Are Wildlife Good in Themselves-An Empirical Exploration into the Prevalence and Features of the Belief that Wildlife Possess Intrinsic Value (Absolute Final)

In the case of wildlife, environmental ethicists have offered a variety of frameworks asserting that species possess value outside of the utility they offer humans, although there is con

Are Wildlife Good in Themselves? An Empirical Exploration Into the Prevalence and

Features of the Belief That Wildlife Possess Intrinsic Value

Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science in

the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By Benjamin J Wickizer, B A

Graduate Program in Environment and Natural Resource

The Ohio State University

Copyrighted by Benjamin J Wickizer

2016

Abstract Intrinsic value has been the focus of philosophers’ inquiries in numerous contexts

In the case of wildlife, environmental ethicists have offered a variety of frameworks asserting that species possess value outside of the utility they offer humans, although there is contention within the field as to these claims However, wildlife’s intrinsic value has received minimal attention outside of the normative approach taken by environmental ethics Thus, little is understood about intrinsic value in the context of conservation from

a social psychological perspective

Using a national data sample from the United States, this study addresses four research questions: 1) What is the prevalence of the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value? 2) Is the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value separate and distinct from existing measures of wildlife value orientation (i.e., mutualism)? 3) Does the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value help explain other wildlife-related judgments? 4) What social and demographic factors are associated with the belief that wildlife possess

intrinsic-value belief These findings have implications for the field of human

dimensions of wildlife as well as wildlife policy Perhaps most importantly, my findings suggest the majority of the American public deems wildlife worthy moral consideration – meaning, wildlife are entitled to be treated in ways that consider their welfare, rather than simply being utilized for humanity’s benefit Presently, wildlife policy in the United States largely ignores the welfare of wildlife, focusing almost exclusively on provisioning benefits to human beings Altering wildlife policy such that it provides meaningful consideration for the welfare of wild animals would require profound changes to the policies and institutions that govern wildlife conservation in the U.S

Dedication

I dedicate this work to my grandmother, Barbara Painter She engendered a resolute curiosity in me, and taught me about, among many other wondrous things, trilliums

Acknowledgments

I first would like to acknowledge the insights that Dr Eric Toman, Dr Robyn Wilson, and Dr Jeremy Bruskotter have provided, in addition to their willingness to review my final work Additionally, I am indebted to Dr Bruskotter for his excellent guidance, training, and assistance during my tenure at Ohio State University I thank Dr Bruskotter and Dr Wilson for allowing me to utilize their dataset

The faculty at my undergraduate institution, SUNY Geneseo, whose training exceptionally prepared me to pursue my future professional and academic undertakings, deserve acknowledgment Specifically, I must thank Dr William Cook and Dr Jordan Kleiman They taught me to ask the right questions and understand the significance of the answers

I am appreciative of my family’s patience with my persistent inquiries for their opinions of wildlife and axiological subjects, which helped frame my thinking about this work I am grateful for my mom’s unwavering support and faith in my ability to succeed and surmount challenges I thank my dad for his helpful informal statistics consultations, but more importantly, for his boundless willingness to listen and provide insight and encouragement And last, but certainly not least, I am eternally grateful to my fiancée, Laura, whose support, patience, belief, and love serve as a wellspring for me

Vita

2005………Mercer Island High School

2010………B.A History, SUNY Geneseo

2013 to present……… M.S The Ohio State University

Publications Wickizer, B J., & Snow, A (2011) Rediscovering the transportation frontier: Improving

sustainability in the United States through passenger rail Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 11(1), 12-16, 61-62

Fields of Study

Major Field: Environment and Natural Resources

Specialization: Environmental Social Science

Table of Contents

Abstract………ii

Dedication……… iv

Acknowledgements……… v

Vita……… vi

List of Tables………viii

Introduction……… ………1

Literature Review……… ……… 7

Methods……… ………45

Results……… ……… 61

Discussion……… ………83

Limitations……… ……… 97

Conclusion and Suggested Future Research………….……… 100

References………102

List of Tables Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Logistic Regression Model Independent Variables…62 Table 2 Agreement With the Response Item: “Wildlife Have Inherent Value, Above and Beyond Their Utility to People.”……… 64 Table 3 Agreement With Response Item: “Wildlife are Only Valuable if People Get to

Table 4 Prevalence of Intrinsic Value Belief for Combined Intrinsic-Value Measure….65 Table 5 Principal Component Analysis for Wildlife Value Orientation and Intrinsic-Value Items………68 Table 6 ANOVA for Intrinsic-Value Belief and Wildlife Attitude……… 70 Table 7 ANOVA for Intrinsic-Value Belief and Variance of Wildlife Attitudes……….71 Table 8 Intrinsic-Value Believers’ and Non-Believers’ Attitudes Towards Individual Animals……… 72 Table 9 Intrinsic-Value Belief and Wildlife Attitude (Controlling for Wildlife Value

Orientation)………75

Table 10 Intrinsic-Value Belief and Variance of Wildlife Attitudes (Controlling for Wildlife Value Orientation)……… 76 Table 11 Prevalence of Support for the Endangered Species Act………77

Table 12 Logistic Regression Model Explaining Endangered Species Act Support……79 Table 13 Logistic Regression Model Explaining Intrinsic-Value Belief……… 81

Introduction

According to psychological theory, human values, attitudes, and beliefs play a pivotal role in shaping how individuals formulate judgments and decide on appropriate actions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Rokeach, 1973) Understanding the relationships between internal psychological cognitions with one other and human behavior is a

primary goal of social psychologists These relationships can provide insight into why people behave in certain ways, potentially increasing social scientists’ ability to explain behavior More importantly for public policy, these insights can elucidate which

approaches and mechanisms might allow for the expansion of certain behaviors and the curtailment of others, as well as the viability of policies vis-à-vis the public One of the many areas of study receiving attention from social psychologists interested in values and attitudes has been the environment and nature, and more specifically, wildlife With wildlife species being affected by anthropogenic activities to perhaps a greater degree than ever before (Barnosky et al 2011; Pimm et al., 2014; Wilson, 2002), and with institutions attempting to address these impacts, understanding wildlife-related cognitions and their relationship to the human behaviors affecting species is of paramount

importance

One concept regularly referenced in discussing nature but seldom studied

empirically, despite its arguable impact on American perceptions and consciousness of

the natural world, is the belief that wildlife and/or nature possess intrinsic value Many

within America’s environmental/conservation pantheon – Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, and Aldo Leopold – referred to or implied the notion that nature, or some of its component parts (e.g., wildlife), has value of itself, outside of the utility it offers

humanity (Cafaro, 2004; Fox, 1981; Muir, 1903; Worster, 1994) Their explications of this concept surely shaped Americans’ perspectives of and relationship with wildlife and nature Moreover, the most central wildlife-related modern U.S environmental statute, the Endangered Species Act, at least implies that wildlife species have intrinsic value by not preferencing one species over another based on their instrumentality or other similar criteria during the listing and recovery process (Endangered Species Act of 1973, 2012) However, its implementation often involves less-than-egalitarian resource distribution between species (Brown, Larmer, Thomas, & Wall, 1985), as well as the ability to exempt species from protection in certain cases Thus, intrinsic value is of substantial importance for understanding American views towards wildlife and nature, as well as discerning the congruency of public orientations with the concepts/beliefs that underpin existent or potential wildlife policies

Furthermore, in the case of the Endangered Species Act, clarifying public

sentiments towards wildlife and the reasons for their preservation can bolster arguments against weakening the law’s provisions or repealing it outright Prior amendments, such

as those in 1978 and 1982, as well as the dozens of proposals to alter or weaken the law

in the present Congress (Defenders of Wildlife, 2015), indicate that such threats are not unsubstantiated Intrinsic value has heretofore received minimal attention from scholars interested in wildlife conservation (Vucetich, Bruskotter, & Nelson, 2015) outside of the field of environmental ethics (Callicott, 1999; McShane, 2007; Rolston, 1988; Taylor,

1986; VanDeVeer, 1995;), and environmental ethicists generally treat intrinsic value as a theoretical and/or metaphysical concept Conservation biologists have also discussed intrinsic value in relation to wildlife (Soule, 1985), but they generally invoke it to lend credence to the notion that wildlife should be protected, as opposed to studying the concept itself This lack of attention is somewhat understandable, as intrinsic value lacks

a single, universally agreed upon definition For example, some ethicists interpret

intrinsic value as applying to individual animals (Regan, 1983; Taylor, 1986), while others believe it applies to entire species or even ecological collectives (Callicott, 1989; Rolston, 1994) These conceptual differences, along with other complexities, make intrinsic value a somewhat unwieldy concept, and complicate efforts to utilize intrinsic value as a means to help guide conservation decisions or policy

Intrinsic value also has received criticism as being subordinate or even

superfluous to instrumental value in terms of its capacity to construct convincing

arguments for conservation (Norton, 1991), and considered problematic because of its less-than-simple transference into quantitative assessments like cost-benefit analysis (Justus, Colyvan, Regan, & Maguire, 2009; Maguire & Justus, 2008) Further, some philosophers have argued that intrinsic value in non-humans does not exist or is

unobservable (Norton, 1992; Svoboda, 2011) However, largely absent from such

critiques is the extent to which people endorse or oppose the idea that components of nature possess intrinsic value Whether or not wildlife’s intrinsic value can or should be monetized or incorporated into economic assessments, or even whether or not it should exist as a theoretical concept from a normative standpoint are not necessarily the most fundamental questions related to wildlife’s intrinsic value, nor are they reason enough to

discount the concept regardless of the answers Of equal, or perhaps greater, importance

is addressing such questions as, “To what extent does the public believe wildlife possess intrinsic value,” and “What effect does this belief have on how we perceive and relate to wildlife”? If intrinsic value is a widely held belief, suggesting a high degree of public moral consensus, then perhaps it is deserving of more attention within conservation decision-making and policy In the case that it is a widespread belief, it could also be valuable for encouraging pro-environmental behavior, or identifying common ground among stakeholders with opposing interests

Social psychological studies related to conservation have generally not focused precisely on evaluating belief in nature’s intrinsic value, as many items used to assess anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric orientation fail to accurately depict intrinsic value belief (Vucetich et al., 2015) Though a number of ethicists have taken up the task

of focusing specifically on intrinsic value, their approach has generally been theoretical and normative, offering no empirical insight into intrinsic value as a cognition For example, ethicists have addressed the types of species that should be afforded intrinsic value by applying ethical theory to construct philosophical frameworks (Callicott, 1989; Regan 1983; Rolston, 1988; Taylor, 1986) Environmental pragmatist philosophers have advocated, and in some cases pursued (Minteer, Corley, & Manning, 2004), a “public philosophy” approach that attempts to more readily integrate philosophy with “real world” environmental questions related to public values and environmental policies However, these philosophers have generally been critical of intrinsic value as diverting environmental ethics from what they deem are more important tasks, such as

understanding which types of arguments morally motivate individuals to be more

environmentally concerned (Light, 2002; Norton, 1992) This study hopes to fill a void between these divergent perspectives It pursues, at least to a degree, the practical

philosophy advocated by so-called environmental pragmatists, while focusing on the concept of wildlife’s intrinsic value that is argued for by theoretical, nonanthropocentrist philosophers, and it applies social psychological theory and approaches to explore the issue

This study will first review relevant ethical literature discussing and critiquing the concept of wildlife’s and nature’s intrinsic value, then it will discuss existing literature related to values and attitudes towards wildlife and the environment It will then attempt

to empirically identify the prevalence of the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value, its association with other wildlife-related judgments (e.g., wildlife attitude and Endangered Species Act support), and determine what individual-level factors explain individuals’ belief in intrinsic value In pursuit of these goals, the following research questions will

be addressed:

1) What is the prevalence of the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value?

2) Is the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value separate and distinct from existing measures of ‘wildlife value orientations’ (i.e., mutualism)?

3) Does the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value help explain other related judgments?

wildlife-4) What social and demographic factors are associated with the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value?

The concept of wildlife’s intrinsic value is primed for greater examination through the lens of environmental social psychology, and this study hopes to further this process, not

only identifying findings related to intrinsic value, but also suggesting paths ripe for further exploration in the future.

Literature Review Ethical Dimensions of Wildlife’s Intrinsic Value

Theories of intrinsic value Intrinsic value is the concept that an object has value

outside of its relationship or utility to other objects (Lemos, 1994; O’Neill, 1992)

Certain explanations of intrinsic value hold that its existence is not dependent on the psychological dispositions of individuals (i.e., that it is independent from any ‘valuation’ process), this is termed the objectivist view (Lemos, 1994; O’Neill, 1992) In other words, belief or non-belief in intrinsic value by individuals does not actually influence whether an object truly does or does not posses intrinsic value Intrinsic value is often juxtaposed against instrumental value, or the value that an object possesses value because

of the utility it offers another entity (most often humans) Objects possessing

instrumental value are a means to an end, while those with intrinsic value have been

described as being ends in themselves (O’Neill, 1992)

These two value types (intrinsic and instrumental) can exist alongside each other

in the same object, thus an object may possesses both intrinsic and instrumental value, may have one but not the other, or may posses neither (O’Neill, 1992; Stenmark, 2002; VanDeVeer, 1995) Objects that possess intrinsic value are thought to deserve some type

of obligatory moral consideration or deference because of this status, regardless of their associated instrumental value (Vucetich et al., 2015) That is to say, if an object has intrinsic value, it deserves to be treated in such a way that considers its welfare To illustrate the concept of intrinsic value, consider a tool such as a hammer A hammer has instrumental value because it provides a benefit to its user However, a hammer

generally is not considered to possess intrinsic value because it does not have any value outside of pounding nails, and thus it deserves no moral consideration A child, on the other hand, may possess instrumental value because he/she can accomplish chores, but he/she also has value outside of this usefulness to parents or others That value is

considered intrinsic value, which, irrespective of his/her characteristics, affords him/her moral consideration (Vucetich et al., 2015)

Some ethicists, however, question intrinsic value’s existence, humanity’s ability

to perceive it (Langton, 1998), or whether it actually applies to concrete, individual entities (e.g., humans, animals, tools), asserting that it pertains only to abstract entities (e.g., properties, such as pleasure, or facts, such as the fact that someone is happy)

(Lemos, 1994) It is beyond the scope of this review to delve into the range of arguments related to intrinsic value’s general existence, although the review will touch on a few theoretical and practical critiques of intrinsic value in the context of wildlife and nature Suffice it to say, this study approaches intrinsic value as a valid concept that can pertain

to concrete objects such as wildlife As was mentioned earlier, this study’s primary objective is not to argue for the validity of intrinsic value and its applicability to wildlife research from a normative or theoretical standpoint, although this is briefly discussed

Instead, the purpose here is to explore whether the general population holds this belief and if so, how this affects various judgments about wildlife

Perhaps the greatest conceptual distinction related to intrinsic value is whether or not this value is objective or subjective If intrinsic value is objective, an entity under consideration (e.g., wildlife) has value wholly independent of human consciousness or beliefs If intrinsic value is subjective, though an entity has value outside of its

instrumentality to humans, this value is conferred by a valuer (this is also sometimes

referred to as inherent value) (Norton, 1992) Part of the rationale for contending the

objectivist position is that if intrinsic value is completely independent of human valuation and valuers, then arguments for protecting nature are no longer subjective value

judgments, as some have construed them to be Instead, they are universal properties, lending more credence to the notion that protecting wildlife or nature is a moral

imperative or obligation (Norton, 1992)

Holmes Rolston III is perhaps the most notable adherent to what is termed the objectivist view of intrinsic value, offering a more metaphysical argument about its existence (Rolston, 1988) His explanation of intrinsic value is as an immutable

characteristic of objects, much like a carbon’s relationship to Earth’s life forms

(McShane, 2007), and thus even in the absence of humans, Rolston (1998) suggests that objects possessing intrinsic value would not cease to maintain that value Richard

Routley (1980) offered a hypothetical proposition, termed the “last man” argument, to illustrate the implications of a rejection of wildlife’s intrinsic value He posed the

scenario of an individual being the sole human inhabitant of Earth and that this person has a means to destroy all other life on Earth, and thus no humans would exist to be

affected by this mass extermination after this individual’s demise Despite a lack of instrumental consequences because of the non-existence of humans, he argued that many people would view a decision to destroy all life in this scenario as morally wrong,

suggesting a widespread belief in intrinsic value The implication of this thought

experiment is objectivist in nature, as it suggests there is culpability in destroying other life forms in the absence of human valuers However, some argue that the objectivist view is untenable because, among other things, humans lack evidence of this value’s existence because they lack the faculties to perceive and observe it, thus asserting its existence is impossible (Norton, 1992; Svoboda, 2011)

Unlike Rolston, J Baird Callicott adheres to what has been termed a subjectivist view of intrinsic value Callicott acknowledges the modern scientific principle that the physical world is “value-free” (Callicott, 1989, p 132) and that value has its source in human consciousness However, he asserts that this does not render human

consciousness as the only object of value in the world, but that non-human objects have value, both for the utility they provide valuers and for what they are irrespective of this instrumental value (Callicott, 1989) Value in the modern, scientific sense requires, according to Callicott, a valuer to generate it (Callicott, 1989), belying the objectivist view He asserts that, “One often finds, however, lurking beneath a recitation of the benefits to man provided by other species severally and the existing biotic complement of earth collectively, a scarcely concealed nonutilitarian substratum of value” (Callicott,

1989, p 130)

Another fundamental question related to the nature of intrinsic value is its

egalitarian or inegalitarian nature (i.e., is intrinsic value equally distributed across

entities, in this case, species types?) Rolston asserts that although certain species might serve a more critical role in the functioning of an ecosystem, and thus possess greater instrumental value, other species that are often less critical for ecosystem function, such

as a bald eagle, have greater intrinsic value (Rolston, 1994), likely because of they are

“higher” functioning or have greater sentience But this question of value distribution between species depends on whether wildlife are being considered at the individual or species level, and particularly the health status of the species, as the intrinsic value of an endangered individual or whole species could be considered greater than that of a non-endangered species (Rolston, 1994) From Callicott’s perspective, the presence of

intrinsic value does not necessitate absolute protection and complete deference in the context of wildlife or the environment (Callicott, 1999), and Rolston appears to agree (Rolston, 1994) Vucetich et al (2015) also echo this notion

The functioning of modern human societies would seem to require some sacrifice

of objects that possess intrinsic value Perhaps the appropriate approach is to consider the sacrifice of objects with intrinsic value morally acceptable in cases in which the sacrifice serves to realize other intrinsically valuable ends, such as enhancing the health

of another intrinsically valuable species, and for which no reasonable alternatives exist to achieve these ends without this sacrifice Otherwise, humanity would be paralyzed from making almost any decision, such as slapping a mosquito, or hunting members of deer populations that might otherwise damage an ecological balance or die a more painful, prolonged death from starvation as a result of their natural predators being removed Additionally, all ethics are likely to afford humans at least equal, but more often greater, intrinsic value compared to other life forms, and thus decisions that are truly injurious to

humans to the benefit of other creatures are also potentially morally questionable, as humans possess intrinsic value Scenarios in which wildlife’s intrinsic value is placed ahead of humans’ intrinsic value would seem to demonstrate a “reverse-speciesism” of sorts

Two of the primary proponents of value egality among different species are Tom Regan and Paul Taylor, asserting that individual life forms possess some sort of inherent (for our purposes, intrinsic) worth or value, making them deserving of moral

consideration Regan (1983) asserts that all animals that meet his criteria for inherent value, which includes, among other things, acting deliberately, being self-conscious, and entertaining goals, are endowed with equal rights and consideration, presumably

stemming from their equal value Thus Regan does not afford intrinsic value to all species, but the ones he does ascribe it to have equal value Taylor (1986) asserts that all life forms are “teleogical-centers-of life,” meaning they are an end in themselves,

endowing them with equal intrinsic value, or inherent worth, as he terms it He argues that moral agents (i.e., humans) have a moral obligation to treat them not as means to an end, but as an end in themselves, requiring human respect and consideration Taylor’s criteria for ascribing intrinsic value is broader than Regan’s, but they both provide

minimal gradation in value ascription for the species they believe deserve such a

distinction The problem with value egality, among other things, is that if animals

possess equal intrinsic value, and their societal instrumentality is not driving our behavior towards them because they deserve moral consideration, then we have no real value measure to guide ethically sound decisions and trade offs regarding human-animal

relations Callicott (2002) has critiqued the egalitarian ethical position for similar

reasons, noting it lacks practical application as a general environmental ethical

framework because of its focus on individual beings

The question of whether intrinsic value applies to individuals versus species is also fundamental for creating a framework for wildlife’s intrinsic value Much like the question of value egality, Regan and Taylor both see intrinsic value as applying to

individual life forms, not species or ecosystems Again, Regan (1983) is more

constrained in that his framework applies to only a limited number of animal species, while Taylor’s (1986) applies to all biota Because both theories are extentionist in nature, tracing the nature of humanity’s intrinsic value and identifying characteristics shared by other creatures to extend them intrinsic value, they are not particularly

applicable to environmental collectives such as species or ecosystems, as the criteria for intrinsic value in both ethics is not compatible with these larger scale environmental entities And this, according to Callicott (1989; 2002), is problematic Any

environmental ethic should, in Callicott’s estimation, give greater preference to

endangered species and the perpetuation and biodiversity and ecosystem richness and function Thus, he suggests an environmental holism, termed ecocentrism by some, applying intrinsic value to environmental collectives as well as individuals, and

adjudicating individual beings’ value based on their role in the biotic community

(Callicott, 1989) Rolston agrees, although his litmus test for intrinsic value in nature is

“a life defended for what it is in itself” (Rolston, 1994, p 173), which is not easily

applied to environmental collectives Thus he offers a third value type – systemic value – alongside intrinsic and instrumental values He describes the valuation of entities

possessing systemic value (e.g., ecosystems) as, “Valuing the products but not the system

able to produce these products is like finding a goose that lays golden eggs and valuing the eggs but not the goose” (Rolston, 1994, p 177)

Moving from the theoretical to the practical, if intrinsic value was completely eschewed in the realm of policymaking, then the U.S.’s seminal wildlife protection statute (i.e., Endangered Species Act) would not exist in its present form Many of the species currently listed would not have Endangered Species Act protections because they have little or no clear instrumental value If instrumental value is the only metric for determining what species deserve protection, it implies that some species extinction is not only acceptable, but it is desirable (when it serves an instrumental purpose) And while most would agree that the loss of individual beings is acceptable in many cases, far fewer are likely to agree that the loss of entire species is acceptable Scholars have highlighted this implication as a justification for why intrinsic value is needed when pursing

conservation, critiquing approaches that make instrumental value the sole basis for

conservation because they put the onus on scientists to prove a species’ worth, or else potentially risk its decline (Callicott, 1999; Callicott, 2002; Paterson, 2006; Rolston, 1988)

Critiques of intrinsic value As mentioned earlier, a number of critiques have

been aimed at wildlife’s intrinsic value (and the intrinsic value of nature generally), including the argument that it diverts interest from more important, practical applications

of environmental ethics and is superfluous to achieving conservation goals and public support; that it is an ill-defined concept; and that is it not translatable to decision-making frameworks Although certain aspects of these critiques have merit, some suggest a

limited understanding of the intrinsic value literature Thus, it is worth briefly reviewing

these critiques and offering some basic responses

Bryan Norton (1991; 1992; 1995), as well as other environmental pragmatist ethicists (Light, 2002), has contended that the questions that the field of environmental ethics addresses and the answers it offers should be of more practicable relevance and have greater applicability to addressing/adjudicating the host of environmental problems confronting societies Light (2002) and Norton (1992) have also argued that the field’s preoccupation with intrinsic value has limited its ability to interact with other fields, pushing it towards disciplinary obscurity Additionally, Norton (1991) and other

pragmatists (Minteer & Manning, 2000) assert that in the absence of an ethic recognizing intrinsic value, because the protection of the environment is generally in society’s best interest, the same ultimate conservation outcomes will be achieved in the long run – termed the convergence hypothesis Minteer and Manning (2000) lend some empirical support to the convergence hypothesis, at least on the individual level They found that respondents expressed a diverse set of environmental ethics and value motivations related

to nature, but despite this value pluralism, a vast majority agreed with forest management approaches that were environmentally sustainable However, this study did not directly address intrinsic value or assess whether differences in support for policy outcomes varied between those who believed nature possesses intrinsic value and those who did not (and convergence suggests that nature’s intrinsic value is moot in terms of creating different policy outcomes, but this is unclear from the study) Furthermore, although convergence might occur on the individual level, that does not mean it will occur as part

of the policymaking process, which is a primary reason that nonanthropocentrist ethicists,

such as Callicott and Rolston, assert the importance of recognizing intrinsic value in policymaking

Pragmatists have suggested intrinsic value should be abandoned in favor of an ethic based solely on instrumental value, and contend the field should place more focus

on clarifying values that are held by a wide contingent of the population (Light, 2002) This instrumental, non-intrinsic ethical approach is referred to as an anthropocentric ethic, in contrast to the previously discussed ethics that are referred to as

nonanthropocentrist However, Ben Minteer (2001), also an environmental pragmatist, believes that there is room for a more contextualized, less universalist version of intrinsic value within environmental pragmatism, and acknowledges that much of the public is inclined to recognize nature’s non-instrumental value Callanan (2010) also argues for the importance of intrinsic value for pragmatists She asserts the importance of

representing a pluralism of environmental values (i.e., anthropocentric and

nonanthrpocentric values) within pragmatic frameworks because the public appears to harbor similarly pluralistic environmental values, potentially enhancing the efficacy of the pragmatist ethic

Nonanthropocentrist ethicists (Callicott, 2002; Rolston, 2009), as well as others (Sarewitz, 2009; Stenmark, 2009) have been critical of Norton’s convergence hypothesis Both Callicott (2002) and Rolston (2009) contend that ignoring intrinsic value in

policymaking results in fundamentally different policies, policies that are decidedly more anthropocentric and require that any objects facing impacts from projects or policies have easily discernable benefits to humans, or else face sacrifice Upon examination of the three environmental issue types – human population, wilderness preservation, and

wildlife management – Stenmark (2009) argues that the policies likely to be advocated by anthropocentrists (instrumental value), biocentrists (intrinsic value for individuals), and ecocentrists (intrinsic value for environmental wholes) around these issues would result

in distinctly different policy outcomes, in opposition to the convergence hypothesis Sarewitz (2009) also questions Norton’s contention that the interests/welfare of people and those of species/nature converge in the long run (although Sarewitz also questions intrinsic value’s potency as a basis for policy) He argues that it is often difficult to fully understand the true welfare of these two entities and their interactions, rendering it

difficult to know or test whether policy outcomes benefit, presently or in the future, both humanity and nature Even in the case that adequate understanding exists, Sarewitz (2009) questions humanity’s ability to restrain itself and recognize what Norton argues is

in its enlightened self-interest in the long run – the wellbeing of the planet

Callicott (1999; 2002) also points out that the more holist nonanthropocentrist (ecocentric) theories do not advocate for the abjuring of instrumental value, as some anthropocentrists suggest (Justus et al 2009), but instead argue that both value types should be considered In light of this, the convergence hypothesis, assuming it is true, somewhat misses the point – even if the same policy ends can be achieved invoking instrumental or intrinsic value, is not the argument for conservation strengthened when both value types are recognized and utilized as a justification for conservation?

Additionally, addressing intrinsic value beyond the realm of policy, Kate McShane states:

We want theories that can help us figure out how to think and feel about the

different parts of the world in which we live Even if they would recommend the same policy choices, then, if the two theories endorse different attitudes—if, for

example, one says it is appropriate to love the Rocky Mountains and the other says it is a kind of mistake to do so—this is a difference about which we still have reason to care (McShane, 2007, p 60)

Another criticism of intrinsic value is that it lacks well-circumscribed parameters and consistent application Justus, Colyvan, Regan, and Maguire (2009) state that “no pattern” (p 187) exists in how intrinsic value is applied, although they seem to be

primarily addressing its use by conservation biologists in their critique There is merit in their argument for a greater degree of conceptual clarification when conservation

biologists invoke it Biologists, as well others who invoke it, should be aware of the way

in which they apply and discuss intrinsic value and provide adequate parameters to ensure clarity and understanding In fact, greater engagement with ethicists could be beneficial for accomplishing this Otherwise, it is likely to be misportrayed as a willy-nilly concept However, the occasional questionable application or lack of lucidity should not condemn intrinsic value as a concept generally As is clear from the earlier review of contending ethics related to intrinsic value, ethicists have spent considerable effort to construct different parameters for when and what intrinsic value applies to, as well as how entities should be treated because of this attribution Any subject with the degree of epistemic complexity of intrinsic value will certainly have competing concepts

of its characteristics Callicott (2002) maintains that a problematic component of many intrinsic value critiques is the dubious amalgamation of the various contending concepts

of intrinsic value, creating a Frankenstein’s monster, which seems to function quite well

as a straw man for those critical of intrinsic value Justus et al (2009) appear to fall victim to this phenomenon on multiple occasions within their critique

Intrinsic value has also been criticized as being incompatible with

decision-making frameworks, decision-making it incapable of contributing to conservation decisions

(Justus et al., 2009; Maguire & Justus, 2008) Justus et al (2009) and Maguire and Justus (2008) assert that intrinsic value’s incompatibility with decision-making results from it being deemed to have infinite value; however, in many cases ethicists do not see this as a property of intrinsic value (McShane, 2007) It is best thought of not as a trump card that bestows infinite, inviolable value, but a status that should accord its bearers consideration and potential protection, particularly in the case that instrumental value does not exist or

is unclear However, as was mentioned earlier, intrinsic value and instrumental value should both be considered when making conservation decisions; the presence of intrinsic value does not invalidate instrumental value (VanDeVeer, 1995) Justus et al (2009) also discuss the problematic synonymization of instrumental value with market or economic value, and they argue, as do Maguire and Justus (2008), that many intrinsic value

proponents fail to recognize the full suite of instrumental values, thereby

misunderstanding the need for intrinsic value to achieve conservation While it is

difficult to know if this is a problem of non-ethicists, both Callicott (2002) and Rolston (1994) are quite clear about articulating and considering the range of existent

instrumental values, arguing that both value types should be considered and utilized in appeals for conservation

Justus et al (2009) go on to state, “focusing on instrumental values allows

conservation decisions to be analyzed with the same tools as other decisions with

multiple, sometimes conflicting, goals: all instrumental value is comparatively assessed without one form taking absolute priority” (p 190) And although they do vaguely

acknowledge the difficulty in ascertaining these different value types, they seem to

minimize this issue As they readily admit, “market-based” assessments are not always appropriate for certain value types (Justus et al., 2009), but this makes constructing accurate resource-use comparisons difficult, which they claim are required for

conservation decisions Moreover, the instrumental values that are particularly

bedeviling to quantify/monetize are often those associated with supporting conservation (e.g., social, cultural, and ecological) (Parks & Gowdy, 2013), and determining the

proper degree of discounting for future costs and benefits also poses problems (Dasgupta, 2008) Maguire & Justus (2008) appear not to recognize these issues In fact, attempting

to commensurate all value types within cost-benefit analysis introduces a false objectivity into policy decisions, which “masks underlying value choices and imbues what are

inevitably highly uncertain and contingent conclusions with a false patina of scientific accuracy” (Sinden, 2004, p 207) In light of these difficulties related to economic

valuation, a purely instrumental valuation approach should elicit concerns that society could be underestimating or failing to account for the true and total value of conservation, resulting in skewed analyses that provide greater support for development or resource exploitation than is actually warranted

Intrinsic value, however, can be used to inform such environmental making processes For instance, it may be difficult to estimate the future value of

decision-potential pharmaceutical benefits from a rainforest, although the value might be quite large But if the forest’s wildlife, or the ecosystem by extension, were accorded intrinsic value, the instrumental value of developing it would need to be clear and of much greater magnitude than the instrumental and intrinsic value associated with its conservation In

the absence of the recognition of intrinsic value, as well as commensurate policy

framework, even if the estimated value of timbering the forest and converting it for agriculture were trivially greater than that of conserving it and its species, it would be developed because the instrumental value of the forest and its associated resources as commodities outweigh the perceived instrumental value of leaving it intact

This example illustrates the problematic nature of a purely instrumental making process, but including intrinsic value as a component of decision-making

decision-potentially could help truly maximize economic utility in the case that the associated instrumental benefits are opaque but existent Furthermore, the argument that those involved in making wildlife and resource tradeoff decisions should only consider

instrumental valuations is dubious because, as this paper will illustrate, a majority of the population, at least in the United States, holds the belief that wildlife possesses intrinsic value beyond their utility to humans Thus this sentiment seems to warrant some

consideration within the policymaking process However, this is not to say that economic

or instrumental assessments should be abandoned, just that it is perhaps appropriate to supplement these assessments with other value types or evaluations Finally, in

considering intrinsic value, it is important not only to consider its utility for arbitrating specific, isolated conservation use decisions, but also its role in supporting certain

policies, such as the Endangered Species Act, which would be decidedly different and less protective without at least an implicit recognition of intrinsic value

Ethical literature review summary Although the review provided here of

various theoretical issues related to intrinsic value and wildlife is limited, it should

provide an adequate level of foundation for understanding the theoretical and conceptual

issues related to wildlife’s intrinsic value Although normative, universal theories can be formulated to define what objects should be ascribed intrinsic value and how those objects should be treated, what ultimately matters in terms of the “rubber meeting the road” for intrinsic value is whether or not the public acknowledges it and what effect this has As Callicott notes:

The human capacity for the moral sentiments upon which intrinsic value depends

is fairly uniform…and roughly equally distributed throughout the human

population To whom or what these affections are directed, however, is an open matter, a matter of cognitive representation—of ‘nurture,’ not ‘nature.’ A person whose social and intellectual horizons are more or less narrow regards only a more or less limited set of persons and a more or less local social whole to be intrinsically valuable (Callicott, 1989, p 152)

Marvier and Karveiva (2014) argue that wildlife’s/nature’s intrinsic value lacks

resonance or salience with the public, but there is limited empirical evidence to support this In fact, some studies indicate that policies targeting the public which are structured around individuals’ self-interest (i.e., instrumental value) can result in effects that are opposite of what was intended (Bowles, 2008) These unintended policy consequences are the result of undermining and reducing the salience of individuals’ moral sentiments (Bowles, 2008) This study will not attempt to elucidate intrinsic value’s efficacy in terms of issue framing, but it will help clarify how the public regards intrinsic value generally, and how this might affect other attitudes And while it is important to “meet the public where it is” in terms of trying to effect greater pro-environmental attitudes and behavior, it seems injudicious to reject intrinsic value’s potential viability to contribute to

this effort considering the dearth of empirical studies that have included intrinsic value specifically Perhaps even more importantly, if a goal of public policy is to translate citizen values into policy action, improved understanding of the belief that wildlife has intrinsic value, generated by empirical analysis, is needed The remaining portion of the literature review focuses on values and attitudes research related to wildlife and the environment This body of research has applied minimal attention to the belief that wildlife possess intrinsic value, and thus this review primarily focuses on other concepts, such as wildlife value orientation, that are relevant to, but distinct from, intrinsic value

Values and Attitudes

General values and attitudes The process of actively recognizing and defining

values, as well as attitudes, began in the nineteenth century (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Joas, 2003), and progressed through the early twentieth century with William Thomas and Florian Znanckie linking early attitudinal concepts with behavior and further defining values, and L.L Thurston applying psychometrics to measure attitudes (Ajzen &

Fishbein, 1980; Clawson & Vinson, 1978) While these early examples, along with others, laid the foundations for modern work on values and attitudes, empirical work was minimal and theoretical perspectives varied considerably Milton Rokeach is often highlighted for producing a seminal work in modern theory by offering a conceptual model explaining the relationship between values, beliefs, and attitudes (Homer & Kahle, 1988; Dietz, Fitzgerald, & Shwom, 2005; Manfredo, 2008) Rokeach described values as either instrumental – modes of conduct – or terminal – desirable end-states of existence

He also defined values as being generally stable, relatively limited in number, particularly for terminal values, and somewhat consistent within a society, as most individuals in a

given society are subject to many of the same value-influencing forces (Rokeach, 1973) Shalom Schwartz further developed Rokeach’s theory of values, suggesting values could

be encapsulated into 10 distinct value-types (e.g., power, achievement, benevolence), measured by a 56-item questionnaire, and fitting into two distinct continuums – self-enhancement versus self-transcendence, and openness to change versus conservation (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 1994) Schwartz also established the theory of norm-

activation, suggesting that altruistic behavior is more likely when an individual is aware that harm could come to a person that they value and, additionally, when the individual believes they bear some responsibility for this harm (Schwartz, 1977)

Applying earlier posited concepts of values and attitudes, Homer and Kahle (1988) constructed a value-attitude-behavior hierarchical theory (i.e., cognitive hierarchy) and tested it using a structural equation modeling approach, whereby values are the core

of an individual’s cognitive structure Values in this model are conceptualized as being limited in number, stable, and slower forming, consistent with Rokeach’s (1973) general theory Homer and Kahle’s original model included only values, attitudes, and behavior, with the concepts represented in later (less fundamental) strata being more numerous, less stable, and faster forming than those in earlier strata Other scholars within the field of human dimensions of wildlife and the environment applied Homer and Kahle’s model of

a domain-specific cognitive hierarchy to their research and added additional cognitive components to the model, such as value orientations, norms, and behavioral intention (Fulton, Manfredo, & Lipscomb, 1996; Vaske & Donnelly, 1999; Vaske, Donnelly, Whitney, & Jonker, 2001; Zinn, Manfredo, Vaske, & Wittmann, 1998) In Homer and Kahle’s model, as well as subsequent models (Fulton et al., 1996; Vaske & Donnelly,

1999; Vaske et al., 2001 Zinn et al., 1998), the earlier (first order) cognitions were found

to significantly affect adjacent cognitions within this cognitive hierarchy Thus value orientations influence attitudes and norms, and attitudes and norms influence behavioral intention

In the case of attitudes (and likely other cognitions), the degree of specificity of

an attitude or behavior moderates the statistical relationship between them (i.e., general attitudes better predict general behaviors, while specific attitudes better predict specific behaviors) (Heberlein, 1976; Heberlein, 2012; Whittaker, Vaske, & Manfredo, 2006) Additionally, behaviors are not always predictable from attitudes or behavioral intentions (LaPiere, 1934; Heberlein, 2012); this is sometimes referred to as the value- or attitude-action gap (Blake, 1999) A plausible explanation for the existence of this gap is the inability to reasonably incorporate the many various factors that affect singular acts of behavior beyond attitudes into a singular empirical model (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002)

Ronald Inglehart, a political scientist, also studies human values, but through the lens of modernization, with a focus on value-shift associated with this process

Inglehart’s theory builds on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory (Maslow, 1943), which posits that individuals have certain basic needs that must be met, but a finite amount of energy and resources that can be expended to achieve these needs, thus needs that are first-order (e.g., physiological needs; safety needs) are prioritized over more higher-order needs (e.g., love needs; self-actualization needs) Inglehart transferred Maslow’s

individual-level theory to the nation-state level, theorizing that industrial societies have

“materialist” needs, driving them to prioritize values related to safety and sustenance, while post-industrialist societies have “post-materialist” (or “self expression”) needs,

resulting in the prioritization of values related to aesthetic satisfaction, intellectual curiosity, and personal esteem (Inglehart, 1977) These different values then impact the prevalence of certain ideologies, attitudes, and behaviors For example, Inglehart (1997) found that post-materialist values are associated with a greater national-level concern for environmental protection As Maslow discussed in the context of individuals, post-materialist societies are able to focus on higher-order needs because achieving the level

of modernity associated with industrialization, which brings shifts in socioeconomic conditions and societal structures, results in existing materialist needs being consistently met Satisfying lower-order (materialist) needs affords the opportunity to focus on higher-order (post-materialist) needs Not all research, however, is consistent with Inglehart’s theory regarding the influence of post-materialist values (Abramson, 2011; Kemmelmeier, Krol, & Kim, 2002) Despite only providing a limited review here, these theories and concepts form a substantial portion of the edifice upon which much of the subsequent research into values and attitudes in the context of wildlife and nature is built upon

Wildlife and environmental values and attitudes

Social psychological literature Utilizing these foundational theories, in addition

to others, wildlife and environmental scholars have empirically explored the dynamics of humans and their environment and have developed an expanding body of theory related

to values, attitudes, norms, and behavior, as well as external social forces This theory generally represents two approaches for understanding attitudes and behavior – internal and cognitive versus external and social Historically these two approaches have not been highly integrated within the same studies (Dietz, Stern, & Guagnano, 1998;

Sasidharan & Thapa, 2004) A number of more contemporary studies, however, have attempted to unify these two approaches within singular models/analysis (Dietz et al.,

1998; Manfredo, Teel, & Henry, 2009; Teel & Manfredo, 2010; Vaske et al., 2001)

Much of the research related to wildlife and environmental attitudes and behavior has applied the theory of cognitive hierarchy (value-attitude-behavior theory) to illustrate the links between values, or more often value orientations, attitudes, norms, and behavior These studies apply the foundational concepts of earlier research (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Rokeach, 1973), generally conducted outside of the wildlife or environmental context, to measure the relationships between first-order and higher-order cognitions, or these cognitions and behavior (Fulton et al, 1996; Hrubes, Ajzen, and Dangle, 2001;

Manfredo et al., 2009; Vaske & Donnelly, 1999, Zinn et al., 1998)

To clarify, within this literature value orientations are often used to form the first strata of the cognitive hierarchy because values, which by their nature transcend specific contexts and objects, often do not provide enough variation among populations to

identify sufficient and insightful differences between individuals (Bright, Manfredo, & Fulton, 2000; Fulton et al., 1996) Value orientations are collections of beliefs that reflect the application of a value within a more specific domain (e.g., forests, wildlife, etc.), reflecting the effects of ideology on values (Manfredo et al., 2009) In the context of wildlife, value orientations commonly have two dimensions, one labeled “mutualism” and the other “domination.” These value orientations are generally conceptualized and measured to allow individuals to express to what degree they identify with each

orientation, as opposed to presenting the orientations as mutually exclusive tradeoffs along a single continuum (Manfredo et al., 2009) Doministic individuals hold more

utilitarian, pro-use views towards wildlife, reflecting a “view of human mastery over wildlife” (Manfredo et al., 2009, p 411) Mutualists desire greater wildlife protection and have a general affinity for wildlife; Manfredo et al (2009) state, “The mutualism wildlife value orientation views wildlife as capable of living in relationships of trust with humans, as life forms having rights like humans, as part of an extended family, and as deserving of caring and compassion” (p 412) Orientation terminology (e.g., domination orientation versus utilitarian orientation) and the number of orientations and dimensions included within scales does vary within the broader literature on wildlife-related values (Bruskotter & Fulton, 2007; Fulton et al., 1996; Teel, Dayer, Manfredo, & Bright, 2005)

Similar to the mutualism and domination scales, some studies apply a scale of biocentrism to anthropocentrism to measure value orientations towards nature generally, with biocentric value orientations reflecting greater concern for and connection with nature, and anthropocentric value orientations signifying a more human-oriented outlook (Vaske & Donnelly, 1999; Vaske et al., 2001) Van Liere and Dunlap’s New Ecological Paradigm Scale also applies a similar conceptual and measurement approach (Van Liere

& Dunlap, 1980)

Fulton, Manfredo, and Lipscomb (1996) found that wildlife value orientations influence attitudes towards hunting and fishing, as well as attitudes towards wildlife viewing, which, in turn, influence behavioral intention related to these respective

activities Thus, Fulton et al (1996) identified attitudes as playing a mediating role between value orientations and behavioral intentions, lending support for cognitive

hierarchy theory within the context of wildlife This approach has been replicated in a number of subsequent studies (Vaske & Donnelly, 1999; Vaske et al 2001; Whittaker et

al., 2006; Zinn et al., 1998) For example, Vaske and Donnelly (1999) identified

significant relationships between biocentric-anthropocentric value orientations, wildland preservation attitudes, and wildland preservation voting intentions, with value

orientations being responsible for a majority of the variance in attitudes, and attitudes accounting for a majority of the variance in voting intentions Tarrant, Bright, and

Cordell (1997) also supported the cognitive hierarchy theory, finding the effect

environmental values have on specific attitudes towards wildlife species protection was mediated by general environmental attitudes for four different wildlife user

constituencies Zinn, Manfredo, Vaske, and Wittmann (1998) found the influence of wildlife value orientations on normative beliefs related to differing management

techniques of mountain lions, as well as on normative beliefs related to beaver and coyote lethal control Those with protectionist (mutualism) orientations were less willing to accept the lethal control of beavers and coyotes than those with use (domination)

orientations (Zinn et al., 1998) Protectionists also diverged from those with use

orientations on what the appropriate management response was to various scenarios related to mountain lion-human conflict incidents (e.g., mountain lion kills a pet)

Manfredo, Teel, and Henry (2009) found wildlife value orientation was linked with attitudes towards lethal bear management and with hunting behavior The

domination orientation was positively associated with support for lethal bear management and hunting activity and the mutualist orientation was negatively associated with support for lethal bear management and hunting activity Manfredo et al., (2009) also applied measures of materialist and post-materialist values similar to Inglehart’s (1997), finding that materialist values were positively associated with a domination orientation and

negatively associated with support for lethal management and hunting activity, while post-materialist values were positively associated with a mutualist orientation and

negatively associated with support for lethal management and hunting activity Their results suggest that wildlife value orientations, at least in the western U.S., are shifting from domination to mutualism, and that this is likely at least partly a function of the value shift from materialist to post-materialist that Inglehart (1997) suggest accompanies

modernization Manfredo et al (2009) also linked state-level modernization variables – education, income, and urbanization – to mutualism and domination value orientations

At the state level, they found these three modernization variables were positively

associated with mutualism and negatively associated with domination, and each variable accounted for a substantial portion of the variance explained However, individual-level estimates were weak, and a number of them were inconsistent with the relationship direction found within the state-level analysis

This shift in value orientation is associated with changes in attitudes and

behaviors towards wildlife; Manfredo et al.’s (2009) models illustrate the relationships between wildlife value orientation and wildlife attitude and behavior This phenomenon

of wildlife value shift is also relevant for belief in wildlife’s intrinsic value As discussed earlier, Callicott (1989) suggests that most individuals harbor intrinsic value sentiments within their moral framework; however, the objects to which they ascribe this value vary

in accordance with their experiences, socialization, and culture, or “nurture” (p 152) as

he refers to it With increasing modernization and our changing social environment, a similar shift and expansion of our moral horizons related to intrinsic value and wildlife could be underway, although similar to wildlife value orientation, empirical data from