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Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of Military Troops in Haiti and Expected Casualties, September 1994...9 B.6.. Because this is a somewhat imperfect question for estimating the im

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discus-American Public

Support for U.S

Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad

Technical Appendixes

Eric V Larson, Bogdan Savych

Prepared for the Arroyo Center

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Preface

This document contains the technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT), delineates the sources of support and opposition, and identifies potential fault lines in sup-

port The main document is Eric V Larson and Bogdan Savych, American Public Support for

U.S Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad, Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corpora-tion, MG-231-A, 2004.

These appendixes describe bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses of dent-level public opinion data from polling during the final stages of the U.S military inter- vention in Somalia, the peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist re- gime in Iraq.

respon-This research was sponsored by Chief, National Security Policy Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army It was conducted in RAND Ar- royo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine and Resources Program RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Army.

For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Operations phone 310-393-0411, ex 6419; FAX 310-451-6952; e-mail Marcy_Agmon@rand.org), or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard/.

Contents

Preface iii

Tables vii

Introduction 1

Appendix A Statistical Results for Somalia 3

B Statistical Results for Haiti 7

C Statistical Results for Bosnia 15

D Statistical Results for Kosovo 23

E Statistical Results for Afghanistan 31

F Statistical Results for Iraq 39

Bibliography 57

Tables

A.1 Wording of Question in ABC News Somalia Poll, October 5, 1993 3

A.2 Marginal Probability from Probit Estimates of Withdrawal (Q3) 4

A.3 Wording of Question in ABC News Somalia Poll, October 5, 1993 5

A.4 Marginal Probability from Probit Estimates of Escalation (Q7) 5

A.5 Marginal Probability from Probit Estimates of Escalation (Q8) 6

B.1 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of U.S Troops in Haiti and Moral Interests, September 1994 7

B.2 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of U.S Troops in Haiti and National Security Interests, September 1994 8

B.3 Cross-Tabulation of Approval of the President’s Handling of Haiti by Belief in Vital Interests, October 1993 8

B.4 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of Military Troops in Haiti and Prospects for Success, September 1994 9

B.5 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of Military Troops in Haiti and Expected Casualties, September 1994 9

B.6 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of Military Troops in Haiti, Party Affiliation, and Consumption of Information, September 1994 10

B.7 Cross-Tabulation of Security Interests in Haiti and Party, September 1994 11

B.8 Cross-Tabulation of Moral Interests in Haiti and Party, September 1994 11

B.9 Cross-Tabulation of Expected Length of the Campaign in Haiti by Party, September 1994 12

B.10 Cross-Tabulation of Expected Casualties in Haiti and Party, September 1994 12

B.11 Cross-Tabulation of News Consumption Regarding Haiti and Party, September 1994 13

B.12 Wording of Questions in Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, September 23–25 1994 13

B.13 Marginal Probability from the Probit Estimates of Approval (Q15) 14

C.1 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Troops in Bosnia and Beliefs About Security Interests, November 1995 15

C.2 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Troops in Bosnia and Belief in U.S Moral Obligation, November 1995 16

C.3 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Troops in Bosnia and Confidence in Ability to Handle Situation (in Percentage and Number of Observation), November 1995 16

C.4 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Troops in Bosnia and Expected Length

of Commitment and Number of Casualties, November 1995 17

C.5 Support for Military Troops in Bosnia by Confidence in Party Leaders, November 1995 17

C.6 Cross-Tabulation of Beliefs About Security Interests in Bosnia and Expected Length of Commitment Involving Casualties (in Percentage and Number of Observations), November 1995 18

C.7 Cross-Tabulation of Beliefs in Moral Obligations by Confidence in Party Leaders (in Percentage and Number of Observation), November 1995 18

C.8 Cross-Tabulation of Confidence in President’s Ability to Handle Situation in Bosnia by Confidence in Party Leaders (in Percentage and Number of Observations), November 1995 19

C.9 Cross-Tabulation of Expected Length of Commitment and Expected Casualties in Bosnia by Confidence in Party Leaders (in Percentage and Number of Observation), November 1995 19

C.10 Wording of Question in Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll: Bosnia Speech, November 27, 1995 20

C.11 Marginal Probability from the Probit Estimates of Approval (Q2) 21

D.1 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Sending U.S Ground Troops to Kosovo and Moral Interests, April 1999 24

D.2 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Sending U.S Ground Troops to Kosovo and Prospects for Success, April 1999 24

D.3 Cross-Tabulation of Approval for Sending U.S Ground Troops to Kosovo and Worries About Expected Casualties, April 1999 25

D.4 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Sending U.S Ground Troops to Kosovo and Expected Financial Costs of the Campaign, April 1999 25

D.5 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Sending U.S Ground Troops to Kosovo and Party Information, April 1999 26

D.6 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Ground Troops in Kosovo by Party, April 1999 26

D.7 Cross-Tabulation of the Stakes of the Campaign in Kosovo by Party, April 1999 27

D.8 Cross-Tabulation of the Prospects for Success by Party, April 1999 27

D.9 Cross-Tabulation of the Expectation of the Casualties in Kosovo by Party, April 1999 28

D.10 Wording of Question in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press April 1999 News Interest Index, April 15–18 1999. 29

D.11 Marginal Probability from the Probit Estimates of Approval (Q8) 29

E.1 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Action in Afghanistan and Interests, November 2001 31

E.2 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Action in Afghanistan and Prospects of the Campaign, November 2001 32

E.3 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Action in Afghanistan and Expected Casualties, November 2001 32

E.4 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Action in Afghanistan by Party, November 2001 33

Tables ix

E.5 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Action in Afghanistan by Political Views, November 2001 33

E.6 Cross-Tabulation of Stakes of the Campaign by Party, November 2001 34

E.7 Cross-Tabulation of the Prospects of the Military Action in Afghanistan by Party, November 2001 34

E.8 Cross-Tabulation of the Expectation of Casualties in the Military Action in Afghanistan by Party, November 2001 35

E.9 Wording of Questions in ABC News/Washington Post War Poll #2, November 27, 2001 35

E.10 Marginal Probability from the Probit Estimates of Approval (Q2) 37

F.1 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Action in Iraq and Beliefs About Iraq's Ability to Develop Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002 39

F.2 Cross-Tabulation of the Belief in the Presence of WMD in Iraq by Party, October 2002 40

F.3 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War and Justification for War with Iraq, March 2003 40

F.4 Cross-Tabulation of Justification for War by Party, March 2003 41

F.5 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Justification for War, April 2003 41

F.6 Cross-Tabulation of Justification for War in Iraq by Party, April 2003 42

F.7 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Interests, January 2003 43

F.8 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Prospects of the Campaign, January 2003 43

F.9 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Expected Casualties, January 2003 44

F.10 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Consumption of Information by Party (in Percentage and Number of Observations) 45

F.11 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq by Party, January 2003 46

F.12 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq by Political Views, January 2003 46

F.13 Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Campaign in Iraq by Party, January 2003 47

F.14 Cross-Tabulation of the Stakes of the War in Iraq by Party, January 2003 47

F.15 Cross-Tabulation of the Prospects of the War in Iraq by Party, January 2003 48

F.16 Cross-Tabulation of the Expected Casualties in the War with Iraq by Party, January 2003 48

F.17 Wording of Question in Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, January 3–5 2003 49

F.18 Marginal Probability from the Probit Estimates of Approval (Q9) 49

F.19 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Vital Interests, March 2003 50

F.20 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Prospects of the Campaign, March 2003 51

F.21 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq and Expected Casualties, March 2003 51

F.22 Cross-Tabulation of Support for War in Iraq by Party, March 2003 52

F.23 Cross-Tabulation of the Beliefs About Vital Interests in Iraq by Party, March 2003 52

F.24 Cross-Tabulation of the Expected Length of the War with Iraq by Party, March 2003 53

F.25 Cross-Tabulation of the Expected Casualties in the War with Iraq by Party, March 2003 53

F.26 Wording of Question in ABC/WP War Poll #1, Marsh 2003 54 F.27 Marginal Probability from the Probit Estimates of Approval (Q3) 54

Introduction

This set of technical appendixes provides illustrative results from our bivariate and ate statistical analyses of respondent-level datasets from polls conducted during the U.S in- terventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

multivari-The results reported here are results from what we considered to be the “best” of the datasets for each case, not in the sense that the dataset yielded the best predictions, but in the sense that the question wordings that were used most closely approximated the conceptual meanings we had in mind for our independent variables (beliefs about the importance of the stakes, prospects for success, and likely costs, and party and information consumption) and dependent variables (support or, for Somalia, preference for withdrawal or escalation); we performed very many more statistical tests than those reported here, and these analyses yielded similar results.

This document is organized as follows:

• Appendix A provides the results of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses of withdrawal and escalation sentiment on Somalia.

• Appendix B provides the results of our analyses of Haiti.

• Appendix C provides the results of our analyses of Bosnia.

• Appendix D provides results for Kosovo.

• Appendix E provides results for Afghanistan.

• Appendix F provides results for Iraq.

Statistical Results for Somalia

We used a family of statistical techniques called probit regression for our statistical modeling

of individual-level preferences for withdrawal or escalation.

Withdrawal Sentiment

We first model respondents’ preferences regarding staying in or withdrawing from Somalia, based upon data from an ABC News poll conducted on October 5, 1993, two days before the president’s October 7 speech, and at a time when most national political leaders sup- ported withdrawal.

Table A.1 provides the wording of the questions used to estimate our model.

Table A.1

Wording of Question in ABC News Somalia Poll, October 5, 1993

Withdrawal Q3 Do you think the United States should keep troops in Somalia until there’s a functioning

civil government there that can run things, or do you think the U.S should pull its troops out

of Somalia very soon, even if there is no functioning civil government in place?

Stakes Q6 Do you think America’s vital interests are at stake in Somalia or not?

Prospects Q10 Just your best guess: Do you think the United States is going to get bogged down in a

drawn-out military involvement in Somalia, or do you think the U.S military involvementthere will end quickly?

Table A.2 predicts preferences for withdrawing from or staying in Somalia; our pothesis is that a belief in vital interests and good prospects for success would be associated with a willingness to stay, and the absence of that belief would be associated with a prefer- ence for withdrawal The coefficients reflect the average (mean) change in probability of the dependent variable for an infinitely small change in the independent variable, or, in case of dummy variables, for a change from 0 to 1.

hy-As shown, the model correctly predicts 63 percent of the respondents, and also shows that, as predicted, a willingness to stay hinged on the belief that the United States had vital interests involved, and good prospects for a successful outcome, whereas a preference for withdrawal was associated with a failure to see vital interests or good prospects in Somalia Unfortunately, fewer than one in three actually believed that the United States had vital in-

terests in Somalia, and a plurality of 47 percent thought the United States was going to get bogged down in Somalia (by comparison, only 44 percent thought U.S involvement would end quickly), so the net result was lukewarm support for staying.

Table A.2

Marginal Probability from Probit Estimates of Withdrawal (Q3)

Variables Change in Probability at Mean Values

SOURCE: ABC News, October 5, 1993 The withdrawal question was coded as 0 if

the respondent wanted to pull out, and 1 if they wanted to keep troops in

es-In this dataset we had several questions that we were able to use to illuminate the sons for individual attitudes toward escalation of the conflict.

rea-Table A.4 presents the results for the model that sought to predict respondents’ proval or disapproval of sending troops to better protect the U.S troops in Somalia, and Ta- ble A.5 reports the results of the model that sought to predict respondents’ approval or dis- approval for continuing to try capturing the warlord Aidid Our hypothesis is that the willingness to escalate should be associated with the perceived stakes or benefits, the pros- pects for success, and the likely costs; unfortunately, there was no variable for costs in this dataset, so we estimate the model without one parameter.

ap-Statistical Results for Somalia 5

Table A.3

Wording of Question in ABC News Somalia Poll, October 5, 1993

Escalation Q7 The Clinton administration says it is sending 450 more troops with tanks and other heavy

equipment to better protect the U.S troops who are there now Do you favor or oppose thismove?

Q8 The Somali fighters are commanded by a warlord named Mohammed Aidid The UnitedStates, along with other United Nations forces, have been sending out its troops to try tocapture Aidid Do you think the United States should continue trying to capture Aidid, or not?Vital Interests Q6 Do you think America’s vital interests are at stake in Somalia or not?

Prospects Q10 Just your best guess: Do you think the United States is going to get bogged down in a

drawn-out military involvement in Somalia, or do you think the U.S military involvement therewill end quickly?

Table A.4

Marginal Probability from Probit Estimates of Escalation (Q7)

Variables Change in Probability at Mean Values

SOURCE: ABC News, October 5, 1993 The escalation question was coded as 0 if the

respondent did not support sending additional troops to Somalia, and 1 if they

supported additional troops

† dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

* Significant at 10%

** Significant at 5%

*** Significant at 1%

Robust standard error in parentheses

Despite the missing costs parameter, the first model correctly predicts 64 percent of the respondents’ positions on sending more troops, and the second correctly predicts 60 per- cent of the cases Both models suggest that the desire to escalate was associated with a belief

in the importance of the stakes, and a belief that the U.S effort would be successful The agnostics for both models also are good.

di-Table A.5

Marginal Probability from Probit Estimates of Escalation (Q8)

Variables Change in Probability at Mean Values

SOURCE: ABC News, October 5, 1993 The escalation question was coded as 0 if the

respondent did not support additional efforts to capture Aidid, and 1 if they supportedsuch efforts

† dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

Statistical Results for Haiti

Cross-Tabulations of Support and Independent Variables

As shown in Tables B.1 through B.6, simple Chi-square tests of the association between port for the presence of U.S troops in Haiti and beliefs about the U.S stakes in Haiti (both moral interests and more traditional national security interests), prospects for success, ex- pected casualties, and party suggested that support was associated with all four variables, and all were statistically significant at the 001 level.

sup-Table B.1 presents results showing that approval and disapproval of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti were systematically associated with beliefs about the U.S moral interests

in Haiti, in this case, whether or not the Haitian people would, as a result, be better off as a result of the intervention.

Table B.1

Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of U.S Troops in Haiti and Moral Interests, September 1994

Q15 Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti?

Q22 When it comes time for the United States to withdraw its troops from Haiti, do you think the Haitian peoplewill be better off than before the U.S arrived, worse off, or will their situation not have changed?

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table B.2 presents the results of our cross-tabulation of approval of the presence of U.S forces in Haiti and the United States’ stakes in terms of more national security interests,

in this case, the belief that U.S involvement would lead to a reduction in the flow of Haitian refugees to the United States.

Table B.2

Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of U.S Troops in Haiti and National Security Interests, September 1994

Q15 Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti?

Q19 Please tell me whether you think each of the following is likely or not likely to happen in Haiti (as a result

of U.S involvement in that country)… There will be a reduction in the flow of Haitian refuges to the U.S

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Because this is a somewhat imperfect question for estimating the importance of liefs about the importance of national interests in Haiti, we also present the results of our cross-tabulation of approval for the president’s handling of Haiti and the belief that the United States had vital interests at stake in Haiti (Table B.3) from a poll done in October

be-1993 As suggested by the statistical significance of the Chi-square test result, approval of the president’s handling of the situation was associated with the belief that the United States had vital interests in Haiti.

Table B.3

Cross-Tabulation of Approval of the President’s Handling of Haiti by Belief in Vital Interests,

October 1993

Q3 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Clinton is handling the situation in Haiti?

Q13 Do you think America’s vital interests are at stake in Haiti, or not?

SOURCE: ABC News, October 12, 1993

NOTE: p < 0.001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table B.4 shows that approval and disapproval of the U.S presence was cally associated with the level of confidence that U.S troops would be able to withdraw within a few months as planned.

systemati-Statistical Results for Haiti 9

Table B.4

Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of Military Troops in Haiti and Prospects for Success,

September 1994

Q15 Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti?

Q18b Regarding the situation in Haiti, how confident are you that most of the U.S troops will be able to

withdraw within a few months as planned

% Approve % Disapprove N

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table B.5 shows that approval and disapproval of the U.S presence was associated with the level of confidence that the United States would be able to accomplish its objectives with very few or no casualties.

Table B.5

Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of Military Troops in Haiti and Expected Casualties,

September 1994

Q15 Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti?

Q18a Regarding the situation in Haiti, how confident are you that the U.S will be able to accomplish its

goals with very few or no American casualties

% Approve % Disapprove N

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table B.6 presents the results of a cross-tabulation of approval or disapproval of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti by party and self-reported consumption of information on Haiti The hypothesis is that the more information about Haiti a respondent was exposed to, the closer his/her position would be to his/her natural, partisan leaders.1

_

1In technical terms, the hypothesis in fact is just the opposite: that support is not related to party and tion, and the test aims to falsify this hypothesis

informa-Table B.6

Cross-Tabulation of Support for Presence of Military Troops in Haiti, Party Affiliation, and

Consumption of Information, September 1994

Q15 Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti?

Q14 As you may know, the military leaders of Haiti have agreed to step down from power by October 15th andPresident Clinton has sent U.S troops into Haiti to enforce this agreement How closely have you been followingthis situation in Haiti?

Republicans: % Approve % Disapprove N

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 0.125 (Republicans), p < 0.024 (Democrats), p < 0.030 (Independents), in a Chi-square test

of independence

The results in the table confirm this result for Democrats—those who were following Haiti most closely were also most likely to follow the president’s lead It also suggests that Independents generally also were following the president’s lead; the results are inconclusive for Republicans, however—there is no clear pattern to Republicans’ response, and as a result, they fail to achieve statistical significance.

Cross-Tabulations of Independent Variables and Party

The beliefs that the United States had security interests (as proxied by the belief that there would be a reduction in the flow of Haitian refugees as a result of U.S involvement in Haiti, Table B.7) or moral interests (as proxied by the belief that Haitians would be better off as a result of the U.S involvement, Table B.8) in Haiti were associated with party, achieving sta- tistically significant results in both cases.

Statistical Results for Haiti 11

Table B.7

Cross-Tabulation of Security Interests in Haiti and Party, September 1994

Q19 Please tell me whether you think each of the following is likely or not likely to happen in Haiti (as a result

of U.S involvement in that country)

b There will be a reduction in the flow of Haitian refugees to the U.S

% Likely % Not Likely N

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 0.0024 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table B.8

Cross-Tabulation of Moral Interests in Haiti and Party, September 1994

Q22 When it comes time for the United States to withdraw its troops from Haiti, do you think the Haitian peoplewill be better off than before the U.S arrived, worse off, or will their situation not have changed?

In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or Independent?

% Better off % Worse off % Not changed N

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Confidence that the United States would achieve its objectives and be able to draw in a few months as planned (Table B.9) and expectations regarding casualties (Table B.10) were also associated with party orientation, with the result statistically significant in both cases; there was not a statistically significant relationship between information con- sumption and party.

with-Table B.9

Cross-Tabulation of Expected Length of the Campaign in Haiti by Party, September 1994

Q18b Regarding the situation in Haiti, how confident are you that most of the U.S troops will be able towithdraw within a few month as planned

In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or Independent?

% Very confident

% Somewhat confident

% Not too confident

% Not at all confident N

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table B.10

Cross-Tabulation of Expected Casualties in Haiti and Party, September 1994

Q18a Regarding the situation in Haiti, how confident are you that the U.S will be able to accomplish its goalswith very few or no American casualties?

In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or Independent?

% Very confident

% Somewhat confident

% Not too confident

% Not at all confident N

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

As shown in Table B.11, news followership was not statistically associated with party.

Statistical Results for Haiti 13

Table B.11

Cross-Tabulation of News Consumption Regarding Haiti and Party, September 1994

Q14 As you may know, the military leaders of Haiti have agreed to step down from power by October 15th andPresident Clinton has sent U.S troops into Haiti to enforce this agreement How closely have you been followingthis situation in Haiti?

In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or Independent?

% Very closely

% Somewhat closely

% Not too closely

SOURCE: Gallup, September 23–25, 1994

NOTE: p < 0.7140 in a Chi-square test of independence

Results of Statistical Modeling

Table B.12 presents the wording of the questions used in our statistical modeling.

Table B.12

Wording of Questions in Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, September 23–25 1994

Support Q15 Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti?

Security interests Q19b Please tell me whether you think each of the following is likely or not likely to happen

in Haiti (as a result of U.S involvement in that country):

There will be a reduction in the flow of Haitian refuges to the U.S

Moral interests Q22 When it comes time for the United States to withdraw its troops from Haiti, do you

think the Haitian people will be better off than before the U.S arrived, worse off, or willtheir situation not have changed?

0-1-2 categorical scale

Prospects Q18b Regarding the situation in Haiti, how confident are you that most of the U.S troops

will be able to withdraw within a few month as planned?

0-1-2-3 categorical scale

Costs Q18a Regarding the situation in Haiti, how confident are you that the U.S will be able to

accomplish its goals with very few or no American casualties?

0-1-2-3 categorical scale

Information Q14 As you may know, the military leaders of Haiti have agreed to step down from power

by October 15th and President Clinton has sent U.S troops into Haiti to enforce thisagreement How closely have you been following this situation in Haiti?

We included all of the covariates (e.g., race, gender, and education) that we believed might also have an effect, in order to be able to claim that the coefficients represent possible change in support keeping all else constant.

Table B.13 presents the results of our “best” model, i.e., the model that used tions that seemed to be the best fit for the concepts of stakes or benefits, prospects for suc- cess, and costs.

ques-Table B.13

Marginal Probability from the Probit Estimates of Approval (Q15)

Variables Change in Probability at Mean Values

Robust standard error in parentheses

As the results in the table suggest, our model was able to correctly classify 75 percent

of the respondents in terms of whether they approved or disapproved of the presence of U.S troops in Haiti, and beliefs in moral and security interests, the prospects for success, casual- ties, and party were all significant in the regression.

The coefficients (the probability of support given an increase in the independent variable) suggest that a belief that the United States had moral or security interests in Haiti and whether the respondent was a member of the president’s party (i.e., Democrat) were the most important factors conditioning whether or not the respondent approved of the presence

of U.S troops in Haiti Next most important were beliefs that the casualties would be low and, finally, that the prospects for success were good.

None of the other variables or interaction effects we tested (e.g., between party and information consumption) in the multivariate model proved significant, and they did not increase the explanatory power of the model.

Statistical Results for Bosnia

Cross-Tabulations of Support and Independent Variables

Our cross-tabulation of support for contributing U.S troops to an international ing force and beliefs that the United States needed to be involved in Bosnia in order to pro- tect its own interests (Table C.1) showed that a belief that the United States had important security interests in Bosnia was associated with support for the U.S troops, with the results statistically significant at the 001 level.

Q4 Do you think the United States needs to be involved in Bosnia in order to protect its own interests, or don’tyou think so?

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

In a similar vein, the belief that the United States had a moral obligation to help keep the peace in Bosnia was associated with support for contributing troops (Table C.2), and the results again were statistically significant at the 001 level.

Q7 Do you think the United States has a moral obligation to help keep the peace in Bosnia, or not?

% Favor % Oppose N

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Support for contributing troops also was positively associated with the belief that the United States had good prospects—as measured by respondents’ confidence in the presi- dent’s ability to handle the situation in Bosnia (Table C.3)—again, at the 001 level of statis- tical significance.

Table C.3

Cross-Tabulation of Support for Military Troops in Bosnia and Confidence in Ability to Handle

Situation (in Percentage and Number of Observation), November 1995

Q2 Now that a peace agreement has been reached by all the groups currently fighting in Bosnia, the Clintonadministration plans to contribute U.S troops to an international peacekeeping force Do you favor or opposethat?

Q5 How confident are you in President Clinton’s ability to handle the situation in Bosnia?

% Favor % Oppose N

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Support also was negatively associated with the belief that the commitment in Bosnia was likely to be a long-term one involving many casualties (see Table C.4), again at the 001 level of significance.

Statistical Results for Bosnia 17

Q9 If the United States sends troops as part of a peacekeeping mission, do you think that is likely to lead to along-term commitment in Bosnia involving many casualties, or not?

% Favor % Oppose N

Yes, likely to lead to long-term commitment 32 58 338

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Support for contributing troops also was associated with individuals’ level of dence regarding their leaders’ ability to handle the situation in Bosnia (Table C.5);2 those who had greater confidence in the president were more inclined to support the policy of in- tervention, and those who had greater confidence in Republican leaders tended to oppose it.

confi-Table C.5

Support for Military Troops in Bosnia by Confidence in Party Leaders, November 1995

Q2 Now that a peace agreement has been reached by all the groups currently fighting in Bosnia, the Clintonadministration plans to contribute U.S troops to an international peacekeeping force Do you favor or opposethat?

Q6 Who do you have more confidence in when it comes to handling the situation in Bosnia: President Clinton orthe Republican leaders in Congress?

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Cross-Tabulations of Independent Variables and Party

The belief that the United States had important stakes in Bosnia, whether in terms of rity interests (Table C.6) or in terms of a moral obligation to help keep the peace (Table C.7), was associated with confidence in party leaders, our proxy for party, and this result was statistically significant.

secu- _

2We use this variable because the poll did not ask respondents to identify their party

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995.

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table C.7

Cross-Tabulation of Beliefs in Moral Obligations by Confidence in Party Leaders (in Percentage and Number of Observation), November 1995

Q7 Do you think the United States has moral obligations to help keep the peace in Bosnia, or not?

Q6 Who do you have more confidence in when it comes to handling the situation in Bosnia: President Clinton orthe Republican leaders in Congress?

Yes, does have moral obligations No, does not N

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

The perceived prospects for success, as measured by confidence in the president’s ability to handle the situation in Bosnia (Table C.8) and the belief that the commitment would be a long-term one with many casualties (Table C.9), were also associated with our proxy for party, and these results were statistically significant.

Statistical Results for Bosnia 19

Table C.8

Cross-Tabulation of Confidence in President’s Ability to Handle Situation in Bosnia by Confidence in Party Leaders (in Percentage and Number of Observations), November 1995

Q5 How confident are you in President Clinton’s ability to handle the situation in Bosnia?

Q6 Who do you have more confidence in when it comes to handling the situation in Bosnia: President Clinton orthe Republican leaders in Congress?

% Very confident

% Somewhat confident

% Not too confident

% Not at all confident N

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Table C.9

Cross-Tabulation of Expected Length of Commitment and Expected Casualties in Bosnia by

Confidence in Party Leaders (in Percentage and Number of Observation), November 1995

Q9 If the United States sends troops as part of a peacekeeping mission, do you think that is likely to lead to along-term commitment in Bosnia involving many casualties, or not?

Q6 Who do you have more confidence in when it comes to handling the situation in Bosnia: President Clinton orthe Republican leaders in Congress?

% Yes, likely to lead to long-term commitment % No, not likely N

SOURCE: Gallup, November 27, 1995

NOTE: p < 001 in a Chi-square test of independence

Results of Statistical Modeling

There were several challenges with this dataset we encountered in estimating a model of port First, the prospects for success were proxied by a question about the president’s ability

sup-to handle situation Moreover, the questionnaire did not ask about party identification, so party was proxied by a question that asked who the respondent had higher confidence in with respect to situation in Bosnia—the President (a Democrat), or members of the Republi- can majority in the Congress The wording of the questions used is presented in Table C.10.

Table C.10

Wording of Question in Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll: Bosnia Speech, November 27, 1995

Support Q2 Now that a peace agreement has been reached by all the groups currently fighting in

Bosnia, the Clinton administration plans to contribute U.S troops to an internationalpeacekeeping force Do you favor or oppose that?

Benefits Q4 Do you think the United States needs to be involved in Bosnia in order to protect its own

interests, or don’t you think so?

Q7 Do you think the United States has moral obligations to help keep the peace in Bosnia, ornot?

Prospects Q5 How confident are you in President Clinton’s ability to handle the situation in Bosnia?Costs Q9 If the United States sends troops as part of a peacekeeping mission, do you think that is

likely to lead to a long-term commitment in Bosnia involving many casualties, or not?

Proxy for party Q6 Who do you have more confidence in when it comes to handling the situation in Bosnia:

President Clinton or the Republican leaders in Congress?

SOURCE: Gallup, October 27, 1995

Notwithstanding these technical issues, the benefits-prospects-costs paradigm proved quite good in explaining covariance patterns in the support for the military campaign in Bosnia: the model correctly predicted over 80 percent of the respondents in terms of whether they favored or opposed contributing U.S troops to an international peacekeeping force in Bosnia (Table C.11); the second column of coefficients is for the full model, while the first column is for the reduced-form model.

From the table we can see that the most important factor in determining support was the perception of security interests, the next most important factor was respondents’ beliefs about whether the costs in casualties were likely to be high, the third was the perception of moral interests, and the fourth was the belief that a successful outcome was likely; although party was a statistically significant predictor on a bivariate basis, it proved not to be signifi- cant in this model, possibly the result of the imperfect proxy we used.

The reduced-form models for Bosnia also suggested that the theoretically important variables were the critical ones: support or opposition to Bosnia could be predicted for 82 percent of the respondents by knowing only their beliefs about the stakes, prospects for suc- cess, and expected costs; including party and information consumption raised it to 83 per- cent.

Statistical Results for Bosnia 21

Education 1 if some college†

0.005 (0.129)

Education 1 if postgraduate†

–0.118 (0.130)Wald Chi-square (Prod > Chi2) 128.06 (0.000) 147.58 (0.000)

Statistical Results for Kosovo

There were two datasets from the Kosovo campaign that asked all of the questions needed to test our model: Pew Research Center, April 15–18, 1999, and Pew Research Center, May 12–16, 1999 The two questionnaires were conducted by the same agency and used consis- tent question wording, which allows us not only to test the model itself, but also to deter- mine how efficiently results from the regression in one dataset can be used to predict support

in the other For each dataset, we first present bivariate tabulations of the main variables used

in the analysis, then the results of the logistic regression analysis.

Cross-Tabulations of Support and Independent Variables

We first present cross tabulations and Chi-square tests of independence of support for ground troops in Kosovo with beliefs about the nature of the stakes involved, the expected length of the campaign, and the expected casualties and financial costs In all cases, the asso- ciation between support and the independent variables was statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

Results in Table D.1 suggest that approval for sending U.S ground troops to Kosovo was systematically associated with the belief that the United States had moral interests in Kosovo; preventing the killing of citizens of Kosovo was seen as an important justification for the campaign and was associated with support in a statistically significant way.