In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 2 pot

Human beings, who create moral guidelines for human interactionswith anymals, have vested interests, including an emotional attach-ment to themselves and to others of their kind.. In lig

40 chapter one

a particular case is engaged to be married to a man who is on trialfor theft, justice is at risk Vested interests, emotional attachment,and close affinity threaten impartiality When one is in charge ofmaking decisions that affect others, an emotional attachment to onlyone (or a portion) of those affected puts justice at risk This is not tosuggest that emotional attachment or close affinity are vices—rather,

they are virtues In contrast, complete emotional detachment is a

vice, as evidenced by psychopaths, who are a danger to animals(including humans) Emotional attachment need not cause bias in allsituations, though such an effect is highly likely

Human beings, who create moral guidelines for human interactionswith anymals, have vested interests, including an emotional attach-ment to themselves and to others of their kind Human beings have

a particular relationship with the human species over and against allother species, and are likely to have a vested interest in human life

It is not possible for Homo sapiens to move outside of this position of

bias—it is inherent However, in the interest of promoting justice,

we must strive to be impartial in spite of our vested interests andpersonal connections Since we are inherently biased, we must bewary of human assessments of other species, especially assessmentsthat elevate our own ethical standing We must critically examinethe means we use to reach conclusions and regard moral assessmentsthat favor humans as inherently suspicious

There are scores of examples of biased assessments of other species.Our first attempt to teach chimpanzees to speak is an example.Scientists concluded that chimps did not have linguistic ability, thatthey lacked the cognitive mechanisms necessary for all but the mostbasic forms of communication Noted scholars concluded that speech

is the exclusive realm of human beings, a defining characteristicshared by no other animal—and an important element in assessing

moral status It has since been discovered that chimps lack the iology for verbal speech, but communicate effectively—beyond basic

phys-communication—via sign language We are now finding that mals, such as whales, apes, dolphins, and vervet monkeys, have com-plex forms of communication (M S Dawkins 23–24, Warren 53) [Vervet] monkeys are able to pick up subtleties in their grunts thatcompletely escape the human ear To a human, a grunt is a grunt is

any-a grunt It tany-akes technologicany-al any-aids in the form of tany-ape recorders any-andsound spectrograph to show that, as far as the monkeys are concerned,

methods and terms 41there is far more to it than that We still do not fully understandwhat it is that the monkeys are responding to or exactly how theymanage to detect the differences between the grunts But do it theyclearly do, and they leave their human observers slightly baffled (M S Dawkins 23–24)

Human investigations into anymal language appear to have carried

an unspoken motive: “For a variety of economic, religious, or otherideological reasons, it has been important to many people to insist

on an unbridgeable gulf between humans and animals, and languagehas seemed the most promising instrument for achieving this” (Dupre331) Few contemporary ethicists consider language a necessary con-dition for moral standing; such an assessment is now broadly rec-ognized as a form of humanocentrism (Orlans 150)

Similar to human investigations into language, human understandings

of pain, intelligence, communication, thought, community, learningability, and ethics necessarily stem from a narrow perspective, one

gained from an inner understanding of these attributes as parts of our

lives Rene Descartes (1596–1650) is perhaps the best-known example

of a human being incapable of fairly assessing anymals He concludedthat other species could neither think nor feel (Descartes 115) Sadly,while Descartes is a particularly flagrant example, he has not proven

to be an exception to the rule: humans have concocted a plethora

of tests to assess the intelligence, ethical tendencies, and sensitivities

of anymals, with the hope and expectation of further exemplifyingthe special and preferable nature of human beings Ongoing “scientific”assessments of anymals say more about the nature of science—andabout human nature—than they do about anymals

Valuing one species over another is not consistent with scientificinformation Darwin provides no hierarchy in the evolutionary con-tinuum, no progression toward perfection, yet even in this “scientific”age, long after Darwin’s discoveries, people continue to believe thathuman beings are the most “advanced.” Concurrently, we believethat we are the most worthy of moral consideration But why should

we believe that we are radically different from anymals? All animalsexhibit adaptive behavior and have similar central nervous systems—

we are all sentient Animals, both Scandinavians and cocker spaniels,exhibit emotional responses and associate with one another in close-knit groups If anymals fall short of our expectation, then we shouldavow that people do, too

42 chapter one

[A]ny reason we have to doubt the existence of the minds of animalsalso gives us reason to doubt the existence of the minds of otherhumans We are faced with a choice between attributing mental states

to animals and solipsism or skepticism concerning other minds ally As most of us are quite ready to accept that other human beingshave minds, then we should accept that animals too have minds The brains of all multicellular animals, including human beings, aremade of the same matter The fundamental characteristics of neuronsand synapses are roughly the same [ T ]he brains of small whales,dolphins and porpoises are close in size to those of human beings, bothabsolutely and in relation to size of body

gener- gener- gener- the general truth that animal brains are anatomically similar

to our own must be accepted And this gives us reason for ing that the mental events that take place ‘within’ them are in somedegree similar to those which occur in our own brains (Crisp, “Evolution”310–12)

believ-More specifically, Dawkins argues that “we now know that thesethree attributes—complexity, thinking and minding about the world—are also present in other species The conclusion that they, too, areconsciously aware is therefore compelling” (M S Dawkins 177).Contemporary science reveals that human beings are not distinctfrom anymals in any morally relevant way, leading to the importantand inescapable conclusion that “behavioral and emotional kinshipwith nonhuman animals” indicates “moral kinship as well” (Bekoff 360) Methods of assessing cognition and cognitive abilities lack depend-ability even among human beings It is difficult to grasp how peoplemight come to understand the diverse abilities and interests, psy-chological tendencies, and mental capabilities of even one other human.How much more difficult, then, is it for them to understand andappreciate the minds and feelings of anymals? The epistemologicaldifficulties inherent in human assessments of anymals must remain

at the center of any discussion of other species and ought to per any conclusions we reach Because we have proven partial, andbecause we remain inherently partial to our own species, humanstudies of anymals cannot reasonably be assumed to be adequatelygrounded to justify moral conclusions

tem-The force and prevalence of speciesism among humans is shadowed by the history of human partiality across the categories ofrace, sex, age, and sexual orientation The assumption that all humanbeings have moral standing is a recent development Romans “didnot include in their moral community criminals, captives, foreigners,

fore-or nonhumans” (Marshal 80) When Europeans arrived in Nfore-orth

methods and terms 43America, they destroyed most of the inhabitants Only recently hasthe United States legally granted African Americans equal moralconsideration Around the world, women have been (and are) deniedequal moral consideration alongside men In light of a demonstratedhuman tendency for those in power to be partial and unjust in assess-ing the moral standing of other human beings (particularly when theassessor has a vested interest), disparaging assessments of anymals isnot surprising.

Another example of human partiality and hubris relates directly

to ethics Humans have long assumed that only the human animalhas a system of ethics In spite of modern science and the similaritiesthat we now know to exist among species, many still assume, withoutreference to empirical evidence, that only human beings are ethicalanimals Since ethics is the subject of this book, we should considerwhether or not ethics is exclusively the domain of human beings, orwhether it is a more broad and biological phenomenon of the animalworld (including humans)

A minimal definition of ethics entails a system of behavioral normsthat generate expectations of behavior and punish deviance Anymalsappear to comply with social expectations and to suffer social punish-ments for infringements For instance, the vampire bat displays “ani-mal decision-making what looks like a system of morality based

on the principle of reciprocation of favours given in the past, pled with sanctions against those that do not live up to their oblig-ations” (M S Dawkins 57) Based on observations, the same might

cou-be true of nonhuman primates, canines, equines, felines, insects, andperhaps a host of lesser observed anymals (“Inside”)

In the likely event that ethical systems are not exclusively human,two interesting possibilities arise:

• Ethics, including human ethics, might be genetically encoded

• Human ethics are but one of many ethical systems in the animalworld

If the first point is true, then what is esteemed as human ethics may

be merely biology in action E O Wilson argues that “moral ments” might be better described as “moral instincts.” If we are tounderstand “deep springs of ethical behavior,” he argues that wemust consider the “development of moral sentiments as products ofthe interactions of genes and the environment” (64) This argumentmakes moral behavior a genetic predisposition resulting from natural

senti-44 chapter one

selection, rather than a metaphysical truth to be discovered (E O.Wilson 58–59) E O Wilson concludes that ethics are “far more aproduct of autonomous evolution than has hitherto been conceded”(70) While it might prove difficult to explain all of human ethicsthrough biological analysis, Wilson’s perspective heightens awareness

of human beings as animals, not so very different from anymals If

ethics have a biological component, it would not be surprising thatour morality is partial, favoring us and our own

Evolution suggests that if human beings are moral animals by nature,

as has been supposed, other species are also likely to be geneticallywired with an ethical code, or with a tendency to have moral standardsthat permit groups of individuals to function and prosper in commu-nities If this is the case, if other species have and practice their ownforms of morality, philosophers working in ethics have a much broader

field to explore than has generally been assumed Human morality is

specifically the endeavor of human beings, but since anymals are also

ethical agents in their communities, it is important that we strive to

move outside of our narrow, human perspective of ethics to hend a larger moral sphere Like the judge with a vested interest,

compre-we cannot maintain impartiality, or adequately assess ethical principlesand ethical theories, unless we are able to envisage morality fromsomething of an “outsider’s” viewpoint (This does not indicate thatother animals, as moral agents in their own communities, are respon-

sible for righting the wrongs that human beings cause We are the

animals causing untold suffering and death to other species We are

the animals who have an ethic that speaks of the importance of

con-sistency and fail to deliver We need to critically examine our morality

and how we behave, and then change our actions to coincide withideals like consistency, justice, and compassion.)

Do genetically encoded morals justify speciesism? History suggests

that morality changes over time, and this may be related to tion Our ongoing effort to foster a more inclusive morality indicatesthat partiality need not be a permanent part of our genetic code formoral behavior If it were, then racism, sexism, ageism, and het-erosexism would be equally biological, and we could not expect tomake any moral progress toward a more impartial ethic Historyreveals that this is not the case

evolu-Inherent difficulties, epistemological and personal, indicate thatsound ethical theories are not likely to stem from common humanassumptions or standard human comparisons of themselves with any-

methods and terms 45

mals We must be diligent if we are to be impartial Moral

philoso-phers must carefully examine all assumptions and conclusions gesting that attributes are exclusively human, especially if people linksuch an attribute to moral standing It would be wise, given our

sug-partiality, to assume that basic interests across species are the same

unless proven otherwise Animals of every species maintain and tect their physical existence Even a bacterium, the simplest life form,responds to its surroundings “to preserve and protect its form”(Margulis 13, 50) Evelyn Pluhar comments:

pro-Beings who are neurologically highly similar to me, who respond incomplex, relative ways to stimuli that elicit similar responses in me,are probably conscious just as I am This is an extraordinarily stronginductive argument, fulfilling all criteria for good two-case analogicalreasoning, licensing one to infer that another, be the other human ornonhuman, is not merely a cleverly contrived “machine.” Those whoare skeptical about induction as such are, of course, not persuaded bythe argument, but they also cannot be persuaded about the existence

of their own bodies, let alone anyone else’s Short of solipsism, oneseems not to be irrational in putting one’s confidence in the argumentfrom analogy (13)

Impartiality requires us to look anew at anymals There are at leastfour reasons for assuming that anymals have the same basic inter-ests as human beings Such an assumption

• avoids inherent epistemological difficulties of assessing cognitive oremotional states external to ourselves;

• maintains consistency, granting anymals that which we grant otherhuman beings but cannot prove to be true;

• avoids partiality and bias, common flaws of assessments betweenspecies;

• is consistent with science (shared biology), which indicates that

basic interests among living entities are fundamentally the same;

• is consistent with ethology, which also indicates that basic interests

among living entities are fundamentally the same

In the absence of any established morally relevant distinction betweenall human beings and anymals, the burden of justifying differentmoral guidelines for different species lies with those who posit suchdistinctions

Partiality has proven a dangerous stumbling block in shaping humanmorality It is critical that we learn from history and not repeat the

46 chapter one

offenses of our past For instance, in the Southern United States twohundred years ago, immigrants from Europe developed and enforced

an ethical code that held only their kind to be morally considerable:

“Caucasians” were more powerful and passed laws that deprivedAfrican immigrants to the United States of basic rights that we freelygranted to immigrants from Europe

Though just one species among many, humans are no less ful with regard to anymals than Caucasians were in North America

power-in relation to African immigrants two hundred years ago Then, sions were made that hurt those of African descent, but were to theadvantage of Caucasians Today humans make decisions that affectblue-footed boobies and black-tailed deer—and the world in itsentirety—because these decisions seem to be to the advantage ofhumans But as history suggests, a biased, self-aggrandizing ethic isnot to anyone’s advantage, and neither can such an ethic establish

deci-or demonstrate human superideci-ority—on the contrary Most currentcitizens of the United States share a sense of shame at the humanmoral shortcomings associated with the slavery of Africans However,powerful slave owners had much to gain financially by assuming thatblacks were ethically irrelevant Today the same is true of the humanattitude toward and relationship with anymals

If we are to fairly assess our ethical obligations with respect toanymals, we must move beyond our narrow circle of personal, vestedinterests We have assumed that we are the only ethical animals, yet

in relation to anymals our “ethic” translates into little more than

“might makes right.” Bernard Rollin writes:

[W]hy does intelligence score highest? Ultimately, perhaps, becauseintelligence allows us to control, vanquish, dominate, and destroy allother creatures If this is the case, it is power that puts us on top ofthe pyramid But if power provides grounds for including or exclud-ing creatures from the scope of moral concern, we have essentiallyaccepted the legitimacy of the thesis that “might makes right” andhave, in a real sense, done away with all morality altogether If we

do accept this thesis, we cannot avoid extending it to people as well,and it thus becomes perfectly moral for Nazis to exterminate the Jews,muggers to prey on old people, the majority to oppress the minority,and the government to do as it sees fit to any of us Furthermore, ashas often been pointed out, it follows from this claim that if an extrater-restrial alien civilization were intellectually, technologically, and mili-tarily superior to us, it would be perfectly justified in enslaving oreating or exterminating human beings (8)

methods and terms 47

On the other hand, intelligence may also be a benefit We can useour intelligence to subjugate others or to establish a consistent moral-ity Western moral theories are capable of inspiring compassion Ourintelligence may help us to apply our complex moral outlook acrossspecies

Chapter 8 attempts the daunting task of presenting an impartialmoral theory This chapter offers an ethic in which humans areequal members in a menagerie of morally considerable animals This

is a morality in which might does not make right, and in which thevalue of life does not change according to species, race, or sex Forthe sake of impartiality, a central moral tenet, we must rigorouslyquestion “morally relevant differences” assumed to exist between

humans and anymals We should rather assume sameness because we are all animals, evolved from common ancestors, and because moral-ity requires that we strive for impartiality Where no morally rele-vant distinction can be demonstrated, we ought to extend our ethicalcode to include other creatures

Method 7 Casuistry

Casuistry is central to this text; it is a method used by moral phers whereby a specific instance is compared with rulings in othersimilar cases to reach a comparable and therefore presumably justverdict

philoso-Casuistry entails reflection on a given problem in light of relevantaccepted maxims and similar cases from the past, with intent toreach an informed moral judgment regarding a given problem ( Jonsen

1991) The word “casuistry” comes from the Latin casus, which means

“case.” Casuistry is the study of cases, a process of resolving speci fic moral problems by applying general principles of ethics, religion, or

moral philosophy

Casuistry usually requires the assessment of specific details, such

as the degree of guilt or measure of responsibility These are mined by weighing the specific circumstances of a given case Motiveand consent are often critical (Runes 46) In turn, that particular

deter-scenario becomes part of a case history, which sets a precedent by

which future moral judgments might be made in similar cases.Casuistry is important to moral philosophy, and to this book, for

at least four reasons: Casuistry

48 chapter one

• focuses on particular circumstances in specific situations,

• depends on like cases being treated in a like manner,

• holds both motive and consent to be important considerations, and

• entails an informed moral judgment.

First, casuistry avoids abstractions that may plague moral theory andanalytical philosophy; casuistry acknowledges the importance of theindividual case “Casuists are skeptical of principles, rules, rights, andtheory divorced from history, circumstance, and experience One canmake successful moral judgments casuists say, only when one has

an intimate understanding of particular situations and an appreciation

of the record of similar situations” (Orlans 43) In simple terms, ruleslike “do not shove or push” cannot adequately guide morality Ifsomeone is drowning, and a passerby swims in and pushes that indi-vidual toward the shore, has the passerby done wrong by pushing?The passerby may have broken a moral rule (“do not shove”) butthey have not done wrong Similarly, other moral maxims do notapply in all instances This is why casuists believe that the specificinstance is critical to any moral assessment

Second, casuistry assumes the principle of equality, whereby

com-parable instances are treated in a comcom-parable manner, and the

prin-ciple of universality, whereby a decision made in one instance will

hold for all comparable cases (Buning 20) All things being equal, acase of theft ought to be treated like another case of theft One whosteals an ear of corn ought to be treated the same as one who steals

an eggplant, all things being equal Casuists reason from one particular

case to another case that is similar in morally relevant ways; previouscases set a precedent by which similar cases will be judged in thefuture “The casuistic method is to start with cases whose moral fea-tures and conclusions have already been decided, and then to comparethe salient features in the paradigm case (that is, the case with morallysettled dimensions) with the features of cases in need of a decision”(Orlans 43)

However, the qualification, “all things being equal” often doesn’thold, which leads to the third element of casuistry noted above:motive and consent are critical One often-cited philosophical conun-drum is the thief who steals food to feed the starving Let us assumethat the one who steals the ear of corn does so simply because shedoes not want to pay for her food In contrast, the one who stealsthe eggplant does so to feed her starving husband (who is ill andincapacitated) because she is too poor to buy food Casuistry acknowl-

methods and terms 49

edges a morally relevant distinction between a thief who steals out

of indifference or for self-gain, and one who steals for a higher ideal(in the hope of preserving life) No one argues with the importance

of the general maxim “stealing is immoral,” but casuistry edges the importance of circumstances, motive, and intent for assess-ing the morality of individual acts

acknowl-Finally, casuistry entails an informed moral judgment Casuistry is

not about majority opinion or common practices being written intolegal codes Casuistry is a rigorous process of examining actual prob-lems in specific instances, in light of relevant moral theory and othersimilar cases that have been previously examined, in order to reach

an informed moral judgment on that particular situation.

Casuistry is critical to this text because this text compares ity between human beings with morality across species Since thereare no adequately established morally relevant distinctions betweenall human beings and anymals, casuistry is an effective tool for makingmoral assessments of situations involving animals of different species

moral-We have a wealth of cases involving interactions among humanbeings that can assist us in knowing what we ought to do with regard

to an oryx or echidna

Term 8 Living Entity

For the purposes of this book, all species of animals and plants are

to be regarded as living entities (or life-forms) Cells qualify, thoughviruses do not

“Nature,” Aristotle observes, “proceeds little by little from thingslifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to deter-mine the exact line of demarcation” (Margulis 26) The Russian sci-entist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky refers to life as “living matter.”What exactly is life? If we are to respect life, protect life, or cherishlife, we need to have some notion of what constitutes life

“Living entities are best understood as ongoing processes of a tain sort” (L Johnson 205) Life is “less a thing and more a happening,

cer-a process; even the simplest life form respond[s] to its ings to preserve and protect its form” (Margulis 45, 50) A livingentity strives to maintain its existence as the type of entity that it is Even the simplest living beings have complex regulatory, that is cyber-netic, systems that maintain the being within an acceptable range ofstate of being In the face of widely varying environmental conditions,

surround-50 chapter one

its temperature, states of internal organs, biochemical states, and so

on, are maintained in a harmoniously balanced fashion This is not

to say that the status quo is maintained The center of homeostasis

is not a specific condition of the entity but a whole range around whichits life processes oscillate Acorns grow to be oaks The main-

taining of an adequate balance has been given the name homeostasis.

(L Johnson 203–04)

In short, entities that are alive, commonly called organisms, exhibit growth

by metabolizing, reproducing, and adapting to the environment viainternal change

By this definition, animals, plants, fungus, protistans, and monerans teria, pathogens, and blue-green algae) are all living entities Viruses,

(bac-in contrast, do not self-ma(bac-inta(bac-in or metabolize and therefore do not

fit this definition of a living organism Viruses, smaller than cells,

“come to life” when they enter another living organism, but “lacksufficient genes and proteins to maintain themselves” (Margulis 23–24).Yet even the smallest cells, those of the tiniest bacteria, are self-maintaining entities, and thereby qualify as living entities (Margulis23–24)

Term 9 Western Morality/Ethics

The terms “Western morality,” and “Western ethics,” are used with theknowledge that there is not one comprehensive Western ethic; theseterms refer to commonly accepted moral standards shared by the vastmajority of people living according to European and North Americancultural traditions

While there is not a single Western ethic, there are moral tendencies

in the West, many of which are backed by laws As previously stated,the morality of the majority is not a dependable indicator of what

we ought, or ought not, to do However, these moral trends ity convictions) do indicate our generally accepted morality

(major-Western morality accepts and perpetuates a discrepancy betweenthe treatment of human life and the treatment of anymals We inthe West generally protect and preserve human life This is evidencednot just by how we speak of human life (including what our schoolsand religious institutions teach), but by how we live and by our legalsystem It is not lawful for a person to destroy human life exceptunder desperate conditions If someone is in the act of stealing our

methods and terms 51car, we are not legally permitted to attack them with a knife or shootthem with a gun to reclaim our property It is not legal to destroythe life of the robber to preserve personal wealth Only if an indi-vidual is assaulted—unjustifiably physically threatened by another—does that person have a right to self-defense—and defense must beproportional; if the person stops attacking, then the one initiallyassaulted must also stop We are legally permitted to do bodily harm

to other human beings only to protect our own lives Otherwise,

harming other human beings is unjustified, even if they are thieves

or drug dealers selling narcotics to our dependents This law reflectsthe general Western tendency to hold human life in high regard—high above our regard for property In many ways, current Westernlaw holds the preservation of human life above the protection andpreservation of general law and order

Controversial issues such as capital punishment and abortion reflecttension over situations that may challenge our general insistence onthe importance of preserving the lives of citizens Most Western coun-tries have abolished the death penalty, but this practice is alive andwell in the United States Abortion, killing a handful of cells that

could potentially become a human being, remains a divisive issue in

many Western countries

In contrast, Western ethics do not protect the lives of anymals.U.S laws reflect this moral outlook: anymals are property It is ille-gal to kill Myshkin, a beautiful black mutt, because Myshkin is your

neighbor’s property, not because her life is considered to be of value;

the lives of anymals are generally not protected in Western countries

In fact, we can kill them for just about any purpose we choose, ifthey are ours It is morally and legally permissible to kill shorthorncattle and tabby cats at will All types of fish can be tortured for humanpleasure; what is catch and release if not a form of torture for humanamusement?

Actions and laws in the West reveal strong moral views with regard

to humans as opposed to anymals The terms “Western ethics” and

“Western morality,” do not assume that the West has only one ity, but that there are overarching, identifiable tendencies among thevast majority of the population, and it is to these dominant moraltrends that I refer

moral-52 chapter one

Method 8 Interdisciplinary

Morality is determined by factors from different scholarly disciplines;therefore this book is interdisciplinary, including such topics as biol-ogy and theology, ethology and economics

Human endeavors are rooted in human “knowledge”; our standing of the world is relevant to how we think and how webehave Consequently, applied philosophy requires that we combine

under-“facts” from various other disciplines with philosophical speculation

in our quest for the best course of action Applied philosophy asks,

“Given our understanding of the world around us, what ought we to do?”

Most modern philosophers agree that one cannot simply derive

an “ought” from an “is.” Nonetheless, there is a general consensusthat certain “facts,” bits of information gathered via empirical evi-dence, help determine the best course of action For instance, if biol-ogy indicates that spotted-tailed quolls are capable of suffering, andmoral theory suggests that to cause needless suffering is morallyabhorrent, then we ought not to cause spotted-tailed quolls to sufferwithout legitimate cause However, if science indicates that the spot-ted-tailed quoll is incapable of suffering, then ethical teachings onthe matter of suffering are irrelevant to the spotted-tailed quoll Insome ways, biology is critical to morality, particularly in protection-ist philosophy

Academic disciplines do not exist in a vacuum The moral dilemmaentailed in patenting farmed animals will be decided in light of suchdiverse disciplines as genetic engineering, theology, law, morality,biology, and economics (Orlans 100) Experts in each of these fields

of study are critical to reaching a reasonable conclusion on this moralconundrum Similarly, the conditions in factory farms, and whatactually goes on in laboratories, are important for determining whether

or not we ought to eat flesh or permit anymal experimentation One need not be a specialist to decipher many of the relevant

“facts” entailed in drawing moral conclusions For instance, if weknow that an infant is cold, and that the child’s guardian is nearby,most of us will conclude that the guardian ought to warm the child.Similarly, if someone were stuck in quicksand, and several bystandersobserved the individual sinking, most people would agree that because

we value human life, those nearby ought to free the sinking victim.Additional facts may alter these conclusions For example, if the onestuck in the mud was not in danger of death and was an escaped

methods and terms 53convict—one known to kill—perhaps this evidence better indicatesthat if we value life we ought to leave the convict stuck in the muduntil authorities arrive While facts alone cannot reveal answers tomoral dilemmas, they play an important role in determining what

we ought to do (“Facts” often constitute minor premises for ethicaldiscourse while the philosophy of ethics provides major premises.Both are important.)

Effective moral determinations coincide with general understanding

If moral principles are not aligned with how we perceive the worldaround us, they may seem irrelevant or even dangerous, and suchprinciples are unlikely to be honored Therefore, if applied ethics is

to be effective, it is imperative that theories and principles be rooted

in relevant information from a variety of fields of study, and thatthis information is available to the general public For instance, ifthe general public is to accept that people ought to avoid smoking,then relevant information about health and economics, for example,should be made readily available to the public This has in fact hap-pened in the last thirty years The West turned against smoking andembarked on a campaign to educate the public in order to alignwhat people believe to be true with what they ought to be doing —smoking is in fact deadly, and so we should not smoke In contrast,flesh eating is still widely accepted in this country because peopleare given information about nutrition, the farming life, and anymalcare that support this moral outlook But like smoking forty yearsago, the facts we are being fed are not consistent with dietary reality;

in this case, what people generally believe about mozzarella and hotdogs, and what is true, are very different matters Information fromvarious fields is critical both to determine and to support any givenmoral outlook, but incorrect information can be misleading Diligence

in exploring and incorporating information from outside the field ofethics is critical to sound morality

A host of disciplines shape individual worldviews Worldviews are

“an ever-changing complex of beliefs, values, feelings, desires, andexpectations that affect the way a person sees the world and howthat person feels about things in the world” (Marietta 8) Our world-view is central to who we are and helps us determine how we ought

to behave Worldviews “work behind the scenes,” supporting a givenpoint of view or attitude, even though most of us are unaware ofour own worldview (Marietta 8) How often do we say to ourselves,

“Human life is of extreme value in my worldview, but not all

world-what is commonly accepted in any given community Moral norms

depend on such a “cognitive context,” and behavior reflects ourworldview (Callicott, “Environmental” 25) Our worldview is like theair we breathe: we are surrounded by air, and dependent on air,but seldom notice this ever-present aspect of our environment.Among entrenched moral beliefs that are supported by vast andunstated worldviews, the general trend against protectionism is noexception In Western societies “deeply entrenched traditions sup-port the notion that animal welfare must bow to the best interests

of humans” (Lauerman 49) Many disciplines have contributed toshaping our worldviews and our morality; we must examine each ofthese disciplines to properly assess contemporary ethical norms

A philosophical examination of ethics and anymals is likely toinclude information collected by zoologists, biologists, ethologists, andsociologists We must know something about what anymals are like

if we are to explore our ethical obligations toward other species.Moral philosophers need to collect morally relevant details aboutanymals before making ethical determinations For instance, do Jerseycalves have a biology that indicates that they can suffer? Do theybehave as though they are suffering when kept in small crates anddeprived of iron on veal farms? Ought we to continue to raise calves

in this manner? Each moral determination is best supported by tise from other disciplines, in this case biology and ethology Regan and Taylor discuss rights theory, a discipline most commonlylinked with the social sciences Each discusses anymal biology; theirrespective theories depend on ethological studies In contrast, Linzey’stheory is largely dependent on interpreting sacred literature Whileour biological existence is generally in evidence in Western, science-oriented cultures, spirituality has become tangential, even irrelevant.But for many people, faith and scripture are still critical, as theyhave been for hundreds of years “Our attitudes toward nature andother animals are deeply conditioned by beliefs about our natureand destiny—that is, by religion” (L White 23)

exper-methods and terms 55

Ethics and religion are inextricably linked For centuries Christianityhas influenced moral philosophy, while “religion arose on a foun-dation of ethics” (E O Wilson 65) For many Christians and Jews,the Hebrew Scriptures and/or New Testament determine many per-sonal moral obligations For a person of faith, scriptures are oftenthe most important factor in shaping morality

While many contemporary Westerners do not practice any ticular religion, Western culture and beliefs are rooted in Christianhistory and practice Religious traditions are important to contem-porary morality, worldviews, and law—even in secular societies,whether or not the majority of individuals believe in divine forces

par-A thorough assessment of moral practices entails an investigation ofdeep-rooted, historic beliefs based on traditional religious teachings

It is not surprising, then, that one of the protectionist scholarsexamined in this text is a theologian, Andrew Linzey Linzey’s the-ory offers metaphysical (spiritual) support for a comprehensive envi-ronmental ethic, an ethic in which all of creation is treated withself-sacrificing service out of respect for the intentions of a divinecreator

We determine “facts” about the world around us, for better orfor worse, through mathematics, science, scripture, art, faith, andour senses Each is important in determining how we understandand interact with the larger world; each is important to any human

understanding of what we ought to do No single field of study, no individual factor, determines what we ought to do Mathematics, scrip- ture, science, and our senses each aid us in the philosophic process

behind applied moral philosophy We determine what we ought to

do, at least in part, by sifting through relevant information frommany different disciplines For this reason this book includes not onlyphilosophy, but information from several disciplines

Final Note

Although a critical analysis is provided for the most well-known andwell-respected protectionist theories available, this book attests to andaffirms the value of the contributions of these scholars to the ongo-ing philosophical quest for a more consistent, compassionate morality

It is infinitely easier to find fault with the theories of others than it

is to develop a theory of one’s own

PART TWOPHILOSOPHICAL PROTECTIONIST THEORIES

CHAPTER TWOTOM REGAN: THE RIGHTS VIEW

A Regan’s Rights View

Regan began as an advocate for human rights He turned his sophical purposes to investigating rights in the hope of understanding—and being able to explain—why it was morally unacceptable to draftyoung men to fight in Viet Nam He wondered about the nature ofrights and how human rights might defend young men from beingdrafted Toward this end he read the works of Gandhi (Regan,

In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan explained the “Rights View”

in which certain animals have basic rights that ought to be takeninto consideration Regan asserts that normal mammals aged oneyear or more have what he calls “a welfare,” which is necessary foranymals to be considered “subjects-of-a-life” (which we return toshortly) Animals, human or otherwise, that qualify as subjects-of-a-life, have equal inherent value in Regan’s theory Regan outlinesseveral well-respected philosophical guidelines for assessing moral the-ories, such as consistency, impartiality, and conformity with reflective

intuitions, which he uses to test his Rights View (Case 190).

Regan avoids speciesism in its most flagrant forms by identifyingand discussing moral agents, moral patients, and subjects-of-a-life.Through these creative and well-thought-out distinctions Regan avoidstypical speciesist divisions, and incorporates a range of morally rel-

evant characteristics across species.

60 chapter two

1 Equal Inherent Value

a The Cup Itself

Regan rests his theory on the inherent value of specified als In the Rights View inherent value is not based on experiences,

individu-aptitude, or any other acquired or innate characteristic Regan uses

the analogy of a cup to illustrate his point: Like a cup filled with

various items, the cup itself is what matters, not the contents If an

individual is of value, Regan postulates, she is of value in and ofherself—she is both the source and the locus of that value To have

inherent value one need only be a cup (Case 236–37) Inherent value

is not dependent on what others prefer, or on any particular ities possessed Inherent value can neither be earned nor lost.Regan argues that if the contents of the cup—aptitude or expe-riences—are what offer value, that entity becomes a “mere receptacle”for those qualities When humans are viewed as empty cups withvaluable ingredients, such as “virtues” or talents, then those who aremore gifted, or more active, have comparatively higher value Regan

qual-denounces this “perfectionist” approach (Case 233).

b Perfectionism

Regan rejects perfectionism, a method of assessing the value of an

individual (Case 235–36) Perfectionism assigns various degrees of

inherent value based on acquired or biological attributes Regan citesracism and sexism as examples of perfectionism Valuing athletesover businessfolk also qualifies as perfectionism Regan concludes that

inherent value must be based on the cup itself (the individual), and not

on the items inside the cup (such as aptitude, skin color, experience,length of toes, income, education, etc.)

c Equality of Inherent Value

Regan asserts that among those individuals that have inherent value,they all have inherent value equally There can be no entity that ismore or less inherently valuable than another Degrees of inherentvalue are perfectionist Such moral ranking leads to elitist attitudessuch as those of slave owners or members of the Ku Klux Klan

d Moral Intuition

Regan rejects both levels of inherent value and perfectionism based

on moral intuition, which we turn to in short order

tom regan: the rights view 61

2 Welfare

Regan argues that certain individuals have welfare: they fare well orill depending on how their interests are benefited or harmed duringthe course of their lives In the Rights View, all animals (normalmammals aged one year or more—including people) have a “wel-fare.” Regan agrees that humans have more numerous and variedpossibilities than anymals, but

[b]oth animals and humans have preference- and welfare-interests,some biological, some psychological, some social; both may be benefited

or harmed and, if the latter, harmed either because of what they aremade to experience (harms as inflictions) or because of what they aredenied (harms as deprivations); both have lives that are characterized

by pleasure or pain, satisfaction or frustration; and the overall tone orquality of the life of each, to a greater or lesser degree, is a function

of the harmonious satisfaction of those preferences that it is in theinterests of each to have satisfied (Case 119)

a Psychophysical Identity

Regan explains that animals with a welfare (which includes humans)have a “psychophysical identity.” By this he means that normal mam-mals aged one year or older have desires, beliefs, and the ability to

act; they have “preference autonomy” (Case 116).

b Preference Autonomy

Preference autonomy entails wants, desires, and preferences that anindividual strives to fulfill Regan offers examples of preference auton-omy in dogs A dog will choose between different types of food, orbetween various activities, selecting the option that best satisfies her

wants (Case 85) Dogs also avoid what they do not prefer For instance,

Regan would probably agree that a dog, if presented with both arolled up newspaper used for punishment and a leash used for dog

walks, would most likely move away from the paper roll and toward

the leash The newspaper roll elicits dog behavior indicative of ance and displeasure, such as cowing or slinking; the leash is greetedwith enthusiasm in the form of tail wagging and joyous bounding.The dog’s actions demonstrate a preference for the leash, distastefor the rolled-up paper; predictably, the dog would rather go for awalk than be punished Dogs demonstrate their belief that the leashwill satisfy wants, whereas the newspaper will not Objects (such as

avoid-a leavoid-ash) cavoid-ause avoid-a reavoid-action thavoid-at most people cavoid-an reavoid-adily identify avoid-as joy

62 chapter two

or unhappiness, satisfied wants or thwarted desires In this way dogsindicate their preferences, demonstrating “preference autonomy.”

c Benefits and Harms

Welfare is determined by “benefits” and “harms” in the Rights View

In the above case the dog benefits by going for a walk if a walksatisfies her biological, social, and psychological interests, and if her

interests are genuinely good for her If there is no safe place for the dog

to walk, then going for a walk is not in her best interest Similarly, when

a dog wants chocolate, when a child wants to stay up all night buthas to go to school in the morning, or when a cat wants to play inthe roadway, the animals’ interests are not genuinely good for them.Under Regan’s definition, if most of the time a dog is given whatshe prefers, and if what she prefers is good for her, she is livingwell For an animal that has a welfare, Regan asserts:

To live well is to have a life that is characterized by the harmonioussatisfaction of one’s desires, purposes, and the like, taking account ofone’s biological, social, and psychological interests More generally, ani-mals (including humans) live well relative to the degree to which (1)they pursue and obtain what they prefer, (2) they take satisfaction inpursuing and obtaining what they prefer, and (3) what they prefer and

obtain is in their interests (Case 117)

An animal (Homo sapiens) that is living well will display behavior

indicative of pleasure and satisfaction

As mentioned above, harms can be either inflictions or

depriva-tions (Case 94) The random, harsh use of the newspaper on a dog

is an in fliction of harm, while repeatedly neglecting to walk a dog is deprivation In either case the dog’s welfare is diminished

Because deprivation constitutes harm, bringing about an untimely

death is a harm in the Rights View Death “forecloses all

possibili-ties of finding satisfaction” (Case 100) Even a painless, purposefuldeath is a loss, and thereby a great harm to the deceased, if it isuntimely Death may be brought to a subject-of-a-life without con-stituting harm only if death is brought

• by the least painful means available;

• in the true belief that death is in the best interest of the one killed;and

• out of genuine concern for the interests of the one to be killed

(Case 119).

tom regan: the rights view 63

In Regan’s view factors that constitute a good human life “over andabove considerations of basic biological needs” have a counterpart in

anymals (Case 90) Although Regan finds that the opportunities forsatisfaction are more varied and numerous for human beings, any-mals can be harmed in similar ways The welfare of individuals frommany species, whether they are harmed or benefited, carries impor-tant moral implications Regan concludes that it is wrong for humans

to do to anymals what they do not want done to themselves, andthe immorality of such an act is not lessened “if our victims arenon-rational, or not morally autonomous What difference does itreally make whether or not they have or could have a principledobjection to our behavior? If they have no will in the matter I do

not violate their will, but I clearly violate their wishes” (Animals 77).

d Moral Agents and Moral Patients

Regan distinguishes between moral agents and moral patients Moralagents are morally accountable for their actions and are therefore

“justly and fairly held accountable for their deeds” (Case 152) In

contrast, moral patients lack the ability to understand or executemoral behavior Therefore moral patients cannot do right, nor can

they do wrong (Case 152) A variety of animals, including human

infants and imbeciles, fall into the moral-patient category Regan

notes that “normal adult humans are moral agents” (Case 152).

Regan affirms that both moral patients and moral agents haveinherent value To grant inherent value only to moral agents wouldviolate the basic philosophical principle of consistency and impar-

tiality, which requires like cases to be treated in like manner (Case

190) Because inherent value is granted to moral agents (human

beings) without regard for experiences or aptitudes, it would be inconsistent

and arbitrary to exclude moral patients based on these same criteria:Morality will not tolerate the use of double standards when cases arerelevantly similar If we postulate inherent value in the case of moral

agents and recognize the need to view their possession of it as being

equal, then we will be rationally obliged to do the same in the case

of moral patients All who have inherent value thus have it equally, whether they be moral agents or moral patients All animals are equal,

when the notions of “animal” and “equality” are properly understood,

“animal” referring to all (terrestrial, at least) moral agents and patients,and “equality” referring to their equal possession of inherent value

Inherent value is thus a categorical concept One either has it, or one does not Moreover, all those who have it, have it equally (Case 240)

morality (Case 84) Because they can be harmed in similar ways,

impartiality and consistency require that both moral agents and moral

patients be protected if either one is to be protected (Case 189).

3 Moral Standing

Even if individuals cannot rationally articulate distaste for what is done

to them, even if they cannot make moral decisions, entities with awelfare are morally considerable in the Rights View Therefore, we

are morally obligated to consider how a given action will impact any

individuals that have a welfare—not just human beings (“Nature” 9)

“We have a prima facie direct duty not to harm any relevantly similar individual who can be harmed” (Case 193–94).

In the course of making decisions that might affect welfare, we

must consider all entities with a welfare, all that might be affected Morality requires that we assess the loss of each individual equitably

if we are to honor “equal inherent value and the equal prima facie

right not to be harmed” (Case 325) In Regan’s view, for the sake of consistency, all beings with a welfare ought to be taken into account

if we are to consider any beings to be morally considerable because

they have a welfare To do otherwise is to go against lished, basic philosophical guidelines for moral theories; to do other-wise is to be inconsistent and partial

tumors?” (Case 241–42) Each of these has life, but do they have

inherent value?

tom regan: the rights view 65Regan does not think so He concludes that beings with inherentvalue must share some “relevant similarity between them that makes

attributing inherent value to them intelligible and non-arbitrary” (Case

241) This criterion must not vary between individuals, “since that

would allow their inherent value to vary accordingly” (Case 241).

Regan postulates “subject-of-a-life” as the morally relevant similaritythat grants an individual equal inherent value and moral standing:

To be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual whose life is terized by beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense ofthe future, including their own future; an emotional life together withfeelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the abil-ity to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysicalidentity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that theirexperiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently oftheir utility for others and logically independently of their being theobject of anyone else’s interests Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-lifecriterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value—inherent value—

charac-and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles (Case 243)

Regan admits that there may be many who do not fit the of-a-life criterion who ought to be acknowledged as having inherentvalue (such as newborn and severely retarded humans); such exclu-sions run against our reflective intuitions Consequently, he suggests

subject-“subject-of-a-life” merely as a su fficient condition for equal inherent value, not as a necessary condition (Case 246).

In the Rights View the scope of ethical protection is limited to

“normal mammalian animals, aged one year or more” (Case 190),

all of which he asserts are subjects-of-a-life (When he refers to

“ani-mals,” this is the category to which he refers.) He justifies this particular

division not because creatures that fall outside this category are logically excluded from having rights, but because he finds that the rights of those within this cat- egory can be clearly justified based on definable, morally relevant traits.

4 Respect Principle

Gus diZerega writes that respect “is an antidote to expediency andignorance When respected, no being ever counts for nothing Withoutrespect for others, the powerful see everyone and everything as eitherservants and resources or as real or potential obstacles to exercisingtheir power” (37) Regan’s “respect principle” grants equal respect

to all those who have equal inherent value Normal mammals agedone year or more are subjects-of-a-life and therefore have the moral

66 chapter two

right—or valid claim—to be treated with respect The right of asubject-of-a-life not to be harmed is universal in the Rights View,which is to say that it is held by all “relevantly similar individuals”and can only be overridden by appeal to a valid moral principle

(Case 327).

In Regan’s Rights View the prima facie right not to be harmed,

held by all subjects-of-a-life, carries a concurrent duty for human

moral agents Regan’s view might be summarized as follows: of-a-life can be harmed, and are therefore due inherent respect, which forbids that they be treated as means to an end Moral agents have a corresponding direct duty to respect the unacquired moral right not to be harmed that is held

Subjects-by all subjects-of-a-life, and to aid subjects-of-a-life whose basic right to ful treatment is violated (Case 249).

respect-5 Harm Principle

Regan derives the “harm principle” from previously established

con-cepts such as equal inherent value (Case 262–63) Individuals who

have equal inherent value also have a welfare in Regan’s view and

are due the prima facie right not to be harmed (Case 186–87) Regan’s

“harm principle” demands that a subject-of-a-life never be treatedmerely as a means to an end; they are to be treated in ways thatshow respect for their inherent value Moral agents have a duty toassist subjects-of-a-life if others fail to respect their inherent value

(Case 249).

The harm principle, a principle that sets forth a prima facie directduty not to harm either moral agents or patients, can be derived fromthe respect principle when we note that (1) those individuals whosatisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion are individuals who are intelligiblyand non-arbitrarily viewed as meriting respect because they are intel-ligibly and non-arbitrarily viewed as possessing inherent value, and that(2) as subjects-of-a-life, all have an experiential welfare Prima facie,therefore, we fail to show respect for these individuals when we do

anything that harms them (Case 264–65)

6 Overriding Rights

Regan identifies three principles by which a subject-of-a-life’s primafacie, unacquired right not to be harmed may be overridden

tom regan: the rights view 67

a Miniride Principle

The “miniride principle” (from “minimize overriding principle”) asserts

that the rights of the few may be overridden for the rights of the many, all things being equal

For instance, if one miner is trapped in a shaft and will be killed

if explosives are used to free fifty other miners (who are also trapped),the one ought to be killed if necessary to save the other fifty Morality requires that we override a minimum of rights (Case 307); it is preferable to

override only one individual’s right not to be harmed than to ride the same right for fifty

over-b Worse-Off Principle

The “worse-off principle” allows the rights of the many to be ridden for the rights of the few if “the harm faced by the few wouldmake them worse off than any of the many” (Case 328).

over-It is morally preferable to cause many subjects-of-a-life to su ffer lesser harms than to severely harm one subject-of-a-life (Case 308–09) For instance,

in the above mining scenario, if blasting out the single miner could beavoided by digging a tunnel to access the other fifty—but they wouldhave to go without food for several days—one ought to dig The harm

of prolonged hunger is a lesser harm for each of the fifty peoplethan killing would be for the single individual in the adjacent shaft

c Loss of Innocence

Regan adds, “those who forge, as well as those who perpetuate

injus-tice are not on the same moral footing as their innocent victims” (Case

323) Those who have sacrificed their “innocence” simultaneously losetheir equal right not to be harmed Retributive action is permissible.Regan extrapolates from the example of the fifty people trapped

in the shaft to illustrate loss of innocence If the fifty people hadforced the single individual into the shaft “because they believed theymight reap some benefits from his forced labor,” then

the fifty have lost their claim to be protected by the application of theminiride principle, assuming all involved face prima facie comparableharm Or, again, if the lone miner happened to be an orphaned,unloved, retarded slave, while the fifty were highly intelligent, loved,and respected slave-owners, the fifty would have no valid claim to theprotection afforded by the worse-off principle, despite the greater primafacie harm death would be for each of them when compared to the

harm death would be for the enslaved miner (Case 323)