1227 line in the waters the south china sea dispute and its implications for asia

The PLAN’s South China Sea patrols and exercisessince the rulinghave consolidated China’s widerstrategic footprint without adoptingunnecessarilyprovocative military postures.. Meanwhile,

wATERS

TheSouthChinaSeaDi

spute and itsImplicationsforAsi

a

EditedbyAbhijit Singh

LineintheWaters:TheSouthChinaSeaDisputeanditsImplicati onsforAsiaISBN:978-81-86818-27-5

https://amti.csis.org/atlas/

ArbitrationontheSouthChinaSea –ImplicationsforMaritime-Asia

ABHIjITS I N G H

AbhijitSinghisSeniorFellowandHeadofMaritimePolicyInitiativeatt heObserverResearchFoundation (ORF) in New Delhi A former Indian naval officer, he has edited two books onmaritime security - Indian Ocean Challenges: a Quest for Cooperative Solutions (2013) andGeopolitics of the Indo-Pacific (2014), and written extensively on India’s growing maritimereach, security of sea-lines of communication, Indian Ocean governance issues and maritimeinfrastructureintheAsianlittorals.

n2 0 1 6 , a s e r i e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t s i n m a r i t i m e

-A s i a d r e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e t e r r i t o r i a l disputesintheSouthChinaSea,nonemoresothanthePhilippinesvs.ChinaA r b i t r a t i o n o v e r maritimerightsandjurisdictioninthelittoralseas.On July12,2016,atribunalatthePermanentCourtofArbitration(PCA)atHaguepassedalandmarkonthemat

ter,rulingthatBeijing’sclaimsof dashlinearewithoutlegalbasis.ItfurtherconcludedthatBeijing’sactivitieswithinthePhilipp

historicrightswithinthenine-mileexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ),suchasillegalfishingandenvironmentallydamagingartificial islandconstructions,constitutedand infringementofMa

ines’two-hundred-nautical-nila’ssovereignrights

In many ways, China had only itself to blame for the debacle Beijing’s firstreaction to the Philippines’legalappealhadbeentoignorethematteraltogether–asifnotacknowledgingthecasewouldeffectivelydelegitimise it Given the high level of internationalinterest in the affair, however, it was forced to makea course correction, issuing a position paper in December

2014 clarifying its official stance on the issue.1Unfortunately for Beijing, its contention that Manila had violated the United Nations Convention of theLaw ofthe Sea (UNCLOS) by filing a petition on a matter of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorialjurisdiction’failedtoconvincejudgesatthePCA,whoruledcomprehensivelyinfavourofthePhilippines.2

Notwithstanding the maritime legalese surrounding the case, the technicalnuances of the points raisedreveal an underlying narrative It is important tonote that when Manila filed proceedings under AnnexVII of the UNCLOS inJuly 2013, it was smart enough to invoke only those provisions that allowforcompulsorya r b i t r a t i o n F u l l y a w a r e t h a t t e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s a r e

b e y o n d t h e r e m i t o f U N C L O S , t h e

2

At the heart of the Philippines’ submission werequestions about the legalvalidityofChina’snine-dashline’intheSouthChinaSea.Manilaframeditspe tition t

o se e k a c la r ifi c a ti on f r om th e c ou r tw h e th e r sta t

e r ig h t s and obligations in the waters, seabed, and maritime features ofthe

drawnlineonachart.Simplyput,ManilaassertedthatChina’smaritimemapoftheSCSwas of dubious provenance, and claims arisingfrom it were an outrightviolationof the law

SCScouldbedemarcatedbysomethingasarbitraryasahand-AFlawedLegalStrategy

China’s belatedly mounted legal defence was innatelyflawed

Beijingimplausiblyarguedagainstthetribunal’smandatetointerprettheapplication of the UNCLOS;erroneously invoked Art 298, citing itsvoluntaryopt-outofcompulsorya r b i t r a t i o n u n d e r t h e U N C L

O S ; andunconvincinglypetitionedforthedismissaloft h

e P h i l i p p i n e s ’ case, invoking the Declaration of the Conduct ofParties (DOC) in theSouth China Sea.4Nothing in the text of that agreement, the judgespointed out, imposed any obligation on astate to eschew legal remediesin pursuing a just redressal Yet,

Tribunalpasseditsfinaljudgment,fewhadbelievedthatChinawouldfacesuchahumiliating loss It came as a surprise that the tribunalruled in favor ofthe Philippines on almost every count,unanimously rejecting nearly allof China’s maritimeclaims in the region

The felicity with which the tribunal tackled legaltechnicalities

deservesacknowledgment.Thecourtr i g h t l y h e l d t

h a t a l l t h e t e r r i t o r i e s i n the contested SpratlyIslands are reefs or rocks, and not islands –animportantdistinction,asunderUNCLOS,reefscannotgenerateaclaimto the surrounding waters or airspace, and rocks serve asthe basis onlyfor a maritime claim of 12 nautical miles

ofthefeaturesontheSpratlysas“lessthanIslands”negatedt

3

onlyreefsor rocks, deflated Chinese claims China’s outposts in the Spratly

groupare now rendered isolated enclaves floating in the Philippines’

activitiesinsidethe Philippines’ exclusive economic zone Chinese

vessels, the judgesheld, were not only fishing in

routinelyengagedindangerouslymanoeuversbyapproach

ingPhilippineboatstooclose, preventing them from fishing, and

zone.Turningitsknifeinanalreadyachingwound,thetribunalth

encensuredChina for its construction of artificial islands in the region,

which itdetermined had caused severe environmental

damage and heightenedgeopoliticaltensions

China’sOperationalResponse

Despitetheclaritybroughtbytheverdicttomanycon

tentiousissues,it did not plug all loopholes Its biggest inadequacy is

the lack of anhonorable face-saver for Beijing.7China was perhaps

courtwouldpassanadverseruling,butwasstilltakenabackbyt

heseverityofthe final verdict Expectedly, it provoked an immediate

response fromthe PLAN that moves to expand its

SouthChinaSea.Withindaysofthejudgment, Beiji

ngupped thetempoof its reclamation activities and began creating

military infrastructure onislands under its control in the SCS

hadanydoubts,Chinamadeitclearthatthereisnoprovisioninin

ternationallaw to enforce a UN court’s binding judgment

Since then, Chinese military and non-military vessels

methodically expandingits regional military

avoidingriskymanoeuvresthatcouldtriggeranaccidentalclash.Besidessteppingup itsfortification of military outposts in the

opendefianceofthetribunal’sruling,Chinahasconstructedreinforcedaircrafthangars on

Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross Reefs These new

facilitieshavepotential militaryusageandexpandthe

PLA’s power projection

Despitetheclaritybroug htbytheverdicttomanyc ontentiousissues,itdidn otplug

allloopholes.Itsbigg esti n a d e q u a c y i sthelackofanhonora bleface-saver forBeijing.

capabilityintheSouthChinaSea.Incombinationwiththefirst,Beijing

4

has moved to mobilise its massive coastguard fleet to

presenceandintimidatenon-ChinesefishermeninSoutheastandEastAsia,intheprocesssubstantiallyraisingtheriskofaninadvertentclash

The PLAN’s South China Sea patrols and exercisessince the rulinghave consolidated China’s widerstrategic footprint without adoptingunnecessarilyprovocative military postures Rather thanestablishing anairdefenceidentificationzone–whichwouldhavebeenhardtoenforce

–

Beijinginitiatedanewprogramof“aircombatpatrols”,flyingnuclear-capable H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighters over disputed island featuresinan intimidating display of its airpower andresolve.8Worryingly,

China’sjointmaritimeexerciseswithfriendlynaviesincorporated“island-seizingdrills”and anti-submarine warfare

Meanwhile, despite undertaking multiple FONOPS inthe South ChinaSea since the verdict, the US seems

to be at a loss of options in tacklingChina’s provocations.Despite warning from the Obama administrationandPresident-electDonaldTrump,Beijinghasrefusedtomenditsways.In

December 2016, a Chinese boat confiscated a US underwater dronein thewaters off the Philippines, challenging US operationalprimacy

intheSCS.9TheUUVwasreturneddayslater,butBeijingshowedhowit was taking unkindly to intrusive US maritimeoperations, as well asunconsideredremarks byTrumpandhistransition team

Ineffect,BeijinghasmanagedtoshifttheburdenofescalationontotheUSanditsallies,whomustnowdecidehowmuchprovocationisenoughto cross the threshold of tolerance With the ChineseSupreme

Court’srecognitionofa“clearlegalbasisforChinatosafeguardmaritimeorder,marinesafetyandinterestsandto“exerciseintegratedmanagementoverthe country’s jurisdictional seas”, USanalysts and policymakers knowBeijing could soon come upwith a domestic law to tighten its controlover theSouth China Sea.10If China declares base lines around theSpratlys,itwill set the proverbialcat out among the pigeons

India’sSouthChinaSeaInterests

A passive bystander through much of the dispute’srecent history, Indiatook a measured stand in the wake of the UNtribunal’s verdict NewDelhi issued a statement that urged

all parties to show utmost respectfor the UNCLOS,and the international legal order of the seasandoceans.11The statement indicated India’s recognition of the legitimacyofthePer ma ne nt Courtof Arbitration ( PCA),but more importantly, it illustrated New Delhi’s willingness toacknowledge the need for allaffectedpartiesto upholdtheverdict.

While New Delhi’s choice of words seemed motivated

toappearbalanced,China insisted oninterpretingIndia’s standasbeing

5

in support of its position The Chinese media noted

that New Delhi’ssigning of the Russia-India-China

oftheneedforallpartiesinvolvedinthemaritimedisputestosettl

emattersthroughdialogue rather than seekinglegal

recourse

Not that Beijing has ever believed that India’s South

China Sea standmatters Days before the start of the

China’sForeignMinister,heldwide-rangingtalkswithPrimeMinisterNarendraModiandExtern

alAffairsMinisterSushmaSwaraj.12Theagendaincluded a

number of contentious bilateral issues – China’s

perceivedoppositiontoIndia’smembershiptotheNuclear

SecurityGroup(NSG),Beijing’s opposition to UN sanctions on

Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief,Masood Azhar, and the China-Pakistan

nottheaffairsoftheSouthChinaSea.ThatthevisitingChinese

delegatehadthe South China Sea in mind all along was confirmed a day

later, whenthe Chinese media hailed India for being

“neutral on the South ChinaSea” – convinced that if

the matter ever came up at the forthcomingG-20

summit,NewDelhi wouldnottakesides.13

For its part, India realises that too much interest in

the affairs of theSCS has the potential to impact

bilateral ties Indeed, a week prior toWang’s visit to

India, theGlobal Times, a Chinese tabloid widely seen

edthanever.Under the ‘Act East’ policy, trade with ASEAN and the far-eastern

Pacificis expanding significantly Consequently, Asia’s

areincreasinglybecomingavitalfacilitatorofIndia’secono

micdevelopment.With growing dependence on the Malacca Strait for

the flow of goodsand services, economics is increasingly a

factor in India’s Pacific policy.The territorial conflicts in the SCS

ofIndia’seconomicdevelopment,creatinganunacceptableimpedimentforregionaltradeand commerce.15

Moreimportantly,IndiabelievesthatthedisputesintheSoutheastAsianlittoralsarealitmustestforinternationalmaritimelaw.IntheaftermathoftheHagueTribunal’sverdictontheSouthChinaSea,NewDelhifeelsobligatedtotakeaprincipledstandontheissueoffreedomofnavigationand commercial access

as enshrined in the UNCLOS

theguaranteesbeingsoughtbyBeijingfromIndiaaboutstayingneutralon

retrajectoryofIndia’seconomicdevelopment,creat

inganunacceptabl eimpedimentforre gionaltradeandco mmerce.

6

theSCS,NewDelhicannotbeseentobecondoninganaggressivestandby China inthe region

For all of China’s concessions on offer, New Delhi hasreason to continueviewing PLAN manoeuvres in theIndian Ocean Region (IOR) withsuspicion For onething, Beijing still yet to explain its rapidlygrowingundersea presence in littoral South Asia The

anti-piracyoperationstojustifythedeploymentofChinesesubmarinesintheIndian Ocean makes many Indian maritime analysts believe thatChinais preparing for a larger strategic thrustin theIndian Ocean.16

ImplicationsforSouthAsia

AnaggressiveChinesemaritimepostureintheSouthChinaSeaChinesealso has implications for the wider Asian commons – inparticular theSouth Asian littorals, where Indian

powerasymmetries.FormanyIndiananalysts,thereisaclearcorrelationbetweenaggressiveChinesepatrollingintheSCSanditsgrowingdeploymentsintheIndianOceanRegion.China’saggressiveresponsetotheUNArbitralTribunal’sverdictisinterpretedbymanyinIndiaasabroaderstrategytoprojectpower

theEasternIndianOcean,whereChina’sdistantwaterfishingfleetisalreadyasignificant presence

Beijing’s blueprint for maritime operations in the

mightinvolvet h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m u l t i p l e l o g

i s t i c a l f a c i l i t i e s c l o s e w i t h i n India sphere ofinfluence China’s 10-year agreement with Djibouti in2015 for thesetting up of a naval replenishment facility in thenorthernObock region is widely seen by Indian experts as proof of the PLANavy’sstrategic ambitions in theIOR

7

oblivious that it was the prime mover of legal proceedingsagainst China Rather than

hold China to account, President RodrigoDuterte appears keen to

play “political footsie” with Beijing.18In

thecircumstances, it appears only the US and, to a

arewillingtoconfrontChinaintheSouthChinaSea

America’s options are to either raise the frequency of

its freedom ofnavigation or conduct more aggressive

footing regional patrols Despitea resumption of FONOPS,

AmericanpolicymakersthatassertiveUSNpatrolsintheSouthChinaS

eawillchangeChinese behaviour Yet, if Beijing crosses the “red-line” by

reclaimingScarborough, it is likely the US Navy will

offer strong pushback.19Washington will be keen to leverage diplomacy in

preventing tensionsfrom rising But it knows Beijing is

unlikely to offer any guarantees thatit willscale backits

aggressionin theSouth ChinaSea

Even so, there are ways in which regional states could

reinforce the recentruling without militarily confronting

China The first is to encourageboth China and the

Philippines to abide by the UN court’s decision.Other

claimants too must discuss ways in which the ruling

theirownpositionvis-à-visthemaritimedisputes.Allpartiesmustdesistfrommilitary

activities and allowtensions to cool

In the meantime, it is better to keep talking – for the

theproblemsintheSCSmightactuallylieinaccelerateddialo

gue.SoutheastAsian states must encourage Chinese officials to negotiate

with otherclaimants in the South China Sea, and also

make progress on a bindingcode of conduct (CoC)

with ASEAN A clear set of guidelines

downifChinaresortstoassertivemoves,suchasconstructionatScarboroughShoal

ForIndia,itisimportanttodisplaysolidaritywithSoutheastAsianstates

islittleconsensusa mong

Americanpolicymak ersthatassertiveUS NpatrolsintheSouth ChinaSeawillchangeC hinese

behaviour.

topressforapeacefulsolutiontothe SCSdisputes.NewDelhimust

8

encourage both China and ASEAN to undertakegreater confidence-building measures and to reducethe risk of an accidental clash It isinnobody’sinteresttoseegreat-

powerconflictovertheSouthChinaSea

NewDelhicanassureChinathatitdoeshavereasonableoptionsavailable to it With or without the UN court’s interventions,resolvingthe impasse in the South China Sea peacefullyand legally would be ineveryone’sinterests

Againstt h i s l a r g e r b a c k d r o p , t h e f o l l o w i n g

c h a p t e r s o f t h i s p r i m e r attempt to evaluate the prospects

SouthChinaSea.Thecontributorsarguethateventhoughthevexednatureofthe dispute has prevented all sides from reaching aworking consensus,the search for diplomatic solutionshasn’t ended Undoubtedly, as JeffSmith points outs,the only way in which the seriously contested issueoffreedom of navigation (FON) in the SCS can beresolved is throughgreater diplomatic dialoguebetween the US and China Yet, asTengJianqunsuggests,therearemanywaysofinterpretingnavigationalfreedoms – each one meant to servespecific political agendas, and shapedby auniquelynationalist historicalperspective

Ristian Supriyanto points to the need for greaterconfidence

buildingmeasuresintheSCS.WhiletheadoptionofanavalCodeforUnplannedEncountersatSea(CUES)asacrisismanagementmechanismcountsasa p o s i t i v e m o v e ,

that regional states remainincreasinglydependentontheUSfortheirsecurity.HaAnhTuanoutlinesVietnam’sprincipalmotivationsinabstainingfrompubliccriticismofChina.Making predictions about the SCS, heargues, is fraught with risk forHanoi because future outcomesare likely to be dependent entirely onevolvingvariables Finally, Satoru Nagao brings out Japan’sneed for aspecial partnership with India in the

Asgreat-powerp o l i t i c s b e c o m e s m o r e i n t e n s e i n t h e S

o u t h C h i n a S e a , he proposes a deeper India-Japan operationalcompact in the regionallittorals

9

Clearly, the old certainties that brought prosperity

and stability to theWestern Pacific for over three

decades are under threat The US-ledsecurity system

undergirding Asia’s maritime strategic order is

beingdismantled.Moredisturbingly,theinstitutionaledificeo

nwhichpoliticalconfidence in the system was built is being decisively

undermined Thisprimer is an attempt to have a reasoned discussion of the

consequencesofcontinuinginstabilityintheSouthChinaSea

Against this backdrop, the following chapters of this

primer attempt toevaluate the prospects for peace

and stability in the South China

Sea.Thecontributorsarguethateventhoughthevexednatur

eofthedisputehaspreventedallsidesfromreachingaworki

ngconsensus,thesearchfordiplomatic solutions has not ended

Undoubtedly, as Jeff Smith pointsouts, the only way in which US

– each one meant to serve specific political agendas,

historicalperspective

Meanwhile,t h e r e g i o n ’ s m i d d l e p o w e r s r e m a

i n c o n c e r n e d o v e r t h e deterioratingse c u r ity dy n a

mic in th e r e gion R ic h ar dH a y da r ia n giv e s an

excellent account of Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s

agementmechanismcounts as a positive move, he notes, the

absence of consensus in resolving thecontroversial uses of

white-hull vessels and ‘maritime militias’ in enforcingmaritime

claims For Koh Swee Lean Collin, the balancing game

in

theSCScanhaveunintendedconsequencesforallsidesseeking

tomaximisegains Even with closer diplomatic and economic links with

China, heavers, doesn’t change the reality that regional

increasinglydependentontheUSfortheirsecurity.HaAnhTuanoutlinesVietnam’sprincipalmotivationsinabstainingfrompubliccriticismofChina.Making predictions about theSCS, he argues, is fraught with riskforHanoi because futureoutcomes are likely to be

onevolving variables.Finally, Satoru Nagaobrings out Japan’s needfor aspecial partnershipwith India in the regional

powerp o l i t i c s b e c o m e

Asgreat-s m o r e i n t e n Asgreat-s e i n t h e S

o u t h C h i n a S e a , heproposes a deeper India-Japanoperational compact in theregionallittorals

Thecontributorsarguethateventhoughthevexednature ofthedisputehasprevented

allsidesfromreachingaworkingconsensus,thesear chfordiplomaticsolutionshasnotended.

10

Clearly, the old certainties that brought prosperityand stability to theWestern Pacific for over threedecades are under threat The US-ledsecurity systemundergirding Asia’s maritime strategic order isbeingdismantled.Moredisturbingly,theinstitutionaledificeonwhichpoliticalconfidence in the system was built is being decisivelyundermined Thisprimer is an attempt to have a reasoned discussion of theconsequencesofcontinuinginstabilityintheSouthChinaSea

1 PositionPaperoftheGovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaonth eMatterofJurisdictionintheSouthChinaSeaArbitrationInitiatedbyth eRepublicofthePhilippines,MinistryofForeignAffairs, Republic of China July

12, 2014http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml

2 Julian Ku,It is Beijing’s fault that China lost big in the South China

Sea ruling,The Quartz,

July17,2016http://qz.com/733012/it-is-beijings-fault-that-china-lost-big-in-the-south-china-sea-ruling/

3 Abhijit Singh,End of Maritime Innocence, The Asia Times Online, July

10, the-china-vs-philippines-arbitration-saga//

2016,http://www.atimes.com/article/end-of-maritime-innocence-4 JayBatongbacal,Arbitration101:Philippinesv.China,AsiaMaritimeTra

nsparencyInitiative,Jan21,2015https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-101-philippines-v-china/

5 Alex Linder,China swiftly rejects Hague Tribunal ruling against its

South China Sea claims,TheShanghaiist, Jul 12,

2016http://shanghaiist.com/2016/07/12/china_rejects_hague_ruling.p hp

6 Philippines to Declare Marine Sanctuary in South China Sea, The

November21,2016http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/world/asia/phi lippines-rodrigo-duterte-scarborough-shoal-china.html?_r=0

Joint exploration in South China Sea legal, The Business Standard,

south-china-sea-legal-philippine-official-117010500978_1.html

http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/joint-exploration-in-7 Mira Rapp-Hooper,Parting the South China Sea,Foreign Affairs, Sept /

9 Chinese warship seizes US underwater drone in international

December16,2016,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/16/c hina-seizes-us-underwater-drone-south-china-sea

10 Amanda Macias,China’s top court issued an ‘ominous’ message

Sea,TheBusinessInsider,August4,2016http://www.businessinsider.in/Chin

as-top-court-issued-an-ominous-message-about-the-South-China-Sea/articleshow/

53532697.cms

11 Jayanth Jacob,India for peaceful means to resolve South China

for-being-neutral-over-south-china-sea-says-ties-developing-smoothly-2245998

14 Hu Weijia,Indiashould focus on preserving good economic

ties with China, rather than onthe South China Sea, The Global

china-like-it-is-about-the-south-china-sea/

OrganisationOnline,http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/telling-16 China Defends Its Submarines In Indian Ocean,NDTV, July 7,

ocean-says-they-are-legitimate-1429068

2017http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-defends-its-submarines-in-indian-17 Jason Miks,Obama: Consequences if China violates rules and

zakaria-interview-miks/

2016http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/04/us/obama-china-response-18 AndrewBrown,RodrigoDuterteThrowsaGrenade in Washington’s

China Strategy, WallStreetJournal,Sept7,2016http://www.wsj.com/

articles/duterte-throws-a-grenade-in-washingtons-china-strategy-1473239479;TheReal Reasons Rodrigo Duterte Flip-FloppedOn

South China Sea, Forbes, January 4, 2017

Disputeshttp://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/0 1/04/the-real-reasons-rodrigo-duterte-flip-flopped-on-south-china- sea-disputes/#2baf2b8b6361

19 Report: China May Cross Obama’s ‘Red Line,’ Reclaim Scarborough

Shoal, Sputnik News, August15, 2016 https://sputniknews.com/asia/20160815/1044267318/china-red-line- scarborough-obama.html

12

hatadifferenceeightyearscanmake.InJanuary2009,theSouthChinaSea(SCS)wasbarelyon the world’s collective radar ‘Land reclamation’ was still an exotic term China

tosubmitits‘NineDashLine’claimtoanininternationalbodyorseizeScarboroughShoalfrom

thePhilippines.TherewerenoChineseaircraftcarriers,noartificialislands,no‘maritimemilitia’,andno‘military alert zones’ in the Spratlys

After 30 years of comparative stability from 1979 to 2009, the SCS began

eightyearsago.Dormantterritorialdisputes intheSpratlyshavebeeninflamedatopanemergingfaultlinein great power competition as a separate, unrelated disputebetween the US and China over Freedom ofNavigation (FON) has migrated to the SCS,and grown progressively intertwined with the sovereigntydisputesthere

Meanwhile, Beijing seems increasingly determined to construct and operatewithin a parallel set of lawsand norms governing FON and maritimeentitlements gradually abandoning its commitment to the UNConventionontheLaw oftheSea (UNCLOS)andcustomaryinternational law

For the US, the most concerning aspect of these developments relates to an

ChinesechallengestoFONintheSCS.Iftheseverityofthosechallengeswasnotclearbefore,inDecember2016theUSwasconfrontedwithablatantprovocationwhenthePeople’sLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)stoleasovereignUSdroneinwatersbeyondevenChina’sso-calledNineDashLine.1

As with the EP-3 incident three months after President George W Bush’sinauguration, the drone thefttwo months before the inauguration of theDonald Trump presidency, set an ominous tone for bilateralrelations.2It alsoconfirmed what has become increasingly evident in recent years: China andthe US—indeed, China and all nations committed to FON, UNCLOS, and arules-based maritime order—have afundamental conflict of interestin theSouthChina Sea.

13

USInterestsintheSouthChinaSea

It is ironic that there remains so much confusion

about Americaninterests in the South China Sea,

given how Washington’s position hasbeen remarkably

consistent for over 20 years In 1995, the US

StateDepartment identified USinterests in theSCS as

• Freedomo f n a v i g a t i o n i s a f u n d a m e n t a l i n

t e r e s t o f t h e U n i t e d States

On the critical questions related to sovereignty over

the disputed rocksand LTEs in the SCS, America

streatyobligationsapplytodisputedfeatures More recently, violent

shifts in the geopolitical dispensation ofregionalpartnershave

furthercomplicated matters

Yet, these considerations pale in comparison to the one

nationalinterestundergrowingthreatintheSCS:Freedomof

NavigationandtheUS commitment to practice and uphold FON

forcivilian and militaryvesselsas defined by customary

international law and UNCLOS

FreedomofNavigation

While the US-China dispute over Freedom of

Navigation is complexand multi-layered, it revolves

WheredoChina’swatersbeginandend,andwhatis

Chinaentitledtodoin the maritime space under its jurisdiction On

both questions, the USposition generally aligns with

UNCLOS and customaryinternationallaw.DespitesigningandratifyingtheConvention,China’spositiondoesnot The US Congress has not ratifiedUNCLOS since it was signed bythen President Bill Clinton in

1994 but has upheld its provisionsonmaritimeentitlementsandjurisdiction

Broadly speaking, UNCLOS grants nations a 12

(nm)territorials e a s t r e t c h i n g o u t f r o m t h e i r c o n

t i n e n t a l s h e l f w h e r e t h e y

14

enjoyexpansivesovereignrights.Beyondthat,nationsaregrantedmorelimitedrightsoverthingslikeresourceexploitationina200nmExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ).Uninhabitablerocksandnaturalislandsalsogetentitlements: a territorial sea for the formerand an additional EEZ forthe latter Features below sea level

at high tide (LTEs) get no sovereignentitlements

The US also upholds UNCLOS provisions on thecreation of maritime‘baselines’.Seized from Vietnam

in 1974, China has drawn straightbaselines aroundthe Paracel Islands, claiming all the maritimespacewithina s ‘ t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s ’ , a r i g h t U

N C L O S g r a n t s e x c l u s i v e l y toarchipelagicstates.AndAmericanpolicyalignswithUNCLOS’unambiguous treatment of artificial islands: namely, an LTE or rockcannot be

‘upgraded’ to a rock or island simply by blanketing itwithsandfromtheocean floor

Artificial islands, installations and structures

do not possess the statusof islands They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presencedoes not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the

exclusiveeconomiczoneorcontinentalshelf.4

Bycontrast,Chinahasclaimedmaritimespaceandentitlementsbeyondthose granted by UNCLOS, with its ill-defined Nine Dash Lineclaimover nearly the entire SCS serving as the mostnotorious, but by nomeans only, example Legalscholars have long viewed the basis forthisnebulousclaim—China’sso-called‘historicrights’—

asinconsistentwithUNCLOS Their skepticism was confirmed by a July

TribunalrulingwhichdeemedtheNineD a s h L i n e i n v

a l i d andinconsistentw iththe Con ve ntion Inasw

e epin g decision,it also

Maritimejurisdictions

TerritorialS

ea

Upto12nauticalmilesfromacountry’sbaseline(low-water coastline)

Sovereignt e r r i t o r y o f t h e s t a t e Foreigncivilianandmilitaryvesselsright toinnocent passage

fi s c a l , i m m i g r a t i o n o r

s a n i t a r y l a w s

HighSeas AllpartsoftheseathatarenotincludedintheEEZ,theterritorialsea,orintheinternalwatersofa state.No exclusiverights.

Source:TheNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration(NOAA)

15

confirmedw h a t m a n y s u s p e c t e d : n o n e o f C h i n a ’

s s e v e n o u t p o s t s i n the Spratlys—indeed, no feature in the

Spratlys—was a ‘natural island’beforelandreclamation

its territorial sea—including ‘innocent passage’—

require priornotification and consent from Beijing

From a legal perspective, international experts and

law scholars haveconvincingly debunked China’s

minority interpretation of UNCLOS,demonstrating

that the Convention does not grant the coastal

stateexpansive powers to regulate foreign military

activity in the EEZ.5Thatis why China has increasingly downplayed

UNCLOS in defending itsposition, arguing that its domestic

thesemattersorthattheyarebeyondthescopeoftheConve

ntion

Fromapracticalstandpoint,EEZsaccountforsome102milli

onsquarekilometersoftheroughly335millionsquarekilometers

ofoceansurface.Under China’s interpretation, the US and other foreign

militaries couldbe barred from operating in nearly

one-third of the world’s oceans, anoutcome unacceptable

to Washington and one never envisioned by

thedrafters of UNCLOS

FONwithChineseCharacteristics

At first glance, FON is a peculiar issue to quarrel

over: every nation,including China, is a vocal

proponent “There has never been any problemwith the

freedom of navigation and overflight; nor will there ever

beany in the future, for China needs unimpeded

commerce through thesewaters more than anyone else,” Chinese

President Xi Jinping explainedin 2015.6

Chinese officials are less eager to publicly discuss how

Beijing’s definitionof FON extends only to commercial

vessels and not military ones.Beijing has traditionally

avoided articulating this directly but Chineseofficials

have grown less coy in recent years In August 2015,

ChineseAmbassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua

bluntly stated: “No freedomof navigation for warships

and planes.”7Two monthslater, an article inthe

”8

opposition to military FONhas been evident forsometime.WhileseveralcapitalsshareBeijing’spositionthatforeignwarshipsmustreceivepriornotificationandconsenttooperateintheirEEZor

16

peacefullytransittheirterritorialsea,theiroppositionhasbeenlimitedtodiplomaticprotests.China,bycontrast,hasoperationallychallengedtheUSNavywarshipsandaircraftoveronedozen‘unsafeencounters’sincetheturn of the century

Until recently, this cat-and-mouse game largelyunfolded off China’s mainland coast and HainanIsland In 2014, however, China begananunprecedentedspreeoflandreclamationandartificialislandconstructionatopsevenrocksandLTEsunderitsadministrationintheSpratlys

These actions raised fears China would a) seek to claim

andEEZsforitsartificialislandsbeyondwhat’spermittedunderUNCLOS,and b) seek to illegally restrict US military FON around theoutposts.Those fears were confirmed in May 2015 when

a CNN crew aboard aUS surveillance aircraftoperating in international waters near China’sSpratlyoutposts captured a Chinese radio operator warningthe aircrafttoleave China’s‘military alertzone’

GiventhatChinahadnosovereignj u r i s d i c t i o n o v e

r t h a t a i r s p a c e , and since a ‘military alert zone’ has no basis inUNCLOS, the Obamaadministration came under a wave ofpressure to conduct Freedom ofNavigationOperations (FONOPs) around China’s artificialislands tochallenge Beijing’s illegal action

FONOPsandDoubleStandards

Since the late 1970s, the US Departments of Stateand Defense havebeen jointly operating a The USFreedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPs) program

is designed to challenge excessive maritime claimsbyany state, partner and adversary alike Between 12 and 28 times ayear,

US military vessels fly and sail in ways that affirmAmerica’s non-adherence to unlawful claims.Between October 2015 and October2016, the Obama

publicly-acknowledgedFONOPsintheSCS.ThefirstthreeweredesignedtochallengeChina’sopposition to ‘innocent passage’ through its

foreignwarships.TwoofthoseoperationswereconductednearChina’soutpostsin the Spratlys, bookending one near Triton Island

in the Paracels Thefourth, launched near Woody Island, wasdesigned to challenge China’screation of illegal baselines around

the Paracels in 1996, when it illegally“encompasses [ed] the entire group ofParacel Islands within a ring ofsovereignwaters.”9

Beijing has been highly critical of both ‘close-in’surveillance operationsand FONOPs in the past and the most

nodifferent.Theyhave“gonebeyondthescopeoffreedomofnavigation.ItisapoliticalprovocationandthepurposeistotestChina’sresponse,”10

17

arguedC h i n a ’ s f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y “ R e c o n n a i s s a n c e c o n d u c t e d b y t h eU.S military aircraft poses a potential threat to the

security of China’smaritime features, and is highly

likely to cause miscalculation, or evenuntoward

maritime andaerial incidents.”11

A December 2016 report by the National Institute for

SeaStudies(NISCSS)arguesthatFONPOSaredesignedto“

assertnavalandaerial supremacy across the global, protect [America’s]

global interestsand maintain its global hegemony.”

Perhaps most comically, Beijingclaimsthe innocent

passage of US Navy vesselshas “jeopardized

nofitslongstandingexercise of navigational freedoms

as a ‘provocation’ deserving of abelligerent response

Second, FONOPs are the opposite of ‘biased

anddiscriminatory’,conductedagainstnoshortageofUSpa

rtners,includingIndiaandTaiwan,andUStreatyalliesliketheP

hilippines.TheUSdoes,for obvious reasons, conduct more surveillance

operations near Chinathan other regional states but these

FONOPsand,critically,compliantwithUNCLOSandinte

rnationallaw

Finally,C h i n e s e o ff i c i a l s h a v e r e p e a t e d l y a c c u s

e d t h e U S o f a p p l y i n g a double standard, insisting Washington

would not accept the PLANoperating in America’s EEZ.This

claim rings particularly hollow Notonly has the

Chinese military been operating in Japan’s EEZ for

years,but in 2013 PLA Navy warships began doing so

in America’s EEZ Atthe Shangri La Dialogue in

Singapore that year, a “Chinese participantconfirmed

that the PLA Navy had conducted unspecified

activities inAmerica’s EEZ around Guam and Hawaii,

perceivedinBeijingasillegalorhypocritical.”13WhenAdm

SamuelLocklear,thenheadofUSPacificCommand,wasask

edwhetheritwastruethePLANhad begun such operations, he replied:

“They are, and we encourage theirability to do that.” Washington

responded in similar fashion when fiveChinese warships

transited America’s territorial sea off Alaska in

October2015 “This was a legal transit of U.S territorial

inaccordancewith[UNCLOS],”thePentagoncalmlyexplaine

d.14America,inthiscase,haspracticedwhatit’s

preached

AFlagrantProvocation

On 15 December 2016,the US-China FON

itmaneuveredtoretrievean‘oceanglider’UnmannedUnderwaterVehicle(UUV)gatheringhydrographicdata.B

eforetheBowditchcouldr

ecover