In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 1 pptx

359 PART FOUR CONSISTENCY AND IMPARTIALITY IN APPLIED PROTECTIONIST PHILOSOPHY Chapter seven Six Medical Cases: The Value of Innocent Human Life .... In Search of Consistency: Ethics and

In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals

Ralph Acampora, Hofstra University

Cli fford Flynn, University of South Carolina Hilda Kean, Ruskin College, Oxford

Randy Malamud, Georgia State University Gail Melson, Purdue University

Kenneth Shapiro, Co-Executive Director

Animals & Society Institute Editor, Society and Animals Coeditor, Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science

403 McCauley Street Washington Grove MD 20880

t/f 301-963-4751 www.animalsandsociety.org

VOLUME 3

In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals

ISSN 1573-4226 ISBN-13: 978 90 04 14725 6 ISBN-10: 90 04 14725 X

© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijho ff Publishers and VSP.

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printed in the netherlands

Photos on the cover:

As in a Mirror (oil on canvas) and Clamshell Ethics (crayon)

Both are originals and made by the author.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kemmerer, Lisa

In search of consistency : ethics and animals / by Lisa Kemmerer.

p cm — (Human-animal studies, ISSN 1573-4226 ; v 3)

Includes bibliographical references (p ) and index.

ISBN-13: 978-90-04-14725-6

ISBN-10: 90-04-14725-X (pbk.: alk paper)

1 Animal welfare 2 Animal rights 3 Ethics I Title II Series.

HV4708.K44 2006

Dedicated to/In loving memory of the many other members of myfamily, past and present:

Snoopy, Saudi, Peanuts, Fez, Pester, Molly, Crabapple, Annie;

Hippi, Tidbit, Colorful;

Star and two whose names I cannot remember;

Rylie, Pal, Kim, Hans, Randy, Zack, Zeebee, Panda, Orphie, Nachie, Brownie, Lucy, Jojo, Angie, Wags, Suzie;

Matilda, Tuck-Tuck, Baby Fondles, and those that did not live to adulthood; Biddy, Fotinia, Dalila, and dozens of others;

Suzie, Ms Duckie, and many others;

Troubles, Stubby, Commander, Shale, Samantha, Tweezer, Mama Schnook, Kao, Muffin, Gryder, Snerf, Schnickelfritz, BeBee (Problem), Sandi, Skunky, Silver Tabby, Boss Charlie, Underfoot, Sam, Blacky, Pill, Missy, Mustache, Melissa, Sascha, Mosta, Spud, Smokey, Satin, Fluff, Stuffy, Graykin, Jex, Ringer, Boo-witch, Lady Jane Gray, Longjohn, Elf, Popeye, Twitch, Fat Orange, Butterscotch (Buttercrotch on off days), Cinders (Cinderella), Skittle, Saphire, BoBlack, Flag, TummyMummy, Bob, Crosspatch, Simey, Mr Max, Tom Thumb, Stripe, Mini, Heba, Sheba, Miss Flea, Chocolate, Mabel, Boffer, MyDogSpot, MyDogSpot’s Sister Mariezlie (Mizo, Meazlie), Chibi-chan, Friskie, Strip, Strip’s tiny sister who did not live long, Baby Orange, Nabor, Satin, Rabbit, Maggie, Gank, Martha/Grouse, Ebony, Squid Kid, Nosey, Mackie, Mutt, Jeffrey, Paddy, Calli, Sid, Barney, Tipper, Quatro, Mama, Peabody, Cream Pu ff (CreamyMeamy), Priscilla (Pisscilla in moments of bad behavior), and others whose names are temporarily forgotten.

Acknowledgements xiii

Preface xv

Introduction 1

PART ONE METHODS AND TERMS Chapter one T1 Protectionism 7

M1 Selection of scholars 9

T2 Anymals, Nonhuman Animals, Other-Than-Human Animals 10

M2 Applied philosophy 12

T3 Moral standing 16

T4 Morally relevant distinctions 18

T5 Inherent value/intrinsic worth 22

M3 Lifeboat scenarios 24

M4 Idealism 27

M5 Consistency and logical extremes 32

T6 Intuition 37

T7 Speciesism 38

M6 Impartiality 40

M7 Casuistry 47

T8 Living entity 49

T9 Western morality/ethics 50

M8 Interdisciplinary 52

Final Note 56

viii contents

PART TWO

PHILOSOPHICAL PROTECTIONIST THEORIES Chapter two

Tom Regan: The Rights View 59

A Regan’s Rights View 1 Equal inherent value 60

2 Welfare 61

3 Moral standing 64

4 Respect Principle 65

5 Harm Principle 66

6 Overriding rights 66

Summary 68

B Discussion 68

1 Methods 68

2 Central concepts 70

3 Undesirable consequences 94

Conclusion 101

Chapter three Peter Singer: Utilitarian Protectionism 103

A Singer’s Utilitarian Theory 103

1 Utilitarianism 103

2 Sentience 105

3 Mental capacity 109

4 Death and killing 110

Summary 112

B Discussion 112

1 Common concerns 112

2 Problems associated with utilitarianism 113

3 Sentience 128

4 Mental capacity 130

5 Reason without virtues 142

6 Speciesism 143

Conclusion 144

Chapter four

Paul Taylor: Bio-Protectionism 145

A Protectionism and Environmental Ethics: An Uneasy Alliance 145

B Taylor’s Foundation 150

1 Individual versus species 150

2 Natural and nonnatural 150

3 Moral standing 151

4 Moral agents and moral patients 154

5 Rights 155

6 Philosophical principles and standards 158

C Taylor’s Respect for Nature 158

1 Belief system—Biocentric Outlook 159

2 Attitude—Respect for Nature 161

3 Four rules and moral triage 162

4 Five principles 165

Summary 169

D Discussion 170

1 Controversial assumptions 170

2 Theoretical considerations 177

3 Humanocentrism 190

Conclusion 210

PART THREE PROTECTIONIST THEOLOGY Chapter five Andrew Linzey: Christian Protectionism 213

A Theology 214

B Christianity and Protectionism Across Time 217

C Linzey’s Protectionist Theology 228

1 Creation 229

2 Covenant 235

3 Challenges 236

4 Life of Jesus 243

5 Linzey’s Generosity Paradigm 245

Summary 250

D Discussion 251

1 General issues 251

2 Interpretation of scripture 255

3 Theoretical considerations 270

Conclusion 281

Chapter six Consistency across Religious Traditions 283

1 Indigenous traditions 288

2 Vedic/Hindu tradition 302

3 Buddhism 321

4 Daoism and Other Chinese Religions 333

5 Islam 347

Summary 359

PART FOUR CONSISTENCY AND IMPARTIALITY IN APPLIED PROTECTIONIST PHILOSOPHY Chapter seven Six Medical Cases: The Value of Innocent Human Life 363

1 Six medical cases 365

2 Comparative value of human life 374

3 Western ethics and the value of human life in practice 385

Chapter eight Minimize Harm Maxim 391

1 Premise One: All Living Entities Have Moral Standing 391

2 Premise Two: Death and Harm Are Part of Life 407

3 Premise Three: Hierarchies of Moral Standing Are Indefensible 408

Maxim: Minimize Harm 418

1 Subpoint One: Minimize Interference 419

2 Subpoint Two: We May Use Other Life-forms Only with Consent 435

3 Subpoint Three: Intentions Matter 437

4 Subpoint Four: Self-Defense Is Morally Permissible 440

5 Extending Ethics Regarding Protection of Human

Life: A Parallel Theory 443

Summary 445

Chapter nine Application: Contemporary Moral Dilemmas 447

A Ongoing protectionist issues 447

1 Zoos and circuses 447

2 Clothing 455

3 Diet 458

4 Science 468

5 Anymal companions 474

B Hypothetical scenarios 477

1 Organs versus organisms/Species versus individuals 477

2 Adrift on a lifeboat 479

Conclusion 489

Chapter ten Review and Future Directions 491

A Overview 491

1 A conspicuous problem 491

2 A cooperative enterprise 493

3 The Minimize Harm Maxim 494

B Philosophical standards and the Minimize Harm Maxim 495 1 Ethical theories 495

2 Examining the Minimize Harm Maxim 497

3 Comparison 497

C Reexamining Predominant Western Ethics 499

1 Reconsidering the value of human life 500

2 Continuing the trend—moving ethics outward 502

3 Human limitations 503

4 An ongoing endeavor 504

Bibliography 509

Index 531

Special thanks to Susan Stuart (and her partner, Norm Grey) formaking a foreign student welcome in Scotland, and in their home, fordiscussions on topics such as conatus, the unacceptability of violence

in defending the innocent, the perfection of potatoes, and the tance of cats—including the beloved Mr Finn, the esteemed felinefond of hunting worms

impor-I am thankful to the Culture and Animals Foundation for financialsupport Many thanks to Kenneth Shapiro for his help in getting thisbook into print Thank you to Brill for putting together a series thatfocuses on animals and society, and to reviewers, especially PaulWaldau, whose many helpful comments greatly improved the manu-script Thank you to Steven Wells, who proofread the earlier dis-sertation, as well as key chapters of this book, and to Alex (Myshkin)Bury I thank others who offered comments on portions of the man-uscript or key concepts, including Robin Downie, John Halley, FredPorta, Samantha Joo, Kim Woeste, Ed Sandeman, Walter Gulick,Joel Lidz, Matthew Calarco, Brian Dillon, Dagmar Wilhelm, JenniferTobin, Walter Kemmerer, Ed Kemmerer, and to editors LilliaGajewski and Linda Hoffman

I thank Mum (Ruthli) for always having confidence in me I thankDad (Walter) for his respect for all living things I thank my brother, Ed,for his intense interest in ideas and willingness to dialogue on subjects(like the moral acceptability of spraying insecticide on a hoard ofaphids swarming one’s prize pansies) I thank my sister, Jan, for herhuge heart, for her unusual perspectives on animals and people, and

for sharing her home with me—not just her home, but eight beautifulacres filled with rescued animals that became the core meaning ofour shared daily life as I wrote this text I thank my family for being

a family: for offering camaraderie, encouragement, food for thought,long walks outdoors, and plenty of distraction from my labors I thankthe many critters in my life for their companionship, and for thelabor they require, both of which have kept me healthy and happy

I especially thank nonhuman animals past and present that havehelped me to realize truths I otherwise might not have understood,particularly those who fixed their hearts upon me as only a nonhumancan, especially Troubles, Snoopy, Saudi, Bebee, Popeye, and Angie

In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals examines the discrepancy inapplied ethics between treatment of human life and treatment of allother life-forms In the process, this book offers both explanationsand critical analyses of basic moral theories, including utilitarianism

and deontological (rights-based) ethics In Search of Consistency also

offers an in-depth view of moral theory in different areas, such asenvironmental ethics and theology

Western philosophies are remarkably inconsistent in applying ity exclusively to the lives of human beings rather than to the lives

moral-of all living entities This book explores that moral-often-overlooked crepancy via the works of four contemporary philosophers from four

dis-different schools of thought; all four are well known for their novelcontributions in this potentially divisive area of ethics

Four chapters are dedicated to the work of these scholars Eachchapter presents and discusses the proposition by one of these schol-ars to adjust ethical theory to include nonhuman animals TomRegan proposes a theory in support of animal rights Peter Singer

offers a utilitarian theory designed to maximize the satisfaction ofpreferences, aiming for an outcome that maximizes the preferences

of individuals affected Paul Taylor defends a theory of environmentalethics designed to protect wild organisms, based on the inherent worth

of teleological entities Andrew Linzey, the final scholar discussed(and a theologian), outlines an ethic of obligatory servitude to God’screation, including nonhuman animals, rooted in the Hebrew Scripturesand New Testament

The sixth chapter explores protectionist ethics from a range ofspiritual sources, revealing similarities between Linzey’s work and ideasfrom other religious traditions This chapter investigates “animal-friendly” teachings with protectionist tendencies from indigenous,Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Islamic religious traditions throughouthistory Chapter 6 does not explore writings that contradict protec-tionist theology, but rather reveals the strong presence of protectionism

in major religious traditions

Informed by the strengths and weaknesses of the four theories discussed in chapters 1–4, chapter 7 explores the consistent and

impartial application of contemporary Western morality through theMinimize Harm Maxim The Minimize Harm Maxim emerges fromthe consistent application of Western moral respect for human life,

a respect for life that we now reserve almost exclusively for humanbeings, in a consistent fashion that includes all life-forms that are

similar in morally relevant ways The result is a signi ficantly expanded

ethic, complete with a new array of moral dilemmas

The final chapter returns to the ethical dilemma around whichthe book centers—the glaring discrepancy in applied ethics withregard to our treatment of human life as opposed to our treatment

of all other life-forms

In Search of Consistency exposes the ongoing necessity for sophical work in the field of ethics with regard to the treatment ofliving beings and the urgent need for an ethic that is less partialand more consistent for both humans and nonhumans

Is moral concern something owed by human beings only to humanbeings? Certainly two thousand five hundred years of moral philoso-phy have tended to suggest that this is the case, surprisingly enough,not by systematic argument, but simply by taking it for granted Yetthis answer is by no means obvious, and it crumbles when exposed tothe most childlike question of all, “Why.” (Rollin 4)

Morality requires that our sentiments be balanced with relevant factsand reason Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual phi-losophizes with more than just reason—we use our will, feelings,

“flesh and blood,” our “whole soul and whole body” (Stern 6)

We might wish moral philosophy to be a clean and neat process,predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moraldilemmas, but nothing could be farther from the truth

This is not to say that people do not have answers Answers areprovided by almost anyone confronted with delicate questions aboutcomplicated moral matters From abortion and addiction to capitalpunishment and war, people often believe they know what is rightfor themselves and for those around them However, neither per-

sonal preference nor majority opinion makes a sound moral decision,

though these definitely can and do determine a dominant (popular orcommon) morality In fact, the definition of morals conflicts with theidea that what the majority approves is “right” and what the major-ity disapproves is “wrong.” While we are all familiar with the dom-inant morality of our time and place, the majority is much less aware

of whether or not their common moral opinions are rooted in son and empirical evidence

rea-Collectively, we participate in an outrageous moral inconsistency

We accept without question the discrepancy between our moralregard for human beings and our lack of moral regard for all otherliving entities When returning by car from my parent’s home last week,

I came upon a medic unit and a police car A man was sitting onthe bumper of one of the medic cars, with skinned knees Two medicswere attending him He had gone around a corner too fast and hadtipped his motorcycle in the street I drove on, and within half anhour I watched a truck slam into the hind end of a doe She was

2 introduction

bounding, and as if in slow motion she flew from the front of thetruck, spun in the air, and landed in a crumpled heap in the ditch Thetruck kept going The three cars behind the truck kept going I wasthe fourth car behind the truck I watched her try to stand up, herhind end destroyed There were no medics, no police, not even apause in the rushing of cars, though she was in shock and terriblywounded How could a young man with skinned knees receive somuch attention, while a doe who had been hit by a truck received

no more than the passing glance as the people who had run overher rushed on their way? How many deer were hit that same night;how many of them died slowly in ditches? And what of snakes, opos-sums, robins, raccoons, swallows, salamanders, and domestic cats anddogs? Can such a morality, where only human life is held to beworthy of preservation and protection, possibly be defensible?Part I of this book explores moral alternatives to this ongoing dis-crepancy through the eyes of three contemporary philosophers fromthree different schools of thought Tom Regan presents a deonto-logical rights-based theory Peter Singer offers a utilitarian theorydesigned to satisfy the maximum number of preferences and enhancepreferred outcomes or consequences The third scholar, Paul Taylor,defends a theory of environmental ethics designed to protect wildorganisms, based on the inherent worth of teleological entities.Part II begins by discussing the work of Andrew Linzey, a the-ologian Chapter 4 presents and critiques Linzey’s theory of Christianobligation of servitude to God’s creation (including cactus wrens andchannel cats) rooted in the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament.Including a chapter on theology in a philosophy book will seemstrange to some, but theology is central to moral issues in general,and important to ethical theories regarding treatment of nonhumananimals for two reasons First, understanding theology enhances ourunderstanding of morality in general Philosophy was for many yearsthe handmaid and mouthpiece of the church; philosophers labored

to prove the existence of God and to solve “the problem of evil”which troubled many Christian scholars In that sense, Western moralscannot be separated from Christianity Many of our moral standards,from attitudes about abortion to laws regarding gay marriage, havebeen formed by the dominant religious tradition—Christianity.Second, many Westerners are Christians The United States inparticular remains strongly Christian (as evidenced by church affiliation).While philosophical works rooted in scientific notions (evolution and

introduction 3

ethology, utilitarianism and rights theories) might have no impact onconservative Christians, Linzey’s work will Arguments are more effectivewhen the person you are talking to can relate to what you are say-

ing, and when what you are saying really matters to them personally.

For a strong Christian, scripture is key Linzey speaks to those offaith as Regan speaks to those who feel strongly about human rights.For this reason it is critical to include Linzey in this volume and tomake use of religious—specifically Christian—language, as is done

in chapter 5

The sixth chapter explores protectionist ethics across religious tions, This segment of the book investigates “animal-friendly” lore fromindigenous, Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Islamic religious traditions,revealing protectionist tendencies across religious traditions fromaround the world

tradi-Part III explores the consistent and impartial application of temporary Western morality through the Minimize Harm Maxim TheMinimize Harm Maxim consistently applies everyday, commonsenseAmerican respect for human life to cover all life-forms that are sim-

con-ilar in morally relevant ways, resulting in a signi ficantly expanded ethic,

complete with a new array of moral dilemmas

Before discussing the abovementioned theories, it is necessary toprepare some general groundwork Chapter 1 introduces terms thatare important to the overall text and explains and justifies methodsused in this text These terms and methods are explained becausethey are immediately necessary to the content and intent of thisbook, or because they are not specific or central to any one of thefour theories discussed Terms such as “rights,” or “utilitarianism”will be discussed thoroughly in chapters specific to those concepts.Because reading terms and methods can be tedious, readers can gainthe core of each term and method by reading the first sentence ofeach subsection and then move on to the next term or method Formore in-depth coverage of the topic, read the entire section

PART ONE

METHODS AND TERMS

as an example the strings of fiber on the outer surface of a banana

(Animal 80): we have no word for these “banana strings.” Similarly,

there is no generally accepted term that includes all theories, letalone all outlooks, goals, and activists in the “animal rights” movement

“The expression ‘animal rights,’ while often used loosely as a onym for animal liberation, if used correctly, has a more limitedapplication Not all liberationists agree that focusing on the concept

syn-of moral rights is useful, and some even deny that animals (or humans)

possess moral rights” (A Taylor, Animals 18) Moral “rights” are the

subject of specific philosophical theories Those who favor animalrights propose that nonhuman animals have moral rights that weought to respect

Of the four scholars included in this book, Tom Regan proposes

a specific philosophical theory defending the existence of moral rightsfor at least some nonhuman animals Linzey discusses “theos-rights,”rights that he believes we owe not to animals but to the Creator.Linzey is not known as an “animal rights” philosopher, but as a the-ologian who focuses his moral theories on the divine—theos-rightsare owed to God, not to created beings The other scholars pre-sented propose different types of theories including utilitarianism andenvironmental ethics Because there are a wide variety of theories,only very few of which focus on rights theory, “animal rights” is not

a suitable label for the many theories that extend ethics to includeprotection of nonhuman animals

Another commonly used term is “animal welfare.” This term ally encompasses theories that are concerned for animals, but whichultimately favor human beings Traditionally, the animal-welfare

usu-8 chapter one

movement “has sought to minimize the suffering of exploited mals but has not fundamentally challenged the view that animals

ani-are essentially resources” (A Taylor, Animals 18–19) Although there

are radical welfarists whose placement of humans vis-à-vis man animals is far from conventional, the term “animal welfare”designates a specific philosophical outlook that cannot be general-ized to include all protectionist theories

nonhu-In contrast, the animal-liberation movement rejects the idea thatanimals are resources To fight for animal liberation is to hope toput “an end to the routine sacrifice of animal interests for humanbenefit, even where the sacrifice is executed humanely” (Sapontzis77) For animal liberationists liberation of nonhuman animals is “anal-ogous to the two great liberation movements of recent decades inthe United States: that of blacks and women” (Finsen 181) Indeed,the “animal rights” movement is a liberation movement, but thisterm cannot fill the lexical gap for a handful of reasons:

• This term may conjure up images of violence, yet not all whofight

to protect the lives of animals accept violence; in fact, very few do

• This term is committed to other uses, e.g., “women’s liberation.”

• Other liberation movements have their own specific titles “Abolition”distinguishes those who fought for the abolition of slavery in theUnited States prior to the Civil War The civil rights movementadvocated racial equality in the United States The menagerie ofmethods and intents with regard to liberating various nonhumanspecies should also have a term that is uniquely its own Thoughfor many it is a liberation movement in all respects, for othersthis is not the case, which leads to the next point

• “Animal liberation” does not include less radical people who areonly struggling to free certain nonhuman animals from the mostcruel forms of oppression One such group is often referred to asanimal welfarists; they seek to improve the welfare of animals, butnot their complete emancipation Neither “rights” nor “liberation”are appropriate terms for this form of participation in the effort

to end the suffering of other species

• This term is sometimes understood to refer to a narrow, physicalform of “liberation,” but the spectrum of ethical issues concern-ing nonhuman animals is much broader, including such topics ashabitat destruction, hunting, and companion animals

methods and terms 9

• “Animal liberation” fails to acknowledge that we are all animals.Animal liberation would more accurately be called “nonhumananimal liberation.”

• Finally, and most importantly, women and African Americansfought for their own liberation Thus the term “liberation” fails

to account for one of the most unique features of the animal eration movement—those liberated are more helpless and unin-volved in the liberation process than the hopeful benefactors ofany other liberation movement to date

lib-For these reasons, “protectionist” is a preferable term This term can

be used to refer to theories, philosophies, or individuals striving toprotect nonhuman life-forms, whether via animal rights, utilitarianism,theology, or environmental activism, whether as liberationists or as

welfarists “Protectionism” describes any ideology or behavior intended

to protect nonhuman animals from human beings Though the term

“protectionism” has a place in economics, its use there is quitedifferent and confusion is unlikely

Many activists labor to protect human beings, including the unborn,the aged, the enslaved, and children “Protectionist” throughout this

text refers to those who strive to protect and aid nonhuman beings for

their own sakes—not for the sake of humanity For instance, a tionist does not preserve species for human enjoyment, but for thesake of the individual animals themselves, because this is what weought to do with regard to these others Similarly, a protectionistdoes not strive to protect habitat only for human pleasure, but forthose creatures dependent on that environment

protec-Method 1 Selection of Scholars

The core of this text focuses on four scholars who have made breaking, important contributions to protectionism Each has pre-sented a systematized school of thought (rights theory, utilitarianism,environmental philosophy, and theology) Other thinkers not covered

ground-in this book have contributed to the enlargground-ing body of protectionistliterature, including Bernard Rollin, Steve Sapontzis, James Rachels,Mary Midgely, Carol Adams, and Joan Dunayer This book does notattempt a comprehensive survey of protectionist philosophy, but strivesfor depth in exploring four important thinkers; each has published

10 chapter one

at least one foundational book including a systematic theory of

pro-tectionism early in this contemporary movement Singer’s book, Animal

Liberation , was published in 1975; Regan’s book, The Case for Animal

Rights , was published in 1984; and Taylor’s book, Respect for Nature,

in 1986 Linzey’s book, Animal Theology, provides the first systematictheology of protectionism and was published in 1995

No previous author has provided a systematic, in-depth treatment

of these four scholars in one book Most writers have chosen either

a more general survey of philosophical ideas regarding the animalrights movement (exemplified by books such as Finsen and Finsen’s

The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to Respect) orhave omitted theological theories and/or environmental theories Thistext provides a detailed critique of the most influential theories todate regardless of the schools from which they derive, including reli-gious and secular scholars, an environmental philosopher, a rightstheorist, and a utilitarian It entails breadth (without engaging in ageneral historical survey) and depth (without limiting the topic toone concept or scholar)

Term 2 Anymals, Nonhuman Animals,

people are animals, but given common usage, we need a term referring

to animals that excludes humans The term “anymal,” if abused,might permit people to finally remove themselves completely fromthe animal kingdom—verbally, as we have already done mentally and

methods and terms 11morally But one may also hope that this term will remind us that

we are animals and that we therefore need to use a special term when

we speak of the animal world minus human beings

For protectionists, using the term “animal” might be acceptable

in a world where the vast majority of citizens openly and regularlyacknowledged human beings as one species among many, but this

is not the case Other terms such as “nonhuman animals” and than-human animals” are cumbersome, and also reinforce the ideathat there exist two categories—human beings and everything else Wemay be animals, these terms suggest, but we are a very different sort

“other-of animal; the “others,” however, may be lumped together, referred

to as “not us” (nonhuman) Thus, “anymal” seems preferable It alsohas the advantage of being similar to “animal,” with only one letterchanged, and includes the word “any,” lending itself to representing

“any animal” not the same species that we, the speakers and ers, happen to be

writ-Morality can be understood as an extension of our sympathiesfrom those we know well to those whom we know only partially(Telfer 75–76) It is likely that behind the facts and reasons that weuse to justify moral protection for human life lie fundamental virtues—benevolence, compassion, empathy—which help to guide us throughthe process of moral inquiry People generally prefer to be compas-sionate and sympathetic toward family and friends By extension,social and legal ethics protect communities, nations, and (in some

places) all people For this reason, when considering our rightful

eth-ical obligations to anymals, it is important to remember that we areprimates and mammals, closely related to anymals

The importance of this term should not be overlooked Referring

to anymals as “animals” (as if we ourselves were not included)artificially distances people from Yorkshire hogs and chickens, meerkatsand mink, and is therefore likely to impede our ability to assessproper moral obligations toward these beings Words used to describeourselves as if we were distinct from all other animals tend to facil-

itate separation, a separation that defies the biological connection we

share with anymals Using language correctly—acknowledging that

we are included in the scientific definition of what it is to be an mal—reminds us of morally relevant similarities and can therebyhelp us in the process of determining our rightful moral relationshipwith the rest of the animal world