South Africa''''s role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa docx

Conducted by Kristina Bentley and Roger Southall, and published as An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi HSRC Press, 2005, this provided the Foundation’s first op

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List of tables and figures v

Foreword vi

Acknowledgements vii

Acronyms and abbreviations viii

multilateral capacity for peacemaking 27

Peter Kagwanja

constitutional crises of the 1990s 59

Nthakeng Selinyane

Zimbabwe under Mbeki 85

Dale McKinley

Burundi’s war 105

Roger Southall

Burundi: a success story? 135

9 Dealing with Africa’s post-independence past: truth commissions, special courts, war-crimes trials and other methods 191

John Daniel and Marisha Ramdeen

List of tables and figures

CNDD-FDD still in the pre-disarmament assembly areas (PDAAs) 146

per group, 31 May 2005) 148

1996–1998 (R’000) 258

Figures

This collection is a product of a research workshop conducted on behalf of the Nelson Mandela Foundation by the Democracy & Governance (D&G) Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Africa Institute of South Africa, which was held in December 2004 It is a sequel to a previous project that examined the particular contribution made by Former President Nelson Mandela to bringing about the present political settlement

in Burundi, a country that had been wracked by civil war since the early 1990s

Conducted by Kristina Bentley and Roger Southall, and published as An African

peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi (HSRC Press, 2005), this

provided the Foundation’s first opportunity to foster its interest in studying the principles and practices that can be pursued by South Africa and other African countries in attempts to resolve conflicts and establish peace on our continent This wide-ranging collection assesses the South African government’s involvement in promoting peace in a number of political conflicts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and West Africa, as well as Burundi, whilst also attempting to analyse its motivations and capacities for doing so Importantly, too, the collection examines the extent to which the South African model of negotiation and reconciliation can be exported to other countries and, if so, why that should be This latter aspect we regard as particularly important, for while the Nelson Mandela Foundation is proud of sponsoring research, its objective is practical rather than academic: to borrow

the HSRC’s own slogan, it is concerned to promote ‘social science that makes a

difference’ There can be few more important objectives than helping to end the

conflicts that have torn various of Africa’s countries apart It is only upon a basis

of lasting peace that the development and growth that is so important to Africa’s people can take place

I would like to thank the D&G Research Programme, the Africa Institute of South Africa, the editor and all the authors for contributing to a successful and valuable venture

The Africa Institute of South Africa and the Human Sciences Research Council would like to express thanks for permission to include the following papers, which have been or are going to be published elsewhere A version of John Daniel and Marisha Ramdeen’s paper, ‘Dealing with Africa’s post-independence past: Truth commissions, special courts, war-crimes trials and other methods’,

was previously published in South African yearbook of international affairs

2003/04 (SAIIA 2004: 259–80) Dale McKinley’s paper was previously published

as ‘South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki’, Review of

African Political Economy 31: 357–364 Roger Southall’s paper, ‘A long prelude to

peace: African involvement in ending Burundi’s war’, is to be published in Oliver

Furley and Roy May, Ending Africa’s wars (Ashgate 2006).

I would also like to thank the Nelson Mandela Foundation for its generosity in funding this project, and for hosting the workshop at its premises in Houghton

As ever, the then Chief Executive Officer John Samuel was unfailingly helpful, and has been remarkably patient during the extended editorial period Eddie Maloka and Pierre Hugo of the Africa Institute provided invaluable assistance

in the organisation of the workshop, as did Gray van den Bergh and Joan Makalela of the Democracy & Governance Programme of the HSRC A huge debt is also owed to Louise Torr for her thoroughness and intelligence in rendering the diverse papers into a coherent manuscript

AMIB African Mission in Burundi

de Défense

of South Africa

and Reintegration (Burundi)

Co-operation in Africa

ECOSOC Economic, Social and Cultural Commission

Verification, Military Integration and Demobilisation of Armed Movements (Burundi)

LCD Lesotho Congress for Democracy

Programme (Burundi)

Reintegration (Burundi)

PGP Patriotic Grouping for Peace (Côte d’Ivoire)

(DRC)

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan

of apartheid ‘Pretoria’ symbolised racism, force, lies, covert operations and brutality; in short, it represented the antithesis of human rights Not surprisingly, once the ANC moved into office in 1994, it wished to distance itself as far as possible from the past, to identify South Africa with the promotion of human rights, and to abandon hegemony in favour of a more egalitarian relationship with the region, as well as the pursuit of peace and development, notably on the African continent

Yet, in an early debate, there were those who argued that in the ‘real world’

of diplomacy, the simplistic application of human rights principles would have to be mediated by highly complex rules and practices Simultaneously, the domestic demands being placed upon the post-apartheid order would

be so great that a popularly responsive government could not be expected

to prioritise an international human rights agenda over the urgency of reconstruction and development (for a review, see Bischoff & Southall 1999) The practical outcome, perhaps inevitably, was mixed, with important gestures, such as South Africa’s cancellation of Namibia’s apartheid-era debt and a public expression of atonement for Pretoria’s past sins to the people

of Mozambique, combined with what one commentator more severely judged to have been ‘more continuity than change, and the adoption of a traditional western diplomacy’ based upon perceived national interest (Daniel 1995: 34) Retrospectively, however, after more than ten years of democracy

we can see that the tension between pragmatism and principle in Pretoria’s foreign policy remains This is illustrated, most notably, in regard to South Africa’s various interventions in Africa, with, for instance, considerable soul-searching going on about whether the outcome of the remarkable rush of South African investment into the continent will be less of a contribution to African development than to the de facto establishment of a new economic hegemony (Daniel, Naidoo & Naidu 2003) Meanwhile, further debate centres around the motivations for, and effectiveness of, South Africa’s efforts to bring peace to various countries of Africa Motivated by the particular concerns of the Nelson Mandela Foundation, it is to this particular discussion that the present collection is directed

As is all too well known, Africa’s wars and conflicts – whether fanned into flame by the Cold War or ignited by more local causes – have been many, brutal, often intractable and always damaging to any prospect of human development It was inevitable that a democratic South Africa, a country that was regularly hailed for ‘the miracle’ of its internally negotiated settlement between hitherto sworn enemies, represented principally by the former ruling National Party (NP) and the ANC, would be drawn into the business of conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa, not least because of the iconic status of Nelson Mandela, who during his presidency (1994–1999) embodied forgiveness and reconciliation Furthermore, South Africa was seen as having not only a moral obligation to ‘repay’ Africa for sins of the apartheid regime, but also the resources – economic and military – with which to undertake serious continental responsibilities There is no doubt, too, that the United States, the remaining ‘superpower’, was joined by the European Union in looking to South Africa to assume the role of a regional hegemon, taking on the responsibility of leading and cajoling African states, especially those in southern Africa, into adopting ‘democratic’ ways and soundly pro-market economic policies Yet this posed a considerable number of dilemmas for the new South African government In African terms, it was still the new kid on the block, so how could it assume a leadership role without causing offence

to entrenched interests? If it were to deploy its considerable diplomatic, economic and military weight to pursue contentious foreign policy goals throughout the region, would it not be accused of acting like its arrogant predecessor? If it supported democratic aspirations and condemned African tyrants, how would it be able to avoid being labelled a proxy of the West?

And while South Africa’s own recent experience of negotiating a political settlement might well be illuminating, how much purchase would it have in other conflict-torn countries?

The background of the ANC and South Africa’s power and status – as a

‘middle power’ globally and as a ‘great power’ continentally (Van Aardt 2004) – was such that the new regime could not avoid attempting to find answers to these questions Indeed, it was soon to be thrust into seeking to resolve them, notably with regard to its becoming involved in conflict resolution, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives, for it was called upon

to respond to a variety of crises in African states

This collection attempts to trace and debate this evolution through a series

of overviews of key aspects of South Africa’s involvement in attempts to bring various African wars and conflicts to an end, alongside analyses of its engagements in particular countries Efforts to identify ‘best practice’ accompany the examination of South Africa’s successes, and its failures; and with regard to its interventions in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, at least, old and contemporary controversies are joined After highlighting key issues raised by the contributions, this introduction will conclude by identifying challenges for South African foreign policy and for analysts of its conduct

South Africa’s multilateralism

Rok Ajulu, writing in 2001, argued that while President Thabo Mbeki’s ambitions to lead an African Renaissance demand that South Africa develops a high profile in Africa, its various foreign policy initiatives on the continent – ‘in respect of Zaire, Nigeria, the Great Lakes, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Lesotho – have not met with spectacular success’, and he proposed that if it was to do better in the future, ‘it would need to develop a better understanding

of the problems and sensibilities of the continent’ (Ajulu 2001: 40) Some four years later, in this volume, Peter Kagwanja sounds a somewhat more optimistic note, suggesting that South Africa has learnt much from its early mistakes and that it has made considerable progress towards the realisation of its continental goals, most particularly through its commitment to multilateralism

Kagwanja argues that under Mandela, South African foreign policy displayed

a strong human rights orientation, which, critical of Africa’s undemocratic

leaders, caused considerable offence throughout the continent, especially as it lapsed on occasion into the adventurist unilateralism characteristic of the former regime Hence, when Mbeki took office, he turned to multilateralism as the principal vehicle for his pan-African ambitions Promoted as the pursuit of the African Renaissance (which, as Ajulu stresses, is deeply rooted in past Africanist and anti-imperialist thinking), this embedded the ANC’s new commitment to market-based economics, seen as vital to attract foreign investment and hence

to kick-start growth, in a holistic vision geared towards promoting peace, prosperity, sustainable development and good governance across the continent.This was to find institutional form in the transformation of the Organisation

of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) and the launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) Inevitably, these bodies have subsequently become sites of struggle between different African nations Nonetheless, South Africa has resisted the temptation to use its economic and military muscle to establish itself as a hegemonic power Instead, it has opted to use ‘soft power’, in the form of preventive diplomacy and mediation of conflicts, and, in so doing, to enhance its own image and influence on the continent while seeking to build the capacity of Africa’s multilateral institutions

Under Mandela, argues Kagwanja, South Africa learned hard lessons about the way the African continent works, and its unilateralist foreign policy invited isolation Mandela’s hard line against the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Sani Abacha military regime ended unsuccessfully when the OAU declared South Africa’s call for sanctions against Nigeria ‘un-African’ South Africa’s efforts to broker a peace deal between President Mobutu Sese Seko and rebel leader Laurent Kabila in Zaire in 1997 ignored the fact that the latter was on the verge of victory and that the Mobutu regime was on the edge of collapse; subsequently, South African preventive diplomacy proved wholly ineffective

in promoting dialogue between Kabila and rebels based in Uganda and Rwanda, and in preventing Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe from sending in troops to prop up his shaky regime South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in September 1998, in the wake of a disputed general election in that country, may have restored constitutional order, but it simultaneously roused the ghost

of the former regime’s military adventurism Meanwhile, the South African government’s failure to rein in the white mercenaries, arms merchants and diamond smugglers who were assisting Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) prolonged the war in Angola, with the result that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

government locked South Africa out of all its peace initiatives, except in regard

to seeking its support for the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 and its efforts to isolate Unita diplomatically during 1998–2002

Kagwanja views Mbeki’s turn to multilateralism as a strategy to reverse the ineffectiveness of the unilateralism of the Mandela era Yet he is unable to present it as an unproblematic transformation of failure into success, with Zimbabwe being its major stumbling block The deep suspicion, and indeed resentment, of South Africa by Mugabe’s Zimbabwe delayed consensus around

a mutual defence pact until August 2003 This difficult relationship transformed itself into South Africa’s controversial policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards the drawn-out political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe While critics decry this

as ineffective and as conducted with a total disregard for the Mugabe regime’s abuse of human rights and democracy, Pretoria insists it is the only way to prevent state collapse, and that to adopt strong-arm tactics would reinforce the image of South Africa as the regional bully Yet the Mugabe regime lives

on, and Kagwanja notes that after its overwhelming victory in the March 2005 parliamentary elections (conducted within a highly repressive environment), the future of ‘quiet diplomacy’ has been thrown into serious doubt

Kagwanja argues that, notwithstanding the huge problem of Zimbabwe, Mbeki’s foreign policy played a leading role in transforming the OAU into the

AU, which he sees as having been facilitated by an accommodation of interests – and the forging of a powerful partnership – between South Africa and Nigeria Within this context, the AU has ‘provided the Mbeki administration with an ideal multilateral vehicle for its peace and security objectives’, even though manipulation of suspicions of its hegemonic ambitions has enabled Libya and Zimbabwe to weaken key aspects of its more liberal intentions, notably the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Nonetheless, despite old-guard attempts to contain the scope of the AU’s new peace and security architecture, the latter bears the strong imprimatur of South Africa’s liberal activism, notably with regard to provision for an African Standby Force, which – rather than simply being restricted to defending Africa from external threats –

is envisioned by Mbeki and other ‘Young Turks’ as having the capacity to intervene in the continent’s festering internal conflicts

It is within the spirit of this accomplishment that South Africa has played a major role in steering the peace processes in both Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), while also strongly backing AU initiatives with

regard to the implementation of the comprehensive agreement between the Khartoum government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) Given the failure of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the French government to secure peace between the government and rebels in the Ivory Coast, South Africa is now serving as mediator in that country, although much remains to be done before this effort can be proclaimed a success Backed up, recently, by concerted efforts to control

a resurgence of mercenary activities emanating from within South Africa (which were highlighted when Pretoria moved to secure the arrest of mercenaries headed for Equatorial Guinea to topple President Obiang Mbasongo in March 2004), these various peacemaking efforts, nonetheless, seem to be contradicted

by what are clearly inadequate controls over South Africa’s arms industry, which appears guilty of exporting arms to many of the continent’s trouble spots Kagwanja concludes his impressive survey by reflecting upon the limits of an African middle power, reiterating his principal argument that while South Africa may be an economic and military giant compared to its poorer and weaker neighbours, its capacity to use its power in support of its liberal internationalism tied to human rights and democratic development has been severely limited by suspicions about its credentials, namely that it is bent upon establishing itself as a regional hegemon implementing a too-obviously Western agenda Quoting Alden and Le Pere (2004: 29), Kagwanja notes that

‘this has forced the Mbeki administration to abandon the unilateralism and moral rectitude that underpinned the Mandela presidency and turn resolutely

to multilateralism as the preferred instrument of realising South Africa’s goals

in Africa’ Although he acknowledges that this multilateralism faces many complex challenges, Kagwanja insists that its future is bright

Case studies

The six studies we include allow us to trace the movement from unilateralism

to multilateralism in some detail, although only the study of South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in 1998 deals with the foreign policy of the Mandela presidency and falls unambiguously into the unilateralist period Nonetheless,

as indicated in Dale McKinley’s paper on Zimbabwe – in which he argues that the policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ is dictated primarily by South Africa’s corporate interests – there is no sharp divide between the two strategies

by the Mandela government It is certainly the incident that is most widely cited as illustrating South Africa’s unilateralism, although as Kagwanja has made plain, the inadequacies of Pretoria’s initial forays into the DRC (then still Zaire) were actually of far greater regional consequence A large part

of the problem is that the actual intervention in Lesotho was botched The troops of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) had inadequate intelligence, orders and objectives, with the result that angry protesters were not prevented from burning down South African-related and government buildings in the capital, Maseru, and other towns, while an operation that went awry led to the unnecessary deaths of some 16 Basotho troops at the Katse Dam

Commentary on the intervention has been overwhelmingly condemnatory (see, for example, FDG 1998) However, my own perspective, which comes from my stance as an observer of Lesotho’s complex and tangled politics over the last three decades of the previous century, is that South Africa’s intervention was ‘an unlikely success’ (Southall 2003a) In contrast to the widespread portrayal of the protests in Maseru as popularly driven against the result of the April election, which saw the LCD win all but one parliamentary seat, I argue that the protests were overwhelmingly unrepresentative of popular opinion, and had been deliberately whipped up by political leaders who, although having been roundly trounced in an election that had been declared free and fair by teams of highly respectable international observers, nonetheless wanted the result annulled Consequently, as the legitimately elected government was in danger of being overthrown by a military that was largely aligned with opposition forces, its plea to South Africa (formally acting

on behalf of the Southern African Development Community) to intervene to save it was legitimate, even if there is continuing debate about its strict legality (see Levitt 2001, however, for a strong argument that the intervention was in accordance with international law)

Of course, the situation was unnecessarily messy, and controversy continues

to dog the content of the report by South African Justice Pius Langa, which (prior to the intervention) sought to assess the conduct and outcome of the election, its published version ambiguously declaring that the election could not be declared unfair (Langa Commission 1998) There are widespread allegations, favoured particularly in opposition quarters, that an earlier version of the report, which was far more condemnatory of the election, was politically doctored to favour the incumbent government These, it has

to be said, remain unproven, and their final validation or rejection must probably await the lapse of confidentiality of key archives in 20 to 30 years time However, it is probably far more apt to observe that the Langa Report, rather than being a whitewash, was either an incompetent document, overwhelmingly ignorant of Lesotho’s electoral and party politics, or one that for political reasons was frightened to make a forthright judgement Certainly,

I have yet to see any serious analyst confront or reject the arguments of myself and Roddy Fox that, in the first place, the 1998 election results were wholly consistent with the political, demographic and geographic patterns of voting

in the previous election of 1993 and that, in the second place, even allocation

of all alleged ‘ghost votes’ to opposition parties would not have altered the

overall outcome, merely reducing the number of seats that the LCD won on election day from 79 (out of 80 seats) to 75 (Southall & Fox 1999) Whatever the case, over the course of the following four years South Africa oversaw a contentious process of inter-party negotiation and reform of the military that culminated in the adoption of a new Mixed Member Proportional Electoral system This provided the basis for a more politically inclusive electoral outcome in the general election of 2002

Although Kagwanja cites South Africa’s armed intervention in Lesotho as a key indicator of Pretoria’s unilateralism under Mandela, his view needs to be supplemented by recognition that Lesotho’s wholly encircled, impoverished and dependent status renders it something of a special case I have argued elsewhere that, in essence, Lesotho has now become a South African protectorate (Southall 2003b), and this is a line of analysis taken up by Nthakeng Selinyane in his own detailed analysis of the events of 1998 Selinyane argues that relations between Lesotho and South Africa have come full circle since the former country became independent in 1966, from cordiality in the 1960s and early 1970s, through tension and confrontation in

the mid-1970s and 1980s, to a thawing thereafter resulting in ‘current active co-operation’ Yet key to understanding present relations, he also suggests,

is South Africa’s strategic interest in the massive Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) for the sale of water from Lesotho’s highlands to Gauteng Today, this dictates the ‘tone of relations’ between the two countries, which can

be characterised as Lesotho’s subjection to South Africa’s benign hegemony There are important aspects of Selinyane’s interpretation of the internal elements of the crisis that require serious attention He views the post-1993 Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) government as having severely mishandled its treatment of both the defence force and its own Lesotho Liberation Army; further, it is seen as having bungled its relations with the monarchy, and hence raising political tensions The BCP is accused of squandering its popular goodwill during its first term, and even if Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle’s transmutation of his support within the BCP into the LCD prior to the 1998 election was formally constitutional, it was manifestly politically tendentious; and yes, Selinyane is correct to note that, once it had been confirmed in power

by South Africa, the LCD sought to manipulate the inter-party negotiations around devising a new electoral system All these developments are evidence

to Selinyane of a tradition of elite democracy in Lesotho that views ordinary citizens as little more than voting fodder and that encourages a fractiousness

in politics, which propelled South Africa into making as hasty a diplomatic exit as it could

Nonetheless, the major argument he puts forward of relevance to our present concerns is that South Africa’s actions in and after 1998 demonstrate the potential for Pretoria to act as a benign hegemon in order to create peace and stability throughout the region Now, while this is highly contentious and may assume a military capacity that South Africa simply does not have, he does point out the anomaly that while South Africa is regularly criticised for not taking a stronger leadership role in defence of human rights and democracy

in cases like Zimbabwe and Swaziland, it is simultaneously condemned as insensitive for taking strong and principled actions in the case of Lesotho

when the dynamics underlying South Africa’s stance towards Zimbabwe are properly considered.

There is currently no aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy that so obsesses analysts in the media and academia as the Mbeki government’s relations with Zimbabwe Yet as McKinley observes, the resultant debate is flawed (he actually terms it a discourse between the arrogant and the deaf) In South Africa, the debate is (unevenly) divided along racial lines Whereas the majority of whites and the white opposition regard President Robert Mugabe’s land programme

as ‘a disingenuous and politically motivated attempt to maintain power at the expense of white Zimbabweans’ and black Zimbabweans who do not support the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), the Mbeki government and many black South Africans regard his land policies, at core, as a genuine attempt to address one of the enduring legacies

of colonialism, namely large-scale white ownership of land at the expense of the black majority of the population Furthermore, this debate is replicated

at international level, with the predominantly Northern and white states positioning themselves against Mugabe, the predominantly Southern and black states tending to side with him An unfortunate outcome is that black (and other) critics who protest against the appalling human rights outcomes

of Mugabe’s policies get branded as lackeys of Western imperialism

McKinley’s core argument is that the poverty of the debate over Zimbabwe

‘has tended to obscure any meaningful analysis of the real motivations behind South Africa’s policy’ The South African government projects its policy

as motivated by the necessity of working to prevent a total collapse of the Zimbabwean economy and state, arguing that this would be disastrous not only for Zimbabweans themselves but for South Africans as well Its approach

is driven by ‘quiet diplomacy’, on the grounds that this is the most effective strategy, and that were South Africa to be seen to be acting as a hegemon it would be counterproductive, alienating not only Mugabe but other concerned African countries, whose support Pretoria must seek to mobilise

McKinley argues that this approach assumes that the Zimbabwean economy

has not already collapsed and the country has not already lapsed into a

low-level civil war, when the evidence is otherwise The mainspring of South African policy, which by implication is not quite so ignorant of the true state

of affairs as present debate suggests, therefore lies elsewhere, and is to be found in the interests of the new black bourgeoisie (tied to the interests of the

ANC), the construction and promotion of which is a key aspect of Pretoria’s broad economic and political strategies since Mbeki became President

in 1999 Hence, for instance, a key ‘rescue package’ of close to R1 billion offered by South Africa prior to the Zimbabwean parliamentary elections redounded principally to the benefit of South African parastatals, which are directly involved as operators or investors in, or suppliers to, Zimbabwe Meanwhile, South African private industry and interests generally are gaining a considerable foothold in the Zimbabwean economy via the latter’s indebtedness and South African investment and trade options By providing political support and legitimacy to the Mugabe regime, Mbeki’s government

is working to ensure ‘the longer-term security and expansion of South Africa’s (capitalist) economic “investments” in Zimbabwe while simultaneously tying the future health of Zimbabwean capitalists to South African investment and patronage’ In short, the prolongation of the Zimbabwean crisis is facilitating the long-term interests of a South African black bourgeoisie that is aspiring to both regional and continental ascendancy

Other analysts who are highly critical of the South African government’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe attribute the approach to a more complex mix

of factors, with Freeman (2005) proposing that, while the present policy has rendered Pretoria impotent, this is in considerable measure because Mbeki

is constrained by a host of political (domestic and continental) factors (see also Sachikonye 2005) McKinley is also vulnerable to criticism that his empirical evidence about South African economic engagement in contemporary Zimbabwe is weak, and he ignores the costs to the South African economy that the Zimbabwean meltdown is causing Nonetheless, his argument is undoubtedly one of major importance, which further research needs to pursue

Burundi

As this Introduction is being written, Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the

Conseil National pour la Défence de la Démocratie – Force pour la Défense de

la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), is in the process of taking office as president in

Burundi, having been so elected by Parliament, following a general election in August 2005 in which his party won a large majority of seats This constitutes the culmination of a remarkable peace process in which South Africa played

the major role Indeed, at the moment, the political settlement in Burundi would seem to constitute South Africa’s most successful peacemaking intervention in Africa since 1994.

The complexity of the Burundian conflict is outlined in my own paper, itself drawn (but updated) from an earlier study that was funded by the Nelson Mandela Foundation (Bentley & Southall 2005) Brevity with regard to this particular situation is always extremely dangerous, but the essence is that a civil war broke out in 1993 after rebels claiming to represent the majority Hutu people took up arms against a military-backed government primarily representative of the interests of the small minority of Tutsi In 1996, a peace process was launched by the OAU and headed by Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania After Nyerere’s death in 1999, former President Nelson Mandela succeeded him as the key mediator and thereafter engaged in vigorous diplomacy to bring about the important Arusha Accord in August

2000 This allowed for a three-year transitional government, composed of both Tutsi-dominated and Hutu-dominated political parties, with transfer

of office from a Tutsi to a Hutu president half way through Although acknowledged as flawed, principally because the Arusha process had failed to secure the adherence of all the various (fragmented) rebel groups (so that the war ground on), and also because various difficulties meant that the original timetable was not adhered to, the Accord nonetheless eventually provided a framework for peace Continuous rounds of negotiations – skilfully headed by Deputy President Jacob Zuma after Nelson Mandela himself stood back from the fray after August 2000 – drummed up support from important regional and international actors, and cajoled the fractious Burundian political parties and armed groups into adhering to the Accord, to the skeleton of which successive rounds of negotiations added flesh concerning, notably, demilitarisation and demobilisation I ascribe the eventual success of the process to four major factors: forceful and resolute African diplomacy; the critical role of South Africa serving as a determined and neutral broker, backed up by the country’s provision of troops from the SANDF, initially to protect political participants in the process, and latterly to play a more extensive peacekeeping role alongside other troops provided by fellow member countries of the AU; the confluence of a political transition (and winding down of civil war) in the neighbouring DRC; and war weariness on the part of principal political actors and the population in Burundi

Although the formal transition from war to peace, and from a Tutsi-dominated

to a Hutu-led government within a democratic framework, has now been completed, the situation remains fragile Hence, the immense importance

of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, which was launched on 2 December 2004 Designed, firstly, to maintain peace and bring about the disarmament of rebel groups and paramilitaries aligned to the former government and army of Burundi, secondly, to achieve the demobilisation of ex-combatants (including the many child soldiers) and, thirdly, to bring about the reintegration of ex-combatants into society and the formation of an integrated national army, the overall programme is being implemented by transitional bodies that are representative of former government, army and rebel interests working in partnership with key foreign funders and organisations

In his important paper, Henri Boshoff outlines the details and dynamics of this process, noting that while DDR constituted one of the most intractable problems of the political transition, it was to become one of the most positive drivers of the latter once it started up in January 2005 The AU’s African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) has now been replaced by the UN peace-keeping mission, (United Nations Operations in Burundi [ONUB]), under the auspices of which South African troops continue to play a central role Boshoff concludes that while many challenges to the sustainability of peace remain, the DDR process as a component and guarantor of the political transition appears to be successful

As remarkable as South Africa’s role in Burundi has been, it faces a perhaps more formidable task in contributing to the making of a lasting peace in the DRC

The Democratic Republic of Congo

In recent years, South Africa has become critically involved in the process

to end the conflict that has plagued the DRC since the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zairean state amidst a welter of internal and external pressures Initially reluctant to get drawn into the maelstrom of an internationalised civil war, which saw SADC participants (Angola, Nambia and Zimbabwe) lining up in support of a shaky regime (of dubious legitimacy) in Kinshasa in opposition to rebel movements supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi,

South Africa was later to emerge as a principal broker between conflicting interests during what became known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) Culminating in the Pretoria Agreement of 2002, which provided for the drawing up of a transitional constitution, plans for a referendum and election have been formulated

Claude Kabemba’s principal concern is to consider whether this agreement has laid a basis for peace and democracy Interestingly, he explores what writers elsewhere have described as the ‘curse’ of the possession of rich natural resources The Congo’s riches, he argues, have attracted the attention of numerous greedy adventurers over decades However, while he acknowledges that multinational corporations may well be complicit in the gross exploitation

of the DRC’s resources, it does not follow that they are responsible for the brutal and kleptocratic governance to which the Congo has been subject since independence Such a perspective suggests that the DRC is a prisoner of its own riches, whereas, in contrast, the future demands that the country takes charge

of its own destiny Yet historically the DRC’s rulers have looted the national treasury and regarded the state as their personal possession While hailing the present transitional constitution as a document of hope, Kabemba worries that the broader transitional process has failed to adequately address the issue

of leadership, and that too few measures have been put in place to ensure that a democratic leadership becomes genuinely patriotic, transformative and accountable to the people Outlining multiple challenges, which will have to be addressed if the DRC is to achieve a stable state, Kabemba concludes that South African support for the consolidation of both democracy and development – even if it is somewhat self-interested – will continue to be vital

Ivory Coast

If it is unsurprising, given its regional weight and interests, that South Africa should have become intensely involved in peace processes in central and southern Africa, it is rather less expected that the Mbeki government has been drawn into the mediation of the civil war in Ivory Coast However, as Ishola Williams explains in his paper, this is because of the limits of Nigeria as a West African regional hegemon and of ECOWAS as a regional power broker.West Africa has been afflicted by destabilising political crises and conflicts, internal to and between states, for three decades: inter-state conflicts between

Senegal and Mauritania, and between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau; crises

in Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau; and internationalised civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia ECOWAS, or coalitions of its members, have played important roles in attempts to resolve all these conflicts, either by mediation

or the dispatch of troops instructed to enforce, keep or facilitate the peace Its record has been mixed, with some successes chalked up against a larger number of dubious achievements, as the organisation has been challenged, variously, by frictions between Anglophone and Francophone states, by regional states’ concern to contain Nigeria’s ambitions and actions as an aspirant hegemon, and not least by problems around military capacity and economic resources Yet, as far as South Africa was traditionally concerned, these were distant problems and, for all practical purposes, could be largely ignored However, as Williams points out, South Africa’s wish and capacity to remain distant was to change around the year 2000

His analysis is in broad accord with that of Kagwanja Thabo Mbeki’s commitment to an African Renaissance, through such devices as Nepad, has – in the wake of previous differences – brought Nigeria and South Africa, as the major powers within their own regions and within the continent more generally, into closer contact With both being viewed by the US and the West

as having major responsibilities for promoting peace and development within Africa as a whole, they also share interests in encouraging mutual trade and investment (on this, see Daniel, Lutchman & Naidu 2005)

South Africa’s shift to multilateralism and recognition of West Africa as Nigeria’s sphere of influence ensured that it gave (some) financial and diplomatic support to the various peace initiatives in West Africa, while nonetheless remaining at a distance Yet this was to change in 2004 when, with President Olu Obasanjo of Nigeria acting as Chair of the AU, and Mbeki as Chair of the AU’s Peace and Security Council, the latter was to be mandated by the AU to mediate in the civil war in Ivory Coast, which had been precipitated

by an abortive coup by mostly northern elements within the armed forces and gendarmerie in September 2002 Initially, President Laurent Gbagbo had called for assistance from France, hoping that French troops would help him crush the rebels militarily, without giving enough chance to mediators from ECOWAS to bring about a political solution However, as Kagwanja and Williams elaborate, this strategy collapsed in the wake of the outbreak

of hostilities between French and Ivorian troops, and Gbagbo’s fear that

Nigeria’s involvement as mediator or peacemaker would enhance the power

of a regional rival It was in this context that Mbeki was drawn into the crisis

as mediator

South African efforts culminated in the April 2005 Pretoria Agreement between the government and the rebels, under which elections were scheduled for October 2005 However, even though now backed by some 10 000 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers and an embargo put in place against the provision

of arms to either side, it is widely acknowledged that the peace process remains extraordinarily fragile The fundamental problem, as Williams stresses, is that there remains a lack of trust between the conflicting parties Hence, although Mbeki intervened successfully to make Gbagbo reverse a constitutional amendment that would have prevented Alassana Quattara, the main opposition leader, from running as a candidate for the presidency on the grounds that he was not an Ivorian national (that is, with both parents being born in the country), the opposition remains convinced that Gbagbo

is still committed to a military solution Meanwhile, disarmament of both rebel and government militias has hardly started, and it seems inevitable that the elections will have to be postponed until after October 2005 While the Burundi case has shown that extension of a transitional period need not be fatal, the outcome remains highly uncertain and, although the South African Foreign Ministry insists that considerable progress has been made over the last two years, it is still possible that Mbeki’s best efforts may come to nought

The problem, as an editorial in Business Day (23.08.05) recently put it, is that

there is major concern that South African diplomatic efforts are becoming

overstretched, and that while, inter alia, South Africa is heavily involved in

the DRC and Burundi, as well participating in shared efforts to reconstruct Sudan, President Mbeki may well find that he lacks the resources (military and diplomatic) that his efforts deserve As Williams concludes, the Ivory Coast may prove to be the greatest challenge that Thabo Mbeki has yet had to face – although, as this Introduction is being finalised, it is reported that South Africa is walking away from the mediation, blaming rebels and the political opposition for delays Claiming that the latter were refusing to honour their side of the latest peace deal, Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad has announced that it is now the responsibility of the UN and the AU to ensure

that the agreements are implemented (Business Day, 31.08.05).

South Africa and peacemaking: lessons and challenges

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy was widely hailed as

a ‘miracle’ Notwithstanding that various commentators have convincingly challenged the ‘miraculous’ aspect of that transformation (see, for example,

Guelke 1999), it remains the case that what happened – or, rather, how it

happened – is looked to as a model for the resolution of other conflicts in the world, and not least in Africa Many such commentaries focus upon the peculiar combination of reconciliatory and strong-arm tactics used by Nelson Mandela in bringing conflicting parties together, while others focus upon the various compromise constitutional devices to bridge gaps between opposing ethnic and political groups (see Horowitz 1991) However, whatever the approach, the South African transition constitutes both an inspiration

to other countries attempting to claw themselves out of war, and a standard against which to judge their progress In the Burundi case, for example, Mandela was both hailed and criticised for employing strategies and tactics

in negotiations which compared Tutsis to South African whites and Hutus to South African blacks, even if he was (at least at times) at pains to say, ‘We did

it this way, and maybe you can learn from our example’ (Bentley & Southall 2005: 163–190) Yet what are the generic and particular lessons that can be learnt from South Africa’s own experience? And to what extent is South Africa, as an agent of conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa today, able to export and implement them? The present collection includes four papers wrestling with these issues, beginning with John Daniel and Marisha

Commission (TRC) as a model for dealing with other African countries’ own turbulent pasts

Truth commissions and other instruments for dealing with the past

Daniel and Ramdeen begin by noting the recent advances made in Africa with regard, firstly, to democracy and constitutionalism, and, secondly, to human-rights practice as it relates to the demand for accountability for past wrongs Broadly speaking, twentieth century practice after wars or conflicts was either

to attempt to forget the past (by the granting of blanket amnesties or the deliberate promotion of a national amnesia) or by subjection of some of the losers to sanction, the so-called Nuremburg option, or what Mamdani (2002)

terms victors’ justice However, since around the 1970s, a middle course began

to emerge, which involved ‘a distinctive conception of law and justice in the context of political transformation’ Known as ‘transitional justice’, this is a form of law ‘involving a set of judicial or quasi-judicial procedures designed both to deal with the issue of accountability for past wrongs and to ensure the success of the transition’

Daniel and Ramdeen argue that the South African TRC has become the model

by which all other such commissions are evaluated The esteem it is accorded derives from various factors, notably the legitimacy it acquired from its near-universal backing by parties involved in the negotiation process, the public consultation involved in the shaping of its founding legislation, and that its membership, headed by Archbishop Tutu, was highly prestigious and selected

by a transparent and independent process Importantly, too, the TRC was given legal teeth, in that the government had rejected any notion of ‘blanket amnesty’, and that amnesty was to be dependent upon full disclosure of past crimes Thereafter, the Commission conducted its proceedings in public, with both victims and perpetrators enabled to tell their stories; and, importantly,

it directed its attentions to both pro- and anti-apartheid elements, to the formerly ruling NP and its cohorts and to the ANC

It is against the background of the South African TRC that Daniel and Ramdeen take us through other African experiences of truth commissions They judge the Nigerian example, established in June 1999 to investigate human rights violations in the periods of post-independence military rule

between 1984 and 1999, to be a case study of how not to establish a truth

commission (the political will to make it work being almost totally lacking in ruling circles) In contrast, they deem the Ghanaian commission (established

in January 2002 to examine abuses during periods of unconstitutional rule since 1957) to be the most closely approximated to the South African model, and to have become a serious instrument of accountability

The transitional justice process in Sierra Leone, a product of the Lomé Accord

of July 1999, which brought an end to that country’s horrific civil war, is unique in that the truth commission there operates alongside a war-crimes process being conducted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established

by the UN Security Council Distinguished by its multinational composition (including one commissioner from South Africa), the commission has gone about its business openly and efficiently, and has taken evidence from a large

number of victims, perpetrators and witnesses; in large measure, it would seem to have been well received, even though its performance has been marred by some difficulties in its relationship with the Special Court

In Morocco, civil society groups created a Moroccan Forum for Truth and Equity, which – campaigning for a South African-style TRC – has eclipsed the Indemnity Commission, established by King Mohammed VI in 1999 to enquire into the circumstances of the large number of ‘disappeared’ since 1956, but the findings of which were popularly rejected as too protective of government After noting the failure of the Kibaki regime to establish a commission in post-Moi Kenya and the possibility of the establishment of one in the DRC, Daniel and Ramdeen proceed to use the Ethiopian experience to argue the inappropriateness of the ‘war-crimes trial’ approach in under-resourced Third World contexts The authors feel that this judgement is manifestly endorsed

by the serious delays in prosecution of alleged genocidaires in Rwanda, many

of whom are still languishing untried in jail after several years, although many others have now been released to confess their crimes and seek peace with their communities through a communal conflict-resolution system known

as gacaca

Overall, Daniel and Ramdeen’s argument that South Africa has been to the fore

of considerable progress towards securing accountability of rulers in the wider continent is at one with more detailed analyses of the TRC, an outstanding example of which concludes that ‘nations moving through democratic transitions may indeed find a workable model in South Africa’s ethical yet pragmatic experiment in dealing with the past’ (Graybill 2002: 178)

Best practice

In contrast to the various analyses of South Africa’s diverse engagements in conflict resolution and peacemaking, Hussein Solomon (an international relations theorist) provides an overview of what he considers to be ‘ten principles of best practice engagement’, which should or could be pursued

in Africa Arguing that attempts at peacemaking should be accompanied

by simultaneous efforts at reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation, his ten principles stress the importance of understanding the reasons why states become involved in seeking to resolve other states’ conflicts, of using the right approaches for conflict resolution and prevention at the same time,

and of ensuring that proposed solutions are aimed at the long term and are not designed simply to offer a ‘quick fix’ Furthermore, he urges the need for: co-ordination of the efforts of the diverse international actors engaged in any intervention so that they are complementary and not competitive; the importance of the search for human security being prioritised over the rights

of states; the need for a strengthening of international law for the purposes

of stressing prevention of conflict by way of guidelines, instruments and standards; the attaching of sanctions to crimes; and strategies that should

be pursued with regard to different violations of human rights Meanwhile, the capacity for pre-emptive action to prevent conflicts needs to be backed

up by the development and emplacement of early warning systems, linked

to the institutionalisation of an early response system It is also important that any external intervention be linked to economic reconstruction efforts, which should pay particular attention to addressing economic inequalities, notably in situations of ethnic conflict Peacekeeping interventions should be undertaken only in situations where there is a possibility of some minimal agreement between enemies, should be matched to peacemaking and peace-building efforts, and ideally should take place to prevent destructive conflict developing rather than after it has done so Finally, Solomon stresses the importance of understanding the psychology of leaders involved in conflict, especially in African countries, which, too often, are dominated by ‘big men’: the need for ‘rapport’ between interveners and conflicting leaderships is an aspect that he feels is too often ignored

Solomon argues the necessity for the implementation of his principles if the objectives of Nepad are to be realised His next assignment must surely be to use his framework for the analysis of South Africa’s own various interventions, and thereby perhaps explain the relative success of Pretoria’s engagement in Burundi, its impotence in Zimbabwe, and the fragility of its efforts in the Ivory Coast

The gendering of peacemaking

Alison Lazarus would argue that, for all their merits, Solomon’s ten principles ignore the fact that conflict is always gendered; that is, on the whole, war affects men and women differently, men have disproportionate access to the means and institutions of violence and, hence, the combatants and

perpetrators of violence are predominantly (but not exclusively) men In this circumstance, the pursuit of human security, which she argues is central to all ‘peace work’, must necessarily take these gender imbalances and associated gendered identities into account.

It is from this perspective that Lazarus finds much to commend in South African efforts as mediator in the DRC and Burundi In these two countries, she argues, South Africa’s peace practitioners have committed themselves ‘to inclusivity especially with regard to promoting women’s involvement in peace processes’, notably through the linkage of formal mediation between political and armed groupings to informal attempts by women to establish a peace that ensures gender equality, a dimension that she elaborates in some detail Even if this is at variance with interpretations that suggest she may be exaggerating the extent to which South African negotiators have sought to include civil society and women (see, for example, Bentley & Southall 2005: 152–154), this leads her to prompt the question of whether the South African government should deliberately include women in its mediation teams to ensure that the latter’s efforts are sufficiently gender sensitive and likely to promote gender equality Noting the ambiguity of the literature in this regard, she leans to the answer that men and women are likely to bring different strengths to any negotiation process, and that ideally, therefore, mediation teams should be inclusive of both – and should take full cognisance of international recommendations designed to enhance gender sensitivity as an aspect of conflict resolution and peacemaking, which have been taken up vigorously by South African and other African feminist activists organising for peace in Africa Arguing that South African practice has been in advance of elsewhere on the continent, she concludes that there is still considerable room for improvement and greater gender sensitivity

Are peacemaking and arms-making compatible?

South Africa, increasingly engaged in conflict resolution and peacemaking since 1994, inherited a substantial arms industry from the apartheid regime, and is now having to face the dilemma of how it can or should reconcile its humanitarian foreign policy goals with those of arms-making Sanusha Naidu approaches this question by discussing how South Africa has sought to become a ‘responsible’ arms dealer

Naidu notes that, via the promotion of the industry under the aegis of Armscor (established in 1968), which dished out contracts to private companies, South Africa had become relatively self-sufficient in arms production by the late 1980s, by which time economies of scale and cost-recovery measures were propelling the state corporation towards the export of its products This pressure upon the local arms industry to become a global arms seller was only increased by the swingeing cuts in the defence and arms procurement budgets, which followed the political transition in 1994 However, this ran at odds with the new government’s commitments to human rights internationally,

to which end it established the National Conventional Armaments Control Committee (NCACC) in 1995 to ensure transparency in the procurement process, and compliance with official policy and the country’s obligations under international law and agreements

The basic thrust of this new regime was to ensure that arms exports should not contribute to the escalation of conflicts, should not arm oppressive regimes, and should contribute only to countries’ legitimate defence needs However, as Naidu proceeds to elaborate, these pragmatically noble goals have been severely undermined by subsequent practice, with the NCACC manifestly failing to control the export of South African arms to conflict hot-spots and some highly dubious regimes, despite its attempts to set in place various checks and balances Her analysis is also strengthened by any reference

to the notorious post-apartheid ‘arms deal’ whereby South Africa committed

to the purchase of warships and arms from several European powers: as Crawford-Browne (2004: 330) notes, the confluence of the interests of global arms sellers, the local arms industry and certain highly placed politicians was

‘decisive in influencing the diversion of national resources into…negative and non-productive arms spending’ Furthermore, it has recently been reported that the Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, a defence force agency that must by law report annually to Parliament on South Africa’s arms exports, has classified as ‘secret’ its report for sales in 2003 and 2004, and the NCACC has been accused of not only violating its governing act but ignoring

the concerns of human rights organisations (Financial Mail, 04.08.05).

Naidu’s overall argument, therefore, is that rather than having become a

‘responsible’ arms producer, South Africa has allowed its arms exports to fuel conflicts in many parts of the developing world, even though the arms industry is simultaneously developing its capacity to support peace-building

efforts, notably through mine clearance She concludes, rather alarmingly, that whereas the apartheid regime was more explicit in its policy of regional destabilisation, the current government’s culpability ‘seems to be driven and shaped by the marketisation of the arms industry’

South Africa as an African peacemaker

It is widely recognised that, notwithstanding ambiguities, South Africa’s African foreign policy has undergone a major transformation since 1994 From a state oriented to the West and seeking to impose its will and domination upon its immediate region, South Africa is now a state that is increasingly Africa-centred and dedicated to creating co-operative relations with its neighbours However, reflective of its economic and political weight, under Mbeki South Africa has sought to assume a leadership role in Africa, notably through the restructuring of the OAU into the AU and the associated promotion of Nepad, a programme which for all its limitations and faults explicitly links the continent’s development prospects and ambitions to the resolution of Africa’s conflicts and the promotion of peace If it is true that there has been something of a shift from the pursuit of principle under Mandela to greater pragmatism under Mbeki, then it is also the case that the latter’s policy has been far more programmatic, seeking to balance South Africa’s ostensibly humanitarian aims against the realities of power politics, and to combine South Africa’s perceived national interest with the promotion

of wider African development

The South African government’s activism has inexorably drawn it into extensive involvements in conflict resolution and peacemaking Some of these, notably in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, have been dictated by immediate self-interest and propinquity Others, such as those in Burundi and Ivory Coast, have been invited by African hopes that the peculiar mix of South Africa’s continental weight and the experience of its own transition would render

it an effective mediator Whatever the motivation, and whatever success (or otherwise) that has ensued, South African policy is heavily premised upon the key assumption that is made manifest in Nepad, notably that peace – and the ‘good governance’ that allows and promotes it – is a fundamental requisite for the attraction of investment, domestic and foreign, that Africa needs To

be sure, given South African corporate ambitions in Africa, there is a strong

dose of self-interest in this approach, as is confirmed by Daniel and Lutchman (2006), who demonstrate the strong association between South Africa’s peacemaking involvements in countries such as the DRC and Sudan (and its collaboration with oppressive regimes such as that in Equatorial Guinea) and its search for energy self-sufficiency Inevitably, therefore, even if South Africa’s policy in Africa displays a broadly integrated approach, there are manifest contradictions, these being most obvious in the case of Zimbabwe, where the confusion of its objectives and motivations has reduced its supposed activism to a plight of impotent passivity Nonetheless, post-apartheid South Africa’s forays into Africa have seen it emerge as a leading force for regional peace and security.

Does this imply that South Africa is (or should aspire to becoming) a ‘benign hegemon’, as suggested by Habib and Selinyane (2004)? The empirical answer

is most certainly that it is not, for as Alden and Le Pere observe, ‘while having many of the trappings of a hegemonic power, South Africa is nonetheless experiencing difficulty operationalising these attributes into concrete policy gains in the region’ (2004: 294–295) The normative question is also probably best answered by a negative, for apart from any disjuncture between aspiration and capacity, the post-apartheid South African government is acutely aware

of other African governments’ sensitivities to any prospect of South African domination, and that a bid for hegemony would be hugely resented and counterproductive This is not to deny that South Africa is a regional power at the centre of a sphere of influence, only to observe that there are regional and continental realities that curb and limit its ambitions Although these latter will almost inevitably draw Pretoria into conflict as well as co-operation with other African states, especially as South African corporates and parastatals drive deeper into the continent, it remains the case that South Africa’s self-interest appears to be increasingly aligned with the promotion of peace

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