The nature and effects of informal accountability for others

This is important for the field to ascertain if individuals actually do, and if so, what contributes to those feelings and why might they be motivated to seek conditions of informal acco

Florida State University Libraries

Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2006

The Nature and Effects of Informal

Accountability for Others

M Todd (Matthew Todd) Royle

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF INFORMAL

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR OTHERS

Degree Awarded:

Fall Semester, 2006

The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of M Todd Royle defended on

Gerald R Ferris Committee Member

Jack Fiorito Committee Member

Caryn L Beck-Dudley, Dean, College of Business

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have received immeasurable support from my parents Throughout the years, their support was both financial and emotional I have been so blessed to have parents to talk to when the days were long I knew my father stood behind me and would understand the long hours I knew my mother would simply offer a kind, embracing word to the weary, and assure me that

what I was doing was worth the sacrifice

A special place in my heart, and in this document is reserved for Kirstin Orphan

She has lent her care, support, and ideas to me on many occasions She has the patience

to both help troubleshoot technical aspects of my documents and to tolerate me I

sincerely appreciate what she does to buoy my spirits and calm me when times are

troubling Thank you Kirstin, my words are not enough

My brothers are also a source of both strength and inspiration It has been my

pleasure to grow up their “big brother” and an even greater pleasure to get to know them

as men Gentlemen, our surfing, diving, and golfing trips have been some of the best

times of my life Thanks

Many years from now when I look back on my life and career, I think Dr Wayne

Hochwarter will figure as one of the most influential people I ever met It was he who is

largely responsible for bringing me into the doctoral program, and it was he who most

strongly influenced the work I have done here at Florida State University Thank you so

much for taking countless hours to tutor me and develop my skills as an academic

I am also grateful for the guidance of Dr Jack Fiorito He was the first person to

take me under his wing, and let me help him write I would also like to thank Dr Gerald

Ferris for all his support, guidance, encouragement, mentoring, and financial generosity

for conference travel Their work ethics set the finest of examples for young researchers

I would also like to thank Dr Angela T Hall for her guidance and support She is

as close to sister as a man from a family of all boys will ever get She has given me so

much support and information in the course of my doctoral studies that I feel almost

embarrassed thanking her She is a wonderful sounding board, and a great friend Few

individuals have her character and keen wit

I would also be remiss if I did not thank the following individuals: Jason Stoner,

N Paul Harvey, Kenneth Harris, Jim Zboja, and Clay Vorhees Each of them has been

both a good friend and a wonderful colleague I would not have made it through this program without them

Antecedents of Informal Accountability for Others 24

Moderating Effects of Control on the Outcomes of IAFO 35

Predictors of Informal Accountability for Others 62

The Moderating Effects of Control on IAFO-Job Outcome Relationships 68

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Employee Cover Letter and Opinion Questionnaire 99

Appendix B: Supervisor Cover Letter and Evaluation Questionnaire 107

Appendix C: Human Subjects Committee Approval Letter 108

REFERENCES 109 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 129

Table 3: Study 1 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Testing the Effects of

Table 4: Study 2 Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing the Effects of Independent

Table 7: Results of Simple Slope Analysis for Significant Interactions for Study 2 92

Table 8: Summary of the Tests of Hypotheses for Study 1 93

Table 9: Summary of the Tests of Hypotheses for Study 2 94

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Model of Informal Accountability for Others 95

Figure 2: Interaction Graph of Contextual Performance Regressed on IAFO and Conservation of

Figure 3: Interaction Graph of Tension Regressed on IAFO and Self-Regulation for

Figure 4: Interaction Graph of Job Satisfaction Regressed on IAFO and Self-Regulation for

ABSTRACT

Accountability is an important organizational phenomenon that has been recognized by both academicians and practitioners as a fundamental element in the successful operation of organizations (Tetlock, 1985; 1992; Ettore, 1992) Prior research has focused on different ways

in which individuals are affected by accountability conditions However, research has heretofore overlooked the possibility that individuals seek informal accountability for others

Phenomenological researchers (Tetlock, 1985, 1992), Frink and Klimoski (1998) called for the development models of accountability that include both external (to the person) and

internal conditions, objective and subjective factors, and formal accountability mechanisms (e.g., accounting procedures) and informal accountability mechanisms (e.g., norms and culture) The current research has attempted to enfold these ideas as well as to examine informal

accountability for others as a tool of social influence with attendant job and individual outcomes

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Importance of Informal Accountability for Others

Hard on the heels of several high-profile US corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson, and most recently Fannie Mae) comes a growing concern

in both academic literature and popular press concerning a perceived lack of

accountability Accountability is a fundamental aspect of both personal and

organizational life (Tetlock, 1985, 1992), and thus is critical for society to function adequately A lack of accountability may usurp a firm’s legitimate governance system of checks and balances, consequently affecting the performance of the organization

adversely (Yarnold, Muesur, & Lyons, 1988; Enzele & Anderson, 1993) So

fundamental is accountability that Lerner and Tetlock (1999) contended that social interactions would be impossible without it

Accountability need not always be a formal system or reporting, and often

individuals will feel pulled in several different directions at once by various

constituencies (Cummings & Anton, 1990) This suggests that others are important in determining how accountable one feels To date, little research has dealt with the notion that individuals may feel accountable for others at work This is important for the field to ascertain if individuals actually do, and if so, what contributes to those feelings and why might they be motivated to seek conditions of informal accountability In order to

determine if this is the case, a model is needed that sheds light upon antecedent

conditions, consequences and possible moderators The hypothesized model of informal accountability for others in this dissertation addresses these concerns

Study Aims

Despite the fact that accountability has been a matter of public discourse and concern for some time, and is critical for proper organizational functioning, the construct

itself is vastly underdeveloped (Frink & Klimoski, 1998, 2004) To address this gap, research has advocated the development of models that incorporate both formal (e.g., reporting of supervisors and subordinates) and informal (e.g., cultural and organizational norms) dimensions (Frink & Klimoski, 1998, 2004) Tetlock (1985, 1992) contended that systematic examinations of accountability are needed to explain how individuals react to their subjective interpretations that exist in organizations

Although informal accountability for others exists in virtually all work settings, it does not mean individuals necessarily choose to accept it Frink and Klimoski (1998, 2004) noted that external conditions help shape perceptions of accountability, but that

ultimately it is the individual’s choice whether it is accepted It is my contention that individuals choose to engage in behaviors that demonstrate their accountability for others

In other words, it is not just there, it is enacted and embraced as a tool for managing the environment and reducing uncertainty This is consistent with control theory predictions that individuals will engage in such behaviors because they seek to minimize the

discrepancy between their present condition and a desired goal state (Carver & Scheier, 1982)

In this dissertation, I will systematically investigate these subjective

interpretations in order to expand the field’s understanding of an informal dimension of accountability Specifically, I propose the existence and structure of informal

accountability for others and present a model that will be empirically tested The premise

of this dissertation is based on the fact that people feel accountable for the attitudes and behaviors of others in the organization regardless of their respective ranks, positions, or any formal charter/mandate by the firm Individuals may feel that they answer for not only themselves but also for others (Morrison & Phelps, 1999) Further, when being scrutinized by others, individuals perceive that they will be either rewarded or punished

by the organization or stakeholders

In this dissertation, I intend to explicate the processes undertaken by individuals

to seek informal accountability for others, as well as examine antecedent conditions, outcomes and potential moderators Contemporary research has highlighted

accountability’s potential to affect strain reactions (e.g., Hall, Royle, Brymer, Perrewé, Ferris, & Hochwarter, in press) and contextual performance (e.g., Royle, Hall,

Hochwarter, Perrewé, & Ferris, 2005) However, to date, the field has not attempted to systematically examine if the same potentially harmful (stain) or organizationally helpful (performance) outcomes surface for those informally accountable for others

Implications for Theory and Practice

Theoretical contributions

Any investigation of informal accountability for others would be advised to discuss potential moderators, especially when considering strain outcomes Evidence of moderation would inform the field of boundary conditions (e.g., informal accountability for others might act as a stressor in the absence of control) as well as to partially replicate prior research (e.g., Hall et al., 2005)

Substantial research regarding the moderating effects of control in stress related outcomes (e.g., Dwyer & Ganster, 1991; Perrewé & Ganster, 1989; Ganster &

Schaubroeck, 1991) exists in the literature Building on this research, studies have shown that accountability acts as an agent of strain (e.g., Hall et al., 2005), most notably when control is lacking As such, findings have shown that control moderates the stressor-strain relationships such that strain is reduced and job satisfaction increased when discretionary behavior is allowed (Ganster & Schaubroeck, 1991) This dissertation will systematically evaluate if control affects informal accountability for others in the same way

It is my contention that a phenomenological (e.g., Tetlock, 1992, 1995)

examination of informal accountability for others will support prior research (Hall et al., 2005) Specifically, perceptions of accountability demands are influenced by both

objective conditions created by both formal accountability and a subjective sense of accountability of their own choosing (Tetlock, 1985, 1992) In this dissertation, I extend theory by demonstrating that individuals purposefully seek informal accountability for others Individuals choose these conditions because properly signaling informal

accountability, while possessing both individual and organizational resources, provides a

number of favorable outcomes, one of which is to reduce future uncertainty

Practical contributions

Of critical importance to this research is the evaluation of informal accountability for others to act as a stressor I also assess whether informal accountability for others affects both on-the-job (e.g., task) and contextual performance (e.g., organizational citizenship behaviors) Provided individuals have some control at work, they may choose

to publicly acknowledge their informal accountable for others This choice may be

motivated by both self-serving directives and by a sincere interest in how others do their jobs In either case, those informally accountable for others will likely spend more time at work mentoring, coordinating activities, or informally making quality control checks

It is also possible that individuals may be motivated to seek informal

accountability for others based on their interest in the well-being of the organization Further, diligent attention to how others perform their jobs may require an individual to carefully consider how well he/she is doing, and correct any deficiencies, thus improving his/her performance By assuming informal accountability for others, individuals

concerned about the firm may simultaneously reduce uncertainty for both themselves and others

Practical implications of this research relate to employees’ efforts to obtain or maintain control in the face of the possible strain of informal accountability for others For example, some individuals are inclined to enhance their senses of personal control by affecting, if not interfering, with the actions of others (Greenberger & Strasser, 1991) If informal accountability for others can be shown to pose a threat to one’s ability to cope, organizations may expect employee interference in attempts to reduce uncertainty

This reality is important because it suggests that there are accountability features

in the firm’s immediate environment that it has only a limited ability to predict, or

control, but which might be engaged in by its members However, it is possible to

identify individuals with this tendency to interfere with others It is imperative that this is recognized because it can be channeled in directions that facilitate the organization’s contextual performance (Greenberger & Strasser, 1991)

Another practical implication of this research relates to the flattening of

organizational structures and increasing spans of control (Cascio, 1995) When an

organization reduces its levels, accountability for others is promoted This is largely due

to a lack of authority and answerability with respect to position power However,

accountability mechanisms are no less important in these organizations In fact, if

informal accountability for others can be shown to positively affect performance and satisfaction, firms may choose to try to hire those with personality traits that make them likely to accept answerability for others as an informal mechanism of corporate

governance

Overview of the Relationships

I propose that both contextual/organizational factors, as well as personal or

dispositional variables, act as antecedents to informal accountability for others The environmental conditions that contribute to an individual’s attempts to seek informal accountability for others are related to embeddedness (Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski,

& Erez, 2001; Lee, Mitchell, Sablynski, Burton, & Holtom, 2004) This manifests itself

in terms of the degree to which individuals feel like they fit and are linked to others in the organization Some of these linkages may be particularly important with respect to the relative power of those with whom individuals are associated In addition, there is a relationship between being cohesively bound to a group with strong norms and being responsible for others, (i.e initiating change)(Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Hackman, 1983);

a related but distinct concept that will be discussed later in greater detail

Not all factors that push individuals to seek informal accountability for others, however, are derived from external cues Many are hypothesized to be internal to the individual As such, the remaining predictors employed in this dissertation are individual level, or dispositional, variables that promote the pursuit of informal accountability for others They included organization-based self-esteem (Pierce, Gardner, Cummings, & Dunham, 1989), self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974, 1979, 1987), individual needs

(McClelland, 1961), and conscientiousness (Hogan, 1983; McCrae & Costa, 1987)

Control, discussed earlier, is hypothesized to act a situational moderator between informal accountability for others and the dependent variables: job satisfaction,

performance (both contextual and task-related) and job induced tension

Organization

This dissertation unfolds as follows: Chapter Two will lay the foundations of informal accountability for others and review relevant literature It will also examine responsibility for others, a related, but distinct construct (e.g., Morrison & Phelps, 1999) Further, Chapter Two will include a synopsis of the seminal works and theories on the topic of accountability along with social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), and models of leader-member exchange (LMX) (e.g., Dienesch & Liden, 1986), because they act as the theoretical drivers of informal

accountability for others Finally, I systematically converge on the importance of

informal accountability for others by exposing potential gaps in existing theory and suggesting how they might be bridged

Chapter Three introduces the dissertation model and hypotheses This model includes antecedents, moderators, and outcomes A parsimonious review of findings related to both the independent and dependent will be provided prior to melding them into a

discussion of informal accountability for others

Chapter Four outlines the methods proposed to test the model A summary of a proposed research sample will be offered, as well as an explanation of requirements related to conducting hierarchical moderated regression analyses, including the

calculation of a minimum sample size and statistical power, and the contributions of structural equation modeling for confirmatory factor analysis Finally, a list of the

proposed measures to be used will be provided, which will include examples of response formats, and the coefficient alphas that have been shown in previous research as well as those created or amended for this dissertation

Chapter Five will present the findings of the data analysis Tables and figures will

be presented that highlight the regression results, coherently and succinctly frame the moderated regression results as well as graphing significant interactions Overall

synopses of the results for both samples are then provided

Chapter Six is presents a broader and deeper discussion of the findings note in Chapter Five It will lay out what was good about the study, in terms of its positive findings, its methodology, and its data analysis techniques Concomitantly, I will discuss

the shortcomings of this dissertation, discuss, post-hoc, the possible reasons for failed hypotheses, and directions for future research In addition, a section on the potential value

of this work to parishioners’ is provided followed by a brief, overall, conclusion

an eventuality

In order to avoid semantic misunderstandings, Epstein (1999) noted that the

related notion of risk is similar to uncertainty, but differs in that risk intones that

individuals have a more precise idea of the probability of some future event (e.g., a 50% chance that one’s stocks will increase in value) As noted, the “large class” associated with uncertainty contains the similar, if not sometimes interchangeable, notions of

“vagueness” and “ambiguity” In my dissertation, I will continue to use the umbrella term

“uncertainty” because it is more inclusive

Expectancies and Uncertainty

O’Driscoll and Beehr (1994) contended that uncertainty contributes to work related affect and strain They noted that the amount of uncertainty that one feels is related to unpredictability about the consequences of role performance Further, they noted that ambiguous situations are generally dissatisfying Along those lines, Beehr and Bhagat (1985) extended expectancy theory (e.g., Vroom, 1964; Porter & Lawler, 1968), which they applied to conditions of uncertainty They suggested that two potentially important types of uncertainty exist: (1) effort-to-performance (E-P) and (2)

performance-to-outcome (P-O) uncertainty In other words, people are uneasy when they

do not know if their work-related efforts will achieve even minimal standards of

acceptability Furthermore, their anxiety is heightened when they do not know if what they do will be valued by important members of the organization (P-O)

O’Driscoll and Beehr (1994), working on the assumption that employees seek social approval, noted that the way a supervisor reacts to a subordinate affects one’s willingness to stay in an organization Along with E-P and P-O expectancies, not

knowing whether a supervisor accepts one is an integral part of uncertainty In other words, not knowing if one is liked or approved of by a superior contributes to

dissatisfaction and turnover intentions Individuals will seek informal accountability conditions if they feel that their gestures will be noticed (E-P) and that they can achieve

an increase in status Further, if these overtures are well received, individuals will be perceived as informally answerable for others, which makes them appear cooperative (P-O), and thus commendable

Roles, Exchanges, and Uncertainty

Role theory (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, & Snoek, 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1978) suggests that subordinates (e.g., role takers) are attuned to expectations that are communicated by superiors (e.g., role senders) Concomitantly, role takers use these perceived expectations

to shape their attitudes and guide behavior Many of the resulting behaviors are aimed at reducing uncertainty For example, when individuals perceive that being a proactive problem solver is expected (e.g., Morrison & Phelps, 1994), they may seek informal accountability for others as a means to both exemplify this virtue and correct a

performance decrement in others for whom they answer

The role senders’ expectations may be communicated in many ways: sometimes formally, as when individuals instruct others in the requirements of their jobs; often informally, as when a colleague expresses admiration or disappointment in a particular behavior (Kahn, et al., 1964) Given the informal nature of informal accountability for others, it is unlikely that role expectations are clearly articulated in a job description Rather, individuals are likely to pursue informal accountability for others because it exemplifies virtues that leaders have publicly lauded (e.g., the desirability of being a good team player)

Clearly, individuals often behave in ways perceived to lead others to form

favorable opinions This is done because individuals are aware that impressions make a

difference in terms of how well individuals are liked, respected, or perhaps feared (Leary, 1996) Self-focused tactics are meant to enhance individuals in the eyes of those to whom they are accountable (Leary, 1996) Those who are successful in this respect are thought

to be diligent, cooperative, model employees (Zivnuska, Kacmar, Witt, Carlson, &

Bratton, 2004) Proclaiming one’s informal accountability for others might be considered

a self-focused impression management tactic because it makes one appear to be diligent, thus increasing affect and respect The benefits accrued by this action are explicated further in models of leader-member exchange (LMX)

LMX and Informal Accountability for Others

Informal accountability for others’ goal of uncertainty reduction fits with the central tenants of LMX theory If individuals make favorable impressions on supervisors, and subsequently develop positive affective relationships, they are channeled into an “in-group” (Diensch & Liden, 1986) Members of this group are privy to benefits such as positive performance evaluations, the possibilities of promotions and higher than average pay-raises They also experience fewer desires to leave the organization (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Wayne & Ferris, 1990; Wayne & Liden, 1995; Graen, Liden, & Hoel, 1982) By being part of the “in-group”, employees realize they have a positive

relationship with their supervisors This belief is well founded given the supervisors’ tendencies to direct positive attention and training opportunities to those who are

members of well liked and positively evaluated (Dienesch & Liden, 1986)

Graen, Orris and Johnson (1963) noted that individuals accomplish their work through roles Though roles may be incomplete and initially ambiguous, individuals have

a vested interest in the performance of others (Dienesch & Liden, 1986) The

establishment of roles is affected by Lord and Maher’s (1991) reciprocal influence model wherein social perception is a sense making process that mediates between the behavior

of a supervisor and subordinate or between team members In other words, it is the interpretation of behavior, as opposed to the behavior per se, that impacts the inter-dyadic relationship (Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994)

It is my contention that by signaling that one informally answers for another that he/she is making a concerted effort to shape perceptions of his/her role performance By assuming informal accountability for others, individuals will try to signal that they are

playing an important role in the organization As such, they seek to have their roles to be

associated with diligence, trust, and possibly worthy of leadership advancement

Models of Accountability

The Phenomenological View of Accountability

Lerner and Tetlock (1999) called accountability the implicit or explicit

expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others Although one might expect that accountability takes place only when a breach of conduct has occurred (Cummings & Anton, 1990), it is possible that an individual could

be held accountable and rewarded for his/her diligent stewardship absent any

wrongdoing Accountability generally implies that those who do not provide reasonable justifications for their actions will be negatively sanctioned with consequences ranging from disdainful looks to loss of one’s livelihood, liberty, or even life (Stenning, 1995) Conversely, individuals who do provide sufficient justification for their actions will experience positive consequences ranging from mitigation of punishment to reward

The phenomenological view of accountability, based on Tetlock’s (1985, 1992) social contingency model, includes several empirically distinguishable sub-components These include (a) the mere presence of others (individuals expect that another will

observe their performance (Zajonc, 1965; Zajonc & Sales 1966); (b) identifiability

(individuals believe that what they say or do will be linked to them personally) (Price, 1987; Zimbardo, 1970); (c) evaluation (participants expect that their performance will be assessed by another according to some normative ground rules and with some implied consequences) (Geen, 1991); and (d) reason-giving (individuals expect that they must give reasons for their attitudes or behaviors) (Simonson & Nowlis, 2000)

Despite the prevalence of the phenomenological view, an interesting disconnect exists in empirical investigations of accountability The social contingency model (e.g., Tetlock, 1992) proposes that accountability is largely subjective, and internal However, the preponderance of empirical accountability studies has treated accountability as an objective, external condition (Frink & Klimoski, 1998, 2004; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) This limitation has caused researchers to potentially miss many facets of informal

accountability for others leaving the construct largely underdeveloped For example, no systematic examination has been given to determining which personality variables, internal to the actors, contribute to making one feel accountable for others that may not

be their formal subordinates

Frink and Klimoski (1998, 2004) contended that too little attention has been paid

to the role of personality variables Despite this contention, some research has identified which personal characteristics interact with accountability to predict outcomes such as performance (e.g., Frink & Ferris, 1999) The conclusion of these studies is that personal characteristics, including Type A (Yarnold et al., 1988) and conscientiousness (Frink & Ferris, 1999), moderate the relationship between accountability and work outcomes

Personality variables are internal to individuals and are thus amenable to

phenomenological investigations However, with respect to informal accountability for others, some personality variables (e.g., conscientiousness) might act as antecedents as opposed to moderators For example, those high in conscientiousness might pursue informal accountability for others to reduce uncertainty and attend to the social

functioning of organization

Timing and prior knowledge of audience preference A major feature of the

phenomenological view is its attention to individuals’ behaviors depending on the time at

which they realize that they are accountable It is possible that individuals know a-priori

that they are accountable for a given course of action On the other hand, they may not know the audience to whom they answer until they have already made pertinent

decisions The phenomenological view predicts different behaviors based on this

accountable, and if they know the attitudes of the audience to whom they answer, they differentially apply any or all of these strategies

Generally, studies have shown that when individuals believe they have to justify their views, they express opinions consistent with those perceived to be held by the audience (e.g., Brief, Dukerich, & Doran, 1991) These findings help substantiate

Tetlock’s (1985, 1992) contention that the acceptability heuristic (often resulting in the rendering of lower quality, less cogent and complex decisions), is likely to occur as individuals seek to conform as opposed to come up with the “best” solution Individuals

do so because it is easier to conform than to critique their own thoughts (Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) It is possible that being informally accountable for others fosters the enactment of the acceptability heuristic if individuals know the

evaluative internal audience personally and are able to guess the reasons to they attribute failure or success For example, if the others for whom individuals are informally

accountable fail, and the evaluating audience thinks it is because they are unmotivated, they are likely to claim that they did not push hard enough to succeed

If individuals do not know the audience’s opinions, and thus cannot automatically conform, Tetlock (1985, 1992) contended that they would preemptively self-criticize Studies have supported this hypothesis in both laboratory experiments (Mero &

Motowidlo, 1995) and field studies (Koonce, Anderson, & Marchant, 1995; Lord, 1992)

In terms of proactive behaviors, pre-emptive self-criticism is likely to yield the most comprehensive and integrative decision making strategies In effect, individuals consider

as many “angles” as possible before determining the most appropriate course of action

Preemptive self-criticism plays a part in individuals’ pursuit of informal

accountability for others For example, individuals may think carefully about how others are doing their jobs and seek to be accountable for those who are both performing well and struggling Individuals might like to be believed to be informally accountable for others who do well because they might be able to bask in their reflected glory, thus ingratiating themselves to powerful others in the organization On the other hand,

individuals may seek to be informally accountable for poorly performing individuals because they feel that their continued underachievement threatens to undermine the well

being of the organization as a whole As such, individuals may choose to assume

informal accountability for others in order to promote corrective measures

Not knowing the opinions of the reviewing audience is not certain to produce integrative strategic thinking For example, both cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and impression management theories (Schlenker, 1980); Tetlock (1985, 1992), predict that individuals will engage in retrospective rationality (i.e., defensive bolstering) when their behaviors are at odds with the opinions and standards of the reviewing audience Staw and Ross (1980) validated this assumption by showing that post-decisional

accountability encouraged individuals to generate reasons as why they were not wrong to act as they did Individuals might also try to undermine opponents’ claims to the contrary Escalation of commitment research indicates that post-decisional accountability increases feelings of obligation to a course of action, especially for those that resulted in a loss (e.g., Conlon & Wolf, 1980; Fox & Staw, 1979)

It is likely the case that defensive bolstering will occur when things go wrong even if one is only informally accountable for another individual For example, if an individual decided to mentor an employee, and that individual fails to develop, the

mentor might be inclined to retrospectively bolster The mentor might claim “he looked good on paper… anybody would agree that he’s a go-getter… it’s not my fault he fizzled out, I did everything I could.” This defensive bolstering helps buoy the mentor’s spirits in the event that the constituency to which he/she is informally accountable assails his/her competency as a mentor

In order to understand the phenomenon of being accountable, one idea emerges time and again Aside from simply being apprehensive about being negatively evaluated, individuals care about how they are viewed because, to some extent, they wish to reduce uncertainty They may employ numerous strategies like those mentioned above (e.g., preemptive self-criticism, defensive bolstering) in order to maintain a standing within the organization that affords some peace of mind In essence, they want to behave in ways that help ensure that they remain employable and promotable

Pyramid Model of Accountability

Accountability, in Schlenker’s terms, refers to being answerable to audiences for performing to certain prescribed standards This entails meeting obligations, duties, and

expectations (Schlenker, 1986; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989; Schlenker, Weigold, & Doherty, 1991) The dimensions of these models are more formal and objective than are phenomenological conceptualizations of accountability

Schlenker et al (1991) contended that when individuals are accountable, they could be made to answer for attitudes or justify their conduct These behaviors can be scrutinized, judged, sanctioned, and potentially rewarded by audiences (Semin &

Manstead, 1983; Tetlock, 1985, 1992) Individuals establish prescriptions for conduct, judge others’ performances in relation to those standards, and distribute rewards and punishments based on these assessments

The “evaluative reckonings” described by Schlenker and colleagues (e.g.,

Schlenker, 1986, Schlenker & Weigold, 1989; Schlenker et al., 1991) are value-laden judgments that require an evaluator to have information about three key elements in order

to assign culpability The elements necessary to make these judgments are: (1) the

prescriptions that should be guiding the actor's conduct on the occasion, (2) the event that occurred that is relevant to those prescriptions, and (3) a set of identity images that are

relevant to the event and prescriptions and that describe the actor's roles, qualities,

convictions, and aspirations

For example, parents, by virtue of their identities, are obligated to treat their children in socially prescribed ways, and can be negatively sanctioned should they fail to

do so (Schlenker et al., 1994) Of course, they may also be lauded for doing an especially meritorious job In order to fully understand the context of an evaluation, one needs information not only about the event itself but also about the relevant prescriptions and the characteristics of the actor involved (Schlenker et al., 1994) Without exception, evaluations involve information about all three elements, although the evaluator may tacitly assume some of this information

The three elements, and the linkages among them, depict a triangle when

visualized, thus the classification Schlenker et al (1990) contended that the combined strength of the three linkages determines how responsible an individual is judged to be That is, individuals are held responsible to the extent that (a) a clear set of prescriptions is applicable to the event (prescription–event link), (b) the prescriptions are perceived to bind an individual by virtue of his or her identity (prescription–identity link), and (c) the

individual is associated with the event, especially if that person is thought to have had personal control over the event, (identity–event link)

In this respect, responsibility is the “adhesive” that binds individuals to events and

to relevant prescriptions that govern their conduct It is in this manner that responsibility provides a basis for judgment and sanctioning (Schlenker et al., 1994) When an

evaluating audience is added to the model in the form of “looking down” and appraising the configuration of the elements and linkages, the image is that of a pyramid (Schlenker, 1986) It is the presence of an evaluative audience and the individual’s answerability to it that then moves the individual from being responsible to being accountable

It is my contention that informal accountability for others can also be viewed in terms of these linkages For example, organizational culture may dictate that established members of a firm mentor new hires (prescription-event link) As established members in good standing, individuals thus feel obligated to meet and orient a new member

(prescription-identity link) The established members know the “rule” that new members need their tutelage and have the ability to give of their time and knowledge (prescription-event link) When these conditions are met and observed by an audience with reward and sanctioning power, individuals are deemed informally accountable for others It is likely that established employees would choose to engage in these activities, thus becoming informally accountable for others, in order to maintain or increase their good standing within the organization

Cummings and Anton’s Conceptualization of Accountability

Cummings and Anton (1990) take a somewhat different approach in defining and explaining responsibility Based on the attribution literature developed by Heider (1958), they define responsibility in terms of a person’s causal influence on a situation They use this definition to highlight the actor’s causal volition in an event This person can affect the situation directly or indirectly, proximally or distally (Cummings & Anton, 1990) The relationship is simple, physical, and linear in terms of the individual and his/her responsibility Therefore, any condition that can be attributed either directly or indirectly

to a one’s influence increases his/her perceived responsibility

Cummings and Anton (1990) also claimed that felt responsibility and accountability are subsequent and distinct outcomes of one’s responsibility (as defined by his/her causal

influence) Further, they argued that felt responsibility is an internal path whereas

accountability is an external, public, and visible social process It is my contention that informal accountability for others may have both internal and external components, but that it is the external, visible, dimension that individuals seek and employ to affect their standing within an organization

Cummings and Anton (1990) did not consider the concept of responsibility and an individual’s ability to recognize it to be identical and comparable Whereas Schlenker considered responsibility an external function of conditions related to events, identity, and prescriptions, Cummings and Anton considered it contingent on individuals’ abilities

to perceive volitional control If a person accepts responsibility he/she assumes “felt responsibility”, a concept closer to accountability due to the evaluation, observation, and personal outcomes that might accompany felt responsibility (Frink & Klimoski, 1998)

Cummings and Anton (1990) proposed that three contingent conditions determine accountability In order to be considered accountable, individuals must: 1) have the capacity to behave rationally, 2) engage in behaviors wherein some outcome is

foreseeable, and 3) deviate from previously stated expectations Cummings and Anton (1990) diverged somewhat from notions typically found in accountability theory

Specifically, they considered deviation from a standard to be a precondition of

accountability whereas others posited that the accountability evaluations could detect either alignment or deviation

Construct Domain: Defining Informal Accountability for Others

My conceptualization of informal accountability for others borrows from

Morrison and Phelps’s (1999) discussion They noted that individuals believe that they are personally obligated to bring about constructive change, which affects (benefits), either directly or indirectly, both themselves and others Another portion comes from Lerner and Tetlock (1999), who called accountability the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, or actions to others Still another comes from Ferris, Mitchell, Canavan, Frink, and Hopper (1995), who

considered accountability to be a function of how much a person is observed and

evaluated by powerful others who have reward or sanctioning power, and the extent to which valued rewards (or feared sanctions) follow these evaluations

Though informative in their own rights, these definitions fail to tap the entire spectrum of informal accountability for others In fact, the notion that others are the focus

of accountability is noticeably missing in its entirety As such, I define informal

accountability for others as follows:

Informal accountability for others is a public demonstration that one is willing to answer for the attitudes and behaviors of individuals in an

organization regardless of formal position within the firm, rank, or mandate

by the organization

Establishing the Construct Domain of Informal Accountability for Others

To this point, I have provided an overview of the phenomenological literature relevant to different facets of accountability I have also provided a definition for

informal accountability for others based on prior related research In this section of my dissertation, I adopt social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964; Porter & Lawler, 1968) the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), and the tenants

of LMX theories (e.g., Graen, et al., 1963; Dienesch & Liden, 1986) as theoretical

frameworks for developing the concept of informal accountability for others Prominent

in the exchange perspectives is the concept of unspecified obligations That is, when one party does a favor for another, there is an expectation of some future return, although exactly when that favor needs to be returned and what form it will take is often unclear (Kaufman, Stamper, & Tesluk, 2001; Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997)

Much of the research in reciprocity involves the informal rules related to the exchange of gifts (Blau, 1977) Although gifts (in this case the gift of sticking one’s neck out for another person), in theory, are given voluntarily, they are actually proffered and repaid under obligation The currency of exchange is not only goods or material gifts, but also services, favors, and assistance as well (Mauss, 1954; Blau, 1977) Members who fail to comply with expectations of reciprocity might be distrusted in future interactions

or socially castigated (Gouldner, 1960) The implications for informal accountability for others are clear Those who willingly answer for others expect something in return Namely, the party that is answerable expects some compliance to demands and goal directed effort to be reciprocated

The prospect of success, with respect to appearing informally accountable for others, is primarily affected by the same social exchange factors used in making

attributions (Blau, 1964) In other words, in order for individuals to expect that being viewed as informally accountable for others will lead to desired outcomes, others for whom they are accountable must interact with them appropriately, believe that their best interests are being protected, and not feel overtly manipulated If the informally

accountable individual can achieve this, social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) predicts the creation of a lasting relationship marked by trust and mutual reciprocity This recurrent interaction reduces opportunism and minimizes uncertainty Additionally, informally accountable individuals would expect others to direct their efforts to organizational and work specific goals that make both the answerable party and themselves look better

LMX theories also help carve a niche for the functionality of being informally accountable for others Subordinates might use being informally accountable for others as

a way to gain entrance to an “in-group” based on their belief that doing so will result in favorable, reciprocal interaction (e.g., Dienesch & Liden, 1986) In addition to gaining better performance ratings (e.g., Wayne & Liden, 1995), “in-group” members might actually be performing better because they have been given preference in training,

development, mentoring, and communication This condition may be the impetus needed

to answer for others over whom they have no formal authority

Despite the different theoretical drivers that I have noted above, there is a related construct in the literature which must be separated from informal accountability for others In other words, in addition to specifying what informal accountability for others

is, I must distinguish it from a conceptually similar stream of research - in this case, responsibility for others

Responsibility for others Most of what has been discussed with respect to

responsibility in past research has involved the relationship of events and roles Little research has dealt with the notion that individuals may feel responsible for aspects of the organizational environment that affect others Responsibility for others has also been characterized as a stressor (Begley, 1994) because it indicates the extent to which an individual (e.g., manager) feels required to counsel subordinates and coach them in decision-making Further, responsibility for others is a potential stressor to the extent

that manager’s decisions affect the well-being, livelihood and feelings of their

subordinates, as well as the viability of the organization

Ivancevich and Matteson (1980) noted that different types of responsibility

unequally affect others They broadly categorized the construct in terms of “responsibility for things” and “responsibility for people.” Though the distinction is somewhat artificial, being responsible for things like budgets, machinery, or property does not affect strain in the same way as being responsible for people In an earlier study, Wardwell, Hyman, and Bahson (1960) found that those with high levels of responsibility for people, as opposed

to things, were more likely to suffer from heart disease French and Caplan (1970)

studied NASA employees and reached similar conclusions They hypothesized that responsibility for people contributed to job-related stress for clerical, managerial and technical employees They found that the more responsibility for people individuals had, the more likely they were to smoke heavily, have high cholesterol, and elevated blood pressure Conversely, those higher in responsibility for things were lower on those

indicators

One possible explanation for these observed findings is that when individuals are more responsible for people they tend to have more face-to-face meetings, which can promote work overload and heightened deadline pressures Another possibility is that with more interaction comes the possibility of more unpleasant interpersonal decisions (Ivancevich

& Matteson, 1980) Still another is that those in formal positions may experience role conflict and role ambiguity For example, Ivancevich and Matteson (1980) noted that when responsibility for people acts as a stressor, eliminating the conditions is not a solution In fact, some employees must be responsible for others However, careful attention to fit between individuals and the job might result in the selection of individuals who are less likely to experience strain

Morrison and Phelps (1999) offer a slightly different perspective They cast responsibility for others as an extra-role activity manifested by individuals’ decisions to take charge at work Conversely, being informally accountable for others does not

necessarily promote beneficial organizational change It is possible that individuals embrace accountability for others to simply manage the impressions others have of them

in order to reduce uncertainty

Critical for determining the extent to which individuals engage in taking charge are both contextual and individual factors Morrison and Phelps (1999) noted that two distinct factors affect individuals’ decision to take charge: an organizational culture which

supports this behavior and their own initiative towards internal improvement In addition, there is an association between those who are cohesively bound to a group with strong norms and being responsible for others (i.e initiating change)(Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Hackman, 1983) Informal accountability for others similarly involves the level to which

an individual is enmeshed within the social structure and the degree to which others engage in certain behaviors For example, if top management appears to strongly support the idea that individuals seek out conditions of informal accountability for others,

members might “take charge”

Though the work of Morrison and Phelps (1999) touches on several facets similar

to informal accountability for others, there are several noteworthy differences

Responsibility for others intones individuals’ efforts towards improvement by

participation in activities deemed good for the organization There is no explicit

assumption that they perceive that they are being watched, rewarded or punished

Informal accountability for others, on the other hand, involves individuals’ behaving in a certain way because they are being watched and rewarded or at least not punished for doing so

Secondly, this research relaxes the assumption that changes that occur due to conditions of informal accountability for others are necessarily aimed at organizational improvement Implicit in Morrison and Phelps’ (1999) work is the assumption that organizations direct individuals to positions of responsibility for others in attempts to make a more cohesive and better functioning organization Though informal

accountability for others may also foster these outcomes, those wishing to manage

impressions may also use it opportunistically as a means to reduce their level of

uncertainty and to secure outcomes deemed desirable

aspect of the phenomenon that has been overlooked is informal accountability for others Specifically, the field does not have a model of how informally accountable individuals

in organizations behave The field will be well served by illuminating the circumstances under which individuals will choose to answer for the behaviors and attitudes of others and better understanding how individuals believe that doing so will help them advance their careers and reduce the potentially unpleasant side-effects of uncertainty Using the phenomenological view (Tetlock, 1985, 1992), I propose a model of informal

accountability for others that examines antecedent, moderator, and consequent

relationships This model and the specific hypotheses will be examined in depth in the following chapter

CHAPTER THREE

MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

Although prior research has established both the theoretical and empirical

importance of accountability in organizations, a model of informal accountability for others has been overlooked (Hall, Blass, & Ferris, 2003; Frink & Klimoski, 1998, 2004) Such an oversight is not surprising given the lack of comprehensive models of formal accountability, the more commonly studied aspect of the construct Building on this reality, the field needs to evaluate informal and not just formal systems of accountability

It is my intention in this dissertation to extend the state of research by developing the idea

of informal accountability for others by couching it in the greater rubric of accountability research To do this, I evaluate its potential as a means to manage impressions, to reduce uncertainty, and to contribute to satisfaction and better job and contextual performance

In addition to examining informal systems, research should consider the

subjective components of rewards, and perceptions of the individual about the audiences (both internal and external) to whom he/she answers To help address these theoretical gaps in the literature, I propose a model of informal accountability for others that

incorporates informal and subjective elements (e.g., individual needs and satisfaction) suggested by Frink and Klimoski (1998, 2004) The model tested in this dissertation is in Figure 1

The following antecedents of informal accountability for others will be

empirically evaluated: conscientiousness, organization-based esteem,

self-monitoring, the need for affiliation, power and achievement, and one’s motivation to acquire and maintain a positive image Embeddedness, an organizational level variable, is posited to act as an antecedent to informal accountability for others as well The

outcomes of informal accountability for others that will be investigated include: induced tension, job satisfaction, and both contextual and job performance Finally, the moderating role of control on the relationship of informal accountability for others and each outcome will be examined

job-Antecedents of Informal Accountability for Others

Individuals are innately motivated to engage themselves in both their

organizational and personal lives, often for different reasons In other words, individuals have needs and participate in activities that help them meet these needs They also have personality traits that incline them to behave in certain ways Frink and Klimoski (1998, 2004) encouraged researchers to incorporate more personality characteristics in the study

of accountability In attempts to help accomplish this, I propose several individual level traits and needs that affect the extent to which individuals seek informally accountable for others

Organization Based Self-Esteem

Pierce, Gardner, Cummings, and Dunham (1989) developed the concept of

organization-based self-esteem (OBSE) This research extends Coopersmith's (1967) contention that self-esteem reflects the extent to which individuals believe they are capable, significant, and worthy Organization-based self-esteem reflects individuals’ feelings of personal adequacy and worthiness as employees Thus, employees with high organization-based self-esteem believe that they are important, meaningful, and

worthwhile Organization-based self-esteem is one component of overall self-esteem that,

in turn, is a facet of self-identity

However, OBSE differs from global self-esteem and self-identity in that it is more

context-specific and, thus, is more responsive to proximal factors at work For example, although global self-esteem and self-identity are relatively stable individual differences, they are based in large part on primary (e.g., family members) socialization experiences (Coopersmith, 1967) On the other hand, OBSE evolves over time based on an

employee's cumulative experiences within a specific organization

According to Korman’s (1970, 1976) consistency model of motivation, esteem is central to the explanation of employee motivation, attitudes, and behaviors OBSE extends this reasoning by positing that experiences at work shape self-esteem beliefs, which subsequently affect attitudes and behaviors For example, those who perform well on a project will infer they are worthy and capable (Pierce et al., 1989) When the organization acknowledges this performance (e.g., praises the work), it adds to

self-the individual’s organization-based self-esteem and makes it more likely that furself-ther beneficial, self-directed, efforts will occur In essence, successes enact a spiral of esteem building situations I contend that positive reciprocal interaction makes it more likely that individuals will choose informal accountability for others Accountability for others signals that one is a responsible, team player and the praise garnered bolsters one’s OBSE

Prior research has shown high self-esteem individuals to be more tolerant of risk, and less likely to stick to conventional roles within an organization (Robbins, 2003) Those high in self-esteem are also likely to be high in self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) At the organizational level, efficacy perceptions across situations lend themselves to OBSE (Pierce et al., 1989) However, organization-based self-esteem differs from perceptions of efficacy in one important respect OBSE describes a person’s self-perceived competence and worth as an organizational member whereas self-efficacy indicates a belief that this competence can be translated into an action that will result in successful performance

According to Korman’s (1970, 1976) those who are high in OBSE believe

themselves to be esteemed and competent As such, they are motivated to engage in activities that validate these feelings To the extent that those in the organization believe that appearing nurturing, responsible, and protective of others, (all facets of how one who

is informally accountable for others might act) is worthy of praise, those high in OBSE will be motivated to exemplify these virtues because it enhances their sense of worth I propose, therefore, that those who feel that they are worthwhile also believe that they are similarly esteemed by the organization

Hypothesis 1: Those high in OBSE will seek more informal accountability for others

McClelland’s Theory of Needs

The theory of needs is one of the most omni-present and pragmatic in

organizational scholarship Developed by McClelland (1961, 1975, 1985), needs theory contends that individuals are motivated by three fundamental needs: achievement,

affiliation, and power I hypothesize that each of these dimensions will affect informal accountability for others Winter (1991) argued that these needs not only motivate

individuals, but also include many of the most important human goals and concerns

Need for achievement McClelland’s (1961, 1971, 1985) need for achievement

describes a person’s drive to excel with respect to some established set of standards Individuals’ achievement needs are satisfied when they are able to actualize their own purposes regardless of the situations of others (Yamaguchi, 2003) Those high in

achievement needs dislike succeeding by chance and seek personal responsibility for their success or failure rather than leaving the outcome to external forces (Robbins, 2003) For example, individuals high in achievement motivation experience joy or

sadness contingent upon the outcome of their efforts (McClelland & Koestner, 1992) McClelland (1961, 1975, 1985) found that individuals high in this dimension differentiate themselves from others by their desire to perform at a higher lever than others Although achievement needs may be measured in terms of mastery and competitiveness, they may also be reflected in the desire to excel in relation to themselves (Heintz & Steele-Johnson, 2004) High needs for achievement move individuals to seek moderately difficult

vocations as well (McClelland & Koestner, 1992) Further, high achievement individuals are more satisfied in jobs that involve both high skill levels and difficult challenges (Eisenberger, Jones, Stinglhamber, Shanock, & Randall, 2005) Finally, individuals high

in achievement needs more frequently seek feedback on their progress towards goal completion (McAdams, 1994; Emmons, 1997)

McClelland (1961, 1971, 1985) noted that high in achievement needs individuals seek situations in which they can obtain personal responsibility for finding novel

solutions to problems The objective to do so is to alleviate trepidations about their future

in the organization These individuals tend to be very persistent with respect to solving problems (McClelland & Koestner, 1992) Further, research has indicated that individuals with high achievement needs are more effective motivators and leaders (McNeese-Smith, 1999; Henderson, 1993, 1995) Finally, the motivation to assume leadership and behave opportunistically is consistent with behaviors of individuals high in achievement needs (Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, & Ferris, 2005)

Brunstein and Maier (2005) noted that two separate but interacting dimensions drive achievement needs: implicit and explicit motives Implicit motives energize

spontaneous impulses to act (e.g., effective task performance) Explicit motives, on the other hand, are manifested by deliberate choice behaviors (e.g., explicitly stated

preferences for difficult tasks) As such, high achievement needs map appropriately onto

a drive to be informally accountable for others Specifically, high achievement needs might drive individuals to seek informal accountability for others because the successful coordination of others’ activities might translate directly into better job performance evaluations (both for them and for those for whom they are informally accountable) This act might be spontaneously impulsive In addition, those who claim informal

accountability for others, and are believed to be effective in this capacity might be

thought to possess better leadership potential and appear to be more diligent team players Being viewed as an effective leader might then be considered an explicit motive

Hypothesis 2: Those high in achievement needs will seek more informal

accountability for others

Need for power The need for power involves the desire to be perceived as

influential It may manifest itself in attempts to make others behave as one would like, or

in a manner that they might not have otherwise (McClelland, 1961, 1975, 1985) In other words, these individuals seek position power that can compel the actions of others Those high in power needs prefer being placed in competitive, status-driven situations and concern themselves with at least the appearance of possessing status (Veroff, 1992) Individuals high in power needs are concerned with ensuring that the means by which they influence others are within their control (Veroff, 1992; McAdams, 1994; Emmons, 1997) Further, in order to maintain viable interdependent relationships with others, individuals with high power needs must often restrain these desires (Yamaguchi, 2003)

Central to one’s need for power is gaining influence over others (McClelland,

1961, 1975, 1985; Robbins, 2003; Yamaguchi, 2003) Individuals with influence can then parlay informal accountability for others into the accumulation of additional resources that serve to enhance their status Prior research indicated that expression of power needs might have a mixed effect on how others are perceived For example, direct subordinates often react negatively to leaders high in power needs whereas clients, and others more distal in the organization view them more positively (McNeese-Smith, 1999; Henderson,

1993, 1995) However, despite these findings, interpersonal failings caused by excessive displays of power seeking have been shown to derail managers (Van Velsor & Leslie, 1995)

When an individual becomes informally accountable for others, the target

becomes cognizant of it Given the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Meyer & Allen, 1997), individuals see that the accountable party has extended a benefit and reciprocate with actions that align with the attitudes or behaviors to repay their obligations

Individuals who are cognizant that another person has been helpful will reciprocate by ensuring that relevant goals are met or corrective measures taken if perceived

performance decrements exist For one high in power needs, this suggests that others will often indirectly cede a portion of their autonomy to them

As a consequence, it is plausible that positive changes to his/her job might occur For example, he/she may gain more social prestige or may be promoted to a job with even more formal, objective accountability At a minimum, those who are known to be informally accountable for others perceive a status differential that appeals to those who seek power

Hypothesis 3: Those with high power needs will seek more informal

accountability for others

Need for affiliation The need for affiliation is the desire to have close, friendly

relationships with others (McClelland, 1961, 1985; Robbins, 2003) Those high in this dimension tend to spend considerable time seeking interactions with others (Koestner & McClelland, 1992) Further, those with strong affiliation needs pursue team activities in which interdependence and cooperation with others are emphasized (Yamaguchi, 2003) Though not as thoroughly studied as the other two dimensions of the McClelland’s needs theory (Robbins, 2003), it does warrant discussion with respect to the decision to pursue informal accountability for others For those who value friendship and prefer cooperation over competition, demonstrating their willingness to accept accountability for others might be taken as a sign of organizational citizenship (McClelland, 1961, 1975, 1985) High levels of affiliation needs incline individuals to be both sympathetic and

accommodating towards others (Koestner & McClelland, 1992) Prior research has noted

a relationship between individuals’ motivation for affiliation and their abilities to lead Specifically, McNeese-Smith (1999) demonstrated a positive relationship between high affiliation needs and enabling others to act in ways deemed desirable

The idea of enabling others is particularly important in collectivistic organizations where members value interdependence and view the self as an aspect of the larger group (Triandis, 1984; Ang & Chang, 1999) Research has indicated a positive correlation between achievement needs and affiliation needs thus, providing support for the

argument that achievement in the collectivistic context does not necessarily encompass individualism, a key element in Western conceptualizations of achievement (Ang & Chang, 1999) In other words, in some cultural contexts, getting ahead means getting along

In the course of social interaction, employees relay pieces of important

information about how to behave at work The norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Meyer & Allen, 1997) predicts that employees will exchange useful information because they feel they owe it to the other party An understanding of the expectations associated with informal accountability for others may be more developed in those high in affiliation needs because they are strongly motivated to foster social ties

Building on this discussion, it is likely that those high in affiliation needs will seek more informal accountability Although doing so can be risky, seeking informal accountability for others may be attractive to those with high affiliation needs because it offers the opportunity to build informal teams and “feel a part of something”

Furthermore, it fosters strong interpersonal associations (McClelland, 1961, 1975, 1985) This helps allay the fears that those with high affiliation needs have of being ostracized (Koestner & McClelland, 1992) These strong interpersonal associations may be used as a resource in the future if one operates in a threatening or uncertain setting

Hypothesis 4: Those with a high needs for affiliation will seek out informal

accountability for others

Self-Monitoring

Self-monitoring is defined as an individual's ability to construct an appropriate pattern of social behavior for a particular context (Douglas & Gardner, 2004) Further, Snyder (1974, 1979, 1987) concluded that individuals are motivated to (a) control their behavior and attention, (b) show sensitivity to social cues, and (c) exhibit socially appropriate behaviors However, individuals vary in the extent to which they are attentive and

responsive to situational cues due to their relative abilities to self-monitor (Cady & Fandt, 2001)

High self-monitors exhibit high levels of conformity by tailoring their behavior to fit social appropriateness High self-monitors are able to manipulate and evaluate

information and others (Cady & Fandt, 2001) As such, they may also be better able to gather information relevant to informal accountability for others For example, high self-monitors inherently possess aptitudes that enable them to identify subtle social cues related to what they should be doing, and how to best get what they want (Cady & Fandt, 2001) Further, high self-monitors are capable of seeing that being informally

accountable for others can be rewarding Since self-monitors are able to carefully craft information and impressions, it is likely that others will comply with their requests

because they seem sincere and mutually beneficial

Hypothesis 5: High self-monitors seek more informal accountability for others

Conscientiousness

Conscientiousness has been described both as an ability to conform to socially prescribed notions of impulse control and as a strategic way to deal with others (Hogan & Ones, 1997) It is strategic in the sense that dutiful attention to detail and procedure might allow one to appear more attractive to leaders Conscientiousness also refers to

individuals’ tendencies to apply themselves to their work (Barrick & Mount, 1993) Further, they typically work harder and more efficiently than others Roberts,

Chernyshenko, Stark and Goldberg (2005) noted that conscientiousness is associated with the maintenance of order, achievement, diligence, dependability, impulse control, and responsibility In contrast, those low on the conscientiousness dimension are often remiss

in their duties They are unproductive and erode the economic well being of the

organization because they are not motivated to achieve, act responsibly, or be dependable (Hogan & Ones, 1997)

As expected, conscientiousness has been shown to predict task performance (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993), contextual performance (Hogan, Rybicki,

Motowidlo, & Borman, 1998; Organ, 1994; Organ & Ryan, 1995), and other outcomes that help facilitate proper social and organizational functioning (Roberts et al., 2005) For example, conscientiousness has been associated with long-term career success (Judge,