Masters of Illusion American Leadership in the Media Age Phần 8 potx

The size of GDP is immaterial when the question is Russian participation in world affairs.The major point is that asking the question reveals both European myopiathey just ignore the nuc

370 Leading Toward Peace

The counsel about coming American weakness and European strength isunconvincing for reasons set out earlier in this book For the present, Europelacks the economic and military strength and the political cohesion neces-sary to suck others into its way of doing things, although it doesn’t lack theself-assurance to try But in the longer run, should the European Unionbecome increasingly like a nation-state, building cohesion and militarystrength, then it may well attempt to dictate the structure of global poli-tics, as it did during the centuries of European imperialism

The transatlantic trap invites America to deny some of the most evidentrisks in the world today Denial isn’t responsible statesmanship Americamust openly confront nuclear proliferation, the Crescent of Fire, the widen-ing gap between rich and poor nations, Russia’s dangerous unpredictability,and China’s rapid emergence as a military challenge – not simply presumethat these sources of danger are going to disappear of their own accord inthe way that harmonism and convergence do

In a situation of long-term and dramatic economic divergence betweennations and regions, in which the United States is widening the gap betweenits economic and military strength and that of the rest of the developedworld, the strategy of the weak is to show the United States that there is

no politically acceptable way for it to exercise its superiority All talk ofthe sanctity of international law, the legitimacy of the United Nations, andthe moral imperative of multilateralism is simply the implementation of astrategy of this sort

The European approach to world problems is generally either a sternrebuke for bad behavior or an offer of incentives for better behavior Forexample, a senior human rights envoy of the European Union to Rus-

sia issued what the Financial Times called “a stern rebuke over judicial

standards” to Russia on September 30, 2004.16It’s hard to believe the sians were much affected by a stern rebuke Quite the contrary, privatediscussions with Russian officials indicate that this sort of thing providesthe Russians with chuckler In response, they adopt the role of the woundedinnocent (“certainly we do nothing to be criticized for”), but laugh aboutthe matter in private How can the Europeans who do this sort of thingseriously expect anything but ridicule?

Rus-As for incentives for better behavior, the European approach is on display

in the controversy over the Iranian nuclear weapons program Initially, theEuropeans offered incentives to the Iranians to cease their program; the Ira-nians took the incentives and continued with their program The Europeansprotested, so the Iranians demanded more incentives.17

The Transatlantic Trap 371

Neither terrorists, insurrectionists, rogue states, the Russians, nor theChinese will pay any attention to this sort of moral suasion at all (althoughthey’ll accept any money the Europeans offer, without abiding by the agree-ments, of course), so it is dangerous for us to do so

ALL THE WAY VIA MULTILATERALISM TO A

WORLD GOVERNMENT

There is now much support in Europe and on the American left for lateral decision making – a form of world government Is the UN a tolerablevehicle for this? The UN wasn’t put together for this, but it’s all we have

multi-If we are to contemplate full multilateral decision making – that is, worldgovernment – then we must redesign the UN or design something else

Immediately at the end of World War II, President Harry Truman spoke

at the founding of the United Nations: “We all have to recognize – no matterhow great our strength – that we must deny ourselves the license to do always

as we please.”18Revisiting this speech a writer for The Economist complained,

“The contrast with the attitude of most subsequent American governments,and especially the current one [the George W Bush Administration] couldnot be more stark.”19 Yet The Economist ignored two factors: Truman’s careful qualification of his endorsement of multilateralism – “to do always as

we please.” The United States does not and should not always act as it pleases,including now But when it is a matter of national defense, the country mustact, even if it is not supported by other countries whose agendas are quitedifferent In addition, there is now a long history of foolishness and futility

in the United Nations against which Americans must weigh our support formultilateralism

The confusion that characterizes European thought about the UnitedNations continues unabated For example, “Why should Russia with a

GDP smaller than the Netherlands have a permanent seat (in the UnitedNation’s Security Council) rather than Japan ?” ask the editors of The Economist, quite seriously.20 The answer is very simple – Russia is a fullyarmed nuclear power covering almost one-seventh of the landmass of theglobe and should therefore be on the Security Council The size of GDP

is immaterial when the question is Russian participation in world affairs.The major point is that asking the question reveals both European myopia(they just ignore the nuclear power of Russia) and the European confusion ofconsumer economics with military power – they are not always synonymous.The United Nations Security Council is about war and peace, it shouldn’t be

372 Leading Toward Peace

another world trade organization The confusion is of consumer economieswith military strength, and of the present with the future (Russia is about

to fully modernize its forces while Japan has not yet chosen its course in thefuture)

If we retain the United Nations in a significant role, then we must shift ourposition to one of multilateralism generally, for otherwise we are assertingboth independence and dependence and there are certain to be differentexpectations of us by our allies, and when we disappoint them, there iscertain to be a major controversy with our allies and more harm than wouldotherwise be done Disappointed expectations embitter people and createtension and conflict They are a sure trap to fall into, and are the result ofour not having sufficiently adjusted our policy for the end of the Cold War.This is the core of what’s happening now over Iraq The argument isbeing made that it was the attitude of the American government – allegedlyunilateralist and arrogant – that undercut and made ineffective the efforts

of the United Nations to disarm Iraq “ the entire process of trying to

avert a war through inspections and negotiations was undercut by the itary buildup,” wrote Richard C Holbrooke, American ambassador to theUnited Nations in the Clinton Administration, “that the United States saidwas necessary to force Iraq to comply – a buildup that some officials laterargued could not be reversed without the United States losing face ‘In ret-rospect, the military buildup and the diplomacy were out of sync with eachother.’ ‘The policies were executed in a provocative way that alienated

The core of the matter is that other nations have learned how to use theUnited Nations to handcuff the United States procedurally and moralisti-cally They claim to do this in support of justice and other such verities.More often, they do it in support of their own interests.23Multilateralismand international law used this way are a sham, and hold that we should

be bound to them is to believe that we should sacrifice our security for anidealist fiction

It is a mistaken notion that diplomacy is a win-win process; and that overtconflict is only win-lose This confuses characteristics of means with charac-teristics of results Diplomacy is often lose-lose when needed actions do notoccur (as today, for example, in the continued diplomatic ineffectiveness

The Transatlantic Trap 373

in stopping nuclear proliferation) and overt conflict can be win-win when

an evil is eradicated The American Civil War, for example, was an overtconflict that put an end to a great evil, slavery, which the southern statescouldn’t end for themselves; in this way it was win-win The same is true ofWorld War II, which put an end to Nazism, which ultimately benefited bothGermany and its enemies

Similarly, it’s an illusion to think that diplomacy is an expression ofharmony; it often is not; it’s frequently a form which conflict takes Just

as individuals can be in conflict who are not actually at blows, so nations aresometimes in conflict even when there is not war between them Diplomacycan, when it is successful, preserve the peace; but a war can reestablish peace.They are both, in that sense, a road to peace The advantage of diplomacy

is that it is not war, and can sometimes avoid war But the absence of war isnot the absence of conflict; and in diplomacy conflict often simmers untilwar breaks out

Hence, it’s also an illusion to think that diplomacy is somehow differentthan conflict; it’s different from war, but it’s often simply another form ofrivalry between nations It’s a mistake, therefore, to think that diplomacyprovides win-win solutions, while war is always a win-lose More often, bothdiplomacy and war are lose-lose for the parties engaged Diplomacy can be

a means of problem solving with an attempt to reach win-win solutions,but it need not be And war can sometimes create an environment in whichproblem-solving takes over But it is an error to associate diplomacy withproblem-solving in all cases – it isn’t that

“Politics is war by other means,” wrote Will and Ariel Durant in theirstudy of world history.24The politics of the United Nations is no different

Amer-it asked others to accept This, Amer-it seems, is fair, and so the rules of the gamebecome as important as the game itself, of which sight is lost The game isthe national security of the United States, reacting at this moment to themost serious loss of life from a foreign attack on its own soil in more thanone hundred and fifty years But of this sight has been lost “Cooperation

374 Leading Toward Peace

was contingent on the United States itself playing by the rules,” wrote LisaMartin implying that France didn’t cooperate with us in suppressing terrorbecause we didn’t play by the rules of multilateralism.25

This is a complete reversal of the actual causality Rather, we rejectedmultilateralism because France didn’t cooperate in combating terror, butpursued private and hidden agendas instead

The error is to look no deeper than methods in determining the objective

of our policy Multilateralism, like unilateralism, is only a device to otherends a device that may or may not be valuable depending on what it canaccomplish to the larger ends What does multilateralism really mean intoday’s environment? It means not acting without the imprimatur of theUnited Nations – which is only obtained by the support of China, Russia, andFrance It means subordinating our own interests to theirs Multinationalistssupport this In making multilateralism an objective, its supporters riskstraying into a shadowy zone in which they have become a fifth column forAmericas rivals serving the interests of our rivals while pretending that theyare serving America

Multinationalists seem to glory in the notion that America should nowmake sacrifices to return to multilateralism It will take time and resources

to rebuild the U.S reputation for multilateralism It will require makingconcessions and accepting compromises on a wide range of issues Thus,

to get others to support us, we must give them what they want at cost toourselves The baby of American interests is here thrown to the multilateralistwolves, our interests are sacrificed to other nations, some of which are oftenhostile, and some of which are disguised as our allies, but who are alliesonly on a situational basis and are as often our rivals and antagonists as ourfriends and supporters

“To argue that the United States should always work through the UN is toargue that China, Russia, or France should have a veto over our use of militaryforce,” wrote Stanley Michalak “Neither the Clinton administration nor anyprevious administration accepted that position Nor will any administration

in the future, or any other member of the Security Council, do so WereTaiwan to declare its independence, the last thing China would do is ask UNSecurity Council for permission to use military force.”26

Amitai Etzioni noted that “Many champions of the United Nations

treat the organization as if it were already some kind of democratic

world government Hence, they attribute enormous importance to whetherthe United Nations approves of a course of action. They confuse what

the United Nations one day can be with the way it is .”27We are less ful There is no reason to believe that the United Nations can be effectively

hope-The Transatlantic Trap 375

reformed, although proposals to do so will remain part of the diplomaticgame played by the nations Nor can the United Nations be disbanded, thepolitical consequences are too great, and there is sometimes a use for aninternational forum It is a partisan forum of mostly nondemocratic soci-eties (whatever label they wear), pursuing an agenda largely at odds withour own, while promoting a humanitarian image for cover It should not beinvested with dignity by our government, but can be used as an instrument

of convenience if and when opportunity arises

UNILATERAL PARTIAL DISARMAMENT

Wishful thinking has reached deeply into the American mentality and may

in fact bring about a great divide in American politics

For those Americans who wish to abandon assertive defense in favor ofmultilateralism, the force of logic will propel them to advocacy of substantialdisarmament This will be a primary alternative to Strategic Independence,impelling America toward a great choice: military dominance combinedwith Strategic Independence, or disarmament combined with multilateral-ism Any other combinations have at their hearts a contradiction, and sowill ultimately fail and be abandoned

Briefly, to attempt Strategic Independence with disarmament is to become

a reckless adventurer in the world, attempting things we cannot achieve,and challenging others we cannot defeat To attempt multilateralism whilemilitarily dominant is to make us a target because of our military strength,and simultaneously deprive us of an effective response by subordinating ourresponse to the interests and concerns of others

Multilateralism requires reduction in armaments for the same reason thatmilitary dominance requires Strategic Independence (namely, the dominantpower becomes a target) Over time this intimate connection between domi-nance and independence, and between multilateralism and arms reduction,will become evident to everyone

A policy in which America would largely stop being the world’s sole power is now being proposed We would disengage and let others policetheir regions of influence The United States would reduce its commitmentsaround the world, letting other powers maintain their own spheres of influ-ence “The very preponderance of American power may now make us notmore secure but less secure.”28Schwarz told an interviewer, “The tremen-dous power we have presents us with an opportunity to somewhat dis-

super-engage militarily from the world.” Also, he said, “the United States has neverwanted Europe to play a powerful and independent role in world politics, or

376 Leading Toward Peace

develop the kind of military capabilities it would need to police its sphere.”

He argues that Europe doesn’t keep house in Europe or the Middle Eastbecause the United States doesn’t want it to Freed by the United States,Europe would, he implies, develop the decision-making competence andmilitary strength to police its sphere of influence.29

Were we to disarm to the status of other powers, then we’d be part of

a world in which Russia, China, ourselves, France, and Britain would besuperpowers, and the rivalry of nations would return to something like that

of the early part of the twentieth century We might be able to maintainpeace, and we might not But we’d certainly have to make the attempt incombination with other countries – in a frankly multilateralist way We couldtry again to be isolationist, and let others attempt to preserve the peace, as

we did early in the 1930s; and then join with others more directly, as we didlater in the 1930s, in our failed attempt to dissuade Hitler and Imperial Japanfrom war But we might not fail this time, since there is now no counterpartfor Hitler and for the Japanese militarists on the world scene

We can be truly multilateralist, indeed, we’d have no other choice, if wewere no longer the dominant power This used to be our tactic After a war,we’d disarm, signaling the world that we were no threat to any significantpower, and forcing ourselves to act with other countries (multilateralism)

or not at all (we did in fact try to work with the western European powers

in the 1930s to reduce the risk of war, despite our not being part of theLeague of Nations) We could return to this approach, this time being fullyengaged in the United Nations We could substantially reduce our militarystrength and become another of the several great powers Then we couldn’tact unilaterally and expect success, and so we’d be forced to be multilateral

In fact, so strong is this logic – the intimate connection of multilateralismwith disarmament – that those who today advocate multilateralism will findthemselves tomorrow advocating disarmament

The logically consistent alternative to Strategic Independence involvesthree imperatives:

1 Reduce our arms to the level of other great powers – Russia, China,England, France – so that we won’t be a target of terrorists or aggressivegreat power rivals (this occurs in part because without sole superpowerstatus, we won’t be pulled into all conflicts in the world);

2 Act multilaterally – so that we won’t be resented; and

3 Play a constructive role in the world – so that we’ll be appreciated.Then, so goes the argument, we’ll be left in peace In a sense, the UnitedStates would be acting as if it had become a member of the European Union,

The Transatlantic Trap 377

turning to our transatlantic allies for help in deciding about major tional issues, and acting without the high level of military power the UnitedStates now exercises We would voluntarily renounce our leading role in theworld, and let others play a much more significant part

interna-Already the Chinese have three times the troop level of our forces, and theRussians have more nuclear weapons (more than officially declared), so that,were we to disarm to the status of the European powers, then we’d become

a subpower We would be much endangered if we joined the Europeans inweakness

The rivalry of nations would return to something like that of the earlypart of the twentieth century, with China and Russia in the part of Germanyand Japan We might be able to maintain peace, and we might not But we’dcertainly have to make the attempt in combination with other countries –

in a frankly multilateralist way We could try again to be isolationist, and letothers try to preserve the peace, as we did early in the 1930s; and then joinwith others more directly, as we did later in the 1930s, in our failed attempt

to dissuade Hitler and Imperial Japan from war

The choice between these two alternatives is likely to become a criticalfault line in American politics Its fundamental cause is the collapse of theSoviet Union, which left America the world’s sole superpower, and so a targetand with responsibilities that it alone can shoulder Thus, history forced us

to a choice that has been very hard for our political process to recognize andarticulate But slowly it is emerging, and at this point it appears that somepoliticians may embrace partial disarmament and multilateralism, turning

to the Europeans for support; and others, may embrace preparedness andsome form of Strategic Independence

Already the Clinton administration took a large step in the direction ofpartial disarmament, reducing our military forces under the banner of apeace dividend (declared at the end of the Cold War) to be directed towarddomestic concerns The result is a force structure that seems more suited to asmall America than to one that is asserting dominance, and a force structurethat is sorely strained by our involvement in Iraq

Were the American public to divide closely on this issue, the unilateralistposition might become untenable – that is, the country requires greater unity

of purpose to be dominant than to be one of a group of powers relying verymuch on others So if the controversy over which way we should go becomestoo intense, then we will lack a key condition for being the world’s solesuperpower Put differently, unilateralists have to win the national debate

on our direction in the world by a larger margin than multilateralists iftheir position is to prevail So a unilateralist presidential candidate has to

378 Leading Toward Peace

make a better case; has to be more articulate and persuasive, than his or heropponent Is this likely? The present president is having difficulty measuring

up to the challenge – not of the policy he has embraced, but of persuadinghis countrymen and women of its correctness

AN INDEPENDENT AMERICA

America has attempted to follow the multilateralist prescription Secretary

of State Colin Powell tried to sponsor a multilateral approach to the Iraqissue, but was undermined by the French position and by opposition of othernations partly driven by the financial incentives offered by Saddam Hussein.The core of the French position was a desire to drive a wedge between Europeand the United States in the interest of European unity Hidden agendas ofthis sort make the United Nations ordinarily an impossible mechanism formultilateralism for America

Still, we often accept a role continually being thrust on us by others, theworld’s policeman, making peace and keeping peace in the trouble spots

of the world We often have difficulty refusing demands to intervene in ascene of turmoil, but it must be done very sparingly, since our own interestsare not directly involved, since there are usually neighboring nations whoshould intervene, and since too many of these involvements can stretch ourforces and the attention of our leaders so much that we cannot effectivelypursue our own higher priority concerns

For us to continue to pay for military to police the world, and allow others

to dictate its use, makes the United States an instrument of the interests ofothers It’s the worst solution for our country And we are finding ourselves inexactly that position Why, for example, are American troops still in Kosovo?Why doesn’t the European Union take over this pacification role in its ownbackyard? Our continued involvement in Kosovo shows our willingness toplay the international sucker

If we chose to strengthen ourselves and avoid being victimized by ers, then Strategic Independence is our best strategic posture because itleaves us in charge of the use of our own capabilities If we disarm, thenmultilateralism is appropriate But to keep armed and allow others to dic-tate our policy is to get the worst of both worlds – that we won’t be permitted

oth-by others to defend ourselves, and yet that we make ourselves a target oth-by ourcontinual interventions which others will require when it’s in their interests(as for example in Bosnia and Kosovo)

An America that declines the multinational fetters in which Europe wishes

to bind it, need not be alone as a result An America that adopts Strategic

The Transatlantic Trap 379

Independence, and so eschews multilateralism at the highest levels of sion, will still want to act multinationally most of the time When the UnitedStates stayed out of the League of Nations at the end of World War I, itwas to preserve independence in decision but not in action We shoulddecide after consultation with others what it is necessary for us to do inour own defense, but we must decide independently; we should act multi-laterally, via security cooperation, if at all possible That is, we will not bebound by decisions of others, but we will act with them The Bush admin-istration has been ineffective in making this distinction convincing in thedebate over the Second Gulf War although it has often tried to articulate itpersuasively

deci-We could choose to be fully multinationalist, as many urge on us, cedingdecision making as well as tactical cooperation to a multilateralist process.Indeed, we’d have no other choice if we were no longer the dominant power.George Washington advised our nation to “avoid entangling alliances.”The modern variant is “entangling multilateralism” including the UnitedNations, which is behind multiple efforts to dilute American influence butretain influence over the use of American power For example, the UnitedNations now seeks to expand Security Council membership, reducing ourrole, a proposal that draws strong support from some American commen-tators

“ [T]he United States,” wrote Walter Russell Mead, “has spent more

time and energy resenting the inadequacies of the current tional architecture than in leading the way to its renewal. We should

interna-be moving to promote the restructuring and reform of the United

Nations. We should be seeking dynamic and flexible single-purpose

and regional institutions. Ideally, the United States should support the

candidacies of Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Germany,Indonesia, and Japan to permanent, veto-wielding seats on the SecurityCouncil. It would be harder to get a consensus but when a consen-

sus was achieved, it would be seen as a much more legitimate and bindingexpression of the global political will than anything the Security Councilcan now produce.”30

It’s hard to imagine a proposal more likely to lead to the further ment of the United States in world politics and to handing more influenceover the employment of American power to other nations The Commis-sioner of the United Kingdom to the UN, commented on the British Broad-casting System on July 21, 2004, “It’s silly to talk about the UN as if it had

embarrass-a sepembarrass-arembarrass-ate existence from the greembarrass-at powers.” Yet ideembarrass-alists of multilembarrass-aterembarrass-alism

do just that

380 Leading Toward Peace

Further examples are as discouraging The Internet is now run by a mittee of private individuals under the oversight of the U.S Department

com-of Commerce The UN wants to displace the United States running it Toother countries, according to press reports, “the central problem is that [thecurrent system of Internet governance] is seen as an expression of Americanunilateralism,” even though the United States contributes a disproportion-ate amount of the financial and technological support of the Internet.31Washington’s position is the traditional American attitude, and remainsvalid today

Many idealists seem able to ignore unpleasant realities that discredit theirvisions This is a strong component of wishful thinking The advocates ofworld government in the present context seem mindless of the corruptionand authoritarianism that permeates the world’s governance Do such peo-ple really want a majority of countries composed of or pandering to Muslimfundamentalists to determine gender status? Do they want the Chinese com-munist party, as part of a coalition of countries seeking to limit Americanpower, to impose its brand of democracy on America?

The UN was even used by Saddam Hussein to frustrate American efforts

in the Middle East “Russia, France and China-all permanent members ofthe U.N Security Council-were the top three countries in which individ-uals, companies or entities received the lucrative vouchers to sell Iraqi oil.Hussein’s goal was to provide financial incentives so that these nations woulduse their influence to help undermine the economic sanctions placed onIraq after the 1991 war At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the fivepermanent members and foment international public support of Iraq atthe U.N and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaignand an extensive diplomatic effort.”32Had Russia and France not protectedSaddam from having to comply with the United Nations’ resolutions, thenmultilateralism might have worked

But in the current state of international ethics, how could it work? ing to Paul Volker’s investigation of the UN’s corrupt oil-for-food pro-gram, Russia had the most companies involved followed by France It can

Accord-be no surprise that Russia and France were Saddam’s strongest defenders

on the UN Security Council.33Furthermore, French diplomat Jean-BernardMerimee, once France’s ambassador to the United Nations, has been accused

by Volker of accepting substantial bribes from Saddam Hussein in the form

of rights to barrels of oil under the Oil for Food scandal In light of this,France’s defense of the Iraqi dictator, its calls for multilateralism and con-sensus, take on a very different appearance That France had a hiddenagenda is clear; and so did other nations It is the persistence of hidden

The Transatlantic Trap 381

agendas in multinational forums that make unrealistic proposals for greaterreliance on multilateralism to curb global dangers and ills (such as repressiveregimes)

Na¨ıve idealism that denies the reality of corruption and self-dealing thatpermeates the United Nations is dangerous because it plays into the hands ofour adversaries There is however, a less na¨ıve idealism which its supporterslabel aspirational realism which seeks modest improvements in the UnitedNations, while being cautious about potential pitfalls Its proponent, MichaelGlennon, contends that America’s decision to unilaterally act in Iraq was pre-cipitated by the de facto collapse of the UN, and argues that the UN can only

be salvaged by radically reconstructing the institution so that its “laws” areconsonant with the operative cultures of the international community Theselaws may contain an aspirational element, but idealism cannot go beyondthe bounds which invalidate the law through confusion Glennon also main-tains national will is more legitimate than that of the United Nations becausethe UN, like the EU, is no more than an expression of bureaucratic prefer-ences while the will of nation states is based on popular will as expressed indemocratic processes.34

When the UN has acted effectively (Korea in the 1950s, Iraq in the early1990s), it has been by giving the job to the United States The UN is powerless

on its own So what supporters of UN-based multilateralism mean by therule of international law is that American power should be harnessed to thepolitical decisions of the UN This is all it can mean

“To the principle that human dignity is dependent on the physical power

of nations to defend themselves, these organizations [UN etc.] and theirspokesmen inveterately prefer the quixotic quest for pan-acceptance of uni-versal legal principles In recent year, we have repeatedly seen the perverseeffects of this disposition Pitting the humanitarians against the very societiesthat have striven the hardest to abide by legal principles it has aligned

them instead with terrorists .”35

Strategic Independence requires that United States should cease trying

to cogovern with others including the United Nations and the EuropeanUnion As a substitute, we should co-coordinate The difference is that weare compelled to seek consensus in the first instance, risking the kind ofobstructionism we encountered with Iraq, but can operate independently

in the latter case The advantage of co-coordination is that we can garnerthe benefit of working with others, without getting too entangled

But if we are to assert the independence of our decision-making in national affairs, then we must be all the more careful about what we choose

inter-to do And here there is great danger that we will go inter-too far

382 Leading Toward Peace

Focusing on security cooperation rather than multilateralism does notmean that our usual posture with respect to other nations is confrontation(as it was over the Iraqi issue) Instead, cooperation is desirable and oftenpossible; but where there is an impasse which threatens our vital interests,

we must be prepared to act unilaterally

After cataloging the changing fortunes of American alliances with othercountries, showing that disagreements have continually reoccurred, evenwith such staunch allies as Britain (over the Suez invasion by Britain in the1950s and the Grenada invasion by America in the 1980s, for example),Dov Zakheim comments, “Does all this mean that ‘there are no alliances,only interests?’ Not at all The distinction is a false one All states haveinterests, and when their interests converge often enough they will formalliances Rarely, if ever, will interests converge all of the time, over years anddecades When some aspect of those interests diverge, the ties that bindalliances might fray, but are unlikely to come apart if underlying common-alities remain intact.”36

The United States should pursue adaptive, nonentangling engagement.America is not the only nation interested in restraining nuclear proliferation,suppressing nonstate terrorists, and coping with Russia and China, so that

we will find allies for each of these purposes We need not tie our handsfurther by a flawed form of multilateralism

The United States should give no one (not an ally, not the United Nations)

a veto over our national security We should be prepared to extend theprinciple of cooperation, but within reasonable bounds We must not bebound to rules the Europeans try to impose on us

Our political leaders repeatedly must assert that the UN is only a sultative body, and sometimes provides services that we can oppose, orrefuse to accept or fund What it is that we really oppose is “stealth worldgovernance” – the real problem we have with multilateralism Multilateral-ism can be easily tamed by our president repudiating wishful thinking about

con-it Likewise the Administration should desanctify the UN by describing it

as a forum for rivals to America, and doing so without without reproach ormalice – simply being honest with the American people

CHAPTER 16: KEY POINTS

1 Cooperating with other countries to build a better world is a centralelement of wishful thinking, and it is fraught with danger for America

if it is taken too far

The Transatlantic Trap 383

2 Other countries have hidden agendas and often consider our attempts

to defend our citizens from attack as nothing more than an expression

of American self-interest

3 Proposals to subordinate our Strategic Independence to a ist approach are therefore very dangerous for us, and we should rejectthem

multilateral-4 To accept a multilateralist limitation on our freedom of action is toseriously underreach in the current international situation

The Middle Course

We are living in contentious era of probes and provocations without theideological crispness of the Cold War There will be a new wave of domi-nance seeking in various regions of the world, and clashes over the control

of natural resources, especially oil Changes will be required because ofpopulation and economic dynamics, and the resultant political dynamics –there are nations with population growth and limited resources; otherswith population decline and enormous resources; nations with growingeconomic and military power but little geopolitical influence, and otherswith declining economic and military power but substantial geopoliticalinfluence

The great challenge, therefore, is how to manage international relations

so that peace is maintained among continual pressures toward conflict; andthis requires a method of altering the status quo, because failure to do sosimply causes pressures to build until there are explosions into conflict Theinternational system (e.g., the UN) today is designed to maintain the statusquo and so engenders conflict; it is not a means of resolution

America should follow a middle course in which we neither try to inate the world via military supremacy and a utopian effort to spread oursystems of politics and economics everywhere, nor look for safety in a falselyidealistic multilateralism Our middle course involves Strategic Indepen-dence and modesty in reach and action

dom-ADJUSTING TO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE WORLD

“ Governments have an interest in preserving the current international

order and thus play by the rules Terrorists want to overturn the existing

order and therefore break the rules.”1

384

The Middle Course 385

This is a very clear statement of a fundamental danger, but it also revealsanother problem whose significance the author misses – that governmentstend to try at all cost to maintain the status quo, and so rigidify the world.Yet peace cannot be maintained in the form of an unchanging status quo,because the impact of different economic cultures is to drive the worldapart – and adjustments will have to be made Unless necessary changes can

be made peacefully, attempts will be made to achieve them by force

Adjustment to change is required by major economic and demographicchanges that have been described previously in this book Failure of theinternational order to adjust peacefully probably will yield open conflicts.But the international system is designed for stability, not change The geo-political status quo (including membership in key international organiza-tions, even national borders) cannot be maintained in the face of what arenow enormous shifts in relative economic and demographic power, and theinternational system has no way to adjust to these changes Maintaining thestatus quo is a likely recipe for war caused by frustrating growing powers.Hence, the United States should sponsor change

But there is a paradox The necessary changes are likely to strengthen theemerging powers, like China, so that we face the danger of strengtheningour adversaries before a conflict and tempting them thereby to conflict viathe opportunity

So, if we don’t make changes, there is an increased likelihood of conflict;and if we do, there is an increased likelihood of conflict If this is an accuratereading of the situation, then conflict is virtually inevitable The internalcausal dynamics (the logic inherent in a situation) is very important; itdictates resultant events no matter what are the ephemeralities of day today politics and international relations The logic in the situation of rapidand significant global change in economics and demographics is conflict,and only how well we are able to sponsor necessary change will lessen thelikelihood of conflict

Change on a large scale inevitability creates tensions, reinforces rivalriesand leads to conflict among nations This is happening now Our nationalleadership has two responsibilities:

r To be sure we prevail in any contest in which we get involved; and

r To try to limit the scope of conflict so that as little damage occurs aspossible

Our public culture senses the danger, but it presumes that deprivation isthe principle cause of conflict and expects convergence to resolve the mat-ter But this is a primitive, na¨ıve, and inadequate conceptualization – more

386 Leading Toward Peace

important than economic deprivation as a cause of international conflictare the changes in demographics and national power which we’ve identified

in this book

Interestingly, the American business world confronted a similar challengecreated by the necessity for change beginning almost a half century agowhen international competition began to heighten in the American market.Survival of our companies required considerable change To get flexibility,the business community weakened the power of the unions (a force forthe industrial status quo), achieved employee relations stability (we havefew strikes now), and then shifted its focus to managing change Unionstrength was a casualty of the process, and business greed is blamed, butpeople know there’s more to it than that – hence the continuing discussion

in Europe about a need for acceptance of productivity enhancing reforms

by unions A similar shift of focus is needed in international relations The

UN may possibly be a casualty as the unions have been That is, unions were

a force for status quo in industry and as a time of major change came on,they declined; the UN is a force for status quo in the world, and as a time ofmajor change comes on, its influence is likely to decline

The challenge for the United States is to lead necessary changes within

in a peaceful mode To do that we have to objectively assess various tions and address them early with imaginative and realistic solutions, whileconfronting early on states that might try to bring about changes throughwar

situa-Unfortunately, there are people who are averse to facing reality Theyaren’t pathological, and when things become unbearable they master theiraversions, but by delaying find themselves at a serious disadvantage As apeople, we find ourselves in that position because of our public culture; and

we threaten to enmesh our president in the same neurotic unwillingness toface reality

Winston Churchill condemned democracies of the 1920s and 1930s forlack of “persistence and conviction” leading to a great war beginning on avery unsatisfactory basis (note that the condemnation is dual – not just thatlack of persistence and conviction led to war, but that it led to war from

a position of weakness).2 The American government today is subject tocondemnation for a lack of objectivity caused by our public culture possiblyleading to war on an equally unsatisfactory basis in the future In both casesthe basic failing is the inability to confront emerging antagonists while theyare weak, thereby insuring a conflict when they become strong

A significant peril is something that endangers the survival of our nation,like conquest by a foreign power and occupation by foreign troops; or to

The Middle Course 387

see much of the nation physically destroyed and millions dead; or to loseself-government and have liberty extinguished; or to cease to be our ownmasters; or to have our people dispossessed and condemned to penury andservitude A significant danger is to experience what happened to Greece atthe hands of Rome; or to Constantinople at the hands of the Turks Theseare significant risks

There loom on the horizon rival nations with the potential to do thesethings to the United States Russia has the capability to level our cities withnuclear weapons (not just one or two cities, which is the potential of terrorists

at their worst, but all of our cities); China is building the capability to do so

FINDING A GRAND STRATEGY

If we are to be successful in changing the game in grand politics from one ofpredatory exploitation of the vulnerable – whether politically or militarilyexposed – to one of problem solution, then we require a grand strategy

Today our country has no grand strategy, though one – Strategic pendence – is knocking at our door A key reason that we have no grandstrategy is that we have trouble recognizing one We have a concept of anobjective, but not of a strategy to achieve it We confuse the objective with astrategy For example, there’s been a consensus among our political partiesand politicians that the United States is both an Asian and European powerand is the keystone to security in those regions Our objective is peace, and

Inde-we recognize a responsibility that the American people are today willing toaccept and that requires us to maintain certain levels of military force

But this is not a strategy; at best it’s that part of a strategy that involves anassessment of the context and an overall objective It’s simply a statement ofthe continuing desirability of global engagement for United States, but saysnothing at all about its terms It’s therefore seriously deficient By default,our grand strategy continues to have at its core Mutual Assured Destruction.It’s via MAD that we hope to preserve peace among great powers; and peaceamong the great powers is our most important objective

The core of the inadequacy of this notion at the level of grand strategy isits failure to recognize that the international context no longer permits thekind of stability the bipolar world of the Cold War permitted How then are

we to maintain stability – and if we can’t, how should our objective changeand what should be the means to accomplish it? A strategy must have bothends and means

At the level not of objectives but of means, America also faces a deepconfusion about missile defense – we have been told that it is necessary to

388 Leading Toward Peace

counter a threat from rogue states; it follows that its target is not Russia orChina, so it is natural to seek to limit the system which we build so that itdoesn’t disturb Russia and China But then our logic adds a caveat – unlessthe intentions of Russia or China are hostile

And this, of course, makes no sense How is a limited NMD created solely

to deal with rogue states in the Crescent of Fire and North Korea to counterRussian and Chinese weaponry, should either of those states prove hostile?

It cannot

This is a failure to think through the implications of the new global context

of instability

America faces a host of objective threats that need to be addressed

Danger number 1 is Russia because it has so many nuclear weapons and

is corrupt and unstable

Danger number 2 is China because there is likely a fundamental conflictbetween our interests and theirs in Asia that cannot be resolved throughtrade and economic integration

Danger number 3 is nuclear proliferation and other weapons of massdestruction.3

Danger number 4 is terrorism, states in the Crescent of Fire and nuclearproliferation – a witch’s brew of substantial size all its own

Danger number 5 is the general and increasing instability caused by thewidening gap between countries that are growing rapidly and those that arestagnant or declining

A grand strategy links our policies with respect to these diverse situationsinto a coherent whole It would have long term elements that should bepursued both in the short-run and in the future It is crucial to recognizethat the means are different in the two time frames

Diplomats and most politicians focus on the short term, and often thinkthat the long-term is nothing more than a series of short terms Whilediscussing China Henry Kissinger observed, “Here the challenge to statecraft

is to ‘navigate’ toward a workable formula where Taiwan will not declareindependence unless attacked, and the People’s Republic will not attackunless Taiwan declares independence.”

The worst approach would be to attempt a clear resolution of the matter

“An attempt to achieve ‘a clear-cut solution will produce an explosion.’”4This is certainly the proper formulation for short-term peace But inthis approach ends and means are hopelessly confused and the principalmeans has become an end in itself– that is, the principal means is dialogue –

“navigation” – but to keep it going has become an end in itself That is, thechallenge for statecraft in Kissinger’s formulation is to avoid overt conflict

by keeping a process going The process has become the objective as there

The Middle Course 389

is no other objective than to avoid a more unpleasant result, and dialoguedoes that

Continuing dialogue as a principal means permits us to pursue our owninterests vigorously, generating resentment and desperation and therebysowing the seeds of war This is where the short- and long-term meansinterfere with one another If dialogue is both the short and long termmeans to peace, we will find that it becomes less and less effective until theunderlying conditions are such that dialogue no longer works and we stum-ble into war We need a more positive approach to the long term, one thatlessens the underlying causes of conflict The more positive approach is oneoffering partnership and gains to others and thereby avoiding war affirma-tively, not merely by dialogue, even where it is accompanied by rejection ofovert aggression ourselves Without a positive approach for the long term,the danger is that other nations will conclude that they have less to lose bywar than by peace

There is also the danger that dialogue becomes the preferred means ofthose who are complacent Satisfied with their position, they have no goal forwhich conflict can be risked; hence conflict is to be avoided as a goal in itself.This is true of the West today, but not of much of the rest of the world Thedisproportionate rates of economic growth and the maldistribution of newtechnology in the world promote anarchistic conflicts and invite growingpowers like China to dismember weak neighbors like Russia

A way out of the conflict of short and long term, and of means and ends, isoffered by having a clear grand strategy such as Strategic Independence andfederalist pluralism With a grand strategy we need only determine whatmeans is most likely to secure our strategy’s success

American foreign policy should recognize that over the next quarter tury Russia will weaken and shouldn’t be treated as an equal; while over thesame period China will strengthen and should be treated accordingly U.S.policy must begin now to favor the transition of Russia to a reduced sta-tus and of China to our principal rival, and we must manage it well orthe result will be disastrous At the core of the danger lies that moment

cen-in history when Russia’s leaders face up to the Chcen-inese threat to Russiaand the great issue for us is how to keep that confrontation from involving

us Because of our role in the world, we are likely not to be able to standaside – we will be drawn in as we’ve been drawn into the broad politicalconflict that is raging in the Middle East Hence, we must try to defuse thesituation early

What is America’s overall foreign policy objective with respect to the othergreat powers, declining and emergent? We have to get our overall purposeright, or we will stumble into conflicts that might have been avoided

390 Leading Toward Peace

Avoidance of a major war involving an exchange of nuclear missiles is theover-riding objective Everything else is subordinate to this goal Preventingterrorist attacks on our homeland is a moral imperative, but even it must

be subordinate to the goal of preventing a nuclear holocaust Advancingdemocracy and free enterprise capitalism are legitimate goals, but they alsoshould be much subordinate to avoiding nuclear war

RESPONDING TO RUSSIA

The first step toward responsible action is to acknowledge that Russiaisn’t what we wish it to be Its leaders aren’t enlightened rationalists anddemocrats committed to maximizing consumer welfare with generally com-petitive markets under a rule of law Russian culture is a complex mix ofauthoritarianism and unprincipled opportunism that rejects a democraticrule of law When the autocrat is strong, Russia tends to be a potent militarysuperpower When the autocrat is weak, as were Gorbachev and Yeltsin,opportunism comes to the fore Asset-grabbing (so-called privatization),racketeering (the Russian “mafia”) and countless other swindles become theorder of the day

Russia’s leaders desire the advantages of Western industrial ization as they did during the Soviet era, and seek the benefits of partialmarketization, but still cling to the authoritarian martial police state Theyembrace the rhetoric of liberalism and popular self-determination, whileacting like autocrats They know what should be done to achieve the ideas

modern-of the West, but what will they do? The answer for the last half nium has been to profess Western populist ideals but act as apostles ofthe authoritarian martial police state, and this still seems the most likelycourse

millen-The West would do best by predicating its policies on the recognitionthat Russia is “abnormal;” recognizing that tsarist and communist Russianever experienced the Enlightenment, and that the Russian system posesextraordinary risks to itself and others.5It is more politically unstable, vio-lence prone, predatory, and imperial than the West Moscow will continue

to modernize as it has in the past, but won’t Westernize in our lifetime, norwill it play by U.S and EU rules of international engagement

American policy makers have been intent on attempting a partnershipwith Russia A recent formulation of American policy by Thomas Graham

of the National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President(Senior Director for Russian Affairs) illustrates the quixoticness of the West’sapproach He talks of a strategic partnership that is making progress andurges further measures to strengthen it.6

The Middle Course 391

America should reverse field We have acted decisively before, mostnotably on the ABM Treaty, NATO enlargement, and the denuclearization

of the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union We can build andemploy the force needed to contain Russia, but the EU cannot because it isreluctant to construct, maintain, and use the military means essential forachieving its vision of a post-modern world order.7This asymmetry bodesill It seems that even if Washington and Brussels see Moscow for what it

is, divergent aspirations and attitudes will make it difficult to devise prehensive diplomatic strategies, even though well-informed commentatorssuch as Zbigniew Brzezinski believe they can and must.8

com-If Russia develops a new generation of nuclear weapons and ballisticmissiles while we are paying billions to remove nuclear triggers from itsolder generation of weapons, we should stop the assistance – it’s doing uslittle or no good And of course if the Russian leadership can’t convincinglydemonstrate that they are becoming democrats under a rule of law, we shouldguard against their irrationalism with Strategic Independence, secure in theknowledge that they can’t compete with our overall defense capability

We should not appease the Russian leadership Only by being dry-eyedand resolute can we gradually influence Russia’s culture and turn it in ourdirection These prescriptions assume that we really want to integrate Russiainto the new global order, and don’t want to prey on its vulnerabilities

by enticing Kremlin elites into accepting NATO expansion in return for

“no-questions-asked” assistance We appreciate that skilled Western policymakers can simultaneously play at many levels, but believe that where nuclearsecurity is concerned we should restrain our power-seeking impulse, andlead by example

RESPONDING TO CHINA

The lines for a confrontation over U.S policy in East Asia are being drawnnow On one side the liberal establishment (with the EU as its ally) and therapidly growing part of our business community (especially WalMart) whohave investments in China – all ensconced in the public culture; on the otherside the current administration, the military-industrial complex, the Japanand Taiwan-oriented part of the American business community (the old

“China lobby) now estranged from the public culture; and not yet persuaded

as to either view, the cautious electorate of the nation’s midsection (the oldMidwest) – which now holds the balance of political power in the country.The shift in American thinking about China started about five years ago whenthe Asian specialists suddenly abandoned Japan for China Asian specialistsare influential; for example, John Hopkins regularly arranges Congressional

392 Leading Toward Peace

trips through its facilities in Nanjing When the shift occurred five years ago,the leading force was the government funding institutions, not individualscholars, who were dumbfounded

The first clear statement of one side of the conflicting views appeared

in an editorial in the New York Times of May 6, 2005 “Japan: For years,

the United States has urged Tokyo to cast off its postwar pacifism and play

a larger role in regional defense Japan’s current prime minister, JunichiroKoizumi, is happy to oblige But he has combined a more assertive militarystance with an embrace of right-wing nationalism that offends and alarmsthe Asian nations that suffered wartime Japanese aggression and atrocities.His repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo have been particularlyprovocative; the shrine is where top Japanese war criminals are among thehonored and the country’s Asian conquests are celebrated.”9

This position condemns a democratic ally of the United States (Japan) foralleging offending the communist authoritarian government of China It is

a consequence of the insistence that China isn’t really authoritarian – thatit’s modernizing and liberalizing – and should be encouraged on that path

by helpful consideration from us Regarding Koizumi and the war memorialshrine, this is entirely pretextual by China because Koizumi is opposed tomilitarism

The Times has picked up the Chinese line on Asian geopolitics completely,

and doesn’t hesitate to directly urge the United States to accommodate theChinese reach for more power in the region All this is fully consistent withand supported by the American public culture with its wishful thinkingabout convergence and harmonization

Yet, in this environment, the Bush administration is strengthening ican military forces in East Asia, ostensibly directed against North Korea,but actually against China (this is especially evident if one thinks of NorthKorea as a satellite or protectorate of China – which the administrationfor diplomatic reasons will not acknowledge) Faced with our public cul-ture, the president shies away from being candid about the real situation –Chinese assertiveness, the increasing squeeze China is placing on Japan,the simultaneous Chinese peace offensive, North Korean militance as anexpression of part of Chinese policy, and the U.S military buildup inresponse – and instead says little, risking public confusion should hostilitiesbreak out

Amer-Although our government seems uncertain which course to pursue,the Chinese have calculated, probably correctly, that our government willaccommodate American business interests and so decide in China’s favor.With respect to China there are essentially three approaches being sug-gested for American policy, if one considers a policy to be composed of trade

The Middle Course 393

and security One approach is to press trade and manage security conflicts

as they arise This approach is supported by the major nations in southeastAsia

Goh Chok Tong, senior minister of Singapore, at a conference aboutsoutheast Asia, commented: “Great power competition and rivalry are facts

of life. It was the stability generated by American power that provided the

foundation for East Asia’s prosperity and development. American power

will provide the overarching strategic unity within which the interaction ofChinese, Indian and Japanese interests with American interests will be anincreasingly important factor. There are voices in the US that argue

that it is better to deal with China now when it is relatively weak ratherthan after it has become strong This is dangerously myopic To treat China

as an enemy will only arouse Chinese nationalism and make China anenemy The rest of the region will not play this game It is not in our interest,nor the world’s There need not be any fundamental conflict between the

US and China.”10He then refers to differences about trade and economicsystems, saying they are not fundamental Gone is any reference to greatpower competition and rivalry, which before he had labeled a fact of life.Here wishful thinking again engages us, and we are told that China will be

an antagonist only if we are hostile – so that we are to blame for somethingwhich in reality we do not control, or perhaps even effect It is unlikelythat China’s leaders are merely awaiting evidence of U.S attitudes beforedeciding their policy Our problem is to ferret out Chinese intentions, and

to protect ourselves if they are hostile Can we rely on Mr Goh’s assurancesthat Chinese intentions are benign?

Conflict isn’t inevitable, no matter what China does There is always quiescence In this sense Mr Goh is right And he has a point about the

ac-“The American Peace.” But as we know from history this isn’t enough; thepeacemaker can always be challenged

The United States should not be provocative A national missile defense

to achieve Strategic Independence allows us to be more tolerant of Chinesemilitary modernization because it reduces the threat to us If it is necessary

to sugarcoat our efforts to defend ourselves for diplomatic purposes, thenAmerica can suggest, as it is doing, that missile defense is necessary againsttactical and strategic ballistic missiles – with or without nuclear warheads –that might be delivered by Iran and Islamic fundamentalists But this shouldonly be done if Congress supports the ruse, and resists gutting the Chinesecomponent of the program

A second approach is to quarantine China both economically and tarily and to prepare to confront it militarily with a view toward the collapse

mili-of the current dictatorship

394 Leading Toward Peace

A third approach is to press for continued development of trade, whilepressing China to renounce military expansion by demonstrating its inef-fectiveness This is the course America should follow.11

The importance of the Iraqi wars to the honing of American large-scalemilitary performance should not be underestimated, and is not lost on ourpotential rivals The First Gulf War taught our military that large numbers

of main battle tanks take too much supply to be able to go as far and asfast as needed; and similarly for masses of infantry Hence, in the First GulfWar, the coalition deployed some seven hundred thousand troops In thesecond a different coalition deployed only about 120,000 But the secondwas more successful than the first In the first coalition forces stopped onthe way to Baghdad and left Saddam Hussein in power, partly for politicalreasons (we’d promised the other coalition members that our only objective

in the war was to liberate Kuwait and that had been achieved), but partlybecause we were unable to supply columns of tanks rushing on Baghdad Inthe second war, columns of fewer tanks were followed closely by a massivesupply column, going fast and very deep into the enemy heartland, andoutrunning his ability to successfully resist But we learned in that exercisethat the supply columns are vulnerable to attack by irregular troops, andpresumably our next conflict will see preparations made for better protection

of supply columns

The Iraqi war has had its effect on the opinions of others America’sdemonstration of the reality of the Revolution in Military Affairs has per-suaded the Chinese, probably among others, that China cannot win a con-ventional war against the United States outside mainland China This isexactly the opposite of the military situation prevailing at the time of theKorean War (1950–1953) when we were unable to defeat Chinese Commu-nist forces conventionally and General Douglas McArthur, commanding ourforces, suggested that we employ nuclear weapons President Harry Trumandeclined the suggestion, removed General McArthur for this recommenda-tion and other reasons (including his perceived rudeness to the President),and Truman’s successor, President Dwight Eisenhower, settled for a draw inKorea Today, instead, Chinese military leadership acknowledges that it can-not win a conventional against the United States, and instead suggests that itshould employ nuclear weapons “If the Americans draw their missiles andposition-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China’s territory, Ithink we will have to respond with nuclear weapons,” the official, Maj Gen.Zhu Chenghu, said at an official briefing “‘War logic’ dictates that a weakerpower needs to use maximum efforts to defeat a stronger rival,” he said,speaking in fluent English “We have no capability to fight a conventional

The Middle Course 395

war against the United States,” General Zhu said “We can’t win this kind

of war.”12As the Chinese move toward this tactical conclusion, it becomesmore important that the United States seek to deny them the additionallong-range nuclear missile capability they are now seeking

A conflict between the two strands of this policy occurs when Americancompanies want to sell to China items that have important defense impli-cations – especially computer technology (both hardware and software)

We should refuse very firmly on this, so long as China is seeking to buildstrategic missiles that can be targeted on us

The third approach has an instinctive appeal to many Americans, but isviable only as part of an overall strategy of Strategic Independence Other-wise, it is merely an invitation to an arms race – one that unfortunately isalready beginning – as the Chinese attempt to develop nuclear missiles thatcan hit the entire mainland of the United States

The same approach first adopted to the Soviet Union has an tive appeal to many in dealing with China, but here the situation is bothworse and better It’s worse because China’s authoritarian free enterprisemakes it a more potent competitor than the Soviet Union And it’s betterbecause the success of China’s commercial sector could gradually modify itsauthoritarianism Under these circumstances it is worth applying carrots andsticks Commercial relations should be encouraged on a strictly equitablebasis without appeasement, and U.S commitment to its Asian allies should

instinc-be resolute We should develop and deploy the weapons needed to deterthe Chinese from developing or using modernized nuclear weaponry Thisapproach may stabilize the region and make free enterprise more desirable

to China than regional aggression

The Bush Administration’s national missile defense proposal announced

in the spring of 2002 is justified as an initiative against rogue states, and in

so defending the proposal the Administration has fallen into a trap of itsown devising To lend credence to its otherwise suspicious claim that missiledefense is justified by rogue states, the proposal for national missile defensewas coupled with a call to reduce America’s nuclear arsenal to fifteen hundredballistic missile warheads Unfortunately, this would assure China reachesparity with America in strategic nuclear capability in short order, given therate at which China is now building missiles This would be a disastrousresult for America, though, as we have pointed out previously, it might bewelcomed by supporters of MAD, for whom a balance of nuclear force is aprerequisite to the careful calculation of risk and reward that MAD requires

to have any hope of success The Administration does not suggest that itfavors strengthening China vis-`a-vis America in the nuclear arms arena in

396 Leading Toward Peace

order to preserve MAD, but it may well be twisting itself into exactly thatposition

The proper objective for the United States is to so develop our offensiveand defensive capability that we deter the Chinese from building additionalstrategic weapons capability – not that we deter them from using their capa-bility once it is built The distinction is crucial MAD argues for our acceptingthe Chinese buildup of strategic missile capability and then count on mutu-ally assured destruction to deter them from using it Strategic Independence

is a step ahead of MAD It seeks to deter the Chinese from building additionalstrategic missile capability in the first place

We are not advocating an arms race with the Chinese or the Russians,yet by its emphasis on retaining current American military superiority theAdministration seems to have accepted the need to outbuild both Russiaand China If the United States adheres to the Bush Doctrine’s emphasis onmilitary superiority, then when the Russians initiate mass rearmament withfifth-generation weapons in 2006 (as stated in Putin’s official defense reformprogram), all hell will break loose as we strive for the first time to race theRussians in earnest Again, we repeat that the United States did not reallyengage in an arms race with the Soviet Union, but relied instead on a differ-ent configuration of arms and diplomacy to counter the Soviet buildup –and we should do the same again Similarly, we should not race China inthe building of nuclear missiles What we should do, and what StrategicIndependence means, is so configure our defense capability and diplomaticinitiatives that we either dissuade the Russians and Chinese from buildups, or manage our way through the Russian’s likely cycle (up and down

in two decades ahead), and seek to defuse the Chinese threat via missiledefense

SHOULDER OR SHED: ARE WE SUITED TO BE A HYPERPOWER?

Americans have certain very good attitudes for our role as citizens of theworld’s only superpower, including a new maturity and willingness to bearthe costs human and financial of our defense in a world in which we are both

a leader and a target Unfortunately, we have five very significant limitations:

r significant illusions about the world;

r media and politicians that exaggerate dangers and objectives;

r a temptation to overreach;

r an overreliance on our military; and

r a preference for inexperienced leaders.

The Middle Course 397

According to a historian of the British Empire, the “most burning question

of American politics is, should the United States seek to shed or shoulderthe imperial load it has inherited?” By “imperial load” he doesn’t mean atraditional, or colonial, empire “The US will always be a reluctant ruler ofother people.”13

The answer to the question of shoulder or shed lies in the suitability ofthe American nation to leadership in the world Are we are able to be thesole superpower, to act in leadership of the world? Have we the nationalcharacteristics to do it? The supreme issue is what role American can playsuccessfully? This formulation of the issue may seem an error to some, whoask if the supreme issue isn’t rather what role we wish to play? The questionreflects the tendency to overreach in American thought – the notion is that if

we chose to play a role, however ambitious, we can do it This is a dangerousnotion We must decide what role we can play successfully and limit ourselves

to that

If we are not suited for the role of sole superpower, then the case forour substantial disarmament and retrenchment in the world is very muchstrengthened; and the case for Strategic Independence is thereby very muchweakened

The core of this issue is for people to set aside their preferences aboutthe question of America’s role in the world, and ask simply whether, if wechose to pursue Strategic Independence as a superpower, we could do soeffectively?

America’s primary strengths as it addresses its role as the sole superpowerare:

r A new maturity in our commitment to the role;

r A willingness to bear the defense burden;

r A new realism about the world and its dangers; and

r A well-led, well-equipped military.

This book has already addressed our nation’s strengths It’s time now todispassionately assess its weaknesses

The argument against the suitability of America to be a superpower suming that it wishes to do so) is that the political and social environment

(pre-in America makes it impossible for us to be effective There are four majorindictments:

1 Lack consensus on national self-interest, lack of proportion in ment, and lack of historical knowledge and perspective, so that we