In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 8 potx

the value of innocent human life 377be found between anymals and all those human beings whose livesare currently protected including Nancy Cruzan and Baby Theresa.Some are not conscious,

376 chapter seven

mally, can such patients be allowed to slip out of existence In rarecases such patients can legally be allowed to die, through legal pro-ceedings initiated by the family and supported by medical person-nel But such patients can never be killed even if treatments willnever improve conditions, even if such patients can never experi-ence the benefits of treatment, and (in the United States) even ifsuch care is clearly unwanted by the patient Care can be termi-nated, permitting the patient to die, but patients can never be overtlyeuthanized Death by starvation or suffocation—deaths brought on

by withholding treatment—are necessarily slower and more painful(in the event that any sensations exist) than would be death brought

on by outright killing But Western morality and law covering ical practice do not permit killing patients under any condition.These cases highlight an ongoing dilemma in Western societies:When is it permissible to allow an innocent human being to die,and when, if ever, is it permissible to actively end the life of apatient—to kill an innocent human being? But this intriguing dilemma

med-is not the focus of the present work, which asks a question that med-isless often raised, but which also cries out when examining these sixcases: How is it morally acceptable to go to such measures to main-tain innocent human life while killing healthy adults in the full bloom

of their lives simply because they are from another species? On whatmorally relevant grounds do United States surgeons annually “trans-plant about sixty thousand pig heart valves into humans,” destroy-ing the lives of every last one of these sixty thousand hogs in thehope of saving humans beings (“Medical”)? What line of reasoningmight protect bodies such as that of Baby Theresa or Anthony Blandthat are neither viable nor conscious, while annually killing six mil-lion anymals for “educational” purposes? How can medical person-nel be required to sustain the painful and unnatural life of MatthewDonnelly or Tracy Latimer, how can we invest in the limp littlebody of Samuel Linares, while nine billion chickens are slaughteredannually to pacify our insatiable taste buds? How can we rationallydefend such an outrageous disparity in our treatment of life?There is as yet no generally accepted, morally relevant distinctionbetween all human beings (including anencephalic infants and AnthonyBland) and anymals An ethic that protects Baby Theresa’s little body

while permitting anyone to kill a perfectly viable turkey vulture or

Hampshire piglet is prodigiously difficult to justify Indeed, it isdifficult to envisage what sort of morally relevant distinction might

the value of innocent human life 377

be found between anymals and all those human beings whose livesare currently protected (including Nancy Cruzan and Baby Theresa).Some are not conscious, and some never have been (nor can be)conscious (Baby Theresa) “Some of them cannot even be called

‘persons’ in the most minimal sense” (Pluhar 62) While Baby Theresaand the three hundred or so other anencephalic infants born in theUnited States each year are neither sentient nor conscious, the nine

billion chickens killed annually are conscious and sentient Baby

Theresa cannot suffer Every last chicken that died last year suffered.Why do we treat these hens with no regard while paying all duerespects to these hopeless human infants?

This disparity is usually defended by noting a given quality that

is generally shared among humans—though not by all humans—butnot thought to be part of the lives of anymals

Homocentrists often cite rationality, creativity, intelligence, languageuse, and autonomy Aquinas believed that we were favored by Godbecause we alone were made in God’s intellectual image; Descartesheld that beings with minds are all capable of expressing thoughts lin-guistically Again, however, as others have pointed out, none of thesecharacteristics serves to distinguish all humans from all nonhumans.(Pluhar 46)

Patients such as anencephalic infants and the brain dead reveal thatinnocent human life is valuable in the West with or without lan-guage, rational thought, or even consciousness Human life has moralstanding even when bereft of every attribute that human beings haveever used to set themselves apart from other species, attributes thathumans have used to justify protecting human life while exploitingand squandering the lives of anymals Western ethics places supreme

value on innocent human life, especially in comparison with all other forms; innocent human life is protected to such a degree as to betruly incomparable with our treatment of any other form of life

life-In the United States, Baby Theresa is protected, but we can maim

or kill anymals at will, so long as those anymals are neither tected as endangered, nor considered to be anyone’s “property.”Anymals can be maimed by tail or ear “docking,” the cutting off ofhorns or beaks, inbreeding, hormone treatments, branding, tagging,

pro-or by catch and release fishing, fpro-or example The philosophical brows of rational beings cannot help but be raised at such an incon-sistent and (thus far) unjustified state of affairs

eye-378 chapter seven

Do we owe an irreversibly comatose, terminally ill human every ical effort needed to sustain such “life” as remains for him or her,while a nonhuman animal is due no special consideration whatever ?Should we make heroic efforts for brain-dead humans but, “withoutany moral compunction,” give lethal injections to blind dogs? Or causecalves suffering and death because we like their tender, “milk-fed”flesh? [H]ow justified [can] such differential treatment reallybe? (Pluhar 116)

med-Why does this remarkable moral disparity persist so many years afterDarwin? How can we believe that every human life has special value,

“sanctity,” or dignity that no other animal holds? Why are human

beings still not classified as “animals” in Western law when the ences have (cautiously) acknowledged for decades that we are animals?

sci-Why doesn’t our scientific classification reveal that Homo sapiens andchimpanzees are more closely related to one another than either one

is to any other species? Why do so many of our “scientific” andeducational materials discuss primates as if we were separate, dis-tinct from all other primates? Microsoft’s encyclopedia defines pri-mates as an order containing “humans, apes, which are the closestliving relatives to humans, monkeys, and some less familiar mam-

mals, such as tarsiers, lorises, and lemurs” (Burnie) Webster’s Dictionary

defines “primate” as composed of human beings, apes, monkeys,lemurs, and others Why not state the truth? The primate order con-sists of apes (including human beings), monkeys, tarsiers, and lorises?

We are animals; we are apes We are not other, outside, separate.

Our DNA has given us away, exposed us as apes not unlike those

we have caged and mocked in zoos and used for our scientific poses Why do not scientists honor our close affiliation—at least withother primates—by refusing to exploit them for research?

pur-Most human beings want to believe that they/we are different,separate, and special Our belief “that human life has unique value

is deeply rooted in our society and is enshrined in our law” (Singer,

Writings 125) It is also evident in the sciences It is fascinating reading

about the history of Western scientific classifications of anymals Abook like that of Ernst Mayr, nearly one thousand pages long, revealsthe various ways we have attempted to classify anymals, and howwrong we have often been Part of this sordid history includes scientiststhat sought symmetry in their classification—they “thought that alltaxa should have approximately the same number of species” because

the value of innocent human life 379

“taxa of highly uneven size seemed too capricious to be worthy ofthe planning of the creator” (241) While theology muddied the work

of some, arrogance clouded the eyes of others who assumed thatthere was a scale of perfection, with some anymals being “more per-fect” than others—and with human beings at the top Understandingevolution scarcely affected this assumption; the language was simplyaltered so that “more perfect” became “higher,” or “more highlyevolved.” This led to further complications, however: “Why shouldfish be higher than the honeybee? Why should mammals be higherthan birds? Is a parasite higher or lower than the free-living formfrom which it was derived?” (Mayr 242) Mayr attests to how “uncer-tain our understanding of degrees of relationship among organismsstill is” in spite of years of work in the field (217) Scientific justifications

of human supremacy have worn thin as we learn more about mals, and more about the human animal But the realities of Darwin’swork, while taking hold in the sciences, seem to have no affect onour behavior; we continue to behave as though we are a very spe-cial species, elevated beyond all calculation in the world of life.Christianity is a cornerstone and sustaining force for our con-temporary outlook Christians often believe that humans, and onlyhumans, are made in the image of God, and that only humans haveintrinsic value Many people justify this ongoing flagrant moral dis-parity on religious grounds, convinced that human life, “no matterhow feeble or impaired, is a sacred gift from God” (Olen 268) Why

any-a just any-and loving god would instigany-ate such any-a discrepany-ancy in the vany-alue

of creation is difficult to comprehend, but this justification, howeverweak, remains a common explanation for the status quo, at least inthe Western world

Current convictions regarding the place of humans in the worldput us on an entirely different plane In this view all other life-forms

are here for our purposes, and not only can be handled as we so choose, but ought to be dominated and used for our benefit because

human beings are the apex of all life Their worth is measured interms of human utility Small wonder there is such a flagrant dis-parity between our respect for the lives of innocent human beingsand our treatment of all other life-forms

380 chapter seven

b Do We Really Value Human Life?

Some might argue that human life is not held in such high esteem

as the above six cases suggest: Our financial choices do not supportthis assertion, abortion is permitted, capital punishment is legal inWestern nations, and we continue to send soldiers off to kill and bekilled

i economics

One might reasonably argue that medical practices in the above sixcases have nothing to do with the value of human life, and every-thing to do with the value of a hospital bed Perhaps the cost of

such medical care is a bene fit in capitalistic countries and the

main-tenance of innocent human life merely incidental Medical sionals will, no doubt, deny such allegations, but can they honestlybelieve that they have Tracy Latimer’s best interests in mind? Didthey operate on her distorted body out of respect for this dilapi-dated, pain-ravaged little girl? What of Matthew Donnelly? And what

profes-of the other infants that perished while Baby Theresa languished inher crib? There seem to be other factors at stake, and no doubtcapitalism, greed, and profits have some effect on medical practices.Likely economic forces aside, the point is not that we are morallyexemplary in handling human life The point is that Western moral-ity and law tend to hold “innocent” human life to be incalculablyprecious while showing no regard for any other form of life, andthat this flagrant disparity cannot be rationally defended While some

of those who profit from forcing intensive medical care on peoplelike Matthew Donnelly may be greedy (or malevolent) rather than

benevolent, the laws behind these medical practices reveal a deeper

and wider commitment, a commitment of the larger Western munity to protect vulnerable patients from being hastily dispatched—

com-a commitment to preserve com-and protect innocent humcom-an life Humcom-ansare thought to have rights, and the right to life is perhaps the mostfundamental of all human rights After all, do you want someone

else to decide whether or not you ought to continue living?

ii we do not invest in life

Still others might argue that the United States does not value life—

if we did, we would quit investing in bombs and make basic

med-the value of innocent human life 381ical care available to all citizens Every day, every hour, life-and-death decisions are made in Western countries based on the avail-ability of resources such as life-sustaining machines and expensivemedicines Every day citizens suffer because of the high cost of med-ical care, and because of the ever-widening gap between the richand the poor Do we really respect human life?

Bombs are not the only example of investments that indicate alack of respect for human life Starvation kills millions of otherwiseperfectly viable human beings while citizens of Western nations dineout on the many legs of a squid, diet to lose the extra pounds theyhave gained by eating large portions of flesh from cattle and pigs,and engage in rigorous exercise programs to burn off excess calo-ries consumed If we value life, why do we not prevent humanhunger worldwide? These charges are valid, but they do not harmthis overarching assertion: Innocent human life is held in extremely

high value relative to the lives of anymals Indeed, the word “extremely”

does not seem strong enough to describe the current situation.Human life is not everywhere and always respected at the levelevidenced by the above six cases These cases reveal that Westernmedical practice and laws regulate the protection and preservation

of innocent human life, no matter if they wish to live, no matter ifthey are in pain, no matter if there is any hope of recovery, no mat-ter if they are viable Respect for human life is not always so read-ily available, but these six cases reveal an ethic of respect for innocenthuman life, a respect that has led to medical practice, backed bylaws, that protect and preserve innocent human life in nearly anycondition where it is possible to do so

iii abortion

With regard to abortion, the question is not whether human life is

of value, but rather what constitutes human life Is a newly ized egg to be considered a human being, worthy of all the sameprotections that you, the reader, are granted by the Western legalsystem? Is the single cell from which a human child develops to beconsidered a full-fledged human being? Is this single living cell’s life

fertil-to be granted all the same protections that your life, or my life, is

to be granted? Is this single cell to be granted as much protection

as the mother, whose life might be endangered by that cell? Thequestion of abortion is not a disagreement about the value of innocent

382 chapter seven

human life; it is a question of whether or not a single cell, an embryo,

or a fetus, is a “human being.” In the Western world innocent humanlife is always protected and preserved, but in the case of abortion,

it is not always clear what constitutes a human life

Abortion also balances the rights of the mother with those of thedeveloping embryo Inasmuch as we are unsure when the develop-ing organism inside the mother ought to be considered a humanbeing, complete with human rights, we are certain that the mother

is a human being, protected by human rights

iv we kill people

Capital punishment, and our predilection for warfare, situations inwhich human life is willfully destroyed, are distinct in morally significantways from our destruction of innocent human life, and are distinctfrom the killing of anymals In the case of capital punishment and

warfare the individuals killed have moral standing They can only be killed

because both the convicted criminal and the enemy soldier are judged

to have made decisions that warrant revoking the standard tion of human life Criminals who fall victim to the death penaltyhave moral standing and are only executed on the basis of what isassumed to be their previous wrongdoings Typically, extensive legalproceedings determine their fate

protec-There is a distinct difference between killing someone because she

or he is convicted of committing a heinous crime after extensivelegal proceedings and the routine killing of anymals that are by alladmissions innocent Convicted criminals are a small subset of humanbeings They go through a rigorous process to determine guilt Theyare at all times assumed to have moral standing and are only put

to death in carefully prescribed ways if convicted In contrast, we have

decided that anymals have no moral standing and, consequently, can

be exploited and executed at will Any innocent Ayrshire cow may

be killed by anyone who “owns” her or by anyone given the ahead to do so (by her “owner”) Her life is for sale In contrast,

go-innocent human beings may never lawfully be slaughtered under any condition by any individual This is the point: Any innocent cow

may be killed; not one innocent human being may be killed Thereyou have it Capital punishment is not a case against the value ofinnocent human life, nor does it in any way compare with our treat-ment of anymal life

the value of innocent human life 383

As with convicted criminals, soldiers have moral standing Soldiersare assumed to have jeopardized their right to have their lives pro-tected and preserved by engaging in warfare As convicted serialkillers are thought to have forfeited their right to life, soldiers areconsidered guilty of being in opposition to a given state Were thosesame individuals not soldiers fighting against Western countries, butvisitors to Western lands, their lives would be granted full protec-tion because every innocent human being has moral standing Incontrast, anymals have no moral standing, and though blameless,are the targets of human exploitation

Warfare and capital punishment both suggest that human life isnot everywhere and always protected and preserved by Westernnations In Iraq, the United States (in particular) killed civilians asthough they were mannequins in a test scenario simply to “defendour way of life” ( Jhally, Ellis, G Smith, Bush) Morally speaking,

“our way of life” is indefensible in a world of limited resources inwhich the United States uses considerably more than its share of the

wealth Such wars are not consistent with respect for human life, any

more than is our acceptance of world hunger These events

demon-strate that not all innocent human life is respected in all cases The important point is not that we always respect human life, but that innocent human life is held in extremely high value relative to the lives

of anymals—even though anymals are inherently innocent with regard

to human morality and law Our disregard for the lives of certainpeople at certain times in certain places does not compare with ourlack of moral and legal protection for the lives of anymals Humans,but not anymals, are assumed to have moral standing The lives ofinnocent humans, but not the lives of innocent anymals, are pro-tected and preserved

v rationalizations

Those who attempt to blame the innocent in the hope of justifyingtheir actions sometimes accuse anymals of beings stupid, or dumb,and therefore deserving what they get—or don’t get—during theirshortened lifetime Cattle are so dumb, chickens are so stupid—howcan we be concerned about their innocent lives? This embarrassingresponse is a form of “blaming the victim” (Davis, “Holocaust”) Anapt example of blaming the victim is when a woman is said todeserve sexual assault because of her intellect, attitude, behavior,

384 chapter seven

appearance, or choice of clothing, for example Anymals do not

“deserve” to be treated like chattel; it is simply a habit of ours to

do so While human life cannot be taken without just cause, there

is generally thought to be no need to explain the killing of anymals.This is because the former are granted moral standing while the lat-ter are not

Conclusion

While world hunger and warfare may cast serious doubt on thedepth and extent of our commitment to innocent human life, forcitizens living in Western countries there can be no doubt that humanlife is generally viewed as priceless, and anymal life as cheap andexpendable We debate whether fetuses can be killed in the lasttrimester, we ponder whether lethal injection is an acceptable method

of capital punishment, we consider whether the death penalty isacceptable even for the most dangerous of criminals, and engaging

in warfare is always controversial We hold human life in such highvalue that we ponder whether those who are suffering terribly, thosewho are soon to die and wish to die, will be allowed to die Meanwhile,

we unceremoniously slaughter millions of white leghorn chickens for

no better reason than that someone will pay to eat their fleshy tle bodies; we euthanize millions of “pets” annually because humanbeings want their children to witness the miracle of life—puppiesand kittens born into the world only to be killed by the hundreds

lit-of thousands because no one wants them (We do not like our dren to witness the horror of euthanizing millions of cats and dogs,however.) We even shoot hundreds of innocent animals for sportand then mount their body parts on the wall as decorations It is

chil-permissible to experiment on any other primate but people are shocked

and horrified to learn of painful or deadly experiments that havebeen done on unwitting human beings, such as the Tuskegee syphilis

studies (Regan, Animal 67–89).

This moral disparity raises a perplexing dilemma in the case ofprimates At some point in history a nonhuman primate gave birth

to a “human being.” If we could identify this historic moment oftransition, and the primates involved, our current ethical standardswould deny moral standing to the parent, while granting moral sta-

the value of innocent human life 385tus to the offspring (a “human”) The mother or father could beexploited and destroyed for science, while the “human” child would

be entitled to experiment on their parents How can such a moralsystem be defended?

But this conundrum is the least of our worries The six cases sented above reveal a flagrant inconsistency in contemporary Westernmorality Human patients can only be permitted to die if they can-not be saved, or in very specific instances, in very carefully moni-tored ways Even if a human being is not viable, even if a humanbeing feels no pain and has no brain waves, even if a human being

pre-is terminally ill and in terrible pain, and even if a human life canonly be maintained at tremendous cost to society, Western nationshave a moral imperative and legal requirement to preserve innocenthuman life

The six cases presented are but a few examples of the extremelimits to which Westerners take their collective regard for innocenthuman life on a day-to-day basis In most instances any and all inno-cent civilian lives are protected and preserved, even at great cost

“Contrary to the best attempts of several fine philosophers, there is

no way to avoid the conclusion that if sentient, conative humans arehighly morally significant, then many nonhuman animals are so aswell” (Pluhar xiii) What would this extreme value for innocent humanlife look like if extended, for the sake of consistency, to all life notproven to be different in morally relevant ways?

3 Western Ethics and the Value of Human Life in Practice

Consistency and impartiality are critical to sound applied philosophy.Casuistry is a respected tool of philosophical inquiry (see chapter 1).Each indicates that like cases should be treated in a like manner Inalmost all instances, regardless of abilities such as language or rea-soning, regardless of functioning (either mentally or biologically inthe sense of viability), the moral imperative is to preserve and pro-tect innocent human life In fact, even if human beings beg to beallowed to die, or beg that their loved ones might be allowed to die,laws and medical practice dictate that human life ought to be pre-served even against such wishes

We have already explored what these cases do not demonstrate—

386 chapter seven

they do not demonstrate that there are no conditions under which

human life might be destroyed, though every human life is grantedmoral and legal standing in the Western world

What do these six examples teach with regard to ideal Western

morality and the preservation of innocent human life?

First, in each case it was possible to keep the individual alive.

Perhaps not for long, perhaps not without suffering, and perhaps

only at great cost, but it was humanly possible to keep these beings functioning biologically The above medical examples are proof of amoral precedent, backed by law, that prioritizes the preservation of

human life whenever possible—not whenever humanely possible, only when humanly possible Whether or not an individual wishes to be

kept alive, whether or not keeping an individual (such as BabyTheresa) alive will cause greater suffering (to other individuals, such

as those babies that could not receive her organs), an individual lifewill be preserved and protected in its own right, whenever possible.Second, these cases do not speak for all situations There are ahost of medical cases in which physicians allow patients to die qui-etly either at the request of the family involved, on their own cog-nizance, or at the request of the patient “Giving medicine to relieve

suffering, even if it risks or causes death, is not assisted suicide oreuthanasia; nor is withdrawing treatments that only prolong a painfuldying process” (Hendin) Such practices are legal and morally accept-able in most Western nations (Hendin) Additionally, nations such

as the Netherlands and Belgium have legalized euthanasia (seeEuthanasia.com for more information.) In the Netherlands physician-assisted suicide is available for patients suffering from “intolerablesuffering that cannot be relieved” (Hendin) In the Netherlands, con-sent is not even a barrier; fully one “quarter of physicians statedthat they ‘terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request’from the patient Another third of the physicians could conceive ofdoing so” (Hendin)

Similar to the Netherlands, Oregon state law officially permits tors to prescribe medication that will end the life of the patient—but only in very specific situations, under tight regulations

doc-Receiving physician assistance in ending one’s life in Oregon is not aseasy as opponents of the state’s law might assume To qualify for theprogram, a patient must be an Oregon resident, at least 18 years ofage, and terminally ill with a prognosis of death within six months or

the value of innocent human life 387less In addition, the attending physician must be licensed in Oregon,and must be willing to participate .

After a patient requests an end-of-life prescription, the request must

be repeated at least 15 days later That request must be followed by

a written request that is signed by two witnesses, one of whom maynot be related to the patient A consulting physician is then called toconfirm the diagnosis and prognosis and to determine whether or notthe patient is able to make and communicate health care decisions forthemselves If the patient is mentally impaired, a psychological exam-ination is ordered

Before the attending physician may write the end-of-life tion, the patient must be informed of alternatives, including hospicecare and palliative treatments If the patient persists in requesting theprescription, the physician must wait another 48 hours before writing

prescrip-it and may request that next-of-kin be notified Finally, the cist who receives the prescription has the right to refuse to fill it.(Sherer)

pharma-Employers such as the U.S Department of Veterans Affairs andCatholic hospitals, do not permit their physicians to participate,thereby limiting availability of this option to certain categories ofpatients Given these strict regulations, complete with a handful oflimiting factors, it is not surprising that only one patient out of tenwho request physician-assisted suicide actually end their lives with aphysician’s care (Sherer)

What is perhaps most interesting is that many patients who doreceive a physician’s assistance still do not choose to end their life.Oregon’s law seems to provide a sense of security of what one canchoose to do, rather than a certainty that patients, given the option,will end their lives Physician-assisted suicide seems to be aboutchoices, options, controlling one’s own fate “From 1997 to 2002,

129 patients died as a result of taking end-of-life prescription ications, accounting for less than one in every 1,000 deaths in Oregon.According to the Oregon Department of Human Services, [in 2002]

med-58 patients received lethal prescriptions, but only 36 died as a result

of using them Another 16 died of their illnesses, and six remainedalive at the end of the year” (Sherer)

Even so, the fate of Oregon law permitting physician-assisted cide is by no means secure, and the debate is ongoing (for updatesand more information, see http://www.euthanasia.com/ or http://www.religioustolerance.org/euthanas.htm) “If the federal governmenthas its way, however, physicians writing such prescriptions could face

sui-388 chapter seven

loss of prescribing privileges under the Controlled Substances Act”(Sherer) As it stands, the Oregon law contradicts the AmericanMedical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics, which states that

“[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with thephysician’s role as a healer, would be difficult or impossible to con-trol, and would pose serious societal risks” (Sherer) Nor is there anyindication that other states will follow Oregon’s lead

While the debate is ongoing, no other state has followed Oregon’slead Voters in California, Michigan, Maine and Washington state haverejected assisted-suicide ballot measures, and the Maine legislaturedefeated a bill that would have implemented an Oregon-style plan.Forty states explicitly forbid physician-assisted suicide; six states pro-hibit it through common law Only three states other than Oregon—North Carolina, Utah and Wyoming —do not have laws prohibitingphysician-assisted suicide (Sherer)

Resistance to physician-assisted suicide in the United States is sistent with commonly accepted and established morality in the UnitedStates “The biggest reason for opposing [physician-assisted suicide]

con-is that suicide con-is not morally acceptable; that it’s not an ate role for a health care provider and that it is not morally accept-able for people to choose to hasten their death” (Sherer) The UnitedStates is similar to most Western nations; “The World Health Organ-ization has recommended that governments not consider assisted sui-cide and euthanasia until they have demonstrated the availabilityand practice of palliative care for their citizens All states and allcountries have a long way to go to achieve this goal” (Hendin).There are also inconsistencies in the Western commitment to thepreservation of human life such as those brought up previously: worldhunger, disease, and warfare But none of these exceptions negatesour general moral commitment to protect and preserve innocenthuman life, as evidenced in medical law and practice

appropri-Third, there are certain human actions that render humans nolonger innocent, in which case their lives may become expendable.This is evidenced in the death penalty and by the killing of enemysoldiers in warfare Western ethics permits life to be taken for thecause of self-defense Human life can be destroyed when such a life

is not considered innocent, when that loss of innocence is of a ical or extreme nature, such as violently attacking another individ-ual, murdering an innocent human being, or taking up arms againstthe state

crit-the value of innocent human life 389Fourth, there is some dispute over what constitutes a human life;abortion is controversial but remains legal, while anencephalic infantsare considered inviolable There is no conclusive agreement as towhere lines might be drawn, but there is a distinctive tendency toprotect more rather than less of those that might be consideredhuman.

Fifth, since we have failed to establish any morally relevant tinction between all human beings and anymals, consistency requiresthat we universalize our ethic of protecting innocent life We areobliged to treat like cases in a like manner and extend our highregard for human life to anymals What is good for the girl is goodfor the gander If innocent human life is worthy of preservation inalmost any situation, so is other innocent life that is not shown to

dis-be different in morally relevant ways

Toward this end, the next chapter presents the Minimize HarmMaxim The case of Baby Theresa is particularly important in thisendeavor because the birth of anencephalic infants is ongoing andpredictable (whereas jellyfish babies do not normally occur in a cer-tain predictable percentage of births) Furthermore, anencephalic

infants exemplify our extreme regard for the lives of Homo sapiens as such because anencephalic infants have no possibility of feeling, think-ing, acting, or even surviving They are not viable, are in no measurewhat any of us know to be human—except in general appearance—yet they are provided a warm bed and food for as long as theymight survive With this in mind, we explore the concept of conatus,biological persistence

CHAPTER EIGHT

MINIMIZE HARM MAXIM

In this chapter a moral maxim, the Minimize Harm Maxim, is sented and defended as a theory rooted in the consistent application

pre-of our high esteem for human life The Minimize Harm Maximincludes three premises that culminate in an ethical maxim followed

by four subpoints Chapter 9 applies these premises and maxims tofive pressing protectionist problems and considers two hypotheticalscenarios

The Minimize Harm Maxim is simply a consistent extension of

contemporary morality—this maxim extends generally accepted morality with regard to human life to all creatures that have not been demonstrated to be different in morally relevant ways Established Western moral standards

generally protect human life even at tremendous cost If the MinimizeHarm Maxim seems extreme, then contemporary standards for pro-tecting human life are extreme If this maxim seems idealistic, then

we seek to protect human life idealistically If it seems outrageous,perhaps our moral accountability to human life is indeed outra-geous or perhaps this maxim only seems outrageous because weare not accustomed to respecting the lives of anymals Finally, even

if this moral maxim seems extreme, idealistic, or outrageous, theconspicuous absence of any morally relevant distinction between allhuman beings and anymals, and the importance of philosophic con-sistency, require serious consideration of the Minimize Harm Maxim

Premise One: All Living Entities Have Moral Standing

1 Conatus, Spinoza, and Theology

Conatus de fines living individuals (Scruton 457) Webster’s Dictionary

explains conatus as “the force in every animate creature,” a forcethat works “toward the preservation of its existence.” In Baruch

Spinoza’s Ethics (1632–1677), conatus is the essence of every living

entity: “Everything endeavors to persist in its own being”; such

392 chapter eight

endeavoring “is nothing else than the actual essence” of a livingentity (Spinoza III, VI and VII)

In the writings of Spinoza, conatus is virtue, which is power, which

is understanding; knowledge of God is the greatest understandingone can have (Spinoza XXV) Spinoza reasons that God, being

omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, must be everything:

“Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived out God” (Spinoza I, XV)

with-If God is everything, then nothing is separate from God and therecan be nothing outside of the divine The Almighty dwells in all

things, and each entity acts necessarily according to the will of God:

“[A]ll things are determined by the necessity of divine nature forexisting and working in a certain way” (Spinoza I, XXIX) Spinoza

concludes that all of nature—all that exists—must be God, and must

be set out to function in a particular way by the divine: God andthe universe are one and the same (Spinoza I, XV)

Like Socrates and Plato, Marx and Gandhi, Spinoza was ested in philosophy as a way of life (Baird 105) Once he deduced

inter-that God is all, he was committed to a life inter-that revealed this

under-standing Spinoza notes that, since we share in divine nature, weshould “act only from God’s command” (Spinoza II, IV A) Loveand morality formed the basis for the application of Spinoza’s phi-losophy in his daily life

Spinoza asserts that the motivating power behind all of our actions

is self-preservation—conatus understood as “endeavor” (Spinoza III,

VI and VII) “The very essence of a human being is desire astriving by which a man tries to preserve his existence” (Spinoza IV,

XXV) Furthermore, the highest virtue is conatus (Spinoza IV, XXII):

“The more each one seeks what is useful to him, that is, the more

he endeavors and can preserve his being, the more he is endowedwith virtue” (Spinoza IV, XX) He reaches this conclusion because

“[n]o one can desire to be blessed, to act well, or live well, who atthe same time does not desire to exist” (Spinoza IV, XXI) For

Spinoza, striving to exist is the foundation of virtue, and to “act absolutely

according to virtue is nothing else than to act under the ance of reason, to live so, and to preserve one’s being (these threehave the same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful tooneself ” (Spinoza IV, XX)

guid-Every living entity, according to Spinoza, is perpetually engaged

in the endeavor to persist, to maintain the actualization of its own

minimize harm maxim 393

essence which is divine (Spinoza IV, LVII) Because this endeavor to

persist is synonymous with God, each living entity finds happinessdependent on its success in existing Our behavior is guided by cona-tus, guided by God, and this impulse for self-preservation brings usback full circle to understanding, the highest form of which is knowl-edge of God (Spinoza IV, XXVIII; Schacht 93) Conatus—theendeavor to persist shared by all living entities—is the power of God(Shahan 131)

Spinoza viewed God as the root source and ultimate means ofself-preservation In Spinoza’s writing, conatus is a natural and vir-tuous pathway to happiness, power, understanding, and the knowl-edge of God (Spinoza IV, XXV) For Spinoza, knowing that Godfiguratively stands behind our endeavor to survive, and knowing thatGod is present in all other beings in a similar way, ought to influencewhat we do

2 Living Entities and Conatus

“All living beings have their own well-being Each living creaturehas life, which can be destroyed or benefited, and thus each livingcreature has its biological good” (Vilkka 24) All living entities havewhat Spinoza describes—conatus Both plants and animals have adrive to maintain integrity or unity Conatus is fundamental to the

“biological nature” of living beings (McGinn 81–99) Conatus, Webster’s Dictionary notes, is “an effort or striving” to maintain existence, is

present in all living entities, and only in living entities.

Any being lacking this basic biological drive to persist is not likely

to survive for long —probably not long enough to reproduce In aworld where only the most fit survive, conatus prevents entities fromfalling prey to other entities, and from death by a host of possiblemeans, including starvation Pulling back from a hot flame, an adren-aline rush when we are frightened, and digestion are all basic forms

394 chapter eight

shady tree The skin cells themselves can perceive the problem andrespond by making the pigment melanin, another way of putting vul-nerable cells in the shade If blood sugar drops to a functionally deficientlevel, it is perceived and corrective measures are taken by the con-version of glycogen or fat reserves into sugar, or perhaps just by eat-ing (G Williams 120)

Because of conatus, entities take in food and water, reproduce, andhave various methods of fending off predators, from thorns to fangs.Animals and plants, unlike stones or buildings, computers or machines,maintain themselves; they have mechanisms to avoid injury, reducethreats, and restore themselves when damaged Any living entity’slife “consists precisely in a struggle to perform these functions, toactualize this nature, to fulfill these needs, to maintain this life”(Rollin 39) Baby Theresa did not have much else going for her,but she did have conatus; her tiny body continued to function in amanner that maintained her existence as long as possible

Conatus highlights the most basic sense of what it is to have an

interest—to have something be in one’s good; conatus lies at the root

of moral standing among human beings Every living being has tus, basic biological interests, the satisfaction of which will allow them

cona-to persist as entities in their own particular ways Conatus, as it turnsout, is the most basic morally critical similarity shared by all livingentities Conatus as a criterion for moral standing includes all living

entities because all such entities have an interest in survival whether

or not human beings believe that they can feel, and whether or not

human beings determine that such animals have a given mentalcapability

The Minimize Harm Maxim is rooted in the consistent tion of morality regarding the protection and preservation of inno-cent human beings Given that there are no morally relevant distinctionsbetween human beings such as Baby Theresa and a quaking aspen

applica-or spiny lobster (except that the aspen and the lobster are viable),consistency and casuistry require that these cases be handled in asimilar manner Aspens and lobsters ought to be granted moral stand-ing and their biological urge to persist ought to be protected and

preserved This protection ought to be extended to all living beings because all living beings have conatus, while Baby Theresa has noth- ing but conatus to indicate that her life ought to be sustained.

Given medical law with regard to anencephalic infants, conatusmust be viewed as sufficient to warrant moral standing in Western

minimize harm maxim 395morality For this reason and for no other reason, the MinimizeHarm Maxim revolves around conatus, biological persistence Thelife of an entity with conatus, an entity able to persist biologically,ought to be protected and preserved because anencephalic infantsare protected and preserved by Western law, as rooted in Westernmorality This is not just an unusual event, but a practice that isongoing every day of the year The Minimize Harm Maxim is builtaround the consistent application of Western ethics concerning inno-cent human life, extending that protection to all life-forms that havenot been shown to be different in morally relevant ways.

3 Epistemological Problems and Mental Attributes

Conatus is in many ways similar to what others have referred to asteleology, the “drive, force, or urge possessed by a thing which isdirected towards the preservation of its own being” (Runes 61)

Arthur Schopenhauer, in The Will to Live, writes that the will to

live is critical for the survival of species, that this force is manifest

in sexual impulses Schopenhauer views “will” as a force that acts

and strives in nature; for Schopenhauer, will is the vital force.

In its most basic form teleology is perhaps synonymous with

cona-tus, but Webster’s Dictionary indicates that teleology implies “design,”

“purpose,” “will,” or “final cause.” For instance, Albert Schweitzer,known for his all-encompassing ethic of reverence for life, based hismoral code on “will to live.” “Will” is a notoriously difficult con-cept to define Many authors have considered “will” to be “a con-scious mental activity unlikely to occur in plants, micro-organisms,and other life-forms that evidently lack the neurophysiological equip-ment to engage in conscious mental activity” (Warren 34–35) YetSchweitzer included all of nature in his moral universe—evensnowflakes Can a snowflake, by any stretch of the imagination, have

“will”?

Teleology is often viewed as having an element of “will,” such as

a “will to live,” but “will” is vague and often used to describe suchdifferent phenomenon as intent, inclination, and biological urge.Furthermore, assessing mental function is problematic It is extremelydifficult, if not impossible, for philosophers (or biologists, or psy-chologists) to determine mental capacity or to ascertain mental states.Theories dependent on “will” must grapple with the epistemologicaldifficulties of assessing mental attributes

396 chapter eight

People have often been biased in assessing mental attributes J S.Mill epitomizes the pitfalls of bias in his famous comparison of humanand porcine: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than apig satisfied” (18) How does Mill know the mental, emotional, orpsychological states of pigs (barracudas, whirligig beetles, sea drums,etc.)? Mill’s generalities and assumptions carry little philosophicalstrength The fact that Mill’s vacuous assumption has been oft quotedmerely highlights human bias, our tendency to believe that our ownexistence is somehow more valuable—and therefore more justified—than that of any other form of life

Others, along the lines of Rene Descartes, have simply denied anymental attributes to anymals, though this runs contrary to reason:The rat could be a little machine with no feelings and our bodiescould also be machines that work in the same ways, but it just so hap-pens that we have conscious experiences and rats do not This is pos-sible but distinctly less plausible than the alternative view that ratshave not just their physiology and behaviour in common with us when

it comes to eating but have conscious experiences associated with isfying their hunger too (M S Dawkins 163)

sat-Those who have not pointed to “will” have sometimes pointed to

“desire” as morally relevant But those who argue that it is wrong

to kill a being that has a “desire” to live have yet to define whatthey mean by “desire.” How can we identify or measure “desire”

in other entities any more than we can identify or measure “will”?The mental state of a boll weevil, chinchilla, or human animal areextremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine, and humans have

at times proven unfit even to assess far more basic attributes ofanymals, such as sentience Such epistemological quandaries suggestthat “desire,” “will,” and any other mental state, while perhapsmorally relevant, are not suitable criteria by which to determinemoral standing

In spite of the problems entailed in assessing mental states, mostprotectionist philosophers consider mental attributes central to moral

standing DeGrazia writes, “[T]he greater a being’s cognitive complexity, the more moral weight her interests should receive” (249) Philosophers (includ-ing Regan and Singer) tend to include consciousness in their assess-ment of moral standing, generally favoring anymals with larger brainsand those we suppose to have more complex mental functioning.Peter Singer writes: “Apart from individuals whose lives are so

minimize harm maxim 397miserable that they do not wish to continue living, the only indi-viduals likely to have no preferences for continued life will be thoseincapable of having such preferences because they are not self-con-scious and hence are incapable of conceiving of their own life as

either continuing or coming to an end” (Animal 9) Singer assumes that mental preference for continued existence is morally relevant (Animal 254): The “obviously relevant issue is whether nonhuman

animals have the same interest in continued life as normal humans”

(Animal 6) According to Singer, if they have such an interest, their

interest must be accorded equal consideration with other ble interests

compara-In Singer’s view certain life-forms (such as those that have little

or no gray matter) cannot be assumed to have a preference for (orinterest in) existence, and they are therefore not morally consider-able Problems in this assertion become obvious if it is rewritten toacknowledge this more basic urge to persist, conatus By adding theword “conscious” to preferences, as he indicates, and by replacing

“preference” with “biological interest” (conatus) we can more clearlysee what seems a serious flaw in Singer’s proposal: “[T]he only indi-viduals likely to have no [biological interest in] continued life will

be those incapable of having [conscious] preferences” (Animal 9) It

is highly unlikely that any creature lacks a biological interest in sisting, regardless of vague and indeterminate (conscious) “preferences.” These

per-word changes highlight the difference between the certainty of a damental biological interest in persistence and the less certain notion

fun-of conscious preferences, and the importance fun-of distinguishing betweenthe two

In contrast, biological functioning is more readily determined.Biological functioning lies at the heart of conatus and is something

we can talk about in a less biased, more reasoned fashion.

My inclination is to purge all biological discussion of mentalist pretation If I should propose that a mosquito turns upwind whenever

inter-it detects increased carbon dioxide so that inter-it can find a breathing mal to feed on, I am talking about its adaptive programming, notabout its understanding or thinking Likewise, when I propose thatSuleiman the Bloodthirsty, a Moroccan potentate some centuries back,amassed a large harem in order to maximize his genetic representa-tion in future generations, I would not be implying that this is what

ani-he consciously wisani-hed I would be talking about tani-he adaptive gramming that was precisely organized for this effect (G Williams 72)

pro-398 chapter eight

Biologically, every living entity strives to persist. Both science and commonsense indicate that living entities function in order to avoid oblivionand to maintain genetic identity over time—they all have conatus,

a biological interest in survival In the words of the marine gist George Liles, “the cells and organs that make life possible hadbetter be well designed, because the job of living is formidable”

biolo-(G Williams 72–73) If we did not function explicitly to persist, we

would surely cease to exist as living entities It does us well to ber that many living entities—uncounted numbers of species down

remem-through history—have been unable to survive in spite of conatus.

The Minimize Harm Maxim, consistent with established Westernmorality with regard to preserving human life, does not rest on thevalue of life, on consciousness, the ability to reason, the “will” to

live, or any mental state Conatus describes what contemporary

Western ethics requires of an individual if that individual’s life is to

be preserved and protected Did Anthony Bland, Baby Theresa, orMatthew Donnelly exhibit a will or desire to live? Anthony Bland’sbrain had turned to liquid He could not have had any will (Keep

in mind that Anthony Bland’s life was preserved over a long period

of time, and only with a major legal effort was he permitted to die.)Anencephalic infants do not have any mental functioning, no desires.Matthew Donnelly spoke up loud and clear, making it known that

he had a will to die Each of these human beings had moral ing; each was protected by Western morality, backed by law andestablished medical practice “Will” plays no part in assessing whetherhuman beings have moral standing; “desire” does not determinewhose life will be preserved

stand-In contrast, conatus does describe what allowed medical

person-nel to keep Baby Theresa alive—conatus was all that she had (aside

from a body that was shaped like a human being, which is of coursenot morally relevant to the protection and preservation of life).Therefore, conatus is sufficient to grant moral standing in contem-porary Western morality; conatus is sufficient to warrant the pro-tection and preservation of an innocent human life “Will” and

“desire,” are not relevant to human moral standing and the vation of human life Consequently, teleology, which is often con-nected with “will” or “desire” is also irrelevant to moral standing inthe Minimize Harm Maxim because this maxim is an extension ofcontemporary Western ethics regarding the protection and preser-vation of innocent human life

preser-minimize harm maxim 399

4 Moral Standing

The four theories presented and discussed in this book each present

a different set of criteria for moral standing:

• Regan: subjects-of-a-life

• Singer: sentient beings

• Taylor: natural teleological entities

• Linzey: all of creation, out of duty to the divine

The Minimize Harm Maxim, based on contemporary Western moralstandards for protecting innocent human life, asserts that all entitieswith conatus ought to have moral standing because all human beingsthat have conatus have moral standing This is perhaps best demon-strated by medical practice and law regarding anencephalic infants.Baby Theresa—anencephaly in general—is an apt example forfour reasons First, anencephaly seems to reveal what might be taken

as the outer limits of the protection and preservation of innocenthuman life Second, three hundred to one thousand such babies areborn in the United States alone, every year, revealing anencephalicinfants not as extraordinary cases, but as ordinary in the sense thatthey are always present, always being provided comfort care Third,Baby Theresa, though hopeless and without any sensation, was offeredcomfort care (rather than being pronounced “dead” so that her

organs might be harvested) against the wishes of her parents,

demon-strating that actions to preserve the life of Baby Theresa were not

taken simply for the sake of the parents, but because of the baby self Fourth, all that anencephalic infants have by way of life is cona-tus They are kept alive simply because they cannot be considereddead (brain dead) when their brainstem is functioning, however mar-ginally Therefore, their biological persistence—conatus—is honoredand preserved Baby K was kept alive because it was possible tokeep her alive, and she only died when it was no longer possible tosustain her Whereas the other four medical cases presented abovemight have been kept alive for other reasons, Baby Theresa hadnothing else going for her—no other reason to be kept alive—onlyconatus as evidenced by her brainstem The only reason an anen-cephalic infant might be considered morally relevant is because ithas conatus, which keeps these little beings breathing for as long asthey are able

her-400 chapter eight

Sentience is often considered relevant to moral standing Why beconcerned with an entity that is incapable of suffering, or as in thecase of Anthony Bland, an entity that is incapable of benefiting fromwhat is done? There are in fact sound reasons why sentience shouldnot be relevant to moral considerability

Pleasure and pain are, in the final analysis, tools: tools by which a ing thing capable of experiencing them can ensure its survival and thefulfillment of its needs But it is the interests that it has in virtue ofits being a living being, and our ability to nurture or impede fulfillment

liv-of these interests, not the pleasure and pain, that make it enter themoral arena [H]umans would still have interests and needs andwould still be objects of moral concern, even if they no longer expe-rienced pain and pleasure And it is this that broadens the scope ofmoral concern beyond pleasure and pain to essential characteristics oflife itself (Rollin 38)

There is a general moral tendency in the West to preserve innocenthuman existence with or without sentience Consistency, impartial-ity, and casuistry require like treatment of like cases Because weprotect innocent human beings even when they are not sentient,

philosophic consistency requires that we respect all innocent living

entities, even if they are not sentient

For the sake of philosophic consistency, the Minimize Harm Maximoffers moral standing and an imperative to protect and preserve life

impartially and equally to all living entities For living entities not shown

to be different in morally relevant ways, the Minimize Harm Maximdoes that which current moral standards and law do for innocenthuman beings Philosophic consistency, impartiality, and casuistryrequire that we treat like cases in like manner

5 Interests, Welfare, Sentience

Conatus—the biological inclination to persist—is fundamentallydifferent from other primary determinants of moral standing such as

“having an interest” and “sentience.”

Recall Regan’s clarification of two distinctive types of “interest,”active and passive, such that the good of an entity can be eitherconsciously sought or a passive reality of biological existence: Regan

distinguishes between being interested in (active), versus something being

in one’s interest (passive) (Narveson, Nature 22) Children are often ested in things that are not in their interest; they may want to eat nothing

inter-minimize harm maxim 401but candy Adults are not all that different Those addicted to cig-arettes want to smoke, but smoking is clearly not in our interest.The same is true for drug addicts In fact, those who are interested

in eating the flesh of pigs, or in eating at KFC, fall into the samecategory It is not in anyone’s interest to eat such foods when health-ier options are available

As with human beings, a dandelion or a bumblebee each have

certain things that are in their interest whether or not they know what

is in their interest and whether or not we know what is in their

inter-est (This is not to say that we cannot know what is in the interest

of a dandelion or a bumblebee We can learn what each entityrequires biologically to thrive and what brings harm We can gather

“objective knowledge of the life cycle of a butterfly, an apple tree,

or a protozoon, and in this sense we know something of what isgood for them” (Vilkka 68).)

One is generally understood to have an interest in something (say, ting a job) if one wants, desires, prefers or cares about—that is, takes

get-an interest in—that thing And something (such as food) is ordinarilyunderstood to be in someone’s interest if that thing has, or might have,

a positive effect on that individual’s good, welfare, or well-being.(DeGrazia 39)

Preference interests denote what one might prefer; welfare interestsare biological needs Biological needs work toward an individual’sgood even if one is not aware of such interests, and even if thatindividual is not aware of the good associated with such interests.All living beings have biological interests A plant has an interest

in water because without water it will die If a plant has its ical needs met, that plant will grow and live If these basic needsare not met, it will die Both plants and animals (yes, including

biolog-human beings) have things that are in their interest—such as water in

reasonable proportions at necessary times Satisfaction of biologicalneeds is fundamental to plant and animal survival, yet does notrequire conscious choice or mental activity Welfare interests require

no mental formation; they are integral to every living entity Sage,snapdragons, reptilian tuataras, basilica spiders, smelt, and humanbeings all have welfare interests—a biological good that can be real-ized or thwarted

Evelyn Pluhar notes some of the entities limited to welfare ests besides blackberry vines and maple trees:

inter-402 chapter eight

Beings with no capacity for consciousness are not sentient They canneither be aware of nor care about anything that happens to them,although they can live, flourish, deteriorate, and die We may feel ( jus-tifiably or not) moral concern for humans who fall into this class, such

as the irreversibly comatose, anencephalic babies born only with brainstems, and the brain-dead However, many have no such moral feel-ings toward plants, sponges, or bacteria, who are quite far removedfrom the human form, although much more apt to flourish in favor-able conditions than the sad cases mentioned above (Pluhar 8)Anencephalic infants are more like plants than animals in severalcritical ways: they cannot feel pain, they cannot move, and theyhave no mental functioning whatsoever The lives of both plants andanencephalic infants can be harmed; there are things that are intheir biological interest

Sentient animals have a critical additional interest over and above

that of anencephalic infants, brain-dead patients, and plants Mostimportantly from a moral point of view, sentient creatures have acritical interest in not suffering, as noted by an organization calledVegan Outreach:

Based on common physiology and behavior, it is safe to say that cows,pigs, chickens, and other animals we raise to eat also experience fearwhen their lives are threatened, pain when their bodies are mutilated,and boredom and frustration when caged for long periods of time.Nonhuman animals show they value their lives and freedom by theirstruggles against being caged, mutilated, and killed Depriving them oflife and freedom harms them in many of the same ways that humansare harmed when deprived of life or freedom (Norris 2)

Pain and suffering are morally relevant Causing pain and suffering to

oth-ers is morally reprehensible when such suffering is not in their est, and when such suffering is avoidable Those who murder arenot looked on in the same light as those who torture and maimbefore they murder The Western legal system deals more harshlywith those who purposely cause suffering; maiming and torturingother human beings add to the severity of a crime, and to the sever-ity of punishment Western morality, backed by law, does not smile

inter-on inter-one who causes gratuitous suffering

So many years after the death of Descartes, few will deny thatanymals suffer “Logic, science, and common sense all point to theexistence of [anymal] suffering” (Pluhar 14) Morally speaking, withregard to pain and suffering, plants and animals are in completely

minimize harm maxim 403

different categories because only the latter can suffer But

anen-cephalic infants demonstrate that the presence or absence of pain and

su ffering are not morally relevant to the preservation and protection of innocent human life In fact, medical personnel were required by law to inad-vertently increase the emotional pain of the parents, and of the fam-ilies of other babies that might have been saved with Baby Theresa’sbody parts, for the sake of preserving her life for as long as possible.Both plants and animals can be harmed—both have many things

that are in their interest—but pain and suffering are peculiar to mals with a functioning central nervous system Each criterion formoral standing proposed by moral philosophers (along with con-sciousness and sentience) is a mere derivative of the “more basicright of a being to pursue its own good” (Regan, “Exploring” 82).Contemporary Western morality with regard to preserving and pro-tecting innocent human life does not distinguish between the sen-tient and the nonsentient, as best evidenced by comfort care offeredanencephalic infants Sentience appears to be a sufficient, but not anecessary, condition for moral standing among human beings

ani-A protectionist theory based on biological interests, on conatus,avoids the pervasive problem of assessing where consciousness orpain begin and end, what mental or physical realities are experi-enced or not experienced, and where certain lines ought to be drawn

in light of these epistemological problems Perhaps this is why temporary Western morality does not consider such distinctionsmorally relevant

con-For the sake of consistency and impartiality, protection of life is

not rooted in sentience in the Minimize Harm Maxim because the ability to suffer and feel pain is not necessary for preserving and protecting inno- cent human beings Based on the six cases presented in chapter 7, thefundamental moral consideration for the Minimize Harm Maxim isthe presence or absence of conatus As among human beings, enti-ties that strive biologically to persist are not compared or weighed

off against one another, nor are they assessed for mental capacity

or the capacity to suffer All things being equal, any innocent human

being that can be preserved generally must be preserved, by law,

unless or until legal proceedings decide otherwise Consequently, inthe Minimize Harm Maxim any living being that can be preserved,ought to be preserved and protected