From the American System to Mass Production, 1800–1932: Development of turing Technology in the United States.. meat packing industry Prior to 1830, the meat trade was a highly decentral
Trang 1M
Macy, Rowland H. (1822–1877)
business-man and retailer Born in Nantucket,
Massa-chusetts, to a seafaring family, Macy made several
attempts to open a dry goods store but failed on
each of them After failures in Massachusetts, he
went to California during the gold rush and
opened a successful operation He eventually
returned to Massachusetts with a small nest egg
of $3,000, opened another operation in Boston,
but again failed to make it successful
Leaving Massachusetts, he made his way to
New York City and opened a dry goods store on
Sixth Avenue near 14th Street in 1857 His
first-day sales amounted to $12, and his store quickly
became a success Two years later, he spent
$2,800 on advertising and generated more than
$85,000 in yearly sales in its first full year He
used a simple formula of spending more on
advertising than his competitors while also using
cash for both buying and selling rather than
using credit Capitalizing on his success, Macy’s
store became one of the best known in New York
City by expanding its offerings from simple dry
goods to a full range of consumer products
After the Civil War, Macy continued to
intro-duce marketing devices designed to attract and
keep customers In 1870, he employed the firstin-store Santa Claus, designed to attract families
at Christmas Continued success led to the ing of the flagship store at Herald Square in NewYork in 1902 By the turn of the century, it was afull-fledged department store The store expandedbeyond dry goods and now carried a wide array
open-of consumer products under one roopen-of
Macy did not live to witness the success orexpansion of his stores He died in Paris at age
55, and the store was taken over by Charles B.Webster Webster invited the Strauss retailingfamily to purchase part of the store 10 yearslater, and by the 1890s, when Webster soldthem his remaining share, they gained control
of Macy’s
One of Macy’s buyers, William Titon,invented the first tea bag in 1912 By 1924, dur-ing the heyday of department and CHAIN STORES,the Herald Square store was the world’s largestdepartment store and held its first ThanksgivingDay Parade, a tradition that continues today Butunlike other retailers, Macys did not participate
in the expansion boom of the 1920s The storebegan to expand to suburban shopping mallsonly after World War II, when it became a chain
Trang 2After a series of acquisitions and management
problems, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
pro-tection in 1992 It was acquired by Federated
Department Stores after emerging from its
reor-ganization in 1994 and, in the name of greater
efficiency, began to shed some stores it had
opened or acquired
Further reading
Harriman, Margaret Case And the Price Is Right: The
R H Macy Story Cleveland: World Publishing,
1958.
Hower, Ralph History of Macy’s of New York,
1858–1919 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univer-sity Press, 1943.
Trachtenberg, Jeffrey The Rain on Macy’s Parade New
York: Times Books, 1996.
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award
Named after former secretary of commerce
Mal-colm Baldrige, the award is actually four awards
given annually to American companies to
recog-nize their achievements The fields in which the
awards are given are manufacturing, service,
small business, and education and health care
The awards were established by Congress in
1987 to recognize American businesses Theywere initiated to emphasize quality, whichBaldrige felt was essential for American compa-nies if they were to maintain their edge and fightoff foreign competition In the 1970s and 1980s,American companies developed a reputation forpoor quality and shoddy products, and theawards were a method of emphasizing quality in
a more global business environment
Each company winning an award must meetspecific criteria for excellence, including leader-ship, customer and market focus, strategic plan-ning, process management, business results, andinformation and analysis Companies winningawards since 1987 were Dana Corp., AT&T Con-sumer Communications Services, Cadillac MotorDivision, Xerox Corp., Ames Rubber Corp., IBM,and the Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., among others.The IBM Corporation used the award to chal-lenge itself to turn around the company in thelate 1980s, once again becoming known for pro-ducing quality products
Malcolm Baldrige (1922–87) was secretary ofcommerce under Ronald Reagan from 1981 untilhis accidental death in 1987 Before enteringgovernment service, he was chief executive offi-cer of Scovill, Inc., formerly a brass mill that hetransformed into a diversified manufacturer ofconsumer and industrial goods The award wasnamed after him posthumously in recognition ofhis championship of quality in both manufactur-ing and the service industries
Further reading
Boyett, Joseph H., Stephen Schwartz, Laurence
Oster-wise, and Roy Bauer The Quality Journey: How
Winning the Baldrige Sparked the Remaking of IBM.
New York: Dutton, 1993.
Brown, Mark G Baldrige Award Winning Quality: How
to Interpret the Baldrige Criteria for Performance.
New York: Quality Resources, 1997.
managerial capitalism When professionalmanagers run companies; characteristic of theperiod of American business development when
260 Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award
Rowland H Macy (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS)
Trang 3family members yielded control of their
compa-nies to professionals The term helps distinguish
the early period of American business, leading to
the Civil War, with the period that followed,
when businesses began to be run by professional
managers trained in various specialty disciplines
This period coincides with the widespread
emergence of stock companies, when many
com-panies sold stock for the first time in order to
expand In the 1840s and 1850s, manufacturing
and RAILROADS (especially railroads) began to
grow exponentially, requiring managers with
more than one set of skills After the Civil War, as
the railroads continued to expand westward, the
need for professional managers became more
pronounced as the organizations grew larger and
more complex Quite often, business
organiza-tions would still be run by family members,
although they were increasingly staffed by
pro-fessional managers, hired from the outside
After the turn of the 20th century, as the need
for managers became more recognized, many
business school programs were instituted to
pro-vide graduate, and later undergraduate, training
for this new managerial class The Harvard
Gradu-ate School of Business was the first graduGradu-ate
pro-gram in the country instituted for this purpose
In the 20th century, the trend became more
clear as fewer and fewer companies remained in
family or founders’ hands The rise of the modern
CORPORATIONafter World War I was an excellent
example The size and complexity of DuPont and
GENERAL MOTORS, the latter headed by Alfred
SLOAN, showed that the 20th-century corporation
had become too large to be ruled from the top and
now required skilled and trained managers at
var-ious stages and levels of organization
The success of larger business enterprises
managed by professionally trained managers
became the cornerstone of American business in
the 20th century In many cases, this success can
be seen in the MERGERS and acquisitions trend
that characterized several decades of the 20th
century and the rise of the conglomerate
organi-zation in the 1950s and 1960s In addition, many
business disciplines created “managerial” tracks
in the post–World War II years, and such plines as managerial accounting, finance, eco-nomics, and information sciences now exist andare designed to train potential managers in deci-sion making and cooperative planning
disci-See also DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO., E I.;
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL; TAYLOR, FREDERICK
WINSLOW
Further reading
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr The Visible Hand: The
Manage-rial Revolution in American Business Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.
Marris, Robin Managerial Capitalism in Retrospective.
New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998.
mass production The process of producing alarge amount of manufactured goods by stan-dardizing parts and production techniques Bydoing so, the producer is able to lower the cost ofproduction and therefore lower the cost of theproduct to the consumer
The method began with the manufacture ofmuskets for the U.S Army around 1800 InventorEli Whitney had contracted with the government
to produce muskets but was unable to meet hisproduction schedule because the parts he usedwere not standard He demonstrated to the armythat if he were able to employ machine tool tech-niques, he would be able to produce a standard,efficient musket rather than the handmade vari-ety, which had been the only method used untilthat time When he began producing musketswith standard parts, the process was born Work-ers were often taught only one part of a system sothat they could produce their own specializedpart of the process quickly and efficiently.When standard parts and mass productionbegan to be used widely, the factory system cameinto general use Factories had been used previ-ously to produce textiles, and the principleswere the same, although the process was moresimple and produced only a simple good Even
mass production 261
Trang 4relatively simply manufactures would become
mass produced after the Civil War Items of
clothing, such as shoes, were mass produced in
the first two decades after the war ended, leaving
hand production to be more of a higher priced
specialty art that defined its products as those of
artisans rather than factory workers
I M Singer began employing these techniques
to produce sewing machines in the 19th century
In 1865, his company produced about 3,000
machines per year, but within 10 years production
multiplied to more than 250,000 But mass
pro-duction is generally considered to have begun
with automobile manufacturing in the 20th
cen-tury Mass production was successfully employed
by Henry FORD in Detroit Ford employed the
assembly, or production, line when producing his
Model T automobiles, and the number of cars
pro-duced multiplied exponentially between 1915 and
1925 Unlike other assembly lines, Ford’s moved,
meaning that workers could remain stationary
while the cars passed before them for finishing As
the number increased, the price began to decline,
producing economies of scale for Ford and other
manufacturers It was the introduction of the
assembly line that brought the idea of mass
pro-duction into the modern industrial age Ford’s
methods relied upon simple styling and models,
which did not change every year, allowing the
process to proceed without interruption Ford
remarked that his customers could have their
choice of color as long as they liked black It was
the only color he produced The Model T was
suc-ceeded by the Model A, whose price also fell as a
continuing result of mass production
In 1918, the American National Standards
Institute was founded in order to set standards
for manufacturing and to study methods of
pro-duction around the country Both world wars
also helped the process develop further, since
standard grades were needed for military
arma-ments In the post–World War II period, many
new products became standardized, and separate
industries developed widely accepted methods of
producing their goods More recently, the
assem-bly line has been using robotic machines ratherthan people in an effort to reduce error in theprocess and speed production
See also WHITNEY, ELI
Further reading
Allen, Frederick Lewis The Big Change: America
Trans-forms Itself, 1900–1950 New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1952.
Hounshell, David A From the American System to Mass
Production, 1800–1932: Development of turing Technology in the United States Baltimore:
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
McCormick, Cyrus (1809–1884) inventor
and businessman McCormick produced thefirst successful mechanical reaper, which revolu-tionized agriculture in the 19th century He wasborn on the family farm in Virginia and tinkeredwith mechanical reaping devices from an earlyage, learning from his father, who was an inven-tor of farm equipment He produced his first in
1831 and received a patent for it in 1834 afterdiscovering that a similar device had beeninvented by Obed Hussey He later purchased aniron works with his father, but they lost substan-tial amounts of money during the Panic of 1837.The reaper developed slowly as a result
The mechanical development of the deviceand its sales were initially slow McCormick soldonly two of his machines in their first year ofproduction (1840) and in 1843 sold 29 But after
a trip to the Midwest, McCormick realized thathis device was more suited to the wide plains ofthe breadbasket states than it was to the rougher,hilly terrain of Virginia, even though he hadinvented a machine that could be used on slopedground By 1848, he had relocated his business
to Chicago and started producing improvedreapers His factory was one of the first examples
262 McCormick, Cyrus
Trang 5of assembly line production, and it came into
existence as his patent for the machine was
run-ning out By 1856, the factory produced more
than 16,000 reapers and related devices, and his
invention was considered the best on the market
McCormick also employed advertising to sell
his product He purchased a newspaper called the
Farmer’s Advance in which he extolled the virtues
of his machine The paper had a circulation of
more than 300,000 His machines sold for $120
each and came with one of the first money-back
guarantees By the time the Civil War ended, his
machine was the most popular in the country and
had made him a rich man By 1880, profits
exceeded $1.2 million a year He also tried his
hand at politics and ran unsuccessfully for
Con-gress in 1864 But McCormick’s invention had a
profound effect upon the economy in the post–
Civil War period Before the reaper, farming was
much more labor intensive, requiring many more
men to harvest wheat and other grains His
inven-tion helped free labor from dull agricultural work
at a time when labor itself was in short supply,
especially during and after the carnage of the war
Before the Civil War, McCormick was a strong
defender of SLAVERY, although he opposed
seces-sion He used some of his wealth to purchase the
Chicago Tribune so that he could make his views
known, but they proved extremely unpopular in
the city After his death, his company was run by
his son, Cyrus H McCormick Jr In 1902, the
company merged with a major competitor, the
Deering Co., to form the INTERNATIONAL HAR
-VESTERCOMPANY The banker to the consolidation
was J P Morgan & Company The new company
continued to be run by McCormick, who owned
almost 50 percent of the stock
See also DEERE, JOHN
Further reading
Casson, Herbert Cyrus Hall McCormick: His Life and
Work Chicago: A C McClurg, 1909.
Hutchinson, William T Cyrus Hall McCormick New
York: Century, 1930.
McCormick, Cyrus The Century of the Reaper Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1931.
McCulloch v Maryland A landmark ruling
by the Supreme Court of the United States thatestablished lines of demarcation between thepower of the states and that of the federal gov-ernment The case involved a suit broughtagainst a branch of the BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES, located in Baltimore Two issues were atstake First was the matter of Congress’s ability toincorporate this second national bank, while theother involved the right of a state to tax aninstrument of the federal government
The Second Bank of the United States waschartered in 1816 In 1818, Maryland passed atax on all banks operating in the state that werenot chartered by the state legislature JamesMcCulloch, its chief cashier, refused to pay thetax, and the case went to the courts, where Mary-land won; the bank appealed to the U.S SupremeCourt Chief Justice John Marshall, deliveringthe unanimous decision of the Court, overturnedthe ruling of the lower court and ruled in thebank’s favor The bank was a legitimate instru-ment of the United States and therefore had aright to exist, despite strong attacks by advocates
of states’ rights Following upon the bank’s macy, the Court also ruled that Maryland’s right
legiti-to tax was subordinate legiti-to the Constitution,which gives the federal government precedenceover the laws of states As a result, the state couldnot tax an instrument of the United Statesbecause it had no authority over it
One important result of the decision was thenotion of tax immunities between the states and
the federal government Following the
McCul-loch decision, interest on municipal bonds would
be treated as exempt from federal income tion, while interest on TREASURY BONDSwould betreated as exempt from state income taxation Itshould be noted that this did not become a prac-tical issue until the Sixteenth Amendment to theConstitution was passed
taxa-The tax interpretation used today came after aseries of other decisions in the 19th and 20thcenturies that reiterated the idea that the federalgovernment and the states were generally
McCulloch v Maryland 263
Trang 6immune to each other’s taxes—based upon
McCulloch As interpreted today, it allows
munic-ipalities to borrow money and pay interest free of
federal tax to investors as long as certain criteria
of the U.S Treasury are met
See also BIDDLE, NICHOLAS; INCOME TAX
Further reading
Gunther, Gerald, ed John Marshall’s Defense of
McCul-loch v Maryland Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford
Uni-versity Press, 1969.
Hammond, Bray Banks and Politics in America from the
Revolution to the Civil War Princeton, N.J.:
Prince-ton University Press, 1957.
McFadden Act Passed by Congress in 1927,
the McFadden Act prevented interstate banking
by commercial banks for 67 years, until the
INTERSTATE BRANCHINGACT was passed in 1994
In the interim, banks tried a variety of strategies
to expand into other states but with very limited
success
The act was a response to the desire of many
states to keep larger banks out of their local
mar-kets During the 1920s, many small banks failed,
especially in agrarian and rural states An average
of two per day were failing when the law was
passed Many state banking authorities feared
that the failing banks’ markets would be taken
over by out-of-state banks and so pressed for
protective legislation Restrictions against
oper-ating a bank within a state were always regulated
by the host state’s banking laws According to the
McFadden Act, banks were prohibited from
opening de novo (new) branches across state
lines This would effectively prevent national
banks from branching into states that were not
their home base of operations
The McFadden Act was cosponsored by
Rep-resentative Louis McFadden (1876–1936) of
Pennsylvania and Senator George Pepper of
Pennsylvania The original resolution did not
contain any specific references to prohibiting
bank expansion Instead, the original intent was
to allow nationally chartered banks, registeredwith the comptroller of the currency, the samesort of privileges within the various states thatwere usually reserved for state banks only How-ever, the act became the cornerstone of the frag-mented banking system in the United States thatlasted for more than 60 years
The act also authorized the comptroller of thecurrency to allow commercial banks to beginunderwriting equity securities Although banksbegan to do so, the provision did not contribute
to the Crash of 1929 because the banks did nothave enough time to underwrite large numbers
of securities before the crash occurred Once the
BANKINGACT OF 1933was passed, this power waseffectively rescinded, and COMMERCIAL BANKING
was separated from INVESTMENT BANKING.The prohibition against branch banking waslifted in 1994, when Congress passed the Inter-state Branching Act, allowing bank holding com-panies to establish themselves in more than onestate Despite the fact that bankers lobbied foryears to have the act removed, it proved remark-ably resilient and defined COMMERCIAL BANKING
for almost seven decades
Further reading
Geisst, Charles R Undue Influence: How the Wall Street
Elite Put the Financial System at Risk Hoboken,
N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2004.
Kroos, Herman, ed Documentary History of Banking
and Currency in the United States New York:
Chelsea House, 1983.
Meany, George (1894–1980) labor leader
Born in New York City, Meany became anapprentice plumber at age 16 before becominginvolved in labor unions He first was active inthe United Association of Plumbers and SteamFitters and became a business agent for hisunion local in 1922 He was elected vice presi-dent of the New York State Federation of Labor
in 1932 and then its president from 1934 to1939
264 McFadden Act
Trang 7Meany also served as secretary-treasurer of
the AMERICAN FEDERATION OFLABOR(AFL) from
1940 to 1952 In 1952, he became president
upon the death of William Green In 1955, he
became president of the AFL when it merged
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) He served as president of the combined
organization until he retired in 1979
A dispute with another labor leader, Walter
REUTHER, led to the United Auto Workers leaving
the union in 1967 Meany was a key figure in
expelling the Teamsters Union, led by Jimmy
Hoffa, from the AFL-CIO in 1957 He was also
strongly opposed to communist influences in
American labor and supported American military
involvement in Vietnam He took strong political
stances, some of which helped affect the
out-come of elections
Meany led the traditionally Democratic union
to a neutral political position after 1972, refusing
to support either of the major candidates for
president in that year As a result, Richard Nixon
won the election, although Meany later accused
him of being sympathetic to big business at the
expense of labor When Nixon’s political troubles
began with Watergate, Meany openly called for
his resignation, reversing some earlier support
He also had a falling out with Jimmy Carter, who
he originally supported, refusing to support
Carter’s economic policies Strongly dogmatic
and individualistic, Meany is considered one of
the major figures in labor union history
See also GOMPERS, SAMUEL; LEWIS, JOHNL
Further reading
Buhle, Paul Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers,
George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of
American Labor New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1999.
Goulden, Joseph C Meany New York: Atheneum, 1972.
Robinson, Archie George Meany and His Times: A
Biog-raphy New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981.
meat packing industry Prior to 1830, the
meat trade was a highly decentralized business,
drawing together individual farmers who duced the livestock, drovers who transported theanimals to population centers, and butcher-merchants who processed the meat and made itavailable to consumers In rural areas (wheremost Americans lived), meat was locally pro-duced outside of market relationships, as farmersharvested their livestock for home use and soldselected cured products to local stores
pro-Beginning in the 1820s, entrepreneurs covered that, whenever possible, it was cheaper
dis-to move the slaughterhouses and meat ing facilities to the animals than to ship live ani-mals to major population centers So long as themeat could be kept from spoiling and trans-ported economically, large-scale production facil-ities near livestock sources permitted economies
process-of scale in meat production Growth process-of internaltransportation, principally roads, canals, andsteamboat shipping on inland and coastal water-ways, allowed nodal points to emerge for packingcured meat, preeminently pork
Its advantageous geographic location helpedCincinnati become America’s leading antebellumpork processing center Perched on the banks ofthe Ohio River in rich farming country, Cincin-nati was a favorite destination for farmers eager
to take advantage of its superior outlets to ern and eastern markets Annual production lev-els exceeded 100,000 hogs in the 1830s andreached 400,000 on the eve of the Civil War Pro-duction was seasonal, with operations commenc-ing once the weather became cold enough tochill the slaughtered meat, and ending in thespring once the rivers became sufficiently clear
south-of ice to ship out the finished product
Cincinnati’s pork packers were businessmenwho rarely soiled their hands by actually cuttingmeat Rather than functioning in a daily marketgauging sales through personal interactions withcustomers, Cincinnati’s meat men gambled onlong-term demand for pork products in distantports and cities, anticipating that pigs purchased
in November would be sold as bacon, ham, andlard six months later They were more merchant
meat packing industry 265
Trang 8than industrialist, better attuned to the vagaries
of credit and demand for commodities than the
mechanics of turning live animals into meat
By the late 1850s, Chicago was challenging
Cincinnati as the nation’s leading pork packing
center The expansion of the nation’s rail
net-work explains much of this change, along with
the continued westward movement of
agricul-ture As railroad track mileage grew to 9,000 in
1850 and 31,000 by 1860, canals and rivers
became less desirable means for transporting
meat RAILROADS had two principal virtues in
comparison to water transport: Trunk routes
could convey food to eastern markets on a
year-round basis, and feeder lines could enter the
countryside and bring livestock from landlocked
farms directly to central markets Located astride
this rail network, Chicago took full advantage of
its transportation advantage and passed
Cincin-nati as the Cincin-nation’s leading meatpacking center
during the Civil War By 1870, Chicago produced
$19 million of cured pork products, twice as
much as Cincinnati
Cincinnati and Chicago, along with other
smaller meatpacking centers, depended on pork
for their major product prior to 1880 American
consumers preferred their pork cured and their
beef fresh; in an era before reliable refrigeration,
only cured products could be processed and then
distributed from centralized packing facilities
Beef production remained a local business well
into the 1880s, as the only way to provide fresh
supplies was for cattle to be slaughtered near to
where it was consumed
The emerging large meat packing firms,
espe-cially those led by Gustavus Swift and Philip
Armour, rose to dominance by exploiting new
technology in the beef trade Expansion of the
rail network opened the Great Plains to the
com-mercial livestock business by connecting eastern
urban areas with midwestern packing centers
Refrigeration, both of the packinghouses and
railroad cars, allowed firms to operate
year-round and sell to customers far removed from
where the animals were slaughtered Swift was
the first meat packing firm to use refrigeratedrailroad cars to convey meat processed in mid-western plants to eastern population centers.Armour and other companies quickly followedSwift’s lead Backward integration, in the form ofownership of central stockyards, assured thelarge midwestern plants of a reliable supply oflivestock, while forward integration, with thecreation of wholesale meat outlets (known as
“branch houses”), gave them entry into sands of American communities
thou-The large meat packing companies were truenational concerns with thousands of employees
by the early 20th century Trained livestock ers scouted for quality livestock in the centralstockyards of cities such as Chicago, Kansas City,Omaha, and Sioux City, aided by company-employed “cowboys” who directed the cows,pigs, and sheep through the sprawling stock-yards Thousands of packinghouse employeesturned the animals into meat, watched closely byplatoons of supervisory employees In the branchhouses spread all over the nation, skilled butch-ers processed the carcass beef and pork into cutssuitable for butcher shops and restaurants Hun-dreds of clerical employees tracked perturbations
buy-in livestock prices, took orders, monitored duction, and tried to be the eyes and ears of theplant superintendents and company executiveswho managed their far-flung enterprise
pro-The meatpacking oligopoly was firmly lished by World War I In 1916, Armour, Cudahy,Morris, Swift, and Wilson killed 94.4 percent ofthe cattle processed in the 12 cities that pro-duced 81 percent of the nation’s beef These fivefirms also controlled 81 percent of the hogslaughter in those centers The structure of meat-packing changed little between World War I andthe NEW DEAL; the Big Four firms (Armouracquired Morris in 1923) accounted for 78 per-cent of the total value of meat products sold in1937
estab-The seeming stranglehold of the Big Fourlasted for a half century By the 1960s, however,their era was over; in 1962 the old-line firms con-
266 meat packing industry
Trang 9trolled only 38.1 percent of the meat products
sold in America Hundreds of new firms sprang
up in the 1950s and 1960s and took advantage of
new and more efficient methods of production
and distribution to take chunks of the marketaway from the old dominant companies
The collapse of the Big Four’s branch housesystem facilitated the entry of new firms Two
meat packing industry 267
Hog slaughtering and pork packing in Cincinnati, Ohio, 1873 (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS)
Trang 10interrelated developments rendered the branch
houses obsolete First, large supermarket chains
proliferated after World War II These national
food retail companies bought meat in large
amounts from packing firms, processed it at
cen-tral warehouses, and then distributed it to local
stores As the importance of independent local
retailers waned, the branch houses lost their
cen-tral role in most urban centers Second, the
enor-mous expansion of the highway network after
1945 eliminated the locational advantage of the
plants built in the rail hubs, and allowed newer,
rural facilities away from rail lines to ship their
meat to supermarket warehouses for lower
distri-bution costs Federal grading of meat helped
these independent packers to compete on an
equal footing with the old companies in their
sales to supermarket CHAIN STORES
Concomitant with the decline of the branch
houses was an enormous increase in meat
job-bers, known as “breakers” and “boners.” Used
primarily by the new independent beef packers,
these jobbers took beef quarters from
slaughter-houses and further processed the meat in
prepa-ration for resale to retail outlets As their names
imply, these wholesalers “broke” the meat down
from quarters into basic subprimal cuts such as
ribs, loins, and rounds, “boned” them, and then
shipped to supermarket distribution centers
Retailers used the wholesalers because they
pro-vided more flexibility in the choice of cuts
offered to the consumer; independent packers
used wholesalers because these new companies
needed to do no more than simply kill and
mini-mally process their product, reducing initial
cap-ital investment and labor costs
Declining concentration was a transitional
phase before a new oligopoly took control of the
meatpacking industry Astute packers such as
Iowa Beef Processors (IBP) founder Currier
Holman and Missouri Beef Packers president
Gene Frye saw an opportunity to dominate the
beef trade by attaching “boning and breaking”
operations to their slaughterhouses that would
assume the tasks of beef wholesalers This
inno-vation quickly became known as boxed beefbecause of the containers in which the meat wasshipped
Boxed beef reduced costs in two ways packing companies saved money because they nolonger paid to ship unusable bones and meatscraps Savings in transportation expensesallowed them to undercut prices of firms thatshipped beef in carcass form and to increase theirmargin on each pound of beef Retailers savedmoney because boxed beef eliminated the skilledand high-paid butchers who had fabricated thecarcasses
Meat-With this cost advantage, boxed beef becamethe new method for controlling the distribution
of beef, much as the branch houses had servedthe Big Four at the turn of the century In lessthan two decades boxed beef grew from a supple-mentary source of supply to the preeminentmethod of marketing beef Sales of boxed beefmore than tripled between 1971 and 1979 to 4.8million pounds, and accounted for one-half of allfederal beef slaughter at the end of the decade.Boxed beef constituted only 20 percent of theretail market in 1972; by 1989 boxed beef’snational market share exceeded 80 percent Asurvey of leading supermarkets revealed that beefshipped in the form of cattle quarters—the oldmethod of transporting beef—accounted for only
4 percent of their receipts in 1986
Boxed beef was a particularly importantsource of dominance for a few large firms thatmastered this technique of production and distri-bution The smaller independent concerns of the1950s and 1960s rapidly lost ground to the newindustry giants in the 1970s as boxed beefflooded the market The leading four firmsaccounted for 60 percent of boxed beef sales in
1979 and 82 percent in 1987 IBP alone produced
40 percent of the nation’s boxed beef in the late1970s Forward integration into boxed beef emu-lated the techniques of the old Big Four at theturn of the century; and it was equally effective
as a method of dominating the industry, albeitunder altered circumstances
268 meat packing industry
Trang 11Dominance in beef allowed the large
compa-nies to assert control over hog slaughter in the
1980s Pork is sold in processed form far more
than beef, and consumer preference for “brand”
products protected Oscar Mayer, Hormel, and
other pork processors from new competition
Nonetheless, aggressive entry into pork
slaughter-ing by the large packers prompted the older
pork-based firms to concentrate on the processing of
meat and to abandon their killing operations By
1990, the pork industry had bifurcated into
slaughtering and processing sectors, each
domi-nated by a handful of firms, albeit different ones
By 1990, a new dominant set of firms had
emerged The new “Big Three” of IBP, Excell (a
subsidiary of Cargill), and ConAgra were almost
as powerful as Armour, Cudahy, Swift, and
Wil-son in their heyday By 1989 the Big Three
slaugh-tered almost 70 percent of the nation’s steers and
heifers and 35 percent of its hogs These
impres-sive figures understate their power over the
distri-bution of meat in the United States In 1990,
these three companies produced more than 75
percent of the nation’s boxed beef, the form in
which most supermarkets receive meat
The contrast between meatpacking in 1955
and 1990 is striking In the old stockyard districts
of Chicago, Kansas City, and Sioux City, several
plants slaughtering a variety of livestock each
employed several thousand workers and were
located in close proximity to each other By the
1990s, most meat production was from dispersed
plants specializing in either beef, pork, or lamb,
usually employing less than 1,000 workers, and
widely scattered through the midwestern
country-side Yet much seemed familiar A small group of
firms controlled the industry, drawing on animal
supplies from the hinterlands to supply a nation of
city dwellers And technology remained the key to
moving large amounts of supplies from farm to
refrigerator for the hungry American public
Further reading
Broadway, Michael, and Donald Stull Slaughterhouse
Blues: The Meat and Poultry Industry in North
America New York: Wadsworth Publishing,
2003.
Halpern, Rick Down on the Killing Floor: Black and
White Workers in Chicago’s Packinghouses, 1904–54.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999.
Horowitz, Roger “Negro and White, Unite and Fight!” A
Social History of Industrial Unionism in ing, 1930–1990 Urbana: University of Illinois
Meatpack-Press, 1998.
Walsh, Margaret The Rise of the Midwestern Meat
Pack-ing Industry LexPack-ington: University Press of
Ken-tucky, 1982.
Yeager, Mary Competition and Regulation: The
Develop-ment of Oligopoly in the Meat Industry Greenwich,
Conn.: JAI Press, 1981.
Roger Horowitz
mergers The process of combining companies
by friendly or hostile means The term refers toboth a discrete activity at many Wall Streetinvestment banks specializing in advising onsuch deals, as well as the generic types of merg-ers that can result The process is tied closely toantitrust and antimonopoly activities as well.Since the Civil War, there have been severalacknowledged merger periods—the 1890s and1900s, the 1920s, the 1950s and 1960s, and themid-1980s to the 2000s In all cases, small com-panies were purchased by larger ones and consol-idated into their operations In the latest period,small companies have bid on larger ones as well.The consolidation trend has often led to closescrutiny by antitrust regulators when violations
of the SHERMAN ACT or the CLAYTON ACT werealleged Each period has had its own distinctcharacteristics setting it apart from the others.The period of the 1890s and the 1900s wasthe period of trust formation, whereby largecompanies, assembled as trusts, purchased thestock of other similar companies, forming enor-mous agricultural and industrial organizations Itbegan in the aftermath of a Supreme Court rul-
ing, United States v E.C Knight Co in 1895,
favorable to trust formation and ended with
mergers 269
Trang 12decisions ordering the breakup of both the
Stan-dard Oil Co and the AMERICAN TOBACCOCO in
1911 The second period, in the 1920s, began
with the Harding administration and ended with
the stock market crash in 1929 It was
character-ized by consolidation in the UTILITIES industry,
retailing, and CHAIN STORES, among others The
third period, in the 1950s and 1960s, witnessed
the growth of the CONGLOMERATES These forms of
industrial organization became known as the
third type of merger, along with horizontal and
vertical mergers Horizontal mergers occur
between two companies in the same sort of
busi-ness, while vertical mergers occur between
com-panies in the same supply chain In the 1980s
and 1990s, the merger trend was very broad,
especially in the wake of DEREGULATIONof many
industries previously separated, including
utili-ties, banks and financial service institutions,
air-lines, retailers, and producers of capital
equipment and machinery
In the late 1960s, outside the bounds of the
four broad periods, the hostile takeover bid was
first employed This occurs when a company
makes an unwanted bid for another, setting off a
chain of events that may lead to bids and
counter-bids from others also interested in the
target company With the advent of the hostile
takeover, bids have also become larger over the
years and have become tied to new issues in the
stock and bond market since financing for such
large transactions can become very complicated
Because of this new twist, Congress passed the
Williams Act in 1968, requiring potential buyers
to register with the SEC once they had
accumu-lated 5 percent or more of a company’s stock
Also appearing in the wake of the hostile
takeover bid were defense measures employed by
companies designed to fend off unwanted
suit-ors, including poison pill defenses and other
measures colloquially known as shark repellents
Greenmail also appeared during the 1980s
Often, a potential bidder would acquire a block
of a company’s stock with the apparent intent of
taking control, but with the actual aim of being
bought out at a higher price by the company’sdirectors When the company complied, theprocess became known as greenmail
Another popular technique used in mergersand acquisitions is the leveraged buyout—a tech-nique developed in the 1970s and designed to buythe existing stock of a company and make it a pri-vate company Leveraged buyouts, or LBOs,became popular during the merger trend thatbegan in the 1980s By borrowing large sums ofmoney, potential buyers could bid for the existingstock of a company Often, the borrowing was acombination of bank loans and JUNK BONDS Usu-ally, the plan was to restructure the company andsell off some of its nonessential assets in order torepay the debt The result would be a more effi-cient, productive company
The best-known LBO of the 1980s was the out of RJR/Nabisco by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, aspecialized buyout firm that was one of the first toemploy the concept successfully Borrowing almost
buy-$23 billion through a variety of sources, the smallboutique firm bought the company and took it pri-vate, making it both the largest merger and largestbuyout to date Another type of leveraged buyout
is referred to as the management buyout, a deal inwhich the management of a company decides tobuy its outstanding stock, converting it to a privatecompany The buyout may be done to fend off ahostile bidder or to raise a company’s stock price ifmanagement believes that its policies can better beexecuted without shareholders The funds used topurchase the stock are usually borrowed from thejunk bond market or banks and then repaid afterthe company is restructured Because of the bor-rowing factor, this type of buyout differs from aleveraged buyout only by the fact that the buyersare insiders of the company rather than someonefrom the outside
See also INVESTMENT BANKING
Further reading
Baker, George P., and George D Smith The New
Finan-cial Capitalists New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998.
270 mergers
Trang 13Geisst, Charles R Deals of the Century: Wall Street,
Mergers, and the Making of Modern America New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 2003.
Henriques, Diana The White Sharks of Wall Street.
New York: Scribner’s, 2000.
Smith, Roy C The Money Wars: The Rise and Fall of the
Great Buyout Boom of the 1980s New York:
Dut-ton, 1990.
Wasserstein, Bruce Big Deal New York: Time Warner,
1998.
Merrill, Charles (1885–1956) stock broker
and businessman Merrill was founder and
chief executive officer of Merrill Lynch & Co.,
the first of the financial retailers that came to
dominate Wall Street in the latter part of the 20th
century His firm started as a retail-oriented
bro-kerage and rose to become the largest securities
house in the country
Merrill was born in Florida in 1885 After
studying briefly at Amherst and the University of
Michigan, he went to New York to find
employ-ment on Wall Street at the small firm of George
H Burr & Co He opened Charles H Merrill &
Co in 1914, specializing in underwriting stocks
of small companies and selling to retail clients
His major competition at the time came from
such firms as E F Hutton He also hired a friend,
Edmond Lynch, who became a partner shortly
thereafter Their original business catered to
small investors and was concentrated mainly on
stock brokerage, but they did engage in small
underwritings, many for emerging retailers such
as Kresge
In the 1920s, the two also became involved
with the silent movie industry, becoming owners
of the Pathé Frères Cinema They later sold their
interest to Joseph P KENNEDY and Cecil B
DeMille; it was eventually transformed into RKO
Pictures By the late 1920s, Merrill was losing
interest in the securities business; immediately
after the Crash of 1929, he effectively withdrew
from the industry, transferring his operations to
E A Pierce & Co For the remainder of the
1930s, he busied himself with his private ings, one of which was a controlling interest inSafeway Stores
hold-Merrill returned to the firm he founded whenPierce ran into financial difficulties In 1940, theold firm was resurrected with the Pierce and Mer-rill names and returned to Wall Street A year later,the firm merged with Fenner & Beane to becomeMerrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Beane In the early1950s, Beane was dropped and Smith was added
to the corporate name becoming Merrill Lynch,Pierce, Fenner, and Smith Charles Merrill died in
1956, just before his firm expanded to become amajor Wall Street investment bank
By the late 1960s, Merrill Lynch vied witholder, more established Wall Street firms for theleadership in underwriting and sales The firmwent public in 1971 and then became listed onthe NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, the firstexchange member to be listed on the exchangeitself By the 1990s, the firm had become thelargest securities dealer in the country in terms ofcapital and underwriting activities in addition toits traditional stock brokering activities By thelate 1990s, it also led Wall Street in many otherspecialized financial services such as MERGERS
and swap finance
See also INVESTMENT BANKING
Further reading
Geisst, Charles R The Last Partnerships: Inside the
Great Wall Street Money Dynasties New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2001.
Perkins, Edwin J Wall Street to Main Street: Charles
Merrill and the Rise of Middle Class Investors New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Meyer, Eugene (1875–1959) financier and
newspaperman Born in Los Angeles, Meyerinterrupted his studies at the University of Cali-fornia in order to follow his family to the EastCoast after his father became a partner at LAZARD
FRERESin New York After graduating from Yale,his father offered him $600 to stop smoking,
Meyer, Eugene 271
Trang 14which he accepted He invested the money,
accu-mulated around $50,000, and purchased a seat
on the NEWYORKSTOCKEXCHANGE, beginning his
career on Wall Street
Meyer became an aggressive investor during
the Panic of 1901 and accumulated many stocks
at very cheap prices When World War I began,
his net worth was estimated at $50 to $60 million
He was a major investor in the Allied Chemical
Corp and the automobile industries In 1918,
Woodrow Wilson appointed him director of the
War Finance Corp., where he gained invaluable
experience in farm financing, among other
spe-cialties Calvin Coolidge made use of that
experi-ence by appointing him to the Federal Farm Loan
Board, and in 1930 Herbert Hoover named him to
the Federal Reserve Board His nomination was
vigorously opposed by Representative Louis T
McFadden of Pennsylvania, author of the MCFAD
-DENACT, but he was confirmed nevertheless
Ideological differences with Franklin
Roo-sevelt’s administration forced him to retire from
public service In 1933, he purchased the
Wash-ington Post with the intent of turning it into a
major national newspaper After a shaky start,
the newspaper succeeded and became nationally
recognized He also purchased the Washington
Times Herald and a radio station.
Meyer returned to public life in 1946, when
Harry Truman appointed him the first president
of the World Bank (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development), which had
just been created at Bretton Woods, New
Hamp-shire, along with the International Monetary
Fund After helping organize the institution, he
resigned and became chairman of the
Washing-ton Post company He died in Florida in 1959 A
daughter, Katherine Meyer Graham, eventually
succeeded him at the newspaper
See also FEDERALRESERVE; NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY
military-industrial complex The term given
to the close alliance between the military anddefense contractors during the 1950s and 1960sunder which preferential contracts were given bythe military through the Defense Department forweapons, ordnance, and aircraft The term wasfirst used by President Eisenhower upon leavingoffice in 1961, when he described the tight rela-tionship that had developed between the twosectors “We must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought orunsought, by the military-industrial complex,”
he stated in his farewell speech from office.The origins of the military-industrial complexcan be traced to World War II, when the generalmobilization brought many companies into directcontact with the government Many began pro-ducing tanks and other armaments for the govern-ment on a large scale During the 1950s and1960s, the Department of Defense continued thetradition in peacetime when it awarded many mil-itary contracts to aerospace and industrial compa-nies to produce all sorts of military weaponry,aircraft, and vehicles In the United States, thegovernment does not produce its own ordnanceand weapons as do some other countries, so thereliance on private contractors was necessary
As a result of the tensions created by the coldwar and the influence of the military, many CON-
GLOMERATES won valuable defense-related tracts that contributed to the rising prices oftheir stocks in the 1960s Although they werehighly diversified companies, many conglomer-ates relied heavily upon defense contracts,awarded to their manufacturing and aerospacedivisions, to produce a substantial portion oftheir revenues Often, they hired senior militaryofficials away from the armed services to serve asconsultants and executives, giving rise to theclose relationship between the sectors andprompting further criticism by those opposed tosuch close collaboration between the militaryand private industry
con-The term has fallen out of favor in recentyears, although it is still used to describe the rela-
272 military-industrial complex
Trang 15tions of armaments producers and of
administra-tions that spend a large amount of the federal
budget on defense
Further reading
Hooks, Gregory Forging the Military-Industrial
Com-plex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1991.
Proxmire, William Report from the Wasteland:
Amer-ica’s Military-Industrial Complex New York:
Praeger, 1970.
mining industry Although basic geology
dic-tated that the mining industry would not play a
leading role in the early economic and political
life of the United States, many early colonists
came to the eastern shores of North America
with hopes of finding vast gold and silver mines
like those exploited by the Spanish in South and
Central America Leaders of the London-based
Virginia Company directed that a crew of 20 men
with six pickaxes begin searching for minerals
within a week of their arrival in Virginia in 1607
Yet the colonists soon discovered that the
moun-tains of gold and silver they had expected to find
were not readily evident anywhere along the
banks of the Chesapeake Captain John Smith
wrote of his disappointment that the mineral
wealth of the immediate region looked rather
unpromising, though he remained optimistic
that further exploration would likely reveal
“mines very rich of diverse natures.”
John Smith was eventually proven correct
The North American continent did hold many
rich mines, not only of gold and silver, but also of
copper, lead, iron, and other metals
Unfortu-nately for Smith and the colonists, the fabulous
gold and silver mines were thousands of miles
from Virginia in what would eventually become
the American West Although disappointed by
the absence of precious metals, early American
colonists did find and exploit less valuable
min-erals, quickly developing small and widely
scat-tered deposits of bog iron ore to make nails and
basic tools But mining bog iron was no path to
easy riches The American colonies wouldundoubtedly have developed in a strikingly dif-ferent manner if geology had layered with goldthe rivers of Virginia instead of California As itwas, the absence of precious mineral deposits ineastern North America ensured that neither thecolonies nor the subsequent early Americanrepublic were much concerned with the miningindustry As late as the 1780s an aging BenjaminFranklin could accurately proclaim, “Gold andsilver are not the produce of North America,which has no mines.”
By the time of the Revolutionary War, thesmall American mining industry primarilyexploited modest eastern deposits of copper, tin,and iron Typically owned and operated by indi-viduals or small partnerships, these early miningenterprises paid a royalty, or percentage of theirproduction, to the government, a system that was
a hold-over from colonial days Shortly after theAmerican Revolution, the Continental Congressvoted to increase the royalty from a fifth to athird in hopes of speeding the repayment of alarge war debt However, the policy was not reen-acted after the dissolution of the ContinentalCongress, in part because during the next fewdecades there was little reason to think muchincome would be gained from the meager easternmineral deposits
The course of the American mining industrybegan to change after the 1803 Louisiana Pur-chase, when the U.S government became the newowner of lead and zinc mines in the upper Mis-sissippi Valley These mines had already provedfairly valuable to the French and Spanish, and inthe light of growing tensions with Great Britain,which would later lead to war, President Jeffer-son was eager to secure a steady supply of leadfor bullets To that end, Jefferson successfullypushed Congress to adopt the Lead Leasing Act
of 1807, establishing a system whereby the ernment leased the mines to private operators inexchange for a percentage of the lead Althoughthe leasing system was plagued by corruptionand inefficiency, it did succeed in encouraging a
gov-mining industry 273
Trang 16significant early mining rush into the upper
Mis-sissippi Valley, where miners could develop the
surface veins of lead with relatively little capital
and simple technology By mid-century lead
min-ing in the area had become a significant part of
the regional and national economy, yet the
indus-try remained largely decentralized and
techno-logically primitive—particularly in comparison
to many European mining operations of the time
An exception to this primitive early state of
the American mining industry occurred in the
development of eastern coal mining during the
19th century The American coal industry’s
exploitation of the huge coalfields of
Pennsylva-nia, West VirgiPennsylva-nia, and other states grew steadily
during the first half of the 19th century in concert
with the demands of early industrialization Well
before the Civil War, coal mining operations in
towns such as St Clair, Pennsylvania, had
devel-oped into large operations using sophisticated
technologies, similar in size and scope to
Euro-pean mines Mining machinery inventors
abounded in the Pennsylvania coalfields, busily
making improvements in pumping machinery,
rock drills, ventilation, and a host of other areas
where deep coal mining raised obstacles Yet few
of these mechanically minded miners and
busi-nessmen had any formal technical education
Rather, much like the civil engineers trained on
great public works projects such as the ERIE
CANAL, early coal mining engineers and managers
learned their trade on the job through informal
apprenticeships with practicing engineers
While the coal mining industry flourished,
hard rock mining remained underdeveloped
dur-ing much of the first half of the 19th century Yet,
as further acquisition of western lands created a
nation stretching from “sea to shining sea,” the
conditions were ripe for a major reorientation of
the American mining industry If geology had
been stingy in providing precious mineral
deposits to the eastern half of the nation, the
opposite proved true in the West The ink had
scarcely dried on the 1848 agreement making
Spanish California part of the United States when
a millwright discovered placer gold deposits nearSacramento, California By summer, some 5,000miners were working in the gulches and streams
of the western Sierra Nevada; by year’s end theyhad washed out nearly $10 million worth of goldfrom the gravel stream beds—and the Californiagold rush had only just begun
Most of the so-called 49ers who arrived in thenext few years mined alluvial gold fields located
on federal land, pursuing gold that had, overmany centuries, been slowly eroded from rockydeposits in the mountains and been carried bywater downstream to settle out in river beds andflood plains The miners had no clear legal right
to take gold from federal lands, yet neither didthe law explicitly prohibit it The governmentsimply had no formal policy for selling, leasing,
or even monitoring public mineral lands For thefirst two years of the gold rush the new territorywas administered by the U.S Army, which essen-tially allowed the miners free run of the federallands—in part because the mining was a boon tothe development of western trade By 1849, thebusy mines in California had already producedalmost 2 million ounces of pure gold worthsomewhere in the area of $40 million—a stun-ning amount of wealth in an era when the entirefederal budget for the same year was slightlymore than $45 million
For a brief time, the California gold fieldsoffered a genuine, if exceedingly slim, chance forany American to strike it rich, if only they couldfind the cash to somehow get to the West Coastand purchase a few basic tools and supplies To
an even greater extent than with the earlier leadmining rush on the upper Mississippi, the Cali-fornia gold deposits could be mined with simpletools and little capital, and the federal govern-ment’s inertia in developing a coherent policy formanaging the gold fields meant that minerscould essentially take whatever they found forfree Still, the vast majority of the early 49ersfound little or no gold, while those who arrived
in subsequent years discovered that most of thebest claims had been taken Further, as the rich-
274 mining industry
Trang 17est and most easily mined deposits gave out,
mines run by individuals increasingly gave way
to mining companies with the capital needed to
pursue large-scale operations By consolidating
many claims into one operation, these
compa-nies could use water cannons and giant dredges
to profitably break up large placer deposits and
remove the gold While highly profitable, such
techniques created wide-scale environmental
damage and angered downstream farmers whose
fertile lands were flooded with silt from the
mines Hard-fought court battles eventually led
to severe restrictions on hydraulic mining in
Cal-ifornia, constituting some of the earliest
signifi-cant environmental REGULATION of the American
mining industry
As downstream placer deposits gave out,
prospectors moved up the rivers and into the
Sierra Nevada and beyond in search of the
“mother lode,” the ultimate source of the gold
encased deep within the Rocky Mountains to the
east By the 1860s, intrepid prospectors had
found hundreds of new deposits, two of which
were large enough to ignite their own mining
rushes: the Colorado gold fields and the famous
Comstock Lode silver mines in Nevada As had
been the case with the early placer mines, a lone
miner or modestly financed partnership could
profitably develop some of the richest and most
easily accessible hard-rock mines But as miners
followed the veins of gold or silver deeper down
into the earth, the costs rose exponentially To
profitably develop the gigantic silver deposit at
the Comstock Lode, for example, required a
complex system of mine timbering, massive
hoisting machinery, and expensive concentrating
and smelting operations As a result, ownership
and management were once again increasingly
consolidated into the hands of a small number of
large mining companies, many now capitalized
by a growing group of mining financiers based in
Boston, Philadelphia, and San Francisco
In 1866, some 17 years after the California
gold rush began, Congress finally began to create
a coherent federal mining policy By this point
the mining industries in California, Colorado,and Nevada had become powerful big busi-nesses, and mine operators and promoters withtremendous fortunes effectively used their eco-nomic clout to influence legislators The resultwas the 1866 lode-mining law, which essentiallylegalized the previous informal policy of freeaccess, no royalty payments, and cheap out-rightsale of public mineral lands Several years later,Congress combined the 1866 law with severalothers to form the famous—and still opera-tional—1872 Mining Law, which preserved theearlier laws’ basic principles while also increas-ing the size of claims to facilitate large-scale min-ing Under the “free and open” access principle,any citizen was guaranteed the right to beginmining on federal land without needing to notifythe government Miners who wished to buy theirclaim had to file with the government, but sub-mitting a so-called patent claim was not in anysense a request for permission to mine Permis-sion had already been granted As a result, thegovernment essentially abandoned its power tomanage and control public mineral lands, retain-ing for the U.S Department of the Interior, theadministrator of the mineral lands, the power togrant title to the land when a miner (or morelikely, a mining company) proved he had done
$500 of work, filed the proper papers, and paidthe small patenting fee
Thanks in part to the extraordinary giveaway
of public mineral wealth legalized by the 1872law, the development of western hard rock min-ing grew at an astonishing rate Although someopportunities continued to exist for small inde-pendent miners, increasingly the mining industrywas dominated by technologically sophisticatedand highly capitalized lode mining companiesthat were eager to move beyond the rapid boomand bust pattern of early mining rushes anddevelop long-term profits An emphasis on effi-ciency, planning, and prudent managementbegan to replace the previous “get rich quick”spirit of mining In 1879, Congress recognizedthe growing economic importance of this evolving
mining industry 275