Searching for new security paradigms israel and south koreas defense transformation

S UMMARY: Notwithstanding the perennial body of literature covering the Revolution in Military Affairs RMA debate over the last two decades, the vast majority of writings have been silen

SEARCHING FOR NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS: ISRAEL AND SOUTH KOREA’S DEFENSE

A CKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

This dissertation has evolved throughout my studies, research, and experiences in South Korea, Israel, and Singapore In all three states, strategic and defense studies in the context of public policy have been of crucial importance, given the many critical factors that have historically shaped their military and security situation Accordingly, understanding the complexity in the continuity and change of their security paradigms, defense strategies, operational concepts, and evolving security challenges cannot be accomplished without the close consultation of selected policy practitioners, military officers and soldiers, defense analysts, leading academics, and journalists that have devoted their professional lives to ensure the continued existence and security of their nation-states This dissertation thus inevitably treads along signposts and paths mapped out by others, who have provided me with insightful comments, thoughts, and observations that sharpened my ideas, concepts, and widened my intellectual horizons While any errors in this dissertation are mine, and mine alone, the following lines are dedicated to a number of special individuals; for their undivided support, encouragement, expertise and trusted advice

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my three

mentors, who have guided me at various stages on my dissertation journey: Chung Min Lee,

Darryl S Jarvis, and Richard Bitzinger Long established in their respective fields and areas,

each has had a profound influence on this project Prof Lee, Dean of the Graduate School of

International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul has been at the conceptual genesis of this thesis, suggesting the idea for a comparative study of Israeli and South Korean Air Power

strategies, as a way to enhance the emerging air power studies in Korea Moreover, Prof Lee

has defined my historical, theoretical, and policy-oriented foundations in security studies, and

served as my intellectual beacon for more than a decade Prof Jarvis at the Lee Kuan Yew

School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, has been my main thesis advisor, reading every chapter draft, and providing critical advice on the organizational structure,

research methodology, and nearly all other aspects of the dissertation In doing so, Prof

Jarvis has taught me the tools for survival in the world of publishing and academia Last but

not least, Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies

at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore has redefined my conceptions of the RMA debates, substantially deepened my knowledge of the field

In the process of my fieldwork in both Israel and South Korea, I have interviewed many unique individuals, who provided me at least some access to primary and authentic information on security/defense related issues, and honored me with their confidence and

trust In Israel, I owe a great debt of gratitude to Ilan Mizrahi, former Head of Israel’s

National Security Council; Prof Isaac Ben-Israel, Head of the Security Studies Program, Tel

Aviv University; Brig Gen Itai Brun, former Head of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Research at IDF’s Command and Staff College; Maj Gen (ret.) Giora Eiland, Senior Fellow

at the Institute for National Security Studies; Prof Uri Bar-Joseph, Chair of the Division of International Relations, School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa; Dr Dima

Adamsky, Research Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya; Dr Deganit Paikowsky,

Research Fellow at the School of Government and Policy, Tel-Aviv University; Prof Efraim

Inbar, Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University; Brig Gen (Ret.) Asaf Agmon, Head of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies; Maj Gen (Ret.) Uzi Dayan, former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff and National Security Council

Chairman; Dr Yoram Evron at the University of Haifa; Dr Amir Horkin, research director at Maagar Mochot, , Zivi Berman at the IDF, and the librarians at the Truman Research Institute

for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

At the same time, my journey in Israel wouldn’t be the same without the special and life-long

friendship of Arnon Eshel, who has always encouraged me to believe in my ideas and find the courage to go beyond my limits; Adriana Cooper – my former classmate at the Hebrew

University of Jerusalem and experienced journalist, sharing some incredible “adventure”

assignments with me; and Meytal Nasie and Iris Nasie – for their undivided love, support, and

inspirational audacity that can’t be described in words

In my interviews in South Korea, I have benefited greatly from the insights, thoughts, and observations of Prof Jae Chang Kim, former Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S.-Korea Combined Forces Command; Prof Chung-in Moon at the Political Science Department at Yonsei University; Prof Lee Jung-Hoon at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University; Prof Sung-Pyo Hong, Head of the Department of Military Strategy Studies at the Korean National Defense University; Dr Taewoo Kim, Senior Research Fellow

at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses; Maj Lee, Jin-Young, ROK Air Force; and Dr

Kim, Min Seok, Senior Writer at the JoongAng Ilbo My studies and experiences in South

Korea also wouldn’t be same without the support and encouragement of my dear friends:

Jae-Sang Koo, CEO and President of Mirae Asset; Dr Yoo-Dongi; Yeon-Kyung Jeon, Hye-Jin Park; Richard Marusyk, Veronika and Lukas Vildman, and many others who went through the

gates of Yonsei University

Last but not least, I have written this dissertation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public

Policy, National University of Singapore, which I am proud of have been in the first Ph.D

cohort The School has provided me not only with a generous research support, art facilities, but most importantly, an amazingly diverse body of faculty and students from around the world, who in many ways shaped my worldview and intellectual curiosity Indeed, the LKY School has been my home for nearly five years, and I have had the honor to study under many inspiring professors I would like to thank LKYSPP faculty members,

state-of-the-particularly Prof Kishore Mahbubani; Prof M Ramesh; Prof Wu Xun; Prof Suzaina Kadir;

Prof Scott Fritzen; Prof Mukul Asher; Prof Dodo J Thampapillai; Prof Caroline Brassard; Prof Gopi Rethinaraj for providing their unique perspectives in teaching public policy;

research methods; and policy analysis In the same token, I am grateful to Ruth Choe for facilitating my path in the School’s administration; Sung Lee and Kirsten Trott at the Research Support Unit; and James Dorsey for placing my articles on editorial pages of major

newspapers

Ultimately, I am grateful for all my fellow classmates, colleagues, and friends; in particular,

Jean-Marc Rickli, Tim Junio, and Anthony D’Agostino for reading my thesis and providing

insightful comments and suggestions Alex He Jingwei, Amarendu Nandy, Allen Lai, Aneliya

Nazirova, Azad Bali Singh, Beat Habegger, Bernard Loo Fook Weng, Cris and Terri Mora, Chris Bronk, Daniel Jassem, Daria Makarova, Denni Cawley, Eva Pejsova, Friedemann Schreiter, Gary Schaub, Gloria Pagliari, Henriette Litta, Iftikhar Lodhi, Ishani Mukherjee, Jan Seifert, Jitka and Petr Cirkl, Kaajal Wallia, Kei Koga, Leong Ching Ching, Luisa Gaspani, Luluk Nur Hamidah, Lyn Toh, Martin Duda, May-May Pichamon, Mikio Kumada, Najwa Fathimath, Petra Wodecka, Priyanka Bhalla, Reuben Hintz, Sandra Egger, Savita Shankar, Shabnam Siddiqui, Schuyler House, Shigeru Togashi, Shilpi Banerjee, Simon Lacey, Sonja Moraz, Sun and Alan Tan, Tamara Anne Lynch, Tan Teck Boon, Toby Carroll, Vikas Kharbanda, and many others around the world for their encouragement and sharing a part of

the journey with me

In closing, my greatest debt – and one impossible to specify – is to my family (Christine, Jiri, Christian), and to Anita (PonPon) – for their patience, love, and faith in my long, and often

winding, endeavors around the world Thank You!

T ABLE OF C ONTENTS:

Acknowledgements ii

Summary vi

List of Tables viii

List of Figures ix

Abbreviations x

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Global Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate 1

1.2 Research Objectives 9

1.3 Defining Small States: Absolute vs Relational Definitions 14

1.4 Rationale and Policy Significance 17

1.5 Why Israel and South Korea? Initial Observations 23

1.6 Chapter Themes & Arguments 26

Chapter 2 Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate: “Five Waves” 2.1 Missing Links in the RMA Debate 31

2.2 Conceptual Diffusion of the RMA 33

2.2.1 First Wave: Soviet MTR 34

2.2.2 Second Wave: RMA and its Early Adaptation in the West 38

2.2.3 Third Wave: RMA “Technophilia” 47

2.2.4 Shift to Defense Transformation 53

2.2.5 Second and Third Thoughts: Modernization Plus 67

2.3 Organizational Interpretations and Contending Schools of Thought 71

2.3.1 Scope of the RMA Debate 71

2.3.2 Between RMA Proponents and Skeptics – Is there an RMA? 72

2.3.3 Five RMA Images – What constitutes an RMA? 75

2.3.4 RMA Diffusion and Adaptation: When, Why, and How RMAs Diffuse? 78

2.4 Toward a Sixth RMA Wave? 82

Chapter 3 Research Methodology and Analytical Framework 3.1 Methodological Approaches to RMA Diffusion, Adaptation, and Innovation 84

3.2 Research Strategy, Map, and Analytical Framework 93

3.2.1 Patterns of RMA Military Innovation 96

3.2.2 RMA Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 98

3.2.3 RMA Limitations & Constraints 100

3.3 Case Selection Criteria 101

3.3.1 Geostrategic Predicaments 101

3.3.2 Defense Management Capacity 104

3.3.3 Defense-Industrial Base 106

3.3.4 Combat Proficiency 108

3.4 Data Collection: Sites and Sources 109

3.4.1 Data Triangulation 109

3.4.2 Interview Process 111

3.5 Research Limitations & Threats to Validity 113

Chapter 4 Israel’s Strategy, Security Debates, and Conceptual Innovation: Continuity and Change

4.1 The RMA Debate in Israel: Opposing Viewpoints 115

4.2 Understanding Israel’s Traditional Security Paradigm 120

4.2.1 Conditions of “Geostrategic Challenge” 121

4.2.2 Three Elements of Israel’s Defense Strategy 125

4.2.3 Patterns in IDF’s Operational Conduct 131

4.3 Israel’s RMA-Oriented Conceptual Adaptation Trajectory 138

4.3.1 Conceptual Roots: The Yom Kippur War 139

4.3.2 1980’s: The Offense-Defense Debate and Early RMA Tactics 143

4.3.3 1990’s: Future Battlefield Concepts and Systemic Operational Design 150

4.3.4 2000’s: The Rise and Fall of the SOD Debate and Concept of Operations 159

Chapter 5 South Korea's Evolving Strategy and RMA Debates: From Emulation to Adaptation 5.1 South Korea's Progressive Security Dilemmas 168

5.2 Revisiting South Korea’s Traditional Security Conceptions 174

5.2.1 Conditions of Geostrategic Inferiority 176

5.2.2 Three Pillars of South Korea’s Defense Strategy 181

5.3 Toward a Korean RMA? 187

5.3.1 Understanding RMA Diffusion Path in South Korea 187

5.3.2 1990s: ROK's Future Battlefield Concepts 191

5.3.3 2000s: U.S.-ROK Defense Transformation 204

Chapter 6 Assessing the Impact of the RMA Diffusion on Israel and South Korea’s Military Modernization: Paths, Patterns, Drivers and Constraints 6.1 Path Divergence 216

6.2 Metrics Revisited 219

6.3 Israel 222

6.3.1 Israel’s Force Modernization: Toward a Smaller and Smarter IDF? 222

6.3.2 Israel’s RMA Diffusion Paths, Patterns, and Drivers 230

6.3.3 Limitations & Constraints 236

6.4 South Korea 240

6.4.1 ROK’s Force Modernization: Toward a Smaller, Advanced Elite Force? 240

6.4.2 South Korean RMA Diffusion Paths,Patterns, and Drivers 246

6.4.3 Limitations & Constraints 252

6.5 Explaining the Variance: Contending Theories 256

6.5.1 Neorealist Perspectives 258

6.5.2 Organizational / Societal Perspectives 260

6.5.3 Cultural Perspectives 262

Conclusion: Theoretical and Policy Implications 7.1 Summary 265

7.2 Theoretical Implications: RMA Diffusion and Small States 266

7.3 Policy Implications 271

Bibliography 275

Biographical Note 296

S UMMARY:

Notwithstanding the perennial body of literature covering the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) debate over the last two decades, the vast majority of writings have been silent or ignored the implications of the RMA diffusion on military modernization and innovation trajectories of advanced small states and middle powers The intellectual thrust in exploring the RMA over the last two decades has focused primarily on the U.S.-centered RMA debate that has evolved in concert with shifts in the U.S military strategy and use of force In particular, there have been at least five progressive stages or “RMA waves” in the ongoing debate: (1) initial intellectual discovery by the Soviet military thinkers in the early 1980s, (2) conceptual adaptation, modification, and integration by in the U.S strategic thought during the early 1990s, (3) climax of the RMA debate during the mid-to-late 1990s, (4) a shift to the broader “defense transformation” and its partial empirical investigation in the early 2000s, and (5) a shift to “modernization-plus” in conjunction with second and third thoughts questioning the RMA paradigm from 2005 onwards With the persisting focus on the American RMA debate however, there is a significant deficit in the existing literature, particularly in the conceptual, technological, and operational dynamics surrounding the RMA diffusion - the international transmission and strategic interaction of RMA-oriented concepts and technologies in divergent geostrategic settings and environments

This dissertation attempts to fill-in the void, investigating the paths, patterns, and impact of RMA diffusion in military modernization trajectories of selected advanced small states - Israel and South Korea Both states have historically faced an array of persistent security challenges and uncertainties brought by the realities of their external and internal security conditions, asymmetries of their location, size, and geopolitical constraints With the end of the Cold War and subsequent shifts in the international and regional strategic environment, the sources and characteristics of threats have been changing Their security environment has been increasingly characterized by the convergence of even more complex “hybrid” security threats, which combine conventional, asymmetrical, low-intensity, and non-linear threat dimensions With the changing strategic realities, both Israel and South Korea have been searching for a new strategic paradigm and operational concepts that would allow greater flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy under conditions of strategic uncertainty In doing so, both Israel and South Korea have studied, benchmarked, and debated selected RMA concepts, while attempting to leverage and exploit emerging RMA technologies

Israeli and South Korean RMA trajectories, however, show considerable variation in the pace, direction, and character of their diffusion and adaptation Israel’s RMA path reflects a unique pattern of early adoption/implementation, speculation, and experimentation in the context of multiple operational adaptations to changing strategic realities Israel has been one of the first countries to apply RMA-related technologies in combat in the early 1980s under the conceptual umbrella of “integrated battle.” IDF’s experiences have partly shaped American, Soviet, and European strategic perspectives and debates on the future of warfare However, until the late 1990s, the IDF has not viewed the emergence of the RMA as a relevant paradigm shift, nor has initiated a comprehensive and disruptive defense transformation drive Rather, Israel’s RMA discourse has reflected a continuous debate between the proponents of traditional concepts and reformers - those arguing for new military thinking within the IDF The changing threat spectrum and operational experience over the last two decades forced the IDF to rethink its traditional concepts, and experiment with innovative combat tactics at different levels of warfare Israel’s combat experiences concomitant with action-oriented lessons-learned from high-low intensity conflicts have arguably accelerated IDF’s ‘bottom-up’ user-oriented military innovation by increasing the pressure to find practical solutions rather than focus on theoretical conceptualizations RMA diffusion in Israel should be thus conceptualized in the context of continuity and change in Israel’s security conceptions and the need to retain IDF’s “qualitative edge” in its operational capabilities

In contrast, the RMA diffusion trajectory in South Korea’s military modernization shows patterns of speculation and experimentation in terms of selected concepts and technologies, but relatively limited implementation in the organizational force structure and the use of force Since the early 1990s, South Korea has been attempting to undertake a comprehensive military modernization in order to respond to the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with the U.S forces, and eventually attain self-reliant defense posture In the process, South Korea attempted to emulate and adapt selected U.S RMA-oriented defense transformation concepts, which have gradually permeated into the U.S.-ROK combined training and operations, and subsequently shaped the character and direction of South Korea’s military modernization However, the compelling and relatively ambitious character of Korean RMA-oriented defense reform plans have been in sharp contrast to the prevailing structural and political realities, including contrasting calibrations of defense requirements, structural dependence on the U.S.-ROK Alliance, static, defensive force posture, and asymmetric organizational force structure that have sustained the relevance

of traditional security paradigm Moreover, South Korea’s military has lacked diverse operational combat experiences that would encourage military innovation Accordingly, there has not been a distinct Korean RMA-oriented conceptual innovation toward a new theory of war

Taken together, Israel and South Korea’s varying RMA trajectories reflect evolutionary, rather than revolutionary process of change over the past two decades Both states have faced

a number of organizational, institutional, and resource impediments, anchored primarily in their traditional security paradigms, which have precluded a major defense transformation and inhibited military innovation In particular, both the IDF and ROKA had to cope with complexities of defense planning under uncertainty: (1) identifying and prioritizing between current and future-oriented defense requirements; (2) ascertaining the feasibility, costs, and performance of selected advanced weapons technologies, and (3) adopting and adapting largely unproven conceptual, organizational, and technological innovations in the use of force Paradoxically, by improving their defense capabilities through high-value weapons systems, niche technologies, and innovative organizational and operational concepts, both states have experienced limitations in their use of force by raising the destructive potential and cost of conflict Their adversaries, state and non-state, have adapted by finding strategies and exploiting capabilities of asymmetric negation

The empirical cases of Israel and South Korea confirm that RMA diffusion trajectories can take multiple facets and rarely proceed in a synchronized rate, path, or pattern Given the range of external and internal variables - enablers and constraints that shape the receptivity of states to absorb military innovation, RMA-oriented diffusion is not sequential nor does it follow a particular model Technological innovation may precede conceptual and organizational adaptation, or conceptual speculation may lead to exploration and experimentation, but not implementation Only if military innovation meets implementation

in both policy and strategy, one can theorize about ‘disruptive’ RMA-oriented defense transformation While existing literature may explain the varying RMA trajectories through neorealist, organizational/societal, and cultural theories, this thesis suggests that changes in strategy resulting from operational lessons-learned in diverse combat experiences may increase the adaptability of military organizations to implement military innovation The findings of this study therefore challenge traditional “hierarchical” schools of thought as well

as “spatial” models explaining military innovation and its diffusion in linear perspectives Ultimately, Israel and South Korea’s RMA trajectories project important theoretical as well as policy-oriented implications particularly in terms of small state’s ability to recognize, anticipate, exploit, and sustain military innovation Arguably, selected small states may translate military innovation into a relative strategic advantage or usable strategic opportunity

at least until it will be offset by countervailing responses by opposing forces or new military innovations The analytical framework used in this study should help policy-makers to make more accurate assessments in this direction

L IST OF T ABLES:

Table 3.1 Primary Sources by Expertise 111Table 5.1 North-South Korea Conventional Balance of Forces (2010) 178 Table 6.1 ROK’s Force Structure (1980-2010) 246

L IST OF F IGURES:

Figure 1.1 RMA as a Theory, Process, and Debate 6

Figure 1.2 Conceptualizing RMA Diffusion Trajectories: Paths, Patterns, and Levels 13

Figure 1.3 Policy Challenges of RMA-oriented Military Modernization 21

Figure 1.4 Asymmetric Responses & Limitations to the RMA 22

Figure 2.1 Overview: Five “RMA Waves” 34

Figure 2.2 RMA Elements (1992) 40

Figure 2.3 Patterns of Military Revolutions (1994) 44

Figure 2.4 Owen’s System-of-Systems Concept 50

Figure 2.5 Network-Centric Warfare Concept 62

Figure 3.1 RMA Diffusion Diagnostics Model 87

Figure 3.2 Assessing Military Capabilities 91

Figure 3.3 Overview of Conceptual Lenses to the Study of RMA 92

Figure 3.4 Analytical Framework: RMA Patterns, Drivers, and Constraints 96

Figure 3.5 Patterns of RMA-Oriented Military Innovation – Main Indicators 98

Figure 3.6 RMA Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 99

Figure 3.7 RMA Adaptation Constraints 100

Figure 3.8 Taxonomy of Defense-Industrial Innovation 107

Figure 3.9 Assessing Defense-Industrial Innovation based on Arms Exports 108

Figure 3.10 Overview of Case-Selection Criteria 109

Figure 5.1 South Korea’s Post-Cold War Conflict Spectrum 188

Figure 6.1 Israel and South Korea’s RMA Diffusion Paths and Patterns 222

Figure 6.2 Israel’s RMA Concepts, Paths and Patterns 233

Figure 6.3 Israel’s Military Innovation Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 235

Figure 6.4 Limitations and Constraints to Israeli RMA 240

Figure 6.5 South Korea’s RMA Concepts, Paths and Patterns 248

Figure 6.6 South Korea’s Military Innovation Drivers: Opportunities and Threats 251

Figure 6.7 Limitations and Constraints to South Korean Defense Reforms 255

Figure 7.1 Future Studies: Conceptualizing R&D Trajectories of Global Defense Industries 273

A BBREVIATIONS:

APS Active Protection System

ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BMS Battlefield Management System

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information

CCRP Command and Control Research Program

CENTCOM Central Command

COG Center of Gravity

DAP Digital Army Program

DBK Dominant Battlespace Knowledge

DIB Defense Industrial Base

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DOD Department of Defense

DRP Defense Reform Plan

EBO Effects-Based Operations

FAD Forward Active Defense

FCS Future Combat System

FEBA Forward Edge of Battle Area

FOFA Follow-on Forces Attack

GCC Ground Corps Command

GFC General Forces Command

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

IAF Israel Air Force

IAS Integrated Advanced Soldier

IDF Israel Defense Forces

IED Improvised Explosive Device

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

KPA Korean People’s Army

MBT Main Battle Tank

MCZ Military Control Zone

MND Ministry of National Defense

NDP National Defense Panel

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

OFT Office of Force Transformation

ONA Office of Net Assessment

OPG Operational Maneuver Groups

OSD Office of Secretary of Defense

OTRI Operational Theory Research Institute

PGM Precision Guided Munitions

R&D Research and Development

RDE&T Research, Development, Evaluation, and Testing

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

ROK Republic of Korea

ROKA Republic of Korea’s Army

RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle

RUK Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SOD Systemic Operational Design

SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UACV Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicle

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

“Often do the spirits of great events stride on before the events, and in today

already walks tomorrow.” [Friedrich Schiller]

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Global Diffusion of RMA Theory, Process, and Debate

Over the past two decades, there has been an intense debate in international security studies, military history, defense economics and public policy concerning an emerging paradigm shift in the character and conduct of warfare - the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Driven largely by the quantum leaps in information and communications technologies and amplified by the changing character of conflicts of the post-Cold War era, RMA proponents have argued that modern military organizations are on the verge of a profound discontinuous, disruptive, and a ―revolutionary‖ paradigm shift in the means, modes, and methods of warfare.1 Notwithstanding the existence of often differing RMA definitions

and schools of thought that have evolved since its early inception as a Military-Technical

Revolution theory by Soviet strategic thinkers in the early 1980s, its underlying premise has

been anchored in three main arguments:

(1) The application of new information technologies into a significant number of military systems coupled with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation will fundamentally alter the character and conduct of warfare by producing a dramatic increase

in the combat potential and effectiveness. 2

(2) Attaining qualitatively new levels of military effectiveness that transcends marginal improvements will essentially mitigate the widening spectrum of security challenges of the

21st century, stipulated by the convergence of conventional, low-intensity, asymmetrical, and non-linear types of conflict.3

(3) States and military organizations adopting RMA-oriented concepts, advanced defense technologies, and relevant force structures will possess a considerable strategic advantage over those that do not.4

1

Bitzinger, R (2008) "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Global Defense Industry: Reactions and Interactions." Security Challenges 4(4): 1-12.; Loo, B (ed.) (2009) Military Transformation and Strategy: Revolutions in Military Affairs and Small States New York, Routledge

4

Mahnken, T and J FitzSimonds (2003) "The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs." Newport Papers(17)

While the RMA has been often characterized by analogy as a ―high concept‖ in the field of strategic studies5, particularly for its ―discontinuous‖ or ―disruptive‖ character; in practice, it has been increasingly linked with a continuous conceptual, technological, organizational, and operational military innovation aimed to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness in how militaries prepare for, fight, and win wars.6 Andrew Ross notes that in historical perspective, most defense/military innovations have been distinctly less than revolutionary or transformational, consisting of incremental, often near-continuous, improvements in existing capabilities.7 Indeed, one could argue that the information-led

RMA has been more profound in shaping the pace, direction and character of military

modernization, defined as ―relevant upgrades or improvements of existing military

capabilities through the acquisition of new imported or indigenously developed weapons systems and supporting assets, the incorporation of new doctrines, the creation of new organizational structure, and the institutionalization of new manpower management and combat training regimes.‖8

Nonetheless, its rather less disruptive character has not mitigated its significance or utility; the development of RMA-oriented concepts, technologies, and organizations has been increasingly perceived as a synonym for ―modern‖ defense policy-making, shaping defense management processes and, ultimately, the use of force in the 21stcentury In this context, the promise of an impending RMA bringing about fundamentally new strategic advantages and military effectiveness by means of utilizing ―smart weapons, sensors, and concepts‖ in the air, land, sea, or space has inspired and even compelled many modern military organizations to rethink nearly all aspects of warfare

5 Gray, C (2002) Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History London, Frank Cass.p.1-20

6 Michael Horowitz, for example, uses the term Major Military Innovations (MMIs) and defines it as

―changes in the conduct of warfare, relevant to leading military organizations, designed to increase the efficiency with which capabilities are converted to power.‖ See: Horowitz, M (2010) The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics Princeton, Princeton University Press p.22

7 Ross, A (2010) ―On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework.‖ IGCC Policy Brief (1): 14-17

8

Tellis, A J., M Wills, et al (2005) Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty Seattle, WA, National Bureau of Asian Research.p.15

At the forefront of an RMA-oriented conceptual, technological and organizational military innovation has been the United States, with the world‘s most sophisticated defense-industrial base and military forces.9 The U.S has taken the lead in conceptualizing visions of future wars, while developing next generation of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms (ISR), command, control, communications, computers, and information systems (C4I), space-based intelligence assets, and integrating them with ―network-centric‖ operational concepts and precision-firepower capabilities These have been consistently tested, modified, and adapted as a ―new way of war‖ in various conflicts and military campaigns – from the Persian Gulf War (1991), through the Air War in Kosovo (1999), and subsequently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (2003-2010) While the intellectual thrust on what defines and drives the ―American‖ defense transformation, its strategic templates, and key operational terms, have changed over the past decade, its underlying aim has remained intact: to transform the U.S military into a more agile, mobile, integrated, and lethal force, capable of directly ―shaping‖ the strategic environment and defeating any existing or future adversary in line with U.S global geopolitical aspirations and interests. 10

Accordingly, one could argue that the mainstream RMA discourse has reflected

predominantly U.S.-centered theory, processes, and debate To begin with, since the

mid-1990s American RMA proponents have conceptualized the RMA in a broader context of the information revolution and its concomitant societal, economic, and political ramifications; projected to bring a paradigm shift from the ―industrial-age‖ toward 21st century

―information-age warfare.‖11

In other words, the underlying theme behind the varying RMA

conceptions has been not only the speed, but more importantly, the magnitude of change, and

9 One could argue that the U.S as a global superpower has the motives, resources, organizational and technological capacity to implement and actively exploit a comprehensive RMA-style defense transformation

10 See official U.S documents and publications of the past decade, which have examined the impact of the changing global strategic context for the U.S military as well as the rationale for attaining new

levels of military effectiveness: the Joint Vision 2010 (1995), Joint Vision 2020 (2000), Global Posture Review (2005), National Defense Strategy (2005), the Quadrennial Defense Review (2007).

11

Toffler, A a H (1993) War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century Boston, Little, Brown & Company.p.27-64

its implications for the military domain that may render traditional principles of uncertainty in war and conventional engagements [as characterized by Carl von Clausewitz‘s principles of war] obsolete.12 For example, RMA advocates have argued that the combination of systems and advanced technologies, including wide area of electronic sensors for long-range, all-

weather, target detection and acquisition, would essentially enable near real-time situational

awareness of the battlefield, and in doing so, mitigate the adverse effects traditionally

synonymous with the fog of war – or the pervasive nature of uncertainty, ambiguity, fear and

friction of battle.13 Traditional battlefield ―friction‖ or probability of error would be significantly reduced in future conflicts In the words of Elinor Sloan, ―more than precision munitions or the contribution of any particular military platform, it is the potential of new military technologies to reduce the ‗fog of war‘ that could change the way wars are fought.‖14

At the same time, the networking of individual weapons systems, platforms, and

―sensors and shooters‖ of the various military services through innovative operational and tactical RMA concepts and technologies would significantly enhance their interoperability, bringing about unprecedented levels of organizational synchronization, agility, and speed in the use of force Together with a range of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and their inter-service application, RMA-oriented military organizations would be able to conduct rapid, standoff, and precision strikes beyond the reach of enemy‘s defenses In theory, this would significantly mitigate the scope and magnitude of collateral damage, shorten the duration of conflicts, and also minimize combat casualty rates traditionally associated with high-intensity

conventional wars In doing so, an RMA-based force would yield a decisive military

advantage at virtually all levels of warfare, shortening the costs and duration of conflicts, and

ultimately, ensure the defeat of any adversary on one‘s terms.15

In the early 2000s, the relatively ambitious premise behind the IT-RMA has gradually permeated into U.S defense planning and management processes Under the umbrella of a broader ―defense transformation‖, broadly defined by the U.S Department of Defense (DOD)

as ―the process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation‘s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position,‖ the DOD accelerated a number of ambitious force modernization programs. 16 Each military service – the Air Force, Navy, Army, and the Marines also conceptualized their roadmaps and strategic templates of future warfare and their operational requirements that provided the rationale for the acquisition, procurement, and integration of specific RMA

―network-centric‖ weapons systems, platforms, and technologies Specifically, the U.S military would require new automated planning and battle management systems; advanced battle field fire-management systems; precision-guided munitions; advanced sensor technologies capable of long-range, all-weather, target detection and acquisition, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); advanced satellite/imagery systems; 4th and 5th generation combat aircrafts; stealth technologies; smaller & faster navy ships. 17

With its ambitious and wide-reaching aims and scope, however, the RMA has ignited

intense policy debates concerning its validity, applicability, and utility The key questions

powering the ―RMA debate‖ over the past two decades have focused on: (1) the definition, metrics, and impact of the revolution; (2) the pace, direction, and cost of technology in warfare, and (3) its relevance amid changes in the sources and character of security threats With the increasing sophistication in the development of RMA-oriented military technologies and R&D programs, many questions also emerged regarding the affordability, feasibility, and

desirability of a comprehensive defense transformation.18 Some of the most pressing questions included: is there an RMA, and if so, what does it mean – what is new or revolutionary? Is it a process signifying a real ―disruptive‖ shift in warfare or a mere continuation of technological progress and modernization of armed forces? If the RMA indeed stipulates a paradigm shift in warfare, what are the defense resource allocation priorities, force structure requirements and procurement needs in the context of future defense planning? Is there a need to pursue the RMA? And ultimately, how effective is the RMA in dealing with the complexity of the security challenges of the 21st century, characterized by the increasing volatility and uncertainty through the convergence of traditional security threats and non-linear/asymmetric threats? With these questions, the RMA debate has projected a

range of contending theoretical perspectives, differing views, and beliefs about the essence of

military power in the 21st century

Figure 1.1 RMA as a Theory, Process, and Debate

RMA shaping defense transformation processes that require sustained and substantial conceptual, technological, and organizational policy- driven innovation in defense planning and management, organizational structures, operational concepts, weapons procurement, and the use of force

across a broad spectrum of

conflict will reduce security

risks over time by improving

the ability to use force,

changing the framework of

war, and altering the

capacity of states to create

and project military power

for political ends

RMA

As the intellectual thrust focused on the U.S RMA theory, processes, and debate, there has not been a substantial research interests in investigating RMA diffusion paths and patterns in divergent strategic settings, particularly its impact on military modernization and defense innovation trajectories of small states and middle powers This is puzzling because a number of small states and middle powers, especially in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East, have been modernizing their forces by procuring selected advanced military systems and technologies, and adapting selected RMA-oriented concepts in their military doctrines.19Ongoing force modernization trends in both regions show the procurement of advanced air assets, air-defense systems, missiles, naval assets, stealth technologies, and upgrade and modernizations of ISR and C4I within ground forces In terms of military expenditures, for example, over a 10-year period 1999-2008, defense spending in East Asia increased by 56% with many countries planning major military purchases.20 Between 1990 and 2002, the Asia-Pacific region alone acquired more than $150 billion worth of arms, making the region the largest arms market in the world.21 Recent studies show that nearly every country in the Asia-Pacific currently possesses at least some ―fourth-generation‖ fighter aircraft that provides greater lethality, precision, range, and overall power projection capabilities.22

Underscoring this thesis is the basic assumption that notwithstanding the scope, magnitude, and sophistication of the ongoing U.S RMA-oriented defense transformation, its theory, process, and debate - cannot be confined solely to U.S perspectives alone Indeed, as Isaacson, Layne, and Arquilla argue ―as technologies become increasingly available to a wide range of states – including those not considered advanced, industrial economies – global

19 Lee, C M (2003) "East Asia's Awakening from Strategic Hibernation and the Role of Air Power." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 15(1): 219-274

20 SIPRI (2010) ―Recent Trends in Military Expenditure.‖ Stockholm: SIPRI

Available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends

21 Tellis, A J., M Wills, et al (2005) Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty p 15

22

A―fourth-generation‖ fighter includes aircrafts such as the Russian Su-27, Su-30, or Mig-29, the U.S F-16 or F/A-18, and the French Mirage-2000 – capable of firing standoff active radar-guided air-to- air missiles, such as the U.S AMRAAM or the Russian AA-12 See: Bitzinger, R (2004) "The Asia-Pacific Arms Market: Emerging Capabilities, Emerging Concerns." Asia-Pacific Security Studies 3(2):1-5

diffusion, and thus, military modernization, become increasingly likely.‖23

While the pace, character, and impact of the RMA diffusion may vary across different geographical regions, organizational structures, and strategic cultures, there are at least three underlying drivers that may support and accelerate its diffusion: (1) the persisting geopolitical insecurity, regional rivalry, and uncertainty stemming from the emergence of complex types of conflicts and threats of the 21st century that broaden national defense requirements and operational needs; (2) the increased economic growth rates, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, that increase the capacity to purchase cutting-edge weapons systems and accelerate force modernization programs, and ultimately (3) the rapid technological change embedded in the globalization, consolidation, and competition of global arms markets and defense industries that have to diversify their commercial interests through export-oriented strategies and innovation.24

In addition, there are a number of historical, institutional and socio-cultural factors that may facilitate [as well as constrain] diffusion of RMA-oriented concepts and technologies For example, as Goldman and Ross illustrate, diffusion can take multiple interactive paths – technological, doctrinal, organizational, and administrative as well as cultural.25 This is because military organizations can be considered both as comparative and competitive institutions that closely monitor each other, and calibrate their performance in relation to other militaries External competitive pressure may provide strong incentive for states to emulate the military practices of the most successful states in the system.26 A military capability proven successfully on the battlefield can stimulate responses abroad - to emulate, offset, or innovate In contrast, RMA-related concepts and processes can be also transmitted through collaborative processes, norms, and practices within alliance frameworks

―Lessons learned‖ from recent operational experiences are often filtered through strategic

23 Isaacson, J., C Layne, et al (1999) Predicting Military Innovation Santa Monica, RAND.p.1

24 Bitzinger, R (2003) Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? Oxford, Oxford University Press

25

Goldman, E and A Ross (2003) ―Concluding Chapter.‖ In: The Diffusion of Military Technology

and Ideas E Goldman and L Eliason (eds.) Stanford, Stanford University Press: 371-403 See also:

Goldman, E and T Mahnken (eds.) (2004) The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia New York, Palgrave

26

Goldman, E and L Eliason (eds.) (2003) The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas p.5

cultures of organizations attempting to adopt, adapt, or respond to the innovations elsewhere [See Chapters 2, 3] Overall, there are a number of complex external and internal factors that shape the pace, direction, and character of global RMA-oriented military modernization.27However, as Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason noted,

Despite the vital concerns at stake, academics are just beginning to investigate the process of [RMA] diffusion: how military knowledge, broadly defined to include hardware (e.g technology) and software (e.g doctrine, tactics, organizational form) diffuses through the international system, or what factors enhance or inhibit incorporating innovations into defense structures…despite the large body of scholarship on military innovation, remarkably few studies explore wither historical or contemporary processes

of diffusion of military innovations.28

1.2 Research Objectives

The relative dearth of scholarly literature on global RMA diffusion paths and patterns represents the key departure point for this study In particular, this dissertation attempts to contribute to the scholarly and policy-oriented literature in strategic and international security studies by addressing the broad puzzle of how the global RMA diffusion – the process of international transmission, communication, and interaction of RMA-oriented concepts and technologies - has shaped the paths, patterns, and scope of military modernization and innovation trajectories of selected small states? In a reverse mode, how have selected small states influenced the conceptualization and transmission of the RMA theory, processes, and debate? Furthermore, why and when do selected small states decide to pursue an RMA-oriented military modernization? And what are the key theoretical and policy ramifications of RMA diffusion? In particular, what are the key determinants as well as limitations and challenges shaping the different RMA diffusion trajectories? Implicit in these questions is the hypothesis that RMA diffusion outside the great power context – its pace, character,

drivers, extent, and impact have varied based on the state‘s ability to recognize, anticipate,

exploit, and sustain military innovation – conceptual, organizational, and technological innovation intended to enhance the military‘s ability to prepare for, fight, and win wars

In a theoretical perspective, conventional schools of thought in international relations and public policy have argued that the diffusion of military innovation is typically hierarchical – the direction and character of military innovation is propelled by strategic competition between great powers, and then selectively adopted or emulated by less advanced

―peripheral‖ or smaller units For example, as Kenneth Waltz noted, ―contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity And so the weapons of the major contenders and even their strategies begin to look much the same over the world.‖29

Similarly, spatial theories of diffusion processes predict that military innovation will proceed rapidly among geographically, culturally, and politically ―proximate‖ states or states with an established sense of ―regional‖ identification created by similar political traditions, structures, or alliances.30 There are at least four additional schools of thought on military innovation that put forward various ‗top-down‘ approaches and debates These emphasize either civil-military relations, inter-service politics, intra-service politics or organizational culture as the main sources of innovation.31 Specifically, Barry Posen‘s theory suggests that military innovation can be stimulated only through civilian-intervention, major operational failures, or persistent resource constraints forcing military organizations to innovate.32 In contrast, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that it is the inter-service competition that drives the diffusion of military innovation.33 While the sources of military innovation may differ, the prevailing view has been that diffusion of military innovation has been a hierarchical process that shapes state‘s choices in adopting particular innovations

29 Waltz, K (1979) Theory of International Politics New York, McGraw-Hill.p.127

30 Hall, J and J Ikenberry (1989) The State Milton Keynes, Open University Press

31 Foley, R., S Griffin, et al (2011) "Transformation in Contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War." International Affairs 87(2): 253-270; Farrell, T and T Terriff (eds.) (2002) The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology Boulder, Lynne Rienner

32 Posen, B (1984) The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars Ithaca, Cornell University Press

33

Rosen, S P (1991) Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military Ithaca, Cornell University Press

However, historical and empirical evidence of RMA diffusion outside the great power context suggests much broader variation in the responses to new military technologies, ideas and knowledge.34 As this thesis shows, RMA diffusion dynamics in small states includes both internal processes of military innovation as well as external processes of military/strategic adaptation or emulation 35 In this context, RMA-oriented military modernization may not always require simultaneous technological, doctrinal, and organizational breakthroughs, but may span in the spectrum between incremental modernization and discontinuous transformation Indeed, one can triangulate RMA diffusion trajectories in three inter-related vectors: 36

(1) Paths - emulation, adaptation, and innovation;

(2) Patterns - speculation, experimentation, and implementation;

(3) Magnitude - exploration, modernization, and transformation;

Military emulation paths involve importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other military organizations Adaptation can be defined through adjustments of existing military means and methods, in which multiple adaptations over time may lead to innovation Military innovation then involves developing new military technologies, tactics, strategies, and structures.37 Farrell and Terriff observe that ―it is only when these new military means and methods result in new organizational goals, strategies, and structures that innovation, adaptation, and emulation lead to major military change.‖38 Similarly, according

to Thomas Mahnken, RMA-oriented military innovation may occur in three distinct but often overlapping phases: (1) speculation; (2) experimentation; and (3) implementation 39 Speculation phase can be defined through novel ways for solving existing operational problems or acknowledging the potential of emerging technologies As speculation turns into

34 Goldman, E and L Eliason (eds.) (2003) The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas Stanford, Stanford University Press

greater awareness, military services establish experimental organizations, battle laboratories, and units tasked with experimenting with new concepts, force structures, weapons technologies, and warfare methods With the broadening and deepening experimentation processes a consensus emerges, when the military leadership and services decide to adopt, adapt, and later refine selected experimental operational concepts, warfare methods, organizational force structures, or new generations of weapons systems and technologies The implementation phase is evident in a range of indicators: i.e the establishment of new military formations; doctrinal revision to accommodate new ways of war; resource allocation supporting new concepts; development of formal transformation strategy; establishment of innovative military units; new branches and career paths; and ultimately, field training exercises with new doctrine, organizations, or technologies.40 By triangulating military innovation paths and patterns, one can distill the magnitude of RMA-oriented diffusion trajectory in three distinct levels: (1) exploration, (2) modernization, and (3) transformation.41Exploration includes both speculation and emulation, with initial attempts to develop new areas of technological expertise; military modernization involves continuous upgrades or improvements of existing military capabilities through the acquisition of new imported or indigenously developed weapons systems and supporting assets;42 Transformation can be then characterized in the context of a ―discontinuous‖ or ―disruptive‖ military innovation that meets both policy and strategy In the words of Andrew Ross,

Disruptive, revolutionary innovation is the result of the confluence of discontinuous technological, doctrinal, and organizational changes; it occurs when discontinuous hardware and architectural changes coalesce and come together in a coherent, integrated whole Existing capabilities are not optimized but rendered obsolete and displaced New dominant technologies, doctrines, and organizations are established and integrated as never before New performance metrics are embraced.43

Similarly, Stephen Peter Rosen conceptualizes disruptive military innovation as:

Change that forces one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions Such innovations involve a new way of war, with new ideas of how the components of the organization relate to each other and to the enemy, and new operational procedures conforming to those ideas They involve changes in critical tasks, the tasks around which war-plans revolve.44

Figure 1.2 Conceptualizing RMA Diffusion Trajectories: Paths, Patterns, and Levels

Source: Author; Based on Mahnken, T (1999); Farrell, T and Terriff, T (2002); Ross, A (2010);

In a policy-oriented perspective, understanding RMA-oriented diffusion trajectories

is important for the security of small states given their underlying strategic advantages and risks On one hand, the RMA as a theory promises to offset geostrategic vulnerabilities and security challenges of small states by leveraging advanced weapons systems and technologies

as ―force multipliers‖ and by developing innovative operational concepts and capabilities As Martin Libicki noted, ―by making use of the technologies of the revolution in military affairs, small countries can tilt the odds against an invading army and remove the certainty of success that once made aggression worthwhile.―45 This is not to say that in earlier periods, technological means and innovations mitigating small states‘ vulnerabilities have not been

recognized.46 However, with the global diffusion of RMA-related concepts and technologies, selected small states may have the potential to significantly enhance their military capabilities and strategic options They may have access to advanced military technologies that provide opportunities for developing unique operational capabilities in terms of mobility, speed, precision strike, firepower, battlespace intelligence, communications, and command and control that amplify their strategic options, previously not available, for the use of force At the same time, however, RMA diffusion may create new strategic competition and security dilemmas by shaping opponent‘s strategic choices, and creating asymmetric counter-measures that may offset the strategic advantages of the RMA-oriented technologies, organizations, and concepts In this context, the key policy question emerges - how can small states leverage an RMA-oriented military innovation – conceptual, organizational, and technological, while mitigating concomitant security and defense management risks? Perhaps more importantly, what are the key variables that may determine its effective implementation?

1.3 Defining Small States: Absolute vs Relational Definitions

In order to examine the RMA diffusion paths and patterns in the eyes and experiences

of selected small states, it is essential to define the military and strategic context The first

step is to ask what do we mean by a small state? This question has propelled a wide range of

contending debates in the areas of small state studies and international relations for over four decades.47 This is because there are inherent conceptual tensions and difficulties in bracketing and defining the shades of gray of small states and their relative capabilities, relevance, policy options, and patterns of behaviour in the international system First, a literature survey

identifies two contending categories of definitions of small states: absolute and relational 48

Underscoring both categories is the neorealist assumption that the behavior of states in the

46

Creveld, M (1989) Technology and War: From 2000 B.C to the Present New York, Free Press.

47 Ingebritsen, C (2006) Small States in International Relations Seattle, University of Washington Press

48

Wiberg, H (1987) "The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defenses." Journal of Peace Research 24(4): 339-363

anarchic international system is mainly determined by the power relations and differentials among them.49 The former includes indicators of „size‟ that serve as the basis for classification

such as population, area, GNP, size of military forces, and other numerical indicators These are then compared or correlated with other variables The smallness of a state is then a function of comparative quantitative indicators, defined largely in absolute terms.50

On the other hand, relational definitions are based on the premise that ―smallness‖

means the lack of influence in the international environment, or high sensitivity to the

environment, and lack of immunity against influences from it, or both Implicit here is the notion is that small states are essentially weak states According to Vital, ―the smaller the human and material resources of a state, the greater are the difficulties it must remount if it is

to maintain any valid political options at all, and, in consequence, the smaller the state, the less viable it is as a genuinely independent member of the international community.‖51 Small

states, however, are not necessarily synonymous with weak states and vice versa.52 As

Handel noted, ―in the study of international relations, it is not the size of a state which matters, but rather its relative strength.‖53 The starting point is thus measuring the power of a state not

against all other countries or a single source, but in relation to its neighbours, and by the degree to which the strength at its disposal matches its national goals and ambitions.54 Handel proposes a dynamic, multi-criteria definition of small states based on population, area, economy, military power, interests and influence in the international system In doing so, he examines the internal as well as external sources of states‘ weakness or strength embedded in the power constellations of different international systems He warns that it is impossible to define groups of states in the international system with a simple set of tangible measures into

49 Handel, M (1990) Weak States in the International System London, Frank Cass

50 According to Ingebritsen, the absolute classification of small states have been rigid and often contested due to their arbitrary nature See: Ingebritsen, C (2006) Small States in International Relations Seattle, University of Washington Press

51 Vital, D (1967) The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations Oxford, Clarendon

52 For example, Singapore is viewed as a small country This is certainly the case when it is compared

to Indonesia; the latter has a huge archipelago and a population of 242 million, compared to the tiny island state of Singapore, with just 4.4 million people However, Singapore‘s defense budget is twice that of Indonesia

53

Handel, M (1990) Weak States in the International System London, Frank Cass.p.10

54

Ibid.

―one concise, precise, and elegant statement‖ as their position is constantly being challenged, tested, and changed In other words, applying quantitative variables such as population or territorial size, GNP per capita, size of armed forces, and other measures to determine the

―smallness‖ or evaluate states‘ position in the international system significantly neglects other

important qualitative or intuitive criteria such as national character or ―effective population‖

that impacts the state‘s economic, industrial, and social capacity

The purpose of this thesis, however, is not to dwell on debating the validity of conceptually precise definitions of ―small states‖ that may be essentially arbitrary As Vital noted, ―a loosely defined concept of a small state that eschews rigid specifications is preferable to a precise definition.‖55

The key aim here is to conceptualize baseline

characteristics of small states that are relevant for the study of RMA Accordingly, this study defines ―small states‖ in the following three dimensions: (1) geostrategic constraints, (2)

relative capabilities and (3) patterns of behavior First, small states in this study are

conceptualized along Handel‘s relational approach, defined in the prevailing geostrategic

predicaments in their respective regional or geographic settings and configurations The

common denominator is their prevailing sense of insecurity and drive to ensure their existence and survival in conditions of strategic inferiority In this context, there are at least five characteristics:

(1) Relative asymmetries of the location, geography and size;

(2) Demographic, economic, and natural resource constraints;

(3) Dependence on external political and material support;

(4) Security uncertainties or proximity to areas of conflict;

(5) Relations and importance between and to great powers;

The sum of these factors then shapes the security equation of small states – from strategic assessments and defense policies toward military capabilities and force employment, and their patterns of behavior in the international arena In this system-level viewpoint, the anarchic nature of the international system determines the behavior of states and vice versa However, small states have traditionally not been able to significantly shape or change the

55

Vital, D (1971) The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict London, Oxford University Press

system-wide forces that influence them.56 The patterns of behavior by small states in the international system typically include: low-level participation in world affairs, narrow scope

of foreign policy issues, limitations of behavior to their immediate geographic arena, reliance

on superpower for protection, partnerships, and resources, active membership in multinational institutions, disproportionate spending of foreign policy resources to ensure physical and political security and survival. 57

Notwithstanding the varying geostrategic predicaments that have traditionally shaped national security and military strategies of small states, not all small states in this definition are relevant for the study of the RMA Indeed, as shown in detail in Chapter 3, there are

selected RMA-oriented small states as well as middle powers that have not only the motives, but also the means and sophistication to pursue an RMA-oriented military modernization In

this context, there are three additional defining pillars: (1) defense management capacity to plan, organize, lead, and control armed forces and their supporting systems to adopt particular RMA trajectory, while sustaining sufficient military capabilities to achieve national security

objectives; (2) relatively advanced, reliable, cost-effective defense industrial base capable of

developing innovative defense technologies, niche products, and services; and (3) combat proficiency to engage in a range of military operations, and having the potential to integrate and exploit selected RMA concepts and technologies at the operational level

1.4 Rationale & Policy Significance

Throughout the Cold War, the range of viable foreign and defense policy options for small states to deal with their security predicaments was not wide Not all small states have been necessarily considered as weak states; however, they have been more dependent on outside political and material support, particularly by great powers On the one hand, small

states have aimed at strengthening alliances with great powers – a form of external

balancing 58 - in which a great power defends the interests of a small state in subordinate

domains and assures at least partial extended deterrence, but at the same time it may impose costly diplomatic attachments and long-term policy constraints Alternatively, small states have pursued self-reliance by maximizing their available internal resources; a form of

internal balancing However, as Cohen noted, the potential ‗payoffs‘ of internal balancing

has been limited, as small states, especially ―those seeking to counterbalance their ‗smallness‘

by increasing levels of military expenditure and production invariably find that the ancillary economic and social costs associated with pursuing self-reliance are always high, and in many cases crippling.‖59 Notwithstanding alternative strategies for small states such as

―defensive isolation‖ (Systemschliessung), neutrality or diverse strategies of adaptation such

as ―active foreign policy‖ or ―non-offensive defense,‖ the structure and realities of the anarchic international system has arguably forced most small states to adopt defensive postures based on a mix of both external and internal balancing.60

With the end of the Cold War era, however, and the resulting systemic shifts in the international arena characterized by changes in the balance of power, the increasing salience

of non-state actors, socio-cultural and economic globalization, and the information revolution, the traditional security equation of small states has been changing According to Inbar, while the impact of these shifts varies in different geographical areas of the globe, two key variables

in the security paradigm of small states have been affected: freedom of action and relative

capabilities.61 First, the demise of the communist Soviet bloc and the prevalence of the United States as the sole global superpower alleviated the political constraints traditionally imposed by superpowers on small states during the Cold War, permitting relatively greater freedom of action to pursue their strategic interests In this context, regional actors that have been once constrained by the fear of superpower intervention can pursue their national

58 Waltz, K N (1979) Theory of International Politics Boston, McGraw-Hill

59 Cohen, S (1995) "Small States and their Armies: Re-structuring the Militia Format of the Israel Defense Force." The Journal of Strategic Studies(18): 78-93

60 Inbar, E (1996) "Contours of Israeli New Strategic Thinking." Political Science Quarterly (111):

41-64.

61

Inbar, E and G Sheffer (eds.) (1997) The National Security of Small States in a Changing World London, Frank Cass

interests with fewer concerns on the global implications of their policies.62 At the same time, small states that face or are threatened by aggression can no longer be assured of superpower intervention for their defense, which essentially amplifies their security dilemmas

Second, the prevailing insecurity and uncertainties of the post Cold War era has subsequently increased the defense requirements of many small states In particular, the means and modes of conflict in the 21st century have become more dispersed and more decentralized, with the convergence of conventional, low-intensity, asymmetrical, and non-linear threats blurring traditional offense and defense lines The progressive complexity of emerging threats and conflicts thus means the widening of the scope and character of operational requirements Modern military organizations are ever more required to field multi-mission capable forces backed by advanced military technologies that are adaptable and interoperable This in turn amplifies the relevance of the RMA theory and processes that emphasize networked systems, platforms, organizations, and concepts to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in the use of force In this context, the ongoing globalization of arms markets, arms competition, and privatization of defense industries may enable selected small states to gain access for procurement of RMA-oriented military technologies seen as significantly enhancing their defense and even power projection capabilities

Pursuing an RMA-oriented military modernization, however, is bound to a range of policy impediments, feasibility risks, and problems - from institutional barriers to change, designing new doctrines and operational concepts, to budgetary and resource constraints that limit the options for weapon systems, procurement, and acquisition According to Treddenick,

―managing the RMA means finding the resources to make it a reality- the essential issue is affordability.‖ 63

In other words, as Horowitz noted, ―as the cost per unit of technological components of a military innovation increases and fewer commercial applications exists, the

level of financial intensity required to adapt the innovation increases.‖64

For small states with limited resources, the development, procurement and integration of RMA-related technologies stipulates even greater need for efficient allocation of scarce defense resources that must be balanced in the context of short- and long-term national security objectives and operational plans – i.e with regard to the existing force structures, quality and quantity of weapons systems available for deployment, operations and maintenance, logistical, infrastructure, and training In this context, policymakers may face substantial political pressures to downsize defense expenditures in favor of policies that aim at ensuring socio-economic stability and growth As a result, the financial constraints coupled with broader resource mobilization challenges have serious implications on the selection, acquisition and procurement of systems and platforms that characterize the ―hardware‖ side of the RMA

At the same time, however, enhancing military effectiveness cannot be achieved by simply buying new hardware alone.65 According to Goldman and Mahnken, implementation requires a formal transformation strategy; new units to exploit and counter innovative mission areas; revising doctrine to include new missions; establishing new branches and career paths within the military; changing the curriculum of professional military education institutions; and field-training exercises to practice and refine concepts.66 The RMA diffusion and its variations thus pose a number of challenges for decision-makers Defense planners must first define and contextualize the relationship and linkages between the varying RMA concepts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels At the strategic level, this means clearly identifying both short-term and long-term strategic risks, resource allocation priorities, and rethinking national security conceptions

Figure 1.3 Policy Challenges of RMA-Oriented Military Modernization

Source: Adapted from the Swiss Federal Department of Defense (2009);

At the operational level, defense policy makers must formulate the joint service) operational concepts, doctrines and training programs, devise specific procurement methodologies for advanced technologies, while identifying and solving short-term or current operational problems The lack of interoperability may create serious problems on the battlefield, with consequences for the political realm.67 Furthermore, at the operational level, RMA-oriented military modernization may bring new language and terms of reference, changing standing operating procedures, exercise plans, and organizational structures In short, an RMA-oriented military modernization requires substantial organizational adaptation

(inter-at virtually all levels Yet, with limited defense resources, deeply entrenched str(inter-ategic cultures, organizational resistance to change, and inter-service rivalries and vested organizational interests, the pace and character and RMA implementation may be incremental or gradual

Notwithstanding the range of defense management problems, perhaps the most compelling impediments to an RMA-style military modernization and innovation is the broader strategic context of the changing global security dynamics and emerging threats Conflicts in the 21st century are characterized by unconventional, unforeseen, and unpredictable methods of warfare There are a number of low-tech and relatively inexpensive

New strategic defense concepts;

Integrating RMA into defense planning;

Devising strategic capabilities plan;

How to implement strategic RMA-oriented policies and plans;

Identify and solve long-term strategic problems, risks; Systems Integration;

Operational

Changes in military strategy;

Formulating joint and inter-service (Army, Air, Navy) doctrines;

Operational plans;

Capabilities development programs;

Procurement programs;

Training programs;

How to implement newly adopted operational policies, strategies, and doctrines; Identify and solve operational problems;

Tactical

Language and terms

of reference;

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP);

Work plans;

Exercise plans;

Field operations plans;

How to implement organizational policies and short-term plans;

Identify and solve current problems;

asymmetric responses and countermeasures that can selectively mitigate key advantages of

RMA-oriented forces Figure 1.4 illustrates this pattern of “challenge, strategic response,

and adaptation”, where non-state armed groups or terrorist organizations are motivated to

achieve a relatively high level of ―effectiveness‖ or political leverage by utilizing a mix of high-tech and low-cost technologies and adapting asymmetric tactical negation not restricted

by traditional rules of conflict They may attempt to subvert the technological advantages of RMA-oriented states through a prolonged, unstructured tactics, seeking to exploit their political and strategic vulnerabilities Similarly, states with outdated conventional armies that cannot finance nor develop modern weapons technologies may opt for asymmetric responses (operational or technical) by pursuing the development and production of WMDs and ballistic missiles

Figure 1.4 Asymmetric Responses & Limitations to the RMA

Source: PPT Kaspar Stefan Zellweger, Geneva Institute of International Studies (2008);

Taken together, the RMA debate is not solely academic If national security planners

of selected small states and middle powers are to make appropriate strategic decisions, they need to understand both the limitations in integrating RMA-related concepts and technologies

in their force modernization programs, as well as its security and defense policy ramifications Hence, there is a need to understand the diffusion of RMA concepts and technologies from a

comparative perspective: i.e what are the unique aspects, similarities and differences in RMA

U.S – Full Spectrum RMA; Global reach

Israel, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the EU;

Traditional Conventional armies (i.e North Korea, Syria, Iran, Pakistan)

Non-State Actors: i.e

Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah Hamas FARC LTTE

Asymmetric WMD Aspirations

integration approaches by small states? How has the RMA affected procurement needs of small states? To what extent can small states afford an RMA-oriented military modernization? What are the reactions and interactions between RMA concepts and selected military industries of small states? To what degree has the RMA altered the operational conduct, training, and outcome in the use of force by small states? Overall, does the integration of RMA-related concepts and capabilities offset the traditional geostrategic predicaments of small states; while at the same time provide answers to the emerging security challenges?

Indeed, RMA diffusion and adaptation in military modernization trajectories poses a range of strategic advantages, opportunities as well as policy limitations and risks While the magnitude and impact of the RMA diffusion and adaptation in the military modernization paths of selected small states may not encompass a ―full spectrum‖ discontinuity in the means

and modes of war per se, in the long-term its integration propels a comprehensive rethinking

of defense policies, military doctrines, defense technology management processes, organizational force structures, and force employment These in turn require changes in strategy, which amplifies the policy relevance and implication of the RMA diffusion and adaptation by selected small states

1.5 Why Israel and South Korea – Initial Observations

Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom suggesting that Israel and South Korea reflect fundamentally divergent historical experiences, security environments, political and economic development models, varying strategic and military cultures, and thus their RMA trajectories cannot be compared, this study argues that both states represent relevant cases for

a comparative study of RMA diffusion and adaptation To begin with, Israel and South Korea

can be considered as small states from the relational point of view68 - based on the relative asymmetries of their location, geography and size; demographic, economic, and natural resource constraints; dependence on external political and material support [particularly the United States]; security uncertainties or proximity to areas of conflict; and relations and

68

Handel, M (1990) Weak States in the International System London, Frank Cass.p.9-48

importance between and to great powers Both states have historically faced an array of persistent security challenges and uncertainties brought by the realities of their external and internal security conditions, asymmetries of their location, size, and geopolitical constraints [See Chapter 3] During the Cold War, both Israel and South Korea‘s security environment has been shaped primarily by traditional conventional threats and linear threat-based defense planning However, with the end of the superpower rivalry and subsequent shifts in the international and regional strategic environment, the sources and characteristics of threats have been changing In this context, both Israel and South Korea‘s security environment has been increasingly characterized by the convergence of even more complex or ―hybrid‖ security threats, which combine conventional, asymmetrical, low-intensity, and non-linear threat dimensions These include regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, limited incursions and border skirmishes by both state and non-state actors, information warfare and cyber attacks, as well as traditional security threats posed by conventional power projection aspirations and force developments by neighboring hostile states The increasing amalgamation of security threats have in turn created greater security uncertainties and defense policy challenges, which have propelled robust debates within their strategic and policy communities regarding the relevance of their traditional security paradigms, direction and scope of their particular force modernization programs, defense requirements, and overall strategic choices Indeed, facing new strategic realities, both Israel and South Korea have been rethinking their traditional security conceptions, defense planning and management processes, and force postures While their defense concepts, strategic adaptations, operational conduct have varied, both states have essentially aimed to enhance their military capabilities based on ―smaller and smarter‖ forces In the process, both Israel and South Korea have been studying, benchmarking, and debating selected U.S.-based RMA concepts and technologies, adopting them based on their defense needs, available resources, and lessons learned In the Israeli case, its practical

implementation of RMA–oriented tactics may have even preceded both the American and Soviet conceptual formulation.69

Yet, both Israel and South Korea have experienced a number of challenges in their RMA-oriented military modernization; from defining new strategic and operational concepts through a broad range of defense management constraints, and perhaps most importantly, by the emergence of new asymmetric forms of warfare Indeed, the task of formulating a comprehensive strategic blueprint of what constitutes an Israeli or South Korean RMA has proven challenging Security planners in both Israel and South Korea must answer anew to what degree are their traditional defense planning paradigms relevant in meeting their continuing conventional security threats as well as a wide spectrum of emerging conflicts and non-linear crises? How to resolve the gap between long-term strategic planning and short-term operational requirements? What weapons technologies and systems should be procured

at what price, and which of them are relevant within an affordable framework? What elements of the RMA are relevant in the broader strategic context of the 21st century? Accordingly, both Israel and South Korea may represent relevant empirical cases not only for testing the validity of the RMA hypotheses, but also from the policy-oriented perspective on how to cope with security and defense management challenges posed by the RMA diffusion

At the same time, however, in drawing close parallels between South Korean and Israeli security challenges, several important points should be noted First, their regional security environment and strategic realities do not reflect an exact microscopic copy of one another Indeed, many Israeli as well as South Korean defense experts would argue that the conflict spectrum of each state remain fundamentally unique; with Israel traditionally facing a dynamic, active, and more intensive conflict spectrum, whereas South Korea‘s threat environment reflecting rather static, defensive patterns (despite North Korea‘s acts of violence) Moreover, since the end of the Korean War, and for nearly 60 years onward, South

69

As Dima Adamsky points out, ―while the Americans were the first to produce RMA-type munitions, and the Soviets were the first to theorize on their revolutionary implications, the Israel Defense forces (IDF) were the first to employ these revolutionary weapons in combat Adamsky, D (2010) The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel Palo Alto, Stanford University Press.p.4

Korea defined its security through collective defense mechanisms institutionalized in the U.S.-ROK alliance, which provided assurances of defense and deterrence vis-à-vis external military threats On the other hand, Israel‘s national security conceptions, defense strategies, and operational conduct have been traditionally focused on pursuing self-reliance, albeit recognizing the impediments of superpower involvement coupled with external dependence

on major weapons systems procurement This dimension has shaped the varying motivations for adopting RMA-related concepts and technologies Second, their internal political and social fabric along with strategic culture and military thinking has varied Third, the size of their forces, organizational force structure, and weapons systems deployment has also differed, particularly in terms of quality and quantity These claims, while valid, do not detract from the validity of exploring their RMA diffusion and adaptation trajectories that extend beyond the differences in circumstances Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, Israel and South Korea‘s responses to the RMA may provide relevant test cases of how different strategic contexts and experiences may shape different patterns of military and technological innovation by small states; aimed to leverage new war-fighting concepts and/or new means of integrating advanced weapon technologies

1.6 Chapter Themes & Arguments

The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature overview of the RMA debate, its intellectual history, diffusion, and schools of thought that have emerged over the past two decades It sketches the evolving character and direction of the RMA conceptual debate on both theoretical and policy-oriented levels, and argues that issues surrounding the RMA and its diffusion, emulation, and adaptation in the security, defense planning, and use of force by selected small states provide relatively unexplored territory in the ongoing RMA discourse To demonstrate this, the Chapter provides an overview of the stages or ―Five RMA Waves‖ through which the RMA debate has evolved – primarily, but not exclusively in the U.S military thought In doing so, the Chapter attempts to contextualize the varying approaches in understanding the RMA, and

emphasizes that the vast majority of RMA and defense transformation studies have been relatively silent or ignored the implications of RMA diffusion and adaptation in security, defense planning, and the use of force by small states and middle powers, particularly in the strategic contexts of East Asia and the Middle East

Chapter 3 presents the methodological foundations, research strategy and design, analytical framework and data collection used in this study It begins by outlining the range

of conceptual lenses, focus areas, and segments that could be applied to a comparative study

of RMA diffusion: national security conceptions, defense management processes, and the use

of force Subsequently, it selects one particular tier – theoretical and conceptual dimensions

of RMA diffusion - the “software side” as principal unit of analysis The Chapter then

projects a comparative analytical framework that synthesizes ―RMA diffusion diagnostics‖ variables into patterns, drivers, and constraints As with any empirical study, the chapter conceptualizes case selection criteria and metrics that define RMA-oriented small states relevant for this study Last but not least, the Chapter addresses potential caveats, research barriers, and threats to validity

Moving to the first case study, Chapter 4 explores the conceptual diffusion and adaptation of the RMA in Israel - through the lens the continuity and change of its national security conceptions, defense strategies, and operational experience of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) The Chapter argues that development of Israeli RMA concepts from the mid-1990‘s onward should be conceptualized primarily through the lens of continuity and change in Israel‘s security conceptions, focused on retaining Israel‘s qualitative ―strategic edge‖ amid continuously changing operational requirements In this context, the Chapter begins by defining Israel‘s traditional security paradigm - its assumptions, foundations, and core elements: deterrence, early warning, and rapid military decision It also characterizes the traditional patterns in IDF‘s operational conduct and use of force: offensive ethos, preemption, and rapid maneuver Subsequently, the Chapter identifies the sources of change and debates

in Israeli military thought since the Yom Kippur War onwards, and projects the development

of RMA-oriented operational concepts over the last three decades It points out that Israel has

been one of the first countries to apply RMA-related technologies in combat in the early 1980s under the conceptual umbrella of ―integrated battle.‖ IDF‘s experiences have inherently influenced the American, Soviet, and European strategic perspectives and debates on the future of warfare However, until the late 1990s, the IDF has not viewed the emergence of the RMA as a relevant paradigm shift, nor has initiated a comprehensive and disruptive defense transformation drive Rather, Israel‘s RMA discourse has reflected a continuous debate between the proponents of traditional concepts and reformers - those arguing for new military thinking within the IDF In this context, the changing strategic realities and operational experience over the last two decades forced the IDF to rethink its traditional threat-oriented concepts, and experiment with innovative combat tactics at different levels of warfare The culmination of Israeli RMA-oriented conceptual military innovation and debate has reached

in the mid-2000s, when the IDF experimented with a theory of Systemic Operational Design and its integration into a new Concept of Operations (CONOP)

Chapter 5 defines South Korea‘s RMA trajectory through the complexity of shifts in the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula Since the early 1990s, South Korea has been attempting to undertake a comprehensive military modernization in order to respond to the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with the U.S forces, and eventually attain self-reliant defense posture In the process, South Korean RMA diffusion path proceeded on two inter-related levels: external/emulative – shaped by the shifts

in the U.S.-ROK alliance and U.S defense transformation; internal/adaptive – defined in South Korea‘s changing strategic assessments and policy-imperatives to develop ―self-reliant‖ military capabilities Arguably, the former has shaped the latter by providing key benchmarks for defense planning, interoperability requirements, and training of the ROK armed forces Selected U.S RMA-oriented defense transformation concepts have gradually permeated into the U.S.-ROK combined training and operations, and subsequently shaped the character and direction of South Korea‘s military modernization However, the compelling and relatively ambitious character of Korean RMA-oriented defense plans have been in sharp contrast to the prevailing structural and political realities such as contrasting calibrations of defense