[22141332 - Journal of Jesuit Studies] The Intellectual Pedigree of the Virtue of Magnanimity in the Jesuit Constitutions

Boston College frspinal@bc.edu Abstract The article traces the development of the virtue of magnanimity in Aristotle, Cicero, and Thomas Aquinas in order to assess John O’Malley’s claim

© Spinale, 2015 | doi 10.1163/22141332-00203004

brill.com/jjs

The Intellectual Pedigree of the Virtue of

Magnanimity in the Jesuit Constitutions

Kevin Spinale S.J

Boston College

frspinal@bc.edu

Abstract

The article traces the development of the virtue of magnanimity in Aristotle, Cicero,

and Thomas Aquinas in order to assess John O’Malley’s claim that Section 728 of the

Constitutions of the Society of Jesus represents a paraphrase of section i.66 of Cicero’s

On Duties For Aristotle, the virtue represents individual’s striving for greater virtue

and honor In Cicero, the virtue takes on Stoic characteristics and is tempered with

justice and concern for the common good Thomas Aquinas links the virtue to hope

in initiating great enterprises and accomplishing great virtue in accord with God’s

will Ignatius uses magnanimity to indicate a virtue that synthesizes Cicero’s

atten-tion to the common good and Aquinas’s noatten-tion of hope in God’s providence Ignatius combines this synthesis with his own inclination to take that which is

excellent in others and generously incorporate it into the Society’s work in

magnify-ing God’s glory

Keywords

magnanimity – Aristotle – Cicero – On Duties – Aquinas – Ignatius – John W O’Malley –

Jesuit Constitutions – superior general – virtue

Introduction

During the course of his address to the students of Jesuit schools of Italy and

Albania in June 2013, Pope Francis urged his audience to recognize the

impor-tance of the virtue of magnanimity, that is, “having a great heart, having

great-ness of mind; it means having great ideals, the wish to do great things to

1 “Address of Pope Francis to the Students of the Jesuit Schools of Italy and Albania,” Paul vi Audience Hall, Friday, June 7, 2013 (available at www.vatican.va).

2 Ibid.

3 Annotation 5: “al que recibe los exercicios, mucho aprovecha entrar en ellos con grande ánimo y liberalidad con su Criador y Señor, ofreciéndole todo su querer y libertad, para que

su divina majestad, así de su como todo lo que tiene se sirva conforme a su sanctísima

volun-tad.” Ejercicios Espirituales, trans Manuel Iglesias (Collegeville, mn: Liturgical Press, 2006), 10.

4 “Address of Pope Francis to the Students of the Jesuit Schools of Italy and Albania.”

5 Several scholars argue something to this effect, including Michael Ivens in his commentary

on the Exercises (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 1998), 6; as well as Howard Gray’s Alpha Sigma

Nu Society address, “Ignatian Honor,” (March 5, 2011).

6 John O’Malley, “Jesuit History: A New Hot Topic,” in America 192, no 16 (2005),

http://ameri-camagazine.org/issue/530/article/jesuit-history-new-hot-topic; O’Malley, “Jesuit Spirituality:

The Civic and Cultural Dimensions,” Review of Ignatian Spirituality 35 no 1 (2005): 37–44,

here 40–42; O’Malley, “The Pastoral, Social, Ecclesiastical, Civic, and Cultural Mission of the

Society of Jesus,” in O’Malley, Saints or Devils Incarnate? Studies in Jesuit History (Leiden: Brill,

2013), 37–52, here 47; O’Malley, “Saint Ignatius and the Cultural Mission of the Society of

respond to what God asks of us.”1 Francis concluded his written remarks with the following blessing: “The Lord is always close to you, he picks you up when

you fall and impels you to develop and to make ever loftier decisions, ‘con

grande ánimo y liberalidad,’ with magnanimity Ad maiorem Dei gloriam.”2 The

Spanish phrase he employs comes from Annotation 5 of Ignatius of Loyola’s

(1491–1556) Spanish original of the Spiritual Exercises.3 Francis’s spoken

remarks that day included this definition of magnanimity: “[T]he key point in the education we Jesuits give – for our personal development – is magnanim-ity We must be magnanimous, with a big heart, without fear; always betting on the great ideals.”4

Magnanimity represents a complex concept at the heart of ancient and medieval accounts of virtue It is, for the most part, a non-biblical concept that

is modified by various thinkers throughout the Western tradition Magnanimity appears in two rather significant parts of the two documents that establish and

define the Jesuit charism—the Spiritual Exercises and the Constitutions Francis quotes from Ann 5 of the Exercises, which denotes the proper underlying

dis-position of the entire retreat—a disdis-position that carries through from the

Principle and Foundation, to the elements of election, to the Suscipe in the

Contemplatio ad obtinendum amorem.5 Magnanimity also appears in

sec-tion 728 of the Constitutions It is one of the core qualities of the ideal superior

general of the Society of Jesus In several places, John O’Malley has argued that section 728 represents a paraphrase of Cicero’s account of magnanimity in

section i.xx.66 of his De officiis.6 Indeed, there are many points of correspondence

Jesus,” in O’Malley, Saints or Devils Incarnate?, 257–97, here 255; Robert Maryks, Saint Cicero

and the Jesuits The Influence of the Liberal Arts on the Adoption of Moral Probabilism

(Burlington, vt: Ashgate, 2008), 77.

7 In an effort to be precise, I include the book, section citation, and the Bekker numbers I use

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);

between Cicero’s ideas presented in Book I of De officiis and the Ignatian

orien-tation of magnanimity, that is, as Pope Francis defines it, a big heart open to

great things There are also points of correspondence between Cicero and wider elements of Ignatian spirituality And, indeed, section 728 reads like a

paraphrase of De officiis i.xx.66 However, to reduce the Ignatian concept of

magnanimity evident in the Exercises and the Constitutions to a paraphrase of

Cicero’s presentation of the virtue is to ignore the rich synthesis of classical

and medieval thought that underlies its Ignatian usage Furthermore, such emphasis on the coherence of Renaissance ideas with the ideas of Juan Alfonso

de Polanco (1517–1576), Jerónimo Nadal (1507–1580), and Ignatius, neglects the

modifications or inflections built into magnanimity by Ignatius and his

com-panions In the founding documents that are attributed principally to Ignatius,

magnanimity entails generous surrender of one’s talents to service of God; an

indifference that does not intimate Stoicism; accurate and reflective self knowledge so as to initiate grand undertakings; confidence in God’s help; and

a redirecting of honor and glory to God Incorporating Cicero’s ideas, Thomas

Aquinas presents magnanimity as a part of fortitude that involves confidence

and hope Finally, magnanimity consists in readiness to recognize excellence

evident in others Magnanimity, because it orients Ignatius or the superior general or the rank and file Jesuit toward great things, encompasses the intellectual and cultural resources of secular culture in initiating the great

enterprises that will ensure the greater glory of God Therefore, beyond simply a restatement of Ciceronian concepts, Ignatian magnanimity both

embodies a synthesis of ancient and medieval thought and names the very

inclination toward such a synthesis—as Pope Francis declares—a big heart

open to great ideals

Aristotle on megalopsychia (μεγαλοψυχια)

Aristotle’s account of megalopsychia or greatness of soul centers upon

extraor-dinary virtue Aristotle situates megalopsychia in the category of virtues of

character, that is, those virtues which arise out of habituation For Aristotle,

human happiness “is equivalent to living well and acting well” (ne i, 4; 1095a).7

for the Greek, I employ Ingram Bywater’s critical text Ethica Nicomachea, ed Ingram Bywater

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1890).

The human good entails, precisely, activity of the soul in accordance with

vir-tue (ne i, 7; 1098a) Aristotle’s ethics combine a universal standard (virvir-tue

con-sists in the mean between excess and deficiency) with the relative aspect of the circumstances of each moral agent Aristotle summarizes his basic structure of virtues in this way: “Virtue, then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting

in a mean relative to us, and determined by reason – the reason, that is, by

ref-erence to which the practically wise person would determine it” (ne ii, 6; 1107a)

Any human being can become angry or spend money, but doing such things “in relation to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim in view, and in the right way – that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy…[t]his is why excellence in these things is rare, praiseworthy, and

noble (καλον)” (ne ii, 9; 1109a) The magnanimous or great-souled individual,

who excels in all virtue, is rare, praiseworthy, and noble

For Aristotle, greatness of soul or magnanimity (megalopsychia) implies vir-tue on a grand scale (ne iv, 3; 1123a32) He writes, “A person is thought to be

great-souled, if he thinks himself worthy of great things – and is indeed worthy

of them” (ne iv, 3; 1123b1) The great-souled person is extreme as virtue itself is

an extreme However, magnanimity is a mean between the excess of vanity— claiming honor when one is not worthy of it—and the deficiency of smallness

of soul (micropsychia), that is, not claiming the honor one is due (ne iv, 3;

1123b12–15) Aristotle then moves quickly through the syllogisms of his portrait

of the magnanimous person Since worth (axios) is concerned with external

goods and honor is the greatest external good because it is rendered upon the gods, the great-souled person is concerned with honor and dishonor in the

right way (ne iv, 3; 1123b23) Then Aristotle makes a remarkable statement, as

grand as the concept that he is presenting: “The great-souled person, since he

is worthy of the greatest things [honor], must be the best person of all” (ne iv,

3; 1123b27–29) The magnanimous person demonstrates greatness in every vir-tue, and so, magnanimity represents a sort of crown or ornament of the virtues

(kosmos tis einai ton areton).

Aristotle completes his portrait by delineating various attributes of the mag-nanimous person In all things, the great-souled person is superior, dignified,

calm, self aware (ne iv, 3; 1124b5), courageous, does not complain, and is slow

to act but for matters involving great honor or significance (ne iv, 3; 1124b24–25)

The magnanimous person is isolated from his fellow men and women by his bearing The excellence of his virtue is so extraordinary that it prevents him from interacting on equal terms with anyone but his peers in virtue—who are

8 Because the ancient authors portray the magnanimous individual in masculine terms, I use

the masculine pronouns and distinctions in order to cohere with the original texts I try to be

inclusive in my use of pronouns when it will not confuse the original sense of the text.

9 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed Jonathan

Barnes, vol 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1952 This notion in expanded in

Carson Holloway’s chapter, “Aristotle’s Magnanimous Man,” in Magnanimity and

Statesmanship, ed Carson Holloway (Lanham, md: Lexington Books, 2008), 13–28, here 19.

few The magnanimous person is motivated by great honor and dismissive of

unimportant honors conferred by inconsequential people (ne iv, 3; 1124a10–11)

Lastly, though a person of wealth and noble bearing, the great-souled

individ-ual is not excessively distressed or moved by loss of wealth, power, and good or

bad fortune (ne iv, 3; 1124a14–15) Virtue, honor, and self-awareness insulate

the magnanimous person from most of what individuals of lesser virtue endure

in their daily lives

Many modern scholars criticize Aristotle’s virtue of magnanimity—the supersized instance of virtue in an individual—for two reasons First, the

mag-nanimous man seems to present a problem for Aristotle’s system in which

agents act in accord with virtue for the sake of the summum bonum itself:

human activity in accord with virtue.8 Second, in Aristotle’s portrait, though he

has a legitimate claim on great honor, the great-souled man appears to be

emi-nently aristocratic, aloof, and self-absorbed because of his concern for the greatest honors The great-souled person seems to disdain or ignore anything

or anyone beneath his concern (Eudemian Ethics iii, 5; 1232b4–7).9 Yet, there

are other instances in the Aristotelian corpus where megalopsychia is related

to offices within the polis because great offices represent opportunities for

great honor (ee iii, 5; 1232b22–24) At times, civic positions of great power are

worthy of pursuit because they offer the opportunity to engage in greater works that garner even greater honor

For the scope of the current study of magnanimity, five basic aspects of

Aristotle’s presentation of the virtue of magnanimity perdure through to the

Thomistic tradition and the time of Ignatius They include, first, the notion

that magnanimity involves virtue on a grand scale and concerns great actions

and honors Second, the magnanimous person attains genuine understanding

of him or herself and legitimately claims great honor Third, the great-souled

person remains calm and mostly unaffected by ill or good fortune, by the

opin-ions of others, and by honor that originates in people inferior to him or her

There is also, fourthly, the notion that a distinction exists between honor that

arises from the masses and true honor which, in turn, allows for the possibility

that the great-souled person may be disdained falsely by the masses Fifth, the

10 Henceforth, I refer to these works as On Moral Ends and On Duties.

11 I retain the neuter form in discussing honestus-a-um (an adjective used as a substantive to

denote a concept) as a philosophical concept akin to “to kalon” or “to de ti”.

12 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed and trans Robert Drew Hicks

(Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1935), vol 2, book vii, sections 87–88.

13 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Moral Ends, ed Julia Annas, trans Raphael Woolf (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2008), 73.

deficiency of magnanimity—pusillanimity—involves timidity that shrinks from noble actions and projects because the small-souled person, though

wor-thy of such undertakings, feels inappropriately unworwor-thy of them (ne iv, 3;

1125a30) Such principles remain part of the concept of magnanimity through

to Ignatius and Polanco’s collaboration in the composition of the Constitutions.

Cicero on magnanimitas or animi magnitudo

During the last few, turbulent years of his life, 46–43BC, Marcus Tullius Cicero

produced several works on moral philosophy including De finibus bonorum et

malorum and De officiis.10 Throughout these works, Cicero is enthralled by the

Latin term honestus denoting that which is moral, decent, honorable Honestum

is a rather complicated concept that becomes the core of Cicero’s ethics.11 In a

world threatened by political violence, Cicero understands honestas as the prin-cipal motivation for any human action Honestas entails conformity to nature

The notion of conformity to nature has its origin in the Stoic tradition,

includ-ing Chrysippus’s own De finibus and Diogenes Laertius’s portrait of Zeno.12 The

Stoics place the orientating point of their morality outside the soul Happiness

is not the soul’s activity in accordance with reason, but the individual’s harmo-nizing him or herself with the will or order of the universe The center of ethical activity is not the soul of the agent but the wider universe and its divine order The agent is a part of the order and endeavors to act in accord with it

In Book iii of his On Moral Ends, Cicero presents a summary of Stoic moral

philosophy It is the most complete account of Stoicism extant from the ancient world Sections 21–26 of Book iii, spoken by Cato the Elder, are an expansion

of Diogenes’s portrait of Zeno: “the final aim, then, is to live consistently

and harmoniously with nature […] what is moral (honestum) is the only good” (On Moral Ends iii, 26).13 The Stoic system prizes that which is honestus

over ordinary objects of affection (iii, 21) Wisdom ensures one’s orientation toward the moral over and against the mind’s desire and more basic affec-tions (iii, 23) Furthermore, as Cicero writes, “Wisdom embraces magnanimity

14 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, eds Miriam Tamara Griffin and E Margaret Atkins

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

15 O’Malley makes an interesting point about this section in his article, “Jesuit Spirituality:

The Civic and Cultural Dimensions,” 41 He compares On Duties i, vii, 22 with Annotation

23 of the Spiritual Exercises.

(animi magnitudo) and justice, and judges itself superior to anything that might

befall a person” (iii, 25) According to Cicero speaking through Cato, the Stoic

differs from the Peripatetic in that external goods do not affect one’s happiness

or the actuation of one’s virtue (iii, 43) Nor do bodily goods contribute to one’s

overall happiness (iii, 45) Magnanimity, at least for Cicero’s Stoic character

Cato, is an aspect of wisdom that recognizes and clings to that which is

hones-tus as superior to anything that might come about, good or bad, in one’s life.

Cicero offers a detailed account of magnanimity in the first book of On

Duties, a work of philosophy addressed to his son Marcus.14 In it, he states that

he writes on moral philosophy because he sees it as having the widest practical

application (i, 4) Cicero draws “chiefly” (potissimum) from Stoicism in his

pre-sentation of practical philosophy (i, 6) Some sections later, he addresses his

son directly and claims that all that is morally right (quod est honestum) flows

from one of four sources: theoretical consideration of truth; the conservation

of organized society in which every individual is rendered his or her due and

obligations are carried out faithfully; the greatness and strength of a noble and

invincible spirit; or, finally, the orderliness that consists in temperance and self

control (i, 15) In expanding on the third of four sources of the good, Cicero

argues that the largeness and nobility of soul (animi excellentia magnitudoque)

is revealed not in the accumulation of resources and expansion of personal

advantage (i, 17), but in contributing to the common good (i, 22).15 Furthermore,

in Cicero’s political thinking, one’s country claims a share of one’s being , and

citizens have a responsibility to contribute “to the general good by an

inter-change of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our

industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man

to man” (i, 22)

Like the Aristotelian sense of magnanimity, Cicero understands the virtue

as an extraordinary manifestation of virtue in an individual that elevates him

or her above concern for wealth, good fortune, and, as Cicero has it, the

vicis-situdes of life Cicero acknowledges the honor of great-souled individuals;

however, he warns that exaltation of spirit (animi elatio) can devolve into lust

for power and injustice (i, 62) Justice and concern for the common good (pro

salute communi) must be integral to magnanimity or greatness of soul becomes

vicious (in vitio est) (i, 62) Justice and concern for the common good displace

the Aristotelian notion that the great-souled person acts on a grand scale to

16 The Peripatetics clearly take issue with the truth of this claim Aristotle makes a strong

case in ne i, 9 (1100a) that such a view of the summum bonum is quite flawed After all,

would anyone call Priam happy at the end of his life seeing his son’s corpse disgraced and his city conquered?

attain great honor As the Stoics have oriented their ethical system to a static, unchanging, universal notion outside the moral agent (but, at the same time, encompassing the agent), Cicero fuses magnanimity with justice and outward concern—the common good Magnanimous individuals cultivate an ambition tempered by a spirit of fairness and equality essential to justice (i, 64)

Book i, Section xx.66 and following, represents Cicero’s definition of mag-nanimity Section (i, 66) is clearly a text used by Polanco in the composition of

Part ix, section 728 of the Constitutions A detailed comparison of the two texts

follows below In section (i, 66), Cicero delineates two essential characteristics

of magnanimity First, the great-souled man disdains everything but that

which is moral and noble (honestum decorumque) (i, 66) He is free from

sub-jugation to any man, any passion, or any good or bad fortune Second, Cicero writes that the great-souled man does “deeds not only great and in the highest degree useful, but extremely arduous and laborious and fraught with danger both to life and the things pertinent to living” (i, 66) Cicero’s magnanimous man is orientated solely to moral goodness and propriety the highest human goods Such an orientation elevates the great-souled man to a plane of moral

grandeur that is concerned solely with that which is honestus.16 Indeed,

activ-ity on a grand scale is integral to Cicero’s magnanimactiv-ity, but it is not directed toward the attainment of honor, which is essential to the Aristotelian concept

In fact, Cicero shuns honor for honestum Cicero’s magnanimity also includes

the performance of things laborious and arduous This too is a departure from

Aristotle’s megalopsychia The Ciceronian concept acknowledges that not only

will the great-souled man face serious danger, but he will also have to face tedium, struggle, and labor

For the next several sections of On Duties, Cicero connects magnanimity

with the holding of political office and makes an appeal to a life of civic activity over and against the contemplative life of a philosopher This is a clear innova-tion over the Aristotelian concept of magnanimity Cicero explicitly links mag-nanimity to justice, the common good, Stoic indifference, political office, and,

above all, to dedication to that which is honestus First, indifference does not

mean withdrawal or retirement from civic duty (i, 69), for political activity can benefit more people and increases one’s own greatness and renown (i, 70) Cicero states quite clearly that greatness of soul, indifference, and constancy cannot be made manifest other than through participation in political life

(i, 72–73) He advocates for public life over the life of philosophy because

mag-nanimity emerges in and through the rigors of political struggle (i, 73) Magnanimity is magnified in the politician because he is vulnerable to so many

worries and intense emotions (i, 72–73) It is not only in war that one can

dis-tinguish oneself through magnanimous action (i, 74–75) Those who serve the

state garner the same honor – including Cicero himself (i, 76–78), for it is moral, not physical strength that denotes greatness of spirit (i, 79) Magnanimity,

as Cicero writes, “requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose

to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in

human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from

one’s natural state of the dignity of a philosopher” (i, 67) Magnanimity bears

all ills for honestum Lastly, justice is integral to magnanimity: “It is our duty,

then, to be more ready to endanger our own rather than the public welfare and

to hazard honor and glory more readily than other advantages.” (i, 84) Service

in political office makes one vulnerable to the stress of public life, but it also

affords one the opportunity to demonstrate and grow in one’s magnanimity

Five basic Aristotelian elements of megalopsychia remain a part of Cicero’s

virtue of magnanimity Greatness of soul concerns extraordinary virtue and

activity on a grand scale Second, the magnanimous man, indeed, is self-aware,

but he is also cognizant of a greater, more comprehensive natural order of

which he is apart Third, the magnanimous individual is indifferent to the many realities or vicissitudes of life In fact, perhaps by dint of his own

experi-ences at the end of the Roman republic, Cicero insists on the inclusion of

indif-ference at the core of magnanimity Fourth, the magnanimous man knows the

distinction between what is truly virtuous and that which the masses identify

to be virtuous and honorable The great-souled man is ready to suffer the

con-sequences that stem from the ability to discern more adeptly what is actually

honorable and to cling to it Fifth, Cicero’s small-souled man is one who avoids

political life for the safety of a life insulated from the turbulence of public

ser-vice Cicero also adds to the concept He fuses magnanimity to justice, concern

for the common good, and political life, while shedding Aristotle’s emphasis on

honor and the necessary aloofness of the magnanimous man Cicero’s

modifi-cations of the virtue of magnanimity certainly stem from his own political

experience and his exposure to Stoicism

Aquinas on Magnanimity

Within his account of fortitude – its components and contraries – in Questions

123 to 129 of the Secunda Secundae of the Summa theologica, Thomas Aquinas

17 Craig Titus, Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude (Washington, dc: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 174, argues that Thomas is quoting On Duties i, 22, but it could well

be from section i, 78.

refers to or quotes Marcus Tullius Cicero (“Tully” in the Blackfriars’ English translation) no less than sixteen times Thomas draws explicitly from Cicero’s

early work on rhetoric (De inventione rhetorica) and On Duties, which he quotes extensively in Q 123, Art 1 and in his respondeo in Q 129, Art 7 However,

Aquinas’s principal authority for this section is Aristotle He anchors his moral speculation in the Peripatetic tradition in which virtue in accordance with rea-son represents humanity’s ultimate excellence (Q 123, Art 1) At the summit of the moral life, just below the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude govern the virtues of character Fortitude, of which magnanimity is a subset, shapes and strengthens reason and the will to overcome appetitive obstacles or perceived difficulties that hinder human beings in cooperating with God’s grace to bring about a good end or some perfection (ibid.) Fortitude helps the moral agent conform to reason when acting (ibid.) It belongs to fortitude to face dangers and bear toils (Q 123, Art 3) Fortitude is chiefly about resisting fear and sustaining faith in extremely difficult circumstances (ibid.) Fortitude most immediately concerns danger of death, for, as Thomas writes, “fortitude of soul must be that which binds the will to reason in the face of the greatest evils” (Q 123, Art 4) Thomas cites Cicero in the second objection of (Q 123, Art 5) essentially agree-ing with Cicero that though fortitude concerns danger of death, the virtue is relevant beyond the battlefield because the realm of politics could also involve threat of death.17 Thomas follows his question on fortitude with an account of martyrdom (Q 124), which he declares to be the paradigmatic act of fortitude Thomas’s presentation of fortitude corresponds well with the concepts of

jus-tice, courage, and magnanimity as discussed by Cicero in Book i of On Duties It

also accords with Ignatius and Polanco’s brief mention of the virtues of fortitude

and magnanimity in Part ix, Section 728 of the Constitutions Cicero, Thomas, and

Ignatius understand fortitude to be concerned with enduring danger of death in

order to remain committed to that which is the ultimate good (honestum for

Cicero in his Stoic writings and the Christian God for Thomas and Ignatius) It is

evident then, that the final lines of both Section (i, 66) of On Duties and Section 728

of the Constitutions pertain to the virtue of fortitude Both texts envision the

pos-sibility of death and call forth fortitude in response to such a circumstance Furthermore, all three thinkers understand fortitude to be necessary outside the realm of war For Ignatius, such fortitude is even necessary in the governance of a religious order Fortitude is relevant for political affairs and, for Thomas and