Experiments designed to elicit imme-diate retrospective judgements about one’s conscious experiences moved away from use of objective, performance-related measures to a focus on subject
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as immediate retrospective awareness With that inclusion, the whole nature of
the experimental method changed as well The method of systematic introspection (Ausfrageexperimente) became dominant Experiments designed to elicit
imme-diate retrospective judgements about one’s conscious experiences moved away from use of objective, performance-related measures to a focus on subjective report and on qualitative description of experience In particular, we see a striking change in how the experimenter is involved in the experiment: eliciting qualita-tive data requires the experimenter to ask questions to which the subject responds One consequence was that certain theoretical differences were prone to show
up in the introspective data itself, rather than in what was taken to be the scien-tific interpretation of the introspective data (Danziger 1980, 253) The infamous
‘imageless thought controversy’ between Titchener and the Würzburg school is
a case in point Würzburgers like Külpe claimed that they could introspect
non-imagistic and non-sensational awarenesses (unanschauliche Bewusstheiten)
reflecting higher cognitive activity Titchener, on the other hand, argued that intro-spection did not reveal anything non-imagistic or non-sensational and hence that his opponents were simply confused in various ways, either mistaking sensational composites for putatively non-sensational elements of experience or letting their theoretical preferences infect their introspective data
This episode thus also reflects another aspect of the state of play among experi-mental introspectionists in the early decades of the 1900s The debate had become one about competing pictures of the metaphysics of conscious experience, with Titchener defending a structuralist, bottom-up picture, and the Würzburg school defending a richer conception of conscious experience including complex and higher-level cognitive elements Titchener adhered to the doctrine of sensational-ism, the view that conscious experience is composed of sensory elements that com-bine to produce the overall experience Sensationalism, endorsed already by Mill and earlier British empiricists (Mill 1843, ch 4), gives introspection a key role in analysing experience into its basic components and in discovering the rules of com-bination in terms of which complex conscious contents of ordinary experience can
be explained In this capacity, the role of introspection was to overcome the nạve but misleading take on experience, and to discern the real conscious character with its basic sensational structure In Titchener’s hands, then, introspective investiga-tion of conscious experience is a form of analysis, or, as it was sometimes called
‘reduction’, of experience into its basic sensory components (Titchener 1912c) Külpe and the Würzburgers endorsed a rather different picture of conscious ence Specifically, they held that, in addition to sensory aspects, conscious experi-ences included other fundamental aspects, in the form of mental activity The latter could not be analysed into combinations of the former This basic outlook drew on Brentano’s act psychology and Husserl’s phenomenological approach to investi-gating experience The Würzburg emphasis on investiinvesti-gating conscious thinking and activity in experience derived from these very different interests
Both sides of the debate practiced systematic introspection, however Yet sys-tematic introspection presented several methodological problems (some old,