Japan And The Shaping Of Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia _ Japanese Diplomacy And The Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993.Pdf

Japan and the shaping of post Vietnam War Southeast Asia Tai Lieu Chat Luong Japan and the Shaping of Post Vietnam War Southeast Asia The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent out[.]

Japan and the Shaping of

Post- Vietnam War Southeast Asia

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia into instability and deteriorated relations between Vietnam and the subsequently established Vietnam- backed government in Cambodia on the one hand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the other As a result of the conflict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia while China, through its support of the anti- Vietnam Cambodian resistance, improved relations with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand Japan’s Fukuda Doctrine – its declared priorities of promoting cooperative and friendly relations between Communist Indochinese nations and non-Communist ASEAN countries – became increasingly at odds with Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader Cold War confrontation Tokyo had to steer a path between Wash-ington’s hard- line policy of isolating Vietnam and its own desire to prevent regional destabilization

Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what was Japan’s response to the challenges to its objectives and interests in South-east Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settle-ment of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? It argues that Japan’s contribution was more active than has widely been recognized

Andrea Pressello is Assistant Professor at the National Graduate Institute for

Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

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Japan and the Shaping of Post- Vietnam War

Southeast Asia

Japanese Diplomacy and the

Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993

Andrea Pressello

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Names: Pressello, Andrea, author

Title: Japan and the shaping of post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia : Japanese

diplomacy and the Cambodian conflict, 1978–1993 / Andrea Pressello Description: New York : Routledge, 2018 | Series: Politics in Asia series | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017011433| ISBN 9781138200234 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315514932 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Japan–Foreign relations–Southeast Asia | Southeast Asia–Foreign relations–Japan | Cambodian-Vietnamese Conflict, 1977–1991–Peace.

Introduction: regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s

Southeast Asia policy 1

1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s postwar foreign policy,

2 US “exit” and Japanese “entry”: post- Vietnam War

Southeast Asia and the Fukuda Doctrine, 1969–1977 44

3 The Cambodian conflict and the polarization of

Southeast Asia: Japan’s response, 1978–1980 91

4 New Cold War and Japan’s pursuit of its regional agenda,

5 The unfolding of Japan’s “twin- track” diplomacy in

Southeast Asia, 1983–1984 157

6 Changing Cold War environment and the intensification

of Japan’s peace diplomacy, 1985–1988 183

7 The Cambodian peace process and the shaping of

post- Cold War Southeast Asia: Japan’s role, 1989–1993 215

This book draws largely from the research I carried out as a doctoral student in the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Insti-tute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo I am highly grateful to Professors Iwama Yoko, Michishita Narushige, Miyagi Taizō, and Nobori Amiko for their valuable guidance and comments on my research My gratitude goes also to the anonymous reviewers for their useful inputs and suggestions Professor Sudō Sueo’s comments on part of my research at the 2011 Annual Convention of the Japan Association of International Relations have also been important for the realization of this work Finally, I am indebted to the several diplomats, officials, politicians, and scholars who, both in Japan and overseas, have patiently answered my questions and shared their experiences and inspiring insights with me I am solely responsible for the analyses and any factual errors of this book

This book is derived in part from articles published in Japanese Studies on

March 31, 2014 (available online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/

10.1080/10371397.2014.886506), in Japan Forum on July 1, 2013 (available

online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2013.8

02368), and in Asian Studies Review on March 5, 2013 (available online: www.

Regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s

Southeast Asia policy

The objective of this book is to clarify Japan’s role in the shaping of the post- Vietnam War order in Southeast Asia by examining its diplomacy on the Cam-bodian conflict (1978–1993), the main source of regional instability in those

years In the period after World War II, the Japanese considered Southeast Asia1

to be important in the process of rebuilding their economy and international role The fact that Japan did not have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China until the early 1970s and had a difficult relationship with the Korean Peninsula increased the importance of Southeast Asian countries for the Japanese This region’s natural resources and markets were deemed attractive in Japan When Tokyo began to provide official development assistance (ODA), a large part of it – as well as increasingly of Japanese trade and investments – went

to Southeast Asia During the 1970s, a growingly confident Japan, whose economy had by then become the second largest in the Free World, looked at Southeast Asia also as instrumental to enhance its international role by acting as

a sort of “representative” of this region in the developed world The fact that vital sea routes, through which oil from the Middle East was shipped to resource- scant Japan, were located in proximity of Southeast Asian waters further increased the strategic importance of this region, especially in the after-math of the first oil shock of 1973 Realizing peace and stability in Southeast Asia became, therefore, one of the important issues for Japan’s foreign policy However, the fluid regional environment during the 1970s complicated the realization of such an objective The end of the war in Vietnam brought signi-ficant changes in Southeast Asia A division was consolidated between the non- communist countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) on the one hand – which, during the 1970s, included Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – and, on the other, the Indochinese com-munist regimes of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam After the rather traumatic experience of its participation in the Vietnamese conflict, the United States reduced its involvement and military presence in the region This created room for the Soviet Union and China to increase their influence in Southeast Asia, a scenario that the Japanese expected to have adverse implications for Southeast Asia’s stability and for Tokyo’s interests in that region With one of the driving forces being the objective of stopping such a scenario from materializing, Japan

intensified efforts to promote development in Southeast Asia and cooperative and friendly relations between Indochinese and ASEAN countries; this was expected to strengthen their resilience and make them less vulnerable to exter-nal sources of destabilization These objectives were central in the policy toward Southeast Asia that Japan formulated during the 1970s One of its major articu-lations was contained in the speech that Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo delivered

in Manila in August 1977, which became known as the Fukuda Doctrine He made clear that Japan had no ambition to become a military power, and that it desired positive relations with Southeast Asian nations based on mutual trust and understanding The third pillar of the speech enunciated Japan’s commit-ment to help realize peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia by supporting the development of the ASEAN countries and the establishment of peaceful and cooperative relations between them and the communist states of Indochina The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak

of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia back into instability and deteriorated relations between Vietnam (and the newly established Vietnam- backed government in Cambodia) and ASEAN countries As a result of the con-flict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia by obtaining access to Vietnamese military bases China supported the communist Khmer Rouge (the largest among the anti- Vietnam Cambodian resistance groups) and their leader, Pol Pot It especially improved relations with Thailand, the country most exposed to the effects of the Cambodian conflict and through whose ter-ritory Chinese aid was allegedly provided to the Khmer Rouge The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 significantly heightened the Cold War tension, marking the beginning of the so- called New Cold War In Southeast Asia, the result was the deepening of divisions between, on the one hand, coun-tries that opposed the Soviet- backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia – includ-ing the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations – and, on the other hand, the Soviet Union and Vietnam The Cambodian conflict and the invasion of Afghanistan complicated Japan’s implementation of the Fukuda Doctrine in that they enlarged the division between ASEAN and Indochinese countries – espe-cially Vietnam – and, at the same time, created an incongruity between the doc-trine’s third pillar and Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader Cold War confrontation Against this background, this book addresses the fol-lowing questions: what was Japan’s response to these challenges to its objectives and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region?

A case of passive diplomacy?

It is argued in the literature that, as a result of the Cambodian conflict and of the New Cold War, Japan – in line with its being a member of the Free World – gave up the pursuit of the Fukuda Doctrine and of bridging efforts between the ASEAN countries and Indochina Therefore, the argument goes, Japan put on

hold its active diplomacy and its search for a larger political role in the region until the late 1980s, when the waning of the Cold War created the conditions for a Japanese involvement in the Cambodian peace process after 1989 In his important work, Wakatsuki Hidekazu argues that after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Japan abandoned its Southeast Asia policy based on the Fukuda Doctrine, which had become inoperable following the outbreak of the Cambo-dian conflict.2 With Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao leaving office in late 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and with the Iran hostage crisis, Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi’s policy toward Vietnam changed and became firmer.3

Despite initial attempts to maintain in existence the Fukuda Doctrine, the ment goes, during 1980, Japan eventually took a firm stance as “a member of the West,” especially under Prime Minister Ōhira and Foreign Minister Itō In this context, the third principle of the Fukuda Doctrine became inoperable, and the age of Japan’s omnidirectional foreign policy ended.4 Hence, Wakatsuki points out that, from that moment, Japan concentrated on its status as a

argu-“member of the West” and, especially under Foreign Minister Itō, actively backed ASEAN and China’s hostile stance against Vietnam, leading to the dete-rioration of Tokyo’s Southeast Asia policy and to the shelving of the Fukuda Doctrine’s third principle.5 Consequently, Japan abandoned the policy of main-taining a “dialogue pipe” with Vietnam, strongly criticized Hanoi, and sup-ported the Khmer Rouge’s hold on the Cambodian seat at the United Nations (UN).6 Thus, by shifting to a firm posture as a “member of the West,” Japan gave up attempts to pursue an independent political role based on preserving a free hand in its diplomacy.7 In the words of international relations scholar Sudō Sueo, by 1980, “Japan’s Southeast Asian policy, which had been centered on aid to Vietnam, had lost its direction,” as the outbreak of the Cambodian con-flict “resulted in the termination of Tokyo’s pursuit of a political role” and in the failure of “the policy of urging coexistence.”8 Under Prime Minister Ōhira and Foreign Minister Itō, Japan shifted toward a foreign policy as a “member of the West,” thereby abandoning its independent diplomacy and dialogue with Vietnam.9 Sudō claims that, despite Foreign Ministers Sonoda Sunao and Abe Shintarō’s proposals on the Cambodian problem, respectively, in 1981 and

1984, Japan supported the ASEAN’s anti- Vietnam stance by suspending aid and aligning with “a policy of isolating Vietnam in every possible way [which] has been formulated as an implicit ‘consensus’ among ASEAN, China, the United States and Japan.” Hence, “politically, Japan’s role in promoting a solution to the Kampuchean issue has been minimal, going little beyond the promise of aiding the post- settlement reconstruction of the Indochinese states.”10

As a result of the tendency in the literature to consider Japan’s pursuit of the Fukuda Doctrine as having ended by around 1980 and, accordingly, to regard the Japanese diplomacy on the Cambodian problem as passive, previous studies claim that Japan’s active contribution to peace efforts in Cambodia began only several years later, when Japan restarted actively pursuing the Fukuda Doctrine and playing a political role to stabilize and integrate Southeast Asia Indeed, Japan’s initial involvement in efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict has been

traced to the late 1980s,11 when Japan departed from the passive diplomacy efforts12 with respect to Cambodia that it had followed since the conflict began and that were limited to supporting the ASEAN stance.13 On this, Tomoda Seki argues that, between 1979 and 1988, “Japan pursued no independent peace initiatives, simply conforming to the Cambodian policy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.”14 It was only in the period 1988–1990 that “Japan began to formulate its own peace initiative toward Cambodia,” abandoning its line of “strict conformity” with ASEAN’s stance In particular, the Cambodian peace process from the late 1980s “was the first occasion on which Japan clearly and deliberately attempted to play a political role in Asian affairs.”15 For Tomoda, facilitated by international political changes that created more favor-able conditions for a settlement of the conflict, beginning in 1988, “Japan aban-doned its policy of rigid conformity to the ASEAN position and began to search for an independent solution.” This marked one response to international pres-sure on Japan to shoulder more of the burden of world affairs.16 Other scholars contend that “[t]he initial Japanese interest in the Cambodian settlement was made public in August 1988 when the Japanese government invited Prince Sih-anouk to Tokyo and at the Paris International Conference in the summer of 1989.”17 Along similar lines, Hirata Keiko maintains that the Fukuda Doctrine

“withered in the 1980s due to US pressure on Japan to curtail contacts with Vietnam in the midst of heightened Cold War tension.” Therefore, it was only

in August 1988 when it invited Sihanouk to Tokyo that Japan first indicated its interest in the Cambodian peace process.18 Takeda Yasuhiro claims that it was after Prime Minister Takeshita’s announcement in May 1988 of the Inter-national Cooperation Initiative (which proclaimed Japan’s willingness to con-tribute more to the world including to conflict resolution) that “Japan embarked on direct engagement in the Cambodian peace process […].”19 To sum up, a recurrent argument in the literature is that Japan’s active involvement

in efforts to end the Cambodian conflict and, thereby, to play a political role in the region, only began in the late 1980s when the peace process eventually materialized

Reinterpreting Japan’s Southeast Asia diplomacy after the

Vietnam War

Drawing from declassified documents (including newly released ones), views, and other primary sources, this book suggests a different interpretation of historical facts and argues that, despite the heightening of regional and global tension after 1979, Japan continued to pursue its agenda in Southeast Asia It did so even though some aspects of its diplomacy were at odds with the US stance, hence showing determination to pursue a more independent foreign policy in the region On the one hand, Japan acted as a member of the Free World by applying sanctions against the Soviet Union for its intervention in Afghanistan, providing strategic economic aid, and condemning the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia On the other hand, the Japanese continued to engage

inter-with Soviet- backed Vietnam in an effort to reduce the distance between ASEAN countries and Hanoi on the Cambodian conflict and, ultimately, to resume regional peace and stability In other words, the Japanese strove to pursue their regional policy within the framework of the Fukuda Doctrine rather than by adopting a diplomacy merely aligned to the US Cold War strategy By shedding light on these aspects of Japanese diplomacy especially in the period of the New Cold War – on which little has been previously written considering that, when discussing Japan’s role on the Cambodian problem, the recurrent focus in the literature is on Tokyo’s role in the peace process after 1989 – this book also suggests a new interpretation of Japan’s diplomatic role in the Cambodian problem In contrast to claims in the literature that Japan became involved in efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict only when the peace process began

in the late 1980s, this book demonstrates that Japan’s role to resume peace in Cambodia and stability in the whole of Southeast Asia actually began when the conflict broke out at the end of the 1970s In fact, one of the central arguments

of this book is that Japan’s active involvement in the peace process after 1989 represented the culmination of a decade- long diplomatic endeavor rather than simply the result of a reaction to external circumstances such as, for example, the more favorable international environment

Sources and structure

As mentioned above, this book, in which events are examined with an historical approach, is based mainly on primary sources Among them, declassified docu-ments (including from Japanese, American, and Australian archives) have largely been used Other primary sources, such as oral histories, memoirs, speeches, statements, and other official documents, as well as interviews conducted by the author with relevant individuals involved in the matters discussed in this volume, have also been used In addition to sources related to Japanese prime ministers and other decision- makers and actors in Japan and abroad, particular attention has been given to archival materials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter MOFA) – several of which have been obtained by the author through the Information Disclosure Law This reflects the central role played by MOFA – and, within it, particularly by the traditionally independent- minded Asia Affairs Bureau (hereafter Asia Bureau) and its various sections such as the First South-east Asia Division, the Regional Policy Division, etc – in Japanese policymaking

on Southeast Asia in the period under examination The large role played by MOFA can be explained also by considering that, for large parts of the period discussed in this book, the interest of the Japanese political community in the Southeast Asian developments remained relatively limited.20 Such interest increased with Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian peace process from the late 1980s and, in particular, with the participation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992–1993

The volume is organized in a chronological way The first chapter provides

an overview of Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s

This is a necessary background to have a better understanding of the origins of Japan’s approach, objectives, and issues in relation to this region The second chapter discusses the process that, during the 1970s, led to the formulation of Japan’s new approach toward the region and to the Fukuda Doctrine Chapters

3, 4, and 5 examine how, between the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, Japan responded to the challenges to Southeast Asia’s stability brought by the Cambodian conflict and the heightening of Cold War tension The significant changes to the international environment stimulated by the new Soviet course under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and their impact on the Southeast Asia situations and on Japan’s regional diplomacy are discussed in Chapter 6 Finally, the period between 1989 and the early 1990s, characterized by the end

of the Cold War and the materialization of the Cambodian peace process, is examined in the last chapter, followed by a section with concluding remarks

Notes

1 In this study, the term Southeast Asia refers to the region including what are the current member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sin- gapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

2 Hidekazu Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai: reisen henyōki no Nihon to Ajia

1971–80nen (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2006), 296, 305, 307 See also:

Yoshi-hide Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” in Vietnam Joins the World, James W

Morley and Masashi Nishihara eds., (Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe, 1997), 181–182.

3 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 283.

4 Ibid., 307.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 334 On similar lines, Soeya Yoshihide pointed out that, with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack against Vietnam in 1979, “the founda- tions of Japan’s omnidirectional diplomacy and the Fukuda Doctrine were destroyed.” Following the invasion of Afghanistan, “the Fukuda Doctrine became inoperable” because the international opposition to the Moscow–Hanoi alliance became “unequi- vocal.” Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 181–182.

7 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 339.

8 Sueo Sudō, “The road to becoming a regional leader: Japanese attempts in Southeast

Asia, 1975–1980,” Pacific Affairs, 61:1 (Spring 1988): 27, 46, 49 See also: Sueo Sudō, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy

(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), 205.

9 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 334, 338–339.

10 Sueo Sudō, “From Fukuda to Takeshita A decade of Japan–ASEAN relations,”

Con-temporary Southeast Asia 10(2), (September 1988): 119, 137.

11 Seki Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role in Asia: the Cambodian peace

settle-ment,” Japan Review of International Affairs (Spring, 1992): 46–47; Soeya,

“Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 187; Yasuhiro Takeda, “Japan’s role in the

Cambodian peace process: diplomacy, manpower, and finance,” Asian Survey, 38(6)

(1998): 554.

12 Yukio Imagawa, Cambodia and Japan, trans S M Mahiwo, ed M R Espinas

(Quezon City: ReadySet Corporation, 2008), 63.

13 Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role,” 44, 46; Masaharu Kōno, Heiwa kōsaku:

Tai Kanbojia gaikō no shōgen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999), 24.

14 Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role,” 44.

15 Ibid., 43.

16 Ibid., 46.

17 Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 187.

18 Keiko Hirata, “Reaction and action: analyzing Japan’s relations with the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam,” in Japan and East Asian regionalism, Javed S Maswood, ed

(London, New York: Routledge, 2001), 107–108, 113.

19 Takeda, “Japan’s role in the Cambodian peace process,” 554.

20 A research conducted by the author on the number of sessions in the Japanese Diet (Lower House, Upper House, and joint sessions) in which, between 1979 and 1993, the Cambodian situation was discussed, has revealed that, in the three years between

1979 and 1981 (corresponding to the initial phases of the conflict and of the refugee crisis) there were respectively 44, 62, and 64 sessions in which the Cambodian problem was discussed After that, the number halved From 1988, the number started to grow again, with 45 sessions, and the peak was in 1993 (the year in which two Japanese citizens involved in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia were killed and in which the first post- conflict free elections were held in Cambodia), when the number of sessions reached 192 The research has been carried out through the database of the National Diet Library of Japan available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s

postwar foreign policy,

of stability in, the Southeast Asian countries.”1 Why did the Japanese prime minister put so much emphasis on the importance of this region for Japan? Before this question is addressed in the following sections, it is necessary to briefly mention the role of Japan in Southeast Asia during the Pacific War One

of the factors that escalated tension between Japan and the United States and that led to the outbreak of war between them in December 1941, was Japan’s decision to move southward in order to ensure access to oil reserves in the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia) After Japan’s occupation of the whole of French Indochina in the summer of 1941, the United States, which was the main supplier of oil to Japan, joined hands with Britain and the Netherlands to impose a total oil embargo on Japan Gaining access to Southeast Asian oil and raw materials, which were crucial for the continuation of Japan’s industrial pro-duction in support of the Japanese war effort, became a main and vital goal for Imperial Japan However, an expansion into Southeast Asia meant war, in the first place, with the United States and Britain As the Japanese carried out the Pearl Harbor attack on the United States on December 7, 1941, they rapidly took control of Southeast Asian territories Two observations can be made about Japan’s military invasion of this region during the Pacific War First, it shows the strategic value that Southeast Asia had for Japan Second, the legacy

of the suffering and damages provoked in this region by the Japanese military was to affect Japan’s postwar relations with Southeast Asia as well as Tokyo’s diplomatic posture and policies, resulting in the Japanese adoption of an often- cautious approach when dealing with the region After the end of the Pacific War, Southeast Asia re- emerged in Japanese and American planning for Japan’s recovery The victory of Maoist forces in China led, in 1949, to the formation

of the People’s Republic of China In the context of the intensification of the Cold War confrontation in Asia, the establishment of a communist regime in

China complicated the future of Japanese relations with that country In fact, under pressure from the United States, in April 1952, Japan signed a treaty of peace with the nationalist government of the Republic of China This move pre-cluded the establishment of relations between Japan and the People’s Republic

of China It also meant that Japan lost access to mainland China’s markets and natural resources from which it had benefited until the end of war

It is in this context that, after the end of the war, the importance of east Asia for Japan once again grew and this region was identified as a replace-ment for Chinese markets and natural resources Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had a clear idea of how Southeast Asia fitted in Japan’s postwar recovery In a speech he gave in November 1954 in Washington, he pointed out that Japan largely linked its economic recovery to the development of cooperative relations with Asia – and in particular with Southeast Asia He explained that, “[a]s an island nation, entirely dependent on trade, Japan knows she cannot survive unless the free nations of the Asian community also survive, and unless there is free trade and friendly cooperation among us.” However, because of the unavailability of trade with China, “in order to be self- supporting, Japan must develop its trade with Southeast Asia.”2 He later elaborated on this point asserting that “[w]e had lost through the war our sources of raw materials

South-in Manchuria, Korea and elsewhere, and it was my wish to see the loss replaced

by closer economic relations with the countries of Southeast Asia.” Indeed, as Yoshida made clear, “[i]t has been my conviction that the economic future of Japan lies in the expansion of trade with the countries of Southeast Asia.”3

The Japanese MOFA shared Yoshida’s views In May 1954, MOFA made the point that considering the scarcity of natural resources in Japan, the country had

no choice but to import raw materials and food; finding markets for Japanese products was also imperative for the survival of the country However, as observed by MOFA, Japan had lost “her once tight hold on China” and was

“no longer in a position to import Chinese resources as she wishes or to olize China as her export market.” Moreover, the gradual industrialization of China was “turning her steadily into Japan’s competitor.” In contrast, the nations of Southeast Asia were “not likely to become Japan’s competitor in the near future and promise to remain complementary to Japan.” According to MOFA, this factor, combined with the geographical proximity of the region to Japan, indicated “the need and wisdom for Japan to make all- out efforts in the direction of tighter economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries.”4

However, there were doubts about the extent to which Southeast Asia could

be a valid replacement for China The doubts stemmed from the small size of the Southeast Asian countries’ economies Therefore, Japanese policymakers considered it necessary to increase those nations’ capacity “to sell and buy.” For that purpose, support had to be given to development projects in mining, agri-culture, hydroelectric power, and transportation infrastructure which “would make their [Southeast Asian] products more accessible, increase their income and thereby their purchasing power and raise their standards of living.”5 In other words, as Yoshida put it, developing Southeast Asia was “a vital issue to

Japan” if Japan wanted to make it a substitute of China for the provision of food and raw materials.6

Japan and the threat of communism in the region

The idea of Southeast Asia as critical for Japan’s economic recovery was linked

to another key objective of the Yoshida administration’s policy toward this region: to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia to communist forces This region’s political instability and economic difficulties worried the Japanese MOFA warned that as long as such a situation continued, “there always exists a danger that they [Southeast Asian countries] may fall an easy prey to communist infil-tration.”7 If such an outcome materialized, Yoshida believed that “Japan would find it impossible to stand alone.”8 For the Japanese, Indochina was the most problematic area in Southeast Asia in consideration of the fact that it “stands astride our line of trade with Southeast Asia upon which our economy depends

to no small extent […].”9 In May 1954, MOFA’s Asia Affairs Bureau (hereafter Asia Bureau), which within MOFA was the main section in charge of Japan’s relations with Asia, indicated that not only Vietnam but also Cambodia and Laos were at risk of ending up under communist influence Moreover, although Southeast Asia was not considered to be under immediate threat from domestic communist movements, things could change in the longer term The Asia Bureau linked this possible outcome to Southeast Asian countries’ weak capacity

to resist communist influence, which created a fertile soil for a possible gence of communist guerrilla In order to enhance those countries’ capacity to resist communist influence, MOFA indicated that, in addition to strengthening their military capabilities, it was necessary to promote their economic develop-ment and avoid that nationalist sentiments became combined with com-munism.10 At that time, when talking about the communist threat to Southeast Asia, Japan’s main concern was the People’s Republic of China There were indications that Southeast Asian people were “impressed in no small measure by the rapid development of Soviet Russia and the quick rise of Communist China.”11 Several Japanese saw a link between the possible expansion of com-munist influence in Southeast Asia and Japan’s own security In May 1954, MOFA stressed that,

emer-[t]he setting up of communist rule in China has already brought to Japan serious disadvantages, economic as well as political Even her very existence may be menaced unless any further spread of communism in Asia is fore-stalled with might The economic development of Southeast Asia is thus a question of vital importance for Japan.12

The Japanese concerns about Southeast Asia were largely shared in Washington For the Americans, on the one hand, a link existed between the role of South-east Asia to support the economic recovery of Japan and, on the other, the need

to avoid that this region ended up under communist influence In January

1951, John Foster Dulles, then special advisor to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, made clear that,

if Japan is to be on the side of the free world, it will be necessary to assure that its industry can keep running and that it will receive sufficient quant-ities of the necessary raw materials, particularly coking coal and iron ore.Therefore, Dulles stated that, “if the US were to use all of these materials for its own industry and not be willing to make reasonable quantities available to the Japanese, it would be futile to expect the Japanese to keep away from Com-munism.” Dulles warned that,

should the Soviets obtain the industrial power of Germany and Japan, it would place them in such a position of strength that it would be necessary for the US to spend more and produce more to offset this difference, so that it really was to the interest of the US to make it possible for Japan to stay on our side.13

It was Southeast Asia that was to provide those raw materials to Japan Dulles explained that “Japan formerly had obtained large quantities of iron ore from Malaya and the Philippines and that these sources could possibly be re- activated

so that the burden on the US would be lessened.”14 The following year, a

“statement of policy” by the US National Security Council on the American objectives in Southeast Asia warned that “[t]he loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist control as a consequence of overt or covert Chinese Communist aggression” would have serious consequences, including

on Japan In fact, the document noted, Southeast Asia – and within it Malaya and Indonesia in particular – was “the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important com-modities.” Moreover, the exports of Burmese and Thai rice was of “consider-able significance” to Japan Therefore, the National Security Council indicated that “[t]he loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to communism.” The United States had therefore to “encourage and support closer cooperation among countries of Southeast Asia, and between those countries and countries

of the Free World, including Japan.”15

The growing American concern about developments in Southeast Asia, ticularly in Indochina, emerged from US President Dwight D Eisenhower’s famous statement to the press of April 7, 1954 Answering a question about Indochina’s strategic importance, Eisenhower spoke of a “falling domino” to describe the possible loss, one by one in a sequence, of countries of the region

par-to communism After emphasizing that about 450 million Asians had already been lost to communism, the president raised the question of what the con-sequences would be – for the people of the region as well as in terms of loss of

sources of raw materials – if Indochina, Burma, Thailand, the Korean Peninsula, and Indonesia were also lost to communism Eisenhower also reflected on the impact of such a scenario on Japan: he pointed out that the spread of com-munism in those countries would take away “in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go – that is, toward the Communist areas – in order

to live.”16 Therefore, Southeast Asia became integrated in the US strategy of speeding up the recovery of Japan as a resilient Cold War ally

The Yoshida administration’s initiative for the development of

Southeast Asia and Japan’s reparations

As discussed, supporting the economic development and the improvement of living standards of Southeast Asian countries became a priority for Tokyo’s regional policy “Inculcation of democracy and military assistance alone […] will not be enough to build them [Southeast Asian countries] up into a strong bulwark against the onrush of communism”17 was the line of thought within MOFA Yoshida himself made clear that “to make Southeast Asia prosperous is the most full- fledged way to counter communism [in that region].”18 Con-cretely, the idea Yoshida had in mind was a cooperation between the United States and Japan on the basis of which the United States would provide capital whereas Japan would offer technology and expertise These efforts, to which also other Western countries were expected to contribute, would have the effect

of developing anti- communist forces in Southeast Asia.19 Fostering Southeast Asian countries’ development was “as important, if not more important,” to preserving their freedom “as is a collective defense system of a military character.”20

The concrete materialization of this idea was the Yoshida administration’s plan for the development of Southeast Asia The initiative consisted of Japan’s provision, in cooperation with the United States, of “machineries and produc-tion technology As a payback, Japan would import at a cheap price the result-ing industrial raw material goods.”21 The Japanese expected this plan to lead to the achievement of a balance in Japan’s import/export and to economic self- reliance As the Yoshida government explained, after the termination of Japa-nese trade with China, such a plan was an economic strategy that Japan had to actively pursue.22 The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was supportive of expanding Japanese economic relations with South-east Asia MITI wanted to decrease Japan’s dependence on the import of natural resources from the United States, hence it was interested in developing South-east Asia.23 In its white paper released in July 1951, MITI emphasized that, from that moment on, Japan had to give importance “to the export of capital goods for the program of Southeast Asian industrialization.”24 In the summer of

1951, the Japanese began to work on this plan and, in early 1952, the ment set up a council with the task of “deciding the basic policy” on issues such

govern-as cooperation for Southegovern-ast Asian development.25

In order to concretely support the process of Southeast Asian development, and considering Japan’s limited resources, the Yoshida administration sought to involve Western countries, the United States first, whose capital was essential for implementing the Japanese plan Obtaining such support was one of the major objectives of Prime Minister Yoshida’s trip to Europe and North America in the fall of 1954 In the United States, Yoshida delivered a number of speeches through which he made his intentions public He spoke of communist “secret maneuvers and underground intrigues to prepare for open and armed aggres-sion”26 and emphasized that “[i]f China’s economic progress is such that she outstrips her neighbors substantially in the years ahead, the gravitational pull will be too much to resist, and Southeast Asia will fall to the Communists without a struggle.”27 According to Yoshida, poverty and nationalism created fertile soil for the spread of communism in Asia For this reason, he explained, it was necessary to “increase the economic productivity of Free Asia, utilize untapped resources, raise living conditions, and develop regional and inter- regional trade.”28 In his speeches, Yoshida made sure to underline the link between development and security He stated that,

the military approach to defense is not the sole or the main answer to the problem of peace and security in Asia If the people of Free Asia are given a better way of life, a better standard of living and a hope for the future, you give real meaning and impetus to an Asian defense alliance.29

After these premises, Yoshida called on Western powers to join Japan in a

“counteroffensive” by undertaking “a vigorous and imaginative program of nomic development and cultural uplift for Asia.” In particular, he called for American financial contribution “Without the active and strong support of the

eco-US, any program for the economic and social betterment of Asia would be doomed to failure,” he stressed.30 In more concrete terms, in his speech at the National Press Club in Washington on November 8, 1954, Yoshida proposed

an Asian version of the Marshall Plan and quantified the amount he expected the United States to contribute yearly to such a plan: US$4 billion.31 Japan would contribute to the plan by providing technology, managerial competence, and skilled manpower.32

The American response to the Japanese proposal was negative During a meeting with Prime Minister Yoshida in Washington on November 9, Secretary

of State Dulles made clear that the United States could not provide the bution to the “Southeast Asian Marshall Plan” proposed by Yoshida Dulles explained that Southeast Asian countries were not able to absorb such amounts

contri-of money He added that, at the time contri-of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe,

“you had a highly developed industrial society and the task was to rehabilitate a plant which had been in being […], [i]n the case of Southeast Asia you are start-ing, so to speak, from scratch […].” Therefore, he was not convinced “that it would be practical to attempt to spend, on that effort […] any such figures as would compare with the Marshall Plan figures.”33

In parallel with attempts to find capital for the development of Southeast Asia, Japan began to pay reparations to Asian countries for the damages caused

by the Japanese military during the Pacific War In addition to their original motivation and to their importance for the mending of Japanese relations with the region, reparations were also to be seen as another instrument through which Tokyo pursued its twofold plan of developing commercial relations with Southeast Asian nations while supporting their economic development Indeed, starting in 1954 – when Japan concluded its first reparation agreement with Burma – the payment of reparations facilitated Japan’s economic access to markets in the region Reparations took the form of the provision by Japan of goods and services which were to be purchased from Japanese firms, thus stimu-lating Japanese production and the establishment of commercial relations with the region Indeed, Japanese companies expanded their operations in Southeast Asia, and this process was reinvigorated when Japan began to provide official development assistance (ODA) Yoshida explained that reparations would “help rebuild Southeast Asia and develop wider markets there for themselves [the Japanese] and other nations.”34 He also expected that the settlement of the reparation problem would facilitate the normalization of relations and the increase of trade with reparations- recipient countries In that sense, during his above- mentioned November 9 meeting with Dulles, Yoshida stated that reparations could be viewed as “an investment.” They would, in fact, help raise living standards in Southeast Asian countries and develop those countries’ ability

to buy and sell; this, in turn, would result in an increase of Japanese exports and the strengthening of the Japanese economy Such a process would also reduce the margin of action for communism in the region In other words, Yoshida explained, reparations permitted “to catch two birds with one stone.”35 Refer-ring specifically to Japanese reparations payments to the Philippines, Yoshida wrote that,

all our payments in goods and services should be so channeled as to help the economic reconstruction and industrial development of the Philippines and to enable that country to supply us with more raw materials, such as iron ore and lumber, as well as to buy more from us We must see that our reparations are applied to the purpose of expanding the economies of both countries and of promoting also the prosperity of East Asia.36

Southeast Asia and the enhancement of Japan’s international profile

In his statements during the November 1954 visit to the United States, Yoshida sought to draw attention to the important role that Japan, in light of its simul-taneous being an Asian nation, a member of the Free World, and an industrial-ized economy, could play for the promotion of regional prosperity and stability Yoshida pointed out that Japan, “the only highly industrialized and modern nation in Asia,” was in a position to greatly contribute to “the economic devel-opment of Asia and the establishment of a community of Free Asian states.” He

noted that Japan, on the one hand, shared “many of the ways and sentiments of the Oriental world” and, on the other, was the Asian country that was politically and economically the closest to Western nations By virtue of these characteris-tics, Yoshida concluded that Japan could act as “an intermediary between the ancient East and the modern West” and was ready to play its “natural role” of contributing to Asia’s economic and political recovery in cooperation with the United States.37 Referring to the American aid policy toward Southeast Asian countries, Yoshida believed that,

[u]nless she [the United States] has a thorough knowledge of the ditions in that part of the world, the costly aid she gives may mean no more than ‘throwing a piece of gold to a cat.’ The cat does not know how to make use of the gold What it needs is fish

con-Therefore, Yoshida argued,

[i]f America earnestly desires to bring prosperity and higher living standards

to that area and to protect it from Communist infiltration, she should above all consult with Japan who is most familiar with conditions in that region, use Japan’s profound knowledge, and work out an aid policy in cooperation with Japan

In his opinion, the United States should “give more thought to the fact that cooperation with Japan will enable her to carry out a policy adapted to reality with less expense, and will at the same time protect her from the unjust accusa-tion of colonialism.”38 What Yoshida was suggesting was the idea that there was

a role that Japan could play as a bridge between the Western world and Asia At the same time, by highlighting as he did in his November speeches in the United States that economic aid and security in Asia were linked, Yoshida sought to emphasize the contribution that Japan could make to the pursuit of peace and prosperity in Asia

The Hatoyama administration and Southeast Asia

The improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and China was high on the foreign- policy agenda of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō, who took over from the Yoshida administration in December 1954 Nevertheless, during Hatoyama’s term, Japan continued to pursue the creation of a scheme for the development

of Southeast Asia On March 10, 1955, Tatsunosuke Takasaki, the director general of the Economic Planning Agency, met with Harold E Stassen, the dir-ector of the US Foreign Operations Administration, and presented him with a proposal for economic cooperation with Southeast Asia Similar to the Yoshida initiative, the Japanese proposal was framed in the context of the advancing communist influence in the region The starting point of the plan presented by Takasaki was Southeast Asia’s difficult economic conditions and low standards

of living which represented “an ideal setting for the infiltration of communist influence.”39 The Japanese proposal drew attention to the direct impact that this situation had on Japan Considering that Japanese exports to Southeast Asia accounted for 36 percent of all Japan’s exports and that Japan was importing food (such as rise, vegetable oil, sugar) and raw materials (including rubber, tin, iron ore) from that region, “communist ascendency in these countries would seriously threaten the Japanese economy.” Despite this situation, Tokyo could

“hardly afford” to provide large amounts of aid to Southeast Asian nations due

to its resources being used for the rebuilding of the Japanese economy, for repaying prewar debts, and for paying reparations Therefore, Japan was pre-pared to contribute technical assistance and managerial expertise For financial contributions, the Japanese called for the American provision of capital by stating that,

[i]n order to check the Communist offensive directed against this region, […] it is imperative that the intra- regional economic development and the improvement of the living standards are effected before it is too late And this would not be impossible if the US and other free nations join their efforts in extending positive economic assistance to this region.40

Once again, Japan’s proposal failed to obtain US support The American tion was that,

posi-the US cannot undertake, even in combination with oposi-ther Western countries […], to supply all the foreign exchange resources desired by Asian countries

to carry out their development programs […] It is clear that no such resources are likely to be forthcoming, or such expansion achieved, without substantially intensified internal efforts in Asian countries themselves.41

In March 1956, Takasaki slightly modified his approach and made a new attempt with the United States In a meeting in Tokyo with a high- level Amer-ican delegation led by Secretary Dulles, he touched upon Japan’s conclusion of

a reparation agreement with Burma and the positive prospects for signing similar agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia However, he noted that those countries “did not have sufficient capital of their own to utilize the reparations payments effectively.” Japan could not provide the necessary capital because, Takasaki argued, if Japan were to offer it, “she would naturally be suspected of attempting to ‘infiltrate’ and ‘dominate’ the area.” Capital from Britain and the United States would raise similar suspicions in those countries – which had only recently obtained their independence – “if either of these nations were to sponsor a unilateral investment plan.” The solution was, according to Takasaki,

“a joint capital investment and loan program” in which the interested free nations would participate, “thereby removing suspicion that any single nation was attempting to dominate the receiving nation.”42 Prime Minister Hatoyama raised the same issue in talks with Dulles, noting that Japan had an interest in

ensuring that its reparations to Southeast Asian countries “were put to effective use.” For this purpose, he suggested that it was necessary to set up “[s]ome sort

of development organisation, financed by the United States, which would enable these underdeveloped countries to put these funds to use […].”43 Dulles’ response was tepid He observed that “by far the greater share of direct eco-nomic aid under the American aid program went to these areas,” and added that the possibility of coordinating American aid with Japanese reparations should be further studied.44 Yet again, Japanese efforts were not successful Scholars Hatano Sumio and Satō Susumu point out the importance of looking at the Takasaki initiative in the context of Japanese domestic politics In the face of the Hatoyama government’s focus on improving relations with the communist powers, the opposition had been advocating the development of Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia Therefore, the Takasaki proposal was to

be viewed also in the context of the Hatoyama administration’s need for termeasures to this situation.45 As a matter of fact, the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, which opened the way to Japan’s accession to the United Nations in the same year, attracted most of the atten-tion of Japanese foreign- policy makers It was during the administration of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke – which was inaugurated in February 1957 fol-lowing the two- month-long government of Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan – that the priority of Southeast Asia on Japan’s foreign- policy agenda increased

coun-The meaning of Southeast Asia for Prime Minister Kishi

Kishi Nobusuke became the first postwar Japanese prime minister to visit east Asia In fact, he visited this region twice during his mandate Fukuda Takeo, who later became prime minister between 1976 and 1978, was close to Kishi and revealed some aspects of Kishi’s interest in the region For what con-cerns the Philippines, Kishi’s involvement with this country was deepened by his friendship with that country’s wartime president, Jose P Laurel After the end

South-of WWII, the two men developed close relations while being inmates in a nese jail Kishi later became the president of the Japan–Philippines Friendship Association He had close ties also with Indonesia and developed “very friendly” relations with President Sukarno.46 As a matter of fact, Southeast Asia was high

Japa-on Kishi’s foreign- policy agenda As he wrote in his memoirs, the “three pillars”

of Japanese foreign policy were “cooperation with the US, a UN- centered diplomacy, and the promotion of [Japan’s] Southeast Asia foreign policy.”47

Similarly to the previous administrations, commercial interests in this region and the need to prevent it from ending up under communist influence were important factors behind Kishi’s interests in that region Beyond this, there was

in Kishi also a marked interest in Southeast Asia as instrumental to enhance Japan’s position both in Asia and vis- à-vis the United States Indeed, Kishi intentionally chose to visit the United States only after his trip to Southeast Asia

in 1957 His belief was that he had “first to visit Southeast Asia and then go to the US so that during negotiations with the Americans Japan was to act not as

an isolated country but as the representative of Asia.” Therefore, Kishi wrote,

“before and after going to the US, I visited 15 [Asian] countries during my two trips.”48 More specifically, he explained that through his visits to Southeast Asian nations, he, as the leader of “Asia’s Japan,” wanted to have an under-standing of those countries’ situation and to talk with their leaders and listen to their demands He believed that doing so was the appropriate way to then go and talk with the Americans and to make his visit to the United States more fruitful In Kishi’s words,

building Japan’s status in Asia, namely, highlighting that Japan was the center of Asia, would make the Japan–US relationship more equal on the occasion of his meeting with Eisenhower and would strengthen Kishi’s position during negotiations with the Americans.49

Such an idea of Japan as “the center of Asia” was not unrelated to Kishi’s wartime support for the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere, which was to be Imperial Japan’s sphere of influence in Asia In fact, Kishi is reported to have stated in an interview that there was a link between his postwar interest in Asia and the ideas at the basis of the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere.50 The US ambassador in Japan, Douglas MacArthur II, noted Kishi’s determination in pursuing Japan’s foreign policy in the region In Febru-ary 1958, he wrote to the Department of State that the “Kishi government more than any in recent past is looking toward Japanese participation in SEA [Southeast Asia] economic development as major element of Japanese foreign policy.”51 The importance of Southeast Asia for Japan’s own economic develop-ment was another important aspect behind the Kishi administration’s policy toward this region When in February 1957 the Japanese Minister of Finance met with Benjamin F Fairless, Chairman of the Committee of Citizen Advisors

on the Mutual Security Program, he made clear that,

Japan’s economic self- reliance depends on exports to the US, on the gress in the economic development of Southeast Asian countries, and on trade with Communist China If US aid for the economic development of Southeast Asian countries is provided through Japan, this would speed up the process of Japan achieving economic self- reliance.52

pro-The Southeast Asia Development Fund proposal

While looking at Southeast Asia as instrumental for the enhancement of Japan’s international political role and economic position, the Kishi administration was well aware of the direct relation between seeking to tighten Japanese relations with Southeast Asia on the one hand, and countering the spread of Chinese influence in that region on the other In February 1957, during the above- mentioned talks with Benjamin F Fairless and members of his delegation, Kishi stated that,

one thing on which we have to pay attention about Communist China is its relations with Southeast Asia Before China completes its internal building and makes its economic advance into Southeast Asia, measures have to be taken to counteract to this by quickly developing Southeast Asia among the free countries.53

Along similar lines, in December 1957, during a meeting with Australia’s Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey, Kishi explained his proposal for a Southeast Asia Development Fund The Japanese prime minister linked this initiative with the need to counter communism in Southeast Asia He stated that “communist forces were utilizing the strong anti- colonialist sentiment existing among Southeast Asian countries.” In this context, it was “Japan’s mission” to work to both restraint those Asian countries from taking a sudden extreme direction in the name of anti- colonialism and to have harmonious rela-tions between those Asian countries and Western Europe As Kishi argued, making progress in developing Asian countries’ economies “played an extremely important role in preventing the advance of communist forces.”54

A fundamental aspect was that, in order for it to function, the Southeast Asia Development Fund – which was to include the 18 members of the Colombo Plan plus Taiwan – was to have the United States and Japan cooperate to provide capital and technology to promote Southeast Asia’s development.55 An articulation

of the rationale and objective of the Japanese proposal can be found in the records

of Kishi’s talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in June

1957 in Washington Kishi indicated that the economic, political, and social unrest existing in Southeast Asia provided “grounds for communist infiltration.” It was, therefore, “imperative that such Communist infiltration be prevented by the granting of assistance to Southeast Asian development.” As Kishi added, “this would also be to the material advantage of Japan in the opening of new markets for Japanese exports, and in the provision of raw material sources.” However, although Japan wanted to export to Southeast Asia, “we must first increase their purchasing power.” The problem, the Japanese prime minister noted, was that the region lacked the necessary capital and technology.56

It is important to point out that the Japanese proposal also reflected Kishi’s idea of “using” Southeast Asia to establish Japan’s leadership position in Asia

As he explained,

if this idea [the Southeast Asia Development Fund] is realized, Japan’s leadership in Southeast Asia would be established This means that Com-munist China and the Soviet Union’s influence in Southeast Asia would be eliminated and the position of the liberal camp would be strengthened.Moreover, Kishi’s “basic way of thinking” was that the scope of the Japanese policy toward Southeast Asia – of which the Southeast Asia Development Fund was to be part – went beyond the borders of this region: in fact, it should be viewed in the context of “Japan’s world policy.”57

In May 1957, Kishi departed for his first official visit to Southeast Asia, ping in Burma and Thailand His itinerary included also stops in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan One of the objectives of his trip was, in addition to com-municating his regret for the damages and suffering provoked by Imperial Japan

stop-in the region, to listen to the reactions of those countries to his Southeast Asia Development Fund proposal.58 As planned, just after his visit to the region the Japanese prime minister went to the United States Kishi presented his proposal

to his counterparts, but the American reaction was unenthusiastic, due to ington’s unwillingness to shoulder the provision of capital for the proposed fund Secretary of State Dulles told Kishi that “to evolve the concept [of Kishi’s proposal] into reality was a difficult and complicated affair Nevertheless, the US […] would study with ‘sympathy as to its purpose’ the proposal to which the Prime Minister had referred.”59 A few months later, Dulles told Japan’s Foreign Minister, Fujiyama Aiichirō, that the Americans did not think,

Wash-that the proposed organisation [the Southeast Asia Development Fund] with a capital of US$700 million is practical Multiplicity of means is not desirable; we already have the World Bank, the Export- Import Bank, our new development loan fund, and we prefer to work through these general-ized institutions rather than set up a new one of limited character.60

On the other hand, despite rejecting the Japanese initiatives, Washington had

an interest in the expansion of Japan’s economic relations with Southeast Asia

As Ambassador MacArthur explained,

[i]t is in our interest to encourage participation by Japan in SEA economic development because it will have twofold beneficial effect of furthering US policies in SEA and in Japan [I]t is in US interest that Japan rather than Communist China or Soviets exercise greater economic influence in SEA Increasing economic activity of ChiComs [Chinese Communists] in SEA makes this latter point of increasing importance.61

In November 1957, Kishi departed for his second trip to Southeast Asia This time he visited Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philip-pines (where there were some protests against Kishi’s visit due to the existence

of some negative sentiments toward Japan for its acts during the war) He also stopped in Australia and New Zealand Kishi once again presented his pro-posal for the Southeast Asia Development Fund, but Southeast Asian coun-tries’ reaction was quite unenthusiastic.62 Kishi revealed that, among all the leaders he met in his two trips to Asia during 1957, Nehru and Rahman, the leaders of India and Malaysia respectively, had “the strongest reaction toward the proposal The other leaders did not oppose the proposal but did not have

a very strong reaction.” According to Kishi, the reason for such a tepid tion was that, considering that Japan at that time still did not have the ability

reac-to provide the necessary capital for the development of the region, some of

the Southeast Asian countries might have considered the proposal to be just

an idea.63

A final observation about the Kishi administration’s Southeast Asia diplomacy

is that, among Southeast Asian nations, Japan gave particular attention to nesia As Kishi pointed out, considering its natural resources and large popula-tion, among Southeast Asian nations, Indonesia was the one with the highest potential for developing as a wealthy country.64 As a non- aligned nation, Indo-nesia was not part of the anti- communist bloc The risk of communist influence

Indo-in the country was an aspect to which Japanese foreign- policy makers paid ticular attention For Kishi,

par-with the establishment of official diplomatic relations par-with this country [Indonesia], commercial relations will expand: this outcome benefits not only Japan and Indonesia, but is also desirable for the stability and prosper-ity of the whole Asia and of the world.65

Indeed, under him, Japan and Indonesia reached an agreement on reparations (for a total amount of US$223 million, paid to Indonesia between 1958 and 1970) and, in 1958, signed a peace treaty

To sum up, the Kishi administration’s initiative for the Southeast Asia Development Fund failed to gain enough support both in the region and in the United States Nevertheless, on a bilateral basis, Japan succeeded in improving relations particularly with Indonesia, a country that Japan con-sidered critical for regional stability as well as from a commercial point of view Kishi’s drive to strengthen Japanese relations with Southeast Asia came

to an end in July 1960 when, after managing to conclude the tortuous sion of the Japan–US Security Treaty amid widespread domestic opposition,

revi-he resigned

Southeast Asia in Prime Minister Ikeda’s foreign policy

In light of the domestic turmoil that had characterized the last part of the Kishi government, the administration of Ikeda Hayato, inaugurated in July 1960, focused its attention on the growth of the Japanese economy Ikeda’s “Income Doubling Plan” acted as a driving force for the high- speed growth of the Japanese economy under his administration In 1964, the Tokyo Olympics and Japan’s accession to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), the exclusive club of the most industrialized countries, boosted domestic moral and confidence These achievements were seen by many as a symbol of Japan’s recovery and of its being back into the international com-munity On the back of these achievements, Ikeda strove to boost the inter-national role of Japan as one of the three pillars of the Western bloc, together with the United States and Europe On Southeast Asia, Ikeda, who visited this region twice during his mandate, believed that Japan had a sort of “special posi-tion” in this region compared to the Western powers According to Itō Masaya,

who served as Prime Minister Ikeda’s private secretary, after returning from his first visit to Southeast Asia in November 1961, Ikeda developed the thinking that, in contrast with the long history of colonization of that region by Euro-pean powers and, more recently, by the United States, Japan was “a new country” because, compared to them, “Japan can tackle Southeast Asian prob-lems from a freer position.”66 Indeed, at the end of his first tour of Southeast Asia, Ikeda observed that countries of the region viewed Japan as a developed

“elder brother” and proudly stated that he had carried out his visit to the region

as the leader of “Japan as part of Asia” rather than as the prime minister of a country that was a member of the Free World bloc.67 The Ikeda administration’s Asia policy was noted by US Secretary of State Rusk during his visit to Japan in November 1961 He reported to the State Department that he was “impressed with [the] general atmosphere here of need and opportunity for Japan to play a much more active role in Asia, a mood prompted both by political and eco-nomic considerations.”68

Southeast Asia was also part of the vision that Ikeda developed for Asia Ikeda’s private secretary, Itō Masaya, revealed that, after traveling to Europe and after observing the European Economic Community (EEC), “Ikeda became increas-ingly convinced that an isolated country would not prosper” and that “if Asian countries exchanged their natural resources, labor, and markets, and if their growth policies were successful, it would be possible to establish a large prosperity zone.” If such a zone was established, Ikeda thought, “it would become a big force vis- à-vis Communist China.”69 His idea was that “a prosperity zone” includ-ing Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Malaysia, could be established and would form the basis

of an “Asian economic community,” that is, the “new EEC of Asia.”70

The Ikeda administration and China’s influence in Southeast Asia

Similarly to his mentor, Yoshida Shigeru, Ikeda’s views on Southeast Asia were also influenced by the need to counter the spread of communist influence His administration judged the situation in the region to be “highly unstable, owing to the existence of a powerful Communist China and to the weak foundation of the newly- independent nations situated around that country.” The Chinese were carrying out “a persistent propaganda offensive which seeks

to stir up anti- US sentiments by exploiting nationalism in the newly- independent countries” as well as to create “distrust of the US and a neutralist mood in Japan” and other countries Beijing had concluded friendship treaties with Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Cambodia in 1960, and with Indonesia

in 1961, and had been trying “to win the goodwill of these countries by ing them economic cooperation.”71

What kind of threat did Communist China pose concretely? MOFA’s ment was that, “[a]t least for some time to come there seems to be little likeli-hood that Communist China would launch any direct military operations of its own.” Such a prediction was based on the difficult domestic economic situation

assess-that China was experiencing, characterized by poor harvests in 1959 and 1960, slow progress in the industrialization of the country, shortage of oil resources, and insufficient transportation capabilities Therefore, MOFA believed that,Communist China has, for the moment, placed its emphasis on a policy of subversive activities, taking advantage of the unstable conditions and popular discontent or apathy in the neighboring Asian countries and of the lack of unity in the policies of the countries of the free world towards these Asian countries.71

The Soviet Union contributed to rising concerns as a result of its strong support

of North Vietnam and North Korea.72 It is, however, to be pointed out that, despite expressing concern for the influence of Communist China in the region, Japan had an interest in improving relations with Beijing Although Japan had recognized the Republic of China, Japan’s policy toward Communist China was

“to improve relations on the basis of respect for each other’s international tion and non- interference in the internal affairs of the other country.” Such a position, MOFA explained, showed that “[t]here is some difference between Japan and the US in their attitudes toward Communist China.” Japan’s policy,

posi-as clarified by MOFA, wposi-as “to maintain amicable relations even with countries whose political philosophy is different from its own on the basis of the two con-ditions mentioned above.” Moreover, the geographical proximity between Japan and China, and their historical ties, made the “erection of artificial bar-riers” between the two countries “unnatural and inconsistent with popular sen-timent in Japan.” It was on the basis of such reasoning that, according to MOFA, Japan desired “to further contacts with Communist China by means of trade and exchange of people and culture […].”73

One of the Southeast Asian countries that the Japanese considered to be ticularly exposed to communist influence was Burma On his way back to Japan after his November 1961 visit to Asian countries, Prime Minister Ikeda, while observing that “Communist China’s advance in Southeast Asia is strong and, in the future, will further increase,” stated that the country most subject to Chinese influence was Burma.74 As a matter of fact, in 1949, Burma had quickly recognized the People’s Republic of China and had been supporting its admis-sion to the United Nations In 1960, Burma and China signed a treaty of friendship and non- aggression as well as a border agreement When Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Burma the following year, the two countries also signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation.75

This background further motivated the Ikeda administration to increase efforts to improve relations with Burma Ikeda’s ideas on the Burmese situation emerged in a private conversation he had with Secretary of State Rusk in Japan

in November 1961 As reported by Rusk, “Ikeda was optimistic about prospects

of bringing Burma further into [the] free world and away from Communist China.” In particular, the Japanese prime minister, “[t]hrough close personal friends in Burmese Government,” was “trying to work out Japanese aid to

Burma which would divert [the] latter from large ChiCom [Chinese nist] assistance.”76 Burma was one of the countries Ikeda visited during his first trip to Southeast Asia in the fall of 1961 On that occasion, in a November 24 meeting in Rangoon with Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Ikeda sought to per-suade him to improve relations with the West, hinting at the economic benefits that Burma could gain from it Ikeda pointed out that, “historically, both the Soviet Union and China had a big interest in advancing south toward the Indian Ocean,” and indeed he noted that the Chinese and Soviets were “putting efforts toward the Northern part of Burma.” The Japanese prime minister made the point that “the time has arrived for Burma to take a clear policy toward com-munism,” and improve relations with the Free World He explained that if Burma started to be trusted by other Western countries, it could receive eco-nomic aid from them Ikeda added that Japan was ready to mediate in case Burma was willing to open to cooperation with other countries of the world, starting with the United States.77

A few months later, in February 1962, in a meeting with US Attorney General Robert F Kennedy, Ikeda called on the United States to consider increasing aid to Rangoon He emphasized that, even though the Burmese military were anti- communist, “loans from Communist China totaling 160 million pounds exert a powerful attraction.” Ikeda informed Kennedy that Japan would soon dispatch a mission to Burma to support the Burmese four- year eco-nomic development plan.78 During his trip to Europe in the fall of 1962, Ikeda spoke of “Japan’s intention to do what it can to prevent the Chinese Commu-nists from advancing into Burma and Thailand by way of Laos.”79 In concrete terms, under the Ikeda administration, Japan granted additional reparations to Burma This was the result of a request for an increase of the amount of Japa-nese reparations that Burma had presented to Japan in April 1959, following the signing, on November 5, 1954, of a bilateral peace treaty and agreements

on reparations and on economic cooperation After lengthy negotiations, in

1963 Japan eventually added US$140 million to the US$200 million of tions agreed between the two countries in 1954 As a result, Japan became the largest aid donor to Burma According to the US State Department, this devel-opment was to be seen in relation to Ikeda’s belief “that Japan could develop a position of special influence in Burma.” However, even after the increase of Japan’s financial provisions to Burma, the Americans noted that “[t]his experi-ment has shown little results, since the Burmese seem no more responsive to Japanese overtures than those of any other country.”80

repara-The Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation and Japan’s diplomacy

As previously mentioned, among Southeast Asian nations, Japan paid particular attention to Indonesia Matsunaga Nobuo, a MOFA official who, at the time of Ikeda’s second visit to Southeast Asia in 1963, served as private secretary to the vice foreign minister, explained that in Japan “there has always been awareness that the stability of Indonesia – a country with a large population and territory – is

very important for the stability of the whole Southeast Asia.” This was an important factor motivating the Japanese support for Indonesia’s economic devel-opment.81 Indonesia was important also for the realization of the previously men-tioned Ikeda’s vision for the creation of an “Asian EEC.” The Japanese prime minister was aware that such a plan could not be realized in a short time, but was convinced that the strengthening of Japanese relations with countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines would contribute to realizing his idea.82

When, in the first half of the 1960s, a dispute between Indonesia and sia escalated into a low- intensity conflict, concerns mounted in Japan for the implications that such a situation could have on regional stability Among them,

Malay-a possible deteriorMalay-ation of IndonesiMalay-a’s dispute with the British- bMalay-acked MMalay-alMalay-aysiMalay-a might result in a tightening of Jakarta’s relations with Beijing As a background,

in May 1961, Malaya’s Prime Minister Rahman mentioned the formation of the Federation of Malaysia – comprising Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak – which was formally established in September 1963 with the backing

of Britain The formation of Malaysia was strongly opposed by Indonesian ident Sukarno, who viewed it as a new form of colonialism and as a threat to Indonesia.83 The Philippines, which had territorial claims in North Borneo, also opposed the formation of Malaysia In August 1963, just before the establish-ment of Malaysia, the leaders of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines had agreed in Manila to establish “Maphilindo,” a regional plan through which the three countries would tighten their relations They also decided to entrust the

Pres-UN Secretary- General with carrying out a survey among people of North Borneo and Sarawak to find out whether they supported joining Malaysia or not However, even before the results of the survey (which showed that people

in those areas were in favor of joining Malaysia) were made public, the tion of Malaysia was announced This infuriated Jakarta and Manila.84 Fighting ensued between Indonesia and Malaysia An escalation of the conflict could have had serious consequences for regional stability Malaysia was backed by Britain, as well as by Australia and New Zealand By virtue of its alliance with Australia and New Zealand, an attack against one of them would also drag the United States into the conflict.85

To be sure, Japan did not oppose the formation of Malaysia In fact, its establishment was considered beneficial for the stabilization of Southeast Asia and for the expansion of Japanese political and economic relations with this new state However, the importance of Indonesia for Japan led the Japanese to adopt

a prudent stance on the formation of Malaysia Moreover, partly as a result of a request by the Indonesian government, Japan avoided officially expressing support for the establishment of Malaysia.86 Nevertheless, the Ikeda administra-tion became involved in efforts to persuade the disputants to solve the problem peacefully In May 1963, Japan hosted talks in Tokyo between President Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman Then, during his visit to Southeast Asia later that year, Ikeda sought to persuade the leaders of Indonesia and the Philip-pines to find a peaceful settlement of the problem and offered Japan’s cooperation for that purpose.87 Following Ikeda’s visit to Southeast Asia, the

American ambassador in Tokyo, Edwin O Reischauer, reported that the nese were concerned “that developments consequent Sukarno’s confrontation policy against Malaysia could lead to serious situation detrimental to long- term Japanese interest.” In order to address this situation, during his visit to the Phil-ippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, the Japanese made efforts “to create atmosphere conducive to return situation to normalcy.”88 In November

Japa-1963, as part of efforts “to enable Japan to maximize its influence,” Tokyo sent

a high- ranking government official to Bangkok to attend the Colombo terial conference “in order to backstop Thai Fonmin Thanat’s mediation efforts.” As Ambassador Reischauer pointed out, this move was in line with Tokyo’s hope that “eventually Sukarno can be persuaded to forego aggressive military adventures and instead establish position as leader of LDCs [least developed countries] by successful development of Indonesian economy.”89

minis-When Sukarno visited Japan in January 1964, Ikeda joined US Attorney General Robert Kennedy in efforts to persuade the Indonesian president to end the Indonesian military activities in Sabah and Sarawak.90 In the same month, Ikeda sent a letter to Prime Minister Rahman of Malaysia in which he urged the settle-ment of the dispute “by peaceful talks among the governments concerned on the basis of the principle of international justice.” Ikeda also offered his good offices by telling the Malaysian prime minister that Japan was available to give

“any help” if he wanted to discuss the peaceful settlement of the problem.91

Japanese efforts continued in June 1964 with the hosting in Tokyo of a summit among the leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, but the talks were not successful.92 Additional mediating attempts by Japan were made in the final months of the Ikeda administration.93 However, such efforts, as well as those made by other countries, were proving ineffective in settling the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia The administration of Prime Minister Satō Eisaku who, in November 1964, succeeded Ikeda after he had to step down for health reasons, took over in attempts to help restore peace between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur

Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia under the Satō

followed the United States as Japan’s second- largest source of imports and export market The dependency of Southeast Asian countries on trade with Japan was also high (Table 1.2); as far as exports were concerned, in 1967, 26 percent of Southeast Asian exports went to Japan, whereas in 1970, the percentage rose to

34 percent Southeast Asia also became the largest recipient of Japanese official development assistance (ODA) (Figure 1.1) In 1970, the amount of aid dis-bursed by Japan to this region was US$192.49 million, that is, 52.7 percent of the total Japanese economic assistance to Asia (Table 1.3).96

The Satō government inherited the previous administration’s line of linking the preservation of Japanese interests in Southeast Asia with the countering of communist influence in that region A few weeks after the inauguration of the Satō cabinet, the US Department of State noted that Japan “keenly feels the 7,000

Southeast Asia Africa Middle East

Figure 1.1 Total Japanese official development assistance (ODA) by region (million US$) Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA database, www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/ shiryo/jisseki/kuni/index.php (accessed February 14, 2017).

Table 1.1 Japan’s major import/export markets (US$ thousand)

Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports

Total 4,054,537 4,491,132 8,451,742 8,169,019 28,591,144 23,470,711 United States 1,101,649 1,553,534 2,479,232 2,366,146 8,847,678 5,851,634 Southeast Asia 1,306,622 914,876 2,194,877 1,406,149 6,309,572 4,171,248 Middle Near

East 177,770 449,272 356,155 1,111,813 1,173,904 3,490,784

EC 315,387 313,431 743,083 570,251 3,299,444 1,958,972 Source: MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1973, p 753.

need to further strengthen and develop friendly relations with the Asian tries,” including countries such as Indonesia and Cambodia “which are more sympathetically inclined towards Communist China,” thus maintaining “as great

coun-an influence as possible upon these countries.”97 Similarly, in January 1965, the Japanese embassy in the United States informed the American secretary of state that Prime Minister Satō was “deeply disturbed” over Communist China’s

“conduct in Southeast Asia.”98

On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the willingness in Japan to improve relations with the People’s Republic of China continued During a January 1965 summit with President Johnson, Prime Minister Satō made the point that “politics and trade are differentiated in Japan’s contacts with main-land China,” and added that Japan “cannot ignore the mainland’s propinquity and its long history of cultural contact with the Chinese Therefore, Japan has developed trade relations with the mainland.”99 To be sure, China’s recent nuclear tests had increased concern about Chinese intentions The Cultural Revolution in China added confusion and uncertainty about the impact of

Table 1.2 Southeast Asia’s dependency on trade with

Source: MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1973, p 755.

Table 1.3 Percentage of Japanese ODA to Southeast Asia

out of total Japanese ODA to Asia (US$ million)

Asia Southeast Asia %

domestic developments on that country’s external behavior The reality was that Satō believed that China had “a greater influence in Asia” compared to the Soviet Union and that “the nations of Southeast Asia fear China above all.”100

Moreover, the Satō administration viewed Southeast Asia not only as a “Cold War battlefield” against communism and as an attractive market and source of raw materials, but also as important in the context of efforts to enhance Japan’s international profile As noted by the US Department of State in January 1965,

“Satō intends to expand Japan’s non- military aid to Southeast Asia” not only to protect Japan’s “vital stake in Southeast Asia” but also “to serve the twin object-ives of strengthening the US–Japan partnership and increasing Japan’s influence

in world affairs.”101 Indeed, Satō sought to make Japan’s role in the region more visible As Foreign Minister Shiina explained to Secretary of State Rusk, the Satō administration was “re- examining Japan’s policies toward Southeast Asia with the aim […] of making greater efforts in this area beyond mere commercial transactions.” These areas included “the development of economic and cultural ties with political overtones between SEA nations and Japan.”102 However, there were two challenges to Southeast Asia’s stability and, consequently, to Japanese interest in the region: they were the situation of Indonesia and the deterioration

of the conflict in Vietnam These issues are discussed in the following sections

The Indonesian issue

Similar to the Ikeda administration, also under Prime Minister Satō, Japan lowed closely the developments in Indonesia and made diplomatic attempts in relation to them Over and above the ongoing confrontation with Malaysia, in January 1965, the situation of Indonesia was complicated by President Sukar-no’s decision to withdraw the country from the United Nations Just after the announcement, Satō sent a cable to the Indonesian president trying, in vain, to persuade him to change his decision Meanwhile, Tokyo mobilized its ambas-sador in Jakarta who, accordingly, had a series of meetings with Sukarno with

fol-“frank exchanges of views, but Sukarno had been adamant.”103 A US ment of State confidential paper of January 7, 1965, reported that the Japanese were growingly concerned about Indonesia and noted that “[t]hey are inclined

Depart-to favor a conciliaDepart-tory approach as a means of keeping Indonesia ‘friendly’ Depart-to Japan and the Free World.” However, such a Japanese conciliatory stance “does not stem from any sympathy for Sukarno’s policies […].” In fact, “Japan will

be cautious about making commitments to Indonesia that might impair its position of impartiality and thus undercut its hopes of contributing to a resolu-tion of the confrontation crisis with Malaysia.”104 A few days later, during talks with US President Lyndon B Johnson on January 12, Satō raised the issue of Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN The specter of Communist China tight-ening its links with Indonesia was at the top of the Japanese prime minister’s mind He emphasized to Johnson that the United States should “avoid actions which would drive Sukarno […] into the arms of Communist China.”105 In the following months, Japan continued approaches to Sukarno to convince him to

reverse his decision about his country’s participation in the United Nations As MOFA officials pointed out, Japan “feels it cannot give up on dealing with Sukarno; if Indonesia collapses, communism will take over.” Therefore, it was necessary to take “every opportunity” to have Sukarno and Rahman sit at the negotiating table.106

A major turning point arrived a few months later in Indonesia, with the attempted coup of September 30, 1965 Major General Suharto played a key role in stopping the organizers of the coup from bringing it to completion and restored order Following the coup, Suharto’s authority increased, whereas Sukarno’s power weakened In March 1966, Suharto took over as the new pres-ident of Indonesia, ending the Sukarno era Under Suharto, the tightening of Beijing–Jakarta relations – an outcome that Tokyo and Washington had been trying to avoid during the Sukarno administration – was no longer a matter of concern Japan supported the stabilization of Indonesia by approving US$30 million in emergency credit for that country.107 Meanwhile, Japanese imports from Indonesia grew, hence helping Jakarta in those delicate transitional years

In 1967, 24 percent of Indonesia’s exports went to Japan That percentage increased to 31 percent in 1968, 38 percent in 1969, and 50 percent in 1970.108

During 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia established diplomatic relations and their dispute was settled This removed a source of instability in Southeast Asia Meanwhile, the situation in Vietnam had become by far the largest threat to regional stability The Satō administration’s response to this problem is dis-cussed in the next section

Tokyo’s dealing with the Vietnam War problem

The Japanese expected a communist takeover in South Vietnam to have cussions on regional stability, on Japan’s interests in Southeast Asia, and on the Japanese domestic political situation Such was the assessment already under the Ikeda administration During a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on July 11, 1964, Fukuda Tokuyasu, the director general of Japan Defense Agency, stated that if South Vietnam ended up in communist hands, it would result in the strengthening of the political left in Japan and in boosting its opposition to the Japan–US Security Treaty and the presence of American bases on Japanese territory Fukuda also pointed out that an American defeat in South Vietnam would mean a loss of commercial opportunities in Southeast Asia.109 From a broader regional perspective, Fukuda argued that a communist victory in South Vietnam would have repercussions in several countries, includ-ing Thailand and Indonesia, whereas in South Korea it would possibly boost the local Communists’ activities Japan would certainly be affected by the materiali-zation of such a regional scenario.110 The Satō administration’s stance on the Vietnam problem emerged in a meeting that Satō had in December 1964 with

reper-US Ambassador Reischauer The Japanese prime minister expressed hope that the United States “would remain firm and not pull out” from Vietnam, but believed the American bombings of North Vietnam were “a great mistake.” For

Satō, “the most important problem is to create civil stability and protect people against guerillas.”111 A few days later, during talks with President Johnson, Satō expressed his view that “[n]either an advance north nor American withdrawal was desirable The latter would provoke a ‘falling domino’ situation The US should hold on” and be patient.112

Japan’s position on the Vietnamese issue was largely influenced by the ence within Japan of opposition to the American military intervention in Vietnam As Ambassador Reischauer explained in a May 1965 telegram to the State Department, the Satō administration had expressed in public its under-standing and moral support for the American actions in Vietnam However, public opinion in Japan had been “overwhelmingly critical” and “[e]ven gov-ernment leaders, realizing the political danger of getting too far out of line with public opinion, have tended to be somewhat equivocal in their statements

exist-of support […].” Reischauer assessed that such a reaction by the Japanese public was a result of “fear that Japan might become involved in the war if it further escalates” and of “a natural sympathy in Japan for the apparent ‘under-dogs’ in the bombings, since they are racially, culturally and geographically closer to the Japanese than are the Caucasians who come from afar, armed with superior weapons.” A third factor highlighted by Reischauer was the existence among the Japanese of a sense of “identification of the American position [in Vietnam] with that of the Japanese armies in China before and during the Second World War.”113

Although there were those within MOFA who supported the US policy in Vietnam, including bombing activities against North Vietnam,114 critical voices

of the American military operations in North Vietnam existed In April 1965, during working- level policy planning talks between officials of the US Depart-ment of State and of MOFA, the Japanese side expressed “major reservations […] regarding the wisdom and utility” of the American bombing of North Vietnam MOFA officials showed “a strong preference for a formula under which the United States would temporarily suspend bombing during a period

of mediation” and suggested a temporary suspension of bombings and the setting up of a mechanism – “to collect evidence regarding continued DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] activities in South Vietnam” – in which the Japanese expressed readiness to participate They also “made the implicit sug-gestion that a cessation of bombing on the US part be lined with a cessation of infiltration on the part of North Vietnam.”115

Nakae Yōsuke, a MOFA official who, in the second half of the 1960s, served

in the Japanese embassy in Saigon and later became director general of MOFA’s Asia Bureau, confirmed that several people within MOFA did not completely support the United States on the Vietnamese issue For example, the thinking within the Asia Bureau was that it was necessary to address the Vietnam problem from the point of view of what was best for the Vietnamese people Such an approach, according to Nakae, was different from the one of MOFA’s North American Affairs Bureau.116 Differences existed also in the understanding of the nature of the North Vietnamese struggle Nakae pointed out that, in Japan,

there were those who believed that rather than being a communist, North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist who was pursuing a struggle for his country’s liberation and independence.117 Miyazawa Kiichi, a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician and future prime minister of Japan, explained

in 1965 that Vietnam was not likely to end up under the influence of China The reason was the existence among Vietnamese people of some fear of the Chinese which was the result of the difficult history of Sino- Vietnamese rela-tions, characterized by Chinese invasions of Vietnam On the other hand, according to Miyazawa, the Americans were “seriously convinced that they are fighting [in Vietnam] to counter China, thus to protect Vietnamese people’s freedom and democracy.”118 In other words, Miyazawa disagreed with the US belief that a communist victory in Vietnam would lead to the formation of a regional communist bloc under Chinese influence because such a belief did not take into consideration the Vietnamese people’s difficult feelings toward the Chinese Nevertheless, Miyazawa still believed that if the whole of Southeast Asia ended up under Chinese influence this would be “a significant obstacle” for Japan’s trade with Southeast Asia.119

One effect of the existence of domestic opposition to the Vietnam War was that, during much of 1965, Japan’s support for the US policy in the region was

“inhibited” and Japan was “discouraged” from providing aid to the South namese.120 Miyake Wasuke, a MOFA official who, in 1969, became director of the First Southeast Asia Division (which was in charge of Indochina) revealed that the United States requested Japan to provide economic aid to South Vietnam but, due to domestic political opposition to providing large quantities

Viet-of aid to Saigon, Japan focused on the provision Viet-of humanitarian aid.121 As a background, by mid- 1965, Tokyo had contributed non- military aid to South Vietnam for a total amount of US$1.5 million This added to the US$39 million in reparations that Tokyo had previously agreed upon with South Vietnam Nevertheless, despite the highly sensitive nature of the Vietnam problem, Japan, always acting with caution, made attempts to create the environment for a peaceful settlement of the conflict As part of these efforts, Tokyo sought to convince the North Vietnamese to sit at the negotiating table Not having diplomatic relations with Hanoi, the Japanese endeavored to have their message delivered to North Vietnamese authorities through the Soviet Union Tokyo also sought Moscow’s cooperation to persuade Hanoi to nego-tiate When MITI Minister Miki Takeo visited the USSR in July 1965, during talks with Premier Kosygin he raised the issue of Vietnam and of the need to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict Washington did not oppose Japanese efforts vis- à-vis the Soviets “to urge Hanoi to enter into unconditional discus-sions,” but was skeptical that the Soviets had “any appreciable influence” with the North Vietnamese.122 President Johnson’s decision in December 1965 to temporarily suspend the bombing of North Vietnam boosted Japanese moves for a peaceful settlement of the conflict In January 1966, Foreign Minister Shiina went on a mission to Moscow Before his departure, he explained the objective of his trip by stating that “[t]he ChiComs are trying to prevent Hanoi

from negotiating because continuation of the war will benefit Peking.” fore, he was about to go to Moscow hoping “to urge the USSR to influence Hanoi toward negotiations.”123 In Moscow, Shiina met with Foreign Minister Gromyko and told him that the United States was ready to stop the conflict, but “unless Hanoi also inclined to stop war, there would be no solution.” The Japanese foreign minister then urged his counterpart to “exert influence on Hanoi to come to a conference,” but Gromyko maintained an inflexible atti-tude and made the point that the Vietnam problem could be solved if the United States ended its military operations, withdrew from Vietnam, and abided by the Geneva agreement.124 Meanwhile, in late January 1966, Prime Minister Satō dispatched former diplomat Yokoyama Masayuki on a mission to

There-a number of countries in Europe There-and AsiThere-a “to meet with North VietnThere-amese diplomatic representatives in an attempt to foster support for a peace confer-ence on Vietnam.” As before, however, the mission did not bear immediate fruit.125 A channel with Hanoi was opened in Moscow by the Japanese ambas-sador, who began to meet periodically with the North Vietnamese ambassador

to discuss the Vietnamese situation and possible ways to end hostilities However, “after four meetings – in July, September, and December 1966, and

in January 1967 – the North Vietnamese ambassador was reassigned and the talks ceased.” Japan tried in vain to open a similar channel with the new North Vietnamese ambassador Other options were explored, with Prime Minister Satō giving instructions in March 1967 to “Japanese embassies in locations having North Vietnamese representation to attempt to open a diplomatic dia-logue.”126 A few months later, in July and August 1967, Foreign Minister Miki embarked on a trip to USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, all coun-tries that had close contacts with North Vietnam Miki sought their cooperation to induce Hanoi to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict During discussions with the Polish foreign minister on July 26, Miki tried to persuade him to use Polish channels with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam with the ultimate objective of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.127 The following day, Miki met his Hungarian counterpart and, pointing out that Hungary had deep relations with Hanoi as well as con-tacts with the United States, asked the Hungarian foreign minister if his country could play a “mediation role” between North Vietnam and the United States Miki also asked the Hungarians to inform Hanoi that Japan was always available to contribute to a resumption of peace in Vietnam.128 Commenting

on this type of Japanese diplomatic effort, Alexis Johnson, the US ambassador

in Japan between 1966 and early 1969, stated that “[t]he Japanese government tried to act as intermediary several times, as did many other governments, but was cold- shouldered by Hanoi.”129 Despite the failures of the Japanese attempts, Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda Takesō provided an explanation of Tokyo’s intensified diplomatic activity on the Vietnam problem As reported by Ambassador Johnson, Shimoda told him that the fact that Japan could not provide military help “gave it a special ability to take advantage of whatever openings for diplomatic resolution presented themselves.”130