Singapores role in indonesias confrontation of malaysia and the impact of confrontation on singapore indonesia relations 3

Indonesia‘s Confrontation of Malaysia was a major event in the British decolonisation process in Southeast Asia and has largely been examined from the domestic political and British stra

Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation examines the role Singapore played in Confrontation and how Confrontation has affected Singapore-Indonesia relations The orthodox historiography of this bilateral relationship tends to start with the period of hostility during the Confrontation years from 1963 to 1966 After the Confrontation came to an end in 1966 when Suharto took power from Sukarno, Singapore-Indonesia relations were still marked by hostility because of the execution of the two Indonesian marines

in 1968 despite Suharto‘s pleas for clemency However, relations became cordial and cooperative in 1973 until 1998 when Suharto stepped down In the post 1998 or post New Order period, relations have been characterised by moments of unfriendly exchanges although the overall tenor of the relationship has remained close and cooperative (Hamilton-Hart, 2009)

While this orthodox interpretation is commonly accepted as the way bilateral relations progressed, the study of how British decolonisation affected bilateral relations has not been subjected to much scrutiny Indonesia‘s Confrontation of Malaysia was a major event in the British decolonisation process in Southeast Asia and has largely been examined from the domestic political and British strategic points

of view

This dissertation highlights the agency of the political actors involved in the politics of decolonisation, Confrontation, and nation-building during the 1960s, with a focus on how Singapore played a central role in escalating regional tensions during Confrontation The focus on Singapore‘s long overlooked role during Confrontation is important because it sheds light on the key role Confrontation played in the re-

organisation and development of the international relations of Southeast Asian colonial states.1

post-An appreciation of the role played by Singapore in relation to the role played

by Indonesia in the prelude to Confrontation which was characterised by the British decolonisation process in Southeast Asia, the Confrontation years from 1963 to 1966, and the aftermath of Confrontation up till 1973 when Singapore-Indonesia relations were restored, highlights how each side drove the conflict and thus related to each other These years were marked by the search by both countries (although Singapore was then briefly part of Malaysia) for their own post-colonial identity which was played out in the form of their strategic and international behaviour during the Confrontation years The focus on Singapore‘s role in the prelude to Confrontation and the years of the conflict is significant because, firstly, it challenges notions about the hegemonic role Indonesia plays in Southeast Asia For example, Ganesan argues that ―Indonesian political stability and leadership are crucial to the maintenance of a stable environment in Southeast Asia‖ and that

―in a positive situation, Indonesian hegemonic ambitions would be usefully channelled into a regional leadership role, not unlike its primus inter pares status in ASEAN On the other hand, in a negative situation, the entire region could become politically turbulent, akin to the Indonesian military confrontation against Malaysia between 1963 and 1966‖ (2005: 81)

1

Sorensen highlighted in 1997 that the post-colonial state is one other main state prototype in the international system in addition to the ―taken for granted‖ Westphalian state, which has largely formed the basis for the analysis of conflict and cooperation in the international system However, this approach fails to ―adequately investigate substantial changes in statehood and their consequences for conflict and cooperation‖, which requires an analysis of how ―specific types of statehood set the stage for distinct forms of conflict and cooperation.‖ (―An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood:

Consequences for Conflict Cooperation‖, Review of International Studies, Vol.23 No.3, Jul 1997, pp

Thus, it appears that an explanation for Confrontation was that Indonesian hegemonic ambitions were not accommodated in a positive manner Similarly, Emmers argues that, in the quest for hegemony in maritime Southeast Asia, ―Indonesia exercised coercive power in the mid-1960s‖ (2005: 649) in the form of Confrontation Emmers also addresses the question of whether Indonesia can be regarded as a regional hegemon possessing the ability to ―inflict punishment on a regional and international rival, to cause a change in the distribution of power as well as the pattern of relationships by its ability to act alone, and to develop a process to achieve consent and restraint among rivals within a region‖ (Kapur, cited in Emmers, 2005: 647)

Indonesia, however, could not and did not act unilaterally in a way that set the pattern of relationships in Southeast Asia While Sukarno and his political leaders at that time expressed their vision of what post-colonial Southeast Asia should be – Hatta in fact echoed consistent Indonesian claims that ―Indonesia has no territorial claims whatsoever beyond the area of the former Netherlands Indies‖ (a posture which was consistently ignored or distrusted by Britain and her allies who held the belief that Sukarno had to have expansionist ambitions) and that ―once Indonesia had achieved independence, the ending of colonialism everywhere became one of the objectives of its foreign policy‖ (1965: 139) – it did not mean that Indonesia harboured territorial ambitions and sought regional hegemony This was because Singapore‘s interests and strategies relating to the establishment of Malaysia and how the PAP collaborated with the Tunku and the British to form Malaysia were crucial factors pushing Indonesia on the path towards Confrontation.2

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Poulgrain argues that ―the British played a part in fomenting confrontation to facilitate the inclusion

of Sarawak in the formation of Malaysia‖ and that ―given the conditions which prevailed in Sarawak in late 1962 and early 1963, the principles of anti-colonialism espoused by Sukarno inevitable drew him and Indonesia into Konfrontasi‖ (―The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, 1945-

Secondly, a focus on Singapore‘s role in Confrontation challenges the notion that the relationship was asymmetrical in nature and Singapore played an essentially reactive role in the bilateral relationship (Hamilton-Hart, 2009) This reactive role is expressed in the form of the ―practice of foreign policy predicated on countering an innate vulnerability (which) is a function of a minuscule scale, a predominantly ethnic Chinese identity associated with a traditional entrepot role and also a location wedged between the sea and airspace of two larger neighbours with which Singapore has never been politically at ease‖ (Leifer, 2000: 1) While Confrontation was one significant instance where Singapore was not politically at ease with both Malaysia and Indonesia, the nature of Singapore‘s relationship with both countries was not one where Singapore merely played a reactive role This was shown in the key role Singapore played in setting up the conflict through its pursuit of merger with Malaya and internationally as a counterweight to Indonesia‘s diplomatic offensive against Malaysia

Indonesia‘s Confrontation against Malaysia was an enigma, beginning and ending ―cryptically, hesitantly and shrouded in ambiguities‖ (Mackie, 1974: 1) In fact, when Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman made the public proposal

on 27 May 1961 that Malaya, Singapore, Brunei and the ―British colonial possessions‖ of Sabah and Sarawak be ―incorporated within a single political frame‖, the Indonesian reaction was ―neither truly sympathetic nor truly discouraging‖ (Leifer, 1983: 76) However, after the Brunei revolt in December 1962, the Indonesian Government began to express opposition to the said Malaysia Plan.3

1965‖, C.Hurst & Co., 1998, UK, p 10) This dissertation illuminates how Lee Kuan Yew‘s interests and strategies regarding Malaysia were largely aligned with and pushed along the British decolonisation plan, resulting in Confrontation

3

According to Leifer, ―Until the uprising in Brunei in December 1962, the only explicit opposition to

Subsequently, the Indonesians criticised this Malaysia Plan vehemently as a British

‗neo-colonialist project‘ and as a threat to their country‘s security (Mackie, 1974: 3) Despite Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, the new state came into being on 16 September 1963 when Malaya merged with the former British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak Indonesia‘s subsequent launch of Confrontation against Malaysia

was described by The Times of London as ―the most irrational of all recent disputes‖

(Boyce, 1968: xi) This dissertation argues that it is through an analysis of Southeast Asian, in particular, Singaporean and Indonesian perspectives, strategic interests and behaviour with regard to the concept of Malaysia and Malaysia‘s formation, as well as how Confrontation was really a means for establishing a postcolonial international foundation for Southeast Asia through ―creative destruction‖, that we can understand the ―irrationality‖ of this conflict – why it started and took the course it did

1.1 The formation of Malaysia: The key role of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew

Indonesia‘s opposition to the newly created state that was Malaysia was based

on the perception that Malaya‘s independence which was declared by the Tunku on 31 August 1957 was a ―sham while the making of Malaysia was a neo-colonial conspiracy‖ (Stockwell, in Burroughs and Stockwell (eds) 1998: 139) According to Fieldhouse, ―neo-colonialism .came into general use only in the 1950s as a consequence of the withdrawal of political control from an increasing number of European colonies; and its implication is that for a less developed country the normal end of colonialism does not necessarily result in genuine independence‖ (1981: 8)

Communist Party in December 1961 The significance of such opposition was less in its timing than in its terms, which foreshadowed the idiom in which Sukarno was to reject the legitimacy of the new federation It was described as ‗a new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of Indonesia‘ and ‗an unacceptable colonial intrigue‘‖ (―Indonesia‘s Foreign Policy‖, Allen and Unwin,

1983, UK, p 77)

Malaysia was regarded by its detractors as the embodiment of neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia because it appeared to maintain British hegemony over its constituent parts which all had shared the experience of British colonial rule The perpetuation of British influence over the post-colonial state of Malaysia was made possible due to the state-society relationships and institutions established during colonial times (Stockwell, 1998: 139)

Stockwell questions whether Malaysia‘s establishment was the making of a neo-colony, arguing that ―neo-colonialism is flawed so far as Anglo-Malayan relations are concerned (and) a preliminary review of the government record indicates a number of weaknesses regarding its application to the period from the coming of independence to the formation of Malaysia‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 144) British and Australian archival records that sketched out the course towards Malaysia‘s establishment validate Stockwell‘s thesis Archival records revealed that the lead-up to Malaysia Day on 16 September 1963 was fraught with pitfalls that reflected how British plans were influenced by the objectives and ambitions of the Malayan, Indonesian and Singaporean leadership One such pitfall was the pressing concerns of the Indonesians on the question of whether the people of the North Borneo territories were willing to be part of Malaysia, which formed the main basis for Indonesian opposition to Malaysia and accusations that the new state was the embodiment of British neo-colonialism This concern was revealed by Mr Djokojuwono of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs on 13 December 1962, shortly after the Brunei revolt, which signalled the start of a more assertive policy against Malaysia He emphasised Indonesia‘s natural legitimate interest in developments in a neighbouring territory and the implementation of the Malaysia proposal which was a threat to Indonesia‘s security Djokojuwono went on to say that

―If the Malaysia plan was acceptable to the people involved and had gone through smoothly then that was well and good Indonesia would accept such a situation However, events had taken a new turn‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 13 December 1962, NAA)

Djokojuwono also said that Indonesia was likely to ―make a statement emphasising the need for the people of North Borneo to be fully consulted regarding implementation of the Malaysia plan‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 13 December 1962, NAA) Djokojuwono‘s position portrayed one significant aspect of the difficulties faced by the British in the last stages of the movement toward the establishment of Malaysia, resulting in a challenge to the British de-colonisation policy of which two guiding principles were

―that the new political leaders who assumed the reins of power when the Colonial Office departed should be known to be amenable to continued British investment; and the other, that the political environment envisaged by the British as best suited to such regional development did not include Sukarno as leader of neighbouring Indonesia‖ (Poulgrain, 1998: 6)

Therefore, Anglo-Malayan relations after Malaya‘s independence in 1957 up to Malaysia‘s formation were not characterised by absolute British control over the nature of the relationship and the political future of Malaysia and Indonesian opposition towards Malaysia was one factor that threatened the disruption of the Malaysia plan

On the surface, Britain‘s plan to grant independence to its colonies in Southeast Asia as one state rather than separate states seems to suggest a strong neo-colonialist undercurrent Although the broad official British line was that ―the aim of

British policy in Asia should be to encourage and persuade and help Asian countries

to conduct their own affairs in an orderly, efficient, and peaceful way‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 149), which may be reflective of the objective that the former colonies secure genuine independence after colonial rule, the reality was that ―London was principally concerned to achieve the merger of Singapore and Malaysia (as) (t)his was regarded

as crucial to the security of both the island and the broader region‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 149).4 This British concern with merging Singapore with Malaya to form Malaysia despite the practical difficulties of doing so5 points to an aspiration to perpetuate British influence over the post-colonial politics of the territories that were to form Malaysia This aspiration was expressed in the form of the Grand Design, a pet project put forward by Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia in the early 1950s By 1955, MacDonald had stated that the ultimate goal of British colonial policy in Southeast Asia should be this Grand Design (Easter, 2004: 5-6) which later, in the 1960s, was revived as a way ―to accommodate the rising force of nationalism in Asia-Africa if Britain‘s influence was to survive in the post-colonial world‖, especially the ―growing nationalist assertiveness in Singapore‖ (Subritzky, 2000: 210) However, although this Grand Design was MacDonald‘s pet project, its enactment was, to a large extent, shaped by the Tunku‘s and Lee Kuan

4

Domestically, Britain also faced tensions over the issue of how its policy towards its former colonies should evolve For example, ―institutional fragmentation occasionally threatened to sabotage Britain‘s Malaysia policy (and) the perspectives of officials in Southeast Asia varied with the office which they held and the careers they had followed‖ (See Stockwell, 1998: 148-149)

5 The difficulties in forming Malaysia lay in the sheer diversity of the various territories involved which were connected only by the thread of British colonialism Easter commented on this state of affairs when he wrote that, ―in the 1950s Britain possessed a motley collection of colonies in Southeast Asia

On the mainland there was Malaya, a major producer of rubber and tin with a mixed population of indigenous Malays and immigrant Chinese At the tip of the Malayan peninsula lay the small island colony of Singapore, with a predominantly Chinese population 435 miles to the east across the South China Sea, Britain had two more colonies on the island of Borneo; North Borneo and Sarawak, whose population consisted of a complex mix of Malays, Chinese and tribal peoples such as Dayaks and Kadayans Nestling in amongst Sarawak was the tiny Sultanate of Brunei, a British protectorate with great potential oil wealth Despite the differences between these individual territories, British policymakers were periodically interested in merging them together to create an independent state‖

Yew‘s interests and objectives regarding the political futures of Malaya and Singapore This was indicative of how British neo-colonial aspirations faced an important challenge from its former colonies

The Greater Malaysia plan and the prelude to the establishment of the Federation that was Malaysia, was manipulated by the political leadership in Malaya and Singapore, showing that British did not have a free hand to do whatever they wished This supports Karl Hack‘s thesis that ―the reason for federation had much to

do with local developments, little to do with British plotting‖ (Hack, 2001: 275, cited

in Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 4) Similarly, archival records reveal that ―as with other instances of decolonisation in Africa, the British, far from operating as the hegemonic director of an orderly process of withdrawal in the early 1960s, were forced into courses of action that they would have preferred to avoid, as bargains were struck and timetables set by the political leaders in Malaya and Singapore‖ (Jones, 2000: 86) These assessments are validated by Lord Selkirk, the UK High Commissioner of Singapore and British Commissioner in Southeast Asia, who remarked that

―Whitehall in fact took no initiative until the Federation had been proposed, first in private and then in public, by the Prime Minister of Malaya and immediately supported by the Prime Minister of Singapore It was only after the proposals had been endorsed by all the territories concerned that Whitehall gave its full cooperation to the establishment of the Federation and sought to make it a success‖ (Selkirk, 1965, cited in Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 4)

Therefore, while the idea of Malaysia had its origins in British neo-colonialist aspirations, it was the political leadership in Malaya and Singapore that drove the state-building project forward

The Tunku‘s role was crucial in bringing about Malaysia and improvising on the British Grand Design which was essentially a blueprint for the de-colonisation process in Southeast Asia to solve the following two separate problems The Grand Design

―would provide a viable political entity for the Borneo colonies, considered too small and unsophisticated to survive by themselves as an independent state; and it would allow the transfer to the Malayans of responsibility for internal security in Singapore, thereby relieving Britain of an onerous, costly, and politically demanding task‖ (Subritzky, 2000: 210)

The British wanted the Grand Design to be ―gradualist‖ because the Colonial Office believed that Britain ―would first have to bring the Borneans to political maturity‖ (Easter, 2004: 6) However, the Tunku had other plans He perceived the usefulness of the Grand Design as a means to ―forestall possible Indonesian or Philippine claims on the Borneo colonies (and) more importantly, he saw it as a way of merging the economically important colony of Singapore with Malaya without disrupting Malaya‘s delicate racial balance‖ (Easter, 2004: 6) Thus, the Tunku made the so-called ―historic‖ announcement on 27 May 1961 in Singapore when he ―sounded the possibility of bringing the territories of Singapore, Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak and the Federation of Malaya closer together in political and economic cooperation‖ (Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 4) By making this announcement, the Tunku revived the British strategy for divesting control over its colonies in Southeast Asia

The British Grand Design was therefore to a large extent, pushed along by the Tunku who then invited Lee Kuan Yew, who was Singapore‘s Prime Minister, on 25 July 1961, ―to engage in preliminary discussions on the future constitutional

relationship‖ (Sadka, 1962: 21) between Malaya and Singapore This was indicative

of how the Malaya and Singapore political leadership exerted their influence on the Malaysia Plan, which resulted in an issuance of a joint communiqué on 24 August

1961 by the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew which gave

the main outlines of their agreement On October 18, the Federal House of Representatives approved the principle of Malaysia and endorsed their Government‘s initiative in taking action for its realisation On November 16, the (Tunku) left for talks in London on the future of the Singapore base and the mode of consultation with the Borneo territories, and on November 22, the British and Malayan governments declared their agreement in principle, and the (Tunku) forecast that merger would take place in 1962 At the same time, the Federation and Singapore governments issued a White Paper setting out heads of agreement so far reached (Sadka, 1962: 21-22)

These events suggest that the Tunku was the main initiator of Malaysia.6 While the Tunku‘s announcement on 27 May 1961 ―has often been taken as the genesis of the Malaysia idea, which saw its fruition two years later, in September 1963‖ (Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 4), the reality was that Lee Kuan Yew too had a significant role to play

in the materialisation of Malaysia

The roots of Lee Kuan Yew‘s involvement in the formation process of Malaysia lay in the British vexation over Singapore‘s sizeable Chinese population that

―was becoming increasingly resentful of their colonial status, personified by the still

6 The Tunku‘s motivations were political and strategic in nature According to Subritzsky, ―…by 1961, the Tunku himself had become very disturbed with developments in Singapore In short, he feared that

a predominantly Chinese communist state, analogous to Cuba in the western hemisphere, was about to

be created on Malaya‘s borders He was therefore receptive to the arguments of Sir Geofroy Tory, British high commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, that federation was the only realistic alternative‖ (1999: 26)

substantial British military presence on the island‖ (Subritzky, 1999: 25) Both the British and the Tunku feared that the Barisan Sosialis, which was regarded as being strongly influenced by communist ideology, would come to power in Singapore, thus not only bringing a communist threat right to Malaya‘s doorstep, but also crippling the British base on the island by industrial chaos due to the widespread local support from organised labour enjoyed by the Barisan According to Murfett et al., Lee Kuan Yew

―supported British arrangements to expand the bases and adopted an agenda crowned by two items: a merger with Malaya, to give Singapore the political depth to crush the communists and the economic and military space to survive and thrive; and internal stability, in part to keep the British comfortable with the commitment to maintain large bases in Singapore Lee regarded the British presence as essential to make Singapore more secure and boost its economy during the years of transition needed to bring about a successful merger‖ (1999: 311)

The British concern over the potential hostility from the Barisan over the former‘s bases in Singapore provided the impetus for Lee Kuan Yew to push harder for the establishment of Malaysia as a means to realise the PAP long-held vision of a ―united Malaya inclusive of Singapore‖ which the PAP began to work assiduously for since it was voted into power in May 1959 (Lau, 1998: 10)

Lee Kuan Yew‘s urgency in pursuing merger was a crucial variable in the process of forming Malaysia Lee Kuan Yew‘s sense of urgency, like the Tunku‘s, was based on political self-interest and strategic calculations, which were anchored in his perception that

―Singapore‘s exclusion from Malaya was the result of a ‗freak man-made frontier‘ (and) had the British heeded the history of the peoples of Malaya and geography and economic realities they would have put Singapore into the Malayan Union, just like Penang and Malacca‖ (Lau, 1998: 10)

Thus, Lee Kuan Yew visited London in May 1962 and used the visit as one platform

to stress to the British ministers ―the need for urgency in establishing Malaysia‖7(DO169/249, 14 September 1963, National Archives, UK)

As for Lee Kuan Yew‘s state and political survival imperatives, they can be summarised as follows First, without merger, Singapore could not survive politically

or economically because it had no natural resources and was faced with a decline in entrepot trade, coupled with a burgeoning population which needed jobs Merger would give Singapore a much-needed ―hinterland‖ to ―provide a bigger market for its manufactured goods‖ Furthermore, Britain would not agree to an independent Singapore state that was ―not economically viable‖ Second, ―the 1959 self-governing constitution was due for review in 1963, with independence as the next logical step‖ and the PAP‘s political survival was tied with its ability ―to achieve independence for Singapore‖ Finally, ―merger was politically beneficial to the PAP‖ because ―its erstwhile left-wing communist opponents would be politically neutralised in a Malaya headed by a right-wing and anti-communist government‖ (Lau, 1998: 10) Thus, there was a strong anti-communist element underpinning Lee Kuan Yew‘s and the PAP

7

Lee Kuan Yew also expressed that ―merger could take place forthwith (during a talk on the formation

of Malaysia with the Tunku and the British on 29 July 1962) and was disappointed that the wording ‗by the 31st August 1963‘ for the coming into being of Malaysia could not be altered for a specific and earlier date On his way to London he had appeared, at his own request, before the committee of 17 at the United Nations in New York to explain the position of the Singapore Government with regard to his forthcoming referendum and to explain and justify his policy of merger‖ (DO169/249, 14 September 1963, National Archives, UK) His actions and behaviour reinforced the fact that he was anxious about achieving merger as soon as possible

leadership‘s pursuit of merger as the sole means to ensure Singapore‘s viability British colonial rule

post-This strong anti-communist sentiment came to a head in the form of Operation Cold Store, which was a crucial event that greatly facilitated the process towards the establishment of Malaysia Cold Store, which took place in the early hours of 2 February 1963 in Singapore, saw the arrest of ―over 100 opposition party leaders, trade unionists, student unionists, journalists and political activists who had voiced their dissent of the Malaysia project‖ (Zahari, 2007: 11) These were groups of people who

―opposed the merger of Singapore with Malaya and subsequently the formation of Malaysia, (were) labelled communist, pro-communist or a supporter of communists According to (the British), ‗only the communists opposed the merger and the Malaysia state project‘‖ (Zahari, 2007: 9)

It was therefore ―imperative that leaders of the opposition parties who voiced out against merger and the colonialist project, Malaysia, be taken into custody‖ (Zahari, 2007: 9) According to former Singapore journalist and Cold Store detainee Said Zahari, ―the Singapore, Malaya and British authorities conspired to amplify the dangers of the communist threat to strike fear among the people especially the Malays‖ and the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew and the ―British colonialists‖ had worked

―throughout 1962‖ to find ―a common solution towards destroying their dissenters in Singapore‖ (2007: xviii, 9) Thus, the significance of Cold Store was that it reflected the British motivation in ensuring ―the success in the formation of Malaysia, its neo-colonial project, and simultaneously, protect its colonial interests in Southeast Asia‖ (Zahari, 2007: 10)

However, Cold Store, despite becoming intertwined in the web of British intrigue, cannot lend support to the claim that Malaysia was therefore a neo-colonialist project Instead, it appeared that Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku had differences in terms of when to carry out the operation and who was to do it For the British, they

―were not concerned with when or who carried out the arrests What was crucial to the British was that LKY‘s political opponents were arrested and detained under the Act Only an act of such proportion would ensure the success in the formation of Malaysia ‖ (Zahari, 2007: 10)

Thus, the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew were left to decide the timing of the operation and who was to carry it out Lee Kuan Yew ―wanted the arrests to be made after the formation of Malaysia and carried out by the Malaysian government‖, effectively wanting to ―wash his hands off the arrests‖ However, the Tunku wanted otherwise and pressured Lee Kuan Yew to carry out Cold Store because the Tunku wanted Cold Store to be a ―Singapore initiative‖ and ―the PAP leadership to purge Singapore of communist groups and its elements before the merger of Singapore with Malaya for the formation of Malaysia‖ Otherwise the Tunku ―would not agree for Singapore to

be a part of the Federation of Malaysia‖ (Zahari, 2007: 10) This aspect of Cold Store brings to our attention how the British were not ―operating as the hegemonic director

of an orderly process of withdrawal in the early 1960s (and) were forced into courses

of action that they would have preferred to avoid8, as bargains were struck and

as to improve Lee Kuan Yew‘s position in the Singapore referendum campaign Ultimately, the British

timetables set by the political leaders in Malaya and Singapore‖ (Jones, 2000: 86) Therefore, Cold Store was an exercise in local agency on the part of the political elites

of Singapore and Malaysia

For Britain, Malaysia was viewed as the perfect plan to preserve Britain‘s strategic and political interests in Southeast Asia by way of securing the political future of the politically immature and weak Borneo territories as part of a bigger federation, preserving a pro-British and anti-communist Government in Singapore, and solving London‘s problem of ―an expensive military burden at a time when Britain‘s economy looked unable to sustain a global defence role‖ Furthermore, Malaysia would provide Britain the opportunity to ―ride the wave of decolonisation and retain a military base in an independent Asian ally rather than an outmoded colonial enclave‖ (Easter, 2004: 21) However, this impeccable concept of Malaysia was sorely tested and subverted by Malayan, Singaporean, and subsequently, Indonesian political leaders Ultimately, the process of Malaysia‘s establishment was not marked by British ―mastery over the planning and execution of the ‗grand design‘‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 152) Rather, it highlighted the crucial role Southeast Asian elites like the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew took on in driving the Malaysia project forward and the reasons why the Indonesian leadership perceived the project

to be a neo-colonialist one and mounted Confrontation against the new state when the evidence points to the contrary that Britain had hegemony over the state-formation process This state of affairs is explained through a focus on the Indonesian and Singaporean perspectives or understanding of the concept of Malaysia

attempt to divest control over Singapore‘s internal security led Britain to ironically become more involved in Singapore‘s internal security situation by lending stronger support to Cold Store (―Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy,

1.2 Indonesian and Singaporean perspectives on Malaysia as a key driver of Confrontation

The concept of Malaysia was rooted in the neo-colonial intentions9 of the British which were ―to maintain rather than end Britain‘s historic interests in the region‖ (Subritzky, 2000: 211) These intentions were reflected in the declaration by

Harold Watkinson, then British Defense Minister, in March 1962 that

―he could not see British military forces withdrawing from their Singapore bases in the foreseeable future Moreover, he continued, consultations between the British and Malayan governments were underway for a military build-up

in connection with the proposed Malaysian federation to cope with security in the additional territories of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo‖ (Van der Kroef, 1963: 175)

In addition, the fact that ―the British needed Singapore so much for their broader strategy, and had such reservations about its internal stability, that they resisted any idea of granting genuine independence to the island by itself‖ (Murfett et al, 1999: 310), demonstrates British intentions to perpetuate their influence in Southeast Asia through Malaysia

9 According to Subritzky, historians have differing views on what the British government‘s overall intention was with regard to the pursuit of decolonisation through Greater Malaysia One view is that Malaysia‘s formation was arranged to assist British withdrawal from the region and Greater Malaysia was designed to enable the British to continue to bring to bear greater control over the decolonisation process and avoid political instability after their departure Another interpretation is that the British were responding to an altered political environment in which formal rule from London was no longer feasible Instead, British influence could still be retained, albeit by more indirect means, like self- government within the British Commonwealth This option gave the British hope that still pervasive bilateral ties in finance, trade and defence, would continue to tie Malaysia to Britain, thus safeguarding British influence long after formal independence had been granted Such an arrangement would be reminiscent of ‗informal empire‘‖ (―Britain, Konfrontasi, and the End of Empire in Southeast Asia,

1961-65‖, International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat, p 211) Both interpretations, however, point

to the British intention of creating Malaysia as a means of stamping British influence on the political future of the federation and Southeast Asia, thus indicating that Malaysia was not genuinely independent

However, one of the major factors that frustrated British intentions to manage their decolonisation process in Southeast Asia in order to serve their strategic interests was Indonesia‘s Confrontation of the newly formed Malaysian Federation, which caused the British to lose significant control over the process of the Federation‘s formation Besides contending with the interests of the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew10, Confrontation meant that the British found themselves having ―to resist Indonesian attempts to abort, destabilize, or splinter Malaysia until Indonesian authorities dropped the policy of Confrontation, recognised Malaysia, established normal diplomatic relations with it, and agreed to live in peaceful coexistence‖ (Farrell, in Murfett (ed), 2010: 74) In fact, the establishment of Malaysia and Indonesia‘s policy

of Confrontation which followed promptly on its heels was marked by Britain‘s

―fairly limited‖ role and instead marked as ―the beginning of a new era in the international relations of Southeast Asia‖ (Butwell, 1964: 946) This was reflected in the limits to which the British could force the Malaysia plan through The Tunku was the one who revived hopes for a Malaysian Federation in 1961 and that

―notwithstanding Malcolm MacDonald‘s enthusiasm for closer association and despite his optimism in the willingness of peninsular and island elites to combine in a common endeavour, ingrained Malay distrust of Chinese-dominated Singapore deterred the British government from pushing ahead with merger in what were generally seen to be unpropitious circumstances‖ (Stockwell, 1998: 145) Also, more importantly,

10 The Tunku‘s influence on the British plan for creating Malaysia was to make sure that the inclusion

of Singapore was not going to upset the Federation‘s racial balance and for the Federation to act as a bulwark against communism For Lee Kuan Yew and his PAP cadres like Dr Toh Chin Chye, the maxim, ―outright independence would lead the people of Singapore to disaster‖ (CO1030/1124, 12 June 1961, National Archives, UK), drove their determined attempts to aid in the materialisation of

―the impact of Malaysia upon the international politics of Southeast Asia is to

be seen largely in its contribution to this evolutionary change in the character

of such politics – which increasingly stress the interaction among Southeast Asian countries rather than the relationship between them and other powers

By interaction is not meant cooperation; the relationship may be, and frequently is, one of hostility‖ (Butwell, 1964: 941)

The embodiment of such a new pattern of state interaction in Southeast Asia was Indonesia‘s Confrontation of Malaysia which was essentially a ―controversy concerning Malaysia‘s establishment, legitimacy, and future‖ (Butwell, 1064: 942) playing out among the Southeast Asian states

The heart of this debate over the legitimacy of Malaysia‘s independence and the attendant perception that it was a neo-colonialist British creation lay in Indonesia‘s and Singapore‘s perception of the newly created state and the principles which it was built on This aspect of Confrontation connected with ―local‖ perspectives from the political actors involved in the conflict and for who the conflict was crucial has been relatively under-studied However, this clash of perspectives between the Singapore and Indonesia political leadership provides an important perspective to understand the origins of the conflict, its course, how it ended, and the extent to which it has affected the pattern of interaction between Singapore and Indonesia, which is also relatively under-analysed

The benefit of focusing on comparing Singapore‘s and Indonesia‘s perceptions

of Malaysia is due to the important but under-examined role that Singapore‘s PAP leadership under Lee Kuan Yew played in the origins of Confrontation and how this conflict evolved This involves exploring a watershed event in Singapore‘s political

history, Operation Cold Store, which played a crucial role in the origins of the conflict Also, it is through a focus on Singapore‘s role in Confrontation that we can examine the reasons why Indonesia viewed Malaysia as a neo-colonialist project and decided to launch the Confrontation policy Similarly, it is through an examination of how the ―local‖ leadership in Singapore and Indonesia interacted with each other during Confrontation, which was essentially the debate over the legitimacy of Malaysia, that we are able to elicit the effects of a major foreign policy event or international conflict on bilateral relations after the conflict ended

A core aspect of the way Confrontation drove Singapore (then part of Malaysia)-Indonesia relations was the debate over the legitimacy of the new Malaysian Federation and whether it was formed in accordance with the people‘s will Singapore and Indonesia adopted diametrically opposite positions on this subject The Indonesian perception, as expressed in General Nasution‘s article ―Confrontation: Our fight against neo-colonialism‖, was that ―Malaysia‘s independence was granted by the British as a present It is understandable, therefore, that the greater part of

‗Malaysia‘s‘ life is still controlled by the colonialists‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 11 January

1964, NAA) Singapore‘s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, on the other hand, declared,

―Let no one doubt that Malaysia is no neo colonialist plot We have decided this day to go ahead in unity willingly and freely with our brothers in Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak ‖ (DO187/31, 18 September 1963, National Archives, UK)

Thus, the issue at the heart of Confrontation was whether Malaysia was formed in accordance with the free will of the people involved or if it was a ―present‖ from the British with strings attached that would render Malaysia‘s independence inauthentic

Other hypotheses about the causes of Confrontation mostly focus on Indonesia‘s domestic politics For example, Hindley argued that ―the policy of confrontation serves the domestic political and economic interests of many of the persons and groups comprising the Indonesian political elite‖ (1964: 905) Similarly, Weinstein argued that Confrontation essentially had its roots in the domestic political realm – ―the Crush Malaysia campaign was to a significant extent dependent on confrontation‘s ability to perform important political functions for the principal actors and for the system as a whole‖ (1969: 9) Gordon pursued the argument that the convergence of Indonesia‘s irredentism which is related to the classic problems of boundaries and territory, with Indonesia‘s special brand of national ideology, could explain why Indonesia ―begins to appear as the potentially most troublesome actor in Southeast Asia‖ (1964-1964: 379) Gordon advanced the thesis that Confrontation and

―Sukarno‘s refusal to accept U Thant‘s determination that the establishment of Malaysia is supported by its resident peoples are merely the most recent surface manifestations of a deeper problem (whose) source of the threat lies largely in what appears to be a continuing expansionist sentiment among Indonesian leaders‖ (1963-1964: 378-379)

The perspective that Confrontation was a Sukarno-driven policy which has its roots in Indonesia‘s glorious past of Srivijaya and Majapahit is presented in a SAF

journal, Pointer, by one Captain Benedict Ang who writes,

―the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires had provided inspiration for Sukarno‘s concept of Indonesian territory Indeed, Sukarno‘s perception of what constituted Indonesia was arguably the prime motivating factor that led him to pursue a confrontational policy against the Dutch over Irian Jaya in 1962 and later against the British over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963‖ (1998)

This viewpoint expressed in Singapore‘s military journal is intriguing because firstly,

it corroborates Singapore‘s main foreign policy principle of innate vulnerability in relation to its aggressive immediate neighbours of Indonesia and Malaysia, and reflects the notion that Singapore was a passive victim of Confrontation Secondly, it echoes Gordon‘s thesis during the Confrontation years that Sukarno and his leaders harboured expansionist ambitions This is at odds with Sutter‘s assessment that Jakarta and Peking thought of dividing Southeast Asia into spheres of influence under Peking, Hanoi and Jakarta (1966: 532), which suggests that Indonesian aims for having a Southeast Asian sphere of influence could have been driven by the objective

of achieving ideological solidarity with Peking, perhaps with the intention of both sides to enter a ―marriage of convenience‖ to pursue their expansionary aims Thus, Indonesian ―expansionist‖ ambitions could have been essentially framed by international politics of the time rather than due to historical glory Indonesian intentions toward other parts of Southeast Asia therefore were murky during the Confrontation years For example, the Australian embassy in Jakarta was unconvinced about the apparent lack of display of Indonesian expansionist ambitions According to an Australian report ―Indonesian relations with Malaya‖ dated 3 July

1961,

―We have had reports about Dr Subandrio‘s idea of having Singapore become part of Indonesia and his privately expressed view that the British Borneo Territories should form part of the Indonesian island of Kalimantan However,

Dr Subandrio and the Indonesian government have been meticulously careful

to avoid laying themselves open to the charge that if their claim to the territory

of West New Guinea were met, this would be the first step only in a series of territorial claims, for example to Portuguese Timor, British Borneo and, possibly, Singapore and Malaya If the Indonesians have territorial ambitions towards British Borneo or Singapore, they remain concealed in the minds of their leaders‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, NAA)

While this assessment took place during the period when Indonesia had yet to voice strong opposition to the Malaysia plan, it is nevertheless significant because it revealed the fear that Indonesia might be inherently expansionist However, in a sign that the times were uncertain, the Australian report concluded,

― any interest which Indonesia might show in the North Borneo territories or Singapore is not necessarily to be feared by us as an example of territorial aggression It should also be examined as a possible means whereby a hostile Chinese influence in that area could best be controlled‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 3 July 1961, NAA)

This conclusion was echoed by Kahin later in 1964 when he wrote that the primary reason for the establishment of Malaysia and a crucial reason for Indonesian and Filipino opposition to this new state was the concern over the political potential of the largest group of overseas Chinese in the world A main preoccupation for the British and Malayan supporters of Malaysia as well as the Indonesian and Philippine

promoters of the rival ‗Maphilindo‘ concept was how to exert political control over ―a culturally self-conscious group which is not only numerically the largest, but economically much the strongest and educationally by far the most advanced of all of Malaysia‘s people‖, or at least isolate them from Peking‘s political influence (Kahin, 1964: 254) Kahin‘s assessment signals an alternative view that Confrontation was not merely the product of Indonesia‘s domestic political situation and that Indonesia was not in complete control of the course that Confrontation took Instead, it appears that a characteristic of Confrontation was that it was more of a response to external events than a policy designed to throw the first punch at Malaysia

This perspective of Confrontation highlights the fact that external forces influenced why and how Indonesia pursued Confrontation One of the most comprehensive studies about how British intelligence acted as agent provocateur, setting up Indonesia‘s inexorable decision to launch Confrontation, was covered by Poulgrain who reviewed ―the historical role of Sukarno as the initiator of confrontation‖ Poulgrain also questioned Mackie‘s attribution of ―sole culpability to Indonesia when a motive clearly existed for colonial authorities to play a role in fomenting disturbance‖ (Poulgrain, 1998: 6) Similarly, Easter analysed Britain‘s role

in Confrontation from 1960 to 1966, arguing that British defence and strategic interests in Southeast Asia seemed to drive British policy in Confrontation In turn,

―Indonesia challenged Britain‘s goals through Confrontation and it is clear from Indonesian public statements and western intelligence reports that Jakarta objected to Malaysia not just because it wanted a proper process of national self-determination for Borneo, but also because it opposed the British military presence in Singapore Confrontation can be seen as an attempt by a rising

middle power to oust the British imperialists and establish control in the region ‖ (Easter, 2004: 197)

Easter took the position that Confrontation was a response to external forces, in this case, British strategic interests, thereby shifting the focus of scholarship on Confrontation from one that is Sukarno and Indonesia-centric to one which also examines the role of other political actors in the conflict

Singapore was one political actor that played a significant role in Confrontation which however remains relatively neglected In fact, Poulgrain points out that

―Jakarta‘s irreverent attitude towards the British colonial authorities and Malayan political elites was encouraged further by Singapore‘s regional entrepot function which included the illegal trading of Indonesian primary commodities The smuggling of primary commodities by Chinese traders based in Singapore and tolerated by the British authorities angered Jakarta‖ (Poulgrain, 1998: 65)

Furthermore, the Indonesian elites perceived Singapore as primarily a hub for illegal and clandestine trade which enabled Singapore to become prosperous at the expense

of Indonesia Singapore was also viewed as a flourishing ―cultural, educational and economic centre of regional overseas Chinese‖ which adversely affected the Indonesian government‘s attempts to absorb its own Chinese community (Lee, 1993, cited in Rahim, 2009: 152) These observations suggest that, firstly, Indonesia‘s irritation and anger at the strategic purposes Singapore served for Britain could have contributed the impetus towards Confrontation Second, that Indonesia was angry at

Singapore because it was illegally profiting from Indonesian commodities and thereby diverting funds from the Indonesian government

Singapore and Indonesia clashed over the concept of Malaysia— an important factor that led to tense Malaysia-Indonesia relations which exploded into Confrontation For Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia was legitimate because ―the people of Singapore expressed their desire to seek this independence through Federation with Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak to form an independent state of Malaysia‖ (DO187/31,

18 September 1963, National Archives, UK) Indonesia took on the contrary position which highlighted British decolonisation aims, that is, the Federation of Malaysia,

―although independent, would still retain, it was hoped in London, a strong British influence over its affairs‖ (Subritzky, 2000: 17) From then on, a relatively under-studied aspect of Confrontation, which was this ongoing clash over the legitimacy of Malaysia between Singapore and Indonesia, took place

A main component of this dissertation is the demonstration of how the Confrontation years were an expression of the contention between Singapore and Indonesia about Malaysia‘s right to exist and its status as a truly independent post-colonial state, which although couched in moral terms about the ideological foundations of the new Federation, nevertheless involved a concurrent protection of each side‘s self-interest This frame of reference indicates that, far from being a vulnerable political entity during the prelude to Confrontation and the years of the conflict, Singapore exerted a strong influence on how the conflict turned out by providing a main challenge to the Indonesian argument that Malaysia was neo-colonial and thus did not have the right to exist The Singaporean political leadership under Lee Kuan Yew provided a challenge to Indonesia‘s grievances and arguments

formation of Malaysia and the shaping of the concept of a Malaysia that was the antithesis of what Indonesia was prepared to accept, as well as the international campaign to gain recognition for Malaysia‘s right to exist in the face of Indonesia‘s diplomatic campaign to the contrary This in turn provides a fresh perspective on the events of the conflict, with a focus on Singapore‘s strategies and interests and how they interacted with Indonesia‘s It lends support to the argument that, while Britain had neo-colonial intentions, they were sabotaged by ―local‖ interests and therefore Malaysia was actually formed on the basis of what the political leadership in Singapore, Indonesia and Malaya wanted

1.3 Creation of a Post-Colonial Regional Order for Southeast Asia

A dominant theme when considering Malaysia‘s formation, Indonesian reactions toward Malaysia, and how the process and aftermath of Malaysia‘s establishment altered the international politics of post-colonial Southeast Asia, is how Southeast Asian elites wanted to forge their own political and international future in the wake of decolonisation

This dissertation also highlights the theme of historical progress in the international system through channelling ―conflict and violence toward a constructive result‖ (Waltz, 1962: 335) in the form of a peaceful federation of Southeast Asian states founded upon the representation of their citizens‘ wishes This issue is central to the Singapore-Malaysia-Indonesia conflict over the legitimacy of the newly formed state of Malaysia, which is central to the development of Confrontation

The analysis of Singapore‘s role in fomenting Confrontation and shaping the events of the conflict in relation to Indonesia‘s pursuit of Confrontation brings to the fore the Southeast Asian perspectives of the legitimacy of Malaysia, the principles

upon which Malaysia was established, and the ensuing contest in Southeast Asia over Malaysia‘s existence These perspectives and issues indicate that Confrontation was more than just Sukarno or Indonesia centric, and not only about British decolonisation interests which no doubt played a major role in creating the conflict

The main issue that arises when considering Singapore‘s role in Confrontation

is how the PAP leadership‘s vision of Malaysia was in conflict with the Indonesian leadership‘s conceptualisation of the new state The PAP‘s strategic interests in the materialisation of Malaysia also clashed with those of the Sukarno‘s leadership‘s The

―enthusiasm expressed in Singapore for a merger‖ with the Malayan Federation was a key aspect of understanding ―Singapore‘s road to nationhood (through) the context of its major detour through Malaysia‖ (Tan Tai Yong, 2008: 7) This shows that the PAP leadership envisioned the establishment of Malaysia as a factor enabling Singapore to achieve independent nationhood In contrast, Sukarno‘s Indonesia viewed the materialisation of Malaysia as not only ―a means of projecting the control

of a reactionary Malay elite into the Borneo territories by means of a cooperative arrangement with the British and the same aristocratic elements of those territories through whom the British ruled until recently‖, but also as ―an affront to their nation‘s dignity and international importance that a Western power should arrogate the right to direct the political destiny of people ethnically similar to Indonesians in areas immediately across their borders‖ (Kahin, 1964: 261) Thus, for Indonesia, ―territorial disputes and disputes over the rights of nations to secede featured prominently in the justification for the Malaysian confrontation‖ (Kivimaki, 2001: 10)

Archival records demonstrate the centrality of the unintended contest between Singapore and Indonesia over the legitimacy of Malaysia and the principles espoused

―driven from Singapore‖ perspective of Confrontation through detailing how Singapore‘s pursuit of merger with the Malayan Federation to form Malaysia as a means to independent statehood triggered a reaction from the Indonesians to ―carry out a policy of confrontation against the Malaysia idea‖ (Leifer, 1983: 79) This perspective highlights that the roots of Confrontation were the result of ideological and historical structures rather than merely being triggered by domestic political events such as the Brunei revolt of December 1962, which has largely been seen as one of the most direct causes of the conflict

The Indonesians perceived that, Malaysia, by virtue of being ―a cover for continued British economic, political and military influence‖ (Legge, 1972: 363), and not formed as an expression of the genuine wishes of the people involved, especially those in the Borneo territories, was indicative of how Malaysia was a ―graft‖ of Britain This was reflective of how Malaysia had no moral basis as a state because its territorial boundaries and right to self-determination were influenced heavily by colonial legacies On the other hand, from Singapore‘s perspective, such colonial influence on post-colonial state formation need not mean that the rights of the people were violated This underpinned Singapore‘s reiteration that ―let no one doubt that Malaysia is no neo-colonialist plot‖ (DO187/31, 18 September 1963, National Archives, UK) despite the fact that Britain was heavily involved in bringing about its establishment For example,

― an agreement was reached in London on the ninth day of July, 1963, between the Governments of Singapore, Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and the United Kingdom that Singapore shall on the thirty first day of August 1963, join with the existing states of the Federation of Malaya and the states of

Sabah and Sarawak in the state of Malaysia‖ (DO187/31, National Archives,

UK, 18 September 1963)

Singapore‘s Lee Kuan Yew also expressed his opinion that Malaysia was not a mere

―graft‖ of Britain without a ―moral‖ basis of its own This was because the people involved ―have proclaimed (their) inalienable right to be free – free from colonial domination, in a manner of (their) choice‖ (DO187/31, National Archives, UK, 31 August 1963) According to Lee Kuan Yew, the exercise of this choice by the people

of Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo ensured that Malaysia was not

―just another name for a collection of ten million Malays, Dyaks, Dusuns, Murats, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, Ceylonese, and others, brought together

by an accident of British colonial domination of this part of the world We have shown in our struggle against colonial domination that we are not merely

a conglomeration, an inarticulate and inchoate conglomeration, of just so many races We have the will and the wherewithal to be a nation in our own right That is the right that we the people of Singapore today proclaim‖ (DO187/31, National Archives, UK)

Lee Kuan Yew‘s remarks show that he envisioned that Malaysia would be a nation in its own right and not merely a post-colonial state that was inherited from Britain Singapore therefore attempted to be a driving force for establishing the principles that the new state of Malaysia would operate by, demonstrating in another context the refusal to be a mere ―possession‖ to be incorporated into another nation that was Greater Malaysia or the Federation of Malaysia This was a result of the fact that ―the government in Singapore, which represented a predominantly Chinese electorate, was composed of men whose vision of a socialist society was not confined by the

territorial bounds of the island-state‖ (Leifer, 1965: 54) This ambition was expressed way back in 1954 in the PAP‘s manifesto as,

―Though because of the division of Malaya into two territories, we are technically a political party operating in Singapore we shall in all our approaches to the problems of this country disregard the constitutional division We are as actively interested in the problems of our fellow Malayans

in the federation as we are in those of Singapore When Malayans in the Federation who agree with our aims join us we shall work throughout Malaya‖ (cited in Leifer, 1965: 54)

During the years that Singapore was part of Malaysia, this ambition to shape national political affairs was partly expressed in the form of the campaign for a ―Malaysian Malaysia‖11, reflecting Singapore‘s vision of what the ―moral‖ basis of the state should be However, in line with the idea that historical progress in the international system is based on both ―moral improvement and self-interest‖ (Hurrell, 1990: 199), Singapore‘s moral vision of Malaysia was heavily coloured by the PAP‘s political self-interest

The Indonesian views on Malaysia were coloured by their strategic interest, which found expression in their Confrontation policy, which was essentially

self-a mself-anifestself-ation of the ―high degree of morself-al indignself-ation self-agself-ainst the other‖ (Mself-ackie,

11 According to Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli, ―Between the years 1959 and 1965, PAP‘s promotion of Malayan nationalism was politically expedient in view of the merger with Malaysia which had been canvassed as part of PAP‘s agenda of a non-communist, democratic-socialist and multicultural Malaya When the marriage between Singapore and Malaysia began to fall apart, the PAP would explain the difficulties as a result of the party‘s decision to stick to its guns on what is considered as the ―right‖ solution Repackaging its agenda as ―Malaysian Malaysia‖, the PAP reaffirmed its non-communal nature and redirected its energy to opposing what it saw as the parochial interests of extremist politicians in the United Malaya National Organisation (UMNO), who were pushing for the line of

―Malay Malaysia‖ From its platform of Malaysian Malaysia, the PAP would repeatedly level the charge of chauvinism against its political adversaries‖ (―The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and it Pasts‖, NUS Press, Singapore, 2008, p 94)

1974: 9) In contrast to Lee Kuan Yew‘s view that Malaysia was not a mere conglomeration or hodgepodge of territories merely inherited by the British, Sukarno and his leadership believed that ―Malaysia was merely a ramshackle neo-colonialist creation of the British and that it would fall apart under the strain of confrontation‖ (Mackie, 1974: 8) Thus, Indonesia began the diplomatic campaign against Malaysia which was largely premised on the conviction that Malaysia was a ―neo-colonialist puppet regime imposed upon the people against their will‖ (Mackie, 1974: 8-9)

The result was that Confrontation was a highly politicised campaign, high on rhetoric but low on the scale of military activity This highly politicised nature was especially evident on the economic front where economic interests were subjugated in favour of national pride or what Subandrio called the maintenance of a ―certain dignity of principle‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 24 September 1963, NAA) Singapore took on

a central position of interest because, as Nasution expressed, ―we had experienced economic subversion: smuggling, barter trade and various other economic disturbances, mostly caused by Singapore‘s illegal brokers who had connection with Djakarta‘s businessmen from Pintu Ketjil‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 3 January 1964, NAA), revealing the maxim that economic interaction is moral only if it is entered into on equal voluntary terms by all parties

This also highlights the fact that Singapore was a crucial point of concern and calculation that influenced Indonesia‘s decision to pursue Confrontation The perception that Singapore was a possible epi-centre for subversion was linked to Nasution‘s argument that ―the real danger of Malaysia to Indonesia was that it offered the Chinese of the region an opportunity to establish their dominance and it therefore represented an opportunity for Peking to increase its influence‖ (Legge, 1972: 364)

states framed the decision to launch Confrontation, which was a reflection of how Cold War politics dominated the thinking of political elites when they considered the impact of the formation of Malaysia on the international politics of Southeast Asia

Confrontation epitomised what Harrison describes as conflict is the source of the emergence of pacific relations (Harrison, 2002: 150) The essence of this maxim was captured succinctly in Subandrio‘s words that

―Confrontation does not mean that Indonesia is out to wage war but rather aims at a peaceful settlement of the problem The name may be misleading The expression ‗Crush Malaysia‘ should be taken figuratively, not literally‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 11 January 1964, NAA)

This dissertation highlights the ways in which Confrontation was a manifestation of the theme of how conflict is the basis of the establishment of a new world order in Southeast Asia, and may explain how and why Confrontation ended in what seemed

to be a sudden manner in the political and diplomatic sense

This theme that conflict is the source of transformative change in the international system was reflected in the origins and formation of Maphilindo and ASEAN In fact, there were precursors to Maphilindo like SEATO and ASA.12However, this dissertation focuses on Maphilindo – the loose consultative arrangement for Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia to cooperate in matters of security, economic development, and social and cultural affairs (Butwell, 1964: 943) - because it was conceptualised as the formation of Malaysia was underway and it was because of defending Maphilindo that Indonesia launched Confrontation (Editorial

from the Indonesian Herald, 15 January 1964, in A1838/3006/4/7, 17 January 1964,

12

For more information on SEATO and ASA, please see Richard Butwell, ―Malaysia and its Impact on

the International Relations of Southeast Asia‖, Asian Survey, Vol.4 No.7, Jul 1964

NAA) Also, the Indonesian leadership supported Maphilindo, as shown in the way that Maphilindo was not only given prominence in their speeches, but also the reiteration of Sukarno together with Macapagal that Maphilindo was ―an effective vehicle for devising Asian solutions to Asian problems by Asians themselves‖ and that it ―must be strengthened ‗as a living reality‘ in order to provide equitable solutions for regional problems – including those arising from the formation of Malaysia – as well as to promote regional security and economic cooperation‖ (Taylor, 1964: 167-168), thus suggesting that Maphilindo was taken seriously as an alternative way of conceptualising a new regional order

The vision and intention of Maphilindo as a means for the region to know peace and cooperation free from ―British intransigence‖ (A1838/3006/4/7, 17 January

1964, NAA), made Maphilindo the embodiment of how Southeast Asians were to forge their own political and international future In the case of ASEAN, this dissertation shows how Confrontation contributed to its formation, reflecting the idea that there was some continuity between Maphilindo and ASEAN as Southeast Asian political elites attempted to create their own post-colonial regional order

Confrontation exerted influence on the re-organisation of the International Relations of Southeast Asia This is presented through the explanation of why Malaysia fell apart with the secession of Singapore and the impact of this secession on Confrontation These two events are reminiscent of the idea that there is a propensity for progress in international politics through ―creative destruction‖ of colonial structures

There were two reasons why Malaysia failed First, it was due to British interference or influence in the manner of Malaysia‘s formation While such interference was limited in reality, the British influence on the Malaysian nation-

building project was evident as reflected in Operation Cold Store, showing that there was some form of Western or outside influence in domestic politics Second, it was the Singapore PAP leadership‘s ambitions to assert themselves politically, refusing to

be a mere ―graft‖ of Malaysia that contributed largely to Singapore‘s separation from Malaysia, vindicating Indonesia‘s position that Malaysia‘s ―moral personality‖ as a state formed as an expression of the free will of its populace was suspect After separation, Singapore again played an important role in rapprochement with Indonesia, by first resuming trading ties with Indonesia Singapore‘s newfound status

as an independent state that arose out of the ashes of Malaysia was also crucial in disposing Indonesia to end Confrontation

Finally, Singapore-Indonesia relations in the aftermath of Confrontation are examined, highlighting that the notion of the transformative nature of the international system through historical progress which depends crucially on ―creative destruction‖

is applicable in understanding how Singapore and Indonesia transformed the nature of the bilateral relationship after the experience of the Confrontation years The lessons Indonesia and more crucially, Singapore, learnt from the Confrontation years, highlights the capacity for transformative change in international politics and history Therefore, an account of how Southeast Asian elites drove Confrontation and re-organised the conduct of international politics among themselves as post-colonial states, emphasises that contemporary Singapore-Indonesia relations should be viewed

in a macro-historical context rather than one that seems to reflect short-term disturbances

Chapter 2: The Underlying “Causes” of Confrontation, and Relations between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaya: 1957-1962

The period between 1957 and 1962 marked the beginnings of interaction among newly-emerging Southeast Asian post-colonial states on the back of British decolonisation This period was characterised by the poor state of Malaya-Indonesia relations A few factors stemming from deep historical roots contributed to the tense relations between Malaya and Indonesia which culminated in Confrontation These include the class of factors that coloured and reflected Indonesia‘s domestic and foreign policies While a confluence of historical factors and the Indonesian political situation from 1957 to 1962 formed the backdrop of Confrontation, Singapore‘s pursuit of its own political and international interests exacerbated tensions

Singapore was then not a part of the Federation However, the Singaporean political leadership at that time supported the Federation‘s attainment of independence

―with pride and happiness‖ and expressed ―hope that one day soon Singapore will be united with the Federation‖ (Singapore Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates, 21 August 1957, Col 2493 – 2496) Indonesia, on the other hand, reacted in a more subdued manner as expressed in a 5th November 1957 note prepared by the Australian intelligence service, which quoted Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio saying that Indonesia ―regarded the Federation as particularly important‖ (A1838/3006/4/7 Part 1, ―Relations between Malaya and Indonesia‖, National Archives of Australia) This interest in Malaya resulted from the Indonesian political leadership‘s ―grave doubts about the authenticity of its independence‖ (Weinstein, cited in Liow, 2005(2): 93) and the ideological stance that Malaya required ―revolutionising as a result of its counterfeit independence‖ (Bunnell, cited in

The course towards Confrontation was set by a deterioration in Indonesia relations Both sides clashed over ideas related to Indonesia‘s history of national revolution, domestic politics, foreign policy and Sukarno‘s style of leadership These four classes of factors are most often cited as the underlying determinants of Confrontation Many scholars have already chronicled the bilateral friction between Malaya and Indonesia from 1957 to 1962, focusing on ―the role of individual leaders in fomenting bilateral friction, noting in particular the tension between Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and President Sukarno‖ (Liow, 2005(2): 87) which had its roots in Indonesia‘s brand of political history While rocky Malaya-Indonesia relations as a result of the tension between Sukarno and the Tunku did result in Confrontation, scant attention has been paid to the role Singapore‘s political leadership played in exacerbating tensions between the two during this period

Malaya-A segment of Singapore‘s political leadership was strongly supportive of Malaya‘s independence because they were looking forward to the day Singapore could achieve independence too and join the Federation It was in this context that Singapore‘s political interests influenced the course of relations between Malaya and Indonesia from 1957 to 1962 Singapore‘s interest in Malaya‘s survival, and its hopes and strategies to join the Federation pushed Malaya-Indonesia relations towards breaking point in 1963 which culminated in the policy of Confrontation The poor state of Malaya-Indonesia relations was characterised by mismatched expectations and conflicting self-interest, exacerbated by Singapore‘s own vision of its future position in the Federation, what sort of independent nation it wanted to be and its political strategies and calculations for achieving this goal

A crucial factor influencing Malayan, Singaporean and Indonesian attitudes towards the British-created Malayan Federation is historical, that is, each political entity‘s pre-colonial and colonial experience In terms of colonial experiences, Indonesia‘s experience with the Dutch was arguably more traumatic and bitter compared with Malaya‘s and Singapore‘s experiences with the British Indonesia tended to project its own colonial experience or circumstances onto Malaya which resulted in its hostility and suspicion towards Malaya

However, historical circumstances did not determine how events eventually play out Instead, Indonesia‘s, Singapore‘s and Malaya‘s pre-colonial and colonial experiences shaped their differing attitudes towards the formation of the federation, generating misperceptions that led to conflict This reflects the idea that historical structures are ―both a constraining and dispensing force‖ (Huntley, 1996: 61) in the way that, while historical experience has a strong influence on the course of events, it

is the agency of the political players making and acting out their choices within the historical circumstances that shape outcomes In tracing the contrasting histories of colonialism in Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia, it is evident that, while these colonies were constrained by historical structures and therefore conditioned by them, there was also at work human agency in the form of political elites jostling for power and acting out strategies which influenced their own perspectives regarding British-created Malaya Singaporean political strategies and interests deepened the tensions and suspicions between Malaya and Indonesia as a result of their contrasting political histories

2.1 The “Greater Indonesia” concept

At this juncture, it is appropriate to present an overview of the pre-colonial history of Indonesia and how it translated into the ―Greater Indonesia‖ idea which took root after the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia The aim is to demonstrate how Indonesia‘s ―ancient Hindu-Buddhist past including Srivijaya (c Late 600s-1300s) and Majapahit (1293-c 1520) which both came to dominate the trade routes of the region and a large portion of what is now Indonesia continue(d) to be fundamental to Indonesia‘s self-image as an ancient regional power‖ (Smith, 2000: 500) This was reflected in the way political elites in the aftermath of the Japanese Occupation debated the extent of Indonesia‘s territory Muhammad Yamin was one of the

―most extreme of the Indonesian proponents of a ‗Greater Indonesia‘ nationalist idea (who) advocated that the new state should coincide with the Indonesian fatherland (Tumpah-darah Indonesia), whose extent, he stated, had been most recently determined by the fourteenth-century state of Madjapahit (which) he claimed, had included Sumatra, Java, Madura, the Lesser Sundas, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, Peninsular Malaya, Timor and Papua‖ (McIntyre, 1973: 81)

Mohammad Hatta did not agree with Yamin‘s concept of Tumpah-darah Indonesia but advocated that the Indonesian borders should coincide with those of the former Netherlands Indies However, despite Hatta‘s case, there was active lobbying by the BPKI by KMM members to include Malaya within the Indonesian state such that

―the ‗Greater Indonesia‘ advocates won the day In a vote taken after Hatta‘s speech, 39 or 66 percent of the 66 members who voted at the meeting, cast their ballot in favour of an independent Indonesia which would include the

territory of the former Netherlands Indies, as well as Malaya, North Borneo, Papua and Portuguese Timor‖ (McIntyre, 1973: 82)

The lobbying for the inclusion of Malaya in Indonesian territory gives the impression that Indonesia harboured expansionist tendencies towards Malaya However, there were feelings of affinity in Malaya towards the ―Greater Indonesia‖ concept which was arguably ―the product of the racial anxiety and social frustration of a small group

of vernacular-educated Malays‖ (McIntyre, 1973: 82) This seemed to suggest that the idea of including Malaya in ―Greater Indonesia‖ did not necessarily evoke fears in the Malayan leadership of Indonesian expansionism The reason why the Malayan leadership developed the fear of potential Indonesian expansionist tendencies was that the Tunku‘s main concern after Malaya gained independence in 1957 was that ―there was now a very strong feeling amongst many Malays who looked to Indonesia as a

‗big brother‘ which (the Tunku‘s government) could not ignore‖ (A1838 3006/4/7 Part 1, 7 November 1957, NAA) The Tunku and his political elites were afraid of expansionism in the form of the potential for ―revolutionary fervour of Indonesian nationalism (spilling) over into the comparatively tranquil Malayan political domain‖ (Liow, 2005(2): 92)

An underlying causal factor of Confrontation is said to be a Sukarno-driven expansionist foreign policy based on a sense of regional entitlement and leadership This was arguably a result of Indonesia‘s illustrious pre-colonial past as illustrated by the empires of Srivijaya and Majapahit, which took root in 1945 The call to include Malaya within Indonesian territory was made by Muhammad Yamin and endorsed by Sukarno on 11 July 1945 which entailed