The Identification of Problems in Agricultural Economics Research

The latest attempts at identifying problems are those made by the members of a subcommittee of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Agricultural Economics which appeared in

The Identification of Problems in Agricultural Economics Research

Author(s): A N Halter

Source: Journal of Farm Economics , Dec., 1960, Vol 42, No 5, Proceedings of the

Annual Meeting of the American Farm Economic Association (Dec., 1960), pp 1459-1471 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural & Applied

Economics Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1235709

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access to Journal of Farm Economics

CHAIRMAN: JOHN M BREWSTEm, AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA THE IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURAL

ECONOMICS RESEARCH*

A N HALTER University of Kentucky

THE MOST important mental requirements for doing successful search are curiosity and love of research One of the main incentives

for research is the desire to win the esteem of one's associates The chief

reward from research is the thrill of discovery Thus at the start, the task

of identifying a workable problem appears to be a rather drab

site to research However, in agricultural economics we have been

blessed with scholars who are willing to identify the problems to which they feel the members of the profession should orientate their research

efforts The latest attempts at identifying problems are those made by

the members of a subcommittee of the Social Science Research Council

Committee on Agricultural Economics which appeared in the August,

1959, issue of the Journal.1 Thus in regard to formulating problems my

paper comes after the "final curtain." Hence, I will venture to go behind

the "scenes" and try to report to the audience what I interpret has gone

on "backstage." In reporting on the "backstage" activities you understand

that I didn't see any of the "dress rehearsals" nor have I talked to

bers of the production personally

Any "backstage" has immovable fixtures which serve for many plays

and different actors Likewise in the identification of problems there are

some immovable points of view which give rise to particular kinds of

problems Hence in this paper I will first present a heuristic device for

examining most points of view This device will serve the useful purpose

of (1) classifying problems and (2) making explicit where "short circuits"

of facts and "frayed ropes" of theory can give rise to pseudo-problems

Second, I will attempt to show how the problems that the subcommittee

* The author would like to acknowledge the advice of P R Johnson, H H Jack

and J W Hubbard in preparing this paper However, I am fully responsible for the

inadequacies that remain.

'George K Brinegar, Kenneth L Bachman, and Herman M Southworth,

tations in Research in Agricultural Economics," J Farm Econ., 41:600-19 (Aug

1959) One can rarely pick up a research paper or peer into the Journal without seeing

a mass of problems in the process of being identified This paper is not intended to

be a review of that literature.

1459

A N HALTER

has identified can be examined with this device Finally, I will present a

point of view which I believe clarifies certain issues and provides a new

way of approaching research problems in agricultural economics

Device for Depicting Points of View First consider the realm of the facts, that collection of actual

ings which everyone can experience Let us divide this collection into at

least two parts, social and physical (natural) and represent them

matically by two intersecting elipses Call the left one SF denoting social

facts and the right one PF for physical (natural) facts Now if your point

SF X X PXF

of view tells you there are particular kinds of facts, then you designate

such by putting a cross (X) in the appropriate place For example, I

lieve there are both kinds of facts, hence, I would place a cross in each

lune A cross (X) in the intersection (the lens) would imply that there are

some SF which are also PF However, cross hatching the lens means that

there are no SF which are PF.2 Leaving the lens or lune blank means that

the proponents of the point of view make no commitment regarding the

existence or nonexistence of these kinds of facts

Second, consider the interpretation placed upon facts or what will be

called the domain of theory Let us divide this domain into three parts:

(1) Social or societal theory, (2) Physical or natural theory and (3)

mative theory These can be represented as three intersecting elipses

Call the left one ST for societal theory, which includes propositions in

sT N!

only the indicative mood describing and explaining social facts The middle ellipse, labeled PT for physical theory, consists of propositions

also in the indicative mood that describe and explain physical or natural

2 Crosshatching a lune implies there are no such facts.

1460

facts Finally, the remaining ellipse, denoted as NT for normative theory, consists of propositions in the indicative and the imperative moods which state either what the ends of individuals and society are or what they

should be.3 Now the intersection between ST and NT can:

(1) contain a cross (X) implying that the particular societal theory siders existing ends necessary for describing and explaining social facts (These propositions are in the indicative mood.)

(2) be cross-hatched implying that existing ends are not necessary for describing and explaining SF

(3) be blank Either case (2) or (3) combined with a cross (X) in the lune of NT implies that the normative theory states propositions in only the imperative mood The intersection of PT and NT can be given a lar interpretation The intersection of PT and ST are those propositions

in the indicative mood which describe and explain SF and/or PF The intersection of ST, PT, and NT are those propositions in the indicative mood which use existing ends in describing and explaining SF and/or PF Understand that only the intersection with NT contains propositions in the indicative mood, the lune of NT contains only propositions in the perative mood

Thirdly, let us consider the region of metaphysics which can be sented by one ellipse containing those propositions taken for granted fore the physical and/or societal theories can explain SF and PF or before normative theory can prescribe ends.4 To show the relation between this ellipse and the other two sets, let us construct as in Diagram I a hierarchy

of order between them Thus metaphysics is of the highest order, lowed by theory with facts at the bottom The relation of each level to the other two can be indicated by sets of directed lines (arrows indicate direction of relation) Between the metaphysical and theoretical levels lines labeled P for the presupposing relations can be indicated to nect the presuppositions with the theory Between the theoretical and the factual levels, lines can be drawn (labeled E in Diagram I) which denote the methodological relation of explaining.5

Finally a fourth level can be indicated between the levels of theory and fact by an ellipse which denotes those propositions of technology, i.e., those of medicine, engineering, and, depending upon your point of view, agricultural economics The lines labeled C between any theory and technology imply a contributory relation, i.e., technology may use

8 Indicative pertains to that mood of the verb which represents a concern with an objective fact Imperative pertains to that mood which is expressive of a command. 'Cf A N Halter, "A Metaphysical Hypothesis," J Farm Econ., 40:1871-74 (Dec 1958)

The arrow on the line labeled E on the diagram denotes direction(s) of the lation(s), here induction and deduction.

A N HALTE

Metaphysical

Level

Level

Theore

Technological

Level

tSF ( PF 3 Factual

Level

DIAGRAM 1 DEVICE FOR DEPICTING POINTS OF VIEW.

sitions of ST and/or PT in the indicative mood with propositions of NT

in the imperative mood to derive propositions which can influence the social facts-SF Hence a line labeled I between technology and SF plies an influence relation, i.e., technology changes SF

Now in constructing this hierarchy a means for classifying problems for research can be evolved Thus the four levels provide four kinds of problems: (1) metaphysical, (2) theoretical, (3) practical or technological and (4) factual Transition between the levels involves a chain of ological problems Thus each line between the levels implies a particular set of methodological problems, e.g., the E relations imply the logical problems of science, the I relations imply the problems of method

in teaching, preaching and "politicking."6

The P relations between social or physical and metaphysics imply the problems that philosophy of science study and the C relations imply the technical problems of

crafts, e.g linear programming in current usage.

1462

Now that the structure for picturing a point of view has been

oped let us apply it to a particular one and see what it shows The

committee referred to earlier stated their belief that F S C Northrop's

(The) Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities provides a "frame of

reference" for analyzing the intellectual efforts of agricultural

mists.7 Therefore, before examining the subcommittee's view, let us gain

some facility in applying the device by examining the view set forth in Northrop

Northrop separates theory into three kinds: (1) theory of natural

ence, (2) theory of social science and (3) normative theory of the

ities and social science The first he says is basic to such discoveries as

the atomic bomb, the second designates the de facto state of affairs in ciety and the third designates "the humanistic and social end, the correct

or good form of social organization, not yet perfectly actualized in fact,

at which we should aim."8 His claim that there are social and physical

facts is clear from the following quotation:

The only difference between the theory of natural science and the factual ories of social science is that the former applies the traditional method of the

natural sciences to the facts of nature, whereas the latter applies it to the facts

of culture and society.

To build up the relation between theory and what we have called

physics we need to consider several passages from Northrop's book

First he argues that normative theory can be verified He says

that the scientific method for verifying normative social theory cannot be that for verifying the theory of natural science or factual social theory For

otherwise normative social theory and factual social theory would be identical, and the distinction would evaporate.9

Second he says that there is an empirical connection between the lates of nature or natural man and normative theory It is this connection which provides the method by which the correct or most adequate,

mative social theory can be picked out from among the possible tive social theories

Let us picture what we have up to now in a diagram showing the oretical and factual levels of Northrop's view (Diagram 2).10 The cross in the lunes at the fact level indicates he believes both exist; however, the blank lens means he made no commitment concerning the intersection The cross in the lens between PT and NT indicates the existence of 7Brinegar, et al., op cit., p 618.

'F S C Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), p 329.

' Ibid., p 329 This point is well taken The equating of normative and predictive theory is a common confusion in agricultural economics literature.

'? Both this and the way in which Northrop presents his view are abstract However,

Northrop (perhaps intentionally) presents no examples specific enough to refute his

view at a more concrete level.

A N HALTER

Metaphysical

Level

Theoretical Level

Technological

Level

Instruments

Social Institutions and Practices

DIAGRAM 2 F S C NORTnEOP's POINT OF VIEW.

mative postulates of nature and natural man."l The blank lens of ST and

PT is consistent with the blank lens of SF and PF That there is a

tion between the postulates of natural man and normative theory can be

shown by a line drawn between the two crosses To justify this

tion one must look to the metaphysical level While Northrop does not

use the word metaphysical there is little doubt that he is making a

supposition when he says:

The philosophy defining a particular normative social theory has two apparently

paradoxical properties of designating both an "ought" for culture which

duces choices, moral values and ideals, and an "is" for nature which permits

verification.

Thus we can add to our diagram the metaphysical level and a line of

presupposition to the connection between natural man and normative

" From this and a Northrop diagram I inferred that the lens between ST and NT

must be cross-hatched Ibid., p 339.

1464

theory In philosophical literature this metaphysical relation is called the "naturalistic fallacy." According to G E Moore these so-called istic truths which Northrop says are verifiable assert a relation between

an existing thing and an intrinsically "good" thing.l2 That is, according to Moore, any attempt to define the "good" in terms of the actual is cious and hence no scientific method can be formulated to prove or prove assertions making attributions of "good."

To complete Northrop's view I have inserted the level of technology.13

He makes a distinction between technological instruments and social techniques Thus, only physical theory contributes to technological velopment while only normative theory contributes to the institution of social practices I conclude that he claims: (1) that engineering has no normative aspect and (2) that social theories which explain social facts

do not contribute to the formulation of social institutions and practices However, I do not understand why on one hand physical theory utes to instrument technology while on the other social theory does not contribute to the practices and institutions which influence social facts Since Northrop's purpose was mainly that of justifying the metaphysical presupposition to which I referred above, he may have overlooked this latter point However, that examining his view in this pictorial way leads

to questions of omission shows the merit of the device

Based upon the above demonstration, I would be more reluctant than the subcommittee to recommend Northrop's "frame of reference" for lyzing agricultural economists' efforts My belief that the subcommittee did not in fact accept Northrop's point of view in identifying problems will be considered in the following section

The Subcommittee's Problems Time does not permit examining each problem identified by the committee and hence I will consider only their first, technological change

I have presented in Diagram 3 my conception of the subcommittee's point

of view In order that you can follow the discussion I have numbered each line and will provide, in that sequence, direct quotes to bear witness

to my conception

(1), (2), (3) That physical theory and existing ends contribute to nological instruments which in turn influence social facts: "Technological change, defined as the effects secondary to the accumulation and tion of knowledge, is at once the source of hope for the future and the cause of most of the adjustment problems faced in the present."

(4) That theory springs from the facts by induction: "An array of useful " G E Moore, Ethics (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1912).

I inferred this from a diagram, Northrop, op cit., p 339.

1466 A N HALTER

Metaphysical

Level

) Level

/ I \\ I

c x (2) C

1/ /6) | \ (5) (6) Technological

Level

(4)E

C \ C rnstruments

\ |J/ X j / Social Institutions

DIAGRAM 3 SUBCOMMIrTTEE'S POINT OF VIEW

questions center on the measurement of technological change These questions concern levels and rates of change, and are significant at all degrees of aggregation A second interest area concerns the factors that are strategic, at various times in various societies and industries, in mining the development and adoption of technology."

(5) That valuations are basic to social their rol e in

tion of social techniques: " related is the question of relevant beliefs and value systems of farm and nonfarm people in an increasingly ized, highly technical system of agricultural production Are modifications occurring in the image of the farmers' role as regards, for example, the scope of independence of management decision that is feasible, or as gards the degree of personal responsibility for economic security in a rapidly changing world? Shifts in value patterns related to such things can enlarge the range of acceptable choices in responding to problems that accompany technological advances."

(6) (7) That imperative ends from a normative theory contribute to social techniques which influence social facts: "On the side of income tribution there is need for more accurate measurement of the incidence of the gains and losses to various groups from new technology It is not enough to say that all society gains in the long run Interest in the tion of incidence implies interest in how to shift the gains and losses ing from technological change Thus questions arise concerning how to control the impacts of technological change and how to shift them."'4

To maintain that this is the way most agricultural economists view the problem of technological change and perhaps most other problems would imply a knowledge beyond my capacity However, I would ask, now that the viewpoint is exposed by the structure of the device, are there nesses which could give rise to pseudo-problems?

Let us consider the circuit (2), (3), (4) or as the subcommittee called

it the "Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde facets."'5 This conception considers ing ends as basic to technological change and to explaining social facts

In this regard Northrup points out, "As long as valuations are taken as the fundamental concept of the science, an economic dynamics will be possible for two reasons."16 These he says are: (1) the subjective relative character of valuations necessitates leaving the state of a system at a given time unprecisely designated and (2) the failure of the total quantity

of valuations to obey a conservation law prevents the prediction of a future state Thus, following Northrop, the 'lack of an adequate theory

of growth or economic development [as] the most obvious need of cultural economists " can only be a pseudo-problem.'7 Although the subcommittee remarks that "The direct quest of such a theory does not appear promising ." Northrop says it is "ruled out." Thus we can plete Diagram 3 by inserting the metaphysical ellipse and the tion that the system is in the state of constant change, i.e., its Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde characteristic

This does not imply that agricultural economists must continue to gage in an unproductive pursuit My conception if correct demonstrates merely that this is the case within the point of view of the subcommittee This, however, has important implications It means considering a ent point of view

Proposed Point of View

I do not intend to provide a fully developed point of view; rather I will show an outline of one which could be followed in searching for research All quotes from: Brinegar, et al., op cit., pp 606-08 Emphasis mine

5 Ibid., p 607 The circuit (4), (5), (7) gives rise to similar difficulties.

6 Northrop, op cit., p 245 Notice in this regard, the crosshatched lens between

ST and NT of Diagram 2 That this point is well taken see Diagram 4.

"1 Brinegar, et al., op cit., p 606.