Heynoski-Quinn-2012-organizational-potential-challenge-assumptions-OD

The principles at the heart of the Toyota Production SystemTPS,whichismorecommonlyreferredtoas lean production, are respect and continuous improvement.. Although senior managers at Trans

Seeing and realizing organizational potential:

Whatifallorganizationsarefilledwithuntappedresources?

Whatifseeingandutilizingresourcesdependedupon how

peopleseeandtalktoeachother?Whatifchangingtheway

weseeandtalktoeachothercouldtransformorganizational

capacity?

Thispaperisaboutlearningtoactivateconversationsthat

challenge assumptions, stimulate learning and facilitate

change.Webeginwithacasethatillustratesthefailureto

seepotential.Weproposethattheabilitytoseepotentialis

rooted in shared assumptions and beliefs, and link these

assumptionsto organizationaldiscourse Throughasecond

case example,we show the differencethat discourse can

make.Weconcludewithanassessment toolthatmanagers

can use to help themselves and others reflect on their

assumptions,altertheirdiscourseandaccessvitalresources

CASE 1: THE INABILITY TO SEE POTENTIAL

Inthe1950sGeneralMotors(GM)initiateda‘‘sunbelt

strat-egy’’ which involved building plants in the southern and

westernstates.TheUnitedAutoWorkersuniondetermined

thatitwasamovetounderminetheunion,andthesenew

plantsbecameconflict-ridden.Oneofthemostextremewas

the plant in Fremont, CA Union absenteeism was at 20

percent.Therewereapproximately21grievancesfiledeach

daybyunionmembers.Wildcatstrikeshappenedregularly

Costs were 30 percent higher than the costs of Japanese

competitors Sales, quality and productivity were all very

low At thecost of millions ofdollars, manyinterventions

weretried,butlittlesuccessfollowed.In1982,GMclosedthe

Fremontplant.Normallythiswouldbetheendofthestory,

butGMmadeanunprecedentedmove.Twoyearslaterthey

enteredajointventurewiththeirchiefcompetitor,Toyota,

tocollaborateonthedesignandproductionofanewcarat

thedefunctFremontplant

Inproposingthenewendeavor,GM indicatedthatthere

wouldbeconstraints.Theplantcouldnotberemodeled,and

the old equipment had to beused The former and most seniorUAWworkershadtobehiredfirst.Thismeantthemost disgruntled people had to return Toyota accepted these constraints under the condition that Toyota managers run theplant

TheplantwasreopenedandnamedNUMMI–—NewUnited MotorsManufacturingIncorporated.Toyotamanagers intro-ducedtheToyotaProductionSystem(TPS)totheemployees

ofNUMMI.TPSisanoperationalexcellencephilosophybased

onasetofprinciplesthatseemedforeigntotheemployeesof theformerFremontplant.Theseprinciples,whichcontinue

to bea centralpartofToyota’sphilosophytoday,are con-tinuous improvement and respect for people Naturally employees expressed skepticism,but theToyota managers consistently responded in a manner that reinforced these principles even in the face of significant challenges and intervened when employees failed to adhere to them In doingso,Toyotamanagersinitiatednewconversationsthat helpedtransformthewayemployeesviewedtheirwork

Attheendofoneyear,salesbegantoclimb.Qualityand satisfaction wentfrom being theworst to thebest of any otherGMplant.Productivitydoubledthecorporateaverage Thesepositivechangeslastedfordecades.Whenaskedforan explanation,UAWworkerstalkedaboutchangesin manage-ment, changes in the culture, and changes in their own behavior Union memberswent from going home at night thinking about how to disrupt the organization to being completelycommittedtothesuccessoftheorganization AssumptionsandPotential

Therearemanypointsthatcouldbemadeaboutthiscase, butoneimportantlessonisthattheplantwasteemingwith potentialthatwasnotvisibletoGMexecutives.The execu-tives had tightly held assumptions They assumed that the extensive conflict was the fault of union members They firmly believed that union members were beyond

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doi: 10.1016/j.orgdyn.2012.01.005

theyassumedtobetruewaswrong.UnderToyotaexecutives,

theunionmemberschanged.TheGM executivescould not

realizethepotentialintheirownorganizationbecausethey

could notseeit,andthey couldnotsee itbecauseof the

assumptions they weremaking, whichled to formsof

dis-coursethatreconfirmedtheirincorrectassumptions

Assumptions are beliefs that have become so deeply

engrainedthattheyareacceptedasthe‘‘truth.’’Hereare

somecommonassumptionsabouthowpeopletendtoactin

organizations

Peoplepursuetheirself-interests

Peoplepursueexternalrewards

Peopleliveinassumptionsofexchange

Peopleminimizepersonalcosts

Peoplepreferthestatusquo

Peoplebecomedistrustful

Peoplecommunicatepolitically

Peopleseeconstraints

Peopleassumehierarchy

Peoplecompeteforscarceresources

This list seems to have a slightly negative tone, but

theseassumptionsreflectwhatsocialscientiststendtofind

when they study organizational life Economists, for

ex-ample,oftenbeginwiththeassumptionthatresourcesare

scarce, and people are embedded in networks of

self-interested transactions These assumptions also tend to

holdforpracticingmanagers.Wecallthemnormal

assump-tionsbecausetheyaretheimplicitbeliefsfromwhichwe

tendtooperate

WesuspectthatitwasnormalfortheexecutivesatGMto

make these kinds of assumptions about union members

Imagine,forexample,thatsuchamanagertriedtointroduce

achangeandunionmembersimmediatelybeganto resist

The resistant behavior of the union members would then

reconfirm the executives’ beliefs that theunion members

wereatwarwithmanagement.Theseexecutivesthenwould

be justified in feeling that they had been attackedby an

enemy Such experiences would continually reconfirm the

truththattheylivedinaworldofconflict.Theirthoughtsin

anygivenconversationwouldbebasedonthefearofconflict

Actingon their negativefeelings, they would implicitlyor

explicitlycommunicatedistrusttotheemployees.Thiswould

give rise to more conflict, which would confirm that the

executiveswererightinthefirstplace

In this process, the assumptions become constraints

Because the managers are unable to challenge their own

assumptions,theyarealsounabletochangehowthey

impli-citly and explicitly communicate those assumptions to

others In this situation, assumptions shape organizational

discourse,andorganizationaldiscourseinturnperpetuates

theprevailingassumptions.Withoutaninterventionto

chal-lenge assumptions, it becomes impossible to recognizeor

realizethepotentialinthe‘‘enemy.’’Inthisimagined(and

therefore real) war, each side blames the other for any

problems or setbacks In enacting their dysfunctional

assumptions,managersbecomecarriersofthediseasethey

are trying to eradicate The conflict and distrust in the

system,somethingtheydetest,isactuallyembodiedintheir

coreassumptionsandcommunicatedbytheireverywordand action.Theyarecaughtinaviciouscyclethatmayeventually leadtogreatfailure,asillustratedinthecaseoftheFremont plant

Because normal assumptions are so deeply engrained, theybecomeexpectations.Everyconversationanddecision begins to reflect these assumptions When managers con-sciouslyand unconsciously designorganizational processes basedonnormalassumptions,theseprocessesincentpeople

tocontinuetobehaveinnormalways.Unfortunately,normal assumptionsandnormalbehaviordonotresult in extraor-dinaryorganizationaloutcomes

Werefertothepreviouslistofassumptionsasthenormal lens.Weusetheword‘‘lens’’becausewetendtoseewhatwe assume we will see In making normal assumptions and enactingthe normallens, we tend to ensurethat we will get normal outcomes The organization thus stays on its currenttrajectory,oritbreaksdownandmovestoaneven morenegative trajectory.Goodbecomesaverage,average becomesbad

SeeingOrganizationalPotential

Sohowdowemovefromthenormallenstoalensthatmight give rise to a positive trajectory? This paper is part of a specialissueonpositiveorganizationalscholarship.Positive organizationalscholarship is an area of study that is con-cerned with whatpeople andorganizations are likewhen theyareattheirverybest.Whensocialscientistsusethelens

ofpositiveorganizationalscholarship,theystudyexceptional ratherthanaverageperformance.Thedatageneratedfrom thesestudiestendtocapturepeopleandorganizationsonan upwardtrajectory

When examining organizations at their best, social scientists find intrinsically motivated people, who make assumptionsof contributionwhilesacrificingforthe com-mongood.Theyarewillingtogobeyondnormal expecta-tions.They exist in communities in which hierarchy still exists,but it becomeslatent Relationships arebased on trustandasenseofequality.Inthesecommunitiespeople arenot trapped in their own past;they envision possibi-lities and initiate change Through this creative process they become more effective versions of themselves and tendtoexpandtheexistingpoolofresources.Wecallthis pattern positive organizing It is a contrast to normal organizingasshowninTable1.Thepreviouslistofnormal assumptionsappears on the leftand positivelist appears

ontheright

The common reactionto this set of positiveorganizing assumptionsis,‘‘Thatis unrealistic.’’Actually thepositive assumptionsare realistic.Theyare justunusualor outside normalexpectations.Excellentfunctioningisseenless fre-quently than normal functioning The assumptions in the positivelens,nevertheless, areasvalidastheassumptions

inthenormallens.Theydescribehowpeoplebehavewhen theytranscendnormalexpectations

Tochangethetrajectoryofanorganization,thepeoplein theorganizationmustmovefromtheassumptionsontheleft

totheassumptionsontheright.Whentheydo,theyengagein

amorepositiveformoforganizing,andthesystemmoveson

anupwardtrajectory.Thismoveisdependentonachangein expectations

AssumptionsThroughDiscourse

Where GM managers failed to change expectations, the

Toyota managers succeeded They successfully altered a

seeminglyintractablecultureandtransformedtheGMplant

intoathriving organization The transformationat NUMMI

was notabout a single, charismatic leader drivingchange

throughthe organization,but ateamof people who

chal-lengedthe prevailing assumptions byconsistently

commu-nicatinganewsetofpositiveorganizingprinciples

The principles at the heart of the Toyota Production

System(TPS),whichismorecommonlyreferredtoas lean

production, are respect and continuous improvement

Employees model respect when they build trust, accept

personal responsibility, and invest in the development of

themselves and others Continuous improvement is on

ongoingcommitmenttoinitiatechange.Asaphilosophyof

operational excellence, TPSemphasizes collaborative

pro-blemsolvingto eliminatesources of wastefrom

organiza-tional processes Employees at NUMMI were not only

challengedtoengageinnewbehaviors,theyweresupported

astheyexperimented.Theyfoundthemselvestakingpartina

discourse of learning and development It is through

dis-coursethatweestablish,maintain,andchangeour

assump-tions Discourse includes not only spoken and written

language, but also nonverbal cues and context Together

theelementsofdiscoursecreateexperiencesinwhichpeople

share not only factual information but also impressions,

ideas,andbeliefs.Thesesocialinteractions,ratherthanjust

ourowninternalreasoning,shapeourassumptions.Discourse

is transformative when employees revise their shared

assumptions

Consider whathappens when anew employee joins an

organization.Throughtheirdailyinteractions,new

employ-eesbegintolearngroupnormsandacceptablestandardsof

behavior Because the way employees talk to each other

oftenreflectstheassumptionsofnormalorpositive

organiz-ing,overtimeemployees internalizemanyofthese shared

assumptions.Theseshapethewaytheyperceiveandrespond

to their surroundings In this context, organizational

dis-coursemaintainsthedominantassumptions.Werefertothis

as‘‘passivediscourse,’’becauseitdoesnotpromotechange

Inotherinstances,newemployeesmayquestionorchallenge

the prevailing assumptions In doing so, they create the

conditionsunder whichchangecanoccur.We referto this

type of discourse as ‘‘generative discourse,’’ because it supports thedevelopment ofnew understanding Since all employeescontributeorganizationaldiscourse,everyonehas

anopportunitytoparticipateinrevisingsharedassumptions

Inthenextsection,weintroduceasecondcaseexample

to illustrate these two types of discourseand discusshow discoursecaneitherundermineorsupportadesired trans-formation.Thecaseexaminesanorganizationwheresenior managers introduced a change in an effort to shift the organizationfrom good to great.We showhowmost man-agersinthisorganizationengagedinpassivediscoursethat reinforcednormalassumptions.Thismadeitimpossiblefor theiremployeestolearnanewsetofassumptions.Thenwe examine theonesuccessfulgroupwithinthisorganization From thispositivelydeviantgroup welearnan alternative approach to discourse, one that facilitates learning and resultsintherealizationofpotential.Managerswithinthis group introduced generative discourse that challenged employeestore-evaluatetheirassumptions

CASE 2: THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE

For oursecond case example, we present the account of another U.S.-based manufacturer that tried to emulate a Toyota-stylesystemofcontinuousimprovement This com-panymanufacturesproductsforthetransportationindustry andwillbereferredtobythepseudonymTransport.In2004, seniormanagersatTransportlauncheda‘‘lean transforma-tionprogram’’modeledaftertheToyotaProductionSystem (TPS),with theintent totransform theorganization’s core processesand cultureinsupport oftheir goalsfor organic growth.Thecompanyinvestedmillionsofdollarstoconvert several production lines into lean productionlines While mostareasofthebusinessfailedtosignificantlychangethe way they operated, one successful department began to operateinafundamentallydifferentway.Weusedatafrom thiscase to show howmanagers’ discourse contributedto thesedifferentoutcomes

WithinToyota,leanimprovementtoolsandtechniquesare partofalargersystemoflearningandproblemsolvingthatis guided by Toyota’slong-term philosophy.At its core, lean productionemphasizesgivingsupporttopeoplesotheycan continuallyimprovetheprocessestheyworkon.Aninternal companydocument,TheToyotaWay2001,isoneattemptto make these central values explicit The purpose of this document isto help employeesthroughoutToyota’s global

Table1 TwoSetsofOrganizingAssumptions

AssumptionsofNormalOrganizing AssumptionsofPositiveOrganizing

Peoplepursuetheirself-interests Peoplesacrificeforthecommongood Peoplepursueexternalrewards Peoplepursueintrinsicsatisfaction Peopleliveinassumptionsofexchange Peopleliveinassumptionsofcontribution Peopleminimizepersonalcosts Peopleexceedexpectations

Peoplepreferthestatusquo Peopleinitiatechange

Peoplecommunicatepolitically Peoplecommunicateauthentically

Peopleseeconstraints Peopleenvisionpossibilities

Peopleassumehierarchy Peopleassumeequality

Peoplecompeteforscarceresources Peopleexpandtheresourcepool

operations develop a consistentunderstanding of Toyota’s

guiding principles Without this understanding, managers

cann’tleadinthetruespiritoftheToyotaWay

AtToyota,continuousimprovementiscarriedoutinrapid

problem solving cycles called Plan-Do-Check-Act cycles

(PDCA) PDCA is a structured process for experimentation

thatpromoteslearning.Dailyproblemsolvingisanintegral

partof employees’ jobs.Changesare implemented at the

lowestpossiblelevelwithintheorganization.Managers

sup-porttheseactivitiesbydevelopingemployees’problem

sol-ving capabilities and facilitating improvement activities

Whileitisdifficulttoestablishaclearrelationshipbetween

incrementalimprovementsandchangestothebottomline,

Toyotaplacesahighvalueonlearning,undertheassumption

thatitwillenabletheorganizationtomeetitsdesired

long-termobjectives Theemphasis oncollaborative learning is

important.Undernormalassumptions,peopleinhigher

posi-tionsareassumedtobeknowledgeable.Becausetheyknow,

theytellpeopleinlowerpositionswhattodo.Theemphasis

onlearningisatthecenterofthepositiveorganizingprocess

Itsuggestsamuchmoreactiveformofdiscourse

Although senior managers at Transport made culture

change a strategic focus in support of the improvement

activitiesbeingmodeledafterTPS, theyrepeatedly

under-minedtheirvisionforchange.Thefocusbecameintegrating

lean tools and techniques with traditional practices and

structuresratherthanlearningtooperateinamannerthat

wasconsistentwiththeprinciplesofTPS.Asemployeestried

to make senseof theongoing change activities,they

con-structedmeaningsthatweremarkedlydifferentfrom

Toyo-ta’s.Theywereholdingpeopleintheassumptionsofnormal

organizing

AtTransport,improvementactivitieswereprimarilytied

to large-scale eventsandprojects Internalchange agents

werehiredtoplanandimplementtheseactivities.Theintent

was to eventually transition these responsibilities to the

operationsteam,butafterfiveyearschangeagents

contin-uedto beprimarilyresponsible for processimprovements

Ratherthanfacilitatecontinuousimprovement, operations

managers focused their efforts on monitoring output and

enforcingpolicies.Transport’simprovementactivitieswere

driven by the desire to produce measurable results, and

short-termoutputrequirementstookprecedenceover

pro-cessimprovement,asshowninTable2

PassiveDiscourse:ReinforcingShared

Assumptions

ThecaseofTransporthighlightsthestarkcontrastbetween

the original model of TPS and Transport’s version of

TPS Rather thantransform theorganization, managersat

TransportfilteredTPSthroughtheirnormallens.Asmanagers triedtospreadandbuildsupportforchangethroughoutthe organization,theirmessagereflected normalexpectations

Inthissection,wefocusononeaspectofTPSthatTransport wantedtoreplicate.Seniormanagerswantedtoreplacethe currenttop-downstyleofprocessimprovementwitha bot-tom-upapproach.Despitecreatingaclearvision,thepassive discourse within the organization ultimately eroded the value of the changes that senior managers attempted to implement

Astrategic thrustwithin seniormanagers’overallvision was to actively engage union employees in improvement activities.Inaddressingtheworkforce,thegeneralmanager

of operations characterized lean production as a ‘‘team sport’’in whicheveryemployee playedarole He further explainedthattheroleofunionemployeeswastocreatively thinkofwaystoimproveproductionprocesses.Thisdesireto morefullyutilizeallofanemployee’sabilitiesalignswitha lean focus on waste elimination, one aspect of which is categorizedasunusedemployeecreativity

Aspart oftheirstrategy, senior managersseta goalof adoptingaprocessimprovementapproachthatmoreclosely mirrored Toyota In TPS, rapid problem solving is led by employeesdirectlyinvolvedintheprocess.Seniormanagers

atTransportalsorecognizedthatculturechangewasneeded

tosupportthistransition.Theyusedtheanalogyof‘‘flipping thepyramid’’ todescribe the desiredcultural transforma-tion.Theorganizationalhierarchywasdepictedasapyramid withseniormanagersatthepeakandunionemployeesasthe base Rather than the few managers at the peak of the pyramid directing the activities of everyonebelow them, thepyramidneededtoberotatedsothatitbalancedonits peak, and the role of managers became to support and mentortheiremployees

Although this was a central piece of senior managers’ formalstrategytoimplementlean production,thischange neverfullymaterialized.Intheabsenceofongoing conversa-tionsthatchallengednormalassumptions,theorganization remainedcaptivetoitspast.Employeeswereunabletolearn new ways of behaving because they were constrained by existingpracticesandbeliefs.Whiletheaveragedurationof improvement projects decreased and the frequency increased, projects continued to be largely planned and ledbylean‘‘experts’’ratherthanoperationsemployeesor teamsof unionemployees As managersworked to imple-menttheleanproductionstrategy,theycontinuedtoexpress normalexpectations.EmployeesatTransportbecamemore entrenchedinthestatusquo.Theoriginalvisionforchange, rather than the organization, was transformed The end result was a hollow shell of change Although production lineswerevisiblyaltered, thephysicalchangesoverlaidan untouchedcoreofnormalassumptionsandbehaviors

Table2 ContrastingApproachestoTPS

Improvementapproach Rapidproblemsolvingisconductedatthelowest

possibleleveloftheorganization

‘‘Experts’’formulateandimplement large-scaleimprovementstrategies Relationships Managerssupportemployees’learningand

development

Managersmonitortaskcompletionand enforcerules

success-ful change begins with leaders establishing the need for

change in order to generate commitment to the change

Whatdoesthenormallenstellusaboutneeds?Thenormal

lens tells us that people are extrinsically motivated and

structuretheirlivesaroundexpectations offairexchange

Undertheseassumptions,managersmustoffersomethingof

valueinreturnforemployees’agreementtogoalongwitha

change.AtTransport,discoursetooktheformofasalespitch

as managers attempted to coerce, cajole, and entice

employeestogetonboardwiththechangeprogram.Senior

managersperceivedthecentraldilemmatobeselectingthe

‘‘right’’combination ofincentives to purchase employees’

compliance

In some ways, Transport was in an enviable position

becausedemand was strong andthe companyhad alarge

backlogoforders.UnliketheGMplant,therewasno

immedi-ateconcern forthe company’s long-termviability.Instead

senior managers sold the change based on the need for

increased capacity and efficiency Most production areas

werestaffedacrossthreeshifts,whichlimitedsenior

man-agement’sabilitytocontinuetogrowthebusiness

Further-more, a product design change mandated by tighter

government regulations eroded a large percentage of the

company’s profit margins on its main product line Senior

managerstriedtoassureemployeesthatbyworkingtogether

toeliminate wastefrom productionprocesses, they would

bothstrengthenthecompanyandcreategreaterjobsecurity

forthemselves

Astheyworkedtoconvinceemployeestoacceptchange,

managers’discoursecreatedmeaningsthatdeparted

signifi-cantly from the underlying principles of TPS At Toyota,

cooperationis builton mutual trust.Toyota develops that

trust in part by making a long-term commitment to its

employees.Employeesareviewedasthecompany’sgreatest

asset,andToyotainvests timeandmoney intheirongoing

development.Incontrast,managersatTransportusedlogic

andpay incentives to try to persuadeunion employees to

behaveinafundamentallydifferent way,whiledoing very

little to develop their understanding of lean production

techniques.Theirdiscoursemaintainedacultureofknowing

andtellingasopposedtoacultureoflearningandsharing

Amongtheunionemployees,leanbecameknownas‘‘less

employees actually needed.’’ Historically, Transport had

experienced fluctuating periods of high and low demand,

withextensivelayoffsaccompanyingthedowncycles.While

seniormanagersclaimedthattheplannedgrowthwouldhelp

them level the demand, union members believed that

improving efficiency would result in more layoffs during

thenextdownturn.Unionemployeesalsoreactednegatively

tothe wordsused bymanagers todefine lean production

Leanproductionwasdescribedasamethodologytoincrease

capacityandimprove efficiencythroughtheeliminationof

waste.Manyunionemployeesfeltthreatenedbytheuseof

the word ‘‘waste.’’ They believed managers were either

insinuating that union employees weren’t doing their job

orthatemployeesthemselveswerethewaste

While managerstriedto reassureunion employeesthat

theywouldn’tlosetheirjobsasaresultofimplementinglean

production, at times they directly and indirectly

contra-dictedthismessage.Forexample,aninitialpriorityforlean

implementationwastoconvertstationaryproductionstands

into one-piece flow lines These changes required large investments,whichsenior managerswouldonlyapproveif thesavingswereexpressedasheadcountreductions.Funding wasdeniedifmanagersshowedthesavingsasanincreasein capacity on the production line Managers also tended to expressapragmaticviewofemployment Asonemanager explained,‘‘Thisisanagencythat’stryingtomakeaprofit.If ourprofitisgoingintoexpenses,whichisheadcount, then we’vegottoreducethat.’’

At Transport, passive discourse maintained normal assumptions andfurther divided managers andemployees intoseparatecamps.Althoughcommunicatingaclearneedis consideredto beanessential part offosteringsupport for organizational change, it does little to generate genuine commitmenttochangewhenthemessagereinforcesnormal assumptions.Astheleaninitiativematured,attemptstotry new things often got held up by protracted negotiations between human resource managersand unionofficials, as eachsidetriedtoextractgreaterbenefitsandprotect self-interests These interactions created winners and losers ratherthanapartnership.Theexchangesalsofueleddistrust anddidlittletoabateemployees’concernsaboutjob secur-ity.Discoursebecameanongoingnegotiationbetween man-agementandunionemployeesratherthanavehicleforthe growthanddevelopmentofemployees

Generative Discourse:Transforming Shared Assumptions

The positivelensturns attentionto whatis goingright It poses counter-intuitive questions Ina normalor decaying system,dowefindexceptionalpatternsofexcellence?Inthis case,dowefindanysubsetsofpeoplewhoareengagedin positiveorganizing?Thesurprisinganswerisyes

Whilethedominant discoursepatterns within Transport reflectedandstrengthenednormalassumptionsabout orga-nizing,oneworkgrouptookanentirelydifferentcourse.They transcendedthenormalassumptionsandmanagedtocreate

anislandofgenerativediscourseandpositiveorganizing.The workplace dynamicson this linewere noticeablydifferent fromotherleanproductionlines.Transport’sCEOnotedthat thisproductionline‘‘isagreatexampleofpeoplewhogetit andareengagedinmakingleanwork.’’

Theshiftfromnormaltopositiveorganizingwasfostered

bylowerlevelmanagerswithinthegroupratherthan orche-stratedbyseniormanagers.Inparticular,therewerethree salariedemployeeswhoplayedacentralroleinthe devel-opment of this positively deviant workgroup.These three individuals proactively initiated new conversations and establishednewchannelsforopencommunicationtoinvolve employees in the lean initiative One of these managers describedthistransformationasagradualprocessof ‘‘build-ingpersonbyperson’’throughaseriesof‘‘one-on-one con-versationseveryday.’’Theemployeesbegantoviewchange throughthepositivelens

Inmanyways,leanimplementationbeganonthis produc-tionlinein thesamemannerthatit hadinlesssuccessful areasoftheorganization.Amanagerwasassignedtoleadthe leantransformation,withthedirectiontocreateaone-piece flowlinefromthecurrentstaticbuildprocess.Aswithmost managersatTransport,thismanagerhadnoprevious experi-ence with TPS, and he was skeptical that it would work

other productionareastried toimplement lean processes

This also createda lot ofresistance to change among the

unionemployees

Oneoftheleanmanager’sfirstactionswastospendtime

with the more experienced lean managers As he learned

abouttheproblemstheyencountered,hebecameconvinced

thataleanproductionlinecouldneverbesuccessfulwithout

everyone’scommitmenttochange.Althoughseniormanagers

hadmadeemployeeengagementacorepartoftheirformal

visionforlean,mostmanagers continuedto definesuccess

usingnormaltermsofexchange.Inreturnfortheirinvestment,

theyexpectedtoseeavisiblytransformedline,employees

whoadheredtothenewworkprocesses,andhigherlevelsof

output.Incontrast,thekeysalariedemployeesinthe

posi-tivelydeviant workgroupdefinedsuccess asa highlevelof

involvement and teamwork between union employees and

management.Theyinitiatedadiscourseofcontributionrather

thanexchangeastheyworkedtodevelopacohesiveteam

Asthethreesalariedemployeescreatedopportunitiesfor

union employees to participate in conversations about

change,discoursebegantotaketheformofatwo-waydialog

rather than a monolog or negotiation Managers involved

unionemployees intheconstruction ofashared visionfor

change,andtheunionemployeesbecomemorepersonally

investedinthechangeprocess.Oneapproachthatmanagers

used to increase employee engagement was through the

establishment of a weekly meeting to gather employees’

suggestions for the redesign ofthe productionline andto

addresstheirconcerns.Anotherwasthroughinformal

con-versationswithindividualemployeestoconfrontissuesand

misconceptions.Forexample,onemanagerdescribedsitting

downwiththedepartment’sunionsteward,whowasstrongly

against lean, to have a frank conversation about lean

Anothermanagertalkedaboutproactivelyinitiating

conver-sationswith unionemployees toresolveissuesbeforethey

escalated to formal grievances.The managersknew these

conversationshadanimpactwhentheybegantoobservethe

union leadership take a more active role in advocating

changetotheunionmembers

Asemployeesbecamemoreengagedinthechange

pro-cess, improvements began to emerge from the ground up

instead of being imposed from the top-down One of the salariedemployees whoplayedacentralroleinthis trans-formationdescribedthischange

‘‘We’vegrowninthisdepartmentfromthebottomup There’smuchmoreinvolvement,withthemanagement workingtogetherwiththepeopleonthefloortofigure outwhat’sgoodforallofus.It’sawin-winsituation,not managementsaysyou’regoingtodothisandthe

employ-eeisthenforcedintodoingit.’’

As momentum began to build, managers were able to transition more ownership for the changes to the union employees.Forexample,whenunionemployeespushedback

onprocesschangesthatmanagershaddevelopedwiththeir input,managersturnedtheprocessredesignovertotheunion employees.Managerswereabletousetheemployeefeedback

asaspringboardforhigherlevelsofengagement insteadof treatingthepushbackasathreat.Ratherthanresistingthe managers’offertoredesigntheprocess,theunionemployees tookitasanopportunity.Thechangeprocessbecamemore collaborative,asmanagersandunionemployeesdrewontheir uniquestrengthsandknowledgetocontributetotheoverall plan.Theleanmanagerprovidedguidanceonleanprinciples andtheoverallvision,whileoperationsmanagersand opera-torscontributedtheirprocessexpertise

Theconversations taking placein theproductiongroup were a new kind of experience The novelty led to new assumptionsaboutwhatwaspossible Thevisionto imple-ment became a shared purpose While the hierarchy still existed,peoplebecamepartnersin relationshipof possibi-lity,trustandlearning.Thedialogswereconversations char-acterizedbyactiveandconstructivechallengethatfostered real learning As their discourse came to reflect these assumptionsofpositiveorganizing,thegroupbegantoexcel andwas recognizedas excellentinthe implementationof leanproduction.Indeed,seniormanagerswereexcitedabout howthisworkgroupwasperformingandwantedtocapitalize

onthepositivetransformationtakingplaceinthisline.The department was beginning to operate in a way that was consistent with senior management’s espoused vision for leanproductionbasedonTPS.Yetaninterestingthing hap-pened.The process of generative discourse was disrupted

Table3 AssessingtheConversationsinYourOrganization.a

DiscourseofNormalOrganizing DiscourseofPositiveOrganizing

Peoplearepursuingtheirself-interests 12345 Peoplearesacrificingforthecommongood

Peoplearefocusedonexternalrewards/punishments 12345 Peopleareintrinsicallymotivated

Peoplespeakintermsofwhatisfairandunfair

Theyarenegotiating

12345 Peoplespeakintermsofwhattheycancontribute Peopleseektominimizetheirpersonalcosts

Theywanttodoaslittleaspossible

12345 Peopleareinvesting,stretching,learning,

andexceedingexpectations Peoplepreferthestatusquo.Theyresistnewinitiatives 12345 Peoplesuggestandsupportnewinitiatives

Peopledonottrusteachother 12345 Peopletrusteachother

Peoplespeakbasedonapoliticalawarenessof

whatisacceptable

12345 Peopleengageinauthenticdialog,constructively

challengingeachother Peopleseetheconstraints 12345 Peopleseethepossibilities

Peoplespeakfromtheirhierarchicalpositions 12345 Peoplespeaktoeachotherasequals

Peoplearecompetingforscarceresources 12345 Peoplearecreatingresourcesastheyspeak

a This tool is based on this paper and is meant for heuristic purposes It is not a scientifically validated instrument.

success,werepromotedintonewroles.Withthistransition,

thefrequency of interactions characterized by generative

discourse beganto decline Intheir formerroles, the key

salariedemployeeshadactivelysolicitedunionemployees’

ideasandprobedforfeedback.Afterthechangesinstaffing,

thesetypesofconversationswerereplacedbynormal

pat-ternsofknowingandtelling.Thelearningprocessgroundtoa

haltasthegroupwentbacktonormalorganizingassumptions

andpassivediscourse

CONCLUSION

We began with the provocative but true statement that

organizationsare filledwith potential resourcesthat

man-agers often failto see.Managers are unable to see these

potentialresourcesbecausetheyhavebeenconditionedto

view their organization through a lens built on normal

assumptions Managers, however, do not have to remain

hostages to these normal assumptions The NUMMI case

suggeststhatthemostextremeorganizationscanchange

Discourse becomes transformative when we engage in

experiencesthatchallengeourbasicassumptionsand

under-standings When we begin to embracethe assumptions of

positiveorganizing,weseenewpossibilitiesandwecreate

new resources The reader may find it useful to use the assessment toolin Table 3 to analyze a given meetingor pattern of conversations A group might even fill out the assessmentinthemiddleorattheendofameeting

Inthisarticleweillustratedthelackofmovementfromone setofassumptionstoanother.Weexaminedanorganization wheremostmanagersenactnormalassumptionsandmakeit impossibleforemployeestoimplementsignificantchange.We thenshowedhowitispossibleforaworkgrouptodefy expec-tationsevenwhenitisembeddedwithinanorganizationthatis lockedinastagnantpattern.Managerswithinthisworkgroup generateddiscoursethatchallengednormalassumptionsand elicitedtheassumptionsofpositiveorganizing

The implication is that managers have the power to awaken the potential within their organizations For this

to happen they must recognize the way their discourse contributestothelensemployeesusetoviewthe organiza-tion They must also recognize they need to relate and interactinwaysthatstimulatetheassumptionsofpositive organizing

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ourarguments buildonearlierworkexaminingtheroleof

communication in change, including: F J Barrett, G F

Thomas,andS P.Hocevar, ‘‘TheCentralRoleofDiscourse

inLarge-ScaleChange:ASocialConstructionPerspective,’’

TheJournalofAppliedBehavioralScience,1995,31(3),352—

372;J.D.Ford,‘‘OrganizationalChangeasShifting

Conver-sations,’’ Journal of Organizational Change Management,

1999, 12(6), 480—500; B Doolin, ‘‘Narratives of Change:

Discourse, Technology and Organization,’’ Organization,

2003,10(4),751—770

Foradditionalinformationon thefield ofPositive

Orga-nizational Scholarship see:K Cameron,J Dutton, andR

Quinn (eds.) Positive Organizational Scholarship:

Founda-tions of a New Discipline (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler,

2003);K.Cameron,andG.Spreitzer(eds.)OxfordHandbook

ofPositiveOrganizationalScholarship(NewYork,NY:Oxford

UniversityPress,2012)

ForfurtherinformationontheToyotaProductionSystem, seeJ.K.Liker,TheToyotaWay:14ManagementPrinciples fromtheWorld’sGreatestManufacturer(NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 2004);J P Womack, andD T.Jones, Lean Thinking (NewYork:FreePress,1996)

Foradiscussionof theorganizationalculturechangeat NUMMI see: K Cameron, and R Quinn, Diagnosing and ChangingOrganizational Culture: Basedon the Competing ValuesFramework(SanFrancisco:JohnWiley&Son,2011);J Shook,‘‘How to Change a Culture: Lessons from NUMMI,’’ SloanManagementReview,2010,51(2),63—68;W.W.Wilms,

A.J.Hardcastle,andD.M.Zell,‘‘CulturalTransformationat NUMMI,’’SloanManagementReview,1994,36(1),99—113 Dataand quotationsfor thesecond caseexample were originallycollected aspartof thefollowingstudy:K Hey-noski, Understanding Change Dynamics: Examining the UnderlyingPatternsthatShapeOrganizationalChange (Doc-toraldissertation,2011)

Katherine Heynoski is a consultant with Battelle for Kids Her current research examines the practices of highly

effective educators and schools using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies She received her Ph.D in

industrial and operations engineering from the University of Michigan (1160 Dublin Road, Suite 500, Columbus, OH

43215, United States; email: kheynoski@gmail.com ).

Robert E Quinn is a professor at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business He currently directs The

Center for Positive Organizational Scholarship His current research interests are in leadership and change

(Stephen M Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234, United

States; email: requinn@umich.edu ).