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Tiêu đề Macy's: From Dry Goods Store to Department Chain
Trường học Harvard University
Chuyên ngành Business History
Thể loại essay
Năm xuất bản 1996
Thành phố New York
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From the American System to Mass Production, 1800–1932: Development of turing Technology in the United States.. meat packing industry Prior to 1830, the meat trade was a highly decentral

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M

Macy, Rowland H. (1822–1877)

business-man and retailer Born in Nantucket,

Massa-chusetts, to a seafaring family, Macy made several

attempts to open a dry goods store but failed on

each of them After failures in Massachusetts, he

went to California during the gold rush and

opened a successful operation He eventually

returned to Massachusetts with a small nest egg

of $3,000, opened another operation in Boston,

but again failed to make it successful

Leaving Massachusetts, he made his way to

New York City and opened a dry goods store on

Sixth Avenue near 14th Street in 1857 His

first-day sales amounted to $12, and his store quickly

became a success Two years later, he spent

$2,800 on advertising and generated more than

$85,000 in yearly sales in its first full year He

used a simple formula of spending more on

advertising than his competitors while also using

cash for both buying and selling rather than

using credit Capitalizing on his success, Macy’s

store became one of the best known in New York

City by expanding its offerings from simple dry

goods to a full range of consumer products

After the Civil War, Macy continued to

intro-duce marketing devices designed to attract and

keep customers In 1870, he employed the firstin-store Santa Claus, designed to attract families

at Christmas Continued success led to the ing of the flagship store at Herald Square in NewYork in 1902 By the turn of the century, it was afull-fledged department store The store expandedbeyond dry goods and now carried a wide array

open-of consumer products under one roopen-of

Macy did not live to witness the success orexpansion of his stores He died in Paris at age

55, and the store was taken over by Charles B.Webster Webster invited the Strauss retailingfamily to purchase part of the store 10 yearslater, and by the 1890s, when Webster soldthem his remaining share, they gained control

of Macy’s

One of Macy’s buyers, William Titon,invented the first tea bag in 1912 By 1924, dur-ing the heyday of department and CHAIN STORES,the Herald Square store was the world’s largestdepartment store and held its first ThanksgivingDay Parade, a tradition that continues today Butunlike other retailers, Macys did not participate

in the expansion boom of the 1920s The storebegan to expand to suburban shopping mallsonly after World War II, when it became a chain

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After a series of acquisitions and management

problems, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy

pro-tection in 1992 It was acquired by Federated

Department Stores after emerging from its

reor-ganization in 1994 and, in the name of greater

efficiency, began to shed some stores it had

opened or acquired

Further reading

Harriman, Margaret Case And the Price Is Right: The

R H Macy Story Cleveland: World Publishing,

1958.

Hower, Ralph History of Macy’s of New York,

1858–1919 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

Univer-sity Press, 1943.

Trachtenberg, Jeffrey The Rain on Macy’s Parade New

York: Times Books, 1996.

Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award

Named after former secretary of commerce

Mal-colm Baldrige, the award is actually four awards

given annually to American companies to

recog-nize their achievements The fields in which the

awards are given are manufacturing, service,

small business, and education and health care

The awards were established by Congress in

1987 to recognize American businesses Theywere initiated to emphasize quality, whichBaldrige felt was essential for American compa-nies if they were to maintain their edge and fightoff foreign competition In the 1970s and 1980s,American companies developed a reputation forpoor quality and shoddy products, and theawards were a method of emphasizing quality in

a more global business environment

Each company winning an award must meetspecific criteria for excellence, including leader-ship, customer and market focus, strategic plan-ning, process management, business results, andinformation and analysis Companies winningawards since 1987 were Dana Corp., AT&T Con-sumer Communications Services, Cadillac MotorDivision, Xerox Corp., Ames Rubber Corp., IBM,and the Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., among others.The IBM Corporation used the award to chal-lenge itself to turn around the company in thelate 1980s, once again becoming known for pro-ducing quality products

Malcolm Baldrige (1922–87) was secretary ofcommerce under Ronald Reagan from 1981 untilhis accidental death in 1987 Before enteringgovernment service, he was chief executive offi-cer of Scovill, Inc., formerly a brass mill that hetransformed into a diversified manufacturer ofconsumer and industrial goods The award wasnamed after him posthumously in recognition ofhis championship of quality in both manufactur-ing and the service industries

Further reading

Boyett, Joseph H., Stephen Schwartz, Laurence

Oster-wise, and Roy Bauer The Quality Journey: How

Winning the Baldrige Sparked the Remaking of IBM.

New York: Dutton, 1993.

Brown, Mark G Baldrige Award Winning Quality: How

to Interpret the Baldrige Criteria for Performance.

New York: Quality Resources, 1997.

managerial capitalism When professionalmanagers run companies; characteristic of theperiod of American business development when

260 Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award

Rowland H Macy (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS)

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family members yielded control of their

compa-nies to professionals The term helps distinguish

the early period of American business, leading to

the Civil War, with the period that followed,

when businesses began to be run by professional

managers trained in various specialty disciplines

This period coincides with the widespread

emergence of stock companies, when many

com-panies sold stock for the first time in order to

expand In the 1840s and 1850s, manufacturing

and RAILROADS (especially railroads) began to

grow exponentially, requiring managers with

more than one set of skills After the Civil War, as

the railroads continued to expand westward, the

need for professional managers became more

pronounced as the organizations grew larger and

more complex Quite often, business

organiza-tions would still be run by family members,

although they were increasingly staffed by

pro-fessional managers, hired from the outside

After the turn of the 20th century, as the need

for managers became more recognized, many

business school programs were instituted to

pro-vide graduate, and later undergraduate, training

for this new managerial class The Harvard

Gradu-ate School of Business was the first graduGradu-ate

pro-gram in the country instituted for this purpose

In the 20th century, the trend became more

clear as fewer and fewer companies remained in

family or founders’ hands The rise of the modern

CORPORATIONafter World War I was an excellent

example The size and complexity of DuPont and

GENERAL MOTORS, the latter headed by Alfred

SLOAN, showed that the 20th-century corporation

had become too large to be ruled from the top and

now required skilled and trained managers at

var-ious stages and levels of organization

The success of larger business enterprises

managed by professionally trained managers

became the cornerstone of American business in

the 20th century In many cases, this success can

be seen in the MERGERS and acquisitions trend

that characterized several decades of the 20th

century and the rise of the conglomerate

organi-zation in the 1950s and 1960s In addition, many

business disciplines created “managerial” tracks

in the post–World War II years, and such plines as managerial accounting, finance, eco-nomics, and information sciences now exist andare designed to train potential managers in deci-sion making and cooperative planning

disci-See also DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO., E I.;

HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL; TAYLOR, FREDERICK

WINSLOW

Further reading

Chandler, Alfred D., Jr The Visible Hand: The

Manage-rial Revolution in American Business Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Marris, Robin Managerial Capitalism in Retrospective.

New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998.

mass production The process of producing alarge amount of manufactured goods by stan-dardizing parts and production techniques Bydoing so, the producer is able to lower the cost ofproduction and therefore lower the cost of theproduct to the consumer

The method began with the manufacture ofmuskets for the U.S Army around 1800 InventorEli Whitney had contracted with the government

to produce muskets but was unable to meet hisproduction schedule because the parts he usedwere not standard He demonstrated to the armythat if he were able to employ machine tool tech-niques, he would be able to produce a standard,efficient musket rather than the handmade vari-ety, which had been the only method used untilthat time When he began producing musketswith standard parts, the process was born Work-ers were often taught only one part of a system sothat they could produce their own specializedpart of the process quickly and efficiently.When standard parts and mass productionbegan to be used widely, the factory system cameinto general use Factories had been used previ-ously to produce textiles, and the principleswere the same, although the process was moresimple and produced only a simple good Even

mass production 261

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relatively simply manufactures would become

mass produced after the Civil War Items of

clothing, such as shoes, were mass produced in

the first two decades after the war ended, leaving

hand production to be more of a higher priced

specialty art that defined its products as those of

artisans rather than factory workers

I M Singer began employing these techniques

to produce sewing machines in the 19th century

In 1865, his company produced about 3,000

machines per year, but within 10 years production

multiplied to more than 250,000 But mass

pro-duction is generally considered to have begun

with automobile manufacturing in the 20th

cen-tury Mass production was successfully employed

by Henry FORD in Detroit Ford employed the

assembly, or production, line when producing his

Model T automobiles, and the number of cars

pro-duced multiplied exponentially between 1915 and

1925 Unlike other assembly lines, Ford’s moved,

meaning that workers could remain stationary

while the cars passed before them for finishing As

the number increased, the price began to decline,

producing economies of scale for Ford and other

manufacturers It was the introduction of the

assembly line that brought the idea of mass

pro-duction into the modern industrial age Ford’s

methods relied upon simple styling and models,

which did not change every year, allowing the

process to proceed without interruption Ford

remarked that his customers could have their

choice of color as long as they liked black It was

the only color he produced The Model T was

suc-ceeded by the Model A, whose price also fell as a

continuing result of mass production

In 1918, the American National Standards

Institute was founded in order to set standards

for manufacturing and to study methods of

pro-duction around the country Both world wars

also helped the process develop further, since

standard grades were needed for military

arma-ments In the post–World War II period, many

new products became standardized, and separate

industries developed widely accepted methods of

producing their goods More recently, the

assem-bly line has been using robotic machines ratherthan people in an effort to reduce error in theprocess and speed production

See also WHITNEY, ELI

Further reading

Allen, Frederick Lewis The Big Change: America

Trans-forms Itself, 1900–1950 New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1952.

Hounshell, David A From the American System to Mass

Production, 1800–1932: Development of turing Technology in the United States Baltimore:

York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

McCormick, Cyrus (1809–1884) inventor

and businessman McCormick produced thefirst successful mechanical reaper, which revolu-tionized agriculture in the 19th century He wasborn on the family farm in Virginia and tinkeredwith mechanical reaping devices from an earlyage, learning from his father, who was an inven-tor of farm equipment He produced his first in

1831 and received a patent for it in 1834 afterdiscovering that a similar device had beeninvented by Obed Hussey He later purchased aniron works with his father, but they lost substan-tial amounts of money during the Panic of 1837.The reaper developed slowly as a result

The mechanical development of the deviceand its sales were initially slow McCormick soldonly two of his machines in their first year ofproduction (1840) and in 1843 sold 29 But after

a trip to the Midwest, McCormick realized thathis device was more suited to the wide plains ofthe breadbasket states than it was to the rougher,hilly terrain of Virginia, even though he hadinvented a machine that could be used on slopedground By 1848, he had relocated his business

to Chicago and started producing improvedreapers His factory was one of the first examples

262 McCormick, Cyrus

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of assembly line production, and it came into

existence as his patent for the machine was

run-ning out By 1856, the factory produced more

than 16,000 reapers and related devices, and his

invention was considered the best on the market

McCormick also employed advertising to sell

his product He purchased a newspaper called the

Farmer’s Advance in which he extolled the virtues

of his machine The paper had a circulation of

more than 300,000 His machines sold for $120

each and came with one of the first money-back

guarantees By the time the Civil War ended, his

machine was the most popular in the country and

had made him a rich man By 1880, profits

exceeded $1.2 million a year He also tried his

hand at politics and ran unsuccessfully for

Con-gress in 1864 But McCormick’s invention had a

profound effect upon the economy in the post–

Civil War period Before the reaper, farming was

much more labor intensive, requiring many more

men to harvest wheat and other grains His

inven-tion helped free labor from dull agricultural work

at a time when labor itself was in short supply,

especially during and after the carnage of the war

Before the Civil War, McCormick was a strong

defender of SLAVERY, although he opposed

seces-sion He used some of his wealth to purchase the

Chicago Tribune so that he could make his views

known, but they proved extremely unpopular in

the city After his death, his company was run by

his son, Cyrus H McCormick Jr In 1902, the

company merged with a major competitor, the

Deering Co., to form the INTERNATIONAL HAR

-VESTERCOMPANY The banker to the consolidation

was J P Morgan & Company The new company

continued to be run by McCormick, who owned

almost 50 percent of the stock

See also DEERE, JOHN

Further reading

Casson, Herbert Cyrus Hall McCormick: His Life and

Work Chicago: A C McClurg, 1909.

Hutchinson, William T Cyrus Hall McCormick New

York: Century, 1930.

McCormick, Cyrus The Century of the Reaper Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1931.

McCulloch v Maryland A landmark ruling

by the Supreme Court of the United States thatestablished lines of demarcation between thepower of the states and that of the federal gov-ernment The case involved a suit broughtagainst a branch of the BANK OF THE UNITED

STATES, located in Baltimore Two issues were atstake First was the matter of Congress’s ability toincorporate this second national bank, while theother involved the right of a state to tax aninstrument of the federal government

The Second Bank of the United States waschartered in 1816 In 1818, Maryland passed atax on all banks operating in the state that werenot chartered by the state legislature JamesMcCulloch, its chief cashier, refused to pay thetax, and the case went to the courts, where Mary-land won; the bank appealed to the U.S SupremeCourt Chief Justice John Marshall, deliveringthe unanimous decision of the Court, overturnedthe ruling of the lower court and ruled in thebank’s favor The bank was a legitimate instru-ment of the United States and therefore had aright to exist, despite strong attacks by advocates

of states’ rights Following upon the bank’s macy, the Court also ruled that Maryland’s right

legiti-to tax was subordinate legiti-to the Constitution,which gives the federal government precedenceover the laws of states As a result, the state couldnot tax an instrument of the United Statesbecause it had no authority over it

One important result of the decision was thenotion of tax immunities between the states and

the federal government Following the

McCul-loch decision, interest on municipal bonds would

be treated as exempt from federal income tion, while interest on TREASURY BONDSwould betreated as exempt from state income taxation Itshould be noted that this did not become a prac-tical issue until the Sixteenth Amendment to theConstitution was passed

taxa-The tax interpretation used today came after aseries of other decisions in the 19th and 20thcenturies that reiterated the idea that the federalgovernment and the states were generally

McCulloch v Maryland 263

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immune to each other’s taxes—based upon

McCulloch As interpreted today, it allows

munic-ipalities to borrow money and pay interest free of

federal tax to investors as long as certain criteria

of the U.S Treasury are met

See also BIDDLE, NICHOLAS; INCOME TAX

Further reading

Gunther, Gerald, ed John Marshall’s Defense of

McCul-loch v Maryland Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford

Uni-versity Press, 1969.

Hammond, Bray Banks and Politics in America from the

Revolution to the Civil War Princeton, N.J.:

Prince-ton University Press, 1957.

McFadden Act Passed by Congress in 1927,

the McFadden Act prevented interstate banking

by commercial banks for 67 years, until the

INTERSTATE BRANCHINGACT was passed in 1994

In the interim, banks tried a variety of strategies

to expand into other states but with very limited

success

The act was a response to the desire of many

states to keep larger banks out of their local

mar-kets During the 1920s, many small banks failed,

especially in agrarian and rural states An average

of two per day were failing when the law was

passed Many state banking authorities feared

that the failing banks’ markets would be taken

over by out-of-state banks and so pressed for

protective legislation Restrictions against

oper-ating a bank within a state were always regulated

by the host state’s banking laws According to the

McFadden Act, banks were prohibited from

opening de novo (new) branches across state

lines This would effectively prevent national

banks from branching into states that were not

their home base of operations

The McFadden Act was cosponsored by

Rep-resentative Louis McFadden (1876–1936) of

Pennsylvania and Senator George Pepper of

Pennsylvania The original resolution did not

contain any specific references to prohibiting

bank expansion Instead, the original intent was

to allow nationally chartered banks, registeredwith the comptroller of the currency, the samesort of privileges within the various states thatwere usually reserved for state banks only How-ever, the act became the cornerstone of the frag-mented banking system in the United States thatlasted for more than 60 years

The act also authorized the comptroller of thecurrency to allow commercial banks to beginunderwriting equity securities Although banksbegan to do so, the provision did not contribute

to the Crash of 1929 because the banks did nothave enough time to underwrite large numbers

of securities before the crash occurred Once the

BANKINGACT OF 1933was passed, this power waseffectively rescinded, and COMMERCIAL BANKING

was separated from INVESTMENT BANKING.The prohibition against branch banking waslifted in 1994, when Congress passed the Inter-state Branching Act, allowing bank holding com-panies to establish themselves in more than onestate Despite the fact that bankers lobbied foryears to have the act removed, it proved remark-ably resilient and defined COMMERCIAL BANKING

for almost seven decades

Further reading

Geisst, Charles R Undue Influence: How the Wall Street

Elite Put the Financial System at Risk Hoboken,

N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2004.

Kroos, Herman, ed Documentary History of Banking

and Currency in the United States New York:

Chelsea House, 1983.

Meany, George (1894–1980) labor leader

Born in New York City, Meany became anapprentice plumber at age 16 before becominginvolved in labor unions He first was active inthe United Association of Plumbers and SteamFitters and became a business agent for hisunion local in 1922 He was elected vice presi-dent of the New York State Federation of Labor

in 1932 and then its president from 1934 to1939

264 McFadden Act

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Meany also served as secretary-treasurer of

the AMERICAN FEDERATION OFLABOR(AFL) from

1940 to 1952 In 1952, he became president

upon the death of William Green In 1955, he

became president of the AFL when it merged

with the Congress of Industrial Organizations

(CIO) He served as president of the combined

organization until he retired in 1979

A dispute with another labor leader, Walter

REUTHER, led to the United Auto Workers leaving

the union in 1967 Meany was a key figure in

expelling the Teamsters Union, led by Jimmy

Hoffa, from the AFL-CIO in 1957 He was also

strongly opposed to communist influences in

American labor and supported American military

involvement in Vietnam He took strong political

stances, some of which helped affect the

out-come of elections

Meany led the traditionally Democratic union

to a neutral political position after 1972, refusing

to support either of the major candidates for

president in that year As a result, Richard Nixon

won the election, although Meany later accused

him of being sympathetic to big business at the

expense of labor When Nixon’s political troubles

began with Watergate, Meany openly called for

his resignation, reversing some earlier support

He also had a falling out with Jimmy Carter, who

he originally supported, refusing to support

Carter’s economic policies Strongly dogmatic

and individualistic, Meany is considered one of

the major figures in labor union history

See also GOMPERS, SAMUEL; LEWIS, JOHNL

Further reading

Buhle, Paul Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers,

George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of

American Labor New York: Monthly Review

Press, 1999.

Goulden, Joseph C Meany New York: Atheneum, 1972.

Robinson, Archie George Meany and His Times: A

Biog-raphy New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981.

meat packing industry Prior to 1830, the

meat trade was a highly decentralized business,

drawing together individual farmers who duced the livestock, drovers who transported theanimals to population centers, and butcher-merchants who processed the meat and made itavailable to consumers In rural areas (wheremost Americans lived), meat was locally pro-duced outside of market relationships, as farmersharvested their livestock for home use and soldselected cured products to local stores

pro-Beginning in the 1820s, entrepreneurs covered that, whenever possible, it was cheaper

dis-to move the slaughterhouses and meat ing facilities to the animals than to ship live ani-mals to major population centers So long as themeat could be kept from spoiling and trans-ported economically, large-scale production facil-ities near livestock sources permitted economies

process-of scale in meat production Growth process-of internaltransportation, principally roads, canals, andsteamboat shipping on inland and coastal water-ways, allowed nodal points to emerge for packingcured meat, preeminently pork

Its advantageous geographic location helpedCincinnati become America’s leading antebellumpork processing center Perched on the banks ofthe Ohio River in rich farming country, Cincin-nati was a favorite destination for farmers eager

to take advantage of its superior outlets to ern and eastern markets Annual production lev-els exceeded 100,000 hogs in the 1830s andreached 400,000 on the eve of the Civil War Pro-duction was seasonal, with operations commenc-ing once the weather became cold enough tochill the slaughtered meat, and ending in thespring once the rivers became sufficiently clear

south-of ice to ship out the finished product

Cincinnati’s pork packers were businessmenwho rarely soiled their hands by actually cuttingmeat Rather than functioning in a daily marketgauging sales through personal interactions withcustomers, Cincinnati’s meat men gambled onlong-term demand for pork products in distantports and cities, anticipating that pigs purchased

in November would be sold as bacon, ham, andlard six months later They were more merchant

meat packing industry 265

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than industrialist, better attuned to the vagaries

of credit and demand for commodities than the

mechanics of turning live animals into meat

By the late 1850s, Chicago was challenging

Cincinnati as the nation’s leading pork packing

center The expansion of the nation’s rail

net-work explains much of this change, along with

the continued westward movement of

agricul-ture As railroad track mileage grew to 9,000 in

1850 and 31,000 by 1860, canals and rivers

became less desirable means for transporting

meat RAILROADS had two principal virtues in

comparison to water transport: Trunk routes

could convey food to eastern markets on a

year-round basis, and feeder lines could enter the

countryside and bring livestock from landlocked

farms directly to central markets Located astride

this rail network, Chicago took full advantage of

its transportation advantage and passed

Cincin-nati as the Cincin-nation’s leading meatpacking center

during the Civil War By 1870, Chicago produced

$19 million of cured pork products, twice as

much as Cincinnati

Cincinnati and Chicago, along with other

smaller meatpacking centers, depended on pork

for their major product prior to 1880 American

consumers preferred their pork cured and their

beef fresh; in an era before reliable refrigeration,

only cured products could be processed and then

distributed from centralized packing facilities

Beef production remained a local business well

into the 1880s, as the only way to provide fresh

supplies was for cattle to be slaughtered near to

where it was consumed

The emerging large meat packing firms,

espe-cially those led by Gustavus Swift and Philip

Armour, rose to dominance by exploiting new

technology in the beef trade Expansion of the

rail network opened the Great Plains to the

com-mercial livestock business by connecting eastern

urban areas with midwestern packing centers

Refrigeration, both of the packinghouses and

railroad cars, allowed firms to operate

year-round and sell to customers far removed from

where the animals were slaughtered Swift was

the first meat packing firm to use refrigeratedrailroad cars to convey meat processed in mid-western plants to eastern population centers.Armour and other companies quickly followedSwift’s lead Backward integration, in the form ofownership of central stockyards, assured thelarge midwestern plants of a reliable supply oflivestock, while forward integration, with thecreation of wholesale meat outlets (known as

“branch houses”), gave them entry into sands of American communities

thou-The large meat packing companies were truenational concerns with thousands of employees

by the early 20th century Trained livestock ers scouted for quality livestock in the centralstockyards of cities such as Chicago, Kansas City,Omaha, and Sioux City, aided by company-employed “cowboys” who directed the cows,pigs, and sheep through the sprawling stock-yards Thousands of packinghouse employeesturned the animals into meat, watched closely byplatoons of supervisory employees In the branchhouses spread all over the nation, skilled butch-ers processed the carcass beef and pork into cutssuitable for butcher shops and restaurants Hun-dreds of clerical employees tracked perturbations

buy-in livestock prices, took orders, monitored duction, and tried to be the eyes and ears of theplant superintendents and company executiveswho managed their far-flung enterprise

pro-The meatpacking oligopoly was firmly lished by World War I In 1916, Armour, Cudahy,Morris, Swift, and Wilson killed 94.4 percent ofthe cattle processed in the 12 cities that pro-duced 81 percent of the nation’s beef These fivefirms also controlled 81 percent of the hogslaughter in those centers The structure of meat-packing changed little between World War I andthe NEW DEAL; the Big Four firms (Armouracquired Morris in 1923) accounted for 78 per-cent of the total value of meat products sold in1937

estab-The seeming stranglehold of the Big Fourlasted for a half century By the 1960s, however,their era was over; in 1962 the old-line firms con-

266 meat packing industry

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trolled only 38.1 percent of the meat products

sold in America Hundreds of new firms sprang

up in the 1950s and 1960s and took advantage of

new and more efficient methods of production

and distribution to take chunks of the marketaway from the old dominant companies

The collapse of the Big Four’s branch housesystem facilitated the entry of new firms Two

meat packing industry 267

Hog slaughtering and pork packing in Cincinnati, Ohio, 1873 (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS)

Trang 10

interrelated developments rendered the branch

houses obsolete First, large supermarket chains

proliferated after World War II These national

food retail companies bought meat in large

amounts from packing firms, processed it at

cen-tral warehouses, and then distributed it to local

stores As the importance of independent local

retailers waned, the branch houses lost their

cen-tral role in most urban centers Second, the

enor-mous expansion of the highway network after

1945 eliminated the locational advantage of the

plants built in the rail hubs, and allowed newer,

rural facilities away from rail lines to ship their

meat to supermarket warehouses for lower

distri-bution costs Federal grading of meat helped

these independent packers to compete on an

equal footing with the old companies in their

sales to supermarket CHAIN STORES

Concomitant with the decline of the branch

houses was an enormous increase in meat

job-bers, known as “breakers” and “boners.” Used

primarily by the new independent beef packers,

these jobbers took beef quarters from

slaughter-houses and further processed the meat in

prepa-ration for resale to retail outlets As their names

imply, these wholesalers “broke” the meat down

from quarters into basic subprimal cuts such as

ribs, loins, and rounds, “boned” them, and then

shipped to supermarket distribution centers

Retailers used the wholesalers because they

pro-vided more flexibility in the choice of cuts

offered to the consumer; independent packers

used wholesalers because these new companies

needed to do no more than simply kill and

mini-mally process their product, reducing initial

cap-ital investment and labor costs

Declining concentration was a transitional

phase before a new oligopoly took control of the

meatpacking industry Astute packers such as

Iowa Beef Processors (IBP) founder Currier

Holman and Missouri Beef Packers president

Gene Frye saw an opportunity to dominate the

beef trade by attaching “boning and breaking”

operations to their slaughterhouses that would

assume the tasks of beef wholesalers This

inno-vation quickly became known as boxed beefbecause of the containers in which the meat wasshipped

Boxed beef reduced costs in two ways packing companies saved money because they nolonger paid to ship unusable bones and meatscraps Savings in transportation expensesallowed them to undercut prices of firms thatshipped beef in carcass form and to increase theirmargin on each pound of beef Retailers savedmoney because boxed beef eliminated the skilledand high-paid butchers who had fabricated thecarcasses

Meat-With this cost advantage, boxed beef becamethe new method for controlling the distribution

of beef, much as the branch houses had servedthe Big Four at the turn of the century In lessthan two decades boxed beef grew from a supple-mentary source of supply to the preeminentmethod of marketing beef Sales of boxed beefmore than tripled between 1971 and 1979 to 4.8million pounds, and accounted for one-half of allfederal beef slaughter at the end of the decade.Boxed beef constituted only 20 percent of theretail market in 1972; by 1989 boxed beef’snational market share exceeded 80 percent Asurvey of leading supermarkets revealed that beefshipped in the form of cattle quarters—the oldmethod of transporting beef—accounted for only

4 percent of their receipts in 1986

Boxed beef was a particularly importantsource of dominance for a few large firms thatmastered this technique of production and distri-bution The smaller independent concerns of the1950s and 1960s rapidly lost ground to the newindustry giants in the 1970s as boxed beefflooded the market The leading four firmsaccounted for 60 percent of boxed beef sales in

1979 and 82 percent in 1987 IBP alone produced

40 percent of the nation’s boxed beef in the late1970s Forward integration into boxed beef emu-lated the techniques of the old Big Four at theturn of the century; and it was equally effective

as a method of dominating the industry, albeitunder altered circumstances

268 meat packing industry

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Dominance in beef allowed the large

compa-nies to assert control over hog slaughter in the

1980s Pork is sold in processed form far more

than beef, and consumer preference for “brand”

products protected Oscar Mayer, Hormel, and

other pork processors from new competition

Nonetheless, aggressive entry into pork

slaughter-ing by the large packers prompted the older

pork-based firms to concentrate on the processing of

meat and to abandon their killing operations By

1990, the pork industry had bifurcated into

slaughtering and processing sectors, each

domi-nated by a handful of firms, albeit different ones

By 1990, a new dominant set of firms had

emerged The new “Big Three” of IBP, Excell (a

subsidiary of Cargill), and ConAgra were almost

as powerful as Armour, Cudahy, Swift, and

Wil-son in their heyday By 1989 the Big Three

slaugh-tered almost 70 percent of the nation’s steers and

heifers and 35 percent of its hogs These

impres-sive figures understate their power over the

distri-bution of meat in the United States In 1990,

these three companies produced more than 75

percent of the nation’s boxed beef, the form in

which most supermarkets receive meat

The contrast between meatpacking in 1955

and 1990 is striking In the old stockyard districts

of Chicago, Kansas City, and Sioux City, several

plants slaughtering a variety of livestock each

employed several thousand workers and were

located in close proximity to each other By the

1990s, most meat production was from dispersed

plants specializing in either beef, pork, or lamb,

usually employing less than 1,000 workers, and

widely scattered through the midwestern

country-side Yet much seemed familiar A small group of

firms controlled the industry, drawing on animal

supplies from the hinterlands to supply a nation of

city dwellers And technology remained the key to

moving large amounts of supplies from farm to

refrigerator for the hungry American public

Further reading

Broadway, Michael, and Donald Stull Slaughterhouse

Blues: The Meat and Poultry Industry in North

America New York: Wadsworth Publishing,

2003.

Halpern, Rick Down on the Killing Floor: Black and

White Workers in Chicago’s Packinghouses, 1904–54.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999.

Horowitz, Roger “Negro and White, Unite and Fight!” A

Social History of Industrial Unionism in ing, 1930–1990 Urbana: University of Illinois

Meatpack-Press, 1998.

Walsh, Margaret The Rise of the Midwestern Meat

Pack-ing Industry LexPack-ington: University Press of

Ken-tucky, 1982.

Yeager, Mary Competition and Regulation: The

Develop-ment of Oligopoly in the Meat Industry Greenwich,

Conn.: JAI Press, 1981.

Roger Horowitz

mergers The process of combining companies

by friendly or hostile means The term refers toboth a discrete activity at many Wall Streetinvestment banks specializing in advising onsuch deals, as well as the generic types of merg-ers that can result The process is tied closely toantitrust and antimonopoly activities as well.Since the Civil War, there have been severalacknowledged merger periods—the 1890s and1900s, the 1920s, the 1950s and 1960s, and themid-1980s to the 2000s In all cases, small com-panies were purchased by larger ones and consol-idated into their operations In the latest period,small companies have bid on larger ones as well.The consolidation trend has often led to closescrutiny by antitrust regulators when violations

of the SHERMAN ACT or the CLAYTON ACT werealleged Each period has had its own distinctcharacteristics setting it apart from the others.The period of the 1890s and the 1900s wasthe period of trust formation, whereby largecompanies, assembled as trusts, purchased thestock of other similar companies, forming enor-mous agricultural and industrial organizations Itbegan in the aftermath of a Supreme Court rul-

ing, United States v E.C Knight Co in 1895,

favorable to trust formation and ended with

mergers 269

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decisions ordering the breakup of both the

Stan-dard Oil Co and the AMERICAN TOBACCOCO in

1911 The second period, in the 1920s, began

with the Harding administration and ended with

the stock market crash in 1929 It was

character-ized by consolidation in the UTILITIES industry,

retailing, and CHAIN STORES, among others The

third period, in the 1950s and 1960s, witnessed

the growth of the CONGLOMERATES These forms of

industrial organization became known as the

third type of merger, along with horizontal and

vertical mergers Horizontal mergers occur

between two companies in the same sort of

busi-ness, while vertical mergers occur between

com-panies in the same supply chain In the 1980s

and 1990s, the merger trend was very broad,

especially in the wake of DEREGULATIONof many

industries previously separated, including

utili-ties, banks and financial service institutions,

air-lines, retailers, and producers of capital

equipment and machinery

In the late 1960s, outside the bounds of the

four broad periods, the hostile takeover bid was

first employed This occurs when a company

makes an unwanted bid for another, setting off a

chain of events that may lead to bids and

counter-bids from others also interested in the

target company With the advent of the hostile

takeover, bids have also become larger over the

years and have become tied to new issues in the

stock and bond market since financing for such

large transactions can become very complicated

Because of this new twist, Congress passed the

Williams Act in 1968, requiring potential buyers

to register with the SEC once they had

accumu-lated 5 percent or more of a company’s stock

Also appearing in the wake of the hostile

takeover bid were defense measures employed by

companies designed to fend off unwanted

suit-ors, including poison pill defenses and other

measures colloquially known as shark repellents

Greenmail also appeared during the 1980s

Often, a potential bidder would acquire a block

of a company’s stock with the apparent intent of

taking control, but with the actual aim of being

bought out at a higher price by the company’sdirectors When the company complied, theprocess became known as greenmail

Another popular technique used in mergersand acquisitions is the leveraged buyout—a tech-nique developed in the 1970s and designed to buythe existing stock of a company and make it a pri-vate company Leveraged buyouts, or LBOs,became popular during the merger trend thatbegan in the 1980s By borrowing large sums ofmoney, potential buyers could bid for the existingstock of a company Often, the borrowing was acombination of bank loans and JUNK BONDS Usu-ally, the plan was to restructure the company andsell off some of its nonessential assets in order torepay the debt The result would be a more effi-cient, productive company

The best-known LBO of the 1980s was the out of RJR/Nabisco by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, aspecialized buyout firm that was one of the first toemploy the concept successfully Borrowing almost

buy-$23 billion through a variety of sources, the smallboutique firm bought the company and took it pri-vate, making it both the largest merger and largestbuyout to date Another type of leveraged buyout

is referred to as the management buyout, a deal inwhich the management of a company decides tobuy its outstanding stock, converting it to a privatecompany The buyout may be done to fend off ahostile bidder or to raise a company’s stock price ifmanagement believes that its policies can better beexecuted without shareholders The funds used topurchase the stock are usually borrowed from thejunk bond market or banks and then repaid afterthe company is restructured Because of the bor-rowing factor, this type of buyout differs from aleveraged buyout only by the fact that the buyersare insiders of the company rather than someonefrom the outside

See also INVESTMENT BANKING

Further reading

Baker, George P., and George D Smith The New

Finan-cial Capitalists New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1998.

270 mergers

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Geisst, Charles R Deals of the Century: Wall Street,

Mergers, and the Making of Modern America New

York: John Wiley & Sons, 2003.

Henriques, Diana The White Sharks of Wall Street.

New York: Scribner’s, 2000.

Smith, Roy C The Money Wars: The Rise and Fall of the

Great Buyout Boom of the 1980s New York:

Dut-ton, 1990.

Wasserstein, Bruce Big Deal New York: Time Warner,

1998.

Merrill, Charles (1885–1956) stock broker

and businessman Merrill was founder and

chief executive officer of Merrill Lynch & Co.,

the first of the financial retailers that came to

dominate Wall Street in the latter part of the 20th

century His firm started as a retail-oriented

bro-kerage and rose to become the largest securities

house in the country

Merrill was born in Florida in 1885 After

studying briefly at Amherst and the University of

Michigan, he went to New York to find

employ-ment on Wall Street at the small firm of George

H Burr & Co He opened Charles H Merrill &

Co in 1914, specializing in underwriting stocks

of small companies and selling to retail clients

His major competition at the time came from

such firms as E F Hutton He also hired a friend,

Edmond Lynch, who became a partner shortly

thereafter Their original business catered to

small investors and was concentrated mainly on

stock brokerage, but they did engage in small

underwritings, many for emerging retailers such

as Kresge

In the 1920s, the two also became involved

with the silent movie industry, becoming owners

of the Pathé Frères Cinema They later sold their

interest to Joseph P KENNEDY and Cecil B

DeMille; it was eventually transformed into RKO

Pictures By the late 1920s, Merrill was losing

interest in the securities business; immediately

after the Crash of 1929, he effectively withdrew

from the industry, transferring his operations to

E A Pierce & Co For the remainder of the

1930s, he busied himself with his private ings, one of which was a controlling interest inSafeway Stores

hold-Merrill returned to the firm he founded whenPierce ran into financial difficulties In 1940, theold firm was resurrected with the Pierce and Mer-rill names and returned to Wall Street A year later,the firm merged with Fenner & Beane to becomeMerrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Beane In the early1950s, Beane was dropped and Smith was added

to the corporate name becoming Merrill Lynch,Pierce, Fenner, and Smith Charles Merrill died in

1956, just before his firm expanded to become amajor Wall Street investment bank

By the late 1960s, Merrill Lynch vied witholder, more established Wall Street firms for theleadership in underwriting and sales The firmwent public in 1971 and then became listed onthe NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, the firstexchange member to be listed on the exchangeitself By the 1990s, the firm had become thelargest securities dealer in the country in terms ofcapital and underwriting activities in addition toits traditional stock brokering activities By thelate 1990s, it also led Wall Street in many otherspecialized financial services such as MERGERS

and swap finance

See also INVESTMENT BANKING

Further reading

Geisst, Charles R The Last Partnerships: Inside the

Great Wall Street Money Dynasties New York:

McGraw-Hill, 2001.

Perkins, Edwin J Wall Street to Main Street: Charles

Merrill and the Rise of Middle Class Investors New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Meyer, Eugene (1875–1959) financier and

newspaperman Born in Los Angeles, Meyerinterrupted his studies at the University of Cali-fornia in order to follow his family to the EastCoast after his father became a partner at LAZARD

FRERESin New York After graduating from Yale,his father offered him $600 to stop smoking,

Meyer, Eugene 271

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which he accepted He invested the money,

accu-mulated around $50,000, and purchased a seat

on the NEWYORKSTOCKEXCHANGE, beginning his

career on Wall Street

Meyer became an aggressive investor during

the Panic of 1901 and accumulated many stocks

at very cheap prices When World War I began,

his net worth was estimated at $50 to $60 million

He was a major investor in the Allied Chemical

Corp and the automobile industries In 1918,

Woodrow Wilson appointed him director of the

War Finance Corp., where he gained invaluable

experience in farm financing, among other

spe-cialties Calvin Coolidge made use of that

experi-ence by appointing him to the Federal Farm Loan

Board, and in 1930 Herbert Hoover named him to

the Federal Reserve Board His nomination was

vigorously opposed by Representative Louis T

McFadden of Pennsylvania, author of the MCFAD

-DENACT, but he was confirmed nevertheless

Ideological differences with Franklin

Roo-sevelt’s administration forced him to retire from

public service In 1933, he purchased the

Wash-ington Post with the intent of turning it into a

major national newspaper After a shaky start,

the newspaper succeeded and became nationally

recognized He also purchased the Washington

Times Herald and a radio station.

Meyer returned to public life in 1946, when

Harry Truman appointed him the first president

of the World Bank (International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development), which had

just been created at Bretton Woods, New

Hamp-shire, along with the International Monetary

Fund After helping organize the institution, he

resigned and became chairman of the

Washing-ton Post company He died in Florida in 1959 A

daughter, Katherine Meyer Graham, eventually

succeeded him at the newspaper

See also FEDERALRESERVE; NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY

military-industrial complex The term given

to the close alliance between the military anddefense contractors during the 1950s and 1960sunder which preferential contracts were given bythe military through the Defense Department forweapons, ordnance, and aircraft The term wasfirst used by President Eisenhower upon leavingoffice in 1961, when he described the tight rela-tionship that had developed between the twosectors “We must guard against the acquisition

of unwarranted influence, whether sought orunsought, by the military-industrial complex,”

he stated in his farewell speech from office.The origins of the military-industrial complexcan be traced to World War II, when the generalmobilization brought many companies into directcontact with the government Many began pro-ducing tanks and other armaments for the govern-ment on a large scale During the 1950s and1960s, the Department of Defense continued thetradition in peacetime when it awarded many mil-itary contracts to aerospace and industrial compa-nies to produce all sorts of military weaponry,aircraft, and vehicles In the United States, thegovernment does not produce its own ordnanceand weapons as do some other countries, so thereliance on private contractors was necessary

As a result of the tensions created by the coldwar and the influence of the military, many CON-

GLOMERATES won valuable defense-related tracts that contributed to the rising prices oftheir stocks in the 1960s Although they werehighly diversified companies, many conglomer-ates relied heavily upon defense contracts,awarded to their manufacturing and aerospacedivisions, to produce a substantial portion oftheir revenues Often, they hired senior militaryofficials away from the armed services to serve asconsultants and executives, giving rise to theclose relationship between the sectors andprompting further criticism by those opposed tosuch close collaboration between the militaryand private industry

con-The term has fallen out of favor in recentyears, although it is still used to describe the rela-

272 military-industrial complex

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tions of armaments producers and of

administra-tions that spend a large amount of the federal

budget on defense

Further reading

Hooks, Gregory Forging the Military-Industrial

Com-plex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac Urbana:

University of Illinois Press, 1991.

Proxmire, William Report from the Wasteland:

Amer-ica’s Military-Industrial Complex New York:

Praeger, 1970.

mining industry Although basic geology

dic-tated that the mining industry would not play a

leading role in the early economic and political

life of the United States, many early colonists

came to the eastern shores of North America

with hopes of finding vast gold and silver mines

like those exploited by the Spanish in South and

Central America Leaders of the London-based

Virginia Company directed that a crew of 20 men

with six pickaxes begin searching for minerals

within a week of their arrival in Virginia in 1607

Yet the colonists soon discovered that the

moun-tains of gold and silver they had expected to find

were not readily evident anywhere along the

banks of the Chesapeake Captain John Smith

wrote of his disappointment that the mineral

wealth of the immediate region looked rather

unpromising, though he remained optimistic

that further exploration would likely reveal

“mines very rich of diverse natures.”

John Smith was eventually proven correct

The North American continent did hold many

rich mines, not only of gold and silver, but also of

copper, lead, iron, and other metals

Unfortu-nately for Smith and the colonists, the fabulous

gold and silver mines were thousands of miles

from Virginia in what would eventually become

the American West Although disappointed by

the absence of precious metals, early American

colonists did find and exploit less valuable

min-erals, quickly developing small and widely

scat-tered deposits of bog iron ore to make nails and

basic tools But mining bog iron was no path to

easy riches The American colonies wouldundoubtedly have developed in a strikingly dif-ferent manner if geology had layered with goldthe rivers of Virginia instead of California As itwas, the absence of precious mineral deposits ineastern North America ensured that neither thecolonies nor the subsequent early Americanrepublic were much concerned with the miningindustry As late as the 1780s an aging BenjaminFranklin could accurately proclaim, “Gold andsilver are not the produce of North America,which has no mines.”

By the time of the Revolutionary War, thesmall American mining industry primarilyexploited modest eastern deposits of copper, tin,and iron Typically owned and operated by indi-viduals or small partnerships, these early miningenterprises paid a royalty, or percentage of theirproduction, to the government, a system that was

a hold-over from colonial days Shortly after theAmerican Revolution, the Continental Congressvoted to increase the royalty from a fifth to athird in hopes of speeding the repayment of alarge war debt However, the policy was not reen-acted after the dissolution of the ContinentalCongress, in part because during the next fewdecades there was little reason to think muchincome would be gained from the meager easternmineral deposits

The course of the American mining industrybegan to change after the 1803 Louisiana Pur-chase, when the U.S government became the newowner of lead and zinc mines in the upper Mis-sissippi Valley These mines had already provedfairly valuable to the French and Spanish, and inthe light of growing tensions with Great Britain,which would later lead to war, President Jeffer-son was eager to secure a steady supply of leadfor bullets To that end, Jefferson successfullypushed Congress to adopt the Lead Leasing Act

of 1807, establishing a system whereby the ernment leased the mines to private operators inexchange for a percentage of the lead Althoughthe leasing system was plagued by corruptionand inefficiency, it did succeed in encouraging a

gov-mining industry 273

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significant early mining rush into the upper

Mis-sissippi Valley, where miners could develop the

surface veins of lead with relatively little capital

and simple technology By mid-century lead

min-ing in the area had become a significant part of

the regional and national economy, yet the

indus-try remained largely decentralized and

techno-logically primitive—particularly in comparison

to many European mining operations of the time

An exception to this primitive early state of

the American mining industry occurred in the

development of eastern coal mining during the

19th century The American coal industry’s

exploitation of the huge coalfields of

Pennsylva-nia, West VirgiPennsylva-nia, and other states grew steadily

during the first half of the 19th century in concert

with the demands of early industrialization Well

before the Civil War, coal mining operations in

towns such as St Clair, Pennsylvania, had

devel-oped into large operations using sophisticated

technologies, similar in size and scope to

Euro-pean mines Mining machinery inventors

abounded in the Pennsylvania coalfields, busily

making improvements in pumping machinery,

rock drills, ventilation, and a host of other areas

where deep coal mining raised obstacles Yet few

of these mechanically minded miners and

busi-nessmen had any formal technical education

Rather, much like the civil engineers trained on

great public works projects such as the ERIE

CANAL, early coal mining engineers and managers

learned their trade on the job through informal

apprenticeships with practicing engineers

While the coal mining industry flourished,

hard rock mining remained underdeveloped

dur-ing much of the first half of the 19th century Yet,

as further acquisition of western lands created a

nation stretching from “sea to shining sea,” the

conditions were ripe for a major reorientation of

the American mining industry If geology had

been stingy in providing precious mineral

deposits to the eastern half of the nation, the

opposite proved true in the West The ink had

scarcely dried on the 1848 agreement making

Spanish California part of the United States when

a millwright discovered placer gold deposits nearSacramento, California By summer, some 5,000miners were working in the gulches and streams

of the western Sierra Nevada; by year’s end theyhad washed out nearly $10 million worth of goldfrom the gravel stream beds—and the Californiagold rush had only just begun

Most of the so-called 49ers who arrived in thenext few years mined alluvial gold fields located

on federal land, pursuing gold that had, overmany centuries, been slowly eroded from rockydeposits in the mountains and been carried bywater downstream to settle out in river beds andflood plains The miners had no clear legal right

to take gold from federal lands, yet neither didthe law explicitly prohibit it The governmentsimply had no formal policy for selling, leasing,

or even monitoring public mineral lands For thefirst two years of the gold rush the new territorywas administered by the U.S Army, which essen-tially allowed the miners free run of the federallands—in part because the mining was a boon tothe development of western trade By 1849, thebusy mines in California had already producedalmost 2 million ounces of pure gold worthsomewhere in the area of $40 million—a stun-ning amount of wealth in an era when the entirefederal budget for the same year was slightlymore than $45 million

For a brief time, the California gold fieldsoffered a genuine, if exceedingly slim, chance forany American to strike it rich, if only they couldfind the cash to somehow get to the West Coastand purchase a few basic tools and supplies To

an even greater extent than with the earlier leadmining rush on the upper Mississippi, the Cali-fornia gold deposits could be mined with simpletools and little capital, and the federal govern-ment’s inertia in developing a coherent policy formanaging the gold fields meant that minerscould essentially take whatever they found forfree Still, the vast majority of the early 49ersfound little or no gold, while those who arrived

in subsequent years discovered that most of thebest claims had been taken Further, as the rich-

274 mining industry

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est and most easily mined deposits gave out,

mines run by individuals increasingly gave way

to mining companies with the capital needed to

pursue large-scale operations By consolidating

many claims into one operation, these

compa-nies could use water cannons and giant dredges

to profitably break up large placer deposits and

remove the gold While highly profitable, such

techniques created wide-scale environmental

damage and angered downstream farmers whose

fertile lands were flooded with silt from the

mines Hard-fought court battles eventually led

to severe restrictions on hydraulic mining in

Cal-ifornia, constituting some of the earliest

signifi-cant environmental REGULATION of the American

mining industry

As downstream placer deposits gave out,

prospectors moved up the rivers and into the

Sierra Nevada and beyond in search of the

“mother lode,” the ultimate source of the gold

encased deep within the Rocky Mountains to the

east By the 1860s, intrepid prospectors had

found hundreds of new deposits, two of which

were large enough to ignite their own mining

rushes: the Colorado gold fields and the famous

Comstock Lode silver mines in Nevada As had

been the case with the early placer mines, a lone

miner or modestly financed partnership could

profitably develop some of the richest and most

easily accessible hard-rock mines But as miners

followed the veins of gold or silver deeper down

into the earth, the costs rose exponentially To

profitably develop the gigantic silver deposit at

the Comstock Lode, for example, required a

complex system of mine timbering, massive

hoisting machinery, and expensive concentrating

and smelting operations As a result, ownership

and management were once again increasingly

consolidated into the hands of a small number of

large mining companies, many now capitalized

by a growing group of mining financiers based in

Boston, Philadelphia, and San Francisco

In 1866, some 17 years after the California

gold rush began, Congress finally began to create

a coherent federal mining policy By this point

the mining industries in California, Colorado,and Nevada had become powerful big busi-nesses, and mine operators and promoters withtremendous fortunes effectively used their eco-nomic clout to influence legislators The resultwas the 1866 lode-mining law, which essentiallylegalized the previous informal policy of freeaccess, no royalty payments, and cheap out-rightsale of public mineral lands Several years later,Congress combined the 1866 law with severalothers to form the famous—and still opera-tional—1872 Mining Law, which preserved theearlier laws’ basic principles while also increas-ing the size of claims to facilitate large-scale min-ing Under the “free and open” access principle,any citizen was guaranteed the right to beginmining on federal land without needing to notifythe government Miners who wished to buy theirclaim had to file with the government, but sub-mitting a so-called patent claim was not in anysense a request for permission to mine Permis-sion had already been granted As a result, thegovernment essentially abandoned its power tomanage and control public mineral lands, retain-ing for the U.S Department of the Interior, theadministrator of the mineral lands, the power togrant title to the land when a miner (or morelikely, a mining company) proved he had done

$500 of work, filed the proper papers, and paidthe small patenting fee

Thanks in part to the extraordinary giveaway

of public mineral wealth legalized by the 1872law, the development of western hard rock min-ing grew at an astonishing rate Although someopportunities continued to exist for small inde-pendent miners, increasingly the mining industrywas dominated by technologically sophisticatedand highly capitalized lode mining companiesthat were eager to move beyond the rapid boomand bust pattern of early mining rushes anddevelop long-term profits An emphasis on effi-ciency, planning, and prudent managementbegan to replace the previous “get rich quick”spirit of mining In 1879, Congress recognizedthe growing economic importance of this evolving

mining industry 275

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