handbook of positive psychology mar 2005

Contributors GLENN AFFLECK, Professor, Department of Psychiatry, University of Connecticut Health Center NADIA AHMAD,Doctoral Student, Social Psychology Program, Department of Psy-cholog

Handbook of Positive

Psychology

C R Snyder Shane J Lopez,

Editors

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan

Copyright
2002 by Oxford University Press

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.

198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Handbook of positive psychology / edited by C R Snyder and Shane J Lopez.

p cm.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

ISBN 0–19–513533–4

1 Psychology 2 Health 3 Happiness 4 Optimism.

I Snyder, C R II Lopez, Shane J.

BF121 6.H212 2002 150.19'8—dc21 2001021584

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America

on acid-free paper

It gives me great joy to know that so many

sci-entists—many of whom have contributed to

this landmark volume—are striving to inspire

people to develop a more wholesome focus on

the positive aspects of life I am convinced that

one day these scientists will be recognized as

visionary leaders, whose research helped to

identify, elevate, and celebrate the creative

po-tential of the human spirit

Until recently, I had rarely heard about

sci-entific research that examined the

life-enhancing power of “spiritual

principles”—pos-itive character traits and virtues such as love,

hope, gratitude, forgiveness, joy,

future-mindedness, humility, courage, and noble

pur-pose Perhaps my long-standing interest in

these spiritual principles and character traits is

best understood by sharing with you the

fol-lowing perspective My grandfather was a

phy-sician during the Civil War, and several of my

own children are physicians today I think we

would all agree that my children, because of the

enormous number of dollars earmarked for

medical research during this past century, know

a hundred times—perhaps a thousand times—

more about the human body than my

grand-father ever did But I have always wondered:

Why is it that we know so little about the

hu-man spirit?

The research highlighted in this volume

pro-vides overwhelming evidence that many

tal-ented scholars and award-winning researchers

are reclaiming what was once at the core of their

discipline: the psyche, the study and

under-standing of the power of the human spirit to

benefit from life’s challenges The men and

women who have written chapters for thishandbook, as well as countless more inspired bytheir research, are courageously gathering dataand testing hypotheses to help us learn moreabout an essential question that perhaps serves

as the North Star for a positive psychology:What enables us to override our biological in-clinations to be selfish and instead find meaning,purpose, and value in nurturing and upholdingthe positive qualities of our human nature?

In fact, I am more optimistic than ever thatone day soon a group of scientists will publishfindings that will advance humankind’s under-standing of a spiritual principle that has been at

the core of my own life’s purpose: agape love.

One of my favorite sayings is, “Love hoardeddwindles, but love given grows.” Love is morepowerful than money; unlike money, the morelove we give away, the more we have left Per-haps, dear reader, you will be the researcher whostudies a spiritual principle such as agape lovescientifically or empirically Wouldn’t all of hu-mankind benefit from knowing more about thisfundamental “law of life,” and many others?Finally, I am hopeful that as current and fu-ture researchers catch the vision of a positivepsychology, and as foundations and govern-ments initiate programs to support this ground-breaking and beneficial work, we will all forgeahead in a spirit of humility We know so little,

my friends, about the many gifts that God hasgiven to each and every human being As thetruly wise tell us, “How little we know, howeager to learn.”

Radnor, Pennsylvania Sir John Templeton

How often does one have the opportunity to

edit the first handbook for a new approach to

psychology? We had a “once-in-a-lifetime”

scholarly adventure in preparing this Handbook

of Positive Psychology There was never a

ques-tion in our minds about editing this volume

We were at the right place at the right time,

and the book simply had to happen

Fortunately, our superb editors at Oxford

University Press, Joan Bossert and Catharine

Carlin, shared our enthusiasm about the

neces-sity of this volume, and they made this huge

editorial undertaking seamless in its unfolding

The authors we invited to write chapters readily

agreed Much to our delight, this handbook

al-most took on a life of its own We attribute this

to the vitality of the authors, along with the

power of their positive psychology ideas and

science

We complemented each other as an editorial

team Snyder was a stickler for detail and yet

sought ingenuity in thought and expression

Lopez saw linkages in ideas, would call upon the

related literatures, and brought unbridled

en-thusiasm to the editorial process What this

combination produced was a line-by-line

anal-ysis and feedback in every chapter In short, we

were “hands-on” editors Given the stature

of the contributing scholars, with numerous

awards, distinguished professorships, and

honorary degrees, they certainly could have

balked at such editorial scrutiny But they did

not Instead, they used our feedback and revised

their already superb first drafts into stellar

subsequent chapters We are indebted to this

remarkable group of authors for their patience

in this process Their dedication to lence can be seen in the chapters of this hand-book

excel-In order to help readers in gaining a sense ofthe topics contained in each chapter, we haveasked our expert authors to identify sources thatprovide excellent overviews of their areas.Therefore, in the reference section of each chap-ter, the authors have placed an asterisk in front

of such key readings We encourage our readers

to use these background sources when more tailed descriptions of a topic are desired.Now, before you peruse the contributions ofthe outstanding scholars, consider the following Imagine a planet where the inhabitants areself-absorbed, hopeless, and filled with psycho-logical problems and weaknesses Confusion,anxiety, fear, and hostility race through theirminds These creatures “communicate” witheach other by lying, faking, torturing, fighting,and killing They hurt each other, and they hurtthemselves Of course, this imaginary planet isnot far away—we call it Earth Although theseproblems do exist, they are made to loom evenlarger because of the propensities of psychologyand its sister disciplines to focus on the weak-nesses in humankind Now let us imagine an-other planet where the inhabitants are caring,hopeful, and boundless in their psychologicalstrengths Their thoughts and feelings are clear,focused, and tranquil These creatures commu-nicate by spending time talking and listening toeach other They are kind to each other and tothemselves Again, this imaginary, not-so-far-

de-away planet is Earth These positive descriptions

aptly fit many of the people on Earth In this

regard, hardly anyone (including some cynics)

quibbles with this latter conclusion But no

sci-ence, including psychology, looks seriously at

this positive side of people It is this latter

trou-bling void that positive psychology addresses

As such, this handbook provides an initial

sci-entific overview of the positive in humankind

As with any new and promising paradigm, the

reactions of people such as you will determine

the fate of positive psychology Although ence certainly advances on the merits of partic-ular ideas and facts, it also is true that the suc-cess of a new theory rests, in part, upon itsability to gather supporters On this point, thishandbook may enable you to cast a more in-formed vote as to the enduring viability of pos-itive psychology

sci-Lawrence, Kansas C R Snyder

Shane J Lopez

Contributors, xv

PART I INTRODUCTORY AND HISTORICAL

OVERVIEW

1 Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention,

and Positive Therapy, 3

martin e p seligman

PART II IDENTIFYING STRENGTHS

2 Stopping the “Madness”: Positive

Psychology and the Deconstruction of the

Illness Ideology and the DSM, 13

james e maddux

3 Widening the Diagnostic Focus: A Case

for Including Human Strengths and

Environmental Resources, 26

beatrice a wright

shane j lopez

4 Toward a Science of Mental Health:

Positive Directions in Diagnosis and

Interventions, 45

corey l m keyes

shane j lopez

PART III EMOTION-FOCUSED APPROACHES

5 Subjective Well-Being: The Science ofHappiness and Life Satisfaction, 63

ed dienerrichard e lucasshigehiro oishi

6 Resilience in Development, 74

ann s mastenmarie-gabrielle j reed

7 The Concept of Flow, 89

jeanne nakamuramihaly csikszentmihalyi

8 Positive Affectivity: The Disposition toExperience Pleasurable EmotionalStates, 106

jennifer l austenfeld

12 The Positive Psychology of Emotional

Intelligence, 159

peter salovey

john d mayer

david caruso

13 Emotional Creativity: Toward

“Spiritualizing the Passions”, 172

james r averill

PART IV COGNITIVE-FOCUSED APPROACHES

14 Creativity, 189

dean keith simonton

15 The Role of Personal Control in Adaptive

doug-gwi lee

22 Setting Goals for Life and

paul b baltesjudith glu¨ ckute kunzmann

PART V SELF-BASED APPROACHES

june price tangney

PART VI INTERPERSONAL APPROACHES

30 Relationship Connection: The Role ofMinding in the Enhancement ofCloseness, 423

john h harveybrian g pauwelssusan zickmund

31 Compassion, 434

eric j cassell

32 The Psychology of Forgiveness, 446

michael e mcculloughcharlotte vanoyen witvliet

33 Gratitude and the Science of PositivePsychology, 459

robert a emmonscharles m shelton

lisa m pytlik zillig

38 A Role for Neuropsychology in

Understanding the Facilitating Influence of

Positive Affect on Social Behavior and

Cognitive Processes, 528

alice m isen

39 From Social Structure to Biology:

Integrative Science in Pursuit of Human

Health and Well-Being, 541

laura cousino klein

PART VIII SPECIFIC COPING APPROACHES

41 Sharing One’s Story: On the Benefits of

Writing or Talking About Emotional

45 Humor, 619

herbert m lefcourt

46 Meditation and Positive Psychology, 632

shauna l shapirogary e r schwartzcraig santerre

47 Spirituality: Discovering and Conservingthe Sacred, 646

kenneth i pargamentannette mahoney

PART IX SPECIAL POPULATIONS AND SETTINGS

48 Positive Psychology for Children:

Development, Prevention, andPromotion, 663

michael c robertskeri j brownrebecca j johnsonjanette reinke

49 Aging Well: Outlook for the 21stCentury, 676

gail m williamson

50 Positive Growth Following AcquiredPhysical Disability, 687

timothy r elliottmonica kurylopatricia rivera

51 Putting Positive Psychology in aMulticultural Context, 700

shane j lopezellie c prosserlisa m edwardsjeana l magyar-moejason e neufeldheather n rasmussen

52 Positive Psychology at Work, 715

with contributions from Lisa Aspinwall

Barbara L Fredrickson Jon Haidt

Dacher Keltner Christine Robitschek Michael Wehmeyer Amy Wrzesniewski

Author Index, 769

Subject Index, 793

Contributors

GLENN AFFLECK, Professor, Department of

Psychiatry, University of Connecticut

Health Center

NADIA AHMAD,Doctoral Student, Social

Psychology Program, Department of

Psy-chology, University of Kansas

LISA ASPINWALL,Associate Professor,

De-partment of Psychology, University of Utah

JENNIFER L AUSTENFELD,Doctoral Student,

Clinical Psychology Program, Department of

Psychology, University of Kansas

JAMES R AVERILL,Professor, Department of

Psychology, University of Massachusetts,

Amherst

PAUL B BALTES,Director, Center for

Life-span Psychology, Max Planck Institute for

Human Development, Berlin, Germany

JULIAN BARLING,Associate Dean, Research

and Graduate Programs, School of Business,

Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario,

Canada

C DANIEL BATSON,Professor, Social

Psy-chology Program, Department of

Psychol-ogy, University of Kansas

ROY F BAUMEISTER,Elsie B Smith Chair

in Liberal Arts, and Professor, Department

of Psychology, Case Western Reserve

Uni-versity

KERI G BROWN,Doctoral Student, Clinical

Child Psychology, Departments of

Psychol-ogy and Human Development and FamilyLife, University of Kansas

DAVID CARUSO,President, Work-Life gies, New Canaan, Connecticut

Strate-CHARLES S CARVER,Professor, Department

of Psychology, University of Miami

ERIC J CASSELL,Clinical Professor of PublicHealth, Weill Medical College of CornellUniversity

MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,C S and C J.Davidson Professor of Psychology, PeterDrucker School of Management, ClaremontGraduate University

CHRISTOPHER G DAVIS,Associate sor, Department of Psychology, St FrancisXavier University

Profes-SALLY S DICKERSON,Master’s Student, partment of Psychology, University of Cali-fornia, Los Angeles

De-ED DIENER,Distinguished Professor, ment of Psychology, University of Illinois

Depart-at Champaign-Urbana

RICHARD A DIENSTBIER,Professor, ment of Psychology, University of Ne-braska, Lincoln

Depart-LISA M EDWARDS,Doctoral Student, seling Psychology Program, Department ofPsychology and Research in Education, Uni-versity of Kansas

Coun-TIMOTHY R ELLIOTT,Associate Professor

and Psychologist, Department of Physical

Medicine and Rehabilitation, University of

Alabama–Birmingham Medical School

ROBERT A EMMONS,Professor, Department

of Psychology, University of California,

Da-vis

BARBARA L FREDRICKSON,Associate

Pro-fessor, Department of Psychology,

Univer-sity of Michigan

JUDITH GLECK,Max Planck Institute for

Hu-man Development, Berlin, GerHu-many

MICHAEL C GOTTLIEB,Private Practice,

Dallas, Texas

JON HAIDT,Assistant Professor, Department

of Psychology, University of Virginia,

Char-lottesville

MITCHELL M HANDELSMAN,Professor of

Psychology and Colorado University

Presi-dent’s Teaching Scholar, Department of

Psychology, University of Colorado

SUSAN HARTER,Professor, Department of

Psychology, University of Denver

JOHN H HARVEY,Professor, Department of

Psychology, University of Iowa

CLYDE HENDRICK,Paul Whitfield Horn

Pro-fessor of Psychology, Department of

Psy-chology, Texas Tech University

SUSAN HENDRICK,Associate Dean, College

of Arts and Sciences, and Professor,

Depart-ment of Psychology, Texas Tech University

P PAUL HEPPNER,Professor, Department of

Educational and Counseling Psychology,

University of Missouri–Columbia

JOHN P HEWITT,Professor, Department of

Sociology, University of Massachusetts,

Amherst

RAYMOND L.HIGGINS,Professor, Clinical

Psychology Program, Department of

Psy-chology, University of Kansas

ALICE M ISEN,Samuel Curtis Johnson

Pro-fessor of Marketing and ProPro-fessor of

Behav-ioral Science, Johnson Graduate School of

Management and Department of

Psychol-ogy, Cornell University

REBECCA J JOHNSON,Doctoral Student,

Clinical Child Psychology, Departments of

Psychology and Human Development andFamily Life, University of Kansas

DACHER KELTNER,Associate Professor, partment of Psychology, University of Cali-fornia, Berkeley

De-COREY L M KEYES,Assistant Professor,Department of Sociology and the RollinsSchool of Public Health, Emory University

LAURA COUSINO KLEIN,Department ofBiobehavioral Health, Pennsylvania StateUniversity

SAMUEL KNAPP,Director of Professional fairs, Pennsylvania Psychological Associa-tion

Af-UTE KUNZMANN,Max Planck Institute forHuman Development, Berlin, Germany

MONICA KURYLO,Rehabilitation gist, Department of Physical Medicine andRehabilitation, University of Alabama–Birmingham Medical School

Psycholo-ELLEN LANGER,Professor, Department ofPsychology, Harvard University

DOUG-GWI LEE,Doctoral Student, ing Psychology Program, Department of Ed-ucational and Counseling Psychology, Uni-versity of Missouri–Columbia

Counsel-HERBERT M LEFCOURT,Distinguished fessor Emeritus, Department of Psychology,University of Waterloo

Pro-DAVID A LISHNER,Doctoral Student, SocialPsychology Program, Department of Psy-chology, University of Kansas

EDWIN A LOCKE,Dean’s Professor Emeritus

of Leadership and Motivation, R H SmithSchool of Business, University of Maryland,College Park

SHANE J LOPEZ,Assistant Professor, seling Psychology Program, Department ofPsychology and Research in Education, Uni-versity of Kansas

Coun-RICHARD E LUCAS,Assistant Professor, partment of Psychology, Michigan StateUniversity

De-MICHAEL LYNN,Professor, School of HotelAdministration, Cornell University

JAMES E MADDUX,Professor and AssociateChair for Graduate Studies, Department ofPsychology, George Mason University

JEANA L MAGYAR-MOE,Doctoral Student,

Counseling Psychology Program,

Depart-ment of Psychology and Research in

Educa-tion, University of Kansas

ANNETTE MAHONEY,Associate Professor,

Department of Psychology, Bowling Green

State University

MICHAEL J MAHONEY,Professor, Clinical

Psychology Program, Department of

Psy-chology, University of North Texas

ANN S MASTEN,Director, Institute of Child

Development, and Emma M Birkmaier

Pro-fessor in Educational Leadership, University

of Minnesota

JOHN D MAYER,Professor of Psychology,

Department of Psychology, University of

New Hampshire

MICHAEL E MCCULLOUGH,Associate

Pro-fessor, Department of Psychology, Southern

Methodist University

JEANNE NAKAMURA,Research Director,

Quality of Life Research Center, Claremont

Graduate University

JASON E.NEUFELD,Doctoral Student,

Coun-seling Psychology Program, Department of

Psychology and Research in Education,

Uni-versity of Kansas

KATE G NIEDERHOFFER,Doctoral Student,

Social Psychology Program, Department of

Psychology, University of Texas

SUSAN NOLEN-HOEKSEMA,Professor,

De-partment of Psychology, University of

Michigan

SHIGEHIRO OISHI,Assistant Professor,

De-partment of Psychology, University of

Min-nesota

KENNETH I PARGAMENT,Professor,

De-partment of Psychology, Bowling Green

State University

ANITA PARSA,Doctoral Student, Clinical

Psychology Program, Department of

Psy-chology, University of Kansas

BRIAN G PAUWELS,Doctoral Student,

Per-sonality and Social Psychology, Department

of Psychology, University of Iowa

BRETT W PELHAM,Associate Professor,

De-partment of Psychology, State University of

New York at Buffalo

JAMES W PENNEBAKER,Professor, ment of Psychology, University of Texas

Depart-CHRISTOPHER PETERSON,Professor of chology and Arthur F Thurnau Professor,Clinical Psychology Program, University ofMichigan

Psy-ELLIE C PROSSER,Doctoral Student, seling Psychology Program, Department ofPsychology and Research in Education, Uni-versity of Kansas

Coun-KEVIN L RAND,Doctoral Student, ClinicalPsychology Program, Department of Psy-chology, University of Kansas

HEATHER N RASMUSSEN,Doctoral Student,Counseling Psychology Program, Depart-ment of Psychology and Research in Educa-tion, University of Kansas

MARIE-GABRIELLE J REED,Research tant, Institute of Child Development, Uni-versity of Minnesota

Assis-JANNETTE REINKE,Doctoral Student, ClinicalChild Psychology, Departments of Psychol-ogy and Human Development and FamilyLife, University of Kansas

PATRICIA RIVERA,Postdoctoral Fellow, partment of Physical Medicine and Rehabili-tation, University of Alabama–BirminghamMedical School

De-MICHAEL C ROBERTS,Professor and tor, Clinical Child Psychology Program,University of Kansas

Direc-CHRISTINE ROBITSCHEK,Associate sor, Counseling Psychology Program, De-partment of Psychology, Texas Tech Uni-versity

Profes-CAROL D RYFF,Director, Institute on Agingand Professor of Psychology, Department ofPsychology, University of Wisconsin, Madi-son

PETER SALOVEY,Professor of Psychologyand of Epidemiology and Public Health, De-partment of Psychology, Yale University

CRAIG SANTERRE,Doctoral Student, ClinicalPsychology Program, Department of Psy-chology, University of Arizona

MICHAEL F SCHEIER,Professor, Department

of Psychology, Carnegie-Mellon University

MICHAEL SCHULMAN,Clinical Department,

Leake and Watts Services, Bronx, New York

GARY E R SCHWARTZ,Professor of

Psy-chology, Neurology, Psychiatry, and

Medi-cine, Director, Human Energy Systems Lab,

Department of Psychology, University of

Arizona

MARTIN E.P.SELIGMAN,Fox Leadership

Professor of Psychology, Department of

Psychology, University of Pennsylvania

SHAUNA L SHAPIRO,Doctoral Student,

Clinical Psychology Program, Department of

Psychology, University of Arizona

CHARLES M SHELTON,Professor of

Psy-chology, Department of PsyPsy-chology, Regis

University

DAVID R.SIGMON,Doctoral Student,

Clini-cal Psychology Program, Department of

Psychology, University of Kansas

DEAN KEITH SIMONTON,Professor,

Depart-ment of Psychology, University of

Califor-nia, Davis

BURTON SINGER,Professor of Demography

and Public Affairs and the Charles and

Ma-rie Robertson Professor of Public and

Inter-national Affairs, Office of Population

Re-search, Princeton University

C R.SNYDER,M Erik Wright Distinguished

Professor of Clinical Psychology,

Depart-ment of Psychology, University of Kansas

ANNETTE L.STANTON,Professor, Clinical

Psychology Program, Department of

Psy-chology, University of Kansas

TRACY A STEEN,Doctoral Student, Clinical

Psychology Program, Department of

Psy-chology, University of Michigan

WILLIAM B SWANN,William Howard

Beas-ley Professor, Department of Psychology,

University of Texas

JUNE PRICE TANGNEY,Professor,

Depart-ment of Psychology, James Madison

Uni-versity

SHELLEY E TAYLOR,Professor, Department

of Psychology, University of California, Los

SUZANNE C THOMPSON,Professor, ment of Psychology, Pomona College

Depart-JO-ANN TSANG,Postdoctoral Fellow, ment of Psychology, Southern MethodistUniversity

Depart-NICK TURNER,Doctoral Student, Institute ofWork Psychology, The University of Shef-field

KATHLEEN D VOHS,Postdoctoral Fellow,Department of Psychology, Case WesternReserve University

DAVID WATSON,Professor, Department ofPsychology, University of Iowa

MICHAEL WEHMEYER,Courtesy AssociateProfessor, Special Education Department,University of Kansas

GAIL M WILLIAMSON,Professor and Chair,Life-Span Developmental Psychology, De-partment of Psychology, University ofGeorgia

CHARLOTTE VANOYEN WITVLIET,AssociateProfessor, Department of Psychology, HopeCollege

BEATRICE A WRIGHT,Professor Emerita,University of Kansas

AMY WRZESNIEWSKI,Assistant Professor,Department of Management and Organiza-tional Behavior, New York University

ANTHEA ZACHARATOS,Doctoral Student,School of Business, Queen’s University,Kingston, Ontario, Canada

SUSAN ZICKMUND,Assistant Professor, partment of Internal Medicine, University

De-of Iowa College De-of Medicine

LISA M PYTLIK ZILLIG,Doctoral Student,Clinical Psychology Program, Department ofPsychology, University of Nebraska

Introductory and Historical Overview

1

Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention,

and Positive Therapy

Martin E P Seligman

Positive Psychology

Psychology after World War II became a science

largely devoted to healing It concentrated on

repairing damage using a disease model of

hu-man functioning This almost exclusive

atten-tion to pathology neglected the idea of a fulfilled

individual and a thriving community, and it

ne-glected the possibility that building strength is

the most potent weapon in the arsenal of

ther-apy The aim of positive psychology is to

cata-lyze a change in psychology from a

preoccu-pation only with repairing the worst things in

life to also building the best qualities in life To

redress the previous imbalance, we must bring

the building of strength to the forefront in the

treatment and prevention of mental illness

The field of positive psychology at the

sub-jective level is about positive subsub-jective

ex-perience: well-being and satisfaction (past);

flow, joy, the sensual pleasures, and happiness

(present); and constructive cognitions about the

future—optimism, hope, and faith At the

in-dividual level it is about positive personal

traits—the capacity for love and vocation,

cour-age, interpersonal skill, aesthetic sensibility,

perseverance, forgiveness, originality,

future-mindedness, high talent, and wisdom At thegroup level it is about the civic virtues and theinstitutions that move individuals toward bettercitizenship: responsibility, nurturance, altruism,civility, moderation, tolerance, and work ethic(Gillham & Seligman, 1999; Seligman & Csik-szentmihalyi, 2000)

The notion of a positive psychology ment began at a moment in time a few monthsafter I had been elected president of the Amer-ican Psychological Association It took place in

move-my garden while I was weeding with move-my year-old daughter, Nikki I have to confess thateven though I write books about children, I’mreally not all that good with them I am goal-oriented and time-urgent, and when I am weed-ing in the garden, I am actually trying to getthe weeding done Nikki, however, was throw-ing weeds into the air and dancing around Iyelled at her She walked away, came back, andsaid, “Daddy, I want to talk to you.”

done And if I can stop whining, you can stop

being such a grouch.”

This was for me an epiphany, nothing less I

learned something about Nikki, something

about raising kids, something about myself, and

a great deal about my profession First, I

real-ized that raising Nikki was not about correcting

whining Nikki did that herself Rather, I

real-ized that raising Nikki was about taking this

marvelous skill—I call it “seeing into the

soul”—and amplifying it, nurturing it, helping

her to lead her life around it to buffer against

her weaknesses and the storms of life Raising

children, I realized, is more than fixing what is

wrong with them It is about identifying and

nurturing their strongest qualities, what they

own and are best at, and helping them find

niches in which they can best live out these

pos-itive qualities

As for my own life, Nikki hit the nail right

on the head I was a grouch I had spent 50

years mostly enduring wet weather in my soul,

and the last 10 years being a nimbus cloud in a

household of sunshine Any good fortune I had

was probably not due to my grouchiness but in

spite of it In that moment, I resolved to change

But the broadest implication of Nikki’s lesson

was about the science and practice of

psychol-ogy Before World War II, psychology had

three distinct missions: curing mental illness,

making the lives of all people more productive

and fulfilling, and identifying and nurturing

high talent Right after the war, two events—

both economic—changed the face of

psychol-ogy In 1946, the Veterans Administration was

founded, and thousands of psychologists found

out that they could make a living treating

men-tal illness At that time the profession of clinical

psychologist came into its own In 1947, the

Na-tional Institute of Mental Health (which was

based on the American Psychiatric Association’s

disease model and is better described as the

Na-tional Institute of Mental Illness) was founded,

and academics found out that they could get

grants if their research was described as being

about pathology

This arrangement brought many substantial

benefits There have been huge strides in the

understanding of and therapy for mental illness:

At least 14 disorders, previously intractable,

have yielded their secrets to science and can

now be either cured or considerably relieved

(Seligman, 1994) But the downside was that the

other two fundamental missions of psychology—

making the lives of all people better and turing genius—were all but forgotten It wasnot only the subject matter that altered withfunding but also the currency of the theoriesunderpinning how we viewed ourselves Psy-chology came to see itself as a mere subfield ofthe health professions, and it became a victim-ology We saw human beings as passive foci:stimuli came on and elicited responses (what anextraordinarily passive word) External rein-forcements weakened or strengthened re-sponses, or drives, tissue needs, or instincts.Conflicts from childhood pushed each of usaround

nur-Psychology’s empirical focus then shifted toassessing and curing individual suffering Therehas been an explosion in research on psycho-logical disorders and the negative effects of en-vironmental stressors such as parental divorce,death, and physical and sexual abuse Practi-tioners went about treating mental illnesswithin the disease-patient framework of repair-ing damage: damaged habits, damaged drives,damaged childhood, and damaged brains.The message of the positive psychologymovement is to remind our field that it has beendeformed Psychology is not just the study ofdisease, weakness, and damage; it also is thestudy of strength and virtue Treatment is notjust fixing what is wrong; it also is buildingwhat is right Psychology is not just about ill-ness or health; it also is about work, education,insight, love, growth, and play And in thisquest for what is best, positive psychology doesnot rely on wishful thinking, self-deception, orhand waving; instead, it tries to adapt what isbest in the scientific method to the unique prob-lems that human behavior presents in all itscomplexity

Positive Prevention

What foregrounds this approach is the issue ofprevention In the last decade psychologistshave become concerned with prevention, andthis was the theme of the 1998 American Psy-chological Association meeting in San Francisco.How can we prevent problems like depression

or substance abuse or schizophrenia in youngpeople who are genetically vulnerable or wholive in worlds that nurture these problems?How can we prevent murderous schoolyard vi-olence in children who have poor parental su-

pervision, a mean streak, and access to weapons?

What we have learned over 50 years is that the

disease model does not move us closer to the

prevention of these serious problems Indeed,

the major strides in prevention have largely

come from a perspective focused on

systemati-cally building competency, not correcting

weak-ness

We have discovered that there are human

strengths that act as buffers against mental

ill-ness: courage, future-mindedness, optimism,

in-terpersonal skill, faith, work ethic, hope,

hon-esty, perseverance, the capacity for flow and

insight, to name several Much of the task of

prevention in this new century will be to create

a science of human strength whose mission will

be to understand and learn how to foster these

virtues in young people

My own work in prevention takes this

ap-proach and amplifies a skill that all individuals

possess but usually deploy in the wrong place

The skill is called disputing (Beck, Rush, Shaw,

& Emery, 1979), and its use is at the heart of

“learned optimism.” If an external person, who

is a rival for your job, accuses you falsely of

failing at your job and not deserving your

po-sition, you will dispute him You will marshal

all the evidence that you do your job very well

You will grind the accusations into dust But if

you accuse yourself falsely of not deserving

your job, which is just the content of the

au-tomatic thoughts of pessimists, you will not

dis-pute it If it issues from inside, we tend to

be-lieve it So in “learned optimism” training

programs, we teach both children and adults to

recognize their own catastrophic thinking and

to become skilled disputers (Peterson, 2000;

ligman, Reivich, Jaycox, & Gillham, 1995;

Se-ligman, Schulman, DeRubeis, & Hollon, 1999)

This training works, and once you learn it, it

is a skill that is self-reinforcing We have shown

that learning optimism prevents depression and

anxiety in children and adults, roughly halving

their incidence over the next 2 years I mention

this work only in passing, however It is

in-tended to illustrate the Nikki principle: that

building a strength, in this case, optimism, and

teaching people when to use it, rather than

re-pairing damage, effectively prevents depression

and anxiety Similarly, I believe that if we wish

to prevent drug abuse in teenagers who grow

up in a neighborhood that puts them at risk, the

effective prevention is not remedial Rather, it

consists of identifying and amplifying the

strengths that these teens already have A ager who is future-minded, who is interperson-ally skilled, who derives flow from sports, is not

teen-at risk for substance abuse If we wish to vent schizophrenia in a young person at geneticrisk, I would propose that the repairing of dam-age is not going to work Rather, I suggest that

pre-a young person who lepre-arns effective sonal skills, who has a strong work ethic, andwho has learned persistence under adversity is

interper-at lessened risk for schizophrenia

This, then, is the general stance of positivepsychology toward prevention It claims thatthere is a set of buffers against psychopathol-ogy: the positive human traits The Nikki prin-ciple holds that by identifying, amplifying, andconcentrating on these strengths in people atrisk, we will do effective prevention Workingexclusively on personal weakness and on dam-aged brains, and deifying the Diagnostic andStatistical Manual (DSM), in contrast, has ren-dered science poorly equipped to do effectiveprevention We now need to call for massiveresearch on human strength and virtue Weneed to develop a nosology of human strength—

the “UNDSM-I”, the opposite of DSM-IV We

need to measure reliably and validly thesestrengths We need to do the appropriate lon-gitudinal studies and experiments to understandhow these strengths grow (or are stunted; Vail-lant, 2000) We need to develop and test inter-ventions to build these strengths

We need to ask practitioners to recognize thatmuch of the best work they already do in theconsulting room is to amplify their clients’strengths rather than repair their weaknesses

We need to emphasize that psychologists ing with families, schools, religious communi-ties, and corporations develop climates that fos-ter these strengths The major psychologicaltheories now undergird a new science ofstrength and resilience No longer do the dom-inant theories view the individual as a passivevessel “responding” to “stimuli”; rather, indi-viduals now are seen as decision makers, withchoices, preferences, and the possibility of be-coming masterful, efficacious, or, in malignantcircumstances, helpless and hopeless Scienceand practice that relies on the positive psychol-ogy worldview may have the direct effect ofpreventing many of the major emotional dis-orders It also may have two side effects: mak-ing the lives of our clients physically healthier,given all we are learning about the effects of

work-mental well-being on the body; and reorienting

psychology to its two neglected missions,

mak-ing normal people stronger and more

produc-tive, as well as making high human potential

actual

Positive Therapy

I am going to venture a radical proposition

about why psychotherapy works as well as it

does I am going to suggest that positive

psy-chology, albeit intuitive and inchoate, is a major

effective ingredient in therapy as it is now done;

if it is recognized and honed, it will become an

even more effective approach to psychotherapy

But before doing so, it is necessary to say what

I believe about “specific” ingredients in therapy

I believe there are some clear specifics in

psy-chotherapy Among them are

• Applied tension for blood and injury phobia

• Penile squeeze for premature ejaculation

• Cognitive therapy for panic

• Relaxation for phobia

• Exposure for obsessive-compulsive disorder

• Behavior therapy for enuresis

(My book What You Can Change and What

You Can’t [1994] documents the specifics and

reviews the relevant literature.) But specificity

of technique to disorder is far from the whole

story

There are three serious anomalies on which

present specificity theories of the effectiveness

of psychotherapy stub their toes First,

effect-iveness studies (field studies of real-world

deliv-ery), as opposed to laboratory efficacy studies of

psychotherapy, show a substantially larger

ben-efit of psychotherapy In the Consumer Reports

study, for example, over 90% of respondents

reported substantial benefits, as opposed to

about 65% in efficacy studies of specific

psy-chotherapies (Seligman, 1995, 1996) Second,

when one active treatment is compared with

an-other active treatment, specificity tends to

dis-appear or becomes quite a small effect Lester

Luborsky’s corpus and the National

Collabora-tive Study of Depression are examples The lack

of robust specificity also is apparent in much of

the drug literature Methodologists argue

end-lessly over flaws in such outcome studies, but

they cannot hatchet away the general lack of

specificity The fact is that almost no

psycho-therapy technique that I can think of (with the

exceptions mentioned previously) shows big,specific effects when it is compared with anotherform of psychotherapy or drug, adequately ad-ministered Finally, add the seriously large “pla-cebo” effect found in almost all studies of psy-chotherapy and of drugs In the depressionliterature, a typical example, around 50% of pa-tients will respond well to placebo drugs ortherapies Effective specific drugs or therapiesusually add another 15% to this, and 75% ofthe effects of antidepressant drugs can be ac-counted for by their placebo nature (Kirsch &Sapirstein, 1998)

So why is psychotherapy so robustly tive? Why is there so little specificity of psy-chotherapy techniques or specific drugs? Why

effec-is there such a huge placebo effect?

Let me speculate on this pattern of questions.Many of the relevant ideas have been put for-

ward under the derogatory misnomer

nonspe-cifics I am going to rename two classes of

non-specifics as tactics and deep strategies Among the tactics of good therapy are

• Naming the problem

• Tricks of the trade (e.g., “Let’s pause here,”rather than “Let’s stop here”)

The deep strategies are not mysteries Good

therapists almost always use them, but they donot have names, they are not studied, and,locked into the disease model, we do not trainour students to use them to better advantage Ibelieve that the deep strategies are all tech-niques of positive psychology and that they can

be the subject of large-scale science and of theinvention of new techniques that maximizethem One major strategy is instilling hope(Snyder, Ilardi, Michael, & Cheavens, 2000).But I am not going to discuss this one now, as

it is often discussed elsewhere in the literature

on placebo, on explanatory style and ness, and on demoralization (Seligman, 1994).Another is the “building of bufferingstrengths,” or the Nikki principle I believe that

hopeless-it is a common strategy among almost all petent psychotherapists to first identify andthen help their patients build a large variety ofstrengths, rather than just to deliver specific

com-damage-healing techniques Among the

strengths built in psychotherapy are

• Capacity for pleasure

• Putting troubles into perspective

• Future-mindedness

• Finding purpose

Assume for a moment that the buffering effects

of strength-building strategies have a larger

ef-fect than the specific “healing” ingredients that

have been discovered If this is true, the

rela-tively small specificity found when different

ac-tive therapies and different drugs are compared

and the massive placebo effects both follow

One illustrative deep strategy is “narration.”

I believe that telling the stories of our lives,

making sense of what otherwise seems chaotic,

distilling and discovering a trajectory in our

lives, and viewing our lives with a sense of

agency rather than victimhood are all

power-fully positive (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993) I

be-lieve that all competent psychotherapy forces

such narration, and this buffers against mental

disorder in just the same way hope does Notice,

however, that narration is not a primary subject

of research on therapy process, that we do not

have categories of narration, that we do not

train our students to better facilitate narration,

that we do not reimburse practitioners for it

The use of positive psychology in

psycho-therapy exposes a fundamental blind spot in

outcome research: The search for empirically

validated therapies (EVTs) has in its present

form handcuffed us by focusing only on

vali-dating the specific techniques that repair

dam-age and that map uniquely into DSM-IV

cate-gories The parallel emphasis in managed care

organizations on delivering only brief

treat-ments directed solely at healing damage may

rob patients of the very best weapons in the

arsenal of therapy—making our patients

stronger human beings That by working in the

medical model and looking solely for the salves

to heal the wounds, we have misplaced much of

our science and much of our training That by

embracing the disease model of psychotherapy,

we have lost our birthright as psychologists, abirthright that embraces both healing what isweak and nurturing what is strong

Conclusions

Let me end this introduction to the Handbook

of Positive Psychology with a prediction about

the science and practice of psychology in the21st century I believe that a psychology of pos-itive human functioning will arise that achieves

a scientific understanding and effective ventions to build thriving individuals, families,and communities

inter-You may think that it is pure fantasy, thatpsychology will never look beyond the victim,the underdog, and the remedial But I want tosuggest that the time is finally right I well rec-ognize that positive psychology is not a newidea It has many distinguished ancestors (e.g.,Allport, 1961; Maslow, 1971) But they some-how failed to attract a cumulative and empiricalbody of research to ground their ideas.Why did they not? And why has psychologybeen so focused on the negative? Why has itadopted the premise—without a shred of evi-dence—that negative motivations are authenticand positive emotions are derivative? There areseveral possible explanations Negative emo-tions and experiences may be more urgent andtherefore override positive ones This wouldmake evolutionary sense Because negativeemotions often reflect immediate problems orobjective dangers, they should be powerfulenough to force us to stop, increase vigilance,reflect on our behavior, and change our actions

if necessary (Of course, in some dangerous uations, it will be most adaptive to respondwithout taking a great deal of time to reflect.)

sit-In contrast, when we are adapting well to theworld, no such alarm is needed Experiencesthat promote happiness often seem to pass ef-fortlessly So, on one level, psychology’s focus

on the negative may reflect differences in thesurvival value of negative versus positive emo-tions

But perhaps we are oblivious to the survivalvalue of positive emotions precisely becausethey are so important Like the fish that is un-aware of the water in which it swims, we takefor granted a certain amount of hope, love, en-joyment, and trust because these are the veryconditions that allow us to go on living (Myers,2000) They are the fundamental conditions of

existence, and if they are present, any amount

of objective obstacles can be faced with

equa-nimity, and even joy Camus wrote that the

foremost question of philosophy is why one

should not commit suicide One cannot answer

that question just by curing depression; there

must be positive reasons for living as well

There also are historical reasons for

psychol-ogy’s negative focus When cultures face

mili-tary threat, shortages of goods, poverty, or

in-stability, they may most naturally be concerned

with defense and damage control Cultures may

turn their attention to creativity, virtue, and the

highest qualities in life only when they are

sta-ble, prosperous, and at peace Athens during the

5th century b.c., Florence of the 15th century,

and England in the Victorian era are examples

of cultures that focused on positive qualities

Athenian philosophy focused on the human

vir-tues: What is good action and good character?

What makes life most worthwhile? Democracy

was born during this era Florence chose not to

become the most important military power in

Europe but to invest its surplus in beauty

Vic-torian England affirmed honor, discipline, and

duty as important human virtues

I am not suggesting that our culture should

now erect an aesthetic monument Rather, I

be-lieve that our nation—wealthy, at peace, and

stable—provides a similar world historical

op-portunity We can choose to create a scientific

monument—a science that takes as its primary

task the understanding of what makes life worth

living Such an endeavor will move the whole

of social science away from its negative bias

The prevailing social sciences tend to view the

authentic forces governing human behavior as

self-interest, aggressiveness, territoriality, class

conflict, and the like Such a science, even at its

best, is by necessity incomplete Even if

utopi-anly successful, it would then have to proceed

to ask how humanity can achieve what is best

in life

I predict that in this new century positive

psychology will come to understand and build

those factors that allow individuals,

communi-ties, and societies to flourish Such a science will

not need to start afresh It requires for the most

part just a refocusing of scientific energy In the

50 years since psychology and psychiatry

be-came healing disciplines, they have developed a

highly useful and transferable science of mental

illness They have developed a taxonomy, as

well as reliable and valid ways of measuring

such fuzzy concepts as schizophrenia, anger,

and depression They have developed cated methods—both experimental and longi-tudinal—for understanding the causal pathwaysthat lead to such undesirable outcomes Mostimportant, they have developed pharmacologicaland psychological interventions that havemoved many of the mental disorders from “un-treatable” to “highly treatable” and, in a couple

sophisti-of cases, “curable.” These same methods, and

in many cases the same laboratories and thenext two generations of scientists, with a slightshift of emphasis and funding, will be used tomeasure, understand, and build those char-acteristics that make life most worth living

As a side effect of studying positive humantraits, science will learn how to better treat andprevent mental, as well as some physical, ill-nesses As a main effect, we will learn how tobuild the qualities that help individuals andcommunities not just endure and survive butalso flourish

Acknowledgment This research was ported by grants MH19604 and MH52270from the National Institute of Mental Health.Please send reprint requests to Dr M E P Se-ligman, Department of Psychology, University

sup-of Pennsylvania, 3815 Walnut Street, delphia, PA 19104, or e-mail (seligman@psych.upenn.edu) This chapter draws heavily on Se-ligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000)

Phila-References

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98

Identifying Strengths

2

Stopping the “Madness”

Positive Psychology and the Deconstruction

of the Illness Ideology and the DSM

James E Maddux

The ancient roots of the term clinical

psychol-ogy continue to influence our thinking about

the discipline long after these roots have been

forgotten Clinic derives from the Greek

kli-nike, or “medical practice at the sickbed,” and

psychology derives from the Greek psyche,

meaning “soul” or “mind” (Webster’s Seventh

New Collegiate Dictionary, 1976) How little

things have changed since the time of

Hippoc-rates Although few clinical psychologists today

literally practice at the bedsides of their

pa-tients, too many of its practitioners

(“clini-cians”) and most of the public still view clinical

psychology as a kind of “medical practice” for

people with “sick souls” or “sick minds.” It is

time to change clinical psychology’s view of

it-self and the way it is viewed by the public

Positive psychology, as represented in this

handbook, provides a long-overdue opportunity

for making this change

How Clinical Psychology

Became “Pathological”

The short history of clinical psychology

sug-gests, however, that any such change will not

come easily The field began with the founding

of the first “psychological clinic” in 1896 at theUniversity of Pennsylvania by Lightner Witmer(Reisman, 1991) Witmer and the other earlyclinical psychologists worked primarily withchildren who had learning or school problems—not with “patients” with “mental disorders”(Reisman, 1991; Routh, 2000) Thus, they wereinfluenced more by psychometric theory and itsattendant emphasis on careful measurementthan by psychoanalytic theory and its emphasis

on psychopathology Following Freud’s visit toClark University in 1909, however, psycho-analysis and its derivatives soon came to dom-inate not only psychiatry but also clinical psy-chology (Barone, Maddux, & Snyder, 1997;Korchin, 1976)

Several other factors encouraged clinical chologists to devote their attention to psycho-pathology and to view people through the lens

psy-of the disease model First, although clinicalpsychologists’ academic training took place inuniversities, their practitioner training occurredprimarily in psychiatric hospitals and clinics(Morrow, 1946, cited in Routh, 2000) In thesesettings, clinical psychologists worked primarily

as psychodiagnosticians under the direction of

psychiatrists trained in medicine and

psycho-analysis Second, after World War II (1946), the

Veterans Administration (VA) was founded and

soon joined the American Psychological

Asso-ciation in developing training centers and

stan-dards for clinical psychologists Because these

early centers were located in VA hospitals, the

training of clinical psychologists continued to

occur primarily in psychiatric settings Third,

the National Institute of Mental Health was

founded in 1947, and “thousands of

psycholo-gists found out that they could make a living

treating mental illness” (Seligman &

Csik-szentmihalyi, 2000, p 6)

By the 1950s, therefore, clinical psychologists

had come “to see themselves as part of a mere

subfield of the health professions” (Seligman &

Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p 6) By this time, the

practice of clinical psychology was characterized

by four basic assumptions about its scope and

about the nature of psychological adjustment

and maladjustment (Barone, Maddux, &

Sny-der, 1997) First, clinical psychology is

con-cerned with psychopathology—deviant,

abnor-mal, and maladaptive behavioral and emotional

conditions Second, psychopathology, clinical

problems, and clinical populations differ in kind,

not just in degree, from normal problems in

liv-ing, nonclinical problems and nonclinical

pop-ulations Third, psychological disorders are

analogous to biological or medical diseases and

reside somewhere inside the individual Fourth,

the clinician’s task is to identify (diagnose) the

disorder (disease) inside the person (patient) and

to prescribe an intervention (treatment) that

will eliminate (cure) the internal disorder

(dis-ease)

Clinical Psychology Today:

The Illness Ideology and the DSM

Once clinical psychology became

“pathologi-zed,” there was no turning back Albee (2000)

suggests that “the uncritical acceptance of the

medical model, the organic explanation of

men-tal disorders, with psychiatric hegemony,

med-ical concepts, and language” (p 247), was the

“fatal flaw” of the standards for clinical

psy-chology training that were established at the

1950 Boulder Conference He argues that this

fatal flaw “has distorted and damaged the

de-velopment of clinical psychology ever since”

(p 247) Indeed, things have changed little since

1950 These basic assumptions about clinical

psychology and psychological health describedpreviously continue to serve as implicit guides

to clinical psychologists’ activities In addition,the language of clinical psychology remains thelanguage of medicine and pathology—what

may be called the language of the illness

ide-ology Terms such as symptom, disorder, thology, illness, diagnosis, treatment, doctor, patient, clinic, clinical, and clinician are all con-

pa-sistent with the four assumptions noted ously These terms emphasize abnormality overnormality, maladjustment over adjustment, andsickness over health They promote the dichot-omy between normal and abnormal behaviors,clinical and nonclinical problems, and clinicaland nonclinical populations They situate the lo-cus of human adjustment and maladjustmentinside the person rather than in the person’sinteractions with the environment or in socio-cultural values and sociocultural forces such asprejudice and oppression Finally, these termsportray the people who are seeking help as pas-sive victims of intrapsychic and biological forcesbeyond their direct control who thereforeshould be the passive recipients of an expert’s

previ-“care and cure.” This illness ideology and itsmedicalizing and pathologizing language are in-consistent with positive psychology’s view that

“psychology is not just a branch of medicineconcerned with illness or health; it is muchlarger It is about work, education, insight, love,growth, and play” (Seligman & Csikszentmi-halyi, 2000, p 7)

This pathology-oriented and medically ented clinical psychology has outlived its use-fulness Decades ago the field of medicine began

ori-to shift its emphasis from the treatment of ness to the prevention of illness and later fromthe prevention of illness to the enhancement ofhealth (Snyder, Feldman, Taylor, Schroeder, &Adams, 2000) Health psychologists acknowl-edged this shift over two decades ago (e.g.,Stone, Cohen, & Adler, 1979) and have beeninfluential ever since in facilitating it Clinicalpsychology needs to make a similar shift, or itwill soon find itself struggling for identity andpurpose, much as psychiatry has for the last two

ill-or three decades (Wilson, 1993) The way tomodernize is not to move even closer topathology-focused psychiatry but to movecloser to mainstream psychology, with its focus

on understanding human behavior in thebroader sense, and to join the positive psychol-ogy movement to build a more positive clinicalpsychology Clinical psychologists always have

been “more heavily invested in intricate

theo-ries of failure than in theotheo-ries of success”

(Ban-dura, 1998, p 3) They need to acknowledge

that “much of the best work that they already

do in the counseling room is to amplify

strengths rather than repair the weaknesses of

their clients” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi,

2000)

Building a more positive clinical psychology

will be impossible without abandoning the

guage of the illness ideology and adopting a

lan-guage from positive psychology that offers a

new way of thinking about human behavior In

this new language, ineffective patterns of

be-haviors, cognitions, and emotions are problems

in living, not disorders or diseases These

prob-lems in living are located not inside individuals

but in the interactions between the individual

and other people, including the culture at large

People seeking assistance in enhancing the

qual-ity of their lives are clients or students, not

patients Professionals who specialize in

facili-tating psychological health are teachers,

coun-selors, consultants, coaches, or even social

activ-ists, not clinicians or doctors Strategies and

techniques for enhancing the quality of lives are

educational, relational, social, and political

in-terventions, not medical treatments Finally, the

facilities to which people will go for assistance

with problems in living are centers, schools, or

resorts, not clinics or hospitals Such assistance

might even take place in community centers,

public and private schools, churches, and

peo-ple’s homes rather than in specialized facilities

Efforts to change our language and our

ide-ology will meet with resistance Perhaps the

pri-mary barrier to abandoning the language of the

illness ideology and adopting the language of

positive psychology is that the illness ideology

is enshrined in the most powerful book in

psy-chiatry and clinical psychology—the Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or,

more simply, the DSM First published in the

early 1950s (American Psychiatric Association

[APA], 1952) and now in either its fourth or

sixth edition (APA, 2000) (depending on

whether or not one counts the revisions of the

third and fourth editions as “editions”), the

DSM provides the organizational structure for

virtually every textbook and course on

abnor-mal psychology and psychopathology for

un-dergraduate and graduate students, as well as

almost every professional book on the

assess-ment and treatassess-ment of psychological problems

So revered is the DSM that in many clinical

programs (including mine), students are quired to memorize parts of it line by line, as

re-if it were a book of mathematical formulae or asacred text

The DSM’s categorizing and pathologizing of

human experience is the antithesis of positivepsychology Although most of the previouslynoted assumptions of the illness ideology are

explicitly disavowed in the DSM-IV’s

introduc-tion (APA, 1994), practically every word

thereafter is inconsistent with this disavowal For example, in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994),

“mental disorder” is defined as “a clinically nificant behavioral or psychological syndrome

sig-or pattern that occurs in an individual” (p xxi,

emphasis added), and numerous common lems in living are viewed as “mental disorders.”

prob-So steeped in the illness ideology is the

DSM-IV that affiliation, anticipation, altruism, and

humor are described as “defense mechanisms”(p 752)

As long as clinical psychology worships atthis icon of the illness ideology, change toward

an ideology emphasizing human strengths will

be impossible What is needed, therefore, is akind of iconoclasm, and the icon in need of shat-

tering is the DSM This iconoclasm would be figurative, not literal Its goal is not DSM’s de- struction but its deconstruction—an examina-

tion of the social forces that serve as its powerbase and of the implicit intellectual assumptionsthat provide it with a pseudoscientific legiti-macy This deconstruction will be the first stage

of a reconstruction of our view of human havior and problems in living

be-The Social Deconstruction of the DSM

As with all icons, powerful sociocultural, ical, professional, and economic forces built the

polit-illness ideology and the DSM and continue to

sustain them Thus, to begin this iconoclasm,

we must realize that our conceptions of logical normality and abnormality, along withour specific diagnostic labels and categories, are

psycho-not facts about people but social constructions—

abstract concepts that were developed atively by the members of society (individualsand institutions) over time and that represent ashared view of the world As Widiger and Trull

collabor-(1991) have said, the DSM “is not a scientific document It is a social document” (p 111,

emphasis added) The illness ideology and theconception of mental disorder that have guided

the evolution of the DSM were constructed

through the implicit and explicit collaborations

of theorists, researchers, professionals, their

cli-ents, and the culture in which all are embedded

For this reason, “mental disorder” and the

nu-merous diagnostic categories of the DSM were

not “discovered” in the same manner that an

archaeologist discovers a buried artifact or a

medical researcher discovers a virus Instead,

they were invented By describing mental

dis-orders as inventions, however, I do not mean

that they are “myths” (Szasz, 1974) or that the

distress of people who are labeled as mentally

disordered is not real Instead, I mean that these

disorders do not “exist” and “have properties”

in the same manner that artifacts and viruses

do For these reasons, a taxonomy of mental

disorders such as the DSM “does not simply

describe and classify characteristics of groups of

individuals, but actively constructs a version

of both normal and abnormal which is then

applied to individuals who end up being

classi-fied as normal or abnormal” (Parker, Georgaca,

Harper, McLaughlin, & Stowell-Smith, 1995,

p 93)

The illness ideology’s conception of “mental

disorder” and the various specific DSM

catego-ries of mental disorders are not reflections and

mappings of psychological facts about people.

Instead, they are social artifacts that serve the

same sociocultural goals as our constructions of

race, gender, social class, and sexual

orienta-tion—that of maintaining and expanding the

power of certain individuals and institutions and

maintaining social order, as defined by those in

power (Beall, 1993; Parker et al., 1995;

Rosen-blum & Travis, 1996) Like these other social

constructions, our concepts of psychological

normality and abnormality are tied ultimately

to social values—in particular, the values of

so-ciety’s most powerful individuals, groups, and

institutions—and the contextual rules for

be-havior derived from these values (Becker, 1963;

Parker et al., 1995; Rosenblum & Travis, 1996)

As McNamee and Gergen (1992) state: “The

mental health profession is not politically,

mor-ally, or valuationally neutral Their practices

typically operate to sustain certain values,

po-litical arrangements, and hierarchies or

privi-lege” (p 2) Thus, the debate over the definition

of “mental disorder,” the struggle over who

gets to define it, and the continual revisions of

the DSM are not searches for truth Rather,

they are debates over the definition of a set of

abstractions and struggles for the personal, litical, and economic power that derives fromthe authority to define these abstractions andthus to determine what and whom society views

po-as normal and abnormal

Medical philosopher Lawrie Resnek (1987)has demonstrated that even our definition ofphysical disease “is a normative or evaluativeconcept” (p 211) because to call a condition adisease “is to judge that the person with thatcondition is less able to lead a good or worth-while life” (p 211) If this is true of physicaldisease, it is certainly also true of psychological

“disease.” Because they are social constructionsthat serve sociocultural goals and values, ournotions of psychological normality-abnormalityand health-illness are linked to our assumptionsabout how people should live their lives andabout what makes life worth living This truth

is illustrated clearly in the American PsychiatricAssociation’s 1952 decision to include homosex-

uality in the first edition of the DSM and its

1973 decision to revoke homosexuality’s diseasestatus (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Shorter, 1997)

As stated by psychiatrist Mitchell Wilson(1993), “The homosexuality controversyseemed to show that psychiatric diagnoses wereclearly wrapped up in social constructions of de-viance” (p 404) This issue also was in the fore-front of the controversies over post-traumaticstress disorder, paraphilic rapism, and maso-chistic personality disorder (Kutchins & Kirk,1997), as well as caffeine dependence, sexualcompulsivity, low-intensity orgasm, sibling ri-valry, self-defeating personality, jet lag, patho-logical spending, and impaired sleep-relatedpainful erections, all of which were proposed for

inclusion in DSM-IV (Widiger & Trull, 1991).

Others have argued convincingly that phrenia” (Gilman, 1988), “addiction” (Peele,1995), and “personality disorder” (Alarcon,Foulks, & Vakkur, 1998) also are socially con-structed categories rather than disease entities.Therefore, Widiger and Sankis (2000) missedthe mark when they stated that “social and po-litical concerns might be hindering a recognition

“schizo-of a more realistic and accurate estimate “schizo-of the

true rate of psychopathology” (p 379, emphasis

added) A “true rate” of psychopathology doesnot exist apart from the social and political con-cerns involved in the construction of the defi-nition of psychopathology in general and spe-cific psychopathologies in particular Lopez andGuarnaccia (2000) got closer to the truth by

stating that “psychopathology is as much

pa-thology of the social world as papa-thology of the

mind or body” (p 578)

With each revision, the DSM has had more

to say about how people should live their lives

and about what makes life worth living The

number of pages has increased from 86 in 1952

to almost 900 in 1994, and the number of

men-tal disorders has increased from 106 to 297 As

the boundaries of “mental disorder” have

ex-panded with each DSM revision, life has become

increasingly pathologized, and the sheer

num-bers of people with diagnosable mental

disor-ders has continued to grow Moreover, we

men-tal health professionals have not been content

to label only obviously and blatantly

dysfunc-tional patterns of behaving, thinking, and

feel-ing as “mental disorders.” Instead, we gradually

have been pathologizing almost every

conceiv-able human problem in living

Consider some of the “mental disorders”

found in the DSM-IV Premenstrual emotional

change is now premenstrual dysphoric disorder

Cigarette smokers have nicotine dependence If

you drink large quantities of coffee, you may

develop caffeine intoxication or caffeine-induced

sleep disorder Being drunk is alcohol

intoxica-tion If you have “a preoccupation with a defect

in appearance” that causes “significant distress

or impairment in functioning” (p 466), you

have a body dysmorphic disorder A child

whose academic achievement is “substantially

below that expected for age, schooling, and level

of intelligence” (p 46) has a learning disorder

Toddlers who throw tantrums have oppositional

defiant disorder Even sibling relational

prob-lems, the bane of parents everywhere, have

found a place in DSM-IV, although not yet as

an official mental disorder

Human sexual behavior comes in such

vari-ety that determining what is “normal” and

“adaptive” is a daunting task Nonetheless,

sex-ual behavior has been ripe for pathologization

in the DSM-IV Not wanting sex often enough

is hypoactive sexual desire disorder Not

want-ing sex at all is sexual aversion disorder Havwant-ing

sex but not having orgasms or having them too

late or too soon is considered an orgasmic

dis-order Failure (for men) to maintain “an

ade-quate erection that causes marked distress or

interpersonal difficulty” (p 504) is a male

erec-tile disorder Failure (for women) to attain or

maintain “an adequate lubrication or swelling

response of sexual excitement” (p 502)

accom-panied by distress is female sexual arousal order Excessive masturbation used to be con-sidered a sign of a mental disorder (Gilman,

dis-1988) Perhaps in DSM-V not masturbating at

all, if accompanied by “marked distress or terpersonal difficulty,” will become a mentaldisorder (“autoerotic aversion disorder”).Most recently we have been inundated withmedia reports of epidemics of Internet addiction,road rage, and pathological stockmarket daytrading Discussions of these new disorders haveturned up at scientific meetings and are likely

in-to find a home in the DSM-V if the media and

mental health professions continue to rate in their construction, and if treating themand writing books about them becomes lucra-tive

collabo-The trend is clear First we see a pattern ofbehaving, thinking, feeling, or desiring that de-viates from some fictional social norm or ideal;

or we identify a common complaint that, asexpected, is displayed with greater frequency

or severity by some people than others; or

we decide that a certain behavior is able, inconvenient, or disruptive We thengive the pattern a medical-sounding name, pref-erably of Greek or Latin origin Eventually,the new term may be reduced to an acronym,such as OCD (obsessive-compulsive disorder),ADHD (attention-deficit/hyperactive disorder),and BDD (body dysmorphic disorder) The newdisorder then takes on a life of its own and be-comes a diseaselike entity As news about “it”spreads, people begin thinking they have “it”;medical and mental health professionals begindiagnosing and treating “it”; and clinicians andclients begin demanding that health insurancepolicies cover the “treatment” of “it.”

undesir-Over the years, my university has structed something called a “foreign-languagelearning disability.” Our training clinic gets five

con-or six requests each year fcon-or evaluations of this

“disorder,” usually from seniors seeking an emption from the university’s foreign-languagerequirement These referrals are usuallyprompted by a well-meaning foreign-languageinstructor and our center for student disabilityservices Of course, our psychology programhas assisted in the construction of this “disor-der” by the mere act of accepting these referralsand, on occasion, finding “evidence” for this so-called disorder Alan Ross (1980) referred to this

ex-process as the reification of the disorder In light

of the awe with which mental health

profes-sionals view their diagnostic terms and the

power that such terms exert over both

profes-sional and client, a better term for this process

may be the deification of the disorder.

We are fast approaching the point at which

everything that human beings think, feel, do,

and desire that is not perfectly logical, adaptive,

or efficient will be labeled a mental disorder

Not only does each new category of mental

dis-order trivialize the suffering of people with

se-vere psychological difficulties, but each new

cat-egory also becomes an opportunity for

in-dividuals to evade moral and legal responsibility

for their behavior (Resnek, 1997) It is time to

stop the “madness.”

The Intellectual Deconstruction

of the DSM: An Examination of

Faulty Assumptions

The DSM and the illness ideology it represents

remain powerful because they serve certain

so-cial, political, and professional interests Yet the

DSM also has an intellectual foundation, albeit

an erroneous one, that warrants our

examina-tion The developers of the DSM have made a

number of assumptions about human behavior

and how to understand it that do not hold up

very well to logical scrutiny

Faulty Assumption I:

Categories Are Facts About the World

The basic assumption of the DSM is that a

sys-tem of socially constructed categories is a set of

facts about the world At issue here is not the

reliability of classifications in general or of the

DSM in particular—that is, the degree to which

we can define categories in a way that leads to

consensus in the assignment of things to

cate-gories Instead, the issue is the validity of such

categories As noted previously, the validity of

a classification system refers not to the extent

to which it provides an accurate “map” of

re-ality but, instead, to the extent to which it

serves the goals of those who developed it For

this reason, all systems of classification are

ar-bitrary This is not to say that all classifications

are capricious or thoughtless but that, as noted

earlier, they are constructed to serve the goals

of those who develop them Alan Watts (1951)

once asked whether it is better to classify rabbits

according to the characteristics of their fur or

according to the characteristics of their meat He

answered by saying that it depends on whetheryou are a furrier or a butcher How you choose

to classify rabbits depends on what you want to

do with them Neither classification system is

more valid or “true” than the other We can saythe same of all classification systems They arenot “valid” (true) or “invalid” (false) Instead,they are social constructions that are only more

or less useful Thus, we can evaluate the ity” of a system of representing reality only byevaluating its utility, and its utility can be eval-uated only in reference to a set of chosen goals,which in turn are based on values Therefore,instead of asking, “How true is this system ofclassification?” we have to ask, “What do wevalue? What goals do we want to accomplish?How well does this system help us accomplishthem?” Thus, we cannot talk about “diagnostic

“valid-validity and utility” (Nathan & Langenbucher,

1999, p 88, emphasis added) as if they are ferent constructs They are one and the same.Most proponents of traditional classification

dif-of psychological disorders justify their effortswith the assumption that “classification is theheart of any science” (Barlow, 1991, p 243).Categorical thinking is not the only means,however, for making sense of the world, al-though it is a characteristically Western meansfor doing so Western thinkers always have ex-pended considerable energy and ingenuity di-viding the world into sets of separate “things,”dissecting reality into discrete categories andconstructing either-or and black-or-white di-chotomies Westerners seem to believe that theworld is held together by the categories of hu-man thought (Watts, 1951) and that “makingsense out of life is impossible unless the flow ofevents can somehow be fitted into a framework

of rigid forms” (Watts, 1951, pp 43–44) fortunately, once we construct our categories,

Un-we see them as representing “things,” and Un-weconfuse them with the real world We come tobelieve that, as Gregory Kimble (1995) said, “Ifthere is a word for it, there must be a corre-sponding item of reality If there are two words,there must be two realities and they must bedifferent” (p 70) What we fail to realize is that,

as the philosopher Alan Watts (1966) said,

“However much we divide, count, sort, or sify [the world] into particular things andevents, this is no more than a way of thinking

clas-about the world It is never actually divided”

(p 54) Also, as a result of confusing our

cate-gories with the real world, we too often confuse

classifying with understanding, and labeling

with explaining (Ross, 1980; Watts, 1951) We

forget that agreeing on the names of things does

not mean that we understand and can explain

the things named

Faulty Assumption II:

We Can Distinguish Between

Normal and Abnormal

The second faulty assumption made by the

de-velopers of the DSM is that we can establish

clear criteria for distinguishing between normal

and abnormal thinking, feeling, and behaving

and between healthy and unhealthy

psycholog-ical functioning Although the DSM-IV’s

de-velopers claim that “there is no assumption that

each category of mental disorder is a completely

discrete entity with absolute boundaries

divid-ing it from other mental disorders or from no

mental disorder” (APA, 1994, p xxii), the

sub-sequent 800 pages that are devoted to

descrip-tions of categories undermine the credibility of

this claim This discontinuity assumption is

mistaken for at least three reasons First, it

ig-nores the legions of essentially healthy people

who seek professional help before their

prob-lems get out of hand (and who have good health

insurance coverage), as well as the vast numbers

of people who experience problems that are

sim-ilar or identical to those experienced by those

relatively few people who appear in places called

clinics, yet who never seek professional help

(Wills & DePaulo, 1991) As Bandura (1978)

stated, “No one has ever undertaken the

chal-lenging task of studying how the tiny sample

of clinic patrons differs from the huge

popula-tion of troubled nonpatrons” (p 94)

The normal-abnormal and clinical-nonclinical

dichotomies are encouraged by our service

de-livery system Having places called “clinics”

en-courages us to divide the world into clinical and

nonclinical settings, to differentiate

psycholog-ical problems into clinpsycholog-ical (abnormal) problems

and nonclinical (normal) problems, and to

cat-egorize people into clinical (abnormal) and

non-clinical (normal) populations Yet, just as the

existence of organized religions and their

churches cannot be taken as proof of the

exis-tence of God, the exisexis-tence of the mental health

professions and their clinics is not proof of the

existence of clinical disorders and clinical

pop-ulations The presence of a person in a facility

called a “clinic” is not sufficient reason for

as-suming that residing within that person is a

psychological pathology that differs in either

kind or degree from the problems experienced

by most people in the courses of their lives.Second, this discontinuity assumption runscounter to an assumption made by virtually

every major personality theorist—that adaptive

and maladaptive psychological phenomena fer not in kind but in degree and that continuity exists between normal and abnormal and be- tween adaptive and maladaptive functioning A

dif-fundamental assumption made in behavioraland social cognitive approaches to personalityand psychopathology is that the adaptiveness ormaladaptiveness of a behavior rests not in thenature of the behavior itself but in the effect-iveness of that behavior in the context of theperson’s goals and situational norms, expecta-tions, and demands (Barone et al., 1997) Exis-tential theorists reject the dichotomy betweenmental health and mental illness, as do most ofthe theoreticians in the emerging constructivistpsychotherapy movement (e.g., Neimeyer &Mahoney, 1994; Neimeyer & Raskin, 1999).Even the psychoanalytic approaches, the mostpathologizing of all theories, assume that psy-chopathology is characterized not by the pres-ence of underlying unconscious conflicts anddefense mechanisms but by the degree to whichsuch conflicts and defenses interfere with func-tioning in everyday life (Brenner, 1973).Third, the normal-abnormal dichotomy runscounter to yet another basic assumption made

by most contemporary theorists and researchers

in personality, social, and clinical psychology—

that the processes by which maladaptive havior is acquired and maintained are the same

be-as those that explain the acquisition and tenance of adaptive behavior No one has yet

main-demonstrated that the psychological processesthat explain the problems of people who presentthemselves to mental health professionals(“clinical populations”) and those who do not(“nonclinical populations”) differ from eachother That is to say, there are no reasons toassume that behaviors judged to be “normal”and behaviors that violate social norms and arejudged to be “pathological” are governed by dif-ferent processes (Leary & Maddux, 1987).Fourth, the assumption runs counter to thegrowing body of empirical evidence that nor-mality and abnormality, as well as effective andineffective psychological functioning, lie along acontinuum, and that so-called psychological dis-orders are simply extreme variants of normalpsychological phenomena and ordinary prob-lems in living (Keyes & Lopez, this volume)

This dimensional approach is concerned not

with classifying people or disorders but with

identifying and measuring individual

differ-ences in psychological phenomena such as

emo-tion, mood, intelligence, and personality styles

(e.g., Lubinski, 2000) Great differences among

individuals on the dimensions of interest are

ex-pected, such as the differences we find on formal

tests of intelligence As with intelligence, any

divisions made between normality and

abnor-mality are socially constructed for convenience

or efficiency but are not to be viewed as

indic-ative of true discontinuity among “types” of

phenomena or “types” of people Also,

statis-tical deviation is not viewed as necessarily

pathological, although extreme variants on

ei-ther end of a dimension (e.g.,

introversion-extraversion, neuroticism, intelligence) may be

maladaptive if they signify inflexibility in

func-tioning

Empirical evidence for the validity of a

di-mensional approach to psychological adjustment

is strongest in the area of personality and

per-sonality disorders Factor analytic studies of

personality problems among the general

popu-lation and a popupopu-lation with “personality

dis-orders” demonstrate striking similarity between

the two groups In addition, these factor

struc-tures are not consistent with the DSM’s system

of classifying disorders of personality into

cat-egories (Maddux & Mundell, 1999) The

dimen-sional view of personality disorders also is

sup-ported by cross-cultural research (Alarcon et al.,

1998)

Research on other problems supports the

di-mensional view Studies of the varieties of

nor-mal emotional experiences (e.g., Oatley &

Jen-kins, 1992) indicate that “clinical” emotional

disorders are not discrete classes of emotional

experience that are discontinuous from

every-day emotional upsets and problems Research

on adult attachment patterns in relationships

strongly suggests that dimensions are more

useful descriptions of such patterns than are

categories (Fraley & Waller, 1998) Research on

self-defeating behaviors has shown that they

are extremely common and are not by

them-selves signs of abnormality or symptoms of

“disorders” (Baumeister & Scher, 1988)

Re-search on children’s reading problems indicates

that “dyslexia” is not an all-or-none condition

that children either have or do not have but

oc-curs in degrees without a natural break between

“dyslexic” and “nondyslexic” children

(Shaw-itz, Escobar, Shayw(Shaw-itz, Fletcher, & Makuch,

1992) Research on attention ity disorder (Barkley, 1997) and post-traumaticstress disorder (Anthony, Lonigan, & Hecht,1999) demonstrates this same dimensionality.Research on depression and schizophrenia in-dicates that these “disorders” are best viewed asloosely related clusters of dimensions of indi-vidual differences, not as diseaselike syndromes(Claridge, 1995; Costello, 1993a, 1993b; Per-sons, 1986) Finally, biological researcherscontinue to discover continuities between so-called normal and abnormal (or pathological)psychological conditions (Claridge, 1995; Lives-ley, Jang, & Vernon, 1998)

deficit/hyperactiv-Faulty Assumption III:

Categories Facilitate Clinical Judgment

To be most useful, diagnostic categories shouldfacilitate sound clinical judgment and decisionmaking In many ways, however, diagnostic cat-egories can cloud professional judgments byhelping set into motion a vicious circle in whicherror and bias are encouraged and maintaineddespite the professional’s good intentions.This vicious circle begins with four beliefsthat the professional brings to the initial en-counter with a client: first, that there is a di-chotomy between normal and abnormal psy-chological functioning; second, that distinctsyndromes called mental disorders actually existand have real properties; third, that the peoplewho come to “clinics” must have a “clinicalproblem” and that problem must fit one of thesesyndromes; and fourth, that he or she is an ac-curate perceiver of others, an unbiased and ob-jective gatherer and processor of informationabout others, and an objective decision maker.These beliefs lead to a biased and error-pronestyle of interacting with, thinking about, andgathering information about the client One ofthe biggest myths about clinical psychologytraining is that professionals with graduate ed-ucations are more accurate, less error-prone,and less biased in gathering information aboutand forming impressions of other people thanare persons without such training Researchsuggests otherwise (Garb, 1998) Especially per-nicious is a bias toward confirmatory hypothesistesting in which the professional seeks infor-mation supportive of the assumption that theclient has a clinically significant dysfunction ormental disorder The use of this strategy in-creases the probability of error and bias in per-ception and judgment Furthermore, the criteria

for normality and abnormality (or health and

pathology) and for specific mental disorders are

so vague that they almost guarantee the

com-mission of the errors and biases in perception

and judgment that have been demonstrated by

research on decision making under uncertainty

(Dawes, 1998) Finally, because the DSM

de-scribes only categories of disordered or

un-healthy functioning, it offers little

encourage-ment to search for evidence of healthy

functioning Thus, a fundamental negative bias

is likely to develop in which the professional

pays close attention to evidence of pathology

and ignores evidence of health (Wright &

Lo-pez, this volume) From the standpoint of

pos-itive psychology, this is one of the greatest

flaws of the DSM and the illness ideology for

which it stands

Next, these errors and biases lead the

profes-sional to gather information about and form

impressions of the client that, although not

highly accurate, are consistent with the

sional’s hypotheses Accordingly, the

profes-sional gains a false sense of confidence in her

social perception and judgment abilities In turn,

she comes to believe that she knows pathology

when she sees it and that people indeed do fit

the categories described by the DSM Because

clients readily agree with the professional’s

as-sessments and pronouncements (Snyder,

Shen-kel, & Lowery, 1977), the professional’s

confi-dence is bolstered by this “eviconfi-dence” that she is

correct Thus, together they construct a

“collab-orative illusion.”

Finally, because of this false feedback and

subsequent false sense of accuracy and

confi-dence, over time the professional becomes

in-creasingly confident and yet inin-creasingly

error-prone, as suggested by research showing a

positive correlation between professional

expe-rience and error and bias in perceiving and

thinking about clients (e.g., Garb, 1998) Thus,

the professional plunges confidently into the

next clinical encounter even more likely to

re-peat the error-prone process

Faulty Assumption IV:

Categories Facilitate Treatment

As noted previously, the validity of

classifica-tion schemes is best evaluated by considering

their utility or “how successful they are at

achieving their specified goals” (Follete &

Houts, 1996, p 1120) The ultimate goal of a

system for organizing and understanding

hu-man behavior and its “disorders” is the opment of methods for relieving sufferingand, in the spirit of positive psychology, en-hancing well-being Therefore, to determine thevalidity of a system for classifying “mental dis-orders,” we need to ask not “How true is it?”but “How well does it facilitate the design ofeffective ways to help people live more satis-fying lives?” As Gergen and McNamee (2000)have stated, “The discourse of ‘disease’ and

devel-‘cure’ is itself optional If the goal of theprofession is to aid the client then the door

is open to the more pragmatic questions Inwhat senses is the client assisted and injured bythe demand for classification?” (pp 336–337)

As Raskin and Lewandowski (2000) state, “Ifpeople cannot reach the objective truth aboutwhat disorder really is, then viable construc-tions of disorder must compete with one an-other on the basis of their use and meaningful-ness in particular clinical situations” (p 26).Because effective interventions must beguided by theories and concepts, designing ef-fective interventions requires a conceptualiza-tion of human functioning that is firmlygrounded in a theory of how patterns of behav-ior, thought, and emotion develop and how theyare maintained despite their maladaptiveness

By design, the DSM is purely descriptive and

atheoretical Because it is atheoretical, it doesnot deal with the etiology of the disorders itdescribes Thus, it cannot provide theory-basedconceptualizations of the development andmaintenance of adjustment problems that mightlead to intervention strategies Because a system

of descriptive categories includes only lists ofgeneric problematic behaviors (“symptoms”), it

may suggest somewhat vaguely what needs to

be changed, but it cannot provide guidelines for

how to facilitate change.

Beyond the Illness Ideology and the DSM

The deconstruction of the illness ideology and

the DSM leaves us with the question, But what

will replace them? The positive psychology scribed in the rest of this handbook offers a re-placement for the illness ideology Positive psy-chology emphasizes well-being, satisfaction,happiness, interpersonal skills, perseverance,talent, wisdom, and personal responsibility It isconcerned with understanding what makes lifeworth living, with helping people become moreself-organizing and self-directed, and with rec-