In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 5 pptx

People such as Andrew Linzey would argue that it is notChristianity itself, but how human beings have chosen to interpretand live the Christian religion.. The protectionist movement woul

Taylor’s position is inconsistent He insists that rights are not

“derived from or equivalent to assertions about duties” because

in such a case “the question of whether moral agents respect therights of others becomes identical with the question of whether theylive up to their duties” (“Inherent” 24) Rights, he insists, are morethan this Given Taylor’s direct parallels, how can he logically assertthat his environmental ethic can supplant anymal and plant rights,while denying their efficacy as a replacement for human rights?Taylor’s theory demonstrates that respect for nature is not a replace-ment for moral rights Taylor begins chapter six: “In this final chap-ter I consider the moral dilemmas that arise when human rights andvalues conflict with the good of non-humans” (Respect 256) Can thesimple “good” of all other entities compete fairly with the multitude

of comprehensive “rights” Taylor protects for human animals? Taylor’stheory demonstrates that it cannot There is bound to be “tensionbetween claiming that all living beings have equal inherent worthand only granting rights to humans” (Lombardi 257) Indeed, most

of the difficulties of internal conflict in Taylor’s theory stem fromhis tendency to favor human beings, most prominently displayed inhis affirmation of human rights and concurrent dismissal of anymalrights Taylor “cannot bring himself to completely renounce spe-cial respect for persons and sometimes speaks of ‘both systems ofethics’—respect for persons and respect for nature—as if he werejuggling two independent principles” (Callicott, “Case” 107)

Taylor’s acceptance of rights exclusively for Homo sapiens harms

the internal consistency and protectionist qualities of his theory Mostflagrantly, Taylor offers an environmental ethic to protect “wild”entities, inclusive of the most civilized and “unnatural” of species(humans), yet excluding billions of domestic “pets,” “laboratory” any-mals, and “food” anymals that live severely truncated, deprived, andoften painful lives Taylor’s theory allows masses of teleological enti-ties to live and die as property and profit for exploitative industriesthat degrade the land with a multitude of chemicals and tons ofwaste Yet Taylor protects these industries, rather than the lives ofthe individuals or the environment, allowing people to maintain theirintegrity as the type of beings that we are—in this case, greedy,exploitative, and cruel beings

Taylor fails to fulfill his own standards for an ethical system; hishumanocentric tendencies prevent him from applying his environ-mental principles in a disinterested fashion

i Justification

Taylor’s work favors humans in ways that sometimes lead to sophic inconsistencies, and one might suspect that these special humanprivileges are intended to make his theory more palatable: Taylorguarantees

philo-that we human beings can go on living the lives to which we havegrown accustomed He tries to make things come out right—so that

we can eat vegetables, build wooden houses, and generally get on withour human projects —by means of an elaborate set of hedges enabling

us consumptively to use our fellow entities within the limits of hisextremely broad egalitarian theory (Callicott, “Case” 108)

Taylor offers a theory that is more likely to be considered able by granting people more freedom and power Though Tayloradmits that his theory is difficult to realize, he asserts that respectfor nature, based on “equal inherent worth of every living thing,”demonstrates that “biotic egalitarianism does not reduce to absur-

accept-dity” but can be fruitfully implemented (Respect 306).

There is value in presenting a moral theory that is appealing andapplicable, one that seems to offer realistic answers to pressing con-temporary problems Yet Taylor’s human leanings prove disastrous,and in any case, one cannot please everyone At least one of Taylor’sreaders concluded that “the clearest and most decisive refutation of

the principle of respect for life is that one cannot live according to

it, nor is there any indication in nature that we were intended to”(Goodpaster, “On Being” 324) Even with Taylor’s extensive humanbias, it is almost certain that many people would be unwilling toadopt Taylor’s theory of Respect for Nature (Spitler 256)

Moral theory, including protectionist moral theory, ought not tobend to the preferences of the masses People have too often treasuredthe freedom of human expansion, flourishing civilization, and increasedprofit at the expense of other living entities—even at the expense ofless powerful human beings In the United States, in the mid-eighteenthcentury, settlers were free to hunt Native Americans for sport andprofit; those who brought in the head of a Native American werepaid bounty money by the federal government (“Ishi”) In the south-ern United States slave owners were free to profit economically fromslaves, whom they could sell or kill at their whim Our interest infreedom and personal gain has sometimes had an appalling effect

on other individuals—human and nonhuman Power and freedom

are much sought, but they are often not worth the price paid

(Fein-berg, Social 7).

Just as moral theory was brought to bear on those who exploitedAfricans and natives for profit in the United States, sound and con-sistent moral theory must be brought to bear on those who profitfrom destroying the natural world or from the lives of anymals

Conclusion

Taylor’s theory is both broader than most protectionist theories(including plants) and narrower (excluding anymals that are not “nat-ural” or “wild”) Taylor’s work entails theoretical problems and incon-sistencies, such as his tendency to make exceptions in his theory forthe sake of human interests Nonetheless, Taylor’s theory of Respectfor Nature offers a fascinating and inspirational protectionist ethicfor wildlife, and for the natural world He offers a much-needed the-oretical bridge where environmentalists and protectionists might meet

on common ground

PROTECTIONIST THEOLOGY

ANDREW LINZEY: CHRISTIAN PROTECTIONISM

In 1967, in his groundbreaking article, “The Historical Roots of OurEcological Crisis,” Lynn White blamed Christianity for our growingenvironmental crisis “Especially in its Western form,” White wrote,

“Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen”

(1205–06) Since the publication of that article in Science, there has

been much speculation as to whether or not Christianity might be

at fault People such as Andrew Linzey would argue that it is notChristianity itself, but how human beings have chosen to interpretand live the Christian religion

Few have disputed the historical importance of religion to the mation of Western “presuppositions” concerning our relationship withthe world around us (White 1204) Nor are we likely to argue withWhite’s assertion that what people do “depends on what they thinkabout themselves in relation to things around them” (1205–06) Whatdoes Christianity offer with regard to this relationship? Most Christians

for-in the Western world assume that they have been given “domfor-inion”

by God, over the rest of creation, and that we are therefore free tocontinue breeding dogs and eating flesh Is this common view scrip-turally accurate? Does the common Western Christian’s lifestyle ade-quately reflect divine intent as revealed in the Bible?

Andrew Linzey, an Anglican priest and theologian, is the nant scholar behind a theological justification for protectionism Henotes that “[a]ll Christian traditions contain resources for looking

domi-at animals in a positive way,” and thdomi-at “the bdomi-attle for animals willnot, cannot, be won while major institutions in our society hold anti-

progressive views on animals” (Animal Gospel 70, 73) Linzey rejects

the traditional Christian view, which holds that God granted peoplethe right to use nature and anymals for their own ends Linzey’sGenerosity Paradigm requires Christians to exhibit self-sacrificing ser-vice toward all of creation and asserts that exploitation of anymalsviolates God’s will, as expressed in the Bible Andrew Linzey hasstirred many Christians to reexamine scripture and reconsider theirreligious duties with regard to anymals

Theology remains a vital and vibrant moral force in the porary world The protectionist movement would benefit greatly fromreligious support—an alliance that seems natural to many people offaith who stand firmly within the protectionist movement.

“knowledge of God.” The focus of ancient Greek theology exploredthe nature of the gods themselves and the deities’ relations with theworld, especially the world of human beings

We continue to view theology as rooted in reason and disciplinedstudy and as contrasting with mythology Theology examines reli-gious scripture, lore, and belief from the standpoint of faith Suchancient lore is seldom viewed as myth by insiders; “myth” is gen-erally ascribed to the ancient wisdom of “other” peoples Becausefaith is involved, there is a strong element of intuition and personalexperience involved Consequently, many have been unwilling toconsider theology a science

Theology is critical to modern religious belief and practice Thosewho engage in theology most often pursue a greater understanding

of their own religion, and they are motivated by, and overtly seek,

an insider’s view of their particular faith Theology has thereforemost often been an internal dialogue among those of a particularfaith Increasingly, theologians have reached across religious tradi-tions to dialogue about matters of common interest and concern.Theology differs from most other scholarly disciplines in that thecore subject, the divine, cannot be apprehended through empiricalinvestigation Perhaps, at least in part because the taproot springsfrom faith, theology has established rigorous methods of reasoning

about God Authorities examining religious works employ reason,scripture, tradition, and (more recently), experience Theology can

be viewed as a science because it employs systematic intellectual

pro-cedures, rooted in reason, and because all sciences—all human

endeav-ors—are tainted by the human hand, mind, and heart

Theology has not only become more rigorous but much moresophisticated since the days of the ancient Greeks There are variousareas of specialty within theology The most general and compre-hensive is systematic theology, the “ordered exposition of the beliefs

of a religious faith as a whole” (Macquarrie) There are also branches

of theology, such as pastoral theology and, most important for thepurpose of this book, moral theology Moral theology brings faith,scripture, and traditions to bear on specific moral issues Becauseethics cannot be removed from a specific context, moral theology isinterdisciplinary, involving such matters as politics, economics, andsocial activism

In the sixties and seventies, a Catholic priest from Peru GustavoGutierrez, claimed that Christians have a “compelling obligation tofashion an entirely different social order” (Gutierrez 301) Gutierrez

is most often considered the father of liberation theology, a branch

of moral theology that is also a political and social movement thatemphasizes themes from the Bible that reveal God as the champion

of the poor, powerless, and oppressed Gutierrez recognized the erating message of Christianity for the poor people of South America.With his support and encouragement, the poor and oppressed looked

lib-to their “faith lib-to help them, directly, free their people from poverty”(Carmody 154) Liberation theology reminded Christians that theplight of the downtrodden is not morally neutral, that Christianityought to be a “response to God” that turns people into “Christianactivists committed to uprooting regimes of injustice and replacingthem with regimes that give the needs of the poor priority over thewishes, often the luxuries, of the wealthy” (Carmody 156) In thisstruggle many Christian activists must accept a life of poverty, join-ing those who are poor by birth or by chance Choosing poverty

is an act of love and liberation It has a redemptive value If the mate cause of human exploitation and alienation is selfishness, thedeepest reason for voluntary poverty is love of neighbor Christianpoverty has meaning only as a commitment of solidarity with the poor,with those who suffer misery and injustice It is not a question ofidealizing poverty, but rather of taking it on as it is—an evil—to protest

ulti-against it and to struggle to abolish it [Y]ou cannot really bewith the poor unless you are struggling against poverty Because ofthis solidarity—which manifests itself in specific action, a style of life,

a break with one’s social class—one can also help the poor and exploited

to become aware of their exploitation and seek liberation from it

Christian poverty, an expression of love, is solidarity with the poor and

is a protest against poverty This is the concrete, contemporary

mean-ing of the witness of poverty It is a poverty lived not for its own sake,but rather as an authentic imitation of Christ; it is a poverty whichmeans taking on the sinful human condition to liberate humankindfrom sin and all its consequences (“Gustavo”)

Liberation theologists boldly denounced those who hoarded theirwealth and enjoyed luxuries while others were hungry or cold forwant of food and shelter At least part of the Christian church stoodfirmly in opposition to those who benefited from the exploitation ofthe powerless Social movements rooted in faith, enacted with con-viction, are anathema to those in power Liberation theology exemplifiesjust how costly and dangerous faith can be; many priests who crit-icized the wealthy and advocated for the poor, who spoke out againstthe South American establishment on behalf of the powerless, havebeen assassinated But in the words of Gutierrez, “How could oneclaim to be a Christian if one did not commit oneself to remedyingthe situation?” (301)

Liberation theology was pioneered in South America but has hadmuch wider ramifications Theologians and church officials aroundthe world began to apply the social gospel, best exemplified by Christ,aiding the downtrodden Liberation theology, which began with thepoor and oppressed social classes of South America, has had far-reaching implications In a similar fashion to Gutierrez, Martin LutherKing offered a theological critique of racism As a preacher he “chal-lenged white Christians to be true” to scripture and church creed,asserting that “God created all people as one human family, broth-ers and sisters to one another” (Cone 295–96) King referred to the

enslavement of one race by another as sin “He made it impossible

for people of good will to swallow the lie that they could in goodconscience call on God while hating other human beings becausetheir skin was a different color” (Carmody 158) King used theol-ogy to “prick the conscience of both white and black Christians andthereby enlist them into a mass movement against racism in thechurches and the society He made racism the chief moral dilemma,

one which neither whites nor blacks could ignore and also retaintheir Christian identity” (Cone 295–96).

Social movements that align with religions enhance their chances

of success King reached his first audience from the pulpit His ideasresonated with his audience because they were rooted in spiritualteachings that the vast majority of those present held in common.Religious convictions run deep and are often important to people inways secular morality is not Morality, backed by religion, can be aforce to contend with King’s message of equality before God andChristian love was not lost on the Christian congregation he stoodbefore Similarly, church leaders stir Americans on issues such asabortion and gay rights based on church teachings and scripture.Gutierrez and King reminded the Christian church of its ownteachings and insisted that those teachings be enacted in daily life.Without a theological framework, neither Gutierrez nor King wouldhave had a legitimate means by which to examine scripture and callthe church to task Theology provided what each of these Christiansneeded to spearhead social movements against oppression Similarly,theologians have questioned the subordination of women in Christianchurches in light of the liberating message of equality attributed toJesus More recently, the theologian Andrew Linzey has examinedscripture to find a protectionist message that challenges ongoingChristian indifference to the exploitation and suffering of anymals

B Christianity and Protectionism across Time

In the fourth century, Father Basil of Caesarea insisted “that mals live not for us alone, but for themselves and for God” (Sorabji199) Christian protectionism was present in both early and medievalideals, where gentler human relations with anymals were supported

ani-by biblical interpretation (Hughes 313) In a book called Scripture Animals: A Natural History of the Living Creatures Named in the Bible, pub-lished in 1834, the Rev Jonathan Fisher acknowledges that he has

so carefully compiled information on anymals in the Bible to leadyoung readers “into a more intimate acquaintance with the works

of God, and through his works to a knowledge of some part of hischaracter” (338) There has always been a protectionist voice amongChristians, though oftentimes a small and quiet minority Today,

with theologians such as Andrew Linzey, Christian protectionism isperhaps stronger and more visible than ever.

Christian saints have modeled protectionism for centuries Somesaints have been famous specifically for their protectionist beliefs,such as St Francis of Assisi Hagiographies reveal that those believed

to be closest to God, saints, are also close to God’s many man creatures Many rejected the classic separation between humansand nature (Polk 185) Christianity has a long “tradition of individ-ual saints returning to paradisal relations with the animals, com-muning with them and curing them” (Sorabji 203) Hagiographiestestify to a host of “courageous Christians: saints and seers, theolo-gians and poets, mystics and writers who have championed the cause

nonhu-of animals The list must include almost two-thirds nonhu-of those ized saints East and West, not only St Francis but also St Martin,Richard of Chichester, Chrysostom, Isaac the Syrian, Bonaventure,

canon-and countless others” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 27) Benevolence toward

all living creatures was commonplace for venerated Christians.Hagiographies demonstrate that saints, known for their proximity toGod and the Christian ideal, tended to be compassionate and ten-der toward anymals

St Francis of Assisi is probably the most famous protectionist saint

He envisaged God as present in all creatures (Hughes 15) LynnWhite praised St Francis for encouraging Christian humility—forproposing the idea of “the equality of all creatures”; “Francis tried

to depose man from his monarch over creation and set up a racy of all God’s creatures” (1206–07) He “asked for captive ani-mals, and cared for or released them If wild animals were given tohim, he treated them gently and let them go Often they sensed hisfriendship so strongly that they stayed near him instead of fleeing”(Hughes 317) St Francis “saw God expressed in the morphologicalvariety of creation; he valued every species and was drawn into won-der and prayer by individual creatures” (Hughes 316) He insistedthat his followers exemplify compassion for anymals, and it was hisdeepest hope that kindness might flow from all people toward thegreat expanse of the created world

democ-Special relationships between saints and anymals are repeatedlymentioned in hagiographies Sometimes nonhuman animals assistedsaints, such as the wild ass that helped Abbot Helenus At othertimes saints assisted anymals—especially against the cruelties ofhumans—as when St Godric harbored a hunted stag Hagiographies

sometimes credit anymals with having a special spiritual understandingthat humans lack, as in the story of St Columba’s white horse(Waddell) St Kieran of Saighir “lived with a wild boar, a fox, abadger, a wolf and a deer” (Vischer 26) St Jerome, St Guthlac ofCroyland, and St Godric lived with wild anymals that protectedthem; anymals were their closest companions.

Such notable Christians demonstrate “a reversal of the ship of fear and enmity between humans and animals that apper-

relation-tains after the Fall and the Flood” (Linzey, After 100) They demonstrate

a firm belief that Descartes was wrong: “Cogito ergo sum: ‘I think, therefore I am’? Nonsense Amo ergo sum: ‘I love, therefore I am’”

(Coffin 11) For many saints—those believed to be closest to God—the fragile nature of anymals and their complete subjugation to theever-growing power of human beings require Christian charity andChristlike protective tenderness (Polk 185) What we can learn from

“countless saintly examples is that to have a relationship with Godthe Creator can also mean having as a consequence trusting friend-

ships with God’s other creatures” (Linzey, After 101).

This connection between spiritual leaders and anymals runs through the divine “If animals are spiritual beings—in the sense of being crea-tures with their own relationship to the Creator—then it must fol-low that in our encounter with them we apprehend—to somedegree—the Creator or at least the workings of the Creator” (Linzey,

After 58) The influential monk Thomas a Kempis wrote, “If yourheart were right, then every creature would be a mirror of life and

a book of holy doctrine There is no creature so small and meanthat it does not put forth the goodness of God” (69) Unlike most

of us, saints often see creation as a “reflection of God’s mysteriouslove” an understanding of which allows one to “come closer to the

Creator” (Linzey, After 71) One of the greatest Catholic mystics, St.

John of the Cross, noted that anymals “are all clothed with velous natural beauty, derived from and communicated by that infinite

mar-supernatural beauty of the image of God” (Linzey, After 79).

Historically, however, the weight of the Christian church has beenantiprotectionist Animals have most often been viewed as anti-God,chattel, slaves to our needs, and offerings for sacrifices Some are

unclean; all are irrational and bereft of souls (Linzey, After 3–11).

The only noteworthy objection early Christian thinkers raised againstcruelty to animals was the fear that such behavior might lead tocruelty toward other humans (Schochet 274) Christians continue to

be “largely or wholly instrumentalist in their understanding of

ani-mals” (Linzey, After 10–11) A brief history of Western philosophy

and theology provides a context for contemporary Christian attitudestoward anymals, and for Linzey’s work

Ancient Greeks pondered the nature of life, the unique qualities

of the human being, and how people ought to behave with regard

to anymals Hesiod as early as the eighth century BCE discussedhuman moral and religious responsibilities toward anymals (Sorabji 7)

In the middle of the sixth century BCE, Pythagoras founded a gious order that abstained from eating meat (Marshall 69); Pythagorastaught that the soul is immortal, reborn in the form of various species,making us all akin and rendering flesh eating repulsive (R Allen 6).Around 400 BCE Democritus suggested that animals are morallyresponsible and therefore ought to receive just punishment (Sorabji107) About the same time, Diogenes, that most famous cynic, “pro-fessed brotherhood with all beings, including animals He abstainedfrom flesh eating, declaring: ‘We might as well eat the flesh of men

reli-as the flesh of other animals’” (Marshall 76) Diogenes even arguedthat anymals were superior to humans, as did Plutarch in his whim-sical essay, “Beasts Are Rational” (Sorabji 161)

Two thousand years ago, Greek philosophers were teaching that

“kindness and benevolence” ought to extend “to the creatures ofevery species” (Marshall 78) Plutarch, a Greek historian and biog-rapher, as well as a philosopher and spiritual guide, was one of thefirst Greek scholars to write about the moral interests of anymalsindependent from any belief in transmigration of souls (self-interest)

It was the unnecessary suffering and death that caught Plutarch’smoral attention in “On the Eating of Flesh.” “Are you not ashamed

to mingle domestic crops with blood and gore? You call serpentsand panthers and lions savage, but you yourselves, by your own foulslaughters, leave them no room to outdo you in cruelty; for theirslaughter is their living, yours is a mere appetizer” (I 994) Plutarchaccepted those things necessary for human survival, but neither depriv-ing nor killing animals were included

No, for the sake of a little flesh we deprive them of sun, of light, ofthe duration of life to which they are entitled by birth and being [weimagine] that they do not, begging for mercy, entreating, seeking jus-tice, each one of them say, “I do not ask to be spared in case ofnecessity; only spare me your arrogance! Kill me to eat, but not toplease your palate!” (Plutarch On I 994)

Plutarch admits that it is not “easy to extract the hook of eating, entangled as it is and embedded in the love of pleasure” (On II 996) Though difficult to change, the habit of killing for thelove of pleasure was, in Plutarch’s writing, neither natural to humanbeings nor necessary “[I]t is not for nourishment or need or neces-sity, but out of satiety and insolence and luxury that they have turnedthis lawless custom into a pleasure We shall eat flesh, but fromhunger, not as a luxury” (On II 996–7) Plutarch challenged thosewho declared meat eating to be natural that they should kill an anymal without weapons, then “Fall upon it and eat it still living,

flesh-as animals do” (I, 995) Plutarch finds the whole matter of eatingother creatures loathsome:

I rather wonder both by what accident and in what state of soul ormind the first man who did so touched his mouth to gore and broughthis lips to the flesh of a dead creature, he who set forth tables of dead,stale bodies and ventured to call food and nourishment the parts thathad a little before bellowed and cried, moved and lived How couldhis eyes endure the slaughter when throats were slit and hides flayedand limbs torn from limb? How could his nose endure the stench?How was it that the pollution did not turn away his taste, which madecontact with the sores of others and sucked juices and serums frommortal wounds? (On I 993)

Porphyry, slightly later than Plutarch (232–309), may have been thefirst to build an argument based on pain and terror in his argumentthat anymals ought to be handled “differently from plants” (Sorabji184) Porphyry focused on justice and anymals:

[ T ]hough all wolves and vultures should praise the eating of flesh, weshould not admit that they spoke justly, as long as man is by natureinnoxious and ought to abstain from procuring pleasure for himself byinjuring others We shall pass on, therefore, to the discussion of jus-tice; and since our opponents say that this ought only to be extended

to those of similar species, and on this account deny that irrationalanimals can be injured by men, let us exhibit the true, and at thesame time Pythagoric opinion, and demonstrate that every soul whichparticipates of sense and memory is rational For this being demon-strated, we may extend, as our opponents will also admit, justice toevery animal (Porphyry 93–94)

While there were a few enlightened people, such as Porphyry, whorecognized that reasoning powers between human beings and any-mals were a matter of degree, a difference “not in essence, but inthe more and the less” (Porphyry 101), in ancient Greece, as now,

arguments against protectionism revolved around the distinct nature

of humankind (Sorabji 1) The tendency to credit only human beingswith various qualities that humans value, such as reason, began cen-turies ago Most ancient Greek thinkers assumed that only human

beings had “reason (logos), reasoning (logismos), thought (dianoia), lect (nous), and belief (doxa)” (Sorabji 14) Stoics provide perhaps the

intel-first written account where reason is critical to moral responsibility(Sorabji 112) The Stoics denied justice to anymals on the groundsthat they stand outside the human community, and because ratio-nality was considered a prerequisite for joining the community.Anymals were not credited with rationality, and justice could only

be exacted within the community (Sorabji 124).

Aristotle viewed nature as a hierarchy where creatures with lessreasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more reason (Aristotle,

Nicomachean 1:7, 8:12) As a result, he believed that those incapable

of moral deliberation had less responsibility and fewer privileges (S Clark, “Rights” 184) For Aristotle, a more rational mind waspart of a more complete and perfect individual, and the more com-plete and perfect individual was intended to rule over those less com-plete and perfect “The relation of ruler and ruled is one of thosethings which are not only necessary, but beneficial; and there arespecies in which a distinction is already marked, immediately at birth,between those of its members who are intended for being ruled and

those who are intended to rule” (Aristotle, Politics I.5, 1254a17) So

the less perfect exist for the more perfect in Aristotle’s view, andreason makes one more perfect

The soul rules the body with the authority of a master: reason rulesthe appetite with the authority of a statesman or a monarch In thissphere it is clearly natural and beneficial to the body that it should

be ruled by the soul, and again it is natural and beneficial to the

affective part of the soul that it should be ruled by the reason andthe rational part; whereas the equality of the two elements, or theirreverse relation, is always detrimental The same principle is true ofthe relation of man to other animals Tame animals have a betternature than wild, and it is better for all such animals that they should

be ruled by man because they then get the benefit of preservation.Again, the relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior

to the inferior, of the ruling to the ruled (Aristotle, Politics I.5,

1254b2)

And in Aristotle’s view, nature intended this order in the universe:

Plants exist for the benefit of animals, and some animals exist for thebenefit of others Those which are domesticated, serve human beingsfor use as well as for food; wild animals, too, in most cases if not inall, serve to furnish us not only with food, but also with other kinds

of assistance, such as the provision of clothing and similar aids to life.Accordingly, if nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all ani-mals must have been made by nature for the sake of men (Aristotle,

Politics I.8, 1256b15)

Aristotle lived his philosophy, exploiting anymals for his purposes

He kept a large museum of “specimens” that were “drawn, dissected,described, and classified” (Thomson 20–21)

Other philosophers commented that “it is not at all obvious why

it should be supposed that animals exist for us, and for us not merely

to admire, but to kill (Sorabji 200) Platonists Celsus and Porphyrynoted that flies are not of any use to us, whereas human beingsmight be of considerable use to crocodiles (Sorabji 200)

In spite of this worthy voice of dissent, a strong vein of Greektradition, a tradition that was soon to become so much a part ofChristianity, envisioned nature as one great resource for humanexploitation Contemporary Western society inherited this “generalphilosophic indifference toward the natural environment” and towardanymals (Soupios 13) Although the viewpoints of ancient Greekphilosophers were many and varied, though they developed through

a “wide-ranging and vigorous” debate, “Western Christianity centrated on one half, the anti-animal half, of the much more evenlybalanced ancient debate [ T ]this accounts for the relative com-placency of our Western Christian tradition about the killing of ani-mals (Sorabji 2–3)

con-Greek thinking has been very important to Christianity throughearly Christian scholars critical to the formation of contemporaryChristianity For instance, the influence of the late-fourth-centuryChristian theologian, Augustine of Hippo, remains strong to this day;his writing reveals considerable Stoic influence Augustine wrote thatanymals are irrational and it is by just ordinance of God that thelives and deaths of anymals are subordinated to human use When

we say “Thou shalt not kill,” Augustine notes, “we do not stand this of the plants, since they have no sensation, nor of theirrational animals that fly, swim, walk, or creep, since they are dis-sociated from us by their want of reason, and are therefore by thejust appointment of the Creator subjected to us to kill or keep alive

under-for our own uses” (Augustine I 20) Through Augustine, Stoic belief

in the importance of human reason as a prerequisite for receivingjustice “became irrevocably embedded in the Christian tradition”(Sorabji 198)

Augustine was not the only Christian scholar to accept Greek losophy or to place the thoughts of these ancient thinkers in aChristian context and back these secular ideas with the weight ofdivine intent Like Augustine, Aquinas has maintained tremendous

phi-influence over Christianity right up to present times; most porary church doctrines contain his teachings In the thirteenth cen-tury Thomas Aquinas revisited Augustine’s point concerning anymals,inserting ancient Greek philosophy into Christian theology Drawingheavily on Greek philosophy, Aquinas claimed that anymals were

contem-put on earth by God for human purposes (Linzey, After 6) The

follow-ing quote is overtly rooted in the works of Aristotle (here referred

to as “the Philosopher”), endowed with a theological basis by thehand of Aquinas

There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is Nowthe order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even

as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection toperfection Hence it is that just as in the generation of a man there

is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things,like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for animals, andall animals are for man Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plantsfor the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as thePhilosopher states

Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact thatanimals use plants and men use animals, for food, and this cannot bedone unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both totake life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for theuse of men In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of Godhimself (Aquinas II, II Q64, art 1)

Aquinas sums up his point of view: Anymals “are naturally enslavedand accommodated to the uses of others” (Aquinas II, II Q64, art 1) Linzey sums up Aquinas’ point of view regarding anymals:

“[A]nimals have no reason and no rights, and humans no

respon-sibility to them” (Linzey, Animal Theology 15) Aquinas, again citing

Aristotle, alienates humans from anymals by asserting that onlyhumans have both a spiritual and a corporeal element (Aquinas I,

Q 75, A 3) From this he concludes that the souls of anymals arenot immortal; human beings alone possess immortal souls

Aquinas taught that animals have no moral status except through

human interest—as human property (Linzey, Animal Theology 13).

Aquinas writes, “He that kills another’s ox, sins, not through killingthe ox, but through injuring another man in his property Whereforethis is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft

or robbery” (Aquinas II, II Q64, art 1) Given the importance ofAquinas in the Christian tradition, it is not surprising that currentlaws tend to reflect his teachings: Anymals continue to be viewed asmere objects—property—a point of view that has only recently beenchallenged

In summary, based on the works of Aristotle, Aquinas asserted:

• unlike human beings, anymals lack rationality;

• anymals are intended for human use.

Aquinas added the strength of theology to Greek philosophy:

• anymals are made for humans by divine providence;

• because anymals do not have reason, they lack immortal souls.Aquinas concluded, “Hereby is refuted the error of those who said

it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providencethey are intended for man’s use in the natural order Hence it is nowrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any

other way whatever” (Regan, Animal 58–59).

Interestingly,

the argument by which Aristotle linked rationality and immortality hasbeen regarded as fallacious by most philosophers, and his claim thatonly humans are capable of rationality is equally dubious Thus, today’sstandard Christian belief that only humans have immortal souls is, atleast in part, based on the unsound arguments of a non-Christianphilosopher (Singer, “Animals” 227)

Had Aquinas focused on Ecclesiastes 3:18–21, instead of the works

of pre-Christian Aristotle, it is likely that he would have reached avery different conclusion Linzey argues that Aquinas’ Aristotelianpoint of view is theologically indefensible All the same, Aquinas’views held sway, and this exploitative Christian attitude toward any-mals reached an apex in Rene Descartes (1596–1650), who concludedthat anymals could feel no pain because they have no consciousness,and they have no consciousness because they have no immortal soul,

as evidenced by their lack of language (Descartes 116–17) Like many

Western philosophers before him, Descartes emphasized the tance of rationality and used his reason to carry this idea to newand terrible heights In his mind irrational anymals, lacking souls,were mere automata, machines of God that could feel nothing —completely “other” by virtue of lacking rationality.

impor-Descartes’ ideas placed anymals as yet further distant and belowhuman beings, unworthy of—without need of—even the most rudi-mentary consideration Descartes’ radical assertions had dreadful consequences for anymals, especially in the hands of science (Regan,

All 5) In a letter to Henry More dated February 5, 1649, Descartesadmits that his philosophy was not so much cruel to anymals asindulgent to people, permitting us to use anymals for our ends with-

out moral anguish (Singer, Animal 201) His assumptions, most notably

that respect for life revolves around rationality, also bolstered muchprejudice among human beings—white men assumed themselves to

be the crowning achievement in rational thought, while women andother races were considered inferior (Attfield 17)

Descartes’ thinking is in many ways unsatisfactory, both religiouslyand philosophically Religiously speaking, rationality has not been arequirement for respect—even veneration For instance, though Mary(Mother of God in the Christian faith) has never represented rea-son, intellect, or wisdom, she has been venerated by millions ofChristians Mary continues to have great power and prestige, espe-cially in the Catholic church In the Christian view, Jesus was born

both of the Virgin Mary and of Spirit, and both have been

vener-ated for centuries, Descartes’ views notwithstanding

Descartes’ dualism is equally unsatisfactory from a philosophicalpoint of view because rationality is generally not considered morallyrelevant with regard to respect for life If this were not the case,irrational human beings would be expendable Even though Descartes’philosophy has been shown to be unsatisfactory, many continue toemphasize the importance of rational thought as a morally relevantdistinction between our species and every other species, yet scantfew are willing to devalue the lives of irrational human beings Thoughbroadly recognized as irrational and inconsistent, Descartes’ extremedualistic teaching continues to justify human dominion and exploitation

In the aftermath of Descartes, theologian and Anglican priest Dr.Humphrey Primatt offered what seems to be the first theologicalargument for extending justice to anymals Primatt viewed nature as

proof of the goodness of God and developed a theological,

sentience-based argument for the protection of other creatures (Linzey, Animal Theology 15–16) In 1776 he wrote A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and the Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals In this document Primatt notesthat not only people are of God, but all of creation: “Love is thegreat Hinge upon which universal Nature turns The Creation is atranscript of the divine Goodness; and every leaf in the book ofNature reads us a lecture on the wisdom and benevolence of itsgreat Author [U]pon this principle, every creature of God isgood in its kind; that is, it is such as it ought to be” (Murti) Primattalso notes that there is good reason to be loving and benevolent toother creatures because “[p]ain is pain, whether it is inflicted onman or on beast; and the creature that suffers it, whether man orbeast, being sensible of the misery of it whilst it lasts, suffers Evil”(Murti) Primatt spoke for all living beings, including human beings,and noted that skin color is irrelevant—we are each created exactly

as God intended us, whether with dark skin or light, whether acuckoo or a louse In his dissertation, he wrote:

Now, if amongst men, the differences of their powers of the mind,and of their complexion, stature, and accidents of fortune, do not giveany one man a right to abuse or insult any other man on account ofthese differences; for the same reason, a man can have no naturalright to abuse and torment a beast, merely because a beast has notthe mental powers of a man

For, such as the man is, he is but as God made him; and the verysame is true of the beast And being such, neither more nor lessthan God made them, there is no more demerit in a beast being abeast, than there is merit in a man being a man

[ T ]he author and finisher of our faith, hath commanded us to bemerciful, as our Father is also merciful, the obligation upon Christiansbecomes the stronger; and it is our bounded duty, in an especial man-ner, and above all other people, to extend the precept of mercy .[A] cruel Christian is a monster of ingratitude, a scandal to his pro-fession and beareth the name of Christ in vain (Murti)

“We may pretend to what religion we please,” Primatt proclaimed,

“but cruelty is atheism We may boast of Christianity; but cruelty isinfidelity We may trust to our orthodoxy; but cruelty is the worst

of heresies” (Murti) Primatt insisted on a Christianity that would

“promote peace to every creature on earth,” and “create a spirit ofuniversal benevolence” and “goodwill” (Murti)

Theologians such as Humphrey Primatt have never dominatedWestern thought Although benevolence and compassion toward allcreatures has been central in the lives of many exemplary Christians,most of the faithful have ignored this message, and continue to do

so Christians, including important leaders such as Pope Pius IX andreformers such as Calvin and Luther, have generally defended notions

of human dominion and endorsed exploitation rather than change

their way of life (Linzey, After 7, 10).

Although the Western world is now largely a secular world, Christiannotions of dominion continue to dominate our interactions with thenatural world—whether we profess to be Christian or atheist Yet ahandful of Christian theologians continue to offer a religious under-standing that does not admit of exploitation or abuse of anymals.Such is the voice of Andrew Linzey

C Linzey’s Protectionist Theology

Through scripture, Linzey explores creation and the covenant ofGenesis 9 He asserts that all creatures are of God, that the deity’scovenant includes all creatures, all beings share in the suffering oflife on earth, all entities share unity in Christ, and redemption isshared by all creatures He presents his findings, and then examinesbiblical challenges to his thesis, including the practices of anymalsacrifice and eating flesh, and the biblical concept of dominion.Finally, Linzey examines the New Testament, focusing on the life ofChrist as a model of exemplary Christian behavior, the fall and sal-vation, and the support of hierarchy Linzey also discusses biblicalchallenges that might stand in the way of a protectionist theology.Ultimately Linzey employs his protectionist theology to present theGenerosity Paradigm

Like most theologians, Linzey explores Christianity as an insider

to the Christian faith He is speaking to fellow Christians He fore refers to Jesus as “Christ” and the earth as “Creation”; heassumes the validity of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and acceptsthe Bible as a moral and spiritual guide While any one of theseassumptions might reasonably be challenged, to do so is to sidestepthe issue at hand—protectionism As one must accept the notion ofhuman rights to work with Regan’s theory, so one must accept thegeneral Christian vision, shared by millions of Westerners, in order

there-to explore Linzey’s theory The intent of this chapter is not there-to tion the generally accepted basics of Christian faith, but to exploreLinzey’s Christian protectionist theory.

ques-1 Creation

The first chapter of Genesis reports that the elements of creationwere made first, then plants, and finally (on the sixth day) animals,including man and woman:

And God said, “Let the earth bring forth living creatures of every kind:cattle and creeping things and wild animals of the earth of every kind.” And it was so God made the wild animals of the earth of everykind, and the cattle of every kind, and everything that creeps uponthe ground of every kind And God saw that it was good

Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according

to our likeness ” (Gen 1:24–26)

a Shared Origins

Linzey reminds readers that Genesis 1 posits “circles of greater orlesser intimacy with God But what is often overlooked is that ani-mals belong to the innermost circle of intimacy [L]and animals

and humans are created together on the sixth day” (Linzey, Animal Theology 34) “To affirm creation as God’s work is to understand one-

self as a creature” (Linzey, After 12) Our shared origins indicate that

“we cannot logically claim our own value before the Creator

with-out acknowledging the value of other creatures as well” (Linzey, After

13) Linzey concludes: “[ T ]he common creatureliness of all

crea-tures” is the strongest message of Genesis 1 (Linzey, After 18).

Linzey notes that creation doctrine has moral ramifications:

“[A]nimals do not need to justify themselves before God; their

exis-tence is their justification All creatures glorify God, especially theplants and animals, for they are simply blessed in being what they

are” (Linzey, After 72) Linzey argues that anymals, because they are

created by God, must “have moral worth in themselves” (“Animal”90) “Concern for animals, for all the aspects of the created world,

is essential not because these things are pleasing to us but becausethey originate with the creator” (Linzey, “Liberation” 512)

In 1988 the archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, spoke upfor theological protectionism: The Christian “concept of God for-bids the idea of a cheap creation, of a throw-away universe in which

everything is expendable save human existence The whole universe

is a work of love The value, the worth of natural things is not found

in Man’s view of himself but in the goodness of God who made all

things good and precious in his sight” (Linzey, After 13) Linzey notes

that animals are created before human beings, and that God claims these beings to be “good” in and of themselves “God makesthe animals before man, and pronounces them good without man(Gen 1.24–25): they are made by God and for God” (Griffiths 8).Linzey finds in creation “the object of God’s sustaining and prov-

pro-idential love” (Linzey, After 80) Scriptures indicate that “ every

creature is a blessed creature or it is no creature at all ” (Linzey,

Animal Theology 24) According to Linzey, Christians ought to viewcreation from what we imagine God’s perspective to be, not fromour own All creatures are precious because they originate with God,

just like human beings; “all creation proceeds from the creative,

generous hand of God Human or non-human, animate or mate, we all share the profound beneficence of God in his creative

inani-work” (Linzey, Christianity 8).

Thus Linzey makes two primary assertions concerning biblical ation First, we are next to anymals in the creation hierarchy andtherefore must not assume we are radically different, above, or in aseparate sphere Second, because all that exists originated with thecreator, Christians are obligated to treat creation with respect

cre-b Idolatry and Humanism

Both idolatry and humanism are inimical to Christian teachings.Linzey warns that a human-centered ideal denies a God-centeredfaith, and affirms humanism, where people are the measure of all

“The worth of every creature does not lie in whether it is beautiful(to us) or whether it serves or sustains our life and happiness .Only God, and not man, is the measure of all things” (Linzey,

“Liberation” 513) Linzey warns that those who hold themselves up

as the yardstick against which other beings are to be assessed—whichmost Christians have done for quite some time—“has led to a prac-

tical form of idolatry” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 129) To use such a

standard “deifies people by regarding the interests of human beings

as the sole, main, or even exclusive concern of God the Creator”

(Linzey, After 118) We become idols, centering on ourselves rather

than the creator

“While it cannot be doubted that humans hold a high place increation,” it does not follow that people can single-handedly deter-

mine how to treat creation based on what we prefer (Linzey, “Animals”

33) Christians cannot justify everything they do simply because they

believe it to be in their best interest “The welfare of humanity has

become the dominant ideology of our age [B]elief in God mightrequire us to modify or qualify the demands made for human wel-

fare” (Linzey, After 121) In the Christian faith, God alone is the

measure of all If Christians “neglect the place and significance ofother creatures in God’s good creation, Christian theology funda-mentally weakens itself, and its claim to be God centered” (Linzey,

After 119)

Linzey encourages Christians to see the “Creator’s interest in therest of creation, the intrinsic value of each creature in God’s sight,”and acknowledge “the justice and mercy of God which extends to

all works of creation” (Linzey, After 120) “God has created a world

of millions of species that are for the most part utterly otiose and

irrelevant to us” (Linzey, After 122) We are not the center of the created universe, according to Linzey, and all things were not cre-

ated for our purposes Reject humanism, Linzey advises; put Godback at the center

The Jewish and Christian traditions are united in their conviction thatthe world of living creatures exists because God loves them, and sus-tains them, and rejoices in them But if we do not sense this divinerejoicing throughout creation it is perhaps not surprising that we livemean, narrow, self-centered, essentially exploitative lives

The central point is that celebration involves the recognition ofworth, of value, outside ourselves Human beings are not the sum total

of all value (Linzey, After 12)

Contemporary idolatry and humanism demonstrate arrogance andwanton pride in Linzey’s view and are linked with the assumptionthat human beings are the center and measure of all Christians, fol-lowing one line of ancient Greek philosophy most famously expressed

by Aristotle, have based morality on this overinflated attitude ofhuman self-importance Through our “simple-minded humanistic util-itarianism,” we smugly assume that “what is good for us, must be

right with God” (Linzey, After 124).

Linzey remonstrates that this “spiritually infantile” attitude hasallowed us to use “sentient creatures simply as walking ‘spare parts’

for human beings,” to patent them as “financial returns” on human

ingenuity (Linzey, After 125) He rejects what he sees as childish

arro-gance, and challenges Christians to put God back in the center oftheir lives The Bible teaches that the created world faithfully reflectsthe design of a loving and generous creator—a world that can exist,

and can only continue to exist, through God’s attentive care: “The

Lord is good to all, and his compassion is over all that he has made”(Ps 145:9)

God’s love is expressed in creation: “God enjoys creatures Godrejoices, as the psalmist says, in ‘the works of his hand’” (Linzey,

After 104) Because scriptures tell us that the deity saw “good” in theworld, we are called upon to respect what was created, rather thanabuse and exploit what God has called “good.” If we treat our world,and all its myriad creatures with loving care, we acknowledge creation

as priceless and we express reverence for God’s works While as asociety Christians tend to recognize the moral imperative of respect-ing human life as a duty to God, we fail to make this connection

with all life “God created all the animals, not just humans one

might think that to kill any animal is to destroy God’s property, andthus to ‘play God.’ Just like euthanasia” (Singer, “Animals” 229).Christians ought to remember that creation is not ours, but God’s;

“we must never destroy without serious justification and withoutacknowledging that all life belongs not to us but to God” (Linzey,

After 105)

c “Theos-Rights”

“[A]nimals are God’s creatures: we have an obligation to the

Creator to respect what is created” (Animal Gospel 49) Linzey writes,

“God as Creator has rights in his creation” (Christianity 69) Therefore

Linzey does not posit “anymal rights,” but rather “theos-rights,”

“emphasizing the priority of God’s right in creation [Linzey] doesnot posit inherent natural rights independent of God’s sovereignty—quite the reverse [He] focuses attention upon God’s very gift of cre-ation and his own determination to guarantee what he has given”

(Christianity 71).

Linzey asserts that theos-rights recognize the “value of a

God-given life” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 45) “We are justified in claimingrights for them and for ourselves in the context of God’s right to

have what he has given honoured and respected” (Christianity 71).

The motto adopted by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animalstakes on new meaning in Linzey’s theological vision: “[A]nimals arenot ours to eat, wear, experiment on, or use for entertainment.”

According to Linzey, they are not ours to exploit because they are not ours They are God’s loving bounty, and respect for the creatorrequires that we treat other-than-human animals in a way that rec-ognizes this theological truth: “[I]f God is sovereign Creator, all

rights in an absolute sense are God’s” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 50).

Any reference to anymal rights “conceptualizes what is objectively

owed the Creator of animals” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 45) If we put

God back in the center of our lives, Linzey suggests, we will recognizethat “God is the source of rights, and indeed the whole debate about

animals is precisely about the rights of the Creator” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 44) For Linzey, anymals do not have rights, because “it is

not to the creature that honour is given, but to the Creator” ity 70) Theos-rights held by anymals rest on nothing less than “the

(Christian-will of God who desires that they should so live” (Christianity 75).

To distinguish which anymals have theos-rights, Linzey employs

the “spiritual continuity between man and beast” (Christianity 78) He

focuses on three specific criteria: spirit, flesh, and blood He refers

to Ecclesiastes 3:19–22, which is “unambiguous about the spirit ofanimals; the issue is not whether humans have something which ani-mals do not, but whether the spirit of either will survive death”

(Christianity 78) He also quotes Joel 2:28: “I will pour out my spirit

on all flesh” (Christianity 78) Joel links spirit to flesh, and Linzey

notes that the divine covenant of Genesis 9 was with “every livingcreature of all flesh” (Gen: 9:15) (Christianity 79) He then turns to

Leviticus 17:11 to connect flesh with blood: “[T]he life of the flesh

is in the blood” (Christianity 79) Linzey notes prohibitions against

spilling blood and against consuming blood Flesh, which containsblood, is common to human beings and anymals, both of which alsohave spirit Finally, Linzey notes that Jesus became flesh, “enteringinto a relationship of solidarity with all creatures of flesh and blood”

(Christianity 79).

Linzey admits that this does not provide a “watertight distinctionbetween the life of humans and animals on the one hand, and the

life of vegetables and insects on the other” (Christianity 80) Nonetheless,

the criteria of spirit, flesh, and blood certainly make clear a host ofanymals that do have theos-rights These anymals are selected because

through his covenant God elects creatures of flesh and blood into arelationship with himself and humanity God pours out his Spirit uponthem While, therefore, all living things have value to God, the elec-tion of Spirit-filled creatures, composed of flesh and blood, gives themwhat we may call ‘inherent value’ by virtue of their capacity to respond

to him (Linzey, Christianity 80)

Linzey concludes that “the spiritual capacity of animals” gives “them

a status beyond that of cabbages and greenfly” (Christianity 81) Linzeyhighlights particular anymals as having theos-rights because scripture

indicates that “God especially values them” (Christianity 83).

Recognizing the danger inherent in excluding aspects of creation,Linzey notes that he may now be accused of “mammalocentricity”rather than “anthropocentricity,” and cautions,

[W]hile we make a special case for Spirit-filled individuals as bearers

of theos-rights, we hold equally that all living beings are subjects ofvalue [A]ll created life has some claim upon us and that respectfor life—including slugs, snails, and earthworms, remains a clear duty .[W]e regard mammalian and bird life as especially valuable as bear-ers of Spirit-filled life, that in no way detracts from the fundamentalvalue of all other creatures And what is more, we must always be

open to the possibility that we are wrong (Christianity 85)

Linzey notes that “theos-rights” translates into “worth” for anymals

“All creation, large and small, intelligent and unintelligent, sentient

and non-sentient has worth because God values it” (Linzey, Christianity 9)

and in the last analysis, whatever is under the whole heaven is God’s.Linzey finds value in every aspect of creation because it was created

by “divine generosity”; “To affirm the blessedness of creation is toaffirm an independent source of its worth [A]ll creation has an

irreducible value” (Linzey, Christianity 8).

What does this mean in practical terms? Linzey asserts that what

we owe God through theos-rights is that we “value what God hasgiven” as highly as each of those living beings values their own life

(Christianity 87) For each living being its life is infinitely precious—

the same is true of a Jamaican black calf being raised for humanconsumption and a short-tailed chinchilla, now endangered becausehumans have been wearing chinchilla fur Each creature finds itsown life worthy of protection and preservation, whether a dove or

a dromedary Accepting theos-rights requires that we change how

we presently treat these anymals This will require sacrifice, but ispart of our duty as stewards who exemplify “the sacrificial nature

of lordship as revealed in Christ” (Christianity 87, 96) Theos-rights

demand that Christians exercise power only towards God’s end

of their Creator’s right Animals can be wronged because their Creator

can be wronged in his creation” (Linzey, Animal Theology 27).

2 Covenant

Linzey reminds readers that the biblical covenant of Genesis 9 is

between God and all of creation Scripture regarding this divine covenant

is no less than redundant in emphasizing that God’s agreement is

with all creatures:

Then God said to Noah and to his sons with him, “As for me, I amestablishing my covenant with you and your descendants after you,and with every living creature that is with you, the birds, the domes-tic animals, and every animal of the earth with you, as many as cameout of the ark I establish my covenant with you, that never againshall all flesh be cut off by the waters of a flood, and never againshall there be a flood to destroy the earth.” God said, “This is thesign of the covenant that I make between me and you and every liv-ing creature that is with you, for all future generations: I have set mybow in the clouds, and it shall be a sign of the covenant between meand the earth When I bring clouds over the earth and the bow isseen in the clouds, I will remember my covenant that is between meand you and every living creature of all flesh; and the waters shallnever again become a flood to destroy all flesh When the bow is inthe clouds, I will see it and remember the everlasting covenant betweenGod and every living creature of all flesh that is on the earth.” Godsaid to Noah, “This is the sign of the covenant that I have establishedbetween me and all flesh that is on the earth.” (Gen 9:8–17)Five times this biblical passage asserts that God’s Genesis 9 covenantincludes “every living creature,” perhaps indicating that this inclu-

sion is of particular importance It is not written that the covenant was made between God and people about the rest of creation Rather, scripture informs us that God established a covenant with all created life For the purposes of God’s covenant, “humankind and animal-kind are so integrally related they cannot really be separated” (Linzey,

After 22)