Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 6 P35 pptx

Lexis also has a public records service that provides online access to information from selected states about real andPERSONAL PROPERTY assets,UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODEliens,SECRETARY OF S

Trang 1

numerous arrests as well as physical and verbal abuse by local whites Through it all, Lewis maintained a path of nonviolence toward achieving civil rights

Lewis was unanimously elected chairperson

of SNCC in 1963 and served until 1966, when STOKELY CARMICHAEL, the proponent of the more aggressive“Black Power!” strategy, won his seat

During the time that he was chairman, Lewis was one of the speakers during the August 28,

1963, March on Washington, when nearly 250,000 people converged on the U.S capital

to stage a peaceful protest for freedom and fairness in hiring practices After he was ousted

as SNCC chairman, Lewis went on to work for the Field Foundation One of his most signifi-cant roles there was as director of its Voter Education Project From 1970 through 1977 Lewis led grass-roots efforts to organize South-ern African-American voters and to educate the youth politically In 1977 President JIMMY CARTER appointed Lewis to be director of U.S

operations for ACTION, a federal agency overseeing economic recovery programs at the community level

In 1982 Lewis was elected to Atlanta City Council, where he was known for his close attention to the needs of the poor and the elderly Twenty years after he stepped down as the leader of SNCC, Lewis was elected to the U.S House of Representatives after a hard-fought battle with his former SNCC co-worker, Georgia state senatorJULIAN BOND Although, as a congressman, critics accused him of not adapt-ing his positions to the changadapt-ing needs of African-Americans, he nonetheless remained a voice calling for a“sense of shared purpose, of basic morality that speaks to blacks and whites alike.” In 1991 Lewis became one of the three chief deputy whips for the DEMOCRATIC PARTY, one of the most influential positions in the House His criticism of House speaker Newt Gingrich brought him to the forefront of controversy in 1996, although many African Americans considered him to be a moderate In

1994, during a speech to African Leaders in Ghana, Lewis summed up his experience and his commitment to civil rights for all peoples:

“Do not give up, do not give out, and do not give in We must hold on, and we must not get lost in a sea of despair.”

In 1998 Lewis published his autobiography:

Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the

Movement In 2000 he participated in a gathering

in Selma, Alabama, commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Selma-to-Montgomery protest march

In 2003 Lewis was a member of the House Budget Committee, and served on the Subcom-mittee on Health that is part of the House Ways and Means Committee He was also Senior Chief Deputy Democratic Whip in the 108th Congress, as well as a member of the Demo-cratic Steering Committee, the Congressional Black Caucus, and the Congressional Commit-tee to Support Writers and Journalists Lewis additionally served as co-chair of the Faith and Politics Institute

Lewis has been the recipient of numerous and awards and honors, including the National Constitution Center’s “We the People” Award, the NAACP’s Spingarn Medal, and the

Nation-al Education Association’s Martin Luther King

Jr Memorial Award In March 2003 Lewis led

a group of fellow representatives and other politicians on a “Civil Rights Pilgrimage,” a tour of significant sites in Birmingham, Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama The pur-pose of the tour was to acquaint political leaders with the history of the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT and to encourage dialogue on the topics of race and civil rights in the United States

In 2004 Lewis introduced a bill dubbed the

“Civil Rights Act of 2004” by other congress-men He noted in a press release in 2004 that the work of the civil rights movement is “far from done,” adding that “There are doors that remain unopened and some that have slammed even harder shut.” On August 28, 2008, Lewis, speaking on the final night of the Democratic National Convention, called BARACK OBAMA’S presidential nomination “a testament” to Martin Luther King’s vision Later that year, Lewis was re-elected to Congress in the 5th District of Georgia

FURTHER READINGS Bausum, Ann 2005 Freedom Riders: John Lewis and Jim Zwerg

on the Front Lines of the Civil Rights Movement Des Moines, Iowa: National Geographic Children ’s Books Benson, Kathleen 2006 John Lewis in the Lead: A Story of the Civil Rights Movement New York: Lee and Low Books John Lewis House of Representatives site 2009 Available online at <www.house.gov/johnlewis> (accessed August 19, 2009).

IF WE ARE EVER TO

MOVE TOWARD A

COLORBLIND SOCIETY,

ONEAMERICA,ONE

SOCIETY,ONE

FAMILY,ONE

PEOPLE—WE MUST

HAVE POLICIES THAT

PROMOTE AND

ENCOURAGE

DIVERSITY

—J OHN L EWIS

328 LEWIS, JOHN ROBERT

Trang 2

Lewis, John, with Michael D ’Orso 1999 Walking with the

Wind: A Memoir of the Movement San Diego: Harcourt

Brace.

LEX

[Latin, Law.] In medieval jurisprudence, a body or

collection of various laws peculiar to a given

nation or people; not a code in the modern sense,

but an aggregation or collection of laws not

codified or systematized Also, a similar collection

of laws relating to a general subject, and not

peculiar to any one people

In modern U.S and English jurisprudence

this term signifies a system or body of laws,

written or unwritten, applicable to a particular

case or question regarded as local or unique to a

particular state, country, or jurisdiction

LEX FORI

[Latin, The law of the forum, or court.] The

positive law of the state, nation, or jurisdiction

within which a lawsuit is instituted or remedy

sought

The lex fori, or law of the jurisdiction in

which relief is pursued, governs all procedural

matters as distinguished from substantive

rights

LEX LOCI

[Latin, The law of the place.] The law of the state

or the nation where the matter in litigation

transpired

The term lex loci can be employed in several

descriptions, but, in general, it is used only for

lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the

contract was made), which is usually the law

that governs the contract

LEXIS®

An online legal information service that provides

the full text of opinions and statutes in electronic

format Subscribers use their personal computers

to search the Lexis database for relevant cases

They may download or print the legal information

they retrieve

The Lexis service began in 1973 In 1979

the Lexis service was joined by the companion

Nexis® news and information service Lexis

contains more than 5,000 legal sources, and

Nexis contains more than 10,000 news and

information sources The services add

approximately 17.3 million documents each week to their more than three billion docu-ments online

The Lexis service contains major archives of federal and state CASE LAW, statutes of all 50 states, state and federal regulations, and public records from major U.S states The Lexis service has 41 specialized libraries covering all major fields of practice, including tax, securities, banking, environmental, energy, and INTERNA-TIONAL LAW Group files combine legal informa-tion from all jurisdicinforma-tions and, where appropri-ate, add sources of relevant business, financial,

or general news

Lexis also has a public records service that provides online access to information from selected states about real andPERSONAL PROPERTY assets,UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODEliens,SECRETARY

OF STATE corporation filings, a verdicts and settlements library, and court indices and dockets

The company is a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc., part of Reed Elsevier P.L.C., a group of international publishing and information busi-nesses with headquarters in London Lexis-Nexis

is based in Dayton, Ohio During the 1990s and into the 2000s, Reed Elsevier purchased a number of other publishing companies; many

of the materials published by these companies are available on the Lexis system Among the most notable companies are Matthew Bender &

Co., which publishes several popular legal practice materials, and Shepard’s, which pub-lishes Shepard’s Citations

FURTHER READINGS Emanuel, Steven L 1997 Lexis-Nexis for Law Students New York: LexisNexis.

LexisNexis 2004 Understanding LexisNexis New York:

LexisNexis.

“The LexisNexis Timeline.” Available online at http://www.

LexisNexis.com/anniversary/30th_timeline_fulltxt.pdf;

website home page: http://www.LexisNexis.com (accessed August 7, 2009).

CROSS REFERENCES Computer-Assisted Legal Research; Legal Publishing;

Westlaw®.

LIABILITY

A comprehensive legal term that describes the condition of being actually or potentially subject to

a legal obligation

Trang 3

Joint liability is an obligation for which more than one person is responsible

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITYrefers to the status

of those who are responsible together as one unit as well as individually for their conduct

The person who has been harmed can institute

a lawsuit and recover from any or all of the wrongdoers—but cannot receive double com-pensation, for instance, the full amount of recovery from each of two wrongdoers

Primary liability is an obligation for which

a person is directly responsible; it is distin-guished from secondary liability which is the responsibility of another if the party directly responsible fails or refuses to satisfy his or her obligation

LIBEL AND SLANDER Two torts that involve the communication of false information about a person, a group, or an entity such as a corporation Libel is any defamation that can be seen, such as a writing, printing, effigy, movie, or statue Slander is any defamation that is spoken and heard

Collectively known as “defamation,” libel and slander are civil wrongs that harm a reputation; decrease respect, regard, or confi-dence; or induce disparaging, hostile, or dis-agreeable opinions or feelings against an individual or entity The injury to one’s good name or reputation is affected through written

or spoken words or visual images The laws governing these torts are identical

To recover in a libel or slander suit, the plaintiff must show evidence of four elements:

that the defendant conveyed a defamatory message; that the material was published, mean-ing that it was conveyed to someone other than the plaintiff; that the plaintiff could be identified

as the person referred to in the defamatory material; and that the plaintiff suffered some injury to his or her reputation as a result of the communication

To prove that the material was defamatory, the plaintiff must show that at least one other person who saw or heard it understood it as having defamatory meaning It is necessary to show not that all who heard or read the statement understood it to be defamatory, but only that one person other than the plaintiff did so Therefore, even if the defendant contends that the communication was a joke,

if one person other than the plaintiff took it seriously, the communication is considered defamatory

Defamatory matter is published when it is communicated to someone other than the plaintiff This can be done in several different ways The defendant might loudly accuse the plaintiff of something in a public place where others are present, or make defamatory state-ments about the plaintiff in a newsletter or an online bulletin board The defamation need not

be printed or distributed However, if the defendant does not intend it to be conveyed

to anyone other than the plaintiff, and conveys

it in a manner that ordinarily would prevent others from seeing or hearing it, the require-ment of publication has not been satisfied, even

if a THIRD PARTY inadvertently overhears or witnesses the communication

Liability for republication of a defamatory statement is the same as for original publication, provided that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the statement Thus, news-papers, magazines, and broadcasters are liable for republication of libel or slander because they have editorial control over their communica-tions In contrast, bookstores, libraries, and other distributors of material are liable for republication only if they know, or had reason

to know, that the statement is defamatory Common carriers such as telephone companies are not liable for defamatory material that they convey, even if they know that it is defamatory, unless they know, or have reason to know, that the sender does not have a privilege to communicate the material Suppliers of com-munications equipment are never liable for defamatory material that is transmitted through the equipment they provide

In general, there are four defenses to libel or slander: truth, consent, accident, and privilege The fact that the allegedly defamatory commu-nication is essentially true is usually an absolute defense; the defendant need not verify every detail of the communication, as long as its substance can be established If the plaintiff consented to publication of the defamatory material, recovery is barred Accidental publica-tion of a defamatory statement does not constitute publication Privilege confers immu-nity on a small number of defendants who are directly involved in the furtherance of the public’s business—for example, attorneys,

330 LIBEL AND SLANDER

Trang 4

judges, jurors, and witnesses whose statements

are protected onPUBLIC POLICYgrounds

Before 1964 defamation law was

deter-mined on a state-by-state basis, with courts

applying the local COMMON LAW Questions of

FREEDOM OF SPEECH were generally found to be

irrelevant to libel or slander cases, and

defen-dants were held strictly liable even if they had

no idea that the communication was false or

defamatory, or if they had exercised reasonable

caution in ascertaining its truthfulness But the

Court changed the direction of the law with its

decision in New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S

254, 84 S Ct 710, 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964)

For the first time, the Court placed some

libelous speech under the protection of theFIRST

AMENDMENT The plaintiff, a police official, had

claimed that false allegations about him had

been published in the New York Times, and he

sued the newspaper for libel The Court

balanced the plaintiff’s interest in preserving

his reputation against the public’s interest in

freedom of expression in the area of political

debate The Court wrote that“libel can claim no

talismanic immunity from constitutional

lim-itations It must be measured by standards that

satisfy the First Amendment.” Therefore, in

order to protect the free flow of ideas in the

political arena, the law requires that a public

official who alleges libel must prove actual

malice in order to recover damages The First

Amendment protects open and robust debate

on public issues even when such debate includes

“vehement, caustic, unpleasantly sharp attacks

on government and public officials.”

Since Sullivan, a public official or other

person who has voluntarily assumed a position

in the public eye must prove that a libelous

statement“was made with ‘actual malice—that

is, with knowledge that it was false or with

reckless disregard to whether it was false or not”

(Sullivan) The actual-malice standard does not

require any ill will on the part of the defendant

Rather, it merely requires the defendant to be

aware that the statement is false or very likely

false Reckless disregard is present if the plaintiff

can show that the defendant had“serious doubts

as to the truth of[the] publication” (see Masson

v New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S 496, 111

S Ct 2419, 115 L Ed 2d 447 (1991))

Since the Court’s decision in Sullivan, the

question of who is a public official has been

raised often In Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 U.S 75,

86 S Ct 669, 15 L Ed 2d 597 (1966), the Court found that non-elected officials “who have, or appear to have, substantial responsibility for, or control over, the conduct of public affairs” are public officials within the meaning of Sullivan

The Court said that the employee’s position must be one that would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion arising out of the allegedly libelous communication

The Court emphasized that a person’s status as a

“public official” will not be determined by state laws defining that term, because those defini-tions are usually developed for“local adminis-trative purposes, not for the purposes of a national constitutional protection.” Instead, the Court ruled that the determination of whether a public employee is a “public official” will be made on the facts of each case in light of all the relevant First Amendment jurisprudence

Courts have struggled to apply this standard

in a consistent manner For example, in Hiner-man v Daily Gazette Co 188 W Va 157, 423 S.E.2d 560 (1992), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff, who was a member of the State Racing Commission, a municipal judge, and a member

of the State Bar’s Board of Governors and subsequently itsVICE PRESIDENT, was not a“public official” under Sullivan The court did acknowl-edge that the plaintiff enjoyed some degree of authority in his various positions However, the court stressed that he was not an elected official, and in his roles as an unelected official, the plaintiff did not exercise “substantial control”

over the governmental functions giving rise to the lawsuit In another case, however, the Supreme Court of Alaska found that a private doctor who had contracted to provide medical services to five jails was a“public official” under the First Amendment, even though he performed that role in a part-time capacity and was not highly visible in the community (Green v

Northern Pub Co., Inc., 655 P.2d 736 [1982])

Since 1985, courts have tried to clarify this area of law by establishing criteria to help them determine whether non-elected government employees are“public officials” for First Amend-ment purposes These criteria include: (1) the employee’s remuneration (the higher the com-pensation, the more likely“public official” status will be found); (2) the employee’s role in making decisions on public issues (the more authority the employee wields, the more likely “public

Trang 5

official” status will be found); (3) the impact

of the governmental position on everyday life (the greater the impact, the more likely“public official” status will be found); and (4) the potential for social harm caused by someone occupying the position (the more harm that may

be caused, the more likely“public official” status will be found)

Eventually, Sullivan’s actual-malice require-ment was extended to include plaintiffs who are not government officials of any kind, elected or unelected In the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co v Butts and Associated Press v

Walker, 388 U.S 130, 87 S Ct 1975, 18 L Ed

2d 1094 (1967), the Court held that a football coach at the University of Georgia and a retired Army general were similar to public officials in that they enjoyed a high degree of prominence and access to the mass media that allowed them

to influence policy and to counter criticisms leveled against them

In Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S 323,

94 S Ct 2997, 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974), the Court expanded its definition of“public figure”

to include anyone who has invited public scrut-iny by thrusting themselves into the public eye The Court recognized two types of public figures: those who are “public figures for all purposes” and those who are public figures for limited purposes For an individual to be considered a PUBLIC FIGUREin all situations, the person’s name must be so familiar as to be a household word—for example, Oprah Winfrey

or David Letterman A limited-purpose public figure is one who voluntarily injects himself or herself into a public controversy and becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues Limited-purpose public figures have at least temporary access to the means to counteract false statements about them By voluntarily placing themselves in the public eye, they relinquish some of their privacy rights For

The Public Figure Doctrine: An Unworkable Concept?

The “public figure” doctrine

an-nounced by the Supreme Court in

Curtis Publishing v Butts, 388 U.S 130,

87 S Ct 1975, 18 L Ed 2d 1094 (1967),

held that prominent public persons had

to prove actual malice (knowledge of

falsity or reckless disregard of whether a

statement is true or false) on the part of

the news media in order to prevail in a

libel lawsuit Prior to Butts only public

officials had to prove actual malice In

the years since this decision, the PUBLIC

FIGUREdoctrine has proved a troublesome

area of the law, primarily because it is

difficult to apply with any consistency

Some, generally from the news media,

have called for making it easier to classify

a person as a public figure Others believe

that a strict line must be maintained

between public and private figures, so as

to prevent the damaging of personal

reputations by the media Both sides

agree that greater clarity is needed in

defining what constitutes a public figure

Those who favor a less restrictive definition of public figure argue that FREEDOM OF THE PRESS requires such a definition It is in thePUBLIC INTERESTto encourage the reporting of news without fear that the subject of a story will sue the news organization for libel Without adequate safeguards news editors may resort to self-censorship to avoid the possibility of a lawsuit In a democratic society, self-censorship would prove to

be a damaging restriction on the public’s right to information

For these advocates the Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S 323, 94 S Ct 2997, 41 L

Ed 2d 789 (1974), signified a step away from the protections of theFIRST AMEND-MENT The Court held that a person who

“voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy” becomes a public figure “for a limited range of issues.” The Court also held that there are persons who“occupy positions

of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.” This category would include, for example, a national labor or CIVIL RIGHTSleader

Critics of Gertz argue that these two categories make little sense and are of no help to a court in determining whether a person is a public figure For example, should a Hollywood entertainer or a professional athlete be cast as a public person in a libel suit? Do these persons have “persuasive power and influence”?

As for persons who become involved in public events, courts have been unable to articulate a consistent standard for mea-suring whether a person“thrust” himself

or herself into the status of a public figure Studies have revealed contradic-tory ways of applying the Gertz standard Some commentators have advocated abandoning Gertz and replacing it with a

“subject matter” test Under this test if an article or story involves PUBLIC POLICYor

Trang 6

these reasons, false statements about

limited-purpose public figures that relate to the public

controversies in which they are involved are not

considered defamatory unless they meet the

actual-malice test set forth in Sullivan

Determining when someone has voluntarily

injected themselves into the public eye such that

they forfeit some of their privacy rights has not

been easy for courts For example, courts typically

rule that individuals do not make themselves

public figures simply by filing for divorce Gettner

v Fitzgerald, 677 S.E.2d 149 (Ga App 2009) This

is true, courts have ruled, even when one spouse

is a well-known professor at a religious university,

and both spouses are publicly active on social

issues Maguire v Journal Sentinel, Inc., 232

Wis.2d 236, 605 N.W.2d 881 (1999) However,

if a divorce includes allegations of spousal abuse

in a MARRIAGE involving at least one famous

person, those facts might be enough for a court to

find that the divorce proceedings are of“genuine social concern,” thereby converting the plaintiff-spouse into a public figure under the First Amendment Huggins v Moore 94 N.Y.2d 296,

726 N.E.2d 456 (1999)

A 1991 case made it somewhat easier for public figures to sue for libel Masson v New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S 496, 111 S Ct 2419,

115 L Ed 2d 447 (1991), held that a plaintiff alleging libel satisfies the actual-malice standard

if it can be proved that the author deliberately altered the plaintiff’s words and that the alter-ation resulted in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the plaintiff in the original statement Jeffrey M Masson, a prominent psychoanalyst, had sued Janet Malcolm, the author of an article and book about him, as well

as The New Yorker magazine and Alfred A

Knopf, Inc., which had published the article and book, respectively Masson claimed that

the functioning of government, it should

be protected by the public figure

doc-trine Therefore, if a story discusses a

relatively unknown person’s divorce

proceeding or supposed Communist

political leanings, this would be a matter

of public policy (divorce law or political

parties) that invokes the actual-malice

standard in a libel suit

The use of subject matter analysis

would give public figures more protection

than they currently have under Gertz A

story about the private life of an

enter-tainer or professional athlete would

generally not involve a public issue under

even the broadest definition Under the

subject matter test, the celebrity would

not be forced to prove actual malice

Defenders of the Gertz decision admit

that the public figure concept has been

difficult to apply, but argue that the subject

matter test is not a good alternative They

note that although freedom of the press is

an important value, the need to protect the

reputation of private citizens is also an

important societal value Citizens are

encouraged to participate in public affairs,

yet a liberal reading of the public figure

doctrine could discourage participation if

there is no redress for injury to reputation

In addition, private citizens who are deemed public figures could never match the news media’s power and pervasiveness

in telling one side of the story

Even with the difficulties inherent in Gertz, defenders note that it narrowed the public figure category in ways that protect the public Simply appearing in the newspapers in connection with some newsworthy story or stories does not make one a public figure Forced involve-ment in a public trial does not by itself make one a public figure Most impor-tant, those charged with libel cannot create their own defense by converting a private citizen into a public figure solely

by virtue of their news coverage

Defenders of Gertz are leery of the subject matter test They contend this test is too one-sided in favor of the news media Almost any topic in human affairs can be generalized into a public policy issue or one that involves the government It would be unfair to allow

a publication to falsely brand a relatively unknown person a Communist and then assert the person is a public figure because radical political parties are a matter of public concern The victim of this charge would have a difficult

time proving actual malice to win a libel suit

Those who favor a restrictive defini-tion of the public figure doctrine also note that a libel action serves as a private means of controlling irresponsible jour-nalism Gertz, even with its difficulties in application, has allowed private persons a better chance of success in libel suits, which in turn sends a strong message to the media to be more careful in their reporting As to the concerns about self-censorship, defenders of Gertz point out that journalists make choices every day about what is published Falsely tarnish-ing the reputation of a person should be the object of self-censorship in profes-sional news-gathering organizations

FURTHER READINGS Jones, Nora 2003 “Defamation Lawsuit Sparks a ‘Public Figure’ Debate.” Roche-ster (N.Y.) Daily Record (May 30).

Lore, Michelle 2002 “High Court Mulls Limited Public Figure Doctrine ” Minne-sota Lawyer (November 18).

Mitchell, James C 2002 “The Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the Gertz All Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of ‘Celebrity Journalism ’.” Loyola of Los Angeles Enter-tainment Law Review 22 (spring): 559–81.

Trang 7

quotations that were attributed to him in those publications were false and libelous Malcolm conceded that she had altered quotations in order to make the finished product more readable, but she maintained that the essence

of Masson’s words had not been changed The Court held that quotation marks around a passage“indicate to the reader that the passage reproduces the speaker’s words verbatim.” It was careful to protect journalistic freedom and went

on to write that deliberate alteration of quota-tions does not automatically prove actual malice:

We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate

with knowledge of falsity for purposes of New York Times Co v Sullivan … and Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc … unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement The use of quotations to attribute words not in fact spoken bears in a most important way on that inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case

The tremendous growth of electronic com-munications networks since the 1990s has raised numerous questions about liability for defamation Suddenly, it is possible to commit libel and to communicate a libelous statement

to thousands of people, instantly When libel is perpetrated in cyberspace, who is responsible?

Richard Jewell and the Olympic

Park Bombing

T

B

he strange ordeal of Richard Jewell grew out

of the 1996 Summer Olympics bombing One of

thousands of security guards hired for the Atlanta

games, Jewell discovered a suspicious knapsack

containing a bomb on July 27, 1996 Before it

exploded, he helped lead an evacuation that limited

casualties to two dead and more than one hundred

wounded His heroism was widely praised But

within three days, celebrity turned into notoriety as

the FBI had made him a primary suspect

Suspicious of the 11 interviews Jewell granted

following the bombing, the FBI theorized that he

might have planted the bomb in order to be seen as

a hero This theory was promptly leaked to the

press, which made it a cause célébre The Atlanta

Journal-Constitution published an extra edition on

July 30, with a headline that read “FBI Suspects

‘Hero’ May Have Planted Bomb.” The allegations

mounted: Jewell had reportedly sought publicity for

his heroism, while persons at Piedmont College, his

former employer, were said to have made

allega-tions to the FBI about his character and conduct On

NBC’s nightly news program, Tom Brokaw stated

that the FBI “probably” had enough evidence to

arrest and try Jewell

The investigation lasted three months During

this time Jewell became the target of two lawsuits

by bombing survivors, which were later dismissed

He maintained his innocence and tried to clear his name by pointing out that he had not approached the news media seeking attention, a fact which was quickly confirmed Only on October 26, 1996, did the FBI finally clear him as a suspect He appeared at a press conference where he declared that he had spent 88 days living in fear Nearly a year later, after initially refusing, Attorney General Janet Reno formally apologized to Jewell

After being cleared in the fall of 1996, Jewell sued or threatened suit against several media companies for defamation They included ABC, NBC, CNN, the New York Post, NBC anchor Tom Brokaw, and a local Georgia radio station Initially,

he was successful In December 1996, NBC negotiated a settlement with Jewell for a reported

$500,000 CNN and ABC settled, too, as did Piedmont College, which Jewell had sued for allegedly supplying false information

The most controversial lawsuit was filed in January 1997 against the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and its parent company, Cox Enterprises Inc Although truth is the key defense in a defamation case and Jewell was a suspect in the bombing, the libel action was based on more than just a statement of his status as a suspect Listing 19 allegedly libelous headlines and excerpts from articles, the suit claimed that the newspaper libeled him“in a series

Trang 8

Are online information providers considered

publishers, distributors, or common carriers?

What level of First Amendment protection

should be afforded to defamatory statements

transmitted electronically?

In Cubby, Inc v CompuServe, 776 F

Supp 135 (S.D.N.Y 1991), the plaintiff sued

CompuServe, an online service company, for

libel because of statements that had appeared

in a newsletter written and uploaded by an

independent company and transmitted

through CompuServe’s network The federal

district court found that CompuServe had no

editorial control over the contents of the newsletter and that it was therefore only a distributor of the newsletter CompuServe could not be held liable for the newsletter’s contents unless it had known, or had had reason to know, that the newsletter contained defamatory statements Conversely, in Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy Services Co., 63 U.S.L.W

2765, 23 Media L Rep 1794, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y Sup Ct 1995); reh’g denied, 24 Media L

Rep 1126 (N.Y Sup Ct 1995), the court found that Prodigy, an online provider similar

to CompuServe, was a publisher rather than a distributor, and that it was liable for the

of false and defamatory articles that portrayed him

as an individual with a bizarre employment history

and an aberrant personality who was likely guilty”

(Jewell v Cox Enterprises Inc)

But early on, an unusual ruling went against the

plaintiff Fulton County state court judge John R

Mather ruled on October 5, 1999, that Jewell was a

“public figure” for purposes of his legal burden in

the defamation case Mather determined that

Jewell made himself a public figure through his

extensive media interviews following the bombing

Unexpected and far-reaching, the ruling put a

huge obstacle before the plaintiff As the U.S

Supreme Court made clear in its oft-cited 1964

ruling in New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 84

S.Ct 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), there is a distinction

in defamation cases between private individuals

and public figures Private individuals have the

easier task As a private individual, Jewell would

simply need to prove that the newspaper acted with

negligence or carelessness in reporting information

that was false and defamatory in content But in

order for a public figure to prevail, the plaintiff must

prove “actual malice” on the part of the media

defendants Meeting the test for actual malice

requires showing that the defendants knew that the

reported information was false or had a reckless

disregard for the truth

Faced with meeting this significantly higher

burden of proof, Jewell appealed the ruling

unsuccessfully In October 2001 the state Court of

Appeals upheld the lower court, Atlanta

Journal-Constitution v Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga Ct App

2001), and a year later appeals were turned down by both the Supreme Court of Georgia and the U.S

Supreme Court As the lawsuit moved toward trial in

2003, Lin Wood, his attorney, warned that the decision to hold Jewell a public figure “threatens the reputations of any private citizen who is discussed by a member of the media” (The Associated Press October 07, 2002.“Supreme Court Sends Several First Amendment Cases Packing”)

The newspaper’s attorney Peter Canfield observed that Jewell had already admitted to being the focus

of the FBI investigation about which the paper had reported

FURTHER READINGS Calvert, Clay, and Robert D Richards 2002 “A Pyrrhic Press Victory: Why Holding Richard Jewell Is a Public Figure Is Wrong and Harms Journalism ” The Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review (April 2).

“Court Upholds Ruling that Jewell Was Public Figure.” 2001.

Associated Press (October 11).

“Georgia High Court Won’t Hear Jewell Appeal.” 2002.

Associated Press (February 12).

Noe, Denise 2003 “The Olympics Bombed.” Court TV’s Crime Library Available online at <www.crimelibrary.com/

terrorists_spies/terrorists/eric_rudolph/2.html?sect=22>

(accessed July 15, 2003).

“Supreme Court Sends Several First Amendment Cases Packing ” 2002 Associated Press (October 7).

CROSS REFERENCES Public Figure; Terrorism.

B

Trang 9

defamatory material in question because it exercised considerable editorial control over what appeared on its system

Some states have laws that seek to protect vital industries and businesses from unfounded rumors and scare tactics Such was the case in Texas, which enacted food- and business-disparagement laws that allow victims of false statements about their perishable food or business to sue for damages Television host Oprah Winfrey was ensnared in litigation involving these laws after she broadcast an episode of her show in 1996 about the problems surrounding the outbreak of mad cow disease in Great Britain The episode, which was labeled

“dangerous food,” included a guest who suggested that unless the U.S banned certain practices, a mad cow disease epidemic in the U.S would“make AIDS look like the common cold.” Beginning the day of the broadcast, the price of beef dropped drastically and remained low for two weeks The Texas Beef Group filed

a civil lawsuit against Winfrey, her company, and the guest, alleging that comments made

on the program had violated Texas’s disparage-ment laws The judge dismissed the food-disparagement charge, and a jury found the defendants not guilty of business disparage-ment The U.S Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld these rulings in Texas Beef Group

v Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir 2000) The appeals court concluded that the key issue was the statute’s definition of a “perishable food product.” At trial, the defendants argued that live cattle are not perishable food, but the appeals court declined to rule on that issue

Instead, it focused on whether the defendants had knowingly disseminated false information about beef The court grounded its analysis on the legal precedent that the First Amendment protects the expression of opinion as well as fact

“so long as a factual basis underlies the opinion.” It found that, at the time of the broadcast, the factual basis for the guest’s opinions was truthful As for the AIDS comparison, the court characterized it as hyperbole; in its view, exaggeration did not equal defamation Because the challenged com-ments had a factual basis, Winfrey and her guest had a First Amendment right to say them

Định dạng
Số trang	10
Dung lượng	206,55 KB