Kammhuber Line623 The greatest kamikaze effort was made against the invasion fl eet off Okinawa from April to June, 1945.. Kamikaze attacks sank 38 warships, though none larger than a d
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The greatest kamikaze effort was made against the invasion fl eet off Okinawa
from April to June, 1945 Kamikaze attacks sank 38 warships, though none larger
than a destroyer; they damaged nearly 200 more, while killing 4,907 U.S sailors
The Japanese plan was to allow an initial landing, then isolate and destroy it by
driving away the supporting fl eet A naval task force centered on the giant
battle-ship IJN Yamato sailed south with only enough fuel to reach and attack the invasion
fl eet Some dispute that its mission may be fairly characterized as a suicide run as
the apparent intention was to beach “Yamato” and fi ght it out with its massive
deck guns Before that could happen the task force was met by several hundred
U.S naval aircraft and the “Yamato” and its escorts were sunk with great loss of
life About 25 percent of all enemy ships struck by kamikaze were sunk Kamikaze
hit 402 enemy warships in all, putting 375 out of action for some period of time,
including 12 carriers of various type That still left thousands of enemy warships
and transports hovering around Japan’s home islands, readying to support
in-vasion After the surrender, Allied inspectors found over 5,000 aircraft ready for
kamikaze service
Allied countermeasures against kamikaze were highly effective They
in-cluded deploying decoy ships to steer inexperienced pilots away from major
capital warships, increased anti-aircraft guns on all ships, and provision of an
especially heavy Combat Air Patrol (CAP) by dozens of carriers The CAP was
maintained over the fl eet at Okinawa to shoot down suicide attacks at safe
dis-tances It also should be remembered that the vast majority of unskilled
kami-kaze pilots who tried to hit enemy ships instead missed and splashed, or were
shot down during the attempt The danger from kamikaze at Okinawa diverted
a number of B-29 raids intended to pound Japan’s cities to instead bomb
kami-kaze and Banda airfi elds, although given the enemy’s overwhelming superiority
in the air that temporary shift of the strategic bomber force hardly mattered to
the outcome Some 10,000 obsolete old trainers, along with a few new aircraft,
were held in reserve for use as kamikazes pending invasions of the home islands
that never took place They were captured and destroyed after the occupation
of Japan
See also DOWNFALL; ohka
Suggested Reading: Rikihei Nakajima, et al., The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze
Force in World War II (1958; 2003); M Sheftall, Blossoms in the Wind (2005)
KAMINSKI BRIGADE
See Warsaw Uprising (1944)
KAMMHUBER LINE German air defense system for night fi ghter interception
of RAF Bomber Command fl ights over the Low Countries into northern Germany
It was basically in place by the middle of 1941, and complete and growing in
sophis-tication by September 1942 It was named for Luftwaffe General Josef Kammhuber,
General of Fighters in the Luftwaffe and the man in charge of Germany’s homeland
defense Night fi ghters circled inside grid pattern boxes (Räume) until vectored onto