In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 10 pptx

In the absence of any morally relevant distinction between all human beings and all other living entities, consistency and impartiality require the application of this same strin- gent m

For this reason, triage is not representative of contemporary Western morality regarding the protection and preservation of innocent human life We must look elsewhere.

Perhaps sentience will be helpful in determining who will live and who will die in our particular lifeboat scenario To explore this pos- sibility, we must alter our constituency: we will replace the naked mole rat with a daisy Is the life of this newcomer equally precious? Must it be preserved and protected along with the life of the needle- clawed bush baby and the naked mole rat?

Sentience is a morally relevant criterion in Western law—causing serious unnecessary physical su ffering to innocent human beings is illegal One is not allowed to starve or beat up dependents, whether children, the elderly, or “pets.” But pain and su ffering are not rele-

vant with regard to the preservation and protection of human life The case of Matthew Donnelly (the physicist with cancer) provides

an apt example He suffered terribly, to the point where he did not wish to live any longer, yet he was kept alive against his wishes In contrast, Baby Theresa could not feel anything She suffered not one twinge, not one moment of anxiety, not one second of hunger She was not capable of suffering Yet medical professionals maintained Baby Theresa even at the expense of other children who might have lived if they had the organs of this failing, anencephalic infant, organs that her parents wished to donate so that other families might pre-

serve their beloved children Many individuals are kept alive in Western

hospitals who can feel nothing , anencephalic infants and innumerable brain-dead patients, while each day, for want of food and medicine,

human beings who can feel and think and function, su ffer and die In

fact Western nations do not choose to allocate resources in order to protect against su ffering Nor do we make choices in order to pre- serve the lives of those who can suffer in favor of those who can- not feel anything.

The Minimize Harm Maxim is an extension of morality ing the preservation and protection of innocent human life Human life is preserved even if such medical efforts increase suffering Life

regard-is sustained even if that life su ffers terribly in the process, even if preserving that life causes others to suffer and die as a result As it turns out, the daisy will stay on board just as surely as any other passenger.

Western medical practice, rooted in Western morality that tects and preserves the life of every innocent human being, does not

pro-allow any human being to die so that others might live While many

innocent human beings die of simple neglect—malnutrition,

infec-tion, diseases for which there are cures—because funds and e fforts are focused elsewhere, medical practice does not permit the loss of any innocent human life that might be preserved Our responsibility for those that die of want, of neglect, is no less because they do not lie

in a hospital bed, but exploring such cases is beyond the scope of this work.

Western law protects innocent human life The legal system and medical practice reflect a Western morality that holds human life to

be precious to a degree that seems beyond calculation The Minimize Harm Maxim, rooted in morality with regard to protecting and pre- serving human life, also provides no means by which to make dis- tinctions between one life and another As anencephalic infants aptly demonstrate, no innocent human life is allowed to die or be killed— even for the sake of other innocent human lives—if they might go

on living While there are many cases in which individual doctors permit patients to die, or even help them to do so, such cases remain

o ff the books Law requires that each innocent human life be allowed to

persist for as long as possible.

For the sake of consistency and impartiality, in light of casuistry, the life of each living entity on our unique lifeboat is as precious as every other The harm of exterminating any one of these five enti-

ties is equal inasmuch as the life of Baby Theresa is no more or less

morally considerable than the life of any other patient in the

hos-pital where she lived and died The Minimize Harm Maxim, an

extension of contemporary Western morality with regard to the vation and protection of human life, does not discriminate between the lives of a naked mole rat, a spectacled elephant shrew, a hyrax, and a needle-clawed bush baby even that of a daisy Contemporary Western ethics provide no means by which to decide who will live and who will die on our bobbing lifeboat.

preser-Conclusion

Western morality, as evidenced by medical practice and law, protects every innocent human life In the absence of any morally relevant distinction between all human beings and all other living entities, consistency and impartiality require the application of this same strin-

gent morality to all life forms.

The Minimize Harm Maxim is a utopian moral theory, rooted in consistency, extending morality between human beings to all other living beings that have not been shown to be di fferent in morally relevant ways Idealistic theories often seem extreme and unlikely,

but the Minimize Harm Maxim stands as a model of what we ought

to do if we are to be consistent and impartial If the Minimize Harm Maxim seems unreasonable, then our only recourse, if we are to maintain consistency, is to reconsider our current moral ideals with regard to protecting and preserving innocent human life.

REVIEW AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

We have explored the work of four prominent scholars Although a critical analysis is o ffered for the best-known and most respected pro- tectionist theories available, this work attests to and affirms the value

of the contribution that each of these scholars has made to the ing process of seeking and establishing a more consistent, compas- sionate morality We have also explored an idealistic protectionist theory based on consistency and impartiality, the Minimize Harm Maxim In this final chapter, we look back to the previous chapters, and forward to what might lie ahead in the field of anymals and ethics What fundamental concepts have been further explored and developed? What possible directions might be beneficial for future work in protectionist ethics?

ongo-A Overview

1 A Conspicuous Problem

Protectionism is an “idea that is easy to ridicule but hard to refute”

(Ryder, Animal 332).

In the West, both civil law and accepted morality protect human

conatus, the urge “to preserve our existence as persons” (P Taylor “Inherent”

25) Predominant Western morality holds the strong conviction that

there is no legitimate reason to deny moral standing to any human

being; ideally, each human being is maintained even at tremendous expense to society But we do not extend this protection to anymals, and there is a conspicuous absence of any morally legitimate reason for treating human life differently from how we treat all other life- forms Moral philosophers have as yet been unable to establish any satisfactory morally relevant difference between anymals and human beings—one that would justify denying basic protection to other species while maintaining such stringent protection for human life Yet Western ethics, as revealed in the actions of most people, per- sist with this flagrant inconsistency The lives of anymals remain

almost completely unprotected “Current legal consensus seems to

be that nearly any human interest can in principle qualify as an acceptable justi fication for animal use Whether there is a moral consensus in society to this effect is more doubtful” (Orlans 317) As

a result, in the United States, “given the quantity of non-human mals suffering, the extent to which they are suffering, and the rea- son they are intentionally made to su ffer animal liberation is the moral imperative of our time Our focus should be on ending the su ffering as efficiently and quickly as possible” (Ball 4) We are living in a time of great moral reckoning, a time of moral reflection leading to eye-opening moral imperatives previously overlooked We are, slowly, bit by bit, coming to see that our treatment of anymals

ani-in relation to our treatment of human animals constitutes an unjusti fied, flagrant inconsistency Some have come to see that those who cling

to the maximum moral signi ficance of human beings while denying such significance to anymals have no philosophical leg to stand on.

We can either accept anymals into the fold or deny full moral significance to certain human beings Tom Regan writes:

[ T ]he moral beliefs we accept cannot all be true if they include two

or more inconsistent beliefs This much, too, seems clear: our mitment to search for and, when we find them, to address such incon- sistencies offers a fair indication of the seriousness with which we respond to the challenge to develop an informed, thoughtful moral

com-outlook (Defending 101)

Western morality is currently inconsistent; we are inconsistent in our

treatment of life and in our expressed “respect for life.” Peter Singer notes:

People often say that life is sacred They almost never mean what they say They do not mean, as their words seem to imply, that life itself

is sacred If they did, killing a pig or pulling up a cabbage would be

as abhorrent to them as the murder of a human being When people say that life is sacred, it is human life they have in mind But why

should human life have special value? (Writings 125)

Indeed, what is so important about us in a universe of such beauty and diversity? Why do we persist with—and even defend—this flagrantly immoral status quo? The cases of Baby Theresa, Tracy Latimer, Matthew Donnelly, and Samuel Linares (let alone jelly fish babies) make a startling contrast with the indifference we show toward the lives of stray pets, anymals exploited for science and the farming

industry, or any variety of anymals left alongside the roadway “What justifies the difference?” (Singer, Writings 126).

In the first century, the Greek philosopher Plutarch wrote, “For what sort of dinner is not costly for which a living creature loses its life? Do we hold a life cheap?” (“On” 997) Sound ethics do not entail flagrant inconsistencies For those with a critical eye, “it is hard to see a long and bene ficial future for an ethic as paradoxical, incoherent, and dependent on pretense as our conventional ethic of

life and death has become” (Singer, Writings 210).

2 A Cooperative Enterprise

It is the task of moral philosophers to either rectify moral tencies or justify them; the works of Regan, Singer, Linzey, and Taylor are central contributions to this ongoing effort Only by exploring diverse options might we find possible solutions to our ongoing moral dilemma—our flagrant inconsistency Each theory offers insights that “tend to lead us in the right direction” (L Johnson 197) Each moral theory offers valuable insights and worthy possi- bilities As an environmental activist colleague noted, “We must lis- ten to many voices, especially to those issuing from lived realities—even

inconsis-if what is said challenges us”—indeed, especially inconsis-if what is said

chal-lenges us (Gloege, Unpublished communication).

Protectionist philosophy benefits from a diversity of theories, and

so do the diverse populations to which these theories speak For instance, Linzey’s theory will be irrelevant to an atheist, but is likely

to be of considerable interest, and compelling, for a concerned Christian In contrast, theories rooted in scientific understandings of the natural world and animals, such as the works of Singer and Regan, are less apt to reach a conservative Christian (Finsen 193) Meanwhile, if an individual feels strongly about human rights, she

or he will probably find moral concordance in Regan’s work Each theory might help someone to recognize, acknowledge, and rectify this current terrible inconsistency in our morality For this reason, each theory is of value—the diversity itself is of value—and we ought

to strive for “more cooperative work, and less competitive

philoso-phizing” (Regan, Animal 61).

This variety of theories in the protectionist movement also reveals the seriousness with which these ideas are now being taken, and the strength of the work being published by scholars in this growing

field Each of the philosophers explored in this text objects to the moral discrepancy between our overarching respect for human life and our general disregard for all other life-forms “When taken together, these arguments pose a fundamental challenge to tradi- tional morality and its assumption of the superiority of humans and the primacy of human interests” (Finsen 233) Protectionism can never again be dismissed as a side issue; change is inevitable, how- ever slowly it might come to pass.

3 The Minimize Harm Maxim

The Minimize Harm Maxim is part of this ongoing philosophical exploration and is likely to resonate with those who are interested

in strict philosophical consistency, and perhaps with those who are invested in the sanctity of life Consider a person who does not accept the notion of human rights, does not care about minimizing suffering, and who is not moved by religious teachings; what is the most fundamental common ground with regard to life that one might reach with such an individual?

The answer seems to be conatus: such a person is alive and strives

to persist biologically Most people will readily acknowledge that they personally endeavor to survive, and that they wish to protect their personal endeavor to survive Common sense tells us that all other life-forms share this biological urge to persist, and a common ground

is reached not just for all people, but for all life With this basic

recognition it is easy to establish that all living beings ought to be

protected from harm if human beings are protected on the grounds that they wish to persist In the absence of any morally relevant dis- tinction between all human beings and all anymals, the Minimize

Harm Maxim asserts that ethics ought to protect all life-forms that

share this basic urge to persist if this urge is to be protected among human beings For those who assert that only they (or only human beings) have an interest in persisting biologically, empirical evidence

stands against them, and the burden of proof is theirs.

Philosophic consistency indicates that those who wish to exploit anymals must justify such actions; in contrast, those who fight for protectionism are consistent with accepted morality regarding the protection and preservation of life (in the absence of a morally rel- evant distinction between all human beings and all anymals) and need not justify their stance.

Summary of Overview

• Predominant Western moral standards and practices are tent and partial with regard to the moral standing of human beings

inconsis-as opposed to the moral standing of all other life-forms.

• A diversity of protectionist theories is beneficial to the ongoing search for a more consistent ethic with regard to anymals.

• The Minimize Harm Maxim, developed from a consistent application

of extreme respect for human life in Western ethics, as exempli fied

by Western laws and Western medical practice, is part of this ongoing e ffort in protectionist moral philosophy, and is based on the most fundamental common ground with regard to life.

B Philosophical Standards and the Minimize Harm Maxim

1 Ethical Theories

What is right will not always be apparent, and the temptation will always exist to rationalize as necessary what we desire or find conve-

nient (A Taylor, Animal 262)

Human actions affect the land and every living being Maintaining moral standards is linked to a smooth-running, satisfied society

(Horsburgh, Non-Violence 47) Human ethics that guide behavior are

therefore extremely important to each of us and to the larger world The practical application of philosophy, determining what one

ought to do in a given situation, is the task of applied philosophy One philosophical tool for this enterprise is casuistry, examining situations

on a case-by-case basis and consistently applying ethical standards

in diverse situations that are similar in morally relevant ways Ethics entail many ideals that are not only difficult, but perhaps impossible to realize Even a saint must at times be lustful, disin- genuous, or gluttonous; it does not seem feasible to be completely honest at all times Yet self-control and honesty remain ethical ideals

to which most of us readily attest Utopian visions present ideals that

offer moral guidance in real-life situations The role of moral phy is to establish “claims on our consideration or respect which we acknowledge as in some sense ideally determinative” (Goodpaster,

philoso-“On Being” 313).

Making concessions for human shortcomings is not a legitimate

approach to moral philosophy Stringent expectations, and the need

for diligence and sacri fice, should not sway us from pursuing moral ideals Ethics distinguish ideal ways and preferable actions from both undesirable behavior and common practice Morality is about what

one ought to do While human actions may fall short of moral ideals,

the task of moral philosophy is to stand strong against conventional

practices and moral assertions that fall short of the mark An ethic

limited to what an individual can reasonably be expected to achieve is a dation of moral theory.

degra-Moral philosophers are not called upon to justify the way

indi-viduals prefer to live, to appease the masses, or to gratify powerful

individuals bene fiting from the status quo Down through history the masses and the elite have often claimed freedoms for themselves, in particular freeing themselves from morality at the expense of others But freedom from morality does not equate to actual freedom [S]uppose that we had quite di fferent rules, and that more people were free to hit others in the nose, and correspondingly fewer were free to enjoy the full beauty and utility of their own unbloodied proboscises Would this new arrangement have a greater or smaller “amount” of freedom in it, on balance ? [ T ]here would be not “less” free-

dom but freedom of a morally inferior kind (Feinberg, Social 24)

For centuries humans have been freely swinging their fists, while other species have su ffered bruised and broken lives due to a short- coming that persists in Western morality as practiced by most citizens.

A “major role of morality should be to enjoin the protection

of the vulnerable from the powerful” (Miller 333); establishing moral codes that respect and protect the comparatively weak from the strong is one of the definitive duties of moral philosophy The weak and silent have interests; morality requires the powerful to respect the less powerful Who would condone a moral theory allowing the strongest and most powerful their preferences at the expense of the weak, the silent, or the poor? Yet, where other species are con- cerned, commonly accepted morality permits exactly this.

Common Western ethics and practice fail to protect weak and vulnerable anymals from powerful, exploitative human beings This breach of moral responsibility stands in stark contrast with our moral standards regarding the protection and preservation of human lives and is unjust and immoral because we have been unable to put for- ward a broadly accepted morally relevant distinction between humans and other life-forms Down through history and up to the present moment prominent moral practices have been biased, favoring cer-

tain interests Favored interests “tend to be characteristically human,” and the “grounds for discrimination are inadequate” (L Johnson 198) We have failed to establish an ethic that consistently protects the myriad vulnerable living beings from greedy, powerful, prosper- ous, exploitative human beings It is the task of moral philosophers

to offer a more viable (consistent) alternative.

2 Examining the Minimize Harm Maxim

The Minimize Harm Maxim, an idealistic moral theory based on consistency and impartiality, strives to actualize widely accepted con- temporary moral ideals.

The Minimize Harm Maxim does not make concessions for ileged or powerful minorities (human beings as opposed to all other

priv-living entities) It protects all who are powerless The Minimize Harm

Maxim offers an ideal, consistent with norms of moral philosophy For most of us in our daily lives, the ease or difficulty of enact- ing a moral theory does not add to or detract from the strength or desirability of that moral theory (Even though we all lie sometimes,

we generally agree that lying is not morally preferable Even though

we agree that gluttony is no virtue, most of us eat more than we ought to at least on occasion.) In the conspicuous absence of any morally relevant distinction between all people who are morally con- siderable and other living beings, the Minimize Harm Maxim indi- cates how we can maintain consistency and persist with our current ethical standard with regard to human life The Minimize Harm Maxim carries current ethical standards with regard to human life

to their logical conclusion—not to suggest what one might prefer to

do, nor what it is “reasonable” to expect, but in order to indicate

what one ought to do.

3 Comparison

The Minimize Harm Maxim entails a number of important sophical strengths in comparison with other protectionist theories The Minimize Harm Maxim

philo-• maintains consistency and impartiality;

• avoids the dubious metaphysical concept of moral rights;

• avoids the epistemological di fficulties of assessing consciousness across species;

• avoids the epistemological di fficulties of analyzing sentience or ject-of-a-life status across species; and

sub-• does not depend on the epistemologically perplexing task of ing and comparing pleasure, pain, harm suffered, or opportuni- ties for satisfaction.

assess-Of course there are problems entailed in the Minimize Harm Maxim The Minimize Harm Maxim is based on well-established ethics with regard to human life In truth, Western morality is not consistent

on this point War, capital punishment, and abortion reveal guity regarding the preservation and protection of human life Killing some individuals is permissible Such killings indicate that Western

ambi-ethics, at least in practice, do not protect all human life in every

sit-uation However, aside from these comparatively small numbers of human beings, Western laws and morality hold human life in the highest regard, as evidenced by common medical practices such as the care given doomed anencephalic infants Cases presented previ- ously, such as those of Baby Theresa, Tracy Latimer, and Samuel Linares, provide ample evidence of the strong medical practices, based on Western morality and law, regarding the protection and preservation of human life.

Others might object that the Minimize Harm Maxim demands tremendous moral diligence and self-sacri fice But the effort required

to fulfill a moral obligation is not the concern of moral ideals What

is convenient, what one might prefer, or the di fficulty entailed in living an ethical life is not relevant Ethical theories such as the

Minimize Harm Maxim indicate what one ought to do (in this case

for the sake of consistency, if one is to persist with dominant rent ethical standards regarding human life, in the absence of any morally relevant distinctions between all human life and all other life-forms).

cur-Our generally accepted current morality in the West with regard

to human life is extremely costly, and requires tremendous tive sacrifice Nonetheless, there is a consensus, rooted to a large extent in our Christian past, that to protect and defend human life

collec-is morally ideal, and well worth the effort Generally speaking, we would not choose to live in a world devoid of notions of “the sanc- tity of human life,” however spurious such a contention might be Therefore, consistency requires us to extend this ethic to all other living entities that are similar in morally relevant ways If life is

precious, then all life is precious With regard to the Minimize Harm Maxim, the entirety of life is morally considerable—all life is granted moral

standing.

C Reexamining Predominant Western Ethics

The Minimize Harm Maxim is based on the following:

• Generally speaking, Western ethics place supreme value on human life, with only very few exceptions.

• Philosophers have established no morally relevant distinction between all human beings and all other living entities.

• Consistency and impartiality are cornerstones of both Western losophy and applied philosophy.

phi-I have therefore argued as follows:

• If one can find no morally relevant distinction between all people and all anymals, and

• if one accepts the predominant morality in the West regarding

human life,

• then consistency and impartiality require an extension of the moral

sphere to include all living entities.

The Minimize Harm Maxim is but one solution to the above set of problems; there are at least three options for correcting this current inconsistency in the dominant ethic of the West (only the first of which has been explored in this book):

• Extend our dominant Western ethic so that all living entities are morally considerable.

• Establish morally relevant criteria that differentiate some or all human beings from some or all other nonhuman living entities.

• Diminish the moral importance of human life.

Through the viewpoints of prominent scholars, and by exploring the Minimize Harm Maxim, this book has focused on the first option The second option has also been thoroughly explored in moral phi- losophy, but without satisfactory results Scholars have found that a

change in criteria for moral standing that excludes anymals and other life-forms from moral protection will result in the loss of moral stand- ing for at least some human beings if philosophic consistency is main- tained, usually the very young and the mentally limited “R G Frey, for example, has argued that vivisection of some of these humans would be justified, although he is far from gleeful about the prospect” (Pluhar xiii) Evidence suggests that if we wish to continue to exploit anymals, philosophical consistency will require sacrificing certain humans along the way If it is morally permissible to sport kill, trap, breed, capture, tamper with biologically, experiment on, cage, eat, and vivisect anymals, then it must be equally morally permissible to

do this to certain humans beings Most of us are decidedly fortable with this conclusion More importantly, this possible out- come is plagued by the epistemological difficulties of assessing the various capacities of living entities across species.

uncom-The third option, in contrast, remains comparatively unexplored.

1 Reconsidering the Value of Human Life

So you are not like a washing machine or a car and are not de fined

by the material present at this moment You are a complex system of activities that makes temporary use of various kinds of matter, but that matter is not you You, and all other organisms, are continuous sys- tems of material flux, of matter moving in, playing a role, and mov- ing out You are more like a candle flame or a whirlpool than like a washing machine (G Williams 118–19)

What is life? What is the value of human life? As noted in the duction, suffering and death are not the primary focus of this book.

intro-We live, and we die intro-We su ffer While moral virtues support a life

of compassion and caring rather than one of wanton killing or igated maiming, virtues are not the primary focus of this work This book is about consistency in moral practice with regard to our treat- ment of life.

unmit-At what cost ought we to protect life? Some ancient and sive religious teachings, as well as modern science, indicate that we are more akin to the mayfly than to our conceptions of an immor- tal divine If we were to incorporate a may fly mentality into Western morality, an ethic where we accept our own death and the deaths

perva-of our own kind more willingly, it is likely that a more consistent ethic would emerge An ethic that treads a more moderate path with

regard to human life would not require that we be so extreme with regard to other species in order to maintain consistency.

In hindsight, pondering the preceding material, is our treatment

of human life extreme, radical, and inimical to common sense? While many conventional people consider protectionists and protectionism

radical, is it not our conventional ethic with regard to human life that

is extreme and radical?

When faced with the astronomical expense and allocation of ited resources in cases such as those of Baby Theresa, do we ever wonder “whether such treatment of an infant human being is or is

lim-not the right thing to do” (Singer, Writings 126)? Our contemporary

ethic concerning human life when applied to any other life-form, seems excessive, perhaps even ridiculous Is it reasonable for moral- ity, law, and medical practice to be so concerned about perpetuat- ing a living organism simply because it is able to be perpetuated and because its biology strives to persist?

Protectionist theories tend to extend our stringent Western ethic concerning human life outward to include at least some other liv- ing entities Perhaps we ought to reexamine predominant Western ethics with regard to the value of human life in order to clarify where the limits of moral obligation might reasonably lie In light

of the ongoing, flagrant moral inconsistency concerning the tion and preservation of life, perhaps our quest for a more moder-

protec-ate and consistent morality will lead us to reevaluprotec-ate both our ethic toward anymals and our ethic with regard to human life.

In a recent interview Singer commented that for two thousand years humans have “enshrined the sanctity of human life, no mat- ter how compromised” (Specter 46) Western medicine, rooted in Western morality and backed by Western law, maintains patients who have been brain dead for years and whose families wish they

might be allowed to die, elderly patients who would prefer to wither

away in peace but are required to live as long as their bodies are able to biologically persist, and terminally ill patients who have been maintained even though they suffer terribly and ask to be allowed the simple option of death Dominant Western morality encourages the maintenance of human life even at great cost to the community

and against the will of the individual (As noted, exceptions include gerous criminals, “enemy soldiers,” and unborn fetuses up to a cer- tain level of development.)

dan-Philosophic consistency indicates that it might be necessary to

con-sider removing some moral protection granted some human beings in

some situations If so, the details need to be worked out with extreme care But if we are unwilling to modify moral protection for human life, in the absence of any morally relevant distinction between a lifeless, brain-dead human being and a protozoan, consistency requires that we extend moral standing to protozoa We must not lose sight

of the fact that it is because of our extreme current protection of

human life that philosophic consistency leads us to the extreme ethics

of the Minimize Harm Maxim If we do not like the look of the Minimize Harm Maxim, one way to achieve moral consistency is to alter morality with regard to human life.

2 Continuing the Trend—Moving Ethics Outward

Singer writes of our tendency to view “human beings as the center

of the ethical universe”; he identifies this as part of “a set of ideas

we have inherited from the period in which the intellectual world

was dominated by a religious outlook” (Writings 211) Change is

inevitable The “moral inadequacy” of narrow principles that limit

“respect for life to a tribe, race, or nation” has become obvious to the Western world; now we are seriously questioning whether or not the commonly accepted “boundary of our species marks a more

defensible limit to the protected circle” (Singer, Writings 126) Leena

Vilkka notes that the Enlightenment brought human equality, “the idea that we are born equal The second Enlightenment should be the revolution for nature It should extend the principle of equality

to the non-human world” (72) And when we do bring all of life under the umbrella of moral protection, “the comfortable sense of right and wrong, which securely governs our everyday existence, is

no longer tenable, and we can no longer eat, sleep, and work in the same untroubled way” (Rollin 4) As with the freeing of the slaves

in the South, so must be the freeing of anymals across the Western world As we fight for freedom for all people in all societies, so we must ultimately seek freedom for all beings in all nations.

It is the task of moral theories to perpetually knock on established boundaries, to push morality to higher standards Most Westerners have extended ethics outward from self to family to community—to

the entirety of the human species (Norton, Why 173); we are now

called upon to extend moral standing to other species Expanding

moral standing to include other life-forms is inevitable Even if we exclude certain human beings, and even if we fail to protect human beings in certain situations, consistency will require us to extend the circle of moral standing to at least some other species.

Whatever way one looks at ethics, morality is advanced by the inclusion of other species: Moral character, the sum of happiness in the world, and fairness are all “furthered when nonhuman animals are included in the moral sphere” (Pluhar 227).

Only a lingering and unprincipled prejudice can now underlie the exclusion of animals from the kingdom of ends Principled moral equal- ity cannot stop with the human race Thus, animal liberation presents itself not as a deviant blip in moral theory, but as a compelling out- come of a long Western moral tradition as it has become progressively refined through the demands of consistency, through redefinition of what in human experience we value and want morally protected, and through developing empirical knowledge regarding similarities and con- tinuities between the human and other species Such is the case for the animals (Miller 322)

While it remains unclear whether or not every human being in every

possible circumstance ought to be morally considerable, it is clear

that life is precious for each of us, as it is to other living entities If

we care for our lives, and wish that our lives be preserved and tected, and if we are willing to extend this understanding to a moral law and medical practice that protects this same urge in anencephalic infants, on what grounds might we exclude yaks, okapi, or the endan-

pro-gered Iriomote cat? All things being equal, consistency requires the

exten-sion of moral standing beyond the human circle.

3 Human Limitations

How far are human beings able to extend the circle of moral ing? Some philosophers assert that we are meant to be anthro- pocentric, just as “wolves typically conduct themselves in a lupucentric manner, eagles generally behave aquicentrically, and bees are fer- vent apiecentrists” (Thiele 178) Perhaps partiality is not only to be expected but accepted.

stand-In making judgments about the moral status of living things, we are not (or should not be) seeking to estimate their value from the view- point of the gods, or that of the universe We are not gods but human beings, reasoning about how we ought to think and act Our moral

theories can only be based upon what we know and what we care about, or ought to care about (Warren 43)

If this is the case, is it reasonable to expect animals such as human beings to establish a more inclusive ethical vision?

To accept the human tendency to be selfish seems misguided for three reasons First, history and the development of moral philoso- phy do not support this conclusion Self-centered partiality has been the successful target of ethical theory for centuries The abolition of slavery in the United States required Southerners “to give up their biggest economic investment” (“Underground”) Cotton—sown, grown,

and picked by slaves—was the most important export—more

impor-tant than all other exports combined (“Underground”) Today few would argue that the economic base of the South, or the personal eco- nomic interests of those involved, were more important than pro- tecting basic interests of individuals.

Second, if predominant Western morality accepts that human beings are fundamentally selfish and abandons protectionist ethics as

a consequence, repercussions will come back to nip us in the heels.

In the absence of a morally relevant distinction between all human beings and all anymals, an affirmation of human selfishness will ulti- mately lead to the conclusion that individuals who are entitled to

be selfish with other species are no less entitled to be selfish with one another.

Third, any vision that abandons our ongoing quest for a more expansive, compassionate ethic runs contrary to the general under- standing of what it is to be a human being People tend to identify bees with an extremely complex social order, whales with gentleness

in spite of tremendous strength, and eagles for grace in flight and keen eyesight The majority of Westerners have long held that human beings are the quintessential rational and uniquely moral animal If people accept that they are fundamentally selfish and incapable of maintaining a consistent ethic of respect for life, then we will need

to reexamine our understandings of who we are How can the human animal be praised for attributes we are unwilling, or unable, to employ or exhibit?

4 An Ongoing Endeavor

The previous few chapters have presented and defended an ethic that moves beyond persons and rights, beyond vertebrates and sen-

tience, and beyond assumed levels of consciousness to include all ing entities that endeavor to persist The concept of such an expan- sive ethic is not new: Ancient religious beliefs, born before the advent

liv-of human history, include ethical teachings that protect all life and view human beings as just one type of being among many remark- able entities This ancient spiritual vision has been supported by modern science and contemporary philosophers:

[I]t is ethically wrong to suppose that we need and ought to establish

a criterion of moral considerability , [to] persevere in our cal Western imperial venture That is, putting any criterion into prac- tice is an act of domination, an arbitrary act of power and violence

unethi-to the beings that are thereby rendered Other (i.e., constructed as objects of domination and control).

The assumption that we can and ought to establish a criterion of considerability should therefore be abandoned Once it is, however,

we come to the perhaps startling (and to those who are captivated by this assumption, seemingly bizarre) realization that everything must be given moral consideration (Birch 318)

In light of a comparatively inclusive dominant ethic concerning human life and moral standing, and in light of the conspicuous absence of any morally relevant distinction between all humans and every other living entity, the conclusion is inescapable: All living entities ought

to be acknowledged as morally considerable.

If ethical theories are to have practical relevance, those ted to a more consistent ethic—more specifically an ethic that extends moral standing to nonhuman life—ought to re flect this commitment

commit-in word and deed Conscientious commit-individuals are called upon to seek legal backing in order to force change in a morally negligent world.

“The law must be made to recognize that non-humans have claims to life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness just as we do; and among the liberties that individual non-humans should be able

to enjoy is the freedom from exploitation by humankind” (Ryder,

Animal 332).

Growing evidence indicates that a handful of human beings are ready to rise to this moral challenge One of the most well-known lawsuits among protectionists was “on behalf of a small rare fish, the snail darter, [which] derailed construction of a $100 million dam”

on the Little Tennessee River (Stone 178) Such a legal case would have been unthinkable fifty years ago Somewhere in the last half- century the snail darter, and at least one ecosystem, became a serious

moral consideration (even if only to satisfy the human desire to serve species) A handful of people were willing to expend thousands

pre-of dollars, and considerable time and e ffort, to protect the lives of goats and wildflowers on the San Clemente Islands Protectionist law

is growing; Harvard’s law school now o ffers a course on this tant subject Court cases involving anymals, and anymal issues, are increasingly common People are calling others to task for abuse, neglect, and exploitation There will come a time when a speeding driver cannot simply run into a deer, and drive o ff, leaving her to what death she will find The time will come when those who drive

impor-by such su ffering, and fail to render assistance, will be called to task for their indifference, when such behavior will be recognized as morally abhorrent Looking to our own past provides a vision of how we might one day look back on those who have shown indifference

or cruelty to these other beings, how we might view those who have capitalized on the well-being and lives of millions of anymals: Slave-owners and Nazis used the same pathetic excuses that cattle ranchers and vivisectors use today If I had grandparents who were slave owners or Nazis, I would be ashamed and I would change my last name Who are the heroes? The people that had the guts to stand

up against cruelty and indi fference, to speak up against the majority

on issues like slavery, to try to save people from concentration camps They are the heroes, they are who I would want as an ancestor I look at animal exploiters today their horrid animal torture, and I think, their grand-kids are going to change their names! They are an embarrassment to future generations!

Who’s going to be a hero four generations from now? Who are they

going to make movies about movies like Schindler’s List? They’re

going to make movies about those working for the Animal Liberation Front, about people fighting for the rights of animals, about those who are now called terrorists, people like Ingrid Newkirk (Founder and President of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), Joyce Tischler (founder and Executive Director of Animal Legal Defense Fund), Carol Adams, or Jane Goodall The real terrorists will be exposed peo- ple like Charlie Bell, CEO of McDonald’s; E Sander Connolly, assis- tant professor of neurosurgery at Columbia who has been conducting stroke experiments on baboons for years; and Burton Tansky, CEO

of Neiman Marcus stores, who still sells fur from animals who were anally electrocuted or skinned alive (Bury)

Socrates taught that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” Today the Socratic injunction to “Know thyself ” entails

recognizing that one is a single life form among many and that one inhabits an environment that is complex beyond our current under- standing and easily perturbed It also means recognizing that one is part of a global community that has existed for centuries and will, one hopes, exist for many more and that the capacity for an aesthetic appreciation of the majesty, complexity and wonder of the natural world is part of what makes us who we are (Russow 12)

Dominant Western ethics with regard to the moral standing of anymals are not only unacceptable because they are inconsistent, but also because they disregard our biological affiliation with anymals; exemplify a lack of appreciation for the majesty, complexity, and wonder of life; and reveal a lack of understanding for the fleeting nature of our personal physical existence.

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