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National as Political Paranoia in Burma As Essay on the Historical Practice of Power Tai Lieu Chat Luong Administrator 200093e4coverv05b jpg NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA Nordic Institute[.]

Tai Lieu Chat Luong

NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA

Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Recent NIAS

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NIAS Report series 11 First published in 1993

by the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Second edition, revised and expanded,

published in 1999

by Curzon Press

15 The Quadrant, Richmond Surrey TW9 1BP

© Mikael Gravers 1993, 1999 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Gravers, Mikael Nationalism as political paranoia in Burma : an essay on the historical practice of power - (NIAS reports ; no 11)

1 Nationalism - Burma 2.Buddhism - Burma 3.Burma - Ethnic

relations 4.Burma - Politics and government

I.Title 320.9'591 ISBN 0-203-63979-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67899-0 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 07007 0980 0 (Hbk) ISBN 07007 0981 9 (Pbk) ISSN 1398-313x

5 Buddhism, Xenophobia and Rebellion in the 1930s 33

6 Two Versions of Nationalism: Union State or Ethnicism 43

7 Buddhism and Military Power: Two Different Strategies

—Two Different Thakins

55

12 Buddhism and the Religious Divide among the Karen 89

16 Historicism, Historical Memory and Power 127

PREFACE TO THE 1993 EDITION

This essay is an elaborated version of a paper presented at a seminar inhonour of Nobel Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at LundUniversity, Sweden, on 9 December 1991 It is part of a researchproject aiming at an identification and analysis of those historicalprocesses in Burma which have made ethnic opposition escalate into anunending nationalistic struggle—a struggle that has reduced politics inBurma to extreme violence

*****

As preparation for anthropological fieldwork in Thailand from 1970 to

1972 I spent two months in intensive learning of the Pwo Karenlanguage at the Baptist mission in Sangkhlaburi near the Burmeseborder I had three teachers One was Ms Emily Ballard, a long-timemissionary in Burma and a brilliant linguist The other two were a well-known Christian Karen politician Saw Tha Din and his wife They came

to Thailand as refugees and worked for the mission After the sessionswith the Pwo Karen spelling book and grammar, Saw Tha Dinexplained Karen nationalism during the colonial era and afterindependence He gave a vivid and strong impression of how potent themixture of ethnic self-consciousness, religious affection and nationalismcan be in a colonial situation

The endeavours of the Karen National Union, a visit to one of theBurman guerrilla camps belonging to forces loyal to U Nu and underthe command of Bo Yan Naing (one of the famous thirty comrades),and a meeting with Mon leader Nai Shwe Kyin came to mind whilst I wasworking at the India Office Library and Records in London (now calledthe Oriental and India Office Collections) in May 1988 AmnestyInternational had just published a report on Burma, documenting thetorture and killing of Karen civilians, and Rangoon was about toexplode in anger and repression Whilst reading secret reports onreligious and ethnic rebellions in the middle of the last century, it struck

me how the conflict and the violence in Burma have been ingrained insocial relations and their cultural expression during the last two centuries.History in itself cannot explain the violence of today, but the tragicdevelopments since 1988 have made the need for an analysis of theroots of Burmese nationalism even more urgent This essay is, however,

a preliminary contribution based primarily on the works by renownedscholars on Burma and its focus is more on theoretical explanation than

on a detailed historical account Except for information collected during

my stay in Thailand and a short visit to Burma in 1972, I have relied onwritten sources and documents, mainly in English Hopefully, I havenot misappropriated the insights of the valuable works on Burma towhich I am referring

I am grateful to NIAS for inviting me as a guest researcher in May1992—it was a very stimulating visit I am indebted to the India OfficeLibrary and Records, London, and especially to dr Andrew Griffin forhis kind and valuable assistance in locating important documents TheDepartment of East Asian Languages at the University of Lund inspired

me to continue this work by the very timely celebration of a genuinenon-violent nationalist (Aung San Suu Kyi) Last but not least, I mustexpress my thanks to the Research Foundation at Aarhus University,Denmark, for financially supporting the English-language editing of thismanuscript

May peace soon strike the peacock in Burma!

viii

PREFACE TO THE 1999 EDITION

Since the initial publication of this book, I have been pleasantlysurprised by the interest and the positive assessments that it hasreceived, although it was—and remains—a brief and incomplete sketch

of Burma’s history and a preliminary analysis of nationalism

I was even more surprised and delighted when the Journal of Asian Studies (vol 5, no 3, 1994) published a review of the book by

Professor James F Guyot He rightly concludes that my analysis ofnationalism does not come through clearly in the text Nationalism andtheories of nationalism are indeed difficult to handle in a briefpresentation, especially when the history concerned is as complex asBurma’s I have added six new chapters in an attempt to take theanalysis one step further But it is clear, as I stated in the first edition,that my view is one from afar Although I have recently collectedadditional information along the Thai-Burmese border and have hadintensive discussions with Burmese people living in Europe as well aswith colleagues, this book is not an attempt to write a history of modernMyanmar/Burma or to assess the complexity of the changes since 1988

It is an analysis of nationalism, ethnicity and power in the history ofBurma from an anthropological perspective

A Burmese friend, Brenda Pe Maung Tin (Daw Tin Tin Myaing), has

kindly drawn my attention to the term kala (‘South Asian’, ‘Indian’)

which I have used to mean ‘foreigner’ or ‘Westerner’ In the beginning

of the colonial period the term was used for everyone who came fromIndia, including the British This usage is found in English literaturewritten during and immediately after the colonial period and has a

highly problematic connotation in the modern context Today kala

refers to a person of South Asian ethnic origin But it was also used as aderogatory term for Aung San

Suu Kyi in an article in the official New Light of Myanmar entitled

‘Feeling Prickly Heat, Instead of Pleasant Cool’: Pretty little wife of the

white kala (U Phyo 30 May 1996) I apply it metaphorically as a

simplification of cultural differences within a nationalistic discourse.However, this simplification and the negative connotations aremisleading when interpreted as a common modern expression In thefirst edition, the term appears as a historical concept as well as ananalytical concept I should have emphasised this In this revised edition

I shall replace kala with more appropriate terms when necessary.

In her review published in the journal Crossroads (vol 8, no 2, 1994), Mary Callahan rightly criticises my use of the word kala Dr

Callahan states that I have used the term to comprise the ethnicminorities That is, however, not true Although the Christian Karen, inthe opinion of many Burmese, became a divisive force allied toforeigners, and lost their original identity through adopting a foreign

religion, they were not collectively called kala Dr Callahan fails to

recognise that the aim of my book is to analyse nationalism and power

in their historical context I did not argue, as Dr Callahan states, that thexenophobic rhetoric of the State Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC, renamed the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, in1997), is shared by the majority of the population However, therhetoric, still applied by the SLORC, cannot be dismissed as a merebravado having no effect on civil society The often xenophobiclanguage contains a strong symbolic violence It is the strategy of theSLORC to gain support and simultaneously to create fear by thisdominating discourse of nationalism It is unfortunate that in this contextresistance releases more repression in the name of the Myanmar nation

As another Burmese friend, Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, explained to me:

‘During Ne Win’s rule, I did not think of the difference between Burma

as the nation, as the state, and as the military regime.’ The threeelements melted into a single identity not to be questioned This isprecisely how the interpellation of xenophobic propaganda works inBurma and in other places where nationalism is appropriated byautocratic regimes Aung San Suu Kyi (1991) has a clear understanding

of this mechanism and its effects: it derives from fear and it generatesfear The memory of past resistance generates fear and releases

violence; the memory of past violence is the fear of new violent acts, ad infinitum The result of the nationalistic policy and its

repressive character is that social practices in Burma move into a greyzone of dissemblance: neither compliance nor genuine participation;neither direct dissent nor open resistance The grey zone is ruled byfear, distrust, rumours and gossip It is probably filled with secretimaginings that are beyond the reach of this analysis; we cannot know

x

who listens to the rhetoric, what is internalised by whom and whoremains indifferent A dialogue between the military and the oppositionseems extremely difficult after ten years of confrontation Dialoguewithout a belief in compromise and reconciliation is futile.

I have not had the opportunity like Dr Callahan to study the

Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) and its history from inside its archives in Rangoon However, the SLORC seems to control the Tatmadaw and

also has supporters outside the army Although the SLORC suffered aspectacular defeat in the 1990 elections, they obtained about 25 per cent

of the votes (albeit a mere nine or ten seats) in the countryside Theopen economy may also have turned some of the new entrepreneurs into

at least tacit supporters Otherwise, without some support amongstcivilians as well as within the army, it would be difficult for the SLORC

to preserve its totalitarian control Of course, a tacit support inperforming daily duties to earn a living and out of fear of reprisals is notthe same as ideological consensus

Further, in her review Mary Callahan claims that there is a ‘Graverspro-democracy project’ in the book However, it has to be appreciatedthat the democracy project belongs exclusively to the people of Burma!

As regards the fate of democracy in Burma since 1948, the reviewer,perhaps unintentionally, confirms my point that even during thedemocratic period after independence, politics turned violent due to thecomplexity of ethnic conflicts, religion, nationalism and rivalries withinthe Myanmar political parties Despite the turmoil, the Burmese haveparticipated in four elections between 1948 and 1962 No one, includingthe present author, would blame the violence and all other misfortunes

in Burma on the colonial era On the other hand, no one would denythat the colonial policy and practice are extremely important to self-perception and historical interpretations in Burma

The new chapters include an update of events and an assessment ofthe role of Buddhism in recent developments, which also include thesplit within the Karen National Union and the formation of a BuddhistKaren organisation The analyses of nationalism, ethnicity, resistanceand violence are related to a recent anthropological discussion of socialand historical memory to demonstrate the importance of the past on thepresent I have made a few changes to the original text; I have alsoadded new references and data

xi

By courtesy of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Frederik of Denmark,who awarded me a grant from his Research Fund, I was able to visit theKaren people in Thailand and collect information on the role of religion

in the present context I am very grateful for this support It was withgreat kindness and and with patience that many Karens in Wa Ga Gla ofUthaithani province and in the town of Sangkhlaburi in Kanchanaburiprovince, as well as in other places, answered the questions posed bythe anthropologist I shall always be indebted to them for theirfriendship and help

Unfortunately, I arrived in Sangkhlaburi six months after Saw ThaDin died in 1995 at the age of 99 His daughter, Olivia, kindly received

me in his house and shared her memories of her father since 1970 SawTha Din was a genuine representative of the Karen nation as itdeveloped in colonial Burma and in the days of Independence whencooperation and mutual tolerance were still possible

At the British Library Oriental and India Office Collections, London,Patricia Herbert, the Curator, helped me to locate interesting documentsand shared her profound knowledge of Burma and its history

Suggestions and advice from Brenda Pe Maung Tin, a former lecturer

in French at the Foreign Languages University, Rangoon, have beencrucial to the revision Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, Executive Director at theWater Research and Training Centre for a New Burma, Delft, Holland,has supplied valuable information to update the book

I am, as well, indebted to Thomas Lautrup from the Department ofEthnography and Social Anthropology at the University of Aarhus forhis critical review of the manuscript

Thanks are also due to the staff of NIAS Publishing who helped tobring the present revised edition to its completion

Last but not least, I am grateful to Anders Baltzer JØrgensen for hiscooperation and the exchange of knowledge and anecdotes during ourfieldwork in 1970–72, and in 1996, because

[in doing fieldwork] a high level of linguistic competence isobviously an advantage but a flair for friendship is moreimportant than an impeccable accent or a perfect lexicon (EdmundLeach 1982:129)

xiii

ABKNA All Burma Karen National Association

AFPFL Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

DDSI Directory of Defence Services Intelligence

DKBO Democratic Karen Buddhist Organisation

GCBA General Council of Burmese Associations

KNDO Karen National Defence Organisation

OIOC Oriental and India Office Collections

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration CouncilSPDC State Peace and Development Council

USDA Union Solidarity and Development Association

Map 1: Burma

xv

xvi

Since 1988 Burma has gained notoriety for the extreme violence used

by its military regime The country has long been in AmnestyInternational’s spotlight, while refugees tell of unimaginable torture,rape and killing of civilians The Nobel Peace Prize of 1991 was therefore

a well-placed tribute to Aung San Suu Kyi and the fight for democracythrough non-violent methods Unfortunately, it was also a reminder ofthe widespread breaches of human rights which take place in Burma

We are sadly reminded of George Orwell’s description of the colonial

era in his 1936 novel, Burmese Days, which includes scenes that point

prophetically to the present situation with foreboding accuracy

But why has this beautiful country, synonymous with Orientalexoticism, turned away from the world and isolated itself in gratuitousviolence which, in the media, has been compared to Sadam Hussein’sIraq, Pol Pot’s Kampuchea and Ceausescu’s Romania?

In many of their reports, observers have referred to the fact that thecountry’s problems are self-created These problems are defined in suchstereotypical terms as military dictatorship, socialism, and totalitarianone-party rule The comparison made with the above-mentionedregimes is telling and simple, yet explains nothing about the specificconditions in Burma’s historical, social and cultural development thathave brought about the current situation Many wondered howBuddhists, with non-violence as their ideal, could perpetrate so many acts

of cruelty Typically, reporting has focused on pseudo-psychologicalexplanations in the treatment of how nonviolence and non-confrontationbring about an accumulation of aggressive feelings, which in turn findexpression in an almost volcanic eruption of violence.1 On the basis ofsuch theories and superficial comparisons with other violent regimes,there is a pressing need for a detailed examination of the background ofthis development, especially at this point in time when nationalism,

ethno-religious conflict, and the division of states capture our attentionthrough the carnage left in their wake.

The initial explanation of Burma’s present situation must be sought inthe legacy of the colonial era, or rather in the nationalistic paranoiawhich was generated by developments following independence in 1948

—a politically orchestrated paranoia linking fear of the disintegration ofboth union and state with the foreign takeover of power and thedisappearance of Burmese culture In this way the legacy of the colonialera has been used as the rationale for isolation and the use of violence.Burma has been gripped by a strong, almost religious nationalismwhich has retained the expunging of the colonial heritage as its keymotivating force This belief, which has legitimated the army’sautocratic regime under General Ne Win since 1962, has not allowedthe creation of a more democratic society Foreign influence must bekept out with force and violence Thus, the colonial era’s model ofsociety seems to have stunted the country’s development since theregime has focused on this model in a manner bordering on paranoia.During the last thirty years of military rule, this strategy has equated allforeign presences with colonialism and imperialism, as reflected in statepropaganda At the same time the regime has sought to keep Burmesetraditions within what could be called a modern version of thetraditional autocratic political structure

This strategy has generated fear of change and fear of all foreigninfluences and imported ideas Aung San Suu Kyi describes thisdeadlock: ‘[the] fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it’, andadds that the population’s fear and feelings of humiliation must becounteracted if change is to be possible She uses Buddhist concepts in

her criticism of the regime, such as the four selfish qualities (agati)

which corrupt thought and thereby obstruct ‘the correct path’:corruption by desire, hatred, aberration due to ignorance, and fear.Corruption and fear are important elements in the relations of power inBurma, and Aung San Suu Kyi says that these negative qualities must

be fought by all and in all individuals She tries to inculcate civil courage

in a population that has been subdued by 3,000–5,000 killings,imprisonment, violent torture, and the forced removal of entire areas of

1 For example, D D Gray’s article in the Danish newspaper Information (9

September 1988), entitled ‘De fredelige buddhister kan vaere både politisk aktive og voldelige’ [The peaceful Buddhists can be both politically active and violent] (Associated Press).

2 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA

Rangoon.2 She is therefore seen as the politician who stands purely inher nationalism in opposition to Ne Win ‘the Culprit’ (as she describeshim) who is the symbol of corruption, the abuse of power and violentoppression She symbolises the spirit of her father, Aung San Theregime accuses her of being in collusion with ‘foreigners’, namely theBritish colonial power amongst others.

In this book I shall attempt to identify the relationship between some

of the factors contributing to this complex historical process: Burmesenationalism’s fear of foreigners; a colonial era marked by violence; therole of Buddhism in nationalism; the ethnic minorities; and anautocratic political tradition In analysing these historical conditions, Iintend to apply a simplification in the form of abstract models andcondensed descriptions (The theoretical concepts are outlined in

Appendix 1.) This is at the risk of repro ducing colonialism’s andnationalism’s one-sided understanding of the ‘essence’ of development.Essentialisation is precisely the primary function of nationalism byproducing a simplification of a historical process Its theory andhistorical memory collapse complexities into a monolithic andprimordial model of the past in the present Repeating the rhetoric ofnationalism runs the risk of making the same simplification But there isneed for a more abstract, theoretical analysis of the generative elementsand contradictions of the processes Such analyses are often absent inthe typically voluminous works on Burma, wherein the dominantelements of Burmese development tend to be buried by detail.3

Whether or not it is possible to pin down some of the ingredients ofnationalism and the strategies of power will become evident on closerexamination of the country’s history Initially the social hierarchy can

be considered by using ‘the club’ as a symbol of colonial society Theclub was not only a representative symbol, it was also a model of thefundamental properties of the colonial system: a division of labour andpower based on race, class and culture as natural criteria of division

2 Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:180–185).

3 See M Smith (1991:492)—an extremely important and very detailed document.

INTRODUCTION 3

4

Whilst one of Orwell’s characters in Burmese Days says that he hates

Orientals and that any hint of friendship towards them is an instance ofhorrible perversity, the Burmans themselves were not too fond of these

‘foreigners from the West’2 who had conquered them and excluded themfrom any share of power In Rangoon, which the British hadtransformed into the capital with straight streets and Victorianarchitecture, there were three influential clubs: the Pegu, the Boat andthe Gymkhana The Pegu Club was dominated by senior officials fromthe Civil Service and the other two by the mercantile establishment.Neither money nor high status could assure a Burman’s access to one ofthe leading clubs in the capital Race was the unavoidable criterion.3 Tothe male colonisers the club and not the home was the centre of sociallife.4 When Burma closed its borders to the outside world following the

1 G Orwell (1977:17).

2 Kala pyu, ‘white kala or ‘English kala’ The term was used in the beginning

of the colonial period and referred to the fact that the colonisers came from India See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42) and Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:4) A modern term

for ‘foreigner’ or ‘foreign national’ is nyaing-gan khar thar, ‘alien’ or ‘outsider’

is ta zein.

3 See N.F Singer (1995) on the clubs in Rangoon, and C Allen ed (1987: 116), for a broader discussion of the relevance of club life for the colonial power There were clubs which admitted native members, but this always created controversy As a criterion, class was subordinate to race Anglo-Indians had their own clubs.

military coup of 1962, this logic was turned on the foreigners from theWest: ‘The club is only open to Burmese.’5

British colonial policy was based upon the notion of the colonialpower’s determining role in keeping the country together with its manydifferent ethnic groups: Burmans, Mon, Shan, Karen, Kachin, Chin,Rakhine, and immigrant Chinese and Indians—a multi-ethnic societywhich the British believed that their Pax Britannica had served to gatherand save from despotism and ethnic conflict

In Orwell’s book, the Indian doctor Veraswami praises the PaxBritannica which Flory, the book’s main character, dismisses as ‘PoxBritannica’ ‘We steal from Burma’, says Englishman Flory, whereasthe Indian admires ‘the white man’s burden’ The Burman protagonist

in Burmese Days, U Po Kyin, is portrayed as a parasite who exploits the

system through unbelievable intrigues The Englishman has lost hisinnocence and has become ‘the reluctant imperialist’, whilst the Indian

doctor and the Burman aspire to membership of the club with the pukka sahib (the real gentleman) The Indian states (with his kala accent): ‘In

the club, practically he is a European, no calumny can touch him.’ Aclub member is sacrosanct.6 He considers the Orientals to be inferior:

‘we have no humour; the British on the other hand modernise thecountry.’ But he loses the battle for membership in the local club to theunscrupulous scoundrel, U Po Kyin, who sees the Indian as a foreignerhindering Burmese participation in the struggle for power This cocktail

of apartheid, ambivalence and unscrupulous use of all avenues of powerhas never been portrayed with more precision than in Orwell’smasterpiece The tragedy of Burma is that these contradictions still

occupy centre stage, long after the British went home Pukka sahib and

his white man’s burden continue to haunt Burma—or more correctly,are used as a spectre to legitimate tyranny and isolation

A couple of grotesque examples illustrate this Ambivalence inattitudes to the English language, which was absent from the school

4 Furnivall (1956:307).

5 The term Burmese is used here to signify a citizen of the Union of Burma, regardless of ethnic origin A Burman is a member of the ethnic majority group.

See Glossary for further explanation.

6 G Orwell (1977:45) Flory’s pessimistic view of Burma does not offer the Burmese much hope for the future, and in fact strikes a chord with those who blame all problems on the colonial era: ‘In fact, before we’ve finished we’ll have wrecked the whole Burmese national culture But we’re not civilising them, we’re only rubbing our dirt on to them.’ (Ibid: 40.)

6 THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!’

curriculum for many years until reintroduced in 1981 when Ne Win’sdaughter Sanda failed an English university’s entrance exam - if therumours in circulation are true—is one such case Foreign culture,especially Western, is largely kept out This applies also to individualpersons, for example Aung San Suu Kyi’s husband, who is English Theregime dismisses the claim that Burma can be ruled by someonemarried to a ‘foreigner’, one whose children therefore cannot beconsidered Burmese.7 The constitution of 1982 defines citizenship asone-dimensional: one has to prove that his/her ancestors lived in Burmabefore the colonisation began in 1824, and that they belonged to one ofthe indigenous ethnic groups Indians, Chinese and Eurasians can onlyobtain ‘associate citizenship’ and cannot hold high office This attempt

to exploit the fear of foreign influence and the ambivalence still found

in relation to the former colonial power and to ethnic or national identityform one clear symptom of Burma’s problematic condition

Important incidents in Burma’s history show how the fear of losingcultural identity, combined with the use of violence in the battle againstcolonialism and for independence has developed However, in order toplace these examples in the context of modern nationalism and thepresent regime, it is necessary to outline how the Burmans regarded theintrusion of colonialism into their lives They saw the British as a threatnot just against their culture and religion, but also against the unity andtotality of the universe itself with its central tenents based on Buddhistcosmology Within this view of the world, to lose one’s religion,language and culture is symptomatic of a loss of control of political,economic and social relations The universe is literally thrown askew Inother words, Burman ethnic identity is not only culturally defined, butalso refers to an existence in a cosmological totality and in accordancewith its laws This is a unified model, where all parts are largelymutually dependent in direct relations of cause and effect Withoutcentral control there would be chaos

The British colonial model—‘plural society’—was based on theprinciple of ‘divide and rule’, where racial, ethnic, religious, social andeconomic differences and contradictions were allowed to develop Thecentral power controlled these contradictions via India, and the unity inthis world was found in the Empire and its global market The local

7 In the colonial era it was considered almost treason for a British person to marry a Burmese.

NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA 7

society and culture were rendered subordinate to a common division oflabour.

These two models and their collision connect some of history’s mostimportant generative contradictions Such models can also function asheuristic aids in analysing and identifying the central tendencies inBurma’s nationalistic strategies.8

8 In the description above, there is, of course, no suggestion that all Burman and British actions in practice were and still are governed by reference to such

‘models’ and their rationale The ‘models’ are analytical tools to explain strategies—and strategies are expressions of the rationale in the producdon of practice and in the perception and representation of historical processes (cf Bourdieu, 1990:131).

8 THE COLONIAL CLUB: ‘NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!’

‘Oriental despotism’ in 1886, exemplified by the kingdom according tothe colonial power King Thibaw and his family were driven into exile

in India He and his queen Supayalat - nicknamed ‘soup-plate’ byBritish soldiers—were taken in a narrow bullock carriage to the navy

steamer Thoorea whilst the British soldiers waved cheerfully and sang.1

Thibaw remained in exile until he died in 1916

Great Britain had already conquered half of the kingdom in 1826 and

in 1852, and had taken over trade in rice, teak, precious stones, etc.During the 1824–26 war, the British took over the great Shwe Dagonpagoda in Rangoon and permitted their soldiers to enter while stillwearing their boots—a blatant act of profanity as Buddhists removetheir footwear when entering religious areas and their homes as a mark

of respect In 1852 the British again attacked the fortified pagoda—thecentral and unifying symbol for both Buddhism and the kingship As thesoldiers swept across the countryside they ransacked pagodas for theirgold and silver Buddha statues

1 E.C V Foucar (1946) gives a detailed, although somewhat antiBurmese, description of the humiliating end of the monarchy.

The British continued to insist on wearing shoes when enteringmonasteries and pagodas, which they used to garrison soldiers during

‘pacification’ In 1886, the palace in Mandalay was renamed FortDufferin and part of the palace, which had been a Buddhist monastery,became the Upper Burma Club for the British officers In the words ofFoucar: The hall of audience would serve admirably as the garrisonchurch…[the] altar before the Lion throne’ (1946:160) A monk who

proclaimed himself as ‘the ruler of the universe’ (setkya mìn), in

accordance with the Burman tradition of resistance, attempted tooverthrow the foreign occupation of the palace, but to no avail Thecentre of the state had now ceased to exist and the peacock throne wastransferred to Calcutta and placed on exhibition in a museum there.2

The British thereby concluded the political and cultural humiliation

of the Burman people, whose conceptual system was endorsed by theall-dominating Buddhist cosmology The removal of the king and histhrone signalled the end of the Burman kingdom and of BurmanBuddhist culture as everlasting and universal entities According to the

cosmology, Buddhism and dhamma rule will decline before the new Buddha arrives The lack of recognition given to a leader of the Sangha (thathanabaing) by the British was an obvious sign of imbalance in the

sacred-profane universe

During the ‘pacification’ programme of the 1880s the British metwith tough resistance from the guerrilla forces, which in some cases

were led by monks The monastic orders (Sangha) did not participate

directly in the rebellion, insofar as monks are not permitted tocircumvent the principle of non-violence A monk, as a member of the

Sangha, must refrain from taking part in secular activities But restraint

was not possible in situations where the monastic order was left withoutinfluence due to a lack of royal protection and regular gifts from theroyal court and officials The rebelling monks were therefore seen asdefending Buddhist teachings and the world order against collapse.3

Hence the Burmans considered them to be legitimate rebels Thiscosmological order was, as we shall see, based to a large degree uponharmony between the religious and political spheres The colonial

2 The peacock is still an important national symbol It was used by the rebels

on their flag in 1886; the nationalists used the flag in the 1930s; and it is still used by demonstrating students Originally the dancing peacock was a symbol of royal authority and an emblem on the throne in the informal audience hall whilst the lion was the emblem on the throne in the official hall (Htin Aung, 1965: xi).

10 THE VIOLENT PACIFICATION' OF BURMA

forces regarded the rebel monks as criminals, so-called dacoits, an

Anglo Indian term for gangs of armed robbers In the colonialperception the resistance was not a planned or even conscious act ofrebellion but dacoity: The Burmese had a traditional and hereditary love

of desultory fighting, raiding, gang robbery; and their inordinatenational vanity preserved vivid recollection of the time when they were

a conquering race.4

If the monks had to reject the ideal of non-violence in order toresurrect the cosmos, then the British in turn employed the scorched-earth policy in order to bring about ‘pacification’ Villages and stocks

of rice were burnt daily and the rebels were executed A single militaryunit was able to report the burning of forty-six villages, 639 houses and

509 Ibs of rice Rewards were given for the capture of the monksleading the rebellion The rebels’ relatives were rounded up andinterned The colonial power used the Christian minority, amongstothers the Christian Karen, to fight against the rebels The Christianspresented the heads of monks and pocketed the reward.5 Hundreds ofdacoits—resistance fighters—were executed, including women andchildren, in a village near Bassein Rudyard Kipling visited the Britishtroops in 1889 and narrated the atrocities in his poem The Grave of aHundred Heads’ It is based on the soldiers’ recollections of themassacre in the village of Pabengmay These selected verses should suffice to give an impression of the barbarism of the head-huntingduring ‘pacification’:

They made a pile of their trophies

High as a tall man’s chin,

Head upon head distorted,

Set in a sightless grin,

Anger and pain and terror

Stamped on the smoke-scorched skin

3 The opposition between the withdrawn holy order of Buddhism and its secular political dimension is thoroughly analysed in Tambiah (1976) and Ling

(1979) The main work on the Sangha and state in Burma is Mendelson (1975).

4 Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 1907, vol 5, p 176 Oriental

and India Office Collections, British Library, London.

5 The ‘pacification’ has been described by Chief Commissioner Sir Charles Crosthwait (1968 [1912]), who participated; see also D Woodman (1962), M Adas (1982), and M Aung-Thwin (1985).

NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA 11

Subadar Prag Tewarri

Put the head of the Boh [‘chief]

On the top of the mound of triumph,

The head of his son below

With the sword and the peacock-banner,

That the world might behold and know

Then a silence came to the river,

A hush fell over the shore,

And Bohs that were brave departed,

And Sniders squibbed no more;

For the Burmans said

That a kullah’s head Must be paid for with heads five score.6

The Christian participation is certainly an element in the explanation ofmany monks’ active participation in the rebellion The colonial powerbelieved that its primary assignment was to thwart the rebels, whomthey considered politically illegitimate The Burmans fought not onlyagainst a foreign occupying force but also against the disintegration oftheir entire social and cultural order, as defined by Buddhist cosmology

A proclamation from the Royal Council of Ministers (Hluttaw) of 7

November 1885 makes this clear:

Those heretics, the English kalas, having most harshly made

demands calculated to bring about the impairment and destruction

of our religion, the violation of our national traditions andcustoms, and the degradation of our race, are making a show andpreparation as if to wage war upon our state To uphold thereligion, to uphold the national honour, to uphold the country’sinterests, will bring about threefold good—good of our religion,good of our master, and good of ourselves, and will gain for usthe important result of placing us on the path to the celestialregions and to Nibbana [Nirvana].7

Thus the Burman resistance leaders regarded the war as religious.This is demonstrated in an order issued by the Myinzaing Prince:

6 See Htin Aung (1965:210–211) Kullah is used by Kipling to mean

white man, i.e., British Kipling made a single very brief visit to Rangoon and Moulmein.

12 THE VIOLENT PACIFICATION' OF BURMA

The heretic, savage, and lawless kalas have now entered Burma

and are destroying religious edifices, such as pagodas,

monasteries And the kalas are using in the profane way the white

umbrellas and other insignia which belong only to royalty.8

This period entered Burman historical representation as the completehumiliation of their society, a literal trampling upon their religion andculture, and the distortion of their universe Religion and violencecombined as a representation of colonial subjugation This violence inthe broad sense of the word is both the destruction of life and property

by force and the act of intervention using the freedom of some todeprive others of their freedom and identity The memory of thehistorical experience from the colonial ‘pacification’ is crucial to ananalysis of the present nationalism It is thus relevant to compare theabove-cited proclamation with a recent one from the SLORC Althoughthe context is different, the rhetoric points indirectly to history:

Not only the Tatmadaw [army] but also each and every citizen is

dutybound to safeguard independence, sovereignty—Myanmarexercising basic rights most suited for custom, culture of [the] nationalpeoples.9

7 See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42) She writes from a Burmese point of view and emphasises the invasion not merely as a territorial and political annexation but

as an attempt to destroy culture and society.

8 Ni Ni Myint (1983:194) shows that the resistance was organised before Thibaw was exiled Myinzaing Prince, a son of King Mindon, included Shan, Kachin, Palaung and Karen in his force and fought under the peacock banner around Mandalay Monks were crucial in organising his resistance.

9 New Light of Myanmar, 6 June 1997.

NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA 13

14

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND

POLITICAL POWER

In Buddhist cosmology, secular power protects Buddhism as a religious

order The monastic order (Sangha) cannot exist without the state’s

protection and gifts In return, the monks secure king and laymen access

to religious merit—the accumulation of which improves their kamma

(karma) This is realised through ceremonies and gifts to monks or,better still, through the building of pagodas However, the ruling power

is ‘hot’1—it may be necessary to use violence in the defence of thecountry The king might autocratically order the execution of rebelliousrelatives and officials In return, the monks must keep the precepts

regarding ahimsa (non-violence); that is, they must not kill living

creatures Then, like now, monastaries and monks protected againstarbitrary tyranny Monasteries were a source of sanctuary, and monkscould intercede for someone who was condemned or who had to pay aninordinately large amount of tax

The cosmos is thus divided into a sacred and a profane sphere, whichare closely linked and mutually dependent Both are subordinate to

dhamma 2 or the law or teaching of existence, its beings, its order and itsphysical and metaphysical powers, as recognised by the Buddha But it

is important to emphasise that the state and the exercise of power do not

in themselves have a religious character

On the contrary, they can be seen as being antithetical to Buddhistethics, expressing one of the worst evils of existence

1 Secular power can be described as ‘hot’ compared with the religious sphere, where Buddhism is a means to avoid violence and anger.

2 Dhamma covers several different conceptual areas and can only be translated

in context Its content embraces the following: ‘correct behaviour, morality, doctrine, the law of nature and its conditions’, as related in the teachings of the Buddha.

Buddhist cosmology is a total model, which covers all aspects ofexistence, including ethical and ontological principles.3 But in the

process of institutional elaboration, the Sangha is, in a manner of

speaking, a sanctuary from secular society Here, men live in celibacyand obey the 227 disciplinary rules and the optimal practice of ethicalrules Laymen, on the other hand, can make do with five to eight basic

rules The monks within the Sangha maintain justice so that the

monasteries do not become sanctuaries for criminals, swindlers orusurpers However, it was quite normal that a new king would try to

secure control of the Sangha This took the form of the application of

more stringent rules, whereby disobedient or opposing elements werepurged The next step was to build pagodas and raise spires on the top—

forming an umbrella-like crown (htì) This is a sign of glory (hpòn) and

power and can be compared with the king’s crown But the concept of

hpòn is also included in the Burman word for monk (hpòngyi- ‘great

glory’) In this case the word implies, on the contrary, a spiritual and

moral honour achieved through asceticism and knowledge of dhamma.

The monastic order and kingship were thus two separate parts of the

cosmos The king’s hpòn, as a sign of great kamma, can be read in his

personal abilities and behaviour This also applies to political leaders tothis day The monastic order, on the other hand, is an unchallengeableand open zone with equal access for all laymen who seek to attain

religious merit (kutho) regardless of rank, wealth and power The Sangha is divided up into different sects with different views on dhamma

and rules for their monks, whilst each separate monastery possesses agreat deal of autonomy.4

Prior to the colonial era the monastaries functioned as schools whereboys learnt to read and write Learning was synonymous with learning

dhamma and being indoctrinated in the Buddhistic cosmological and

ontological principles Earlier, monks enjoyed great respect locally.They were wise men who knew astrology, alchemy and medicine Such

a hsaya (teacher) was an important person in the local society.

3 See Appendix 1 concerning the following concepts: cosmology, ideology, model and ontology.

4 Mendelson (1975:58) describes the Sangha as an aggregation of individual ascetics rather than a church Monks belong to monasteries (kyaung) and branch

monasteries (taiks) dominated by six main sects.

16 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA

Royal Power

The monarchy was absolutist and dynastic It was based uponendogamy; the queens were often the kings’ half-sisters There was also

a harem, where daughters of officials and tributary vassals lived Some

of the concubines came from minority groups Accession to the thronewas often accompanied by a palace revolution which tended to be a verybloody affair, where queens and concubines sought to get their sons intopower.5

The king and his council (hluttaw) controlled trade in all important

produce such as rice, timber and precious stones They also madedecisions on war, peace and the moving of the capital But to gain andretain power, the king had to administer his absolutist monarchy inaccordance with Buddhistic cosmology and ethics which dictate a

number of attributes He must be a dhammaraja and rule in accordance with dhamma and the ten royal attributes.6 The king’s most importanttask was to protect Buddhism, to ensure welfare and prosperity, and toshow charity Peace, prosperity and the absence of natural catastrophesdepended upon the laity and monks being content with their lot.Harmony in the universe provided the laity with the possibility ofaccumulating religious merit As mentioned earlier, this underlined the

view that the king possessed honour (hpòn-daw—‘royal glory’) as an

expression of good merit both in earlier incarnations and his presentexistence

A person became a mìn (king or leader) because he had a kamma (kan) which made him leader The king was ‘Lord of glory and Lord of Kamma’ (hpòn-shin-kan-shiri) Through his prestigious status as a cakkavatti (‘ruler of the universe’ or setkya mìn in Burman), the king

could maintain law and order in the cosmos Conversely, dissension and

lack of welfare were indicators of declining hpòn and kamma The

5 The last king, Thibaw, executed eighty members of the royal family on his accession to the throne in 1879 In 1884 he executed the rest of the royal family (around 200), who had been imprisoned In this way European historical representations of ‘oriental despotism’ were confirmed The Burmans gained a reputation as a gruesome and violent people See for example Jesse (1946).

6 The ten rules, or rather ideals, relevant for a dhammaraja are as follows:

almsgiving, observance of the Buddhist precepts, liberality, rectitude, gentleness, self-restriction, control of anger, avoidance of the use of violence in the relationship with the people, forbearance, and non-opposition against people’s will (Maung Maung Gyi, 1983:21; Michael Aung-Thwin (1983:54); Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:171–173).

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 17

driving force of the cosmos was not conceptualised as an autonomous,

self-centred ego, but rather kamma was the result of earlier and present

interactions These human interactions are in turn connected with

individuals’ knowledge of dhamma, their intention and practice in relation to the ethical rules Whilst kamma follows on from earlier

incarnations, it can be increased/decreased in accordance with changingconditions The state, the king, officials, peasants, men and women areall subordinated to the law—but in a hierarchy of accumulated reward

Kamma is thus the central ontological principle Nevertheless, a stable

economy and peace were the fundamental criteria ensuring the

collective possibilities for the individual accumulation of kamma The

king was at the top of the hierarchy, a natural auto crat, but, as witheverything in the cosmos, he was subject to its law of impermanence.Furthermore, the king was the lord of the land and the water’, that isthe lord of all living things He also stood at the head of the thirty-seven

nats—spiritual ancestors, often of royal descent and including a Shan

king and a prince from the Mon people These spirits, which alsoinclude the victims of the palace revolutions, can disturb the living if

they are not included in the sharing of religious merit The nats presided

by Thagya Mìn (Indra) are guardians of the royal household (the state)and of the households of commoners The Shwezigon Pagoda in Pagan

is the ceremonial headquarters of the thirty-seven nats and thus the

most important royal symbol.7 By including local spirit cults and theirleaders in some instances, Burmese dynasties maintained a formalhegemony over the minorities Conversely, these local cults and theirleaders often borrowed elements from the dynastic model and Buddhistcosmology In times of decline, princes, monks or peasants could claim

to possess the royal attributes—as long as they could convince others ofthe righteousness of their claim These pretenders to the throne, called

mìn láng (‘king in the making’), sought to prove that they had potential as cakkavatti, dhammaraja and kammaraja, that is, that they

possessed the necessary religious merit Burma’s history is alive with

individuals calling themselves mìn láng and seeking to legitimate

rebellion by applying Buddhist cosmology and its rules

The model thus contains two genealogical principles, both of whichincorporate relations with spirits/forebears and kinship relations withpersons of dynastic birth And yet it is important to stress that ethnic

origin was not a significant factor in relation to a mìn lángs credibility.

7 Htin Aung (1959).

18 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA

Mon, Karen and Shan have all performed this role The important factor

in relation to power was whether or not the individual declared himself

to be a Buddhist, namely one who pays respect to the Buddha by trying

to live in accordance with ethics (sila) and the giving of alms (dana).8

The cosmology could always credit or discredit a ruler or a rebel Asituation with deteriorating welfare as well as higher taxes, conflicts andviolence, or famines and natural catastrophes can signal the end of adynasty and the approach of a new era of peace and prosperity Theconcepts and ideals of the Buddhist cosmology are universal andeverlasting, and they constitute a total model of the society and for itsfuture development The cosmology implies a utopian vision of a

coming Buddha (bodhisattd), who is to appear approximately 5,000

years after Gautama (i.e., within the next 2,500 years) The coming

Buddha is called Ariyametteya.

During the last part of this era the Buddhist ethics of sila and dana will degenerate, and war and misfortune will prevail A setkya mìn has

to clean the immoral and chaotic world and prepare the revival of

dhamma before the coming Buddha can enter the world.

Both kings and mìn làung rebels have ascribed to themselves the attributes of setkya mìn and bodhisatta Secular power and the universal

ethics of Buddhism are thus closely interrelated in this model Theseelements could be interpreted as support for an autocratic ruler who has

the ability to re-establish the world order of dhamma, including ethics

and communal welfare The autocratic element in this model inhered inthe fact that all central practice of power can in principle be legitimised

as necessary for the maintenance of the dhamma kingdom as a unified entity, with regards to kamma and harmony, so that the kingdom can

receive the coming Buddha Individuals, regimes and their attributes canthus be brought into dispute, whereas the above-mentioned regularities,which both connect and disconnect the sacred and profane parts of

existence, legitimise the use of violence when the dhamma kingdom is

threatened

8 Until recently, most of the scholars writing on Burma’s history have maintained that ethnicity was the main contradiction in pre-colonial society, and that Burmans were becoming culturally dominant Analyses by Lieberman (1978) and Taylor (1982) have shown that ethnic oppo sitions were subordinate

to that between Buddhist and non-Buddhist, i.e whether or not the population in question held a position in relation to religion and state, or were not included in these tributary relations However, there were some cultural differences in ceremonies and rituals between ethnic groups in their practice of Buddhism.

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 19

This model for a total cosmic-ontological-political unity has surviveddespite the attempt by a foreign power to destroy it, thereby making itthe quintessence of both Burman (ethnic) cultural identity and a part ofmodern Burman nationalism We shall return to this at a later point.

The British made radical inroads into the universe of dhamma, as

they abolished the monarchy and withdrew official support for

Buddhism and the Sangha Thus, a foreign power intervened directly in dhamma and kamma and therefore in the conditions that facilitated the

existence of society, culture and individuals, as laid down throughcosmology and ontology Colonialism usurped not only power but alsothe order of the world itself This intervention was a key influence onthe construction of Burma’s modern social identity

20 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA

THE COLONISATION OF BURMESE

IDENTITY

To be Burman (bama) today refers to language, literature, tradition,

history, etc This summarises a modern sense of nationality more or less

in the form of an imagined community (Anderson 1991) But in the oldstate and kingdom the dominant identity was determined by (a) whetherone was a Buddhist, and (b) whether one was a member of an alliance withthe ruling dynasty, that is, the place one occupied in the tributaryhierarchy This could be as part of the king’s court (officials, craftsmenand soldiers), or as supplier of tribute via local officials, or as a moredistant vassal, who supplied a symbolic tribute from afar Finally, alarge part of the population were bonded ‘slaves’.1 Most were bonded(indentured) labourers, who could buy their freedom, unlike theprisoners of war The population around the capital was often ethnicallymixed: Burmans, Shan, Mon and other minorities, as well as prisoners

of war from Siam (Thailand) Identity and status within the tributarysystem were inseparable

The character of the regime was experienced by the populationentirely through local officials and how these officials patronised theirclients amongst the peasants Most of the king’s men liable to corvéelived around the capital whilst, for example, the Karen in the mountainspaid tribute only occasionally in natural resources or as suppliers ofprovisions to the army They held a peripheral position but not because

of ethnic identity; the Buddhist Pwo Karen held a prominent position inthe southern kingdom dominated by the Mon people until 1750

1 Hierarchy of commoners (following Aung-Thwin, 1984): Ahmudan: ‘bearer

of duty’, conducted Crown service, which included military service (corvée);

Hpaya kyun: glebe bondsmen working for the monasteries; Athi: non-bonded;

they paid capitation tax in natural resources or money; Kyun: bonded

individuals (‘slaves’).

The individual’s place in this system was therefore dependent on the

following criteria: kamma from earlier lives and present accumulated

religious merit, combined with tributary status and rank As stated

above, there was a connection between kamma and status in this life.

Therefore status as a Burman would be unthinkable withoutacknowledging Buddhism as a shared frame of reference How—andhow much—one practised one’s religion was, on the other hand, not as

decisive as accepting the Buddhist dhamma and subjecting oneself to

cosmology and recognising its legitimacy But what of culture as acriterion for identity? Culture was apparently subordinate to religionand tributary status This did not prevent Burmans from consideringcertain minorities such as some of the Karen, as wild and uncivilised,but this status was assigned predominantly to non-Buddhists

The teachings and cosmology of Buddhism are universalistic and, to

my knowledge, do not discriminate on the basis of ethnic differentiation

It is a modern phenomenon to elevate culture as the dominant andexclusive marker of identity In Burma, the Buddhist cosmology wasdecisive for social, political and cultural identity This identity wasrevealed when threatened by external forces, namely when the harmonybetween the sacred and the profane worlds was broken and when aforeign religion (and power) contested the indigenous model of theuniverse Therefore, the important role of Buddhist cosmology indefining the dominant identity as based on Burman cultural values isbest explained through the confrontation with the Christianmissionaries Whilst Buddhism and Christianity both claim to beuniversalistic systems of ideas, their confrontation in the colonialcontext expressed a particularistic cultural clash This paradox seems to

be extremely important in understanding the present xenophobia inBurma

Christian Intervention

American Baptist missionaries came to Burma in 1813 They did notreceive permission to convert Burmans and had no success until theintervention of the British King Bagyidaw would not allow conversionbecause the Baptists demanded a total break with Buddhist thought, notjust with ceremonies and the monks’ and Buddha’s teachings but alsowith cosmology and ontology themselves In such circumstances,Christian Burmans were not simply people who broke with Burmanculture and religion—they were disloyal citizens of the Buddhistkingdom of Burma Foreigners could certainly practise their own

22 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA

religion but on condition that they did not intervene in the

dhamma-ruled universe

This is extremely important for understanding the Burmans’ identification in relation to the surrounding world, not because thenotions of the last century persist unchanged but because reference tothis tradition is woven into present political strategies and models

self-According to Father Bigandet, Christian Burmans were labelled kala

(‘foreigners’); the comparatively few Burmans who converted werepermanently placed outside of society as aliens: they lost theirnationality after they turned away from the religion of their ancestors.2

The king asked the Missionary Judson about the Christian Burmans:

‘Are they real Burmans? Do they dress like other Burmans?’3 The kingquickly perceived that Christian fundamen-talism and its absolutedemand for subjugation were a forewarning of attempts to conquerBurma by both usurping the cosmological order itself and changing theculturally defined content The Baptists would not allow any reverencefor monks, be it in the form of gift-giving in return for religious merit oreducation in the monasteries This was regarded as idolatry and meantexpulsion from the Baptist sect For missionaries, Burma was controlled

by an idolatrous despotism and tyranny, which inhibited salvation andcivilisation They did not hide their intention to convert the whole worldinto the disciples of Jesus Whilst demanding total subjugation, themissionaries also began to reorganise everyday life and work Workwas measured by time and the sabbath was to be observed This wasfollowed by the teaching of European culture, from learning the Englishlanguage to ideas on order and cleanliness and ‘shaking hands’—animportant part of the Christian, civilised identity.4 This identity wasbased on an auto nomous self, subjugated to a belief in salvation, andmarked by morality and hard work In this way, Burman culture becamesynonymous with paganism and something less civilised, which wasincompatible with Christian identity

2 ‘The few natives that became converts … were called Kalas, because in the opinion of the Burmese they had embraced the religion of the Kalas and had

become bonafide strangers, having lost their nationality’ (Bigandet, [1887] 1996:4) See also H Trager (1966).

3 Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1823, vol 4, p 215.

4 See Comaroff and Comaroff (1989), where a similar process in South Africa

is portrayed and precisely analysed; and Asad (1993), who ties together Christianity and power.

THE COLONISATION OF BURMESE IDENTITY 23