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Tiêu đề The Impact of Audit Quality on Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence in Vietnam
Tác giả Lê Thị Anh Thư
Người hướng dẫn Dr. Lê Hồ An Châu
Trường học University of Economics
Chuyên ngành Development Economics
Thể loại Thesis
Năm xuất bản 2016
Thành phố Ho Chi Minh City
Định dạng
Số trang 75
Dung lượng 1,7 MB

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Cấu trúc

  • CHAPTER 1:INTODUCTION (0)
    • 1.1. P ROBLEM STATEMENT (10)
    • 1.2. R ESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS (12)
    • 1.3. R ESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA (12)
    • 1.4. R ESEARCH C ONTRIBUTION (13)
    • 1.5. T HESIS STRUCTURE (13)
  • CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF (0)
    • 2.1 T HEORETICAL LITERATURE OF AUDIT QUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE (14)
      • 2.1.1. Audit quality definition and relevant theoretical framework (14)
        • 2.1.1.1. Agency Theory (15)
        • 2.1.1.2. The stakeholder theory (16)
        • 2.1.1.3. Theory of Asymmetric Information (18)
      • 2.1.2. Definition and measure of firm performance (19)
    • 2.2. E MPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT THE IMPACT OF AUDIT QUALITY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE (20)
      • 2.2.1. The impact of audit rotation on firm performance (21)
      • 2.2.2. The impact of audit reputation on firm performance (25)
      • 2.2.3. The impact of audit firm experience on firm performance (26)
      • 2.2.4. The effect of Vietnamese Auditing Standards (VSA 220) on “Quality control of (27)
    • 2.3. T HE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (28)
  • CHAPTER 3:RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA (0)
    • 3.1. D ATA COLLECTION (29)
    • 3.2. M ETHODOLOGY (29)
  • CHAPTER 4:DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS (0)
    • 4.1. D ESCRIPTIVE S TATISTICS AND BASIC ESTIMATION (36)
      • 4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics (36)
      • 4.1.2. The correlation matrix of variables (41)
      • 4.1.3. Heteroskedasticity (43)
      • 4.1.4. Identification of Endogeneity Problem (43)
    • 4.2. R EGRESSION R ESULTS AND D ISCUSSION (44)
      • 4.2.1. Audit quality and firm performance measured by ROA (44)
      • 4.2.2: Audit quality and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q (47)
      • 4.2.3: Audit quality and firm performance measured by Z-Score (48)
  • CHAPTER 5:CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (0)
    • 5.1. M AIN F INDINGS (50)
    • 5.2. P OLICY I MPLICATION (51)
    • 5.3. L IMITATION AND FURTHER RESEARCH (52)

Nội dung

In this thesis, audit quality is measured by three variables including audit rotation, audit reputation and audit experience whereas firm performance is proxied by accounting profits ROA

P ROBLEM STATEMENT

From the agency theory’s perspective, the separation of function between ownership and management in corporation leads to information asymmetry problem and conflict of interest between managers and shareholders The role of third party who gives the opinion related to financial information disclosure is very important and audit quality is considered as an external monitoring factor which has a significant effect on firm performance There are some previous studies which investigate the role of audit quality in terms of its effect on firm performance However, they use the different measures of audit quality and conduct in different markets, so the empirical results are inconsistent Some studies point out that the impact of audit quality on firm performance is positive whereas other studies find negative or insignificant effects on firm performance

However, the role of audit quality as a key driver of firm performance has not yet attracted sufficient attention from researchers and policy makers in Vietnam This may result in the fact that investors lack the proper consideration about audit quality which might affect the financial disclosure and useful information for investors’ decision-making

In the process of integration and development, Vietnam has more opportunities to approach and take part in the global organization such as WTO, TPP etc One of the difficulties in the foreseen future isto guarantee the reliance and the transparency of declared financial information to attract foreign investment and create the fair competitive environment The collapse of Arthur Andersen, one of the five biggest audit firms (Big 5) in 2002, the scandal and infringement related to audit quality recently and the integrity of firms’ financial statements force to enhance the investors’ perception about the audit quality and even the pressure to improve the audit quality of external parties In Vietnam, there is also a rising concern about this issue after a serial of scandal of listed companies in the stock exchange such as the evaporated inventories of Truong Thanh Corp (TTF), NTACO Corp (ATA) and bad debt from Ocean Group (OGC) which led to sharp deterioration in stock market and investor’s belief

Audit quality is a controversial issue between the legislators and a key consideration for auditors The audit quality framework of United Kingdom Financial Reporting Council (UKFRC) public in 2008 identifies key determinants of audit quality including culture within audit firm, skills and quality of auditors, the effectiveness of audit process, reliability and usefulness of audit reporting and outside factors According to DeAngelo(1981) and PCAOB (2011), audit quality is identified as the probability of detecting errors or omissions which affect the financial statements in material aspects IFAC (International Federation of Accountants) states that audit quality is the most fundamental characteristic of international auditing standards, it should be capable of consistent interpretation, unambiguous translation, enforceable and designed to achieve a high quality of audit In Vietnamese Standards Auditing 220 (VSA 220) about Quality of auditing activities, audit quality refers to the degree of satisfaction of users of the audit results as the objectivity and reliability of the opinion expressed, and of the entity under audit as to the auditor’s recommendations with the view to improve the business efficiency of the entity within a time limit and at a reasonable price

There is no consensus among researchers about the method to measure audit quality Previous studies use indirect measurement such as audit rotation and audit fees (Sayyar et al., 2015),audit firm size, litigation, auditor tenure, non-audit services, industry experience and peer review (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013) According to Sori et al., (2006), size of audit firm is a good proxy for audit quality because the large audit firm with better reputation, experienced practitioners, superior technology and abundant financial resources will give assurance of audit opinion about the financial status of audited companies Moreover, the large audit firm size might not be pressured by revenue from big clients that affect its independence and objectivity when expressing audit opinion

The initial auditing institution appeared early in 1942, which is the institute of Internal Auditors in the United States of America In Vietnam, the independent auditing firms started later in 1991 To maintain the audit quality, the audit firms and auditors have to comply with the audit standards that have been set by Ministry of Finance and Vietnam Association of Certified Public Accountants (VACPA) Moreover, auditors also conform to the Ethical Standards including the basic principles: integrity, independence, prudence and professional competence The main motivation of principles is to maintain both independence of mind and independence of appearance (ISA 200, 2009) and audit rotation is considered a representative variable for audit independence

In an attempt to enforce and improve audit quality in Vietnam, on 6 th December

2012, Ministry of Finance announced the composition of 37 new auditing standards These standards are applied and effective from January 1 st , 2014 One of which specially focuses on “Quality control of financial statements audit activities” – VSA 220 This standard aims to give more requirements and increase the audit control activities to enhance the quality of independent audit activities in Vietnam.

R ESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of audit quality on firm performance of listed companies in Vietnam Specifically, it aims to give the deep insight into the impact of three proxies for audit quality (audit rotation, audit reputation and audit firm experience) on firm performance measured by firm profitability, market value and risk of bankruptcy Moreover, this thesis will also test the effect of the promulgation of VSA 220 which is considered as an important legal framework to improve audit quality in Vietnam on firm performance

In order to achieve those objectives, we conduct an empirical analysis on the firm level data in Vietnam to seek convincing answers for the following two research questions:

- Does audit quality proxied by audit rotation, audit reputation and audit firm experience have any effect on firm profitability (ROA), market value (Tobin’s Q) and risk of bankruptcy (Z-Score) of listed companies in Vietnam? If so, the effects are positive or negative and why?

- Does the promulgation of VSA 220 in 2014 have any effect on firm profitability, market value and risk of bankruptcy of listed companies in Vietnam?

R ESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This study uses the panel data of 268 listed companies on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2015 Financial institutions and insurance companies are excluded from this dataset given their different financial structure and performance measurement Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation is applied to examine the impact of audit quality on firm performance This study is also to examine the correlation, heteroskedasticity and the fit of instrumental variable by Hansen and Sargan test The impact of three proxies of audit quality on firm performance have been tested individually and simultaneously.

R ESEARCH C ONTRIBUTION

Until now, there is limited empirical evidence about the impact of audit quality on firm performance of listed companies in Vietnam whereas previous studies across countries provide inconsistent results about this effect Therefore, this study is the modest attempt Moreover, what makes this work different from the contemporary literature is that different measurements of firm performance were analyzed, from accounting perspective (ROA) to market value (Tobin’s Q) and risk of bankruptcy (Z-Score) Testing the effect of auditing legal framework in Vietnam via the promulgation of VSA 220 on the audit quality is another contribution that this thesis provides from the empirical evidence Therefore, the findings from this research will suggest important policy implication for investors in their investment decision – making and for policy makers to improve the transparency of business environment in Vietnam.

T HESIS STRUCTURE

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: the second section is the review of theoretical framework and empirical evidence about the effect of audit quality on firm performance The third section will discuss the research methodology and data The empirical results will presented in the fourth section and the last section will conclude and suggest policy implication.

FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF

T HEORETICAL LITERATURE OF AUDIT QUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

2.1.1 Audit quality definition and relevant theoretical framework

Audit quality is a vague term According to DeAngelo (1981) and PCAOB (2011), audit quality is the probability of misstatements and errors of annual audited financial statements in material aspects which are detected by using the appropriate audit procedures Eilifsen and Wilekens (2008) identify that audit quality is an aggregation of independence and competence of auditors to find out the material misstatements and express the appropriate audit opinion based on the audit evidence and applied audit procedures International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) argues that audit quality is the most fundamental characteristic of international auditing standards and it should be consistent interpretation, unambiguous translation, enforceable and designed to achieve a high audit quality In Vietnam Standards Auditing 220 (VSA 220) the concept of the quality of audit activities refers to the level of satisfaction of users about the auditing results as the objectivity and reliability of the opinion expressed, and of the entity under audit as to the auditor’s recommendations with the view to improve the business efficiency of the entity within a time limit and at a reasonable price

The role of third party who gives the opinion related to financial information disclosure is very important Audit quality is considered as an external monitoring factor which has a significant effect on firm performance This was explained from many relevant theories such as agency theory, stakeholder theory and theory of information asymmetric

The agency theory is developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) This theory investigates the relationship between the shareholders and the managers as the agents who are hired for running the firm’s operation to maximize the return for investors Agency theory is also concerned about solving problems which exist in agency relationships because of inconsistent benefits, the disparity of approached strategies and level of risk

The problem relating to the separation between the ownership and management in large corporations is initially discussed by Adam Smith (1776), Berle and Means (1932) However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) restate this problem and emphasize the moral hazard problem Managers may ignore the interests of the owners and hide the inefficient operation in order to get the personal benefits The managers also can use the accounting tricks while preparing financial statements to show the good financial status for self- interest purposes The conflict of interest between directors and shareholders is also demonstrated by the diagram in Soltani (2007)’s research

Source: Jensen (1983), Zahra and Pearce (1989)

Profitability Market Value Corporate Bankruptcy

To minimize the consequences of agency problems, Jensen (1983) suggests some solutions, in which he identifies the monitoring systems These systems have to be independent and there are no interests relative to either owners or managers Kim and Nofsinger (2014) also mention about setting up effective mechanisms for monitoring the manager’s behavior to reduce agency problem Auditor is considered a third party to independently and objectively monitor the financial information disclosure (ICAEW,

The audit function, either internal or external attempts to address the agency problems The role of internal auditor typically ensures the benefits of the board of directors and monitors the director’s behavior and decisions in accordance with company’s policies Therefore, the outside shareholders are not the main objective of internal auditor

In contrast, the existence of external auditors also provides information and monitors the director’s activities for inside parties and outside stakeholders So the influential level and the scope of users of external auditors’ financial information are broader than that of internal auditors (Colbert and Jahera, 1988)

Dang and Fang (2011) provide an empirical test the relationship between the audit quality and owner-manager agency costs using the dataset of listed companies in China Audit quality is considered the monitoring factor that provides an independent supervision and checks the accounting information to reduce the agency costs The results show that higher audit quality reduces the owner-managers agency costs effectively, especially in emerging market Krishnan (2003) argues that high external audit quality declines the manipulation of manager’s ability Habbash and Murya (2010) investigate the effectiveness of external audit on constraining earning managements in UK In their study, the external audit variable is proxied by auditor independence and audit quality The result illustrates that audit can moderate agency costs

The stakeholder theory explains how the relationship between the organization with the outside and inside group affect or be affected by the achievement of the organization’s strategies (Freeman, 1984) The external and internal stakeholders include employees, customers, suppliers, government, shareholders, local community, etc When a company’s financial decision is made, there are many parties to be affected If the company has a good and effective relationship with the stakeholder, they will have a sustainable development in long-term and favorable good-will in public In contrast, the company with the bad performance will not receive the trust from stakeholder

Figure 2.2 The stakeholder model of the corporation

Agency theory mainly focuses on the shareholders whereas the stakeholder theory’s scope is broader In recent years, the organization has to concern about the economics, society and environment aspects The image, information disclosure and the creditworthiness of company in public are really important Managers have to balance the interests and welfare between groups of stakeholders (Brusseau, 2012).The conflict of interest might exist and the demand of transparency in corporation’s information is necessary The stakeholder theory also defines the business ethics in social responsibility

According to Paydarmansh, et al., (2014) audited financial statements are essential for dealing with the disparity between the ownership from management that has been discussed in stakeholder theory The given reason is that independent audit firms with expertise in accounting and finance have full ability to identify the material risks and errors in the financial reports Therefore, it could increase the reliability from the stakeholders

The relationship of objectives in Stakeholder Theory is a double-side effect Once stakeholders properly consider about the quality of audited financial statements, the managers could not manipulate the company’s financial status (James and Izien, 2014) Chiu and Wang (2014) investigate the social disclosure quality in Taiwan by applying the

Asymmetric information is mentioned as one of the three factors of market’s failure including externalities, public goods and asymmetric information This term was first introduced by Akerlof (1970) The asymmetric information is the situation in which some parties possess the information about the transaction in market while other parties involved in this transaction do not obtain the same information Akerlof (1970) argues that the buyers collect the information in market and apply the statistic technique to measure the average value of this class of goods So, the buyers just estimate the length of goods value while the sellers have knowledge about the specific goods

Figure 2.3: The asymmetric information theory

The smooth exchange of information between the seller and buyer is prompting the successful and efficient transactions The presence of asymmetric information could increase the agency cost and an adverse outcome (Anderson and Lyall, 2013)

Stiglitz (2000) identifies the inefficient market with the existence of asymmetric information problem and its consequences including (1) Adverse selection, (2) Moral hazard and (3) Monitoring cost Keat, Young and Erfle (2013) also restate the problems with asymmetric information and give the response of market with asymmetric information problem such as obtaining the information from third parties, depending on the seller’s reputation, market signaling

E MPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT THE IMPACT OF AUDIT QUALITY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE

The information of listed company’s financial status receives interests from the investors, creditors, suppliers, etc… The external auditor is considered as third party which ensures and reinforces the confidence of users of firm’s financial reporting Therefore, audit quality improvement is always the preoccupation of regulators and researchers

Audit quality can be measured using direct or indirect approach The direct approach uses the definition of audit quality to address the measurement of audit quality, while indirect approach bases on the surrogates of audit quality and select the suitable variables to represent audit quality

Regarding to the feasibility of the indirect approach, previous studies use different proxies for audit quality Balsam et al (2003) show that audit quality is the unobservable and ambiguous definition, so the best measurement is to use auditor characteristics to surrogate audit quality Hussein and MohdHanefah (2013) also suggest that it is better to use the indirect method to assess audit quality Nguyen and Ha (2014) provide empirical evidence in Vietnam regarding to the factors affect independence characteristic of audit, and conclude that audit rotation is one of the key drivers of auditor’s independence and audit quality Sayyar, et al., (2015) measure audit quality by using audit fees and audit rotation Al-Khaddash, Nawas and Ramadan (2013) use the set of variables such as internal control, audit firm size, audit fees, auditor independence, industrial specialization and auditor competences Ziaee (2014) examines audit tenure, audit reputation and audit firm experience James and Izien (2014) consider audit tenure, audit firm size, auditor independence as the proxies of audit quality Dadashi et al (2014) assess the audit quality by three proxies which are audit reputation, auditor independence and auditor’s specialty

Lu and Ma (2016) measure audit quality by audit opinion, audit reputation and audit fee

This study uses audit rotation, audit reputation and audit firm experience to proxy for audit quality because of the highly representative and the availability of data sources Audit rotation presents for independent characteristic of audit quality, audit reputation and audit firm experience presents for the brand and specialty in auditing field

2.2.1 The impact of audit rotation on firm performance

Mandatory audit firm rotation is identified in section 207 of the Sarbanes – Oxley (SOX) Act as the principle of a limit time of auditor tenure has conducted and implemented the auditing procedures of one company After the expiration of audit period, the current audit firms will not be re-appointed during a specific period There are many arguments surrounding the audit rotation problem They consider that whether audit rotation will enhance or deteriorate the audit quality

The primary purpose of audit is to give independent opinion to shareholders about the true and fair view of financial statements in material aspects, whether they have prepared in accordance with the Companies Act and Accounting standards The benefits of the users of financial statements (shareholders, potential investors, employers and other sectors in business community are guaranteed (ICAEW, 2006)).The policy makers, regulators and professors have effort to improve the audit quality through enhancing the auditor independence Coyle & Deirdre (2010) investigate 20 accounting firms and interview Irish Accounting bodies, audit regulators, they find that one of the most efficient way to improve and enhance an auditor’s independence perceptions is audit firm rotation

Ouyang and Wan (2013), Anis (2014), Arel et al., (2005), Chi et al., (2009) also give the empirical evidence which shows that the length of audit tenure affects to likelihood perception of auditor independence and audit quality

Ouyang and Wan (2013) find that if the length of audit period is longer than ten years, the probability of accounting fraud in company might increases Moreover, by utilizing the sample of listed firms in USA from 1996 to 2005, they also find that the drawback of long audit tenure in the large companies is more serious than that of small companies The empirical results confirm the effect of audit rotation on audit quality and firm performance

Okolie (2014) examines the impact of audit quality on earning management from discretionary accruals and economic operation manipulation of listed companies on Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) during the period from 2006 to 2011 The result shows that audit quality represented by audit rotation and audit fee has significantly negative impact on earning management It means that audit rotation is positively affects firm performance through mitigating the manipulation of managers

Rahmina and Agoes (2014) state that the failure of business is attributed to auditing failure So, they emphasize the role of audit quality on the credibility of users of financial statements Rahmina and Agoes (2014) suggest that an Institute of Public Accountants should be established and the current mandatory auditor rotation and audit firm rotation should follow the international regulations which require audit rotation every seven years for listed companies in Indonesian stock market

Ardiana (2014) investigates the role of external audit via audit rotation in enhancing the firm performance in Indonesia Firm performance is measured by P/E, P/B and Tobin’s

Q By using 2,240 firm-year observations during the period from 2007 to 2013, the study concludes that the longer audit tenure decreases the firm performance

Khatab (2013) examines the effect of audit rotation on the firm value proxied by Tobin’s Q in Egyptian stock market from 2005 to 2009 Using the Fixed effects model and random effects model, the study gives evidence that audit rotation has a positive effect on enhancing firm performance

Mostafa and Hussien (2010) implement the self-questionnaire survey from 50 auditors who are randomly selected They suggest that mandatory audit rotation at firm level should be applied in Egypt rather than rotation at auditor level Based on the client’s specialization industry, the audit firm will appoint auditors with extensive experience in this field to audit the client, which will generate more benefits for both sides

Sayyar et al., (2015) examine the impact of audit quality proxied by audit rotation on firm performance of listed companies in Malaysia from 2003 to 2012 The empirical evidences show that audit rotation is insignificantly correlated with firm performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q Myers et al., (2003) find that the longer auditing periods can mitigate more extreme management decisions on firm performance

In general, there are two primary points of view about the role of audit rotation from the literature review On one hand, audit rotation is considered as the long length of audit tenure which leads to closer auditor-client relationship and reduces the auditor independence and quality of audited financial statements Anderson and Verma (2012), Crabtree et al., (2004), Lu & Sivaramakrishnan (2009) find that the audit rotation is the useful and feasible method to guarantee auditor independence and objectivity Elder et al.,

(2015) examine the audit firm rotation and audit quality data in Florida government audit market and suggest that rotation policies have positive relation to audit quality via audit firm selection

On the other hand, it is argued that the pressure of maintaining the clients and improving the relationship with clients could cause the auditor to ignore and being unskeptical about the accounting information of clients Some researchers investigate the relationship between audit rotation and audit quality and conclude that the change of auditors after certain period could bring the fresh look and perspective to the audit process

It also increases the probability of detection of misstatements (Siregar el at, 2012)

T HE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In general framework for audit quality and firm performance has been applied in this study

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

D ATA COLLECTION

In this study, data was collected from listed companies on HOSE (Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange) – one of two largest stock exchanges in Vietnam The data is retrieved from annual audited financial statements and Board of Director annual reports uploaded on the website of Cophieu68, Vietstock, Stockbiz and CafeF The sample includes 268 companies over the period from 2010 to 2015 after eliminating companies with missing variables In order to guarantee information homogeneity, the financial institutions, insurance companies, banks and investment funds are excluded from the samples Because they have different mechanisms, capital structures and comply different principles requirements In order to have comparative financial information, the ended of accounting period is identified at 31 st December

M ETHODOLOGY

This study applies the dynamic panel data approach suggested by Okolie (2014) and Sayyar et al., (2015) The endogeneity problem might exist in the effect of audit quality on firm performance because audit quality might be affected by the next firm performance via audit firm selection The use of one-year lagged dependent variables is considered to deal with endogeneity problems and mitigate the impact of previous firm performance The past firm performance shows a good financial status, firm intends to continuously use current audit firm or hire a more reputable audit firm to enhance the credibility of financial statements in the next year Nevertheless, if the previous firm performance is not good, some listed firms have a tendency of hiring audit firm with higher audit quality in next year to express opinion about financial statements aimed to increase the quality of financial statements and firm market’s value So, this study uses the estimation technique of Generalized method of moments (GMM) to address the potential endogeneity problem The GMM estimation will be efficient and preferable to IV estimation because of the existence of heteroskedasticity

Following the work of Sayyar et al.,(2015) and Okolie (2014), the empirical models are written as:

ROA i,t = β 0 +β 1 ROA i,t-1 + β 2 AuditQi,t + β 3 LEV i,t + β 4 LNASSET i,t + β 5 SG i,t + ε i,t (1)

Tobin’Qi,t = α 0 + α 1 TQ t-1 +α 2 AuditQ i,t + α 3 LEV i,t + α 4 LNASSET i,t + α 5 SG i,t + ε i,t (2)

Z-Score i,t = γ0+γ1 Z-Score i,t-1+ γ2 AuditQ i,t +γ 3 LEV i,t γ 4 LNASSET i,t +γ 5 SG i,t + ε i,t (3) Whereas i: firm, t: time, from 2010 to 2015

In order to assess the impact of audit quality on firm performance comprehensively, this study measures firm performance from three approaches: market value, accounting profit and risk of bankruptcy

Dependent Variables: Firm performance is measured by

ROA measures firm earnings as a proportion of net income to totalassets ROA illustrates how much profit the firms can generate from their assets

This ratio is initially developed by Brainard and Tobin (1968) Tobin (1969) re- calculates the value of Tobin’s Q by using the ratio of sum of stock market values and liabilities to replacement costs of assets

It is not easy to measure the market value of liabilities Similarly, there are various types of assets in company, estimation of the replacement costs of assets are really complicated Previous studies use the book value instead of market value to calculate liabilities and assets This formula is also adopted in this thesis to measure Tobin’s Q

Tobin’s Q measures firm value as a proportion of both market capitalization and total book of liability to firm totalassets When the Tobin’s Q indicator is lower than 1, the company is undervalued because the market value of the firm is lower than the value of firm’s assets In contrast, once Tobin’s Q is higher than 1, the value of this firm in market is higher than value of firm’s assets

In another word, if the value of Tobin’s Q is high, company will invest more because it is easy to mobilize capital in the stock market On the contrary, company will reduce investment when Tobin’s Q is low

3 Z-Score (firm’s risk of bankruptcy)

Z-score is developed by Altman (1968) to calculate the risk of corporate bankruptcy This ratio is also used to evaluate the firm’s financial health status Z-Score is made up from five financial ratios:

- X3: Earning before interest and taxes / Total assets

- X4: Market value equity / Book value of total debt

The higher value of Z-Score means the lower risk of bankruptcy The credit of bankruptcy rating is divided into three benchmarks

2.99< Z-Score Safety level The company will not likely go bankruptcy with the presented accounting figures

1.81< Z-Score < 2.99 Dangerous level The investors need to consider about the ability of bankruptcy

Z-Score z = 0.007

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 1.11 Pr > z = 0.266

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 64.21 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 15.55 Prob > chi2 = 0.113

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 12.04 Prob > chi2 = 0.034

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 3.51 Prob > chi2 = 0.622 iv(lag1)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 14.94 Prob > chi2 = 0.093

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.61 Prob > chi2 = 0.434

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1500

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

ROA | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.33 Pr > z = 0.020

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 1.05 Pr > z = 0.295

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 80.76 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 19.80 Prob > chi2 = 0.588

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 16.07 Prob > chi2 = 0.007

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 3.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.031 iv(lag1)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 19.75 Prob > chi2 = 0.020

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.05 Prob > chi2 = 0.821

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1500

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

ROA | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.18 Pr > z = 0.030

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 0.73 Pr > z = 0.463

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 84.24 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 20.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.407

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 15.06 Prob > chi2 = 0.010

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 5.10 Prob > chi2 = 0.404 iv(lag1)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 19.47 Prob > chi2 = 0.021

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.69 Prob > chi2 = 0.208

 Audit rotation, audit reputation, audit firm experience – ROA (4)

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1500

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

ROA | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.42 Pr > z = 0.016

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 0.76 Pr > z = 0.445

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(8) = 59.50 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(8) = 12.04 Prob > chi2 = 0.149

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(3) = 2.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.568

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 10.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.075 iv(lag1)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(7) = 12.03 Prob > chi2 = 0.100

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.935

The impact of audit quality measured by audit rotation, audit reputation and audit firm experience on Tobin’s Q (TABLE 10)

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1501

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

TobinQ | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.50 Pr > z = 0.013

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.39 Pr > z = 0.165

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 192.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 39.26 Prob > chi2 = 0.242

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 31.98 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 7.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.201 iv(lag2)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 37.89 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 1.37 Prob > chi2 = 0.202

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1501

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

TobinQ | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.57 Pr > z = 0.011

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.39 Pr > z = 0.166

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 355.26 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 32.40 Prob > chi2 = 0.528

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 21.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.001

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 10.57 Prob > chi2 = 0.061 iv(lag2)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 32.00 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.40 Prob > chi2 = 0.151

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1501

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

TobinQ | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.45 Pr > z = 0.014

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.53 Pr > z = 0.599

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 11.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.330

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 6.32 Prob > chi2 = 0.787

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 4.19 Prob > chi2 = 0.523

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 2.14 Prob > chi2 = 0.830 iv(lag2)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 5.94 Prob > chi2 = 0.746

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.534

 Audit rotation, audit reputation, audit firm experience – Tobin’s Q (4)

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1501

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

TobinQ | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.78 Pr > z = 0.074

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.25 Pr > z = 0.799

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(8) = 6.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.609

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(8) = 4.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.856

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(3) = 3.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.339

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 0.65 Prob > chi2 = 0.986 iv(lag2)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(7) = 4.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.778

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.00 Prob > chi2 = 0.956

The impact of audit quality measured by audit rotation, audit reputation and audit experience, respectively and simultaneously on Z-Score (TABLE 11)

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1500

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

ZSCORE1968 | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.10 Pr > z = 0.036

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 0.71 Pr > z = 0.476

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 144.42 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 8.09 Prob > chi2 = 0.620

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 4.60 Prob > chi2 = 0.467

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 3.50 Prob > chi2 = 0.624 iv(lag3)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 5.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.804

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 2.75 Prob > chi2 = 0.097

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1500

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

ZSCORE1968 | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.80 Pr > z = 0.071

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 0.28 Pr > z = 0.778

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 162.35 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 5.71 Prob > chi2 = 0.839

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 3.04 Prob > chi2 = 0.693

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 2.67 Prob > chi2 = 0.751 iv(lag3)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 5.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.833

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 0.70 Prob > chi2 = 0.403

Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM

Group variable: ID Number of obs = 1500

Time variable : Year Number of groups = 268

Number of instruments = 17 Obs per group: min = 3

ZSCORE1968 | Coef Std Err z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]

Instruments for first differences equation

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.50 Pr > z = 0.012

Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 0.70 Pr > z = 0.486

Sargan test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 171.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid restrictions: chi2(10) = 5.97 Prob > chi2 = 0.818

(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(5) = 3.93 Prob > chi2 = 0.560

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5) = 2.04 Prob > chi2 = 0.843 iv(lag3)

Hansen test excluding group: chi2(9) = 4.91 Prob > chi2 = 0.842

Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1) = 1.06 Prob > chi2 = 0.303

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