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DUE PROCESS OF LAW Due process of law is a fundamental, constitu-tional guarantee that all legal proceedings will be fair and that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an oppo

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or parents while he or she is under twenty-one years of age, or as the result of a naturalization obtained on his or her behalf while under

21 years of age by a parent, guardian, or authorized agent, unless the individual fails to enter the United States to establish a permanent residence prior to the 25th birthday

The treaty between the United States and the foreign nation determines whether the individual may maintain the dual citizenship

if he or she elects to retain the U.S citizenship,

or may lose his or her foreign citizenship and remain only a U.S citizen

DUCES TECUM [Latin, Bring with you.] Commonly called a subpoena duces tecum, a type of legal writ requiring one who has been summoned to appear in court to bring some specified item with him or her for use

or examination by the court

A person served with aSUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

might be required to present documents, such

as business records or other pieces of physical evidence, for the inspection of the court

DUE Just; proper; regular; lawful; sufficient; reasonable,

as in the phrases due care, due process of law, due notice

Owing; payable; justly owed That which one contracts to pay or perform to another; that which law or justice requires to be paid or done Owed, or owing, as distinguished from payable A debt is often said to be due from a person where he or she is the party owing it, or primarily bound to pay, whether the time for payment has or has not arrived The same thing is true of the phrase due and owing

The term due is essentially contextual in nature and has various legal applications, all of which involve the sufficiency or reasonableness

of an action or obligation

Due care is the use of the requisite amount

of caution needed in a particular set of circum-stances based upon what a reasonably prudent person would do under similar circumstances

Exercising due care while driving might mean obeying traffic regulations

Due consideration is the proper weight or significance given to a matter or a factor as circumstances mandate It may also have app-lication in sufficiency of consideration in the law of contracts

DUE DATE The particular day on or before which something must be done to comply with law or contractual obligation

DUE NOTICE Information that must be given or made available

to a particular person or to the public within a legally mandated period of time so that its recipient will have the opportunity to respond to a situation

or to allegations that affect the individual’s or public’s legal rights or duties

Due notice is not a fixed period of time in every instance but varies from case to case, depending upon the facts and the applicable statutory requirements In some situations, it might be a specified time; in others, it might

be considered a REASONABLE TIME, thereby pre-senting a QUESTION OF FACT in a lawsuit to determine if timely notice has been given

DUE PROCESS OF LAW Due process of law is a fundamental, constitu-tional guarantee that all legal proceedings will

be fair and that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the government acts to take away one’s life, liberty, or property Also, a constitutional guaran-tee that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary,

or capricious

The constitutional guarantee of due process

of law, found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S Constitution, prohi-bits all levels of government from arbitrarily or unfairly depriving individuals of their basic constitutional rights to life, liberty, and pro-perty The due process clause of the FIFTH AMENDMENT, ratified in 1791, asserts that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This amendment restricts the powers of the federal government and applies only to actions by it The due process clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, ratified in 1868, declares, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law” (§ 1) This clause limits the powers of the states, rather than those of the federal government The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has also been interpreted by the U.S Supreme Court in the twentieth century to incorporate protections of the BILL OF RIGHTS,

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so that those protections apply to the states as

well as to the federal government Thus, the

due process clause serves as the means whereby

the Bill of Rights has become binding on

state governments as well as on the federal

government

The concept of due process originated in

EnglishCOMMON LAW The rule that individuals

shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without notice and an opportunity to defend

themselves predates written constitutions and

was widely accepted in England The Magna

Carta, an agreement signed in 1215 that defined

the rights of English subjects against the king, is

an early example of a constitutional guarantee

of due process That document includes a clause

that declares,“No free man shall be seized, or

imprisoned… except by the lawful judgment of

his peers, or by the law of the land” (ch 39)

The phrase law of the land was later renamed

due process of law By the seventeenth century,

England’s North American colonies were

using the phrase “due process of law” in their

statutes

The application of constitutional due process

is traditionally divided into the two categories

of SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS and procedural due

process These categories are derived from a

distinction that is made between two types of

law.SUBSTANTIVE LAWcreates, defines, and regulates

rights, whereas PROCEDURAL LAW enforces those

rights or seeks redress for their violation Thus, in

the United States, substantive due process is

concerned with such issues asFREEDOM OF SPEECH

and privacy, whereas procedural due process is

concerned with provisions such as the right to

adequate notice of a lawsuit, the right to be

present during testimony, and the right to

an attorney

Substantive Due Process

The modern notion of substantive due process

emerged in decisions of the U.S Supreme Court

during the late nineteenth century In the 1897

case of Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 U.S 578, 17 S

Ct 427, 41 L Ed 832, the Court for the first

time used the substantive due process

frame-work to strike down a state statute Before that

time, the Court generally had used theCOMMERCE

CLAUSEor the contracts clause of the Constitution

to invalidate state legislation The Allgeyer case

concerned a Louisiana law that proscribed the

entry into certain contracts with insurance firms

in other states The Court found that the law

unfairly abridged the right to enter into lawful contracts, as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The next 40 years after Allgeyer were the heyday of what has been called the freedom-of-contract version of substantive due process

During those years, the Court often used the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to void state regulation of private industry, parti-cularly regarding terms of employment such as maximum working hours or minimum wages

In one famous case from that era, Lochner v

New York, 198 U.S 45, 25 S Ct 539, 49 L Ed

937 (1905), the Court struck down a New York law (N.Y Laws 1897, chapter 415, article 8, section 110) that prohibited employers from allowing workers in bakeries to be on the job more than ten hours per day and 60 hours per week The Court found that the law was not a valid exercise of the state’s POLICE POWER It wrote that it could find no connection between the number of hours worked and the quality

of the baked goods, thus finding that the law was arbitrary

In Allgeyer and Lochner and in other cases like them, the Court did not find that state legislatures had failed to enact their laws using the proper procedures, which would present

an issue of procedural due process Instead, it found that the laws themselves violated certain economic freedoms that inhered in the due process clause, specifically its protection of

A crowd demonstrates before a federal courthouse in Seattle, Washington, prior to

a hearing in which five detainees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service claimed that indefinite detention violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.

AP IMAGES

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liberty and what the Court described as freedom

or liberty of contract This freedom meant that individuals had the right to purchase or to sell labor or products without unreasonable interference by the government

This interpretation of the due process clause put the Court in direct opposition to many of the reforms and regulations passed by state legisla-tures during the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century Justices who were opposed to the Court’s position in such cases, including Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr and JOHN M.HARLAN, saw such rulings as unwarranted judicial activism

in support of a particular free-market ideology

During the 1930s the Court used the doctrine of substantive due process to strike down federal legislation as well, particularly legislation associated with then-president Franklin

D Roosevelt’s NEW DEAL In 1937 Roosevelt proposed a court-packing scheme in which Roosevelt sought to overcome Court opposition

to his programs by appointing additional justices Although the plan was never adopted, the Court quickly changed its position on substantive due process and other issues and began to uphold New Deal legislation At that time, a majority on the Court, including Chief Justice Charles E Hughes and JusticeBENJAMIN N

CARDOZO, abandoned the freedom-of-contract version of substantive due process

Even before the Court abandoned the freedom-of-contract approach to substantive due process, it began to explore using the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

to re-evaluate state laws and actions affecting civil freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights

Since the 1833 case of Barron v Baltimore,

32 U.S (7 Pet.) 243, 8 L Ed 672, the Court had interpreted the Bill of Rights as applying only

to the federal government Beginning in the 1920s, however, it began to apply the Bill of Rights to the states through the incorporation

of those rights into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment In Gitlow v New York,

268 U.S 652, 45 S Ct 625, 69 L Ed 1138 (1925), the Court ruled that the liberty guaran-tee of the Fourguaran-teenth Amendment’s due process clause protects FIRST AMENDMENT free speech from STATE ACTION In Near v Minnesota, 283 U.S 697, 51 S Ct 625, 75 L Ed 1357 (1931), the Court found that FREEDOM OF THE PRESSwas also protected from state action by the due process clause, and it ruled the same with regard

to freedom ofRELIGION in Cantwell v Connecti-cut, 310 U.S 296, 60 S Ct 900, 84 L Ed 1213 (1940)

Because incorporation has proceeded grad-ually, with some elements of the Bill of Rights still unincorporated, it has also been called selective incorporation Nevertheless, during the twentieth century, most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-ment, thereby protecting individuals from arbitrary actions by state as well as federal governments

By the 1960s the Court had extended its interpretation of substantive due process to include rights and freedoms that are not spe-cifically mentioned in the Constitution but that, according to the Court, extend or derive from existing rights These rights and freedoms include the freedoms of association and non-association, which have been inferred from the First Amendment’s freedom-of-speech provi-sion, and the right to privacy The right to privacy, which has been derived from the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, has been an especially controversial aspect of substantive due process First established in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 85 S Ct 1678, 14

L Ed 2d 510 (1965), the Court later used it to protect a woman’s decision to have anABORTION

free from state interference, in the first trimester

of pregnancy (Roe v Wade, 410 U.S 113, 93

S Ct 705, 35 L Ed 2d 147[1973])

In several recent decisions, the U.S Supreme Court has considered the application

of substantive due process in light of actions taken by law enforcement officers It often has determined that police actions have not violated

a defendant’s due process rights In County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 U.S 833, 118 S Ct

1708, 140 L Ed 2d 1043 (1998), for example, the Court determined that high-speed chases

by police officers did not violate the due process rights of the suspects whom the officers were chasing In that case, two police officers had engaged in a pursuit of two young suspects at speeds of more than 100 miles per hour through

a residential neighborhood One of the young men died, while the other suffered serious injuries A unanimous Court held that the officers’ decision to engage in the pursuit had not amounted to “governmental arbitrariness” that the due process clause protects due to the

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nature of the judgment used by the officers

in such a circumstance

Lower federal courts have applied an

increas-ingly narrow interpretation of substantive due

process rights, which they say include only

fundamental rights, such as the rights to marry,

to have children, to direct the education and

upbringing of children, to marital privacy, to

the use of contraception, to bodily integrity, and

to abortion These courts have been

extre-mely reluctant to recognize any new due process

rights not already recognized by the U.S

Supreme Court For example, one federal court

ruled that the right to enter a public park is not

a right protected by the due process clause, and

thus a city could lawfully exclude a former sex

offender from visiting a municipal park after

the former offender was observed using

bino-culars to spy on other park patrons (Brown v

City of Michigan City, Indiana, 462 F.3d 720

[7th Cir 2006])

Procedural Due Process

A fundamental principle of procedural due

process is that notice be given to persons when

legal action is initiated against them so that they

may have the opportunity to defend themselves

in court Procedural due process is a concept

that applies in civil proceedings, criminal

pro-ceedings, and any other proceeding in which a

person may be deprived of life, liberty, or

pro-perty Procedural due process limits the exercise of

power by the state and federal governments by

requiring that they follow certain procedures

before taking adverse legal action against

some-one In cases where an individual has claimed

a violation of due process rights, courts must

determine whether the citizen is being deprived of

“life, liberty, or property,” and what procedural

protections are“due” to that individual

The Bill of Rights contains provisions that

are central to procedural due process These

protections give a person a number of rights

and freedoms in criminal proceedings,

includ-ing freedom from unreasonable searches and

seizures; freedom from DOUBLE JEOPARDY, or

being tried more than once for the same crime;

freedom from SELF-INCRIMINATION, or testifying

against oneself; the right to a speedy and public

trial by an impartial jury; the right to be told

of the crime being charged; the right to

cross-examine witnesses; the right to be represented

by an attorney; freedom from CRUEL AND

UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; and the right to demand

that the state prove any charges BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT In a series of U.S Supreme Court cases during the twentieth century, all of these rights were applied to state proceedings

In one such case, Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S 335, 83 S Ct 792, 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), the Court ruled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the

SIXTH AMENDMENT right to have an attorney in

“all criminal prosecutions,” including prosecu-tions by a state The case proved to be a watershed in establishing indigents’ rights to legal counsel

The U.S Supreme Court is more likely to find due process violations where the actions of

a government official are clearly arbitrary In City of Chicago v Morales, 527 U.S 41, 119 S

Ct 1849, 144 L Ed 2d 67 (1999), for example, the Court struck down a Chicago anti-gang ordinance as unconstitutional on due process grounds The ordinance allowed police officers

to break up any group of two or more persons whom they believed to be loitering in a public place, provided that the officer also believed that at least one member of the group was a gang member The ordinance had led to more than 43,000 arrests Because the ordinance did not draw the line between innocent and guilty behavior and failed to give guidance to police

on the matter, the ordinance violated the due process rights of the subjects of these break-ups

The Court held that because the ordinance gave absolute discretion to the police officers to determine what actions violated the ordinance,

it was an arbitrary restriction on personal liberty

in violation of the due process clause

In 2002 the Court found that arbitrary actions by a trial judge in aMURDERcase violated the due process rights of the DEFENDANT (Lee v

Kemna, 534 U.S 362, 122 S Ct 877, 151 L Ed

820 [2002]) In that case, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for driving the getaway car for a man who had pleaded guilty

to a murder charge in Kansas City, Missouri

The defendant claimed that he had been in California at the time of the murder, and four family members were to testify at trial that the defendant was not in Kansas City at the time

of the murder However, the family members left before they were expected to testify, and the defense could not locate them The defense asked the court for a short continuance of one

or two days, but the judge refused due to personal conflicts and a conflict with another

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trial Without the testimony of the family mem-bers, the defendant was convicted of murder The high court held that the judge’s arbitrary actions violated the defendant’s due process rights, and it vacated the defendant’s conviction

Procedural due process also protects indivi-duals from government actions in the civil,

as opposed to criminal, sphere The bedrock principle of procedural due process in civil cases

is the concept of notice Unlike criminal cases in which an individual’s liberty is at stake, plaintiffs

in civil cases bring legal actions to recover money

or property from another person, and the law guarantees that individuals be notified before this happens Hand-delivered personal notice

is the preferred method of providing notice of

a pending legal proceeding, but oftentimes hand-delivery is not possible Courts then wrestle with what type of notice will satisfy due process requirements

In Jones v Flowers, 547 U.S 220, 126 S Ct

1708, 164 L Ed 2d 415 (2006), the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a state must do more than serve

a tax forfeiture sale notice by certified mail when the certified letters are returned as unclaimed

The Court held that a state must take“additional reasonable steps” to provide homeowners with notice before taking their homes and selling them These steps include posting notice on a homeowner’s door and addressing mailings to

“occupant.” However, the Court cautioned that homeowners are not entitled to receive actual, hand-delivered notice, so long as reasonable steps have been taken to give notice

Lack of notice also played a key role in Philip Morris USA v Williams, 549 U.S 346, 127

S Ct 1057, 166 L Ed 2d 940 (2007), where the Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause prohibits juries from imposing PUNITIVE DAMAGES on a defendant for injuries that the defendant caused to persons who are not part

of a plaintiff’s lawsuit, even if those persons were in fact injured by the defendant and injured in a substantially similar way In a 5–4 decision written by Justice STEPHEN BREYER, the Court said that due process does not permit a defendant to be punished for harm inflicted upon “strangers to the litigation,” because defendants would lack sufficient notice to defend themselves against claims not specifically raised by the pleadings, and this would intro-duce an unacceptable amount of uncertainty into civil litigation

Procedural due process protections have been extended to include not only land and

PERSONAL PROPERTY, but also entitlements, includ-ing government-provided benefits, licenses, and positions Thus, for example, the Court has ruled that the federal government must hold hearings before terminating welfare benefits (Goldberg v Kelly, 397 U.S 254, 90 S Ct

1011, 25 L Ed 2d 287[1970]) Court decisions regarding procedural due process have exerted a great deal of influence over government proce-dures in prisons, schools, SOCIAL SECURITY, civil suits, and public employment

The U.S Supreme Court in Lujan v G&G Firesprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S 189, 121 S Ct 1446,

149 L Ed 2d 391 (2000), held that a state is not required to hold a hearing before withholding money and imposing penalties on a building contractor The California Division of Labor and Standards Enforcement determined that a building subcontractor had failed to pay the prevailing wage to workers who installed fire sprinklers in state buildings The California agency, without providing notice or a hearing, fined the general contractor, which in turn withheld money from the subcontractor The subcontractor, G&G Firesprinklers, sued the California agency, claiming that the agency had violated the company’s procedural due process rights The Court disagreed, holding that because the company could sue the agency for breach of contract, the fine did not constitute

a due process violation

FURTHER READINGS Cassel, Douglass W., Jr 2003 “Detention Without Due Process ” Chicago Daily Law Bulletin 149 (March 13) Gedicks, Frederick Mark 2009 “An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment ” Emory Law Journal 58.

Israel, Jerold H 2001 “Free-standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court ’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines.” St Louis University Law Journal 45 (spring).

Pennock, J Roland, and John W Chapman 1977 Due Process New York: New York Univ Press.

Wells, Michael L 2009 “State-Created Property and Due Process of Law: Filling the Void Left by Enguist v Oregon Department of Agriculture ” Georgia Law Review (Fall).

CROSS REFERENCES Criminal Procedure; Fifth Amendment; Incorporation Doctrine; Judicial Review; Labor Law; Right to Counsel; Substantive Due Process.

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The fighting of two persons, one against the other,

at an appointed time and place, due to an earlier

quarrel If death results, the crime is murder It

differs from an affray in this, that the latter occurs

on a sudden quarrel, while the former is always

the result of design

In dueling, the use of guns, swords (rapiers),

or other harmful weapons resolves quarrels

through trial by combat Duels used to occur

commonly between opposing individuals

seek-ing restitution or satisfaction outside the court

system In early U.S history, some members of

law enforcement attempted to treat dueling as a

crime, but the practice went mostly

unpun-ished However, with the results of one duel

especially—betweenAARON BURR and Alexander

Hamilton—the practice lost prestige in the

northern states Along with growing public

sentiment against dueling, new laws in the

mid-1800s finally treated the form of confrontation

as outright or attemptedHOMICIDE In states that

have not incorporated dueling into their

homi-cide statutes, dueling is now a crime punishable

by a fine or imprisonment, or both It is also

an offense in some states merely to give or

accept a challenge to engage in a duel

Around the time of the Revolutionary War,

dueling occurred in every state of the nation—

in some areas, regularly—for even relatively

slight offenses, such as insults, or to resolve

gambling disputes Few laws prohibited this

tradition inherited from the Old World, which

continued to evolve, even in Europe Although

no binding set of rules governed the proceedings

of a duel in the United States—largely, no doubt,

because dueling was outside the law—U.S

citizens adopted the European rules from their

ancestors

U.S citizens based their dueling codes on

the Code Duello of Ireland This Irish code

of 1777 contained twenty-six commandments

covering all aspects of a duel It included ways

to avert a duel, such as the manner in which

to apologize when one had committed a

duel-provoking offense If a duel could not be

avoided, the scenario was a familiar one: usually,

opponents would stand back-to-back, then pace

a set number of steps away from each other,

turn, and shoot The Code Duello declared,“The

aggressor must either beg pardon in expressed

terms… or fire on until a severe hit is received

by one party or the other.” In the United States,

less strict variations of the Code Duello allowed

the contest to end without bodily injury, providing for some form of public mockery for the contestant who sought to end the duel

Sometimes, U.S politicians made dueling

a sensational event Critics, such as THOMAS JEFFERSON andTHOMAS PAINE, wanted to make the practice punishable by law with the death penalty But others insisted on resorting to duels

in order to uphold their political reputation

Perhaps the most famous duel in U.S history was fought in 1804 between the Federalist leader

ALEXANDER HAMILTONand New England politician Aaron Burr The two had confronted and spoken harshly to each other for several years, beginning in 1791 Hamilton became furious with Burr during Burr’s unsuccessful campaign for a New York senate seat in 1792 He claimed that Burr had used dirty politics, and ridiculed Burr as “unprincipled and dangerous,” casting him as a power-hungry “embryo Caesar.”

When Burr aspired to become president in the

1800 election, Hamilton voted for Thomas Jefferson—an opponent of his own Federalist party—just for the principle of voting against Burr Burr settled for the vice presidency, and held a grudge for Hamilton’s disparaging treatment

After serving as vice president, Burr chal-lenged Hamilton to a duel Hamilton knew that Burr was a much better sharpshooter than himself, but because of unwritten codes of honor that pressured him not to back out of

A depiction of the duel between Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr on July 11, 1804 Hamilton intentionally missed Burr, but Burr’s shot wounded Hamilton, who died the next day.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

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a duel, he accepted Burr’s challenge On July 11, the two and their seconds (seconds who would take the place of their principal if he could not show) met at the predetermined site of Weehawken, New Jersey, overlooking the Hud-son River (Though both men lived in New York, New Jersey had fewer legal restrictions on dueling than did New York.) Major Nathaniel Pendleton, one of Hamilton’s friends, recited the accepted rules of dueling before the firing

of shots After both parties said they were ready for the duel, by declaring themselves present, their final confrontation began When Pendle-ton shouted, “Fire,” Burr pulled his trigger first The bullet hit Hamilton in his side and pierced his liver Burr was unharmed About thirty-six hours later, Hamilton died from his wound

Even though Burr had killed an elder and respected political leader, neither New Jersey nor New York issued a warrant for his arrest

New York, ignoring the case ofMURDER, pressed misdemeanor charges for breaking the state’s minor restrictions on duels New Jersey charged Burr with murder, but the case never went to trial The only punishment Burr received was a public outcry against him

Attempting to hide himself from Hamilton’s supporters, Burr spent the rest of his life in seclusion and poverty

Some, especially those in the North who were upset with the loss of Hamilton, began to cast the practice of dueling as barbaric and absurd Drastic legislation in Pennsylvania and several New England states, including New York, followed Farther west, the new state of Illinois,

in 1819, hung a man for killing a neighbor in

a rifle duel at the range of twenty-five paces

Most states, however, still did not have laws against dueling

Dueling continued, especially in the South, where notions of individual honor remained deep In 1838, Governor John Lyde Wilson, of South Carolina, wrote the first official U.S

adaptation of the Irish Code Duello As an innovation on the Irish code, Wilson’s Code Duello formalized the U.S principle that required satisfaction to follow a confrontation:

if a person challenged to a duel, or that person’s second, refused to raise arms, public insults would follow, such as postings on walls declaring the individual a coward, a poltroon, a puppy, or worse Although Wilson did not proclaim

enthusiastic support of duels, he did believe that in certain instances, they were necessary and proper; dueling, he felt, served as a logical recourse for any individual seeking satisfaction

in a case where the law could not provide it Wilson’s sixteen-page pamphlet remained pop-ular and was reprinted until 1858

After a fatal duel between two legislators, Jonathan Cilley and William J Graves, Congress passed an anti-dueling law HENRY CLAY, of Kentucky, an opponent of duels, made his support of the bill known by explaining,“When public opinion is renovated and chastened by reason, RELIGION and humanity, the practice of dueling will be discountenanced.” The bill banned dueling in the District of Columbia beginning on February 20, 1839 In the next decades, various states followed Congress’s lead Members of the clergy and concerned politi-cians continued to give impassioned speeches further criticizing the“peculiar practice.” Although dueling persisted into the early 1800s, and reached its height during that period, by the middle of the century it had largely disappeared Historians attribute the decline to an increase in the number of laws banning it, and in the penalties for dueling These laws reflected a change in attitude toward the practice, which came to be viewed as barbarous, rather than honorable The Code Duello’s unyielding, Old World conception of honor was discredited by younger generations Outlawed and outmoded, dueling remains an interesting chapter in the history of dispute resolution in the United States

FURTHER READINGS Baldick, Robert 1970 The Duel: A History of Duelling London: Chapman & Hall.

Billacois, Francois 1990 The Duel: Its Rise and Fall in Early Modern France Trista Selous, trans New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ Press.

Burr, Samuel Engle, Jr 1971 The Burr-Hamilton Duel and Related Matters San Antonio: Naylor.

Cochran, Hamilton 1963 Noted American Duels and Hostile Encounters Philadelphia and New York: Chilton Books Hussey, Jeannette 1980 The Code Duello in America Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution.

Kiernan, V.G 1989 The Duel in European History New York: Oxford Univ Press.

McAleer, Kevin 1994 Dueling Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ Press.

Parker, David S 2001 “Law, honor, and Impunity in Spanish America: The Debate Over Dueling, 1870–

1920 ” Law and History Review 19 (summer) Rush, Philip 1964 The Book of Duels London: Harrp.

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Spierenburg, Pieter, ed 1998 Men and Violence: Gender,

Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America.

Columbus: Ohio State Univ Press Available at http://

www.ohiostatepress.org/index.htm?/books/book%

20pages/spierenburg%20men.htm; website home page:

http://www.ohiostatepress.org (accessed July 20, 2009).

Yarn, Douglas H 2000 “The Attorney as Duelist’s Friend:

Lessons from the Code Duello.” Case Western Reserve

Law Review 51 (fall) Available online at http://www.

law.case.edu/student_life/journals/law_review/51-1/

Yarn.htm; website home page: http://www.law.case.edu

(accessed July 20, 2009).

DUI

SeeDWI

vDULLES, JOHN FOSTER

John Foster Dulles served as U.S secretary of

state from 1953 to 1959 A prominent New York

City attorney, Dulles participated in international

affairs for much of his legal career His term

as secretary of state occurred during the height

of theCOLD WARand was marked by his strong

anti-Communist policies and rhetoric

Dulles was born in Washington, D.C., on

February 25, 1888, at the home of his maternal

grandfather, John W Foster, secretary of state

under President BENJAMIN HARRISON Dulles was

raised in Watertown, New York, where his

father, the Reverend Allen M Dulles, served as

a Presbyterian minister Known as Foster, the

young Dulles was a precocious student,

gra-duating from high school at age 15 and

attending Princeton University at age 16 He

graduated in 1908 and then entered GEORGE

WASHINGTON University Law School Again, he

worked quickly, and graduated in two years

Through the efforts of his well-connected

grandfather, Dulles joined the New York City

law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which has

been called the greatest corporate law firm

of the early twentieth century In 1919 family friend and international financier Bernard M

Baruch invited Dulles to be his aide at the Paris Peace Conference This conference, which was convened to negotiate the terms

of peace to end WORLD WAR I, stimulated Dulles’s interest in international politics and diplomacy

In the 1920s Dulles quickly moved ahead

at Sullivan and Cromwell In 1926, at the age of only 38, Dulles was made head of the firm Representing many of the largest U.S corporations, Dulles became a very wealthy man As his stature rose, he became a prominent figure in the REPUBLICAN PARTY A confidant of New York governorTHOMAS E.DEWEY, Dulles was

John Foster Dulles 1888–1959

1888 Born, Washington, D.C.

1911 Joined Sullivan &

Cromwell in New York City

1924 Served as special counsel to Dawes Plan, which renegotiated Germany's post-war finances and reparations payments

1939 War, Peace and

Change published

1945–49 Served as U.S member of U.N General Assembly

1914–18 World War I

1959 Died, Washington, D.C.

1951 Helped arbitrate peace terms with Japan

1939–45 World War II

1952–59 Served as U.S secretary of state under President Eisenhower

1950–53 Korean War

1961–73 Vietnam War

1900

1919 Served as counsel to U.S representative at the Paris Peace Conference

John F Dulles COURTESY OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES

THE ABILITY TO GET

TO THE VERGE OF WAR WITHOUT GETTING INTO THE WAR IS THE NECESSARY ART…IF YOU ARE SCARED TO

GO TO THE BRINK,

YOU ARE LOST

—J OHN D ULLES

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promised the position of secretary of state

if Dewey was elected president in 1948, but Dewey was unsuccessful and Dulles lost that opportunity

Dulles was an active participant in the effort to reshape foreign relations afterWORLD WAR II He helped form theUNITED NATIONSand was a U.S member to the General Assembly from 1945 to 1949 He performed the duties of U.S ambassador-at-large and was the chief author of the 1951 Japanese peace treaty He also negotiated the Australian, New Zealand, Philippine, and Japanese security treaties in

1950 and 1951

In 1949 he filled a vacancy in the Senate created by the death of SenatorROBERT WAGNER,

of New York, but was unsuccessful in his attempt the same year to win election to a six-year term Dulles’s political fortunes im proved when he aligned himself with the 1952 presi-dential candidacy ofDWIGHT D EISENHOWER He helped Eisenhower defeat conservative senator Robert Taft, of Ohio, at the nominating conven-tion and was rewarded with his long-desired appointment as head of theSTATE DEPARTMENT

As secretary of state, Dulles exhibited a rigid opposition to COMMUNISM He advocated going

to the brink of war to achieve results—a position that led to the coinage of the term brinkmanship

to describe his foreign policy

Dulles is also remembered for his doctrine

of “massive retaliation,” which warned the Soviet Union that the United States would react instantaneously with NUCLEAR WEAPONS to even the smallest provocation Dulles believed that such a policy would discourage aggressive acts, though many allies were concerned that it would turn small wars into much larger and much more destructive ones Dulles died May

24, 1959, in Washington, D.C

FURTHER READINGS Halberstam, David 1994 The Fifties New York: Ballantine.

Merry, Robert W 1996 Taking on the World: Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Guardians of the American Century New York: Viking.

The Papers of John Foster Dulles.The Dwight D Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum Abilene, Tex Avaial-ble online at http://eisenhower.archives.gov/Research/

Finding_Aids/D.html; website home page: http://eisen-hower.archives.gov (accessed September 2, 2009).

CROSS REFERENCE Cold War.

DUMMY Sham; make-believe; pretended; imitation Person who serves in place of another, or who serves until the proper person is named or available to take his place (e.g., dummy corporate directors; dummy owners of real estate)

DURESS Unlawful pressure exerted upon a person to coerce that person to perform an act that he or she ordinarily would not perform

Duress also encompasses the same harm, threats, or restraint exercised upon the affected individual’s spouse, child, or parent

Duress is distinguishable fromUNDUE INFLU-ENCE, a concept employed in the law of wills, in that the latter term involves a wrongdoer who

is a fiduciary, one who occupies a position of trust and confidence in regard to the testator, the creator of the will

Duress also exists where a person is coerced

by the wrongful conduct or threat of another

to enter into a contract under circumstances that deprive the individual of his or her volition

As a defense to a CIVIL ACTION, the federal Rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE require that duress

be pleaded affirmatively

Except with respect to HOMICIDE, a person who is compelled to commit a crime by an unlawful threat from another person to injure him, her, or a third person, will generally not

be held responsible for its commission

CROSS REFERENCE Threats.

DURHAM RULE

A principle of criminal law used to determine the validity of the insanity defense asserted by an accused, that he or she was insane at the time of committing a crime and therefore should not be held legally responsible for the action

The Durham rule was created in 1954 by Judge David L Bazelon, of the U.S Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Durham v United States, 214 F.2d 862 The rule, as stated in the court’s decision, held that

“an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease.” It required a jury’s determination that the accused was suffering from a mental disease and that there was a causal relationship between

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the disease and the act Because of difficulties

in its implementation, the Durham rule was

rejected by the same court in the 1972 case

United States v Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (en banc)

The Durham rule replaced a

nineteenth-century test of criminal responsibility called the

M’Naghten rule The M’Naghten rule, or

“right-wrong” test, required the acquittal of defendants

who could not distinguish right from wrong

This rule was supplemented by the“irresistible

impulse” test, added in the District of Columbia

in 1929, which allowed a jury to inquire as to

whether the accused suffered from a“diseased

mental condition” that did not allow him or her

to resist an“insane impulse.”

By the mid–twentieth century, these early

legal tests of insanity came under increasing

criticism Critics of the M’Naghten rule, for

example, charged that it was outdated and did

not take into consideration the broad range of

mental disorders that had been identified by

modern science Commentators also claimed

that these earlier rules did not allow expert

witnesses to communicate fully the findings of

modern psychology and psychiatry to a jury

The Durham rule sought to overcome these

problems It attempted to create a simple and

open-ended insanity test that would, Judge

Bazelon later wrote, “open up the courtroom

to all the information and analysis available to

the scientific community about the wellsprings

of human behavior.” Bazelon hoped that the

new rule would allow experts to bring to the jury

and the public new insights into “the

physio-logical and cultural, as well as individual

psychological, factors contributing to criminal

behavior.” Bazelon intended it to be not a

precise test but rather a loose concept

compa-rable to the legal definition ofNEGLIGENCE Thus,

he compared the term fault in the negligence

context to the term responsibility in the Durham

context The meaning of such terms, he argued,

would have to be determined by a jury in light

of the facts relevant to each case

Implementation of the Durham rule ran

into serious difficulties The rule did not elicit

the detailed courtroom discussion of mental

illness and criminal behavior that Judge Bazelon

and others had hoped for Instead, just as expert

witnesses had before been asked the yes-or-no

question, Was the accused capable of

distin-guishing right from wrong? experts were now

asked the simple yes-or-no question, Was the

accused’s act a product of mental disease or defect? The Durham rule, therefore, perpetuated the dominant role of EXPERT TESTIMONY in determining criminal responsibility, a task that many critics felt was best left to a jury

As a result of such difficulties, the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously rejected the Durham rule in the 1972 Brawner case The court replaced it with a standard developed by the American Law Institute: “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time

of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law”

(MODEL PENAL CODE§ 4.01[1])

This new test has been described as a more subtle and less restrictive version of the pre-Durham right-wrong and IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE

tests In coming to its conclusion, however, the court in Brawner emphasized that no particular formulation of words provides an easy solution

to the difficult problems involved in assessing the sanity of a person accused of committing a criminal act Instead, the court asserted that criminal responsibility in such trials is best assessed by a properly informed jury that is not overly dominated by expert testimony To help juries make such assessments, the court re-quired experts to explain the underlying reasons for their opinions rather than giving yes-or-no answers to simplistic questions

DUTY

A legal obligation that entails mandatory conduct

or performance With respect to the laws relating

to customs duties, a tax owed to the government for the import or export of goods

A fiduciary, such as an executor or trustee, who occupies a position of confidence in relation

to a third person, owes such person a duty to render services, provide care, or perform certain acts on his or her behalf

In the context ofNEGLIGENCEcases, a person has a duty to comport himself or herself in a particular manner with respect to another person

DUTY OF TONNAGE

A fee that encompasses all taxes and customs duties, regardless of their name or form, imposed upon a vessel as an instrument of commerce for entering, remaining in, or exiting from a port

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