O O Subjectiviy and Selhood Dan Zahavi Investigating the First-Person Perspective O O O O Subjectivi y and Sel hood Zahavi What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct — or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of con- sciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research. Philosophical phenomenology — as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others — not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need— given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity—for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of centr al impor- tance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstr ate its vitality and contempor ary relevance. Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copen- hagen and the author of Self-Awareness and Alterity in Husserl’s Phenomenology . A Bradford Book Photo b y Scanpix/ Morten Juhl “Zahavi delivers a critical phenomenological account of the subjectivity of experience that shows how phenomenology is not just a description but an analysis that can contribute to explanations of consciousness, self, and intersubjectivity. Staying deftly on target, Zahavi challenges higher-order representational theory and standard theory-of-mind approaches to social cognition. He pushes the phenomenological envelope and engages in an original way with traditional analytic philosophy of mind and more recent lines of thought that are drawn from the cognitive sciences. To the list of classic phe- nomenologists from whom Zahavi draws we need to add one more: Zahavi himself.” Shaun Gallagher, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida “Zahavi’s book is a valuable contribution to the current interdisciplinary discussion of consciousness. In simple and direct language, he gives us a full phenomenological investigation of subjectivity and selfhood.” David Carr, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Philosophy, Emory University “In this very timely book, Dan Zahavi offers a wealth of illuminating discussions centered on an integrated investigation of self, self-awareness, and experience that take the first-personal or subjective dimensions of consciousness seriously. Expertly rooted in philosophical phenomenology of both the Austro-German and French traditions, but also engaging in a critical dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind and developmental psychology and psychiatry, he masterfully develops his case by raising precise questions and painstakingly evaluating argumentative lines to possible answers.” Eduard Marbach, Professor of Phenomenology and of Philosophy of Mind, University of Bern, Switzerland “This work takes a huge step forward in bringing phenomenological philosophy to bear on contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It is a work of major importance that no one thinking about the philosophy and science of consciousness can afford to neglect.” Evan Thompson, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto “This book is a masterful demonstration that in order to understand the nature of selfhood, it is necessary to distinguish various levels of self-awareness as well as to consider how these levels become articulated, starting with the direct, embodied experience of being alive in the world. With great scholarship and clarity, Zahavi brings back the central importance of the first-person perspective.” Philippe Rochat, Professor of Psychology, Emory University philosophy of mind The MIT Press • Massachusetts Institute of Technology • Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142 • http://mitpress.mit.edu 0-262-24050-5 ,!7IA2G2-ceafaf!:t;K;k;K;k Subjectiviy and Selhood Investigating the First-Person Perspective Dan Zahavi 4745zahavi 12/29/05 9:13 AM Page 1 Subjectivity and Selfhood [...]... self-alienation They involve the adoption of the perspective of the other on oneself The chapter concludes by discussing the tenability of the customary distinction between two types of phenomenology, a reflective and a hermeneutical Chapter 5 After the detailed analyses in chapters 2–4, the central fifth chapter of the book will contain an extensive discussion of subjectivity and selfhood The chapter will... “world” reciprocally illuminate one another and can be fully understood only in their interconnection Chapter 7 The concluding seventh chapter will address the problem of selfhood and self-awareness by discussing the validity of the theory-theory of mind, that is, the validity of the claim that the experience of minded beings (be it oneself or others) requires a theory of mind This claim has found wide... self-awareness and self-understanding lead to a focused discussion of the relation between the experience of self and the experience of others in the final two chapters of the book Chapter 6 The sixth chapter will provide a systematic outline of the different phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity (Scheler, Heidegger, MerleauPonty, Husserl, and Sartre), thereby allowing for a more nuanced perspective. .. more nuanced perspective on the link between selfhood and otherness The point of departure will be Scheler’s criticism of the argument from analogy It will quickly become clear that a proper understanding of our experience of others must entail a proper understanding of the relation between experience and expressive behavior Our understanding of how we come to experience others as minded bodies must... stressing the socially and linguistically constructed character of the self; the experiential approach, primarily defended by Husserl and Henry, insists that an investigation of the self must necessarily involve the first-person perspective and ultimately conceives of the self as the invariant dimension of first-personal givenness within the multitude of changing experiences After considering some of the limitations... contribution to the understanding of first-person reference and perspective Just like Castañeda, Perry, Nagel, Cassam, and others in the analytic tradition, the phenomenologists argue that the types of self-reference available from a first-person perspective and those available from a third-person perspective are different They have typically claimed that first-personal self-reference owes its uniqueness to the fact... issues and provide analyses that are crucial for an understanding of the true complexity of consciousness and which are nevertheless frequently absent from the current debate, but it can also offer a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity that might be of considerably more value than some of the models currently in vogue in cognitive science By ignoring the tradition and the resources therein,... evaluate the merits of the “no-self” doctrine, that is, the claim that the self is nothing but a fiction Such an investigation may also help clarify the perennial question concerning the relation between self and other To what extent does selfhood involve interpersonal relations? Is the self necessarily embodied and embedded in a physical, social, and historical environment? Some have argued that the constitution... classical and contemporary arguments in favor of a non-egological theory of consciousness and will then turn to a detailed analysis of two different notions of self: (1) the self as a narrative construction and (2) the self as an experiential dimension The narrative approach, advocated by Ricoeur, MacIntyre, and Dennett, among others, conceives of the self as the product of a narratively structured life, thereby... disciplines, not the least in the study of autism Is it true, however, that self-awareness and intersubjectivity the experience of self and of others—are theoretical, inferential, and quasi-scientific in nature? Is it true that mental states are unobservable and are theoretically postulated explanatory devices introduced in order to help us predict and explain behavioral data? Drawing on insights and results . the First-Person Perspective Dan Zahavi 4745zahavi 12/29/05 9:13 AM Page 1 Subjectivity and Selfhood