Money and Power Great Predators in the Political Economy of Development_10 pptx

Thus, the debt cancellation from 2003–04 to 2005–06, granted for low-income countries in respect to ECGD was over £4,000 million, nearly two-thirds of which went to Nigeria, while the co

liabilities relate to disbursements of development finance from the 1980s and 1990s Thus, the debt cancellation from 2003–04 to 2005–06, granted for low-income countries in respect to ECGD was over £4,000 million, nearly two-thirds of which went to Nigeria, while the comparable figures for CDC were only £42 million and for DfID a paltry nearly £12 million, which are generous summary figures since some of the flow relief could relate to stock subsequently cancelled which is an indirect form of double counting if the debt is not performing (HC Library 2007: 36) According to a House of Commons Library paper, in 2005–06, CDC was still owed a total of

£23.4 million by low-income countries, whereas DfID was owed £9.1 million and the World Bank, where DfID is a creditor, £26.3 million

So the Commonwealth Development Corporation is the tail wagging the proverbial dog when it comes to debt relief, with bigger transac-tions than the formal Department for International Development, who ostensibly oversee its affairs (HC Library 2007: 36)

What these figures illustrate is that aid to the private sector (and marginally to parastatals) has, for 30 years or so, been much larger than aid to the public sector and its social institutions in developing coun-tries, and that much of current debt relief relates to liabilities generated there, in unpaid loans for ports, bridges, sugar processing mills and the like By far the largest source of liabilities (roughly 74 times more, if the ECGD figures are compared to the sum of the CDC and DfID totals combined) relates to exported equipment though the ECGD, which includes military equipment where the purchaser simply didn’t pay

up, and the UK taxpayer was thus forced to pay out in insurance claims against the ECGD, which were then eventually written off In this most common scenario, not only did the original ‘aid’ have a low

‘developmental’ value in the first instance, which hardly justifies its accounting as part of a sovereign development debt, but these non-payments were covered by British Government reinsurance cover in any case Some dictatorship got the guns, British citizens paid, and then the bill was counted as debt relief!7

Indeed, UK debt write-offs seem to be concentrated in a few strategic countries in terms of the large deals, and pertain to the long-running debts of the frontier institutions as mentioned above For example, ‘DFID debt relief through all channels amounted to £145m in 2006/07 Non-DFID debt relief (through CDC and ECGD) was

£1,867m, £1,649m of which relates to Nigerian debt relief’ (DfID 2008) Moreover, debt write-offs are also additionally counted as increases in Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the year they are affected, such that apparent generosity in the present can be portrayed and political capital is made by the British Government appearing as a good global citizen, while the bulk of the money actually goes to debt

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initially related to commercial transactions in the better-off countries Here, nearly all debt write-off goes to the ECGD for its past insurance for commercial deals in Nigeria – where the UK supplier wasn’t paid – but because this figure (over £1,600 million) is subsequently added to the general figures for all other countries (£145 million) a generalised generosity can be portrayed

Thus, a House of Commons research paper can summarise that the

UK has ‘exceeded’ its debt relief commitment by cancelling 100 per cent

of all bilateral debts for highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) that qualified for debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (HC Library 2007) As of February 2007 the UK had cancelled all its outstanding sovereign claims for Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mada-gascar, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Zambia, while the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo and Ivory Coast had received ‘full debt flow relief’ and were waiting for ‘full stock cancella-tion’ once they reach HIPC completion point’ (HC Library 2007: 25).8 This sounds impressive, but pertains to the smaller £145 million figure Meanwhile, and again in aggregate, between 2004 and 2005 UK ODA to Africa reportedly increased from £1.3 billion to £2.1 billion, a rise of nearly 60 per cent However, when this debt relief is excluded the amount of aid to Africa actually decreased slightly from 2004 to 2005 Similarly, the increase in bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa was from

£2.1 billion in 2005 to £2.9 billion in 2006, a rise of 41 per cent, but when debt relief is excluded it represents a smaller, but not insignificant 29 per

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Table 9.3 Debts owed and relief granted against CDC, DfID and World

Bank, 2003–06

where DfID

a creditor

low-income countries

(debt relief granted)

2003–06

(stock and flow)

Notes:

CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation), DfID (Department for International Development) Converted from £ thousands to £ millions to two decimal places Rounding errors will have occurred Source: Compiled from Appendix 1, House of Commons (HC) Library (2007), p 36, table: ‘UK Debts owed and debt relief given to low income and lower middle income countries’, citing HC Debate 15 January 2007, cm 743-8WA.

cent rise Table 9.4 contains a further breakdown of debt relief figures The top five rows are mostly intergovernmental loans, and the latter three previous loans to the private sector, for the earlier years 2003–06 Again, the predominance of write-offs to the commercial sector is in evidence, while the much publicised schemes – HIPC, MDRI – garner much fewer resources

Even grants under the World Bank’s Debt Reduction Facility have been handed straight back to the private sector, in order to reduce commercial debt:

used to eliminate approximately $8 billion of low-income country debt by providing grants that enable those countries

to buy back commercial debts at a 90 per cent discount (on average) This programme helps protect low-income countries from ‘vulture fund’ litigation, whereby their commercial debt

is bought up at a discount and then enforced through the courts

(HC Library 2007: 27)9

Thus, not only are these payments to commercial banks counted under overhead ‘increases in ODA’, but so too is debt relief which comprises

a write-down in ECGD liabilities, and, as we explored in chapters 4 and 6, CDC Group investments and the promissory notes deposited in respect of the United Nations, World Bank and regional development banks and funds No wonder authors such as Bond (2006) refer to

‘phantom aid’

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Table 9.4 Total DfID and UK debt relief, 2003–06

2003–04 2004–05 2005–06

Note: In £ millions.

Source: DfID (2006) Statistics on International Development 2001/02–2005/06, October.

Where did the debt come from?

The CDC historically has often had a direct involvement in produc-tion in order to reduce risk, often owning or managing its largest commitments and so using the institution of the firm to enclose its investments more safely Alone among DFIs, the CDC has owned and maintained a significant number of projects, nearly half of which were involved in African estate agriculture until the sell-off to Actis (14 out of 30 managed companies were in this category in 1993 (CDC 1993: 24)) Many dated from the earliest colonial plantation invest-ments; most were in primary commodity production for export, such

as in oil palm, cocoa, rubber, tea, coffee, sugar and forestry; and in most of them CDC remained the largest shareholder, such that the combined equity in managed companies represented 62 per cent of the portfolio in 1992 (CDC 1993: 24) The CDC claimed that all had a

‘valuable demonstration effect in proving the viability of estate agriculture’ (CDC 1993: 24)

However, this demonstration effect would appear stymied if the market conditions of the Zimbabwean investments are anything to go on: the critical CDC loans were in sectors, such as sugar and beef, where EU trading concessions under the Lomé Conventions guaran-teed an export market in the 1990s, which would not be repeatable for others Also, and again preventing ‘demonstration effects’, in Zimbabwe and other countries, local firms could not be ‘catalysed’ because CDC companies were of such a large size that output effec-tively saturated markets This was particularly the case where CDC companies were large ventures in small economies, with, for example, the Soloman Islands Plantations Ltd, an oil palm and cocoa estate, responsible for all the islands’ production of oil palm and 10 per cent

of national export earnings in the early 1990s Similarly, in Swaziland,

a 50 per cent CDC-owned sugar complex, Mhlume (Swaziland) Sugar Ltd, milled one-third of national output in 1992, growing one-third of this itself, while a further third of mill throughput was provided by the Inyoni Yami Swaziland Irrigation Scheme, which was also 50 per cent owned by CDC The Mhlume mill also processed sugarcane cultivated

by out-growers involved in the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms Scheme, whose general manager was provided by CDC (CDC 1993: 25–6) In forestry, similar large estates crowd out, rather than in, other firms: Tanganyika Wattle of Tanzania (established in 1956), and Usutu Pulp of Swaziland (established in 1948 and then sold out to SAPPI, a South African firm, in 2000) are both significant exporters in their host coun-tries, and the latter was the largest block of man-made forest in Africa

in the early 1990s, producing 10 per cent of Swaziland’s export earn-ings (CDC 1993: 30) Actis still owns forestry assets which are market

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dominant, such as Shiselweni in Swaziland and Kilombero Valley Teak

in Tanzania

It is also difficult to take even a cursory glance at the Actis portfolio now and suggest that they have any interest in infant industries or demonstration effects For example, a relatively recent acquisition (in May 2003) was of a 14 per cent stake in Flamingo Holdings with a $16 million equity stake, a fully integrated horticultural business involved

in growing, processing, packaging, marketing and distribution of flowers and fresh vegetables, with a wholly owned subsidiary in Kenya, Homegrown, Africa’s largest exporter of vegetables and flowers to the UK and owner of a 15 per cent market share of Kenya’s horticultural exports (Actis 2008a; Actis 2008c) Also, Flamingo has processing, distribution and marketing operations in the UK, and is the UK’s leading supplier to supermarkets, including Marks & Spencer, Tesco, Sainsbury and Safeway As Actis summarises:

CDC’s investment will be used to support the company’s growth plans, which include the acquisition of other horticul-tural businesses in Africa and the UK to strengthen its supply chain and expand its capacity and product range

(Actis 2008a) Flamingo also sources from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Guatemala, Thai-land, Spain and the Netherlands, and had a worldwide annual turnover of $250m when Actis bought its stake (Actis 2008a) Michael Turner, CDC’s East African director, reportedly commented:

Flamingo is exactly the type of business CDC is looking to invest in – an integrated business with control of the entire supply chain, managed by an excellent team of experienced and committed professionals with a successful track record Its position as an innovator and supplier of the highest quality products means that it has exciting growth prospects

(ibid.) While Flamingo, we are told, meets CDC’s benchmarks on social and environmental standards, none of the 1990s arguments for the role of CDC capital as augmenting and not displacing capital, and being inno-vative with a possible demonstration effect in a particularly risky environment seem to apply here The additional classic of CDC annual reports, of being prepared to be in ‘for the long haul’, also seems affronted, as Actis exited just four years later in August 2007, when 100 per cent of Flamingo Holdings was sold to James Finlay Ltd, a long-established (colonial plantation) company and wholly owned

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subsidiary of John Swire and Sons Limited (a UK-originated global conglomerate) (Actis 2008b); hardly a sale likely to promote a deep-ening of Kenyan capital or ownership Since Flamingo had tripled in size while Actis was a shareholder, and since John Swire already owned premier tea plantations in Kenya, Uganda and Sri Lanka, the sale tends to support a rather different effect of DFI investment, that it seeks out and then promotes privileged market leaders at great profit

to itself and to them, with Actis pocketing the profits and John Swire lengthening its market lead; more a predator behaviour than a developmental one

Private sector development in action: the British case

The CDC claims that status, experience and worldwide contacts are the basis of its ability to reduce risk In practice, risk reduction is secured more directly, by institutional oversight at the level of the firm, or its

‘parent’ national development finance company Also, throughout the period since the early 1980s the CDC, and the Great Predators in general, have made many references to their relationships with governments which can reduce risk at a higher and potentially more decisive level For example, the IFC, with its ‘long experience with business conditions’ in developing countries, assured investors that

‘by exercising its latitude to say “no”, IFC can influence governments

to change policies that impede capital market development’ (IFC 1992: 10–11) This ability to say ‘no’ forms the cornerstone of the power of development finance institutions and has provided the basis for conditionality since their earliest days

In 1949 the CDC Board reported friendly relations with ‘most’ of the government and government departments in the colonies, saw their co-operation as ‘desirable, to say the least’, and then pursued an early assertion of conditionality by remarking that:

unless a sufficient minimum of consideration and active assis-tance is forthcoming, the Corporation would hardly feel justified in considering any substantial investment in the area concerned

(CDC 1949: 46) The onset of the era of structural adjustment and conditionality provided an extension of this historic power by codifying a more complex set of rules and relationships which governed the likelihood

of a DFI saying ‘yes’ This was both due to the beneficial effects of adjustment in terms of the institutions’ own profitability, a fact which encouraged new investment to be made as a reward, and indirectly

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due to the effects of adjustment on the macroeconomic climate, thus reducing perceived country risk overall So, the two types of PSD instrument discussed in chapter 8 – market and investment climate – have been clearly used together for some time

The CDC itself notes the relationship and asserts that, citing the example of Ghana where its portfolio grew rapidly following the onset

of an adjustment programme, its investments ‘help to encourage Governments to persist with economic reform, because they are seen

as part of the fruits of reform’ (CDC 1993: 1) A brief look at the CDC country portfolios in post-adjustment African countries of the 1980s and 1990s confirms this point: there was a general pattern of new investments predominantly following the onset of adjustment programmes For example, the 1983 IMF-supported Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in Ghana, was welcomed by the CDC, whose portfolio consequently grew from £4 million in the mid-1980s to more than £29 million at the end of 1992 (CDC 1993: 33) Table 9.5 shows the CDC portfolio in Ghana following structural adjustment, and then the provenance of the investments by 2008 Only the first investment predates adjustment, and while some money assisted the public utilities sector, CDC’s involvements are predominantly export-oriented or in the financial sector, illustrating well the role of DFIs in providing institutions and structures for the export, and then recy-cling, of finance capital from the core states In Ghana the CDC worked

in collaboration with the World Bank-sponsored Financial Sector Reform Programme (to privatise state-owned banks and extend ‘finan-cial services’), as a founder shareholder in Continental Acceptances Ltd, a merchant bank which began operations in 1990 as a 30 per cent shareholder in Ghana Leasing Co Ltd, and with USAID established Ghana’s first venture capital fund for ‘emerging entrepreneurs’, with the CDC providing the general manager The loan to Ghana Bauxite

Co Ltd involved British-based Alcan Chemicals Ltd, while hotel investment (with IFC) was to Lonrho (CDC 1993: 34–5) Also, the CDC funded British contractors for the rehabilitation of the Tropical Glass factory and the transmission system for the Electricity Corporation of Ghana Ltd (CDC 1993: 32)

Ghana, 25 years on

The CDC summarises that before Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), they could only find one ‘suitable investment’, but that ‘activity picked up strongly’ once it was in place (CDC 1993: 33) This pattern held for Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Malawi as well (Bracking 1997) By 2008, the claims that DFI money assists the growth and development of the private sector in the long run can begin to be

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assessed Tyler (2008) does this for all CDC investments in agriculture from 1948 onward, and overall there is a mixed record across the port-folio In terms of Ghana, Table 9.5 lists ERP investments and their destinies.10 Many of these firms have spent much of this time with periodic cash-flow problems which require refinancing, often by other DFIs, which suggests that CDC was correct in their assessment that they were not initially displacing the (competitive) private sector The electricity projects, still state owned, remain in serious deficit and requiring funds The private sector projects have mixed results, with the Bauxite company clearly a success and thus sold off to a multina-tional in Alcan, while the food processing concerns remain troubled The financial services and capital funds are also successfully func-tioning in the private sector and with DFI refinancing, illustrating that the Ghana capital market has been a success story in terms of Africa as

a whole, warranting an AfDB bond issue in cedi in 2008 (AfDB 2008) However, UK consultants continue to provide technical assistance to the Ghanaian financial sector, and also to financial services across Africa For example, just for the World Bank, not CDC, from 2000 to

2007, contracts worth $24,644 million were awarded to UK consultants for work in Africa in the financial services sector, of which $2.29 million was for work in Ghana, according to the procurement data-base, although as explained above, this does not include all contracts the World Bank makes, so the figure is probably higher.11

Tanzania, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia

In Tanzania, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia structural adjustment was used to build the strength of the CDC portfolio, but again, not predom-inantly in cutting edge new projects but to refinance older colonial ventures, often where British companies also had a stake In Tanzania, after the onset of adjustment CDC invested £40 million in three years

as compared to a total portfolio of £69.7 million, such that over 57 per cent of their portfolio in 1992 had been committed in the previous three years (CDC 1993: 18), although this is quite a disingenuous overhead statistic, since if the CDC Annual Report and Accounts for 1992 are interrogated further, it turns out that just under 60 per cent of the whole value of CDC commitments in Tanzania was a rescheduled government loan, while CDC’s own managed companies collectively received 33.44 per cent of the total loan investment on the books – East Usambara Tea Co., Karimjee Agriculture, Kilombero Valley Teak and Tanganyika Wattle – meaning that nearly 93 per cent of all the funds went to refinance CDC’s own core estates12 or to the Tanzanian Government (CDC 1993: 40) Similarly, in 1992, of the total loan invest-ments listed as having been extended to Malawi, 63.2 per cent was

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Management Co Ltd Ghana V

P *Millicom Ghana Ltd

(f)

Notes: * Indicates that in addition to total investments shown undisbursed commitments remained outstanding at 31 December 1992 T

(a) Only pre-ERP project (b) Established with USAID, CDC

ongoing equity stakes, stopped appearing in annual reports Sources: Compiled from CDC Development R