A Shot Across the Bow- Rhode Islands Oil Spill Pollution Prevent

Roger Williams University Law ReviewSpring 1997 A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act Robert E.. 1997 "A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island'

Roger Williams University Law Review

Spring 1997

A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's Oil Spill

Pollution Prevention and Control Act

Robert E Falvey

Roger Williams University School of Law

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Recommended Citation

Falvey, Robert E (1997) "A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act," Roger Williams

University Law Review: Vol 2: Iss 2, Article 6.

Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol2/iss2/6

A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's

Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and

liams established his "Providence Plantations" at the uppermost

portion of Narragansett Bay in 1636,2 Rhode Islanders have madetheir living in, on and around Narragansett Bay and Block IslandSound

The Port of Providence has been a central hub in the flow ofgoods from points around the world to the surrounding New Eng-

land area All manner of natural resources and manufactured

goods including foreign-made cars, lumber, coal, and of course, oil,have coursed through Narragansett Bay on ships bound for Provi-dence and points beyond This extensive vessel traffic has not beenwithout incident Mishaps have been occurring ever since shipshave been using these waterways.3

The now infamous grounding of the tug Scandia and its tow, the barge North Cape, resulted in the worst environmental disas-

ter in Rhode Island's history.4 On Thursday, January 19, 1996,

the Eklof Marine Tug Scandia left Bayonne, New Jersey, towing the Barge North Cape, loaded with four million gallons of No 2

1 Ballard Shipping Co v Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir 1994).

2 William G McLoughlin, Rhode Island, A History 3 (1978).

3 See Bruce Landis, In Previous Marine Oil Spills, RI Was Lucky, Prov J.

BulL, Jan 20, 1996, at A7, available in 1996 WL 6996194.

4 See Tom Mooney, Oil in the Water, One Year Later, Spill Left Scars Time

Can't Wash Away, Prov J Bull., Jan 19, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL

7312002.

364 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

fuel oil, bound for Providence.5 By the time the Scandia reached

Rhode Island's Block Island Sound, the winds were blowing a gale,thirty-five knots and better, with a dense fog and eight foot seas.6The tug caught fire, and the captain lost control of the vessel as itfoundered in heavy seas about five miles south of Point Judith.7The tug and its barge grounded on Moonstone Beach in SouthKingstown, the site of a federal wildlife refuge.8 Gale winds andtwenty foot waves smashed both vessels against the sandy bottomand opened several gashes in the barge's hull.9 In the final tally,

the barge leaked 828,000 gallons of oil onto the beach, into the rounding coastal ponds and into Block Island Sound.10 The spillkilled an estimated one million lobsters and four hundred birds,"-and forced the closing of many square miles of Block Island Sound

sur-to both commercial and recreational fishing, "seriously cripplingthe state's seafood industry."'12

A bill was subsequently introduced in the General Assembly toamend the current law relating to water, navigation and pollutioncontrol, and was signed into law by Governor Lincoln Almond on

August 9, 1996,13 as the Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control

Act.14

The Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act (OSPPCA)

is a comprehensive attempt to prevent future oil spills, to regulatethe equipment, barge construction standards, and personnel used

in the oil barge industry, and to establish a safety committee tomonitor the effectiveness of existing regulations to protect thecoastal environment of the state.:5 Perhaps the most significantprovision of the OSPPCA requires barge owners to use double-

5 Gerald M Carbone, Oil in the Water: The Grounding, Mayday! We are Abandoning!, Prov J Bull., Jan 28, 1996, at B2, available in 1996 WL 6997544.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Peter B Lord, Oil in the Water, One Year Later, Polluters, State Join to

Study Spill's Impact, Prov J Bull., Jan- 21, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL7312403

11 Id.

12 Christopher Rowland, Drawing a Line in the Sand, R-I Toughens

Oil-Barge Rules, Prov J Bull., Aug 10, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 11084591.

13 Id.

14 RI Gen- Laws §§ 46-12.5-.09 to -1, -12.5-5, -12.5-18 to -25 (1996).

15 Explanation by the legislative council of an act relating to waters and igation-oil pollution control S 3304 Subst A (RI 1996).

nav-OIL SPILL POLLUTION PREVENTION

hulled barges in times of bad weather, or to employ an additional

escort tug to ensure safety By the year 2001, the OSPPCA

re-quires that all barges be either of double hull construction or use

an escort tug regardless of weather conditions.'6 These provisions

stand in stark contrast to those of the federal Oil Pollution Act of

1990 (OPA '90), which does not mandate double hulls on all tank

barges until the year 2015.17

While most Rhode Islanders were pleased with the OSPPCA,

the new regulations did not meet with universal approval TheAmerican Waterways Operators (AWO), the largest tugboat lobby-ing group in the country, immediately voiced its objection to thelegislation In particular, the group expressed concern over thedouble hull provisions, now mandated in Rhode Island fourteenyears ahead of the federal schedule Jack Morgan, a spokesman

for the AWO, commented on the OSPPCA: "We're disappointed

that Rhode Island has passed a law that we view as

constitution-ally indefensible The federal government does have, in our

view, jurisdiction over interstate movement of petroleum products,and we think that's the proper place for it to be decided."'

Linda O'Leary, vice president of the AWO, also commented on

the unilateral character of the OSPPCA:

Without some symmetry, it is impossible to operate,

abso-lutely impossible [On most trips, tugs and barges pass

through several different states It would be technically, erationally and financially impossible to comply with a differ-

op-ent set of laws for each state] If you can't comply with

Rhode Island law, how can you leave New York with a laden tank barge?'9

fully-This Comment will assess the constitutionality of Rhode

Is-land's new Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act in light

of the concerns raised Part I will explore and explain the

perti-nent sections of the OSPPCA Part H will explore the relationship

between the state and federal power to regulate commerce betweenthe states, particularly in the maritime area Part III will explorethe preemption doctrine and analyze the conflicts between federal

16 R.I Gen Laws § 46-12.5-24(b) (1996) (emphasis added).

17 46 U.S.C § 3703(a) (1994).

18 Rowland, supra note 12, at Al.

19 Elizabeth Abbott, Oil in the Water, One Year Later, Spill Produces Flurry

of New Barge, Tug Regulations, Prov J Bull-, Jan 20, 1997, at Al, available in

1997 WL 7312266.

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366 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

and state oil pollution schemes This Comment will conclude thatthe Rhode Island Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act is

a constitutionally indefensible, albeit well-intentioned, exercise ofRhode Island's police power, used in an effort to protect a vital nat-ural resource and economic base in the face of anemic and stalledfederal efforts

I THE Ou SpiLL POLLUILON PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT

The OSPPCA is divided into five separate sections, each dressing a different concern The OSPPCA contains several com-mon and unremarkable sections such as a definitions section,20 anoil discharge reporting section,2 1 and a section establishing theNarragansett Bay/Rhode Island Sound Safety Committee.2 2 Morepertinent for this discussion are the provisions which have beentargeted by critics of the OSPPCA and described as potentially un-constitutional.23 A brief description of these sections follows.The "Personnel Policies" section regulates the personnel re-quired on tugs and tank barges, their qualifications and duties,and in particular, the requirements and manner of drug and alco-hol testing.2 4 This section generally proscribes the use or con-sumption of any alcoholic beverage or illicit drug by personnel on atank vessel

ad-The OSPPCA imposes added personnel requirements for tankbarges operating in coastal waters Specifically, the OSPPCA re-quires that two personnel man any tank barge while it is in RhodeIsland waters, whether underway or at anchor This section is sig-nificant because it requires crew members to be aboard the towedbarge at all times, where none were required before The lack of acrewman onboard who may have been able to set an anchor wasspecifically condemned as a contributing factor in the grounding of

the barge North Cape by Dennis W Nixon, a maritime lawyer,

pro-fessor and director of the University of Rhode Island's graduateprogram in marine affairs According to Nixon, speaking at a Sen-ate commission hearing on preventing future oil spills, the GeneralAssembly should require all oil barges entering Rhode Island wa-

20 R.I Gen Laws § 46-12.5-1 (1996).

21 Id § 46-12.5-5.

22 Id § 46-12.5-25.

23 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.

24 R.I Gen- Laws § 46-12.5-18.

OIL SPILL POLLUTION PREVENTION

ters'to be manned with at least two crew members and equippedwith a workable anchor Nixon further commented that Eklofs twomain competitors in Rhode Island already use crew men, and ad-

ded "[e]ven Eklof operates [with] them, but apparently not in

Rhode Island."25

The most significant portions of the OSPPCA are those

man-dating equipment and design features which supersede those

re-quired by the federal OPA '90 In particular, the OSPPCA requires the owner or operator of a tank barge to equip vessels with func-

tioning radar,2 6 Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers,2 7 both

a magnetic and a gyrocompass,2 8 two VHF radios,29 functioning

automated fire and flooding detection systems,3 0 and deployable anchoring equipment which can be activated by a crewmember on the barge, or another means of retrieving a lost tow.3'The signature portion of the OSPPCA is the section requiringdouble-hulled barges to be used in Rhode Island waters That sec-tion requires that:

manually-Effective June 1, 1997, no tank vessel shall transport oil or

hazardous material on or over waters of the state, in tions of limited visibility unless the tank vessel (i) has adouble hull or (ii) is accompanied by a tugboat escort.3 2 Effec-

condi-tive January 1, 2001, no tank vessel shall transport oil or

hazardous material over the waters of this state in any

condi-tions unless the tank vessel (i) has a double hull or (ii) is

ac-companied by a tugboat escort.3 3

25 Tom Mooney, Senate Commission Opens Hearings on Preventing Spills, Prov J Bull., Feb 3, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 6998404.

26 PhI Gen Laws § 46-12.5-23(l)(a).

27 Id § 46-12.5-23(1)(b) GPS receivers allow for an extremely accurate fix of

a vessel's position by receiving signals from several specialized satellites which are

then processed through a microcomputer to indicate the exact latitude and tude of the vessel.

368 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

The movement to require double hulls or double sides3 4 in thiscountry has been a long and turbulent one.3 5 Although Congress

finally adopted rules requiring double hulls by the year 2015,36

the Coast Guard had been reluctant to impose similar regulations

of its own accord.37 The culmination of that struggle has been scribed as follows:

de-The technology required to build tankers with double hulls(or related designs such as double bottoms and/or sides) isneither new nor especially complex But, despite essentiallyuncontradicted evidence that double hulls would prevent or

at least reduce the severity of some oil spills followinggrounding or collision, the Coast Guard, encouraged bytanker industry representatives, has steadfastly refused to

institute this requirement Following the Exxon Valdez

spill, lawmakers attempted to address both aspects of theproblem-prevention of accidents and prevention of the re-sulting pollution-in a single, lengthy statute, The Oil Pollu-tion Act of 1990 (OPA) One provision of the new legislationrequires double hull ships (or their equivalent) to be phased

in over a period of twenty-five years.3 8

The adoption by the Rhode Island legislature of double hull dates for tank vessels3s is therefore significant, and reflects thefrustration over the inaction of the federal government, coupledwith the anger over the recent catastrophic destruction of a portion

man-of Rhode Island's primary resource

The major issue presented by the new regulations is whetherthe State of Rhode Island may constitutionally supersede the au-thority of the federal government in regulating commerce and mar-itime affairs in light of the implications of preemption and the

34 A double-hulled vessel has one complete hull inside another, providing

maximum protection from groundings or collisions A double-bottomed vessel has

a double layer on the bottom only, providing extra protection from groundings, but

not collisions with other ships or objects above the water line A double-sided

ves-sel has a double layer on the sides, providing protection from collisions, but not groundings.

35 See generally Tammy A Alcock, "Ecology Tankers" and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A History of Efforts to Require Double Hulls on Oil Tankers, 19 Ecology

OIL SPILL POLLUTION PREVENTION

Supremacy Clause, and the plenary authority of the federal ernment in admiralty matters

gov-II THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL PowER

A reviewing court might take either of two lines of analyses, orboth, to analyze any act of Congress relating to the regulation ofmaritime commerce The first is Congress's constitutional power

to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.40 The second isCongress's traditional authority to legislate in the maritime andadmiralty spheres.4 1 It is difficult to follow one of these lines ofanalyses without straying into the other, and back again It hasbeen observed that although "the scope of the maritime law andthat of commercial regulation are not coterminous, the latter em-braces the greater part of all that the former comprehends."4 2

A detailed examination of both analyses reveals that the nary power to regulate and determine the uniform maritime law isvested in the Congress, with some limited legislative power left tothe states only in certain, prescribed situations

1 Congressional Commerce Clause Power

Congress's power to regulate commerce is firmly rooted in theConstitution and American jurisprudence.4 3 The CommerceClause" gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with

foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian

Tribes."4"

A historical review clearly illustrates the need for

comprehen-sive and plenary powers to be vested in the Congress Commerce

in the Colonies was carried on without any significant problemsdue to the controlling forces of England and the colonial gover-nors.46 Following the ratification of the Articles of Confederation,

40 U.S Const art I, § 8, cl 3.

41 Id- at art EI, § 2 For a discussion on congressional Admiralty Power, see

infra Part II.B.

42 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 109, at 7-20 (7th ed 1996)

43 U.S Const art I, § 8, cl 3.

44 Id.

45 Id (emphasis added).

46 John E Nowak & Ronald D Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 4.3, at 137 (5th ed 1995).

370 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

problems between the states quickly developed in the commercialarea.47 The new states specifically denied the central governmentany control over commerce, fearing discriminatory restrictions in-fluenced by conflicting commercial interests.48 As a result, thelack of centralized authority led to "economic chaos" under the Ar-ticles.4 9 In addition to the serious loss of trade with Great Britainand other international concerns, the individual states began set-ting trade barriers among themselves by imposing economic sanc-tions and significant tariffs on goods destined for other states.50This predicament led many political leaders to fear that economicwarfare might bring a dissolution of the nation.5'

The economic balkanization of the states was a prime force forthe calling of the Constitutional Convention in May 1787.52 Theneed for a single, unifying control of interstate commerce was aleading factor in the launching of the Constitutional Convention,and the need was so apparent that it was not even debated at themeeting.5 3

Early in this nation's history the power of Congress to regulate

commerce was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v.

power against New York's power to grant a monopoly to a ship operator running between New York and New Jersey ChiefJustice Marshall interpreted the power to regulate commerce inthe following manner: "It is the power to regulate; that is, to pre-

steam-scribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed This power,

like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be ercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,other than are prescribed in the constitution."55

ex-Describing the sole authority of Congress to regulate

inter-state commerce, Chief Justice Marshall continued: "Hf, as has

al-ways been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited

to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over

1997] OIL SPILL POLLUTION PREVENTION

commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, isvested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single govern-ment."5 6 The authority of Congress to legislate pursuant to the

Commerce Clause has been continually upheld by the Court in the

years since, with almost no exception.5 7

2 Admiralty Jurisdiction

There is no specific constitutional provision conferring on gress the power to legislate generally with regard to maritime oradmiralty matters,5 8 although the Constitution does confer exclu-sive admiralty jurisdiction on the federal courts.5 9 This clause hasbeen interpreted to extend the legislative power of Congress "to ju-

Con-risdictional and procedural matters, and to substantive admiralty

law." 6 0 This power was firmly established in Southern Pacific Co.

Compensa-tion Act for conflicting with the general maritime law under article

HI, section 2 of the Constitution.6 2 In considering the power ofCongress to legislate in the maritime area, Justice McReynolds ob-served first that:

56 Id at 197.

57 See generally C & A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S 383

(1994); West Lynn Creamery, Inc v Healy, 512 U.S 186 (1994); Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 U.S 298 (1992); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 467 U.S 354 (1984); Kassel v Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S 662 (1981); Reeves, Inc v Stake, 447 U.S 429 (1980); Hughes v Oklahoma, 441 U.S 322 (1979); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc v United States, 371 U.S 156 (1962); Huron Portland Cement Co v City of Detroit, 362 U.S 440 (1960); Bibb v Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S 520 (1959); Castle v Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S 61 (1954); American Trucking Ass'n v United States, 344 U.S 298 (1953); South Buffalo Ry v Ahern, 344 U.S 367 (1953); United States v Great Northern Ry., 343 U.S 562 (1952); Dean Milk Co v City of Madison, 340 U.S 349 (1951); H.P Hood & Sons, Inc v DuMond, 336 U.S 525 (1949); Southern Pac Co v Arizona, 325 U.S 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.

Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S 177 (1938) But see United States v Lopez, 115 S Ct.

1624 (1995) (holding that Congress did not have the power to enact Gun-Free

School Zones Act which made it a federal offense for an individual to possess a firearm within a school zone, due to the lack of a jurisdictional nexus to any eco- nomic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).

58 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 109, at 7-18 (7th ed 1996).

59 U.S Const art II, § 2 'The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, and to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction " Id

60 2 Am Jur 2d Admiralty § 6 (1994) (emphasis added).

61 244 U.S 205 (1917).

62 Id at 212.

372 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

Article III, § 2, of the Constitution, extends the judicial power

of the United States "To all cases of admiralty and maritimejurisdiction;" and Article I, § 8, confers upon the Congresspower "to make all laws which shall be necessary and properfor carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all otherpowers vested by this Constitution in the government of theUnited States or in any department or officer thereof."

He went on to conclude that: "Considering our former opinions, itmust now be accepted as settled doctrine that, in consequence of

these provisions, Congress has paramount power to fix and

deter-mine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country." 6 3

In Panama Railroad v Johnson,6 a shipping company had

been sued for negligence by an injured seaman under a federal

em-ployer's liability act.6 5 The defendant argued that the statute,

which incorpiorated other federal statutes pertaining to railwayemployees, could not be applied in the admiralty context.66 JusticeVan Devanter began his analysis by referring to the purpose andscope of the constitutional provision as reflected in prior decisions:

As there could be no cases of "admiralty and maritime diction," in the absence of some maritime law under whichthey could arise, the provision presupposes the existence inthe United States of a law of that character Such a law or

juris-system of law existed in Colonial times The framers of

the Constitution were familiar with that system and ceeded with it in mind Their purpose was not to strike down

pro-or abrogate the system, but to place the entire subject-its

substantive as well as its procedural features-under national

control because of its intimate relation to navigation and tointerstate and foreign commerce In pursuance of that pur-pose the constitutional provision was framed and adopted.Although containing no express grant of legislative powerover the substantive law, the provision was regarded from thebeginning as implicitly investing such power in the UnitedStates subject to power in Congress to alter, qualify or

63 Id at 214-15 (emphasis added).

64 264 U.S 375 (1924).

65 Id at 382 (citing The Act of March 4, 1915, § 20, c 153, 38 Stat 1185, as amended by the Act of June 5, 1920, § 33, c 250, 41 Stat 1007).

66 Id at 385.

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supplement it as experience or changing conditions mightrequire.6 7

The Jensen Court was concerned with the balance of power

be-tween the federal government and the State of New York, both of

whom were regulating within the same subject area.68 In mining just how far a state may regulate within the admiralty con-text, the Court determined the fact "[t]hat this may be done tosome extent cannot be denied Equally well established is therule that state statutes may not contravene an applicable act ofCongress or affect the general maritime law beyond certain lim-its."6 9

deter-The Court then issued its widely quoted maxim concerningstate regulatory powers in this area:

And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it

contra-venes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or

works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate

relations.70

The Jensen doctrine has survived to date, albeit with some

dis-sension, doubt or limitation,7 1 and was reiterated in the recent

case, American Dredging Co v Miller 72 In that case, the SupremeCourt dealt with the question of whether the doctrine of forum nonconveniens is "either a 'characteristic feature' of admiralty or adoctrine whose uniform application is necessary to maintain the'proper harmony' of maritime law."73 The Court determined that,

because "the doctrine of forum non conveniens neither originated

67 Id- at 385-86 (emphasis added).

68 Southern Pac Co v Jensen, 244 U.S 205, 209 (1917).

69 Id at 216.

70 IM (emphasis added).

71 See generally Ceres Terminals, Inc v Industrial Comm'n, 53 F.3d 183(7th Cir 1995) (doubting that Jensen can determine the jurisdiction of state courts);

Ballard Shipping Co v Beach Shelfish, 32 F.3d 623 (1st Cir 1994) (third party

may pursue purely economic damages following an oil spill on navigable waters);

Carey v Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201 (1st Cir 1988) (states can still

exer-cise some jurisdiction in maritime affairs not infringing on a uniform aspect of

admiralty); Slaven v BP America, Inc., 786 F Supp 853 (C.D Cal 1992) (state

may pursue damages for economic injury following an oil spill without physical

injury); Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp v Lathey, 380 S.E.2d 665 (Va 1989) (injured maritime worker may receive state worker's compensation damages

in a shoreside vessel accident).

72 510 U.S 443 (1994).

73 Id at 447.

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374 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

in admiralty nor has exclusive application there . Louisiana'srefusal to apply forum non conveniens does not work 'materialprejudice to [a] characteristic featur[e] of the general maritime

law."7 4

The American Dredging Court went on to discuss the need for

uniformity in the maritime field.75 Citing Knickerbocker Ice Co v Stewart, 7 6 the Court recounted its earlier decision in which it heldthat Congress could not allow the states to implement their ownworkers' compensation statutes affecting injuries occurring in themaritime context, because such a sanction would destroy the con-stitutionally prescribed uniformity required in the admiraltyfield.7 7 In Knickerbocker, Justice McReynolds commented on the

constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to Congress and

con-cluded that it was nondelegable by nature to ensure uniformity

and harmony in one system of regulation.7 8

In American Dredging, Justice Scalia recognized that the

re-quirement of uniformity was not absolute, but that "it would bedifficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the

general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by

state legislation."7 9

Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's doubts, Romero v

this regard The Supreme Court was concerned with a tort claim,under the Jones Act8' and the general maritime law, of a Spanishseaman injured on a Spanish ship while in the Port of New York.8 2

In determining the jurisdictional question, the Court commented

on the power of the states to legislate in the admiralty context: "It

74 Id at 450 (quoting Southern Pac Co v Jensen, 244 U.S 205,216 (1917)).

75 Id at 449.

76 253 U.S 149 (1920).

77 American Dredging, 510 U.S at 449.

78 The subject was intrusted to it to be dealt with according to its tion-not for delegation to others Moreover, such an authorization would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the Constitu- tion not only contemplated, but actually established-it would defeat the very purpose of the grant Congress cannot transfer its legislative

discre-power to the states-by nature this is nondelegable.

Knickerbocker, 253 U.S at 164 (emphasis added).

79 American Dredging, 510 U.S at 448 (citing Jensen, 244 U.S at 216).

80 358 U.S 354 (1959).

81 46 U.S.C.A § 688 (1920).

82 Romero, 358 U.S at 356.

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is true that state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federalmaritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious sys-tem But this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope."8 3The opinion listed several instances of constitutional exercises ofstate power in the maritime field84 including: state remedies forwrongful death and survival actions,8 5 state rules for the partitionand sale of ships,8 6 state laws governing the specific performance

of arbitration agreements,8 7 and state laws regulating the effect of

a breach of warranty under contracts of marine insurance.""These examples of state action have all been upheld as constitu-

tional The Court in Romero was careful, however, to point out

that these valid exercises of state power "have been accepted asrules of decision in admiralty cases, even, at times, when they con-

flicted with a rule of maritime law which did not require

OSPPCA are far more intrusive than those here mentioned, andinterrupt the orderly flow of commerce required by an unvaryingnational scheme, which by its nature requires uniformity fromstate to state, and along all the coasts of this country

B The Police Power of the States

The power of the individual states to legislate within the cise of their inherent police powers,9 0 in both the admiralty andcommerce clause contexts, has also been clearly established

exer-In Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the states

still have the power to affect commerce as an incidence of their

in-83 Id at 373.

84 Id.

85 Id (citing Old Dominion S.S v Primus Gilmore, 207 U.S 398 (1907),

Western Fuel Co v Garcia, 257 U.S 233 (1921); Just v Chambers, 312 U.S 383

(1941)).

86 Id (citing Madruga v Superior Court, 346 U.S 556 (1954)).

87 Id- (citing Red Cross Line v Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S 109 (1924)).

88 Id (citing Wilburn Boat Co v Fireman's Fund Ins Co., 348 U.S 310

(1955)).

89 Id at 373-74 (emphasis added).

90 An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment, U.S Const., upon the individual states, and in turn, delegated to local governments, through which they are enabled to adopt such laws and regulations as tend to secure generally the com- fort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens

Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (6th ed 1990).

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376 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

herent police power to regulate Marshall described these powersas:

[T]hat immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to thegeneral government: all which can be most advantageouslyexercised by the States themselves Inspection laws, quaran-tine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws forregulating the internal commerce of a State, and those whichrespect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts ofthis mass.9 1

The police power concept was relied upon in Willson v

Dela-ware to erect a dam which impeded the passage of an otherwisenavigable stream to prevent the spread of disease from "[olne of

those sluggish reptile streams, that do not run but creep, and

spreads its venom, and destroys the health of all those who

inhabit its marshes."9 3 The defendants in that case were the

own-ers of a sloop, the Sally, who broke the dam in order to navigate

the creek.94 The Court upheld the right of the dam owners, porated by an act of the general assembly of Delaware, to block thedam in order to improve the public health, and reasoned that itwas a valid exercise of state police power, the effect on commercenotwithstanding.9 5

incor-A line of cases relevant for this discussion is based on the culiarly local concern"9 6 or the "maritime but local" doctrines.9 7These lines of reasoning hold that, where the subject matter of aparticular regulation "is such as to leave no doubt of the superiorfitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of differentsystems of regulation, drawn from local knowledge and experience,and conformed to local wants,"95 then one, uniform national rule isnot required, and some state regulation is allowable

"pe-91 Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).

92 27 U.S (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).

93 Id at 252.

94 Id at 246.

95 Id at 245-46.

96 See Cooley v Board of Wardens, 53 U.S (12 How.) 299 (1851).

97 See Wilburn Boat Co v Fireman's Fund Ins Co., 348 U.S 310 (1955).

98 Cooley, 53 U.S at 320.

OIL SPILL POLLUTION PREVENTION

In Cooley v Board of Wardens, 9 9 the Supreme Court ruledthat the local pilotage law of the Port of Philadelphia, although aregulation of navigation, and therefore of commerce, 0 0

was a stitutional exercise of state power.10 The Court recognized thatsome regulations were of necessity local in nature, and the directcontrol of pilotage regulations and requirements in the innumera-ble ports and harbors of the United States by Congress was im-practical and "best provided for, not by one system, or plan ofregulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the sev-eral States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of theports within their limits."10 2 The Court was careful in Cooley,

con-however, to limit its holding to "the precise questions we arecalled on to decide,"' 03-the state regulation of local pilots TheCourt did not purport to decide the larger question of just how farthe states may regulate commerce in the absence of federal legisla-tion on the same subject, or to the extent that Congress may specif-ically prohibit state action.104

The somewhat related "maritime but local doctrine" was

enun-ciated in Wilburn Boat Co., v Fireman's Fund Insurance Co - 0 5 In

that case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine achoice of law question involving a marine insurance contract 0 6 Ahouseboat owned by the plaintiff Wilburn Boat Company had beenmoored on a man-made lake bordered by the states of Texas andOklahoma The boat caught fire and was destroyed, and the de-fendant insurance company refused to pay for the loss, citing abreach of several contract provisions Under Texas law, thebreach, which did not contribute to the loss, would have been im-material.'0 7 Under federal admiralty jurisdiction, however, anybreach of a maritime contract would bar recovery.'0 8

The Courtlooked to "the essentially localized incidence of the transaction"0 9

and concluded that "the interests concerned with shipping in its

378 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

national and international aspects are substantially unconcernedwith the rules of law to be applied to such limited situations."1 10

Wilburn Boat provides a clear example of a case where uniformity

is not required in the maritime field, and one arguably at the site end of the spectrum from interstate shipping navigationalrules and vessel construction standards

oppo-In the more recent case of Huron Portland Cement Co v City

of Detroit, 11 1 the Supreme Court upheld the power of the city toenforce a local smoke abatement ordinance, as applied to ships op-erating in interstate commerce, as a valid exercise of the state'spolice power.1 2 The appellants were the corporate owners of twovessels which used coal-fired boilers for propulsion.1 13 When theships were docked at piers located within the Detroit city limits,the boilers emitted smoke which exceeded in density and durationthe smoke abatement laws of Detroit."x4 Criminal proceedingswere instituted by the city against the ship owners and two of theirofficers for violations of the smoke abatement law.1 5 The shipowners challenged the authority of the city to apply the smokeabatement law to them on two grounds."16 First, the appellantsargued that Detroit may not impose additional standards becausethe ships were inspected and licensed by the United States CoastGuard in accordance with the mandates of Congress 1 7 Second,the appellants argued that the city ordinance "materially affectsinterstate commerce in matters where uniformity is necessary.""8s

According to Justice Stewart, evenhanded local legislation toeffect "a legitimate local public interest is valid unless pre-empted

by federal action, or unduly burdensome on maritime activities

or interstate commerce.""19 Although the analysis of any specific

state regulation is necessarily fact intensive, in Huron, the Court

found that the Detroit ordinance did not conflict with federal spection laws,'20 and was not an undue burden on commerce It is

OIL SPILL POLLUTION PREVENTION

important to note that the Court further defined the analysis andconcluded "[a] state may not impose a burden which materially

affects interstate commerce in an area where uniformity of

regula-tion is necessary." 12 1 Huron is significant because it provides the

framework upon which the basic limitations upon local legislativeaction in this area may be evaluated.122

C Preemption Under the Admiralty and Maritime Doctrines

The operative question for this analysis is whether Rhode

Is-land's OSPPCA "contravenes the essential purpose expressed by

an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the tic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with theproper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international andinterstate relations."12 3

characteris-An analysis under the admiralty context is even less forgivingfor state regulation than that under Commerce Clause theory The

ruling in Jensen clearly requires uniformity in maritime and

shipping regulations, even with regard to state workmen's sation statutes Congress, through the Department of Transporta-tion and the Coast Guard, has promulgated a compendium ofregulations governing shipping'24 and navigation 2 5 which providefor a uniform and predictable national system, free from interrup-

compen-tion by the various rules of the several coastal states, and the

QSPPCA would only serve to frustrate this goal In addition, it is

clear that the regulations at issue, in practical effect, concern theentire East Coast shipping industry, and not some entirely isolated

area Therefore, the "maritime but local doctrine" of Wilburn

Boat 126 cannot save the OSPPCA.

Furthermore, a serious question regarding the ability of gress to delegate any authority to the states concerning maritime

Con-regulation was raised by the holding in Knickerbocker This

con-cern was laid to rest only in the context of spill liability regulations

121 Id at 444 (emphasis added) (citing Hal v DeCuir, 95 U.S 485 (1877);

Southern Pac Co v Arizona, 325 U.S 761 (1945); Bibb v Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S 520 (1959)).

380 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 2:363

by the holding in Askew v American Waterways Operators, Inc 127

Askew concerned an action by barge owners and shipping

compa-nies seeking to enjoin the application of Florida's Oil Spill tion and Control Act.'28 The Florida act is similar in scope andpurpose to Rhode Island's Environmental Injury CompensationAct'2 9 and imposes strict liability for damage caused by oil spillagefrom ships or transport facilities.'3 0 The ship owners argued that

Preven-Florida's act had been preempted by enactment of the federal

Water Quality Improvement Act'3' which was a predecessor to

OPA '90 and contained a non-preemption clause similar to the one

in OPA '90 section 1018.

The Supreme Court upheld the Florida Act, holding that bothacts were intended to cover separate spheres of concern, and didnot conflict in any way The Florida Act covered only liability con-cerns, similar to Rhode Island's Environmental Injury Compensa-tion Act The Florida Act did not, however, contain anyregulations concerning operational or navigational requirements

Askew should therefore reinforce the constitutionality only of the

liability aspects of the Rhode Island legislation, and should be fined to its facts

con-III COMwVERCE CLAUSE PREEM ON ANALYsIs

The powers of Congress and the individual states to legislateare plenary in their respective spheres However, the two can, and

do, conflict Generally speaking, the Supremacy Clause dictates

that in a direct conflict between a state and a federal regulation,

the federal legislation prevails.'3 2 A leading commentator has scribed the underlying rationale of the doctrine: "Despite the diver-sity of preemption problems, the underlying constitutional

de-127 411 U.S 325 (1973).

128 Fla Stat Ann §§ 376.011 to -.17, 19 to -.21 (West 1997).

129 R.I Gen Laws §§ 46-12.3-1 to -8 (1996).

130 Askew, 411 U.S at 327.

131 Id at 328 (citing Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat 91, 33

U.S.C § 1161 (1970)).

132 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be

made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law

of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding

U.S Const art VI, § 2.

OIL SPILL POLLUTION PREVENTION

principles have a common end: to avoid conflicting regulation of

conduct by various official bodies that might have some authority

over the subject matter."13 3

The analysis of a federal preemption'- 4 question begins withthe determination of whether Congress has specifically acted in acertain area, or whether it has not acted, leaving the area open tothe states under the so-called "dormant commerce clause."135When Congress has specifically legislated in a given area, the task

of the courts is to ascertain the extent that Congress intended its

legislation to encompass The traditional preemption tests used by

the Court were first formulated in Hines v Davidowitz l 3 6 TheCourt enunciated the rule that "the test is whether, under the cir-cumstances of a particular case, the state law 'stands as an obsta-

cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress."1 37

More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated its test for mining whether a state statute or regulatory scheme will be pre-

deter-empted by federal legislation In Pacific Gas & Electric Co v State

Supreme Court assessed a challenge by Pacific Gas that certain

sections of California's Warren-Alquist State Energy ResourcesConservation and Development Act,'3 9 dealing with the construc-

tion of nuclear power plants, were preempted by the federal Atomic

Energy Act of 1954.140 The Court succinctly stated the analyticalframework to be used in determining any preemption question

133 Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 46, § 9.1, at 320 (citing Amalgamated Ass'n

of St., Electric Ry & Motor Coach Employees of America v Lockridge, 403 U.S.

274 (1971)).

134 'Federal Pre-emption The U.S Constitution and acts of Congress have

given to the federal government exclusive power over certain matters such as terstate commerce and sedition to the exclusion of state jurisdiction Occurs where federal law so occupies the field that state courts are prevented from asserting jurisdiction." Black's Law Dictionary 612 (6th ed 1990).

in-135 "When the Court seeks to decide the extent of permissible state regulation

in light of a dormant commerce clause power, it is in effect attempting to interpret

the meaning of Congressional silence." Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 46, § 8.1, at

139 Id at 194 (citing Cal Pub Res Code §§ 25524.1(b), 2 (West 1977)).

140 Id (citing 42 U.S.C § 2011 et seq.).

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