Luận văn corporate governance and firm performance an empirical study in vietnam

In this study, the author characterized corporale goveranec by the Board of Director's sive, CRO duality, Board of Directors independence, managerial ownership, state ownership, and audi

VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI

IWTERNATIONAT SCHOOL

GRADUATION PROJECT

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: AN

EMPIRICAL STUDY IN VIETNAM

‘TRAN If0U MANIL

Hanoi - Year 2020

Hanoi - Year 2020

LETTER OF DECLARATION

T hereby dechare that the Graduation Projecl “Corporate governance and firm

performance - an empirical study in Vietnam” is the results of my own rescarch and has never been published in any work of others During the implementation process of this projecl, T have seriously taken research othies; all findings of this projccls are resulls of”

my own research and surveys; all references in this project are clearly cited according to regulations

T take full responsibility for the fidelity of the number and data and other contents

of ny graduation project

Hanoi, 27" May,2020

‘Tran Lluu Manh

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

3.2.2.4, Board gender diversily (BGEN) - .38 3.2.2.5, Managerial owncratip (MOWN) các eieeireirreeeioeue TỂ) 3.2.2.6 Slals owmership (SOWN) 30 3.2.2.7 Audil qualily (AUD) 30 3.2.3 Control variables cà tieereiiirrarriarirrrrarere 3T 3.3 Methodology - 2 3B CHAPTER IV DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RE§ULT 35 4.1 Data Statistics - - 35 4 Regrossion result - - ome

Impact of the Board size on fina perlommance Hee Home 24d Impact of the Audil on firm performance - a AD Impact of the Board Independencs on lirm performanee - cecsseeereeeerecoee để Impact of the CEO dualily on Girm performance 2 Impact of the Slate Ownership on firm porfarmnance 4 Impact of the Managerial Ownership on firm performanee oerieero đổ Impact of Board female members on fin performance - ~ 44 CHAPTEE V CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS eeierieeoeoe AF 5.1 Conclusions - - - a AS

APPENDHTK HH wisientieiiininiaie wianenenaenenieenaie eset 48

CHAPTER L INFRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the strdy

Corporate governance focuses on the structures and processes for the management of

firms and stralogic development, Good governance has lo follow the aliributes of transparency, accountability, fairness, and responsibility in managemal principles

Corporate governanee is generating considerable interest in sccking ways thal boost finn efficiency Corporate governance practice is heavily affected by parties that are active ina company's management structure such as shareholders, investors, creditors, workers, and government The key aim of adopting good corporate governance is long-term value optimization for shareholders and stakeholders A growing number of joint-stook

companies are interested in this concept due to the requirements of Vietnamese corparate

Taw as well as the demands of stakeholders of the business

Not only companies but policymakers are also interested in corporate governance The

long line of collapses of several large well-known corporations in 2001 to 2002 associaled

with accounting fraud and financial crisis im 2008 raised questions about the effectiveness

of corporate governance mechanisms In the US, the scandals at Enron and Equifax ted

to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act im 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010

Comparable failures in Australia (HLH, One.Tel) and Italy (Parmalat) stimulated

tucreased publi interes| in the regulation of corporate governance

Inzecent years, Vietnam has made many reforms in the legal field Therefore, Corporate govemance regulations have made important progress Currently, the Enterprise Law of

2005 and the Securities Law of 2006 are the two most basic legal bases in corporate

governance in Vietnam However, the application of international practices ou Corporate

governance (particularly the OCD 2004 Code of Conduct) is only Limited to listed companies, aud partly to public companies.

CHAPTER L INFRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the strdy

Corporate governance focuses on the structures and processes for the management of

firms and stralogic development, Good governance has lo follow the aliributes of transparency, accountability, fairness, and responsibility in managemal principles

Corporate governanee is generating considerable interest in sccking ways thal boost finn efficiency Corporate governance practice is heavily affected by parties that are active ina company's management structure such as shareholders, investors, creditors, workers, and government The key aim of adopting good corporate governance is long-term value optimization for shareholders and stakeholders A growing number of joint-stook

companies are interested in this concept due to the requirements of Vietnamese corparate

Taw as well as the demands of stakeholders of the business

Not only companies but policymakers are also interested in corporate governance The

long line of collapses of several large well-known corporations in 2001 to 2002 associaled

with accounting fraud and financial crisis im 2008 raised questions about the effectiveness

of corporate governance mechanisms In the US, the scandals at Enron and Equifax ted

to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act im 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010

Comparable failures in Australia (HLH, One.Tel) and Italy (Parmalat) stimulated

tucreased publi interes| in the regulation of corporate governance

Inzecent years, Vietnam has made many reforms in the legal field Therefore, Corporate govemance regulations have made important progress Currently, the Enterprise Law of

2005 and the Securities Law of 2006 are the two most basic legal bases in corporate

governance in Vietnam However, the application of international practices ou Corporate

governance (particularly the OCD 2004 Code of Conduct) is only Limited to listed companies, aud partly to public companies.

‘TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBRE - 7 LIST OF TABLEW 2-+n2n22nHtrngeerie

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION „10 1.1 Background of the stuủy, „10 1.2 Objective of the study - - 12 1.3 Questions 0£ stty, co tHne.reerrrrarirrrrreoreroou T2 1.4, Structure of the study - - - wa 12 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 2e snerrirreereuoe T3 2.1, Previous literature - - - 1B 2.2, Foundational theories - - - a 2.2.1 Agency theory 1m „14

222 pPrincipal-pcincipa ca conflict - - - 16 3.3.3 Stowardship theory 16 2.3, Hypothesis development - - 7 2.3.1 Board Size - - - a 1B 3.3.2 Board independence àcneeererrrirarrrerarrererueu TỔ 2.3.3 CHO duality - - - a 20 3.3.4 Ownership oÊ Board oŸ Matlagels eeienrirerrirrrrirrerroreroo 2 2.3.5 State ownership - - - .23 2.3.6 Board gender diversity 24

24 CUAPTER UL DATA AND METHODOLOGY - - 26

3.2 Variables measurement - - 26 3.2.1 Dependent variables oe ceieneeneneisnsinienenainenenaansnienneananenas 26 3.2.2 Independent variables - - - a BS

ABSTRACT

This cmpirical sludy investigates the relationship between corporale governance and firm performance for listed companies in Viet Nam In this study, the author characterized corporale goveranec by the Board of Director's sive, CRO duality, Board of Directors independence, managerial ownership, state ownership, and audit quality, Also, firm performance is measured by accounting-based measurement (ROA and ROW) The study used STATA to analyze panel data of 144 companics during the period 2016-2019 The results indicated a negative relationship between Board independence and firm performance and the positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in the regression model of ROA Besides, ownership of the Board of Manger is found to affect positively ROL

Keywords: Corporate governance; Firm performance

TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Meaning

BIND Board independence

MOWN Managerial ownership

SOWN State ownership

Pwo PricewaterhouseCoopers

OLS Ordinary least squares

FEM Fixed cffects model

CEO Chief executive officer

ssc State Sccuritics Commission of Victnam

SECO Affairs Swiss Stale Secretariat for Economic

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

‘the amount of knowledge | have received over the past school years is truly great and valuable The teachers with their dedication have conveyed usefil knowledge in textbooks as well as practical cases, Besides, with my continuous efforts I can finally apply what I have learned to complete this thesis

From The boHem of my heart, T would Hike to address my gratitude (o the TS faculty members, and the staff of the training and student affairs department In particular, I would like to express my sincere thanks lo Dr Do Phuong Huyen who guided me

wholeheartedly during the thesis

Although | have tried my best, the study will probably have shortcomings due to the lack

of knowledge as well as the difficulty in finding sources of information I am looking forward to the feedback from teachers and counsclors so that I can recognize my shortcomings and enhance the quality of the thesis,

Hanoi, May 2020

Yours Sincerely,

‘Tran Huu Manh

ABSTRACT

This cmpirical sludy investigates the relationship between corporale governance and firm performance for listed companies in Viet Nam In this study, the author characterized corporale goveranec by the Board of Director's sive, CRO duality, Board of Directors independence, managerial ownership, state ownership, and audit quality, Also, firm performance is measured by accounting-based measurement (ROA and ROW) The study used STATA to analyze panel data of 144 companics during the period 2016-2019 The results indicated a negative relationship between Board independence and firm performance and the positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in the regression model of ROA Besides, ownership of the Board of Manger is found to affect positively ROL

Keywords: Corporate governance; Firm performance

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

‘the amount of knowledge | have received over the past school years is truly great and valuable The teachers with their dedication have conveyed usefil knowledge in textbooks as well as practical cases, Besides, with my continuous efforts I can finally apply what I have learned to complete this thesis

From The boHem of my heart, T would Hike to address my gratitude (o the TS faculty members, and the staff of the training and student affairs department In particular, I would like to express my sincere thanks lo Dr Do Phuong Huyen who guided me

wholeheartedly during the thesis

Although | have tried my best, the study will probably have shortcomings due to the lack

of knowledge as well as the difficulty in finding sources of information I am looking forward to the feedback from teachers and counsclors so that I can recognize my shortcomings and enhance the quality of the thesis,

Hanoi, May 2020

Yours Sincerely,

‘Tran Huu Manh

‘TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBRE - 7 LIST OF TABLEW 2-+n2n22nHtrngeerie

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION „10 1.1 Background of the stuủy, „10 1.2 Objective of the study - - 12 1.3 Questions 0£ stty, co tHne.reerrrrarirrrrreoreroou T2 1.4, Structure of the study - - - wa 12 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 2e snerrirreereuoe T3 2.1, Previous literature - - - 1B 2.2, Foundational theories - - - a 2.2.1 Agency theory 1m „14

222 pPrincipal-pcincipa ca conflict - - - 16 3.3.3 Stowardship theory 16 2.3, Hypothesis development - - 7 2.3.1 Board Size - - - a 1B 3.3.2 Board independence àcneeererrrirarrrerarrererueu TỔ 2.3.3 CHO duality - - - a 20 3.3.4 Ownership oÊ Board oŸ Matlagels eeienrirerrirrrrirrerroreroo 2 2.3.5 State ownership - - - .23 2.3.6 Board gender diversity 24

24 CUAPTER UL DATA AND METHODOLOGY - - 26

3.2 Variables measurement - - 26 3.2.1 Dependent variables oe ceieneeneneisnsinienenainenenaansnienneananenas 26 3.2.2 Independent variables - - - a BS

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

ABSTRACT

This cmpirical sludy investigates the relationship between corporale governance and firm performance for listed companies in Viet Nam In this study, the author characterized corporale goveranec by the Board of Director's sive, CRO duality, Board of Directors independence, managerial ownership, state ownership, and audit quality, Also, firm performance is measured by accounting-based measurement (ROA and ROW) The study used STATA to analyze panel data of 144 companics during the period 2016-2019 The results indicated a negative relationship between Board independence and firm performance and the positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in the regression model of ROA Besides, ownership of the Board of Manger is found to affect positively ROL

Keywords: Corporate governance; Firm performance

TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Meaning

BIND Board independence

MOWN Managerial ownership

SOWN State ownership

Pwo PricewaterhouseCoopers

OLS Ordinary least squares

FEM Fixed cffects model

CEO Chief executive officer

ssc State Sccuritics Commission of Victnam

SECO Affairs Swiss Stale Secretariat for Economic

ABSTRACT

This cmpirical sludy investigates the relationship between corporale governance and firm performance for listed companies in Viet Nam In this study, the author characterized corporale goveranec by the Board of Director's sive, CRO duality, Board of Directors independence, managerial ownership, state ownership, and audit quality, Also, firm performance is measured by accounting-based measurement (ROA and ROW) The study used STATA to analyze panel data of 144 companics during the period 2016-2019 The results indicated a negative relationship between Board independence and firm performance and the positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in the regression model of ROA Besides, ownership of the Board of Manger is found to affect positively ROL

Keywords: Corporate governance; Firm performance

‘TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBRE - 7 LIST OF TABLEW 2-+n2n22nHtrngeerie

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION „10 1.1 Background of the stuủy, „10 1.2 Objective of the study - - 12 1.3 Questions 0£ stty, co tHne.reerrrrarirrrrreoreroou T2 1.4, Structure of the study - - - wa 12 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 2e snerrirreereuoe T3 2.1, Previous literature - - - 1B 2.2, Foundational theories - - - a 2.2.1 Agency theory 1m „14

222 pPrincipal-pcincipa ca conflict - - - 16 3.3.3 Stowardship theory 16 2.3, Hypothesis development - - 7 2.3.1 Board Size - - - a 1B 3.3.2 Board independence àcneeererrrirarrrerarrererueu TỔ 2.3.3 CHO duality - - - a 20 3.3.4 Ownership oÊ Board oŸ Matlagels eeienrirerrirrrrirrerroreroo 2 2.3.5 State ownership - - - .23 2.3.6 Board gender diversity 24

24 CUAPTER UL DATA AND METHODOLOGY - - 26

3.2 Variables measurement - - 26 3.2.1 Dependent variables oe ceieneeneneisnsinienenainenenaansnienneananenas 26 3.2.2 Independent variables - - - a BS

‘TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBRE - 7 LIST OF TABLEW 2-+n2n22nHtrngeerie

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION „10 1.1 Background of the stuủy, „10 1.2 Objective of the study - - 12 1.3 Questions 0£ stty, co tHne.reerrrrarirrrrreoreroou T2 1.4, Structure of the study - - - wa 12 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 2e snerrirreereuoe T3 2.1, Previous literature - - - 1B 2.2, Foundational theories - - - a 2.2.1 Agency theory 1m „14

222 pPrincipal-pcincipa ca conflict - - - 16 3.3.3 Stowardship theory 16 2.3, Hypothesis development - - 7 2.3.1 Board Size - - - a 1B 3.3.2 Board independence àcneeererrrirarrrerarrererueu TỔ 2.3.3 CHO duality - - - a 20 3.3.4 Ownership oÊ Board oŸ Matlagels eeienrirerrirrrrirrerroreroo 2 2.3.5 State ownership - - - .23 2.3.6 Board gender diversity 24

24 CUAPTER UL DATA AND METHODOLOGY - - 26

3.2 Variables measurement - - 26 3.2.1 Dependent variables oe ceieneeneneisnsinienenainenenaansnienneananenas 26 3.2.2 Independent variables - - - a BS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

‘the amount of knowledge | have received over the past school years is truly great and valuable The teachers with their dedication have conveyed usefil knowledge in textbooks as well as practical cases, Besides, with my continuous efforts I can finally apply what I have learned to complete this thesis

From The boHem of my heart, T would Hike to address my gratitude (o the TS faculty members, and the staff of the training and student affairs department In particular, I would like to express my sincere thanks lo Dr Do Phuong Huyen who guided me

wholeheartedly during the thesis

Although | have tried my best, the study will probably have shortcomings due to the lack

of knowledge as well as the difficulty in finding sources of information I am looking forward to the feedback from teachers and counsclors so that I can recognize my shortcomings and enhance the quality of the thesis,

Hanoi, May 2020

Yours Sincerely,

‘Tran Huu Manh

‘TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBRE - 7 LIST OF TABLEW 2-+n2n22nHtrngeerie

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION „10 1.1 Background of the stuủy, „10 1.2 Objective of the study - - 12 1.3 Questions 0£ stty, co tHne.reerrrrarirrrrreoreroou T2 1.4, Structure of the study - - - wa 12 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 2e snerrirreereuoe T3 2.1, Previous literature - - - 1B 2.2, Foundational theories - - - a 2.2.1 Agency theory 1m „14

222 pPrincipal-pcincipa ca conflict - - - 16 3.3.3 Stowardship theory 16 2.3, Hypothesis development - - 7 2.3.1 Board Size - - - a 1B 3.3.2 Board independence àcneeererrrirarrrerarrererueu TỔ 2.3.3 CHO duality - - - a 20 3.3.4 Ownership oÊ Board oŸ Matlagels eeienrirerrirrrrirrerroreroo 2 2.3.5 State ownership - - - .23 2.3.6 Board gender diversity 24

24 CUAPTER UL DATA AND METHODOLOGY - - 26

3.2 Variables measurement - - 26 3.2.1 Dependent variables oe ceieneeneneisnsinienenainenenaansnienneananenas 26 3.2.2 Independent variables - - - a BS

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Meaning

BIND Board independence

MOWN Managerial ownership

SOWN State ownership

Pwo PricewaterhouseCoopers

OLS Ordinary least squares

FEM Fixed cffects model

CEO Chief executive officer

ssc State Sccuritics Commission of Victnam

SECO Affairs Swiss Stale Secretariat for Economic

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

3.2.2.4, Board gender diversily (BGEN) - .38 3.2.2.5, Managerial owncratip (MOWN) các eieeireirreeeioeue TỂ) 3.2.2.6 Slals owmership (SOWN) 30 3.2.2.7 Audil qualily (AUD) 30 3.2.3 Control variables cà tieereiiirrarriarirrrrarere 3T 3.3 Methodology - 2 3B CHAPTER IV DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RE§ULT 35 4.1 Data Statistics - - 35 4 Regrossion result - - ome

Impact of the Board size on fina perlommance Hee Home 24d Impact of the Audil on firm performance - a AD Impact of the Board Independencs on lirm performanee - cecsseeereeeerecoee để Impact of the CEO dualily on Girm performance 2 Impact of the Slate Ownership on firm porfarmnance 4 Impact of the Managerial Ownership on firm performanee oerieero đổ Impact of Board female members on fin performance - ~ 44 CHAPTEE V CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS eeierieeoeoe AF 5.1 Conclusions - - - a AS

APPENDHTK HH wisientieiiininiaie wianenenaenenieenaie eset 48

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

‘the amount of knowledge | have received over the past school years is truly great and valuable The teachers with their dedication have conveyed usefil knowledge in textbooks as well as practical cases, Besides, with my continuous efforts I can finally apply what I have learned to complete this thesis

From The boHem of my heart, T would Hike to address my gratitude (o the TS faculty members, and the staff of the training and student affairs department In particular, I would like to express my sincere thanks lo Dr Do Phuong Huyen who guided me

wholeheartedly during the thesis

Although | have tried my best, the study will probably have shortcomings due to the lack

of knowledge as well as the difficulty in finding sources of information I am looking forward to the feedback from teachers and counsclors so that I can recognize my shortcomings and enhance the quality of the thesis,

Hanoi, May 2020

Yours Sincerely,

‘Tran Huu Manh

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

‘the amount of knowledge | have received over the past school years is truly great and valuable The teachers with their dedication have conveyed usefil knowledge in textbooks as well as practical cases, Besides, with my continuous efforts I can finally apply what I have learned to complete this thesis

From The boHem of my heart, T would Hike to address my gratitude (o the TS faculty members, and the staff of the training and student affairs department In particular, I would like to express my sincere thanks lo Dr Do Phuong Huyen who guided me

wholeheartedly during the thesis

Although | have tried my best, the study will probably have shortcomings due to the lack

of knowledge as well as the difficulty in finding sources of information I am looking forward to the feedback from teachers and counsclors so that I can recognize my shortcomings and enhance the quality of the thesis,

Hanoi, May 2020

Yours Sincerely,

‘Tran Huu Manh

CHAPTER L INFRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the strdy

Corporate governance focuses on the structures and processes for the management of

firms and stralogic development, Good governance has lo follow the aliributes of transparency, accountability, fairness, and responsibility in managemal principles

Corporate governanee is generating considerable interest in sccking ways thal boost finn efficiency Corporate governance practice is heavily affected by parties that are active ina company's management structure such as shareholders, investors, creditors, workers, and government The key aim of adopting good corporate governance is long-term value optimization for shareholders and stakeholders A growing number of joint-stook

companies are interested in this concept due to the requirements of Vietnamese corparate

Taw as well as the demands of stakeholders of the business

Not only companies but policymakers are also interested in corporate governance The

long line of collapses of several large well-known corporations in 2001 to 2002 associaled

with accounting fraud and financial crisis im 2008 raised questions about the effectiveness

of corporate governance mechanisms In the US, the scandals at Enron and Equifax ted

to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act im 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010

Comparable failures in Australia (HLH, One.Tel) and Italy (Parmalat) stimulated

tucreased publi interes| in the regulation of corporate governance

Inzecent years, Vietnam has made many reforms in the legal field Therefore, Corporate govemance regulations have made important progress Currently, the Enterprise Law of

2005 and the Securities Law of 2006 are the two most basic legal bases in corporate

governance in Vietnam However, the application of international practices ou Corporate

governance (particularly the OCD 2004 Code of Conduct) is only Limited to listed companies, aud partly to public companies.

3.2.2.4, Board gender diversily (BGEN) - .38 3.2.2.5, Managerial owncratip (MOWN) các eieeireirreeeioeue TỂ) 3.2.2.6 Slals owmership (SOWN) 30 3.2.2.7 Audil qualily (AUD) 30 3.2.3 Control variables cà tieereiiirrarriarirrrrarere 3T 3.3 Methodology - 2 3B CHAPTER IV DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RE§ULT 35 4.1 Data Statistics - - 35 4 Regrossion result - - ome

Impact of the Board size on fina perlommance Hee Home 24d Impact of the Audil on firm performance - a AD Impact of the Board Independencs on lirm performanee - cecsseeereeeerecoee để Impact of the CEO dualily on Girm performance 2 Impact of the Slate Ownership on firm porfarmnance 4 Impact of the Managerial Ownership on firm performanee oerieero đổ Impact of Board female members on fin performance - ~ 44 CHAPTEE V CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS eeierieeoeoe AF 5.1 Conclusions - - - a AS

APPENDHTK HH wisientieiiininiaie wianenenaenenieenaie eset 48

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

LIST OF TABLES

‘Table 3.1 Definitions and measurements of variables in the study

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.2 Proportion of DUAL and ALD

‘fable 4.3 Pearson correlation matrix among variables

Table 4.4 Tests of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation

Table 4.5 Hausman test results

Table 4.6, Summary of appropriate models

Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis results

TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Meaning

BIND Board independence

MOWN Managerial ownership

SOWN State ownership

Pwo PricewaterhouseCoopers

OLS Ordinary least squares

FEM Fixed cffects model

CEO Chief executive officer

ssc State Sccuritics Commission of Victnam

SECO Affairs Swiss Stale Secretariat for Economic

TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Meaning

BIND Board independence

MOWN Managerial ownership

SOWN State ownership

Pwo PricewaterhouseCoopers

OLS Ordinary least squares

FEM Fixed cffects model

CEO Chief executive officer

ssc State Sccuritics Commission of Victnam

SECO Affairs Swiss Stale Secretariat for Economic

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

‘the amount of knowledge | have received over the past school years is truly great and valuable The teachers with their dedication have conveyed usefil knowledge in textbooks as well as practical cases, Besides, with my continuous efforts I can finally apply what I have learned to complete this thesis

From The boHem of my heart, T would Hike to address my gratitude (o the TS faculty members, and the staff of the training and student affairs department In particular, I would like to express my sincere thanks lo Dr Do Phuong Huyen who guided me

wholeheartedly during the thesis

Although | have tried my best, the study will probably have shortcomings due to the lack

of knowledge as well as the difficulty in finding sources of information I am looking forward to the feedback from teachers and counsclors so that I can recognize my shortcomings and enhance the quality of the thesis,

Hanoi, May 2020

Yours Sincerely,

‘Tran Huu Manh