishing regional coherence and identity….Contemporary regionalism is

really made up of many different regionalisms, reflecting different

conditions, values and even ideological positions across the global arena — it

is a product of the historical, social and political conditions, the strengths and

weaknesses of any particular region.

Mary Farrell shares the same view as Fawcett Farrell has pointed out that “In the new regionalism approach, regions were regarded not simply as formal organizations, or as a ‘given’ but rather understood as constructed and re-constructed in the process of global transformation…” Farrell sees regionalism as:

48

45 Synder 2008 op cit., pp 232-234

46 Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union

Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007

47 Fawcett op cit., p 23

48 Farrell op cit., p.8

In summary, regionalism is a multi-dimensional concept embracing cultural, economic, political, and security cooperation and integration among a group of regional states Regionalism can be driven both by governments and by private sector forces (that is, regionalization) Regionalism does not take place in a political vacuum When regionalism is driven by governments, it is logical to analyze the benefits and costs of state-driven regionalism The potential benefits of regional integration would include: reducing the likelihood of inter-state misunderstandings and conflicts over territory and resources, promoting greater regional economic cooperation and synergy leading to higher levels of national prosperity, increasing the attractiveness of that specific region to foreign investors and thereby job-creation, and greater bargaining clout vis-à-vis other regional groupings Security-regionalism is closely linked to the Deutschian idea of security communities, where the focus is to make the threat and use of force in inter-state relations illegitimate

2.4 Concept of “Security Community”: Ideas of Karl Deutsch

A study of the rise of security communities is directly linked to the perennial question

of war and peace in international relations The rise of security communities is associated with the genesis, motivations and driving forces of regional integration and regional-identity The central question is: How to prevent inter-state wars, and promote the rise of durable regional peace and prosperity among states?

A security community is a special subset of the more general term ‘political community’ In 1957, Karl Deutsch49

49 Karl W Deutsch et al Political Community in the North Atlantic Area Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957 The concept of ‘security community’ was actually first used by Van Wagenen in 1952

and his associates pioneered the concept of

‘security community’ as part of their overall study of the evolution of peaceful transnational relations His approach is known as transactionalism or

‘communications theory’, and focuses on the social dimension of integration Deutsch argued that growing cross-border socio-economic activities like trade, tourism, exchanges of mail, communications, and transactions helped create common values and identities among people from different states and paved the way for peaceful, cooperative relations by making war increasingly costly and thus more unlikely.50 Deutsch and his associates examined the conditions necessary to create and maintain a sense of community among the peoples of the different countries They “attempted to measure the extent of communications and transactions between societies.” Deutsch argued that a high degree of transnational ties between societies leads to peaceful relations that amount to more than the mere absence of war, leading

to what he called a ‘security community’ in which war among the member-states becomes virtually unthinkable

Conditions favourable to the rise of security communities: Its linkage with democracy and liberal-democratic norms

By ‘conditions’ we refer to the historical, socio-cultural, economic, and political factors that make it conducive for security communities to emerge Alternatively, we can think in terms of the independent variables which affect the rise of security communities In Western Europe, these conditions or variables include the horrific experience of the West European peoples of the great destruction caused by World Wars One and Two; visionary leaders; common cultural-religious values; common

50 Deutsch et al 1957; cited in Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to

International Relations: Theories and Approaches Oxford: Oxford University Press

(3rd edition), 2007, p 43

fear of the Soviet threat; strong support of the US for European economic and political integration These conditions provided the driving forces and the ‘demand and supply’ for post-war European regional integration

Deutsch listed two inter-related key conditions for the rise of pluralistic security communities The first condition concerns the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making (democracy; the rule of law; political accountability; the holding of free and fair elections; tolerance and respect for the political opposition) Here, Deutsch and his associates are making an implicit assumption that liberal-democracies appear to have a much better chance compared with non-democracies in forging a security community Second, the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, without resort to violence.51

Sorpong Peou concurs with Deutsch about the importance of democracy and democratic norms in the forging of a security community The rise (and fall) of security communities are dependent, according to Sorpong Peou, on two key conditions

Authoritarian

or autocratic regimes clearly do not satisfy the Deutschian criteria

52

A cultural identity shared by non-democratic or illiberal states may

be helpful in facilitating a sense of cultural community, but this

expectation by itself remains far from sufficient The question

remains as to whether shared liberal norms meet the requirements

for states to build and maintain clearly viable security communities

Alexander Wendt, among others, remains agnostic about whether

Kantian or republican states are the only types of state that can

internalize liberal norms of the democratic peace For him,

‘self-restraint is the ultimate basis for collective identity and friendship

These are liberal democratic norms and community leadership:

51 Laursen, Finn ed Comparative Regional Integration England: Ashgate Publishing

Limited, 2003

52 Peou 2009 op cit., pp 148-49.

and that the latter are rooted fundamentally…in respecting each

other’s difference.53

Peou’s argument that illiberal states are unlikely to forge a genuine security community would appear to have a powerful logic As an example, Peou argued that non-democratic states in the Arab world had made efforts to form alliances among themselves based on ‘pan-Arabism’, but their collective identity was relatively weak

He pointed out that no one had ever considered any of their regional groups, for example the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as a genuine security community Peou posits that it is:

difficult to sustain the argument that non-democratic states can

effectively exercise self-restraint when their autocratic leaders tend

to rely upon repressive means or apply such norms to the extent that

help transform their institutions, such as military alliances, into

security communities I thus argue that ‘community’ is based not

only on self-interest, but also on collective identity based on liberal

norms Non-liberal democratic states may cooperate with each

other, but their form of cooperation is less likely to last and tends to

conform to the Hobbesian logic of self-interest and self-help

Liberal democratic and non-democratic states can also enhance their

cooperation based on the Lockean logic of mutual interest Yet

only liberal democracies can build and maintain genuine security

communities, because of their shared liberal norms.54

Peou has also made the following cogent argument:

Various studies show that ‘alliances between democracies…appear

to be more durable…while others demonstrate that international

security regimes with non-liberal members are less robust than

those with liberal democratic members Democracies ‘perceive

each other as peaceful because of the democratic norms governing

their domestic decision-making processes’ and thus tend to resolve

their disputes in a manner short of war Two of the most important

mechanisms for doing this are peaceful dispute settlement

53 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2000, p 360 Cited in Peou 2009, ibid., p 148

54 Peou ibid., p 149

recourse to war, negotiation and compromise) and legal equality

(voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity)

Among themselves, liberal states that adopt the norm of

self-restraint and non-violence tend to favour negotiation and

compromise They are highly institutionalized and thus tend to rely

on legal means as the way to resolve conflict.55

Writing in 1957 after two devastating world wars, Deutsch had lofty ambitions for his study Deutsch stated that his basic aim was nothing less than the mitigation or removal of the threat of catastrophic interstate wars among the European powers which could threaten the survival of human civilization itself.56

By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of

community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread

enough to assure…dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among the

population By sense of community we mean a belief…that common social

problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’.

Deutsch’s definition

of a security community focuses on the key words of ‘integration’, “we-feeling”, and

‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ Deutsch defined a security community

as a group of people which has become integrated:

57

An understanding of the main features of a Deutschian security community is important as it aids clarity and analysis First, peace is predictable between the members of a security community A practical difficulty here is with defining the meaning of ‘predictable’ with a high degree of precision It can also be quite subjective At the level of national governments, it is unrealistic to expect national elites to base their security-military policies towards potential threats and rivals on subjective considerations Deutsch also implicitly assumed that a greater volume of

55 Peou ibid., p 150

56 Deutsch op cit., p.5

57 Deutsch op cit., p 5

socio-economic transactions would ‘spill-over’ into greater mutual trust between states This Deutschian assumption is problematic because the ‘spill-over’ mechanism is not clearly specified Also, growing inter-state economic interdependence does not necessarily result in greater political affinity and trust among states, as seen in the example of the fluctuations in Sino-Japanese relations Second, the Deutschian paradigm assumes that a security community is forged when there is a high degree of integration But Deutsch did not precisely define what is meant by ‘high degree of integration’ A degree of subjectivity is present here: How high is ‘high’?

Third, in a genuine security community, the threat and use of force in interstate relations has been delegitimized Most governments operate on a worst-case scenario and are likely to take contingency precautions involving the likely use

of force against potential threats and rivals Fourth, no military contingency (mobilization) plans are made against other members of the security community By their very nature, national military establishments tend to operate on the basis of national secrecy with regard to the identification of possible military-security threats and rivals and enemies They also tend to have contingency plans Fifth, transparency

is extensive and complex Indicators would include: annual publication of Defence White Papers; Arms Registers; extensive sharing of intelligence; consultations and joint planning of military exercises Sixth, mutual trust is high.58

58 Ken Booth and Nicholas J Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear,

Cooperation and Trust in World Politics New York: Palgrave MacMillan,

2008, p 183

Based on the above-named criteria, we should expect certain common types of security-military cooperation among the members of a security community, which would be a clear

indication of mutual interests, sensitivity, and embedded political affinity and trust This appears to be the case of Western Europe Seth Jones, in his 2006 study of the rise of European security cooperation among EU members, mentioned the imposition

of common economic sanctions for a foreign policy goal, regional arms production, and the establishment of a European rapid reaction force as examples of strong mutual trust and common identity.59

Members of a security community have “stable expectations of peaceful change” This means that such ‘stable’ expectations do not change, for example, when there is a change of government or regime in a member-state This can only occur if the political elites (ruling party and the opposition) share basically the same values/norms of peaceful change A Deutschian security community exists when a shared sense of belonging to a political community is developed throughout a specific region But this does not imply that tensions and disputes cannot emerge within the region but that the disputants will seek only peaceful means to resolve interstate issues

This is an indication of the high degree of West European common identity and ability to act as an international actor In contrast, ASEAN is clearly a far way off ASEAN did not have an effective common response

to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, or the regional haze issue It remains basically ineffective regarding the human rights violations of the Myanmar military regime

60

59 Jones, Seth G, The Rise of European Security Cooperation Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge University Press, 2006, p 4 Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule, Cambridge,

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005 (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

The difficulty is how to operationalise the key terms like: “dependable expectations of peaceful change”; “degree of integration”; “trust and mutual

60 Synder 2008 op cit., p 234

predictability”: Deutsch did not specify its precise meaning and measurement The terms used by Deutsch in defining his notion of security community can be very subjective Members of a security community regard war among themselves as virtually unthinkable Neither the masses nor the political-military elites expect war with each other In effect, members of a security community truly regard one another

as an integral part of the ‘regional family’ While members of a security community may continue to have differences or disputes, its defining characteristic is that they do not resort to the use of force (war) to settle their disputes Instead, they will invariably turn to diplomacy to peacefully settle their disputes In a genuine regional security community, war is simply not a policy option at all In other words, it is

clearly implied that the members of a Deutschian security community have renounced

war as an instrument of national policy against one another But they are not pacifist states; they are pacific only within the SC For example, the EU (and NATO) carried out airstrikes against Serbia in response to Milosevic’s genocide policies in Kosovo in

1999

In summary, the Deutschian security community concept consists of two basic characteristics First, it is a ‘we-feeling’ community Second, it is a ‘non-war’ community These are the two stringent conditions set by Deutsch and his associates

in the assessment of whether a specific region has become truly integrated into a security community Using these two criteria, we will examine in Chapter Three the claim made by some constructivist scholars that Southeast Asia has become integrated into a security community and highlight the nature of the driving forces shaping Southeast Asian regionalism In Chapter Four, we will examine the claim that the ASEAN Way is the most important factor determining the nature and dynamics of

Northeast Asian regionalism Is this specific claim exaggerated? Are there other factors that are actually more critical to the evolution of Northeast Asian regionalism?

Theoretical Contributions made by Adler and Barnett

The Deutschian security community concept made little headway during the Cold War era as a theoretical tool because of difficulties in operationalizing its key concepts and the US-Soviet antagonisms at the global level Critics have pointed out that the Deutschian SC paradigm did not clearly specify the causal relationship between social assimilation and peaceful political change.61 In 1998, Adler and Barnett made a major contribution to the study of security communities by approaching it from a constructivist viewpoint According to Martin Griffiths, Adler and Barnett made four contributions.62

61 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration: A Reader New

York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006 Joseph S Nye, International Regionalism: Readings Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1968

First, compared to Deutsch’s transactionalism, recent constructivist writings on security community have adopted a more qualitative and sociological approach By pointing to the role of intersubjective norms in shaping peaceful interstate relations, constructivist writings made a useful theoretical innovation and offered new insights Growing economic interactions and transactions between states do not necessarily result in greater peaceful inter-state relations, especially in the political-security arenas The constructivist approach puts greater emphasis on the role of norms and actor socialization in the development of a security community It claims that increased interactions and norm-socialization influence,

62 Martin Griffiths, Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics

London and New York: Routledge, 2005 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order London

and New York: Routledge, 2009 (2nd edition), pp 36-38

and are in turn affected by, the growth and transformation of the actors’ identity and interests

The second contribution of Adler and Barnett is their insight that there are three distinct phases in the growth of a security community (See Figure 2.3) The exploration of the process of security-community building, including the identification of the driving forces that generate a security community, account for the various stages of their development and explain regional variations in the end product Specifically, Adler and Barnett identified three stages or phases in the development of

a regional security community, each of which is marked by a number of characteristics The forging of a regional security community starts with the ‘nascent phase’ In the ‘nascent phase’, a group of states “coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security; and lower the transactions costs associated with their exchanges”.63

The second or ‘ascendant phase’ is marked by tighter military coordination, reduced fears on the part of one actor that others within the group represent a threat, and the beginnings of cognitive transition toward inter-subjective processes and collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change Finally, the third and final ‘mature phase’ is characterised by greater institutionalization, supranationalism, a high degree of trust, and low or no probability

of military conflicts A mature phase may be ‘loosely coupled’ (a minimalist version)

The ‘nascent phase’ contains a number of ‘triggering mechanisms’ including threat perceptions, expected trade benefits, shared identity, and organizational emulation (learning from the experience of other multilateral organizations)

63 Adler and Barnett 1998 op cit., p 50

or ‘tightly coupled’ depending on the degree of trust and institutionalization of the community.64

Tightly-coupled security communities have more stringent standards, including a ‘mutual aid society’ providing for collective and cooperative efforts to help each other and offer joint solutions to common problems; some characteristics of supranationalism, which might include common national institutions as well as supranational and transnational institutions, and some form of collective security agreement A ‘mutual aid society’ would be one where members of a regional community have a very keen sense of mutual sensitivity and quick response to each others’ legitimate interests Andrej Tusicisny has argued for the notion of a

‘comprehensive security community’ – which are zones where not only interstate war, but also civil war, has become unthinkable

65

The third contribution of Adler and Barnett is their application of the security community concept to non-Western regional settings In Deutsch’s original work, he cited two examples of security communities: Sweden and Norway after 1905, and the

US and Canada after 1815 Today, the EU, US-Canada, and Australia-New Zealand are generally agreed to constitute regional security communities They are also liberal-democracies In much of the literature on security communities, it is implicitly

Tusicisny’s point would appear to apply to the cases of US-Canada, Western Europe, and Australia-New Zealand Tusicisny’s point makes intuitive sense A regional security community is unlikely to

be forged unless intra-state armed violence also becomes unthinkable

64 Griffiths 2005 op cit., p 752

65 Griffiths op cit., p 752 See also Andrej Tusicisny, “Security Communities and Their

Values: Taking Masses Seriously”, International Political Science Review 28 (4)

2007: 425-449

assumed that a true Deutschian security community must also be a liberal democratic community.66

The fourth contribution of Adler and Barnett is that as a result of their study, the current understanding of security communities has moved away from the original tendency to view community building as a linear process The current emphasis is on the process, rather than the end product per se Security communities may not be permanent As a number of scholars like Martin Griffiths, Laurie Nathan, and Jason Ralph have pointed out, security communities can unravel and collapse as a result of domestic instability

The challenge is to discover whether security communities can also emerge in non-Western societies, which are often characterised by ‘soft authoritarianism’ and illiberal democracies

67

Adler and Barnett made an important distinction between two categories of security communities They draw a distinction between tightly-coupled and loosely-coupled security communities The value of “dependable expectation of peaceful change” exists across both kinds of communities In tightly-coupled security

Nathan defines domestic stability as the absence of large-scale violence in a country, and argues that it is a necessary conditionfor the rise of security communities Domestic violence makes peoples and states insecure Domestic violence is also likely to lead to tensions among states, which will have an adverse impact on buildingtrust and a sense of collective identity A recent example can be seen in the border tensions and armed clashes between Thailand and Cambodia since mid-2007 over the disputed Preah Vihear temple

66 Griffiths 2005 op cit., p.752

67 Griffiths 2005 op cit., p.752 Laurie Nathan, “Domestic Instability and Security

Communities”, European Journal of International Relations, 12 (2) 2006: 275-299 Ralph, Beyond the Security Dilemma, 2001 op cit

communities, that expectation rests on governance structures that rely “not only on an understanding of their member states’ behaviour in the international sphere, but also

on a reading of their domestic behaviour and arrangements”.68

Adler and Barnett’s typology of a three-phased security community has drawn critical reactions from the scholarly community It is important to note that Adler and Barnett’s first two phases, the ‘nascent’ and ‘ascendant’ phases, cannot be regarded as

This is an important point because the nature of domestic politics in many non-Western societies would appear to have a major impact on prospects for the rise of security communities In a loosely-coupled security community, by contrast, the expectation of peaceful change rests on inter-subjective understandings among state leaders (elite-driven): such a set-

up is compatible with domestic political repression, and hence can be destabilizing This point by Adler and Barnett seems rather puzzling By the time interstate relations have become integrated to the point of being a ‘loosely-coupled’ security community, there would be a high degree of respect for human rights and the rule of law We would not expect such regimes to practice ‘domestic political repression’ Political repression should have no place in a true security community Hence, the importance

of embedded liberal-democratic values in societies labelled as ‘security communities’ Without the strong presence of widespread adherence to truly democratic values, these regimes should not be labelled as ‘security communities’ in the first place Democratic values like respect towards the political opposition, tolerance of political dissent, and the rule of law appear to be pre-requisites for the rise of a regional security community

68 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Studying Security Communities in theory,

comparison and history’, in E Adler and M Barnett eds., Security Communities,

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998 pp 413-441; cited from Jason

Ralph, Beyond the Security Dilemma 2001 op cit., p.94