In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 3 pps

Singer, Practical 12–13 While a utilitarian position may be reached by universalizing interest, Singer is clear that self-interest should not guide morality.Singer asserts that reason is

lives of many people in jeopardy Regan’s discussion of “innocent

threats” deals with situations where moral patients harm moral agents,but he offers no indication that dangerous but innocent moral agentsmight not also be killed to protect moral agents and moral patients.People are often ignorant of the damage they do, but humans, more

than any other animal, endanger life To eliminate every other species when they pose an innocent threat, but not to eliminate humans in

comparable situations, would be inconsistent and speciesist

The vast majority of Western hunters kill for recreation They killbecause they consider hunting a worthwhile and enjoyable way tospend time and because they (or someone they know) eats dead any-mals Few acknowledge (or even consider) that killing anymals forfood is completely unnecessary for their survival, and that such “sport”causes tremendous hardship and harm to other living beings (In

fact, hunters usually assert that they do their victims a favor !) Thus

hunters needlessly endanger and destroy thousands of anymals everyyear, and may be said to do so innocently (out of ignorance) Regan’s

“innocent threats” clause justifies the killing of rabid foxes that mightbite (out of fear or in self-defense) Consistency requires that his the-ory also permit the killing of ignorant—and therefore “innocent”—human beings who habitually and unnecessarily slaughter innocent

anymals To eliminate other species when they pose an innocent threat, but not to eliminate humans in comparable situations, is inconsistent.

b Loss of Innocence

Regan asserts that those who have lost innocence through unjust actions

“have no grounds to complain if we override their right not to be

harmed and spare the victims of their past injustice” (Case 323).

Injustices borne by some grant these beleaguered individuals leges above those who perpetrate such injustices

privi-He asserts, “Those who forge, as well as those who perpetuateinjustice are not on the same moral footing as their innocent victims”

(Case 323) Morality requires us to take into consideration “past tices some have had to bear” (Case 323) “Those who are parties to

injus-such injustice lose the protection the miniride and worse-off principlesprovide and have no just grounds to complain if we override theirright not to be harmed and spare the victims of their past injustice”

(Case 323) This assertion has yet more counterintuitive implications.

As noted, Regan posits a lifeboat with four humans and one dog

vying for space If one being must go overboard, Regan concludesthat the dog ought always and perpetually to go overboard Thisassertion is not consistent with Regan’s Rights View with regard toloss of innocence If consistently applied, how would Regan’s view

on “loss of innocence” affect these hapless sea-bound citizens?Regan notes that “animal agriculture, as we know it, is unjust”

(Case 394) He writes, “Those who support current animal agriculture

by purchasing meat have a moral obligation to stop doing so” (Case

394) He also notes that any hardship the anymal industries sufferdue to a lack of economic support from conscientious objectors isirrelevant because “their voluntary participation in that business sig-nals that they waive the right not to be made worse off if the busi-

ness fails” (Case 394) In other words, the injustice of their acts toward

cattle and pigs, chickens and turkeys, removes them from equal moralfooting with others who are comparatively innocent Similarly, thosewho continue to buy the bodies of slaughtered anymals in prefer-ence to eating rice with vegetables lose their equal moral footing bywillfully choosing to exploit and destroy others

It is reasonable to assume that Regan would make a similar tion about any common yet unnecessary human exploitation of any-mals, from attending circuses to buying cosmetics tested on anymals.All human beings engaged in these practices, who support these mar-kets, harm innocent victims exploited by these markets People whoengage in such acts have a moral obligation to change behavior thatdoes not respect these subjects-of-a-life Such consumers jeopardizetheir innocence

asser-Determining “loss of innocence” in Regan’s Rights View requiresscrutiny to discover whether or not individuals have willfully exploitedothers and gained through such choices Indeed, according to Regan,those who capitalize on anymal agriculture have gained from harm-

ful exploitation (Case 394) Those who support these industries and

perpetuate such injustices are also guilty Flesh and dairy–eaters,leather and fur–wearers, and those who have used other subjects-of-a-life for science projects—as well as any and all individuals whosupport these actions—have jeopardized their otherwise equal right

not to be harmed If even one of the humans on the lifeboat has

been eating bits of bodies, bodies that once shared equal inherentvalue and the equal right not to be harmed in Regan’s Rights View,

then the dog will certainly not be first overboard On the contrary,

loss of innocence for at least one of the four lifeboat-clinging humans

is almost certain As it turns out, the dog is the least likely to be

thrown overboard

Furthermore, Regan clearly asserts that anymals are always innocent moral patients Consequently, dogs (birds, cats, snakes, and any other anymal) cannot ever jeopardize their chance for a spot on the lifeboat

by loss of innocence Meanwhile, powerful, exploitative humans arealmost always guilty of treating anymals as if they did not have equalinherent value—thereby forfeiting a place on the raft to their inno-cent victims—other animals In any and all scenarios, humans arelikely to have jeopardized their innocence in relation to—and withregard to—other species, while anymals always remain inherentlyinnocent Contrary to Regan’s conclusion, if those on a lifeboat arechucked overboard one by one, preserving those who have not

suffered a “loss of innocence,” the survivor will almost surely be the dog.

Though Regan does not discuss where this duty begins or ends,

or the difficulty of determining exactly when such rights are lated, he offers clear guidelines for action:

vio-A slave-trader does not do what is right by supplying his client with

a promised slave, and he has no valid moral duty to do so, despitehis promising [P]romises made in the name of the perpetuation ofthis institution are morally null and void The same is true regardingsociety’s ‘contract’ with science and the supposed duty of scientists tocarry out their end of the agreement by harming some animals so thatothers, both humans and animals, might benefit This “contract” has

no moral validity, according to the Rights View, because it fails totreat lab animals with the respect they are due [S]cience thatroutinely harms animals in pursuit of its goals is morally corrupt,because unjust at its core, something that no appeal to the “contract”

between society and science can alter (Case 390)

Regan’s obligation to defend is clear on two counts:

• Every moral agent is obligated to liberate subjects-of-a-life

• Moral agents are justified in breaching accepted moral standardsand laws in the process of liberating subjects-of-a-life from unjustpractices

According to Regan a moral agent is obligated to break contracts andignore laws in order to fight against the meat industry, or to thwartthe use of anymals in science Regan also indicates that people arejustified in forcing change on those who harm others: “If Heatherviolates the rights of those she cooks and eats when she cooks andeats them, then she has no grounds to complain that we violate her

rights by stopping her” (Case 334) We are permitted to violate

Heather’s rights in order to prevent her from eating the flesh ofother subjects-of-a-life

Regan is unclear where these moral obligations begin and end,

or how far they might carry one along the path of civil ence Consequently, the possibilities are somewhat daunting Are weobligated to unchain our neighbor’s dog? Must we forcefully liberatebattery hens or free-range hens? Does morality require us to engage

disobedi-in guerrilla tactics to set loose laboratory and zoo anymals? Beyondmajor lifestyle changes, is political activism enough, or must we step

in on behalf of every black Angus bull and Barbary ape, every pinkriver dolphin and rock wallaby, every buff-faced pigmy parrot andtabby cat whose rights are violated?

Perhaps Regan accepts all of these obligations If he does not, herisks inconsistency; if he does, he invites chaos The latter is philo-sophically acceptable; the former is not

d Special Considerations

Regan asserts that “the moral bonds between family members andfriends [are] a special consideration that justifiably can override theotherwise binding application of the miniride and worse-off principles”

(Case 316) Through these “special considerations,” Regan justifies

protecting a familiar and preferred human at the greater expense of

a stranger simply because “it is those closest to us whom we stand

to help or harm most, and they, us” (Case 316) Regan argues that

“the relationships between friends and loved ones are special” (Case

317) and therefore impartiality cannot be expected—impartiality is

not preferred Without this “special considerations” clause, Reganwrites, one might be required to “spare the stranger at the expense

of our loved one And that is counterintuitive” (Case 315).

Regan specifically protects basic rights from being toppled for cial considerations.” While no subject-of-a-life can be denied a right

“spe-to life, based on Regan’s special considerations clause, they can be

denied access to goods or opportunities due to personal relations.Consequently, Regan’s special interest clause threatens impartial appli-cation of the Rights View

Yet Regan’s special consideration clause seems to feed into thehand of self-interest:

[L]ove relations are relations of self-interest, though deep ones It is

important to you that you choose that man or that woman, as friend, lover, spouse; that you are the parent of that child; and so for many other such cases —you care for them more If moral relations are

generated essentially by rational agents promoting their own considered, long-run interests, these cases make sense (Narveson, “On

well-a Cwell-ase” 36)

Self-interest is often at odds with morality Clauses providing for cial considerations have frequently been used in just such a self-inter-ested manner—most infamously to defend racism, sexism, andspeciesism Feelings of attachment are often stronger between fam-ily members—and between human beings—than they are betweenstrangers—or between species (Orlans 20) If we allow special con-siderations, as Regan does, human beings are apt to be granted spe-

spe-cial considerations over and above anymals (Rollin 43) and perhaps certain powerful individuals will gain special moral status over other human beings:

If it is permissible to have special regard for family or neighbours, whynot one’s fellow species-members? The problem with this way of think-ing is that there are lots of groups to which one naturally belongs,and these group-memberships are not always (if they are ever) morallysignificant The progression from family to neighbour to species passesthrough other boundaries on the way—through the boundary of race,

for example (Rachels, Created 184)

How will Regan define “friend” and “family” in order to preventracists and bigots from seeking advantages for those nearest anddearest? It does not logically follow that natural feelings, just because

we have them, ought to be the basis of moral obligation Regan’s

special interests clause can be used to legitimize any and all specialinterests: speciesism, racism, and sexism.

Regan seems to include this protective clause to prevent unsavorypossibilities such as fathers neglecting their children to help moreneedy street urchins, or soldiers at war who might abandon com-rades to help the wounded from across the lines

Regan states that such actions are counterintuitive because theydeny fundamental bonds His point is worth considering It is impor-tant to remember that philosophers most often seek ideals, even ifthese ideals are considered extreme, and that utopian visions ofphilosophers have had a tremendous impact on our present world

To explore Regan’s special considerations clause, it seems useful to

visualize a utopian world with no special considerations.

In a completely egalitarian world each of us would deal with one else in the same manner We would impartially help whoeverwas in the greatest danger—as we would do with our own lovedones In times of crises we would make decisions via “moral triage,”helping those most in need rather than tending our loved ones firstand foremost Yes, fathers would leave their children temporarily,when necessary, in order to help other children who were moreneedy And soldiers would cross the lines to help more seriouslywounded on the other side—in fact there would be no “sides,” and

every-no “soldiers.” Whoever was most in need would gain aid regardless of gender, race, family membership, or species While we could all continue to havespecial people in our individual lives, we would not favor these peo-ple in ways that allowed others to suffer greater harms Such anarrangement would end the very possibility of war and famine in aworld of plenty Is such a state of affairs really so bad? This visionseems neither counterintuitive nor negative, but in many ways eth-ically ideal

Conclusion

Regan’s Rights View, especially as revealed in his lifeboat scenario,

is sometimes inconsistent with his overall intent Theoretical problemsexperienced in the extremes of lifeboat scenarios cannot harm thesolid core of Regan’s work: His Rights View effectively exposes themoral inconsistency of offering rights exclusively to human beingswhile denying even the most basic rights to anymals If one accepts

human rights, in the absence of a morally relevant distinction betweencertain other mammals and human beings, Regan convincingly arguesfor a broader category of rights holders.

Regan’s Rights View is detailed and far reaching He provides athorough and solid ground on which to base anymal rights, and heincludes detailed criteria to offer guidance in diverse situations Regan’sgroundbreaking theory is a monumental philosophical achievement.The Rights View remains the most systematic and comprehensiveanymal rights theory to date

PETER SINGER: UTILITARIAN PROTECTIONISM

A Singer’s Utilitarian Theory

Peter Singer’s philosophy on which lives should be sustained andprotected has been one of the most controversial topics in recentdecades He is perhaps the best known contemporary philosopherand has found an audience for his controversial work even amongthose who do not study philosophy But Singer is not an advocate

of animal rights, nor does he qualify as a bunny hugger—his firstlove was not Fluffy or Spot, but philosophy Singer’s studies led him

to utilitarianism, and this is where his protectionist work began.Singer realized the implications of utilitarian theory for animals—philosophical consistency required him to include anymals in his util-itarian moral theory He was not interested in “pets,” but first andforemost in philosophical consistency, which called his attention toanymals His work began to focus on ending oppression and exploita-tion, on reducing suffering in the world—all oppression and exploita- tion, all suffering (Singer, Writings 22) Toward this end, he wrote Animal Liberation, which extends utilitarianism to include anymals based

on equal consideration of interests and sentience

1 Utilitarianism

Consequentialist moral theories claim that the morality of an action

is determined by the consequences of that act One ought to act insuch a way as to bring about the greatest utility, to produce thegreatest good

Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals They assessactions by the extent to which they further these goals The best-known, though not the only, consequentialist theory is utilitarianism.The classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces as much

or more of an increase in the happiness of all affected by it than any

alternative action, and wrong if it does not (Singer, Practical 3)

Utilitarianism does not necessarily require that an action producethe greatest good for the greatest number, as is commonly assumed.Utilitarians generally agree that to achieve the greatest good it issometimes necessary to harm the greatest number For instance, thismight be done in order to avoid more severe harm to a minority:

If there are ten cannibals salivating over a small child, most tarians would agree that the greatest number (the ten cannibals)ought to suffer the unhappiness of thwarted desire, so that the smallchild might live

utili-There are a handful of utilitarian theories, such as classical, rule,and preference utilitarianism, each of which uses a different methodfor assessing what acts yield the best consequences Classical utili-tarians, sometimes called hedonistic utilitarians (such as John StuartMill), measure utility in terms of maximizing pleasure and mini-mizing pain Rather than weigh pleasures over pains on a case-by-case basis, rule utilitarians assert that rules can be established andthen applied in a host of similar situations

Peter Singer is a preference utilitarian Preference utilitarianism

“judges actions, not by their tendency to maximize pleasure or imize pain, but by the extent to which they accord with the pref-erences of any beings affected by the action or its consequences”

min-(Singer, Writings 133) Singer determines preferences through

inter-ests In his view a person’s interests are “what, on balance and afterreflection of all the relevant facts, a person prefers” (Singer, Writings133) His moral theory determines the best consequences of an actionvia the satisfaction of preferences rooted in interests

Like utilitarian philosophers before him, Singer asserts that we areinterested in our own personal welfare; we have a “natural concern

that [our] own interests be looked after” (Practical 12) Some moral

theorists contend that it is “unreasonable to expect people to follow

rules that have no basis in their interests, their reasons” (Narveson, Moral 16) Preference utilitarianism capitalizes on the basic fact thateach of us has desires; we wish to satisfy our own personal prefer-ences Universalizing this interest, and applying reason, leads to apreference utilitarian theory by

recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply becausethey are my own, than the interests of others In place of my owninterests, I now have to take account of the interests of all those affected

by my decision This requires me to weigh up all these interests andadopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of

those affected Thus I must choose the course of action which has thebest consequences, on balance, for all affected This is a form of util-itarianism It differs from classical utilitarianism in that ‘best conse-quences’ is understood as meaning what, on balance, furthers theinterests of those affected, rather than merely what increases pleasure

and reduces pain (Singer, Practical 12–13)

While a utilitarian position may be reached by universalizing interest, Singer is clear that self-interest should not guide morality.Singer asserts that reason is compatible with preference utilitarian-ism and that reason ought to guide morality; “reason is not subor-

self-dinate to self-interest” (Practical 69) Morality requires us to determine

a moral course of action through reason; we ought to “assess themoral claims of those affected by our actions independently of our

feelings for them” (Singer, Practical 67) Rational thought and

uni-versalizing self-interest lead naturally to utilitarianism: self-interestedactions become group oriented in order to achieve the greatest goodfor all those affected

is often quoted by protectionists: “The question is not, Can they

rea-son? nor Can they talk? but, Can they su ffer?” (Bentham Ch XVIII,

Sec 1)

Bentham argued that because anymals have the capacity to feel pain,they ought to be morally considerable While we cannot with legitimatereason discount interests or preferences based on one’s hair color,

IQ , or length of toes, we need not be concerned with those who

have no interests, no preferences whatsoever Any being that can suffer will almost always have an interest in not suffering, Singer notes, and

if we are to bring about the greatest utility, the best consequences

for all concerned, we must take this preference, this personal interest

into account

Consequently, Singer’s utilitarian scales weigh suffering and need—interests and preferences Singer asserts that the ability to suffer is

essential to having preferences, which stem from sentience (Practical

50) A piece of coal cannot have interests or preferences because itcannot suffer An armadillo, on the other hand, has a central nervous

system, can su ffer, and has a strong tendency to prefer not to suffer.

Interests are a morally relevant criterion that is not racist, sexist, orspeciesist Singer concludes, “If a being suffers, there can be no moraljustification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration”

(Practical 50).

For Singer, “at least in our present state of knowledge,” only mals with a central nervous system are morally considerable (Singer,Unpublished; Singer, “Animals” 244) He concludes, the preferences

ani-of any being with a central nervous system, the preference ani-of anybeing that might be affected by a given action, ought to be taken into

account when making a moral determination (Singer, Practical 12).

a Equal Consideration of Interests

Singer’s theory does not demand equal treatment for all sentient

creatures, but it does require equal consideration of interests.

Many philosophers admire utilitarianism for its “unity, its ity to adjudicate non-arbitrarily between all competing moral claims”(Lockwood, “Singer” 158) In a world of human failings—prejudiceand selfishness—there is much to be said for the egalitarian approach

capac-of utilitarianism “Much capac-of classical utilitarianism’s moral force isdue to its scrupulous impartiality”; there is no room to disregardinterests “on the grounds of race, sex, species, or intellect” (Pluhar

181) Equal consideration of interests does not take account of my

interests, or the interests of Australians, or of whites Equal eration of interests requires us to move beyond personal or sectionalpoints of view to take into account the interests of all those who will

consid-be affected “True scales favor the side where the interest is stronger

or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number ofsimilar interests; but they take no account of whose interests they

are weighing” (Singer, Practical 19).

Singer insists that each individual carry no more weight than anyother; each individual counts for one and nobody counts for morethan one The interests of any one individual are no more or less

important than the interests of any other (Singer, Animal 5) Equal

consideration of interests provides a basic principle of equality for

Singer (Singer, Practical 19).

From this point of view race is irrelevant to the consideration of ests; for all that counts are the interests themselves To give less con-sideration to a specified amount of pain because that pain was

inter-experienced by a black would be to make an arbitrary distinction.Why pick on race? Why not on whether a person was born in a leapyear? Or whether there is more than one vowel in her surname? Allthese characteristics are equally irrelevant to the undesirability of pain

from the universal point of view (Singer, Practical 19–20)

It is sentience that matters in Singer’s utilitarian scales The severity

of a pain “depends on how intense it is and how long it lasts, butpains of the same intensity and duration are equally bad, whether

felt by humans or animals” (Practical 54) All sentient creatures have

an interest in avoiding pain, and this preference is no less morallyimportant in other sentient species than it is among human beings

To disregard sentience interests of those that don’t happen to belong

to our particular species, according to Singer, is as irrational as ing the sentience interests of people from other races, age groups,

ignor-or religions Drawing a line concerning what constitutes a legitimate

interest not to be harmed between Homo sapiens and anymals is

arbi-trary and speciesist “Pain and suffering are bad and should be vented or minimized, irrespective of the race, sex, or species of thebeing that suffers” (Practical 54)

pre-Equal consideration of interest requires us to ignore species and

aptitude Equal consideration of interests “implies that our concernfor others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abil-

ities they possess” (Regan, Animal 155) For example, if we are

will-ing to use canines, felines, and nonhuman primates in hope ofdiscovering new medical cures, then we also ought to be willing touse human beings that are similar in morally relevant ways, such asseverely and irreversibly brain-damaged people whom no one wouldmiss Singer concludes that people “show bias in favor of their ownspecies whenever they carry out an experiment on nonhuman ani-mals for purposes that they would not think justified them in usinghuman beings at an equal or lower level of sentience, awareness,

sensitivity, and so on” (Singer, Practical 59).

[ T ]he fact that some people are not members of our race does notentitle us to exploit them, and similarly the fact that some people areless intelligent than others does not mean that their interests may bedisregarded [ T ]he fact that beings are not members of our speciesdoes not entitle us to exploit them, and similarly the fact that otheranimals are less intelligent than we are does not mean that their inter-

ests may be disregarded (Practical 49)

Singer accepts that no two individuals are equal in their particularabilities, or in the nature of their individual interests, but argues thatsimilar interests ought to be weighed equally Races, genders, and agegroups show different aptitudes, propensities, interests—as do species:

“[E]quality is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact”

(Practical 18) Each individual, and each species is different, but they

all have interests, and equal interests ought to be treated equally

We should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does notdepend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similarmatters of fact Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion offact There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a fac-tual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference inthe amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and inter-ests The principle of the equality of human beings is not a descrip-tion of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription

of how we should treat humans (Singer, “All” 152)

There are no morally relevant differences, in Singer’s view, betweenraces, genders, or species where suffering is concerned This is not

to say that there are no morally relevant differences between one

species and another, only that species itself does not qualify as a morally

relevant difference where sentience and suffering, and the preference

to avoid suffering, are concerned

It is acceptable for one to make moral decisions based on species—

in fact we must do so For instance, a young red-toothed shrewstranded on a street-corner in New York City and a young Italianboy stranded on the same corner have very different needs, whichcorrespond with different moral duties Equal treatment might indi-cate that the Good Samaritan take both to a distant meadow andturn them loose Only the shrew would benefit from such a well-intentioned sense of equality This scenario, like most moral dilem-mas, requires different actions for different individuals in order tobring about the best consequences

A Nubian burro need not be guaranteed employment, an elf owlneed not be offered the right to a fair trial, and comatose patients

do not need an exercise pen Most of us, if we were trying to findjust one parent for a tiny, orphaned girl, would choose a female

Homo sapiens Such a choice is based on considerations of both speciesand sex, but it is not morally reprehensible Genders, age groups,races, and species all have different needs, interests, and preferences.Absolute equality is neither appropriate nor desirable Certain moraldistinctions—those based on morally relevant criteria—are legitimate

even if based purely on gender or species; moral decisions based onspecies are only rejected if not based on morally relevant distinc-tions There are many morally relevant differences between humans

and anymals, between each species, and it is perfectly legitimate for

such differences to lead to a variety of different moral obligations.Such different needs are not only true between species, but betweenindividuals of the same species Men have special needs—such asregular checkups for prostate cancer Young people have differentnutritional needs than older people Each individual has her ownparticular set of interests, every one unique, which must be givenequal consideration

This does not mean that all individuals must be given an equalchance to fulfill their particular interests “Not all interests are equallycompelling, as when one person on a date may desire casual sexand the other may not In such a situation it would be wrong tothink that an unbiased evaluation of the competing interests makes

it a standoff ” (Finsen 183) Similarly, a leghorn chicken’s desire tolive out the full extent of her life is more important than a humanbeing’s desire to taste the flesh of a dead leghorn chicken “Not allinterests are equal, nor are all equally important to the individualholding them” (Finsen 183) Certain interests are legitimately givengreater weight than others

Equal consideration of interests requires moral agents to take tience and preferences into account when making ethical decisions,rather than make decisions based merely on species “The basic prin-ciple of equality is equality of consideration and equal consider-ation for different beings may lead to different treatment” (Regan,

sen-Animal 150) Absolute equality is neither necessary nor appropriate.Instead, Singer’s utilitarian theory requires equal consideration of

interests

3 Mental Capacity

[M]any people’s ideas of morality, however diverse and however tantly extended to non-human species, centres ultimately on someaspect of what they perceive to be their “minds” or absence of them,such as whether they can think or feel or are aware of what they aredoing (M S Dawkins 6)

reluc-Mental capacities are relevant in Singer’s theory because he maintainsthat certain mental abilities sometimes influence capacity for suffering

He notes that entities with self-awareness, entities that can foresee

misery, will have mental anxiety in addition to physical suffering Forexample, a woman who knows she is dying and will leave unfinishedengineering plans—over which she has labored for decades—willmost likely experience anxiety over her unfinished work in addition

to any suffering she might experience from her slow demise A spined porcupine does not suffer such scholarly anxieties Both theengineer and the porcupine would experience the physical pain ofdisease and dying, but Singer concludes that only human beings

thin-suffer additional psychological anxieties from unfinished tasks.Singer adds that while self-awareness affects levels of suffering, it

does not always increase suffering Sometimes a broader

understand-ing can decrease misery (Sunderstand-inger, Practical 3) For instance, an injured

long-tailed weasel, taken from the side of the road for medical care,would have greater fear and stress when handled by medics thanwould a human subject The attention of a medic helps alleviate thefears of suffering people, but not the suffering of a wild animal

In Singer’s view certain mental capacities (such as the ability toexperience terror, dread, and self-awareness) are the basis of a morallyrelevant distinction; entities that suffer from the experience of terror

or anxiety prefer not to do so Singer cautions, this does not meanthat those with higher mental capabilities have a greater claim tomoral consideration First, a preference for avoiding terror must begiven equal consideration with other similar preferences Second, notall human beings are equally protected by this morally relevant dis-tinction For instance, inasmuch as it takes a certain mental capac-ity to feel anxiety or terror, human infants and some mentally disabledpeople do not experience these feelings, while many anymals do Ifmental abilities are morally relevant, Singer asserts that justice andconsistency require people to accept that some humans fall outsidethis protected category, while individuals from other species qualifyand ought to be offered due protection

4 Death and Killing

While similar in many other respects, Singer differs radically fromRegan on the issue of death and suffering Singer asserts that theethics involved in killing are “much more complicated” than themorality of inflicting suffering (Singer, Animal 228) For Singer, pain

is pain, but the harm of death is relative to the entity that is killed

and the method used to bring about an untimely death Singer arguesthat taking certain lives quickly and painlessly neither harms nor helpsthose killed, and such killing is therefore not morally reprehensible:

A rejection of speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equalworth It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being,capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complexacts of communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of abeing without these capacities To see the difference between the issues

of inflicting pain and taking life, consider how we would choose withinour own species If we had to choose to save the life of a normalhuman being or an intellectually disabled human being, we wouldprobably choose to save the life of a normal human being; but if wehad to choose between preventing pain in the normal human being

or the intellectually disabled one—imagine that both have receivedpainful but superficial injuries, and we only have enough painkiller forone of them—it is not nearly so clear how we ought to choose The same

is true when we consider other species The evil of pain is, in itself, affected by the other characteristics of the being who feels the pain; thevalue of life is affected by these other characteristics (Animal 20–21)

un-Singer holds that the life of a “self-aware being” in effect has greater

“value” than the life of a creature that does not hold this desirablequality More specifically, Singer asserts that it is a greater wrong

to kill a being that does not wish to be killed A self-aware beinghas an interest in a continued life that cannot be shared by a beingthat does not have self-awareness While both may suffer equallyfrom any given pain, a self-aware being suffers more through deathbecause that being prefers continued existence

Singer notes that this is not a speciesist division—severely damaged humans are not aware of their own being, while some non-human primates exhibit self-awareness Anymals evidence such mentalfaculties in varying degrees When asked who she saw in the mir-

brain-ror, the chimpanzee, Washoe, replied, “Me, Washoe” (Singer, Practical

94) Because self-awareness runs across species (as indicated by Washoeand other nonhuman primates), self-awareness is not species specificand is therefore not a speciesist criteria If mental abilities such asself-awareness are morally relevant, as Singer assumes, some humansfall outside this protected category Justice and consistency requirethat all who qualify as self-aware—primates and otherwise—be offereddue protection

Singer is a preference utilitarian For Singer, moral standing is rooted

in having interests; interests are the basis of individual preferences

He rejects actual equality in favor of equal consideration of interests.

Singer states that species is morally irrelevant when pain and sufferingare involved He maintains that like interests ought to be treated in

a like manner and asserts that all sentient creatures have an est in avoiding harm He offers a utilitarian moral theory intent onmaximizing the satisfaction of preferences of sentient creatures.Singer’s work has helped bring protectionist philosophy—particularlyspeciesism—to the forefront of classrooms, to the mainstream media,and to audiences all over the Western world Singer is perhaps themost widely known contemporary philosopher, largely due to hisongoing, controversial work in the field of ethics and anymals

inter-B Discussion

Utilitarianism, based on pleasures and pains, is at the root of thesimplicity that has made Singer’s work popular, but utilitarianismentails difficult philosophic problems Two common objections toSinger’s work seem unfounded, but serious problems do arise in hisutilitarian theory, including practicability, expendability, and Singer’suse of sentience and mental capacity His objections to speciesism,however, stand

1 Common Concerns

a Asserting New Boundaries

Singer’s theory rejects common, species-based distinctions Opponentsask, “Where does sentience begin?” Which beings can legitimately

be considered self-aware? If we manage to include every humanbeing under our ethical canopy—including one born without anybrain at all—can interests be the final criterion?

Singer admits that drawing a line at the boundaries of sentience

is difficult He does not answer these questions Instead, he notesthat we are keeping brain-dead humans alive on expensive hospitalmachines while denying freedom of movement, adequate nutrition,mother’s care, and life itself to otherwise healthy, sentient anymals

He concludes that the pressing question is not where to draw a newline, but how to begin the process of uprooting extant speciesist atti-

tudes and actions Drawing new lines will be a relevant concern atsome point in the future—but it is not relevant in light of today’sflagrantly speciesist practices Singer’s response seems rational andreasonable in light of the current situation for anymals in Westerncultures in contrast with our treatment of human life.

b Devaluing Human Life

Singer’s critics accuse him of being willing to sacrifice mentally

deficient, helpless human infants to the cause of science, rather than fully sentient, functional “laboratory” anymals But Singer statesplainly: “[ T ]he aim of my argument is to elevate the status of ani-mals rather than to lower the status of any humans I wouldlike our conviction that it would be wrong to treat mentally defectivehumans in this way to be transferred to non-human animals at sim-ilar levels of self-consciousness and with similar capacities for suffering”

Those who object to Singer’s work on the grounds that it ues human life are, in truth, simply restating their objection to the

deval-fact that Singer’s work values the lives of animals—all of them,

LaMancha goats, common snipe, human beings, and the Barbarylion (had this largest of lions not been crowded out of its habitatand hunted to extinction in the last century) Singer cannot legiti-mately be accused of devaluing human life

2 Problems Associated with Utilitarianism

a Practicability

Some philosophers favor utilitarianism for its theoretical simplicity

Utilitarianism is simple in theory, but difficult—if not impossible—toemploy

Singer fails to demonstrate the means by which his theory might

be implemented How might he conclusively determine the best sequences, based on a utilitarian assessment of pleasures and pains,

con-in any one actual situation? Applycon-ing Scon-inger’s simple utilitarian tion to any given instance is by no means simple.

equa-Can we apply utilitarian protectionist theory to determine what

we ought to do regarding the ivory trade? How do pain, suffering,loss of life, and thwarted opportunities of an African elephant orPacific walrus weigh against the incomes of assorted Africans orInuits? What of other individuals that will be affected if the tusks ofanymals are no longer available for human use, such as

• killers that kill animals and sell tusks to smugglers,

• smugglers that smuggle ivory out of the country and sell to artists,

• artists who carve tusks and sell to dealers,

• dealers who sell to shopkeepers,

• shopkeepers who sell to consumers, and

• consumers who enjoy ivory products?

Can we create and use a utilitarian calculation on the ivory trade?Does the utilitarian equation shift if the human beings cannot sur-vive without the ivory trade? What if tusks are simply cut off of alive elephant? What if detusked elephants are thereby placed at jeop-ardy? How might scales of utility accommodate the divergent inter-ests involved in such diverse possibilities?

Similarly, a shift from flesh-based to vegetable-based food tries would, in one way or another, have an impact on almost everyextant individual in the free-market economy If we consider loss ofincome, where might our assessment end? Would we consider theinterests of those who supply knives to slaughterhouses? What aboutsteelworkers (those who make knife sharpeners), and the many peo-ple employed to produce, harvest, package, store, and sell food forthese doomed pigs and chickens? What of those who provide elec-tricity to butcher shops—dam builders and maintenance crews thatsupply electricity and millions of gallons of water, to maintain cat-tle and pigs? Do we consider those who sell transport trucks? Gasstations and road workers who keep trucks on the road? Those whomight take pleasure, or suffer great pains, in watching truckloads ofsheep pass on the freeway? Must we calculate the losses to spousesand children of each business and every employee who will be affected

indus-by such a change?

Is there some way to implement utilitarian theory—with all thatmust be calculated—to answer moral questions? Perhaps one could

address the central equation first, leaving other resultant pleasures andpains (such as those of job loss) as secondary To assess the utility

of dietary choice, perhaps we should focus on calculating the amount

of pleasure gained by eating meat that would not occur if we were

to eat only vegetable dishes (Gruzalski 260) If this is the case, thecore equation is simple: meat diet versus vegetable diet

Singer does just this He focuses on primary interests: Does a flesh

or a nonflesh diet leave more interests satisfied? This approach makessense; if no one finds more satisfaction through eating flesh, it would

be pointless to perpetuate the meat industry purely for the financialneeds of those currently involved in this line of work If eating veg-etables is more compatible with interests, then we might reasonablyask what method of phasing out farms would yield the best conse-quences But if the scales of utility tip toward flesh eating, we willneed to ask what sort of anymal care and slaughter is ethically prefer-able, in which case a new utilitarian equation emerges for consideration.This process enhances understanding of key considerations

Singer weighs the pleasures and pains of eating flesh versus ing vegetables, and concludes that there is no utilitarian gain forflesh eating (“Utilitarianism” 333) Considerable evidence indicatesthat there is no health gain to be had by eating flesh (on the con-trary); nonflesh-eaters argue that there is also no culinary gain.Therefore, Singer finds no grounds on which to justify the subjuga-tion, exploitation, and slaughter of millions of anymals for a foodchoice that offers no benefits whatsoever.

eat-Using this simplified approach Singer lists the following gains ent in a vegetarian diet:

inher-• an end to excessive suffering of food-industry anymals,

• no culinary sacrifice,

• increase in grain available to feed hungry humans,

• health improvements,

• environmental benefits (“Utilitarianism” 332–34)

Singer notes that a vegetarian diet involves financial losses for thosewho gain financially from flesh industries, but he adds that this is aone-time loss and therefore easily outweighed by long-term consid-erations “Compare the indefinite prolongation of animal sufferingwith the once-only cost of a transition, and I think that as long as

we give the interests of animals equal consideration with similar human

interests, the answer is clear” (“Utilitarianism” 334) The solution,then, is to close down the flesh-production lines.

Unfortunately, what seems clear to Singer is not so clear to theflesh-eating majority How ought the preference utilitarians to pro-ceed if those weighing relevant factors on utilitarian scales disagree

on the outcome?

Focusing on the primary question—flesh diet versus nonflesh diet—

avoids a critical point: the “food-anymal” industry already exists Substitute

foods will be developed and will create “new employment and neweconomic opportunities,” but the change will be painful for many(Finsen 214) These harms cannot fairly be removed from Singer’s

utilitarian equation If the equation had been worked out before the

advent of agribusiness, Singer could reasonably focus only on dietarymatters, or world hunger, or the conditions and deaths of anymals,and it would have been clear that the anymal-killing industries oughtnever to begin However, in the early twenty-first century, this mam-moth business cannot be eliminated without creating hardship formillions Hindsight provides excellent clarity of vision, but cannoterase what already exists

Maybe individuals are sufficiently different so as to preclude parisons of interests, happiness, or suffering under any circumstances.Two people can go through identical experiences with considerably

com-different responses When my sister and I went to the doctor as dren for the same injections, the pitiful cries of my sister might leadsomeone in the waiting room to believe she was suffering much morethan I Was she? How can we know? On what grounds can we com-pare suffering across species if we cannot even compare with anycertainty the pain suffered by two sisters receiving the same medicalcare? How can we assess the pleasures of those eating a body-baseddiet against those of vegetarians? Meat eaters tend to assume thatthe pleasures of flesh eating are unique, and without a method formeasuring pleasures, who can argue with their personal preference?Few vegetarians are likely to agree that this is the case Those with

chil-a flesh-based diet who believe giving up flesh is a tremendous nary loss are not apt to give up meat long enough to offer depend-able comment on the differences People react in very different ways

culi-to similar stimuli and no one can reasonably negate another son’s experience

per-“Given the difficulty of measuring preferences, or pain and

plea-sure, in any objective fashion it is impossible to convince a tic that the overall pain caused by eating meat is greater thanthe pleasure” (Telfer 73) We each move from our own worldview:

skep-An economist is likely to argue that money makes the world goaround, while a minister is likely to believe that this function is filled

by faith, religion, and ultimately God Similarly, flesh eaters and etarians tend to view dietary choice through personal lenses Howcan subjective opinions be compared on the scales of utility?Even if we could weigh subjective opinions, there is no unit of valuewith which to calculate pleasure or pain, or preferences The effective-ness of “simple” utilitarianism is further thwarted by a lack of depend-able tools for measuring pleasure and pain (or preferences andinterests) How might Singer measure Suzie’s preference for flesh eat-ing against the society’s health interest in having citizens partake of

veg-a nonflesh diet? If we had a unit of measure to apply to this tion, we could determine once and for all which diet is more satis-factory: vegetarian or flesh But we do not have such a unit ofmeasure In the absence of an objective unit by which to measureinterests or pleasures, it is difficult to apply utilitarianism To beeffective, “there must be principles which determine how these reasonsfor and against are to be weighed” (Sprigge, “Metaphysics” 137)

equa-Moral intuition suggests to most people that loss of liberty, suffering,

and loss of life for billions of farmed anymals will always outweighloss of income or culinary pleasure—that life ought to be protectedabove economic gain or dietary pleasure But Singer does not acceptmoral intuition as a legitimate philosophical guideline (“Utilitarianism”

9, 327) (Nor are Singer’s moral intuitions likely to align with commonsentiments in Western societies!) Yet in the absence of a clearly definedunit of measure, Singer’s conclusions look very much like moral intu-itions—entirely subjective

The issue of flesh eating is comparatively straightforward Otherprotectionist issues entail more complicated epistemological questions

If we are going to use utilitarian scales in determining whether ornot to experiment on human infants, can we answer critical ques-tions? Are we able to calculate how many unwanted, orphaned infantsmight reasonably be sacrificed for the benefit of a certain number

of others? Will we be able to figure out a measurement for agonyand benefits in order to be able to tell how much agony is justifiedfor a particular quantity of benefit? How certain must we be of the

success of an experiment before we can engage in a given

proce-dure (Ryder, Animal 326)? How can we answer these questions if we

do not know the interests of each species—of each entity—and if

we have no unit of measurement?

Additionally, Singer is unable to establish a line at which tience is no longer a concern Do we need to consider the interests

sen-of earwigs? How can we be sure whether or not a horsehair wormcan suffer? If it does suffer, how might we compare its suffering in

a particular instance with the suffering of a rare and mysterious aye in a similar situation? Most people believe that there are great

aye-differences in the capacities of various anymals to experience pain,and perhaps there is How can we know what any creature, outside

of ourselves, feels? “Only God can aggregate the pains and pleasures

of others and only then if he or she can actually feel them” (Ryder,

“Painism” 203) In the absence of godlike knowledge—for many, inthe absence of God—Singer’s theory is difficult to implement.Moral dilemmas are not as straightforward or tidy as mathemat-ical equations As it turns out, we can neither experience nor mea-sure the pains or pleasures of others; we cannot weigh interests as

if they could be set on scales How can we compare them? Yetweighing harms and benefits is not entirely without value Singer’swork follows a long-standing and respected moral tradition of weigh-ing harms and benefits in order to determine what one ought to do.Each of us weighs options in life, and the interests and pleasures weattach to each Parents weigh how best to invest their resources forthe advantage of children; people weigh pleasures in spending timewith different people and choose accordingly Even Western legalsystems weigh harms and benefits For instance, the most notabledistinction between murder and attempted murder is one of harmdone The criminal is no less guilty for having failed in her attempt

to kill, yet the crime is categorized separately and tends to carry alesser punishment Why wouldn’t such criminals be punished moreharshly for being incompetent in addition to being a murderer? Becausepunishment is related to harm done, and the competent and successfulmurderer has definitely done more damage than the inept failure.Because we use the scales of utility both in our personal lives and

in our legal system, perhaps Singer’s theory will eventually reach afunctional state of institutionalized categorization with regard to harmsand benefits, at least with regard to certain situations Until such atime, however, it is difficult to employ Singer’s scales of utility

b Expendability of Life

Tom Regan criticizes Singer’s theory for failing to value life, but Singerasserts that utilitarianism maintains the value of individual lives:[U]tilitarians and others who are prepared to harm individuals willview those they are harming, along with those they are benefiting, asequally possessing inherent value They differ with Regan only in thatthey prefer to maximize benefits to individuals, rather than to restrictsuch benefits by requirement that no individual may be harmed .The principle of equal consideration of interests, which is the foun-dation of utilitarianism as well as of many other ethical views, fullysatisfies the demand that we recognize the inherent value of subjects-

of-a-life (Singer, Animal 11, 13)

Singer’s utilitarian theory ascribes an instrumental value to life Heweighs pleasures and pains to determine which action will bringabout the best consequences for all affected If the life of an ibismust hang in the balance while we determine which actions willbring about the best consequences for all affected, how can the ibis

be said to have inherent value?

Singer might argue that the best outcome for the ibis is as relevant

as the best outcome for all other individuals If her interests aregiven equal consideration, the ibis is granted inherent value—butnot absolute inherent value Absolute value protects the lives of indi-viduals first and foremost, all things being equal In Singer’s theoryeach life is valued in relative proportion to all other sentient beings.Each individual is viewed as a member of a larger group, wheretradeoffs for the greater good are permissible and desirable Singer’stheory acknowledges the “value” of sentient entities by focusing onthe reduction of pain Why would one wish to increase happiness,

or reduce suffering, if individuals have no value? Singer’s theory doesnot overtly ascribe inherent value to any one entity, yet by seekingthe best consequences for all affected, Singer offers each individual

a measure of de facto inherent value, because each entity’s interests

are considered

Individuals are expendable in Singer’s work In this sense Singer’stheory fails to value life in and of itself; he accepts the destruction

of life as a means to an end Singer’s theory indicates that it would

“be justifiable to experiment on a brain-damaged human If it reallywere possible to save several lives by an experiment that would takejust one life, and there were no other way those lives could be saved,

it would be right to do the experiment (Singer, Animal 85) For

utilitarians like Singer, who focus on the satisfaction of interests, viduals can be sacrificed for the greater good.

indi-Ethics in Western countries tend to focus on individual rights,starting with the right to life Singer’s protectionist theory does notadvocate for rights of any kind Some critics have noted Singer’sunwillingness to accept rights philosophically, as opposed to his will-ingness to employ the concept of rights in activism; some have con-sidered this a flaw in his work Singer discusses “rights,” for example,

in his work for the Great Ape Project, of which he is a foundingmember The Great Ape Project demands “the extension of the com-munity of equals to include all great apes: human beings, chim-panzees, bonobos, gorillas and orang-utans” which would requirethat moral agents “accept certain basic moral principles or rights asgoverning our relations” with these other species (“Declaration”).For some philosophers there is something suspicious about Singer’s

interest in extending moral rights to all Great Apes while admitting

that moral rights are “mysterious” (Crisp, “Teachers” 99) I was bled by this inconsistency and asked Singer in person whether ornot he thought human rights were merely a figment of human imag-ination, and if not, why he used this notion to define his Great ApeProject Singer explained that he used this term simply for the sake

trou-of expediency, to discuss the intent trou-of the Great Ape Project in monly understood language—the language of rights Westernersunquestioningly accept the existence of human rights, thereby grant-ing the existence of rights Singer added: If you do not accept thenotion of human rights, “you are more radical than I am” (Singer,Personal)

com-There is something to be said for expedience in critical matters

of applied moral philosophy In his efforts to reach as wide an ence as possible, Singer uses language that is likely to be easily under-stood (Singer, “A Response” 292) Singer does not assert the existence

audi-of rights as part audi-of his moral philosophy For some this seems gerous For Singer, self-conscious beings do not automatically have

dan-a “right to life.” Singer dan-accepts the loss of life dan-as dan-a medan-ans to dan-anend; he writes that it would “be justifiable to experiment on a brain-damaged human If it really were possible to save several lives by

an experiment that would take just one life, and there were no otherway those lives could be saved, it would be right to do the experiment”

(Singer, Animal 85) Even painful experiments on unwilling subjects

can be justified via beneficial consequences (Ryder, Animal 325) Some

do not favor such expedience

Regan objects yet more to Singer’s assertion that “killing a conscious being would be justified if this brought about the optimalaggregate balance of pleasure over pain for those affected” (Case 210).

self-(Technically, Singer’s theory is based on the outcome that brings

the best consequences for all those affected, but Singer indicates thatthe aggregate balance of pleasure over pain amounts to the samething.) Some nonutilitarians object that the goal of achieving thegreatest good for the greatest number “reduces all beings to resources”that might be used to attain this ultimate goal; “individuals can beappropriately sacrificed for the greater good” (diZerega 31) Singer’sprotectionist theory trades off the lives of some for the possible benefit

of others (Regan, “Dog” 56) In a moral theory in which killingsome members to benefit others becomes both possible and ethical,marginalized individuals are at risk

Singer’s utilitarian tendency to trade lives off, one against another,

is epitomized in his “replaceability” argument In order to maximizeutility, Singer asserts that certain individuals ought to be replaced

by entities that are better able, or more likely, to satisfy interestsand increase overall happiness The “replaceability argument” per-mits killing animals (human or otherwise) that have no conception

of themselves as existing in the future, provided such individuals lead

a pleasant life beforehand, are killed painlessly, and are replaced by

beings that will have equally pleasant lives Singer notes that thisview seems counterintuitive (especially since children and severelyretarded individuals fall into this “replaceable” category) Yet he con-cludes that such replacements maximize satisfaction of interests, andutilitarian expedience allows killing comparatively less happy or lesssuccessful individuals in order to maximize overall satisfaction ofinterests

Dale Jamieson, questioning the expendability of life, provides der for pondering replaceability He offers an example consisting oftwo parents who plan to have only a certain number of children,and who have one exceptionally miserable child He asks: Wouldnot their chances of bringing more happiness into the world behigher if they were to eliminate the misery-child and conceive another

fod-in its place? If one entity can be replaced with another that is pier, is not a moral utilitarian compelled to sacrifice the less happyfor the sake of the happier ( Jamieson, “Killing” 142–145)? (Singerwould factor in any anxiety such a moral imperative brings to par-ents of unhappy children; no doubt parents would have to be allowed

hap-to choose hap-to eliminate unhappy children for such a morality hap-to yield

utilitarian value.) Still, it is fair to ask if Singer’s theory not onlypermits but requires the death of such a misery-child.

Michael Lockwood offers another challenge to Singer’s ability argument” via the creation of a company he calls “Disposapup.”This hypothetical company breeds pups to provide pets for families

“replace-“Disposapup” also takes dogs back and disposes of them, by puttingthem painlessly to death, whether because the family wishes to go

on vacation, because their pup has grown beyond the cute and dly stage, or because the family has altogether lost interest in hav-ing a dog In the future, if the family wants a dog, “Disposapup”can give them a fresh start with a cute and cuddly puppy (Singer168) Lockwood and Jamieson demonstrate morally repugnant pos-sibilities embedded in Singer’s replaceability argument

cud-These surprising outcomes appear to stem from errors in Singer’sreasoning In “Killing Humans and Killing Animals” Singer exam-ines two utilitarian outlooks: The “total view” indicates that ethicalactions will always “increase the total surplus of pleasure over pain,irrespective of whether this is done by increasing the pleasure ofexisting beings, or increasing the number of beings who exist” (147)

In contrast, the “prior existence view” considers only the pleasureand pains of beings that already exist (Singer, “Killing” 148) Singeropts for the “total view” because he finds an inconsistency in the

“prior existence view”: “[I]f the pleasure a possible child will rience is not a reason for bringing it into the world, why is the pain

expe-a possible child will experience expe-a reexpe-ason expe-agexpe-ainst bringing it into theworld?” (Singer, “Killing” 148) Singer discounts the “prior existenceview” based on this suspicious asymmetry, and opts for the “totalview,” which leads him to the “replaceability argument.”

The asymmetry Singer notes seems to result from Singer’s ing of the question, rather than from any problem in the “prior exis-tence view.” In his discussion of the “total view,” Singer assumesthat any given life generally counts as a “pleasant life,” unless other-wise described:

word-[I]t does not seem wrong for the government of an underpopulatedcountry to encourage its people to have more children so that the pop-ulation will rise by, say, one million Yet of this million, we can besure that at least one will be thoroughly miserable If it is not wrong

to create the million, but would be wrong to create the single able being, the obvious explanation is that there is value in the cre-ation of the 999,999—or however many it will be—whose lives arehappy (“Killing” 150)

miser-Singer assumes that lives—except the minuscule quantity that areundeniably miserable—are correctly assumed to be “happy,” and aretherefore rightly brought into the world in order to bring about netutilitarian gain Bernard Rollin comments: “Most of us probably willhave more suffering in our lives than pleasure” (34) Singer assessesexistence for the vast majority of human beings, certainly for theaverage human, to be an undisputed positive/pleasure Are not themyriad sentiments of life more complicated?

It seems more reasonable to assign a neutral or mixed value tolife A not-yet-conceived entity is necessarily an unknown, but willmost likely find a mixture of both pleasure and pain throughout life.Some beings, born with diseases or mental defects, are likely to expe-rience increased suffering from medical treatments, torment in youth,exclusion from activities, and uncertain futures Concurrently, theanguish of parents, extended family, and friends is usually height-ened by the birth and life of a child that is physically or mentally

abnormal This is not to say that there is no pleasure in the life of

one born outside the norm, only that it is reasonable to assume thatthe pain ratio will be higher in the birth of an abnormal child—forthe child, the parents, and all involved

If we rewrite Singer’s conundrum, eliminating his assessment ofmost lives as an automatic (and it would seem exclusive) pleasure,the question looks very different: If the pleasure and pain a normal

child is apt to experience is not a reason for bringing it into the

world, why is the certain increased pain of a defective child a

rea-son against bringing it into the world? The question no longer appears

asymmetrical or perplexing If the anticipated mix of pleasure andpain is altered so that increased pain is expected, one might rea-sonably choose not to parent

If the average life is not erroneously calculated as exclusively sure,” Singer’s reason for rejecting the “prior existence view” (anasymmetry created by a fallacious assumption) evaporates In thiscase Singer probably would have opted for the “prior existence view,”thereby avoiding the counterintuitive conclusions of the “replace-ability argument” highlighted by Jamieson and Lockwood

“plea-Singer’s view on painless death seems equally problematic MichaelAllen Fox attacks Singer’s assumption that an individual with no sen-sation has no interests and need not be treated with any consider-ation Fox brings to light a