Each agent builds in the brain a representation of both his or her own intended actions, using internal cues like beliefs and desires, and the potential actions of the other agent.. Thes
Trang 1Figure 6.1 A tentative illustration of the many interactions between two agents Each agent builds in the brain a representation of both his or her own intended actions, using internal cues like beliefs and desires, and the potential actions of the other agent These partly overlapping representations are used
by each agent to build a set of predictions and estimates about the social consequences of the represented actions, if and when they would be exe-cuted When an action comes to execution, it is perceived by the other agent
as a set of social signals which do or do not confirm predictions and possibly modify beliefs and desires
Beliefs and desires of
Agent A
Beliefs and desires of Agent B
Execution of action
Execution of action
Representation
of self-generated action
Representation
of observed action
Representation
of observed action
Social signals from Agent B
Social signals from Agent A
Who ?
Who ?
Estimation of social consequences
Estimation of social consequences
Representation
of self-generated action
in the pattern of cortical connectivity could alter the shape of the networks corresponding to different representations or the relative intensity of acti-vation in the areas composing these networks Although little is known on the functional aspects of cortical connectivity underlying the formation of these networks and, a fortiori, their dysfunction in schizophrenia, several studies have pointed to the prefrontal cortex as one of the possible sites for
Trang 2perturbed activation (e.g., Weinberger & Berman, 1996) Because prefron-tal areas normally exert an inhibitory control on other areas involved in vari-ous aspects of motor and sensorimotor processing, alteration of this control
in schizophrenic patients might result in aberrant representations of actions and emotions Referring to the diagram in Figure 6.1, one of the two agents would become “schizophrenic” if, due to an alteration in the pattern of con-nectivity of the corresponding networks, the degree of overlap between the representations in the brain increased in such a way that the representations would become indistinguishable from each other The pattern of misattribu-tion in this agent would be a direct consequence of this alteramisattribu-tion: for ex-ample, decreased self attribution if frontal inhibition were too strong or increased if it were too weak
References
Adams, L., Guz, A., Innes, J A., & Murphy, K (1987) The early circulatory and
ventilatory response to voluntary and electrically induced exercise in man Jour-nal of Physiology, 383, 19–30.
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A R (1998) The human amygdala in social
judgment Nature, 393, 470–474.
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A (1994) Impaired recogni-tion of emorecogni-tion in facial expression following bilateral damage to the human
amygdala Nature, 372, 669–672.
Baudouin, J Y., Martin, F., Tiberghien, G., Verlut, I., & Franck, N (2002)
Selec-tive attention to facial emotion and identity in schizophrenia Neuropsychologia,
40, 503–511.
Berenbaum, H., & Oltmanns, T F (1992) Emotional experience and expression
in schizophrenia and depression Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101, 37–44 Bruce, V., & Young, A (1986) Understanding face recognition British Journal of Psychology, 77, 305–327.
Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M (1994) The omnipotence of voices A cognitive
approach to auditory hallucinations British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 190–201.
Czibra, G., Gergely, G., Biro, S., Koos, O., & Brockbank, M (1999) Goal
attribu-tion without agency cues: The percepattribu-tion of “pure reason” in infancy Cogni-tion, 72, 237–267.
Daprati, E., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Proust, J., Pacherie, E., Dalery, J., & Jeannerod,
M (1997) Looking for the agent An investigation into consciousness of
ac-tion and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients Cogniac-tion, 65, 71–86 Dasser, V., Ulbaek, I., & Premack, D (1989) The perception of intention Science,
243, 365–367.
David, A S (1994) The neuropsychological origin of auditory hallucinations In
A S David & J C Cutting (Eds.), The neuropsychology of schizophrenia
(pp 269–313) Hove, UK: Erlbaum.
Trang 3Davies, M., & Stone, T (Eds.) (1995) Folk psychology The theory of mind debate.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Decety, J., Grezes, J., Costes, N., Perani, D., Jeannerod, M., Procyk, E., Grassi, F.,
& Fazio, F (1997) Brain activity during observation of action Influence of
action content and subject’s strategy Brain, 120, 1763–1777.
Decety, J, Jeannerod, M., Durozard, D., & Baverel, G (1993) Central activation
of autonomic effectors during mental simulation of motor actions in man Jour-nal of Physiology, 461, 549–563.
Decety, J., Jeannerod, M., & Prablanc, C (1989) The timing of mentally
repre-sented actions Behavioural Brain Research, 34, 35–42.
Decety, J., Perani, D., Jeannerod, M., Bettinardi, V., Tadary, B., Woods, R., Mazziotta, J C., & Fazio, F (1994) Mapping motor representations with PET.
Nature, 371, 600–602.
Dierks, T., Linden, D E J., Jandl, M., Formisano, E., Goebel, R., Lanferman, H., & Singer, W (1999) Activation of the Heschl’s gyrus during auditory
hallucina-tions Neuron, 22, 615–621.
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G., & Rizzolatti, G (1995) Motor facilitation during
action observation A magnetic stimulation study Journal of Neurophysiology,
73, 2608–2611.
Feinberg, T E., Rifkin, A., Schaffer, C., & Walker, E (1986) Facial discrimination
and emotional recognition in schizophrenia and affective disorders Archives of General Psychiatry, 43, 276–279.
Frak, V G., Paulignan, Y., & Jeannerod, M (2001) Orientation of the opposition
axis in mentally simulated grasping Experimental Brain Research, 136, 120–127.
Franck, N., Farrer, C., Georgieff, N., Marie-Cardine, M., Daléry, J D’Amato, T., & Jeannerod, M (2001) Defective recognition of one’s own actions in
schizo-phrenic patients American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 454–459.
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A (1998) Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of
mind-reading Trends in Cognitive Science, 12, 493–501.
Georgieff, N., & Jeannerod, M (1998) Beyond consciousness of external reality A
“who” system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 465–477.
Gérardin, E., Sirigu, A., Lehéricy, S., Poline, J.-B., Gaymard, B., Marsault, C., Agid, Y., & Le Bihan, D (2000) Partially overlapping neural networks for real and
imagined hand movements Cerebral Cortex, 10, 1093–1104.
Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Czibra, G., & Biro, S (1995) Taking the intentional stance
at 12 months of age Cognition, 56, 165–193.
Goldie, P (1999) How we think of others’ emotions Mind and Language, 14, 394–
423.
Gould, L N (1949) Auditory hallucinations in subvocal speech: Objective study in
a case of schizophrenia Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 109, 418–427.
Grafton, S T., Arbib, M A., Fadiga, L., & Rizzolatti, G (1996) Localization of grasp representations in humans by PET: 2 Observation compared with
imagi-nation Experimental Brain Research, 112, 103–111.
Trang 4Haxby, J V., Hoffman, E A., & Gobbini, I (2000) The distributed human neural
system for face perception Trends in Cognitive Science, 4, 223–233.
Heider, F., & Simmel, M (1944) An experimental study of apparent behavior.
American Journal of Psychology, 57, 243–259.
Hoffman, E A., & Haxby, J V (2000) Distinct representations of eye gaze and
identity in the distributed human neural system for face perception Nature America, 3, 80–84.
Ingvar, D., & Philipsson, L (1977) Distribution of the cerebral blood flow in the
dominant hemisphere during motor ideation and motor performance Annals
of Neurology, 2, 230–237.
Janet, P (1937) Les troubles de la personnalité sociale Annales Médico-Psycho-logiques, II, 149–200.
Jeannerod, M (1993) A theory of representation-driven actions In U Neisser (Ed.),
The perceived self: Ecological and interpersonal sources of self-knowledge (pp 89–
101) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jeannerod, M (1994) The representing brain Neural correlates of motor
inten-tion and imagery Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 187–245.
Jeannerod, M (1995) Mental imagery in the motor context Neuropsychologia, 33,
1419–1432.
Jeannerod, M (1999) To act or not to act: Perspectives on the representation of
actions Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 52A, 1–29.
Jeannerod, M (2001) Neural simulation of action: A unifying mechanism for motor
cognition Neuroimage, 14, S103–S109.
Jeannerod, M., & Frak, V G (1999) Mental simulation of action in human
sub-jects Current Opinions in Neurobiology, 9, 735–739.
Johansson, G (1973) Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its
analysis Perception and Psychophysics, 14, 201–211.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A (1982) The simulation heuristic In P Slovic,
D Kahneman, & A Tversky (Eds.), Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M M (1997) The fusiform face area: A
module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 4302–4311.
Kluwer, H., & Bucy, P C (1939) Preliminary analysis of the function of parietal
lobes in monkeys Archives of Neurological Psychiatry, 42, 979–997.
Krogh, A., & Lindhard, J (1913) The regulation of respiration and circulation during
the initial stages of muscular work Journal of Physiology, 47, 112–136.
Lacquaniti, F., Terzuolo, C., & Viviani, P (1983) The law relating kinematic and
figural aspects of drawing movements Acta Psychologica, 54, 115–130 Lang, P (1979) A bioinformational theory of emotional imagery Psychophysiol-ogy, 16, 495–512.
Levenson, R W., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W V (1990) Voluntary facial action
gen-erates emotion-specific autonomic nervous system activity Psychophysiology,
27, 363–384.
Trang 5Lhermitte, F (1983) Utilisation behaviour and its relation to lesions of the frontal
lobes Brain, 106, 237–255.
Liberman, A M., & Mattingly, I G (1985) The motor theory of perception of
speech revisited Cognition, 21, 1–36.
Lipps, T (1903) Aesthetik: Psychologie des schönen un der kunst Hamburg: Voss Lotze, R H (1852) Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele Leipzig:
Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung.
Neisser, U (1993) The self perceived In U Neisser (Ed.), The perceived self Eco-logical and interpersonal sources of self-knowledge (pp 3–21) Cambridge:
Cam-bridge University Press.
Nelson, C A (1987) The recognition of facial expression in the first two years of
life Mechanisms of development Child Development, 58, 889–909.
Paccalin, C., & Jeannerod, M (2000) Changes in breathing during observation of
effortful actions Brain Research, 862, 194–200.
Parsons, L M (1994) Temporal and kinematic properties of motor behavior
re-flected in mentally simulated action Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20, 709–730.
Pigman, G W (1995) Freud and the history of empathy International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 76, 237–256.
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L (1995) Premotor cortex and
the recognition of motor actions Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 131–141.
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Matelli, M., Bettinardi, V., Paulesu, E., Perani, D., & Fazio,
G (1996) Localization of grasp representations in humans by PET: 1
Obser-vation versus execution Experimental Brain Research, 111, 246–252.
Roth, M., Decety, J., Raybaudi, M., Massarelli, R., Delon-Martin, C., Segebarth, C., Morand, S., Gemignani, A., Décorps, M., & Jeannerod, M (1996) Pos-sible involvement of primary motor cortex in mentally simulated movement.
A functional magnetic resonance imaging study Neuroreport, 7, 1280–1284.
Ruby, P., & Decéty, J (2001) Effect of subjective perspective taking during
simula-tion of acsimula-tion: A PET investigasimula-tion of agency Nature Neurosciences, 4, 546–550 Schneider, K (1955) Klinische Psychopathologie Stuttgart: Thieme Verlag Shiffrar, M., & Freyd, J J (1990) Apparent motion of the human body Psychologi-cal Science, 1, 257–264.
Silbersweig, D A., Stern, E., Frith, C., Cahill, C., Holmes, A., Grootoonk, S., Sea-ward, J., McKenna, P., Chua, S E., Schnorr, L., Jones, T., & Frackowiak,
R S J (1995) A functional neuroanatomy of hallucinations in schizophrenia.
Nature, 378, 176–179.
Sirigu, A., Duhamel, J.-R., Cohen, L., Pillon, B., Dubois, B., & Agid, Y (1996) The mental representation of hand movements after parietal cortex damage.
Science, 273, 1564–1568.
Stone, V E., Baron-Cohen, S., Calder, A., Keane, J., & Young, A (2003) Acquired theory of mind impairments in individuals with bilateral amygdala lesions.
Neuropsychologia, 41, 209–220.
Titchener, E B (1908) Lectures on the elementary psychology of feeling and atten-tion New York: MacMillan.
Trang 6Viviani, P (1990) Common factors in the control of free and constrained
move-ments In M Jeannerod (Ed.), Motor representation and control, Attention and Performance (Vol XIII, pp 345–373) Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Viviani, P., & Stucchi, N (1992) Biological movements look uniform Evidence of
motor–perceptual interactions Journal of Experimental Psychology, Human Per-ception and Performance, 18, 603–623.
Weinberger, D R., & Berman, K F (1996) Prefrontal function in schizophrenia:
Confounds and controversies Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, 351, 1495–1503.
Zajonc, R B (1985) Emotion and facial efference: A theory reclaimed Science,
228, 15–21.
Trang 7This page intentionally left blank
Trang 8P A R T I I I
ROBOTS
Trang 9This page intentionally left blank
Trang 10Affect and Proto-Affect
in Effective Functioning
andrew ortony, donald a norman, and william revelle
7
We propose a functional model of effective functioning that depends on the interplay of four relatively independent domains, namely, affect
(value), motivation (action tendencies), cognition (meaning), and
behavior (the organism’s actions) These domains of functioning all need
to be considered at each of three levels of information processing: the reactive, the routine, and the reflective levels The reactive level is pri-marily a hard-wired releaser of fixed action patterns and an interrupt generator, limited to such things as processing simple stimuli and initi-ating approach and avoidance behaviors This level has only proto-affect The routine level is the locus of unconscious, uninterpreted expectations and well-learned automatized activity, and is characterized by aware-ness, but not self-awareness This level is the locus of primitive and unconscious emotions The reflective level is the home of higher-order cognitive functions, including metacognition, consciousness, and self-reflection, and features full-fledged emotions In this framework, we characterize personality as a self-tunable system comprised of the tem-poral patterning of affect, motivation, cognition, and behavior Person-ality traits are a reflection of the various parameter settings that govern the functioning of these different domains at all three processing lev-els Our model constitutes a good way of thinking about the design of emotions in computational artifacts of arbitrary complexity that must