The law recognizes three major categories of damages:COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, which are intended to restore what a plaintiff has lost as a result of a defendant’s wrongful conduct; NOMINAL
Trang 1CROSS REFERENCE Bank of the United States.
vDALLAS, GEORGE MIFFLIN George Mifflin Dallas was born July 10,
1792 to statesman ALEXANDER JAMES DALLAS
He graduated from Princeton University in
1810 and was admitted to the bar three years later
In 1813 statesman Albert Gallatin was dispatched to Russia for the purpose of securing Russian aid in negotiating an end to theWAR OF
1812 between the United States and Great Britain Dallas performed the duties of secretary
to Gallatin and was commissioned in 1814 by the American delegates at the Ghent Peace Conference to relay the terms of peace to the British
Dallas returned to Philadelphia and served
as deputy attorney general before becoming mayor in 1829 for a three-year period He also acted as U.S district attorney, and in 1831, he entered the federal government
Dallas filled a vacancy in the U.S Senate and represented Pennsylvania until 1833; in that same year, he also performed the duties of attorney general of Pennsylvania and continued
in this capacity until 1835
In 1837 Dallas again acted as a diplomat, serving as emissary to Russia Eight years later,
he was elected as U.S vice president during the administration ofJAMES K.POLK His term lasted until 1849, and in 1856, he returned to foreign service, acting as minister to Great Britain until 1861 During his tenure Dallas was instrumental in the negotiations that resulted
in the formation of the Dallas-Clarendon Convention of 1856, for the purpose of arbitrating disputes concerning Central America between the United States and Great Britain Dallas died December 31, 1864, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
DAMAGES The term damages refers to monetary compensa-tion that is awarded by a court in a civil accompensa-tion to
an individual who has been injured through the wrongful conduct of another party
Damages attempt to measure in financial terms the extent of harm a PLAINTIFF has
Alexander J Dallas.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
George Mifflin Dallas 1792–1864
1792 Born, Philadelphia, Pa.
1813 Served as Gallatin's secretary during mission to obtain Russian mediation to end the war
1833–35 Served as attorney general of Pa. 1837–39
Served as minister to Russia
1845–49 Served as vice president under James K Polk
1864 Died, Philadelphia, Pa.
1861–65 U.S Civil War
1775–83
American Revolution
1812–14 War of 1812
1829–31 Served as mayor of Philadelphia
1856–61 Served as minister to Great Britain
Trang 2suffered because of a defendant’s actions.
Damages are distinguishable from costs, which
are the expenses incurred as a result of bringing
a lawsuit and which the court may order the
losing party to pay Damages also differ from
theVERDICT, which is the final decision issued by
a jury
The purpose of damages is to restore an
injured party to the position the party was in
before being harmed As a result, damages are
generally regarded as remedial rather than
preventive or punitive However, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES may be awarded for particular types
of wrongful conduct Before an individual can
recover damages, the injury suffered must be
one recognized by law as warrantingREDRESSand
must have actually been sustained by the
individual
The law recognizes three major categories
of damages:COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, which are
intended to restore what a plaintiff has lost
as a result of a defendant’s wrongful conduct;
NOMINAL DAMAGES, which consist of a small sum
awarded to a plaintiff who has suffered no
substantial loss or injury but has nevertheless
experienced an invasion of rights; and punitive
damages, which are awarded not to
compen-sate a plaintiff for injury suffered but to
penalize aDEFENDANTfor particularly egregious, wrongful conduct In specific situations, two other forms of damages may be awarded: treble and liquidated
Compensatory Damages
With respect to compensatory damages, a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for all the natural and direct consequences of the defendant’s wrongful act Remote consequences
of a defendant’s act or omission cannot form the basis for an award of compensatory damages
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, a type of compen-satory damages, may be awarded when the loss suffered by a plaintiff is not caused directly or immediately by the wrongful conduct of a defendant, but results from the defendant’s action instead For example, if a defendant carried a ladder and negligently walked into a plaintiff who was a professional model, injuring the plaintiff’s face, the plaintiff could recover consequential damages for the loss of income resulting from the injury These consequential damages are based on the resulting harm to the plaintiff’s career They are not based on the injury itself, which was the direct result of the defendant’s conduct
The measure of compensatory damages must be real and tangible, although it can be difficult to fix the amount with certainty, especially in cases involving claims such as pain and suffering or emotional distress In assessing the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded, a trier of fact (the jury or, if no jury exists, the judge) must exercise good judgment and common sense, based on general experi-ence and knowledge of economics and social affairs Within these broad guidelines, the jury
or judge has wide discretion to award damages
in whatever amount is deemed appropriate, so long as the amount is supported by the evidence
in the case
A plaintiff can recover damages for a number of different injuries suffered as a result
of another person’s wrongful conduct The plaintiff can recover for a physical impairment
if it results directly from a harm caused by the defendant The jury, in determining damages, considers the present as well as long-range effects of the disease or injury on the physical well-being of the plaintiff, who must demon-strate the disability with reasonable certainty
George M Dallas.
Trang 3Compensatory damages can be awarded for mental impairment, such as a loss of memory or a reduction in intellectual capacity suffered as a result of a defendant’s wrongful conduct
A plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for both present and future physical pain and suffering Compensation for future pain is permitted when there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will experience it;
the plaintiff is not permitted to recover for future pain and suffering that is speculative
The jury has broad discretion to award damages for pain and suffering, and its judgment will be overturned only if it appears that the jury abused its discretion in reaching the decision
Mental pain and suffering can be considered
in assessing compensatory damages Mental pain and suffering includes fright, nervousness, grief, emotional trauma, anxiety, humiliation, and indignity Historically, a plaintiff could not recover damages for mental pain and suffering without an accompanying physical injury In the early 2000s, most jurisdictions have modi-fied this rule, allowing recovery for MENTAL ANGUISH alone where the act precipitating the anguish was willful or intentional or done with extreme carelessness or recklessness Ordinarily, mental distress brought on by sympathy for the injury of another will not warrant an award of damages, although some jurisdictions may allow recovery if the injury was caused by the willful or malicious conduct of the defendant
For instance, if an individual wrongfully and intentionally injures a child in the presence of the child’s mother, and the mother suffers psychological trauma as a result, the defendant can be liable for the mother’s mental suffering
In some jurisdictions, a bystander can recover damages for mental distress caused by observing
an event in which another person negligently, but not intentionally, causes harm to a family member
In some instances, a plaintiff’s fears can give rise to damages In Norfolk Western Railway Co
v Ayers, 538 U.S 135, 123 S Ct 1210, 155
L Ed 2d 261 (2003), the U.S Supreme Court reviewed the types of damages that were available under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C § 51 et seq In the case, the Court concluded that railroad workers who had been exposed to asbestos could seek damages
for fears that they would eventually contract cancer
Compensatory damages of an economic nature may also be recovered by an injured party A plaintiff may recover for loss of earnings resulting from an injury The measure
of lost earnings is the amount of money that the plaintiff might reasonably have earned by working in her or his profession during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated because of the injury In the case of a permanent disability, this amount can be determined by calculating the earnings that the injured party actually lost and multiplying that figure out to the age of retirement—with adjustments If the amount of earnings actually lost cannot be determined with certainty, as in the case of a salesperson paid by commission, the plaintiff’s average earnings or general qualities and qualifications for the occupation in which she or he has been employed are considered
Evidence of past earnings can also be used to determine loss ofFUTURE EARNINGS As a general rule, lost earnings that are speculative are not recoverable, although each case must be exam-ined individually to determine whether damages can be established with reasonable certainty For example, a plaintiff who bought a restaurant immediately before suffering an injury could not recover damages for the profits he might have made running it, because such profits would be speculative A plaintiff who is unable
to accept a promotion to another job because of
an injury would stand a better chance of recovering damages for loss of earnings, because the amount lost could be established with more certainty
Individuals injured by the wrongful con-duct of another may also recover damages for impairment of earning capacity, so long as that impairment is a direct and foreseeable conse-quence of a disabling injury of a permanent or lingering nature The amount of damages is determined by calculating the difference be-tween the amount of money the injured person had the capacity to earn prior to the injury and the amount he or she is capable of earning after the injury, in view of his or her life expectancy
Loss of profit is another element of compensatory damages, allowing an individual
to recover if such a loss can be established with sufficient certainty and is a direct and probable
Trang 4result of the defendant’s wrongful actions.
Expected profits that are uncertain or
contin-gent upon fluctuating conditions would not be
recoverable, nor would they be awarded if no
evidence existed from which they could be
reasonably determined
A plaintiff can recover all reasonable and
necessary expenses brought about by an injury
caused by the wrongful acts of a defendant In a
contract action, for example, the party who has
been injured by another’s breach can recover
compensatory damages that include the
reason-able expenses that result from reliance on the
contract, such as the cost of transporting
perish-able goods wrongfully refused by the other
contracting party In other actions, expenses
awarded as part of compensatory damages may
include medical, nursing, and prescription drug
costs; the costs of future medical treatment, if
necessary; or the costs of restoring a damaged
vehicle and of renting another vehicle while
repairs are performed
Interest can be awarded to compensate an
injured party for money wrongfully withheld
from her or him, as when an individual defaults
on an obligation to pay money owed under a
contract Interest is ordinarily awarded from
the date of default, which is set by the time
stated in the contract for payment, the date a
demand for payment is made, or the date the
lawsuit alleging the breach of the contract is
initiated
Nominal Damages
Nominal damages are generally recoverable by
a plaintiff who successfully establishes that he
or she has suffered an injury caused by the
wrongful conduct of a defendant but cannot
offer proof of a loss that can be compensated
For example, an injured plaintiff who proves
that a defendant’s actions caused the injury but
fails to submit medical records to show the
extent of the injury may be awarded only
nominal damages The amount awarded is
generally a small, symbolic sum, such as one
dollar, although in some jurisdictions it may
equal the costs of bringing the lawsuit
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages, also known as exemplary
damages, may be awarded to a plaintiff in
addition to compensatory damages when a
defendant’s conduct is particularly willful,
wanton, malicious, vindictive, or oppressive
Punitive damages are awarded not as compen-sation, but to punish the wrongdoer and to act
as a deterrent to others who might engage in similar conduct
The amount of punitive damages to be awarded lies within the discretion of the trier of fact, which must consider the nature of the wrongdoer’s behavior, the extent of the plain-tiff’s loss or injury, and the degree to which the defendant’s conduct is repugnant to a societal sense of justice and decency An award of punitive damages will usually not be disturbed
on the grounds that it is excessive, unless it can be shown that the jury or judge was influenced by prejudice, bias, passion, partiality,
or corruption
In the late twentieth century, several U.S
Supreme Court decisions considered the constitutionality of punitive damages In
1989 the Court held that large punitive damages awards did not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the imposi-tion of excessive fines (Browning-Ferris Indus-tries of Vermont v Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S 257,
109 S Ct 2909, 106 L Ed 2d 219) Later, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co v Haslip, 499 U.S 1, 111 S Ct 1032, 113 L Ed 2d 1 (1991), the Court held that unlimited jury discretion
in awarding punitive damages is not “so inherently unfair” as to be unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S Constitution And in TXO Production Corp v Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S 443, 113 S Ct 2711, 125 L Ed
2d 366 (1993), the Court ruled that a punitive damages award that was 526 times the compensatory award did not violate due process Both Haslip and TXO Production disappointed observers who hoped that the Court would place limits on large and increasingly common punitive damages awards In a 1994 decision, the Court did strike down an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that prohibited judicial review of punitive damages awards, on the ground that
it violated due process (Honda Motor Co v
Oberg, 512 U.S 415, 114 S Ct 2331, 129 L
Ed 2d 336)
In a jury proceeding, the court may review the award, although the amount of damages to
be awarded is an issue for the jury If the court determines that the verdict is excessive in view
Trang 5of the particular circumstances of the case, it can order REMITTITUR, which is a procedural process in which the jury verdict is reduced
The opposite process, known as additur, occurs when the court deems the jury’s award
of damages to be inadequate and orders the defendant to pay a greater sum Both remittitur and additur are used at the discretion of the trial judge and are designed to remedy a blatantly inaccurate damages award by the jury without the necessity of a new trial or an appeal
In rare occurrences, a judge may find that a defendant is not liable and grant judgment as a
MATTER OF LAW In such an instance, the judge must find that there were no facts that justified liability In 2006 the Eleventh CIRCUIT COURT
of Appeals reviewed a trial court’s judgment
as a matter of law in favor of a plaintiff The appellate court concluded that the this judg-ment was unwarranted because a jury should have considered some of the evidence (Chris-topher v Florida, 449 F.3d 1360 [11th Cir
2006])
Treble Damages
In some situations, where provided by statute,
TREBLE DAMAGES may be awarded In such situations, a statute will authorize a judge to multiply the amount of monetary damages awarded by a jury by three and to order that a plaintiff receive the tripled amount The Clayton Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C.A §§ 12 et seq.), for example, directs that treble damages be awarded for violations of federal antitrust laws
Liquidated Damages
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES constitute compensation agreed upon by the parties entering into a contract, to be paid by a party who breaches the contract to a nonbreaching party
Liquidat-ed damages may be usLiquidat-ed when it would be difficult to prove the actual harm or loss caused
by a breach The amount of liquidated damages must represent a reasonable estimate of the actual damages that a breach would cause A contract term fixing unreasonably large or disproportionate liquidated damages may be void because it constitutes a penalty or punish-ment for default Furthermore, if it appears that the parties have made no attempt to calculate the amount of actual damages that might be sustained in the event of a breach, a
liquidated damages provision will be deemed unenforceable In determining whether a par-ticular contract provision constitutes liquida-ted damages or an unenforceable penalty, a court will look to the intention of the parties, even if the terms liquidated damages and penalty are specifically used and defined in the contract
Appellate Review of Damages
When reviewing a trial court’s award of damages,
an appellate court generally examines all of the evidence from the trial to determine whether the evidence supports the award When review-ing awards for compensatory damages, an appellate court determines from the lower court’s record whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in allowing a jury’s damage award to stand or in making his or her own damage award, called a bench award A bench award by a judge is typically subject to closer scrutiny than an award by a jury
An appellate court may determine that a damage award is excessive or inadequate If the court of appeals determines that the damages are excessive or inadequate and can determine the proper amount with reasonable certainty, the court may adjust the award so that it corresponds with the evidence One common method for altering an award is through the use
of remittitur, whereby the judge directs the plaintiff either to accept a lower award or face
a new trial By contrast, if the appellate court cannot determine the proper amount of the award based upon the evidence, the court may order a new trial A court of appeals will also review a trial court’s decision whether to admit
or to exclude evidence that supports the damage award, such as the decision whether to admit or exclude testimony regarding scientific evidence Appellate courts typically review the trial court’s decision with respect to admission or exclus-ion of evidence under the ABUSE OF DISCRETION
standard
Courts review awards of punitive damages differently than other types of damage awards
As of the early 2000s several federal courts of appeals are engaged in an ongoing struggle over what standard of review should be applied to punitive damages at the appellate court level
In Cooper Industries, Inc v Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S 424, 121 S Ct 1678, 149
L Ed 2d 674 (2001), the U.S Supreme Court
Trang 6ruled that appellate courts must conductDE NOVO
review rather than apply an abuse of discretion
standards This ruling means that federal
appel-late courts have great freedom to review and
reduce punitive damages based on previous U.S
Supreme Court standards The decision is one
more example of the Court expressing its desire
to control excessive punitive damage awards
Cooper Industries, Inc involved a suit for
trademark infringement, where Cooper
Indus-tries was accused of using photographs of a
knife manufactured by Leatherman Tool
Group A jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in
general damages and $4.5 million in punitive
damages On appeal, the U.S Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court,
basing its analysis on the abuse of discretion
standard This standard is highly deferential to
the trial court’s actions, allowing the appeals
courts to overturn a decision only if the trial
judge clearly abused his or her authority By
comparison, de novo review empowers the
appeals court to review all of the evidence on
punitive damages without regard to the trial
court’s decision
The U.S Supreme Court agreed to hear
Cooper’s appeal to resolve the division among
the federal circuits over the appropriate
stan-dard of review for punitive damages The Court,
in an 8–1 decision, determined that the federal
courts should apply de novo review Justice
John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority,
concluded that the nature of punitive damages
demanded that appeals courts conduct a fresh
inquiry He noted the similarities of punitive
damages to criminal fines and cited various
criminal cases that addressed the proportionality
of sentences that relied on de novo review
Moreover, Stevens rejected the idea that when
a jury awards punitive damages, it makes a finding of fact that could not be disturbed by an appeals court unless it was clearly erroneous
FURTHER READINGS Abraham, Kenneth S 2007 The Forms and Functions of Tort Law 3d ed St Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West.
Gibeaut, John 2003 “Pruning Punitives: High Court Stresses Guidelines for Deciding Damages ” ABA Journal 89 (June).
Kagehiro, Dorothy K., and Robert D Minick 2002 “How Juries Determine Damages Awards ” For the Defense 44 (July).
Reis, John W 2002 “Measure of Damages in Property Loss Cases ” Florida Bar Journal 76 (October).
Shaw, Robert Ward 2003 “Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: an Economic Evaluation ” North Carolina Law Review 81 (September).
CROSS REFERENCES Personal Injury; Tort Law.
DAMNUM [Latin, Damage.] The loss or reduction in the value of property, life, or health of an individual
as a consequence of fraud, carelessness, or accident
The phrase ad damnum, “to the damage,”
is the name of a clause in a complaint that states the damages for which the individual seeks judicial relief
vDANA, RICHARD HENRY Richard Henry Dana achieved prominence as
a lawyer and author, and for his knowledge
of the sea
Dana was born August 1, 1815, in Cambridge, Massachusetts A student at Harvard University,
he interrupted his studies in 1834 and spent two years as a sailor In 1836 he returned to Harvard,
Richard Henry Dana 1815–1882
1815 Born, Cambridge, Mass.
◆
1837 Graduated from Harvard University
1861–65 U.S Civil War
1834–36 Interrupted studies at Harvard to work as a sailor
◆
1882 Died, Rome, Italy
1861–66 Served as U.S attorney for Mass.
1840 Two Years Before the Mast
published
1848 Helped organize the Free Soil Party
1877 Represented U.S as senior counsel at the fisheries commission meeting in Halifax, Nova Scotia 1867–68 Served as attorney for U.S.
in Jefferson Davis's treason trial
Trang 7graduating in 1837 He subsequently received
an honorary doctor of laws degree in 1866
Before entering a legal career Dana taught elocution at Harvard from 1839 to 1840 He was admitted to the bar in 1840 and established
a successful legal practice, demonstrating his expertise in admiralty cases
Dana entered politics in 1848 as an organizer
of the Free-Soil party, which opposed the principles of SLAVERY He attended the party’s convention of that same year, held in Buffalo, New York
In 1861 Dana performed the duties of U.S attorney for the district of Massachusetts, serving in this capacity until 1866 From 1867 to
1868 he participated in the treason trial against confederate President Jefferson Davis, acting as attorney for the United States During 1866 and
1868 he also returned to Harvard as a lecturer
at the law school In 1877 Dana was selected
to represent the United States as senior counsel
at the fisheries commission held at Halifax, Nova Scotia
Dana is regarded as an eminent writer, as is evidenced by the enduring popularity of Two Years Before the Mast, published in 1840 In this book, Dana described his experiences as a
sailor, recounting his voyage from Boston around Cape Horn to California from 1834 to 1836 He also authored The Seaman’s Friend (1841) and To Cuba and Back (1859), and he edited Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1866) He died January 6, 1882, in Rome, Italy
DANELAGE
A system of law introduced into England as a result of its invasion and conquest by the Danes during the eighth and ninth centuries, which occurred primarily in some of the midland counties and on the eastern coast
Danelage provided basic values and customs
to which the later Norman conquerors of England added their customs to provide the foundation ofENGLISH LAW
DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY Any article that is inherently hazardous or has the potential for harming people through its careless use
Examples of a dangerous instrumentality include explosives and electrically charged wires Statutes andCASE LAWmust be consulted
to determine what items are regarded as danger-ous instrumentalities
When dealing with dangerous instrumen-talities, some jurisdictions require that due care
be exercised to prevent harm to those who are reasonably expected to be in proximity with them Others imposeSTRICT LIABILITYfor injuries and losses caused by them
vDANIEL, PETER VIVIAN Peter Vivian Daniel served as an associate justice
of the U.S Supreme Court from 1841 to 1860
A prominent lawyer and Democratic politician from Virginia, Daniel adhered to a Jeffersonian political philosophy that favored states’ rights and disfavored large economic institutions
A minor figure in the history of the Supreme Court, Daniel joined the majority inDRED SCOTT
V.SANDFORD, 60 U.S (19 How.) 393, 15 L Ed
691 (1857), which held that freed black slaves could not be citizens under the Constitution because they had originally been property, not citizens
Daniel was born in Stafford County, Virginia, on April 24, 1784 He came from a wealthy family and was educated at Princeton
Richard H Dana.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
IN ORDER THAT
JUSTICE MAY BE
DONE TO THE
WEAKEST,AND THAT
IN ANY HOUR OF
FRENZY OR MISTAKE,
WE MAY NOT TOUCH
THE HAIR OF[HIS]
HEAD,WE WILL GIVE
HIM A TRIBUNAL
WHICH SHALL BE
INDEPENDENT OF THE
FLUCTUATIONS OF
OUR OPINIONS OR
PASSIONS
—R ICHARD D ANA
Trang 8University, graduating in 1805 He read the law
in the Richmond offices of EDMUND RANDOLPH,
who helped draft the Constitution He was
admitted to the Virginia bar in 1808
Although Daniel maintained a law practice,
his focus was on politics and government He was
elected to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1809
In 1812 he was appointed by the house to serve
on thePRIVY COUNCIL, which acted as an advisory
board for the state governor Daniel remained
on the council for twenty-three years, serving as
lieutenant governor for much of his term
Daniel was active in the DEMOCRATIC PARTY
and was a strong supporter of PresidentANDREW
JACKSON In 1836 Jackson appointed Daniel as
a judge to the U.S district court for Eastern
Virginia Five years later President MARTIN VAN BUREN appointed Daniel to the U.S Supreme Court This move sparked controversy because
it occurred at the end of Van Buren’s term of office The Whig party’s presidential candidate,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, was elected president
Whigs in Congress tried to block the appoint-ment of Daniel so Harrison could choose a justice Daniel was confirmed by the Senate on March 3, 1841, in the last moments of the Van Buren administration
Throughout his years on the Supreme Court, Daniel maintained his commitment to Jefferso-nian government Thomas Jefferson’s view of republican government valued an agricultural economy and a limited role for government
Daniel also adopted the Jacksonian variation, which included hostility to banks, corporations, and the federal government A southerner and a believer in states’ rights, he supported the right
of states to maintain the institution ofSLAVERY Daniel was known more for his dissents than for crafting majority opinions He did, however, join the majority in the Dred Scott case
Dred Scott was a slave owned by an army surgeon, John Emerson, who resided in Missouri In
1836 Emerson took Scott to Fort Snelling, in what is now Minnesota but was then a territory where slavery had been expressly forbidden by the Missouri Compromise legislation of 1820
In 1846 Scott sued for his freedom in Missouri state court, arguing that his residence in a free territory released him from slavery The Mis-souri Supreme Court rejected his argument, and Scott appealed to the U.S Supreme Court
The Court heard arguments on Dred Scott
in 1855 and 1856 A key issue was whether African Americans could be citizens of the United States, even if they were not slaves Daniel was a
Peter V Daniel.
EARL CLARKE DANIEL, COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Peter Vivian Daniel 1784–1860
1784 Born,
Stafford
County, Va.
1808 Admitted to Virginia bar
1837 Led by President Jackson, number of seats
on U.S Supreme Court increased from seven to nine
1836–40 Served on U.S.
District Court
of Virginia
1860 Died, Richmond, Va.
1861–65 U.S Civil War
1775–83
American Revolution
1812–35 Served on Virginia privy council
1841–60 Served as associate justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court
◆
1809 Elected to Virginia legislature
1847 Wrote the majority opinion in the
License Cases
1857 Joined majority in
Dred Scott v Sandford decision
◆
❖
◆
◆
THE MERE GRANT OF POWER TO THE [FEDERAL] GOVERNMENT CANNOT…BE CONSTRUED TO BE AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION TO THE EXERCISE OF ANY POWER OVER THE SAME SUBJECT BY THE STATES
—P ETER D ANIEL
Trang 9loyal southerner, holding in his concurring opinion that African Americans who had been freed since the enactment of the Constitution could never be citizens The Framers had not contemplated the prospect of granting citizen-ship to persons who were legally recognized as property when the Constitution was drafted
During his term on the Supreme Court, Daniel’s adherence to his principles led him
to drift further from the mainstream As the national economy expanded, and with it both big business and the federal government, Daniel’s Jeffersonian beliefs lost relevance
Daniel died May 31, 1860, in Richmond, Virginia
vDARROW, CLARENCE SEWARD Lawyer and social reformer CLARENCE SEWARD DARROWwas the most famous and controversial defense attorney of the early twentieth century
He won unprecedented fame in momentous courtroom battles in which he championed the causes of labor, liberal social thought, and the use of scientificCRIMINOLOGY His aggressive legal tactics, as well as his outspoken denunciations
of industrial capitalism, political corruption, and popular RELIGION, aroused animosities throughout his life But in the end, his com-passion for oppressed persons, as well as his winsome personality, compelled friends and foes alike to honor his unparalleled legal career
as attorney for the damned
Darrow was the master of the courtroom drama One striking and effective aspect of his legal style was his physical appearance in the courtroom He wore rumpled suits—often bared
to shirtsleeves and suspenders—and let his
tousled hair hang into his face He had a halting walk and slouching stance, and his habits of smoking long cigars slowly during the proceed-ings and even reading and writing during the prosecution’s presentation were endlessly ar-resting for juries and distracting for opponents Darrow was born poor, on April 18, 1857, near Kinsman, Ohio His mother died when he was 14, and his father, an embittered seminary student–turned–undertaker, bore the stigma of the village atheist in an intensely religious rural community As a child, Darrow hated formal schooling, but with his father’s encouragement,
Clarence Darrow.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Clarence Seward Darrow 1857–1938
1857 Born,
near
Kinsman, Ohio
◆
1888 Appointed special assessment attorney for Chicago
1894 Defended Debs during Pullman strike;
Prendergast case was Darrow's only capital case loss
1911 Defended his last major labor case: the L.A Times Building bombers trial; accused and acquitted of jury tampering
1924 Defended millionaire murder suspects Loeb and Leopold
1914–18 World War I
1938 Died, Chicago, Ill.
1861–65 U.S Civil War
1907 Won acquittal for William Haywood and others in Steunenberg bomb murder case
◆
1934 Headed commission to adjust inequities in the law for the National Industrial Recovery Act
1939–45 World War II
❖
◆
1892–94 Worked as chief counsel for Chicago and Northwestern R.R.
1925 Defended John T Scopes
in "Monkey Trial"; prosecutor William J Bryan won in court
◆
Trang 10he read widely from the extensive family library
to educate himself As his father’s intellectual
companion, Darrow grew to love reading, to
hate being poor, and to willingly embrace
unpopular causes Once, Darrow’s father went
to observe a public hanging to see what it was
like, but left before the moment of execution
and reported to Darrow how he felt a terrible
shame and guilt for being any part of such a
“barbaric practice.” This report was not lost on
Darrow, who would become a fierce public
opponent of the popular practice ofcapital
punishment, defending 50 murderers in his
legal career, with only one being sentenced to
death and executed
Darrow’s entrance into the practice of law
was strained by poverty He left his studies at
Allegheny College after one year for lack of
money After three years teaching in a rural
one-room schoolhouse and one year at the Michigan
University Law School, where he again withdrew
for lack of tuition, Darrow gained an
apprentice-ship with a law firm in Youngstown, Ohio There
he read the law and passed the bar exam in 1878
at the age of 21 Returning home, he married
his childhood sweetheart, Jessie Ohl, began his
own practice in the rural Ohio towns of Andover
and Ashtabula, and fathered his only child, a
son In search of a better income for his family
and eager for opportunity, Darrow accepted an
invitation from his brother Everett Darrow to
move to Chicago—then the commercial and
cultural center of the Midwest—in 1887
Darrow’s path from the country to the city
was well-worn by millions of others at the end
of the nineteenth century The lure of jobs and
opportunities following the Civil War combined
with mass migrations from Europe added 31
million residents to U.S cities between 1860 and
1930 Chicago, which had barely existed in 1830,
had grown by 1900 to 3 million inhabitants
Along with other large U.S cities such as New
York and Boston, Chicago was unprepared for
this overwhelming influx of urban immigrants
The results were poverty, crime, and corruption
spawning human misery on a grand scale
When Darrow moved his hopes and his
family to Chicago, the city was in the midst of
both a population and an industrial boom With
its being the railroad center of the nation, the
meatpacking, lumber, steel, and agricultural
industries were rapidly expanding A
devastat-ing fire in 1871 had leveled much of the city and
helped to inspire new building programs and fresh commercial initiatives The city had also become a magnet for social reformers, artists, and intellectuals, includingJANE ADDAMS, Lincoln Steffens, Sinclair Lewis, Edgar Lee Masters, and Theodore Dreiser, who viewed the human suffering of the great city with outrage
Darrow found Chicago both fascinating and troubling While he saw opportunity for himself
to advance, he was moved by the evident suffer-ing of laborsuffer-ing families, poor people, and those who were imprisoned His passion for the lower class only increased as he witnessed the economic contrasts of industry and labor Throughout the city, industrial tycoons were striking it rich off the backs of laborers—often uneducated and poor—who earned poverty wages under hazardous conditions Similarly, the prisons were filled with poor and broken people who had little means of defending themselves
Having read the prison reform writings of Judge John P Altgeld of Illinois, Darrow shortly introduced himself to this social reformer who would one day become governor He began a mentorship in the law and politics of reform under Altgeld that would last until Altgeld’s death When Darrow became outraged by the heavy sentences laid upon four anarchist defen-dants in the Haymarket Square bombing of
1887, Altgeld urged him to join the alliance for theirAMNESTY In turn, Darrow later successfully implored Altgeld as governor to commute their sentences
In 1888, after being impressed by Darrow’s public speaking ability, Mayor DeWitt Cregier,
of Chicago, offered him an appointment as
a SPECIAL ASSESSMENT attorney Within a year, Darrow rose to chief corporation counsel—
becoming the head of the legal department for the entire city of Chicago at age 33 From this vantage point, he observed firsthand the plight of the city’s working class in industries where labor had little power to organize, and government had little power to regulate
After four years, with his city appointment about to be terminated, Darrow accepted an offer to become chief counsel for the Chicago and Northwestern Railway (CNR), which he had recently defeated in court He imposed one condition: that he be allowed to continue his outside legal assistance work as long as it did not conflict with his loyalty to the company
Within two years, a decisive conflict was staring
IDO NOT CONSIDER IT
AN INSULT,BUT RATHER A COMPLIMENT TO BE CALLED AN AGNOSTIC IDO NOT PRETEND TO KNOW WHERE MANY IGNORANT MEN ARE SURE—THAT IS ALL AGNOSTICISM MEANS
—C LARENCE D ARROW