CCU’s “Christ-centered” educational program is no less qualifying nor any more ideological than the educational program of any other qualifying institution...5 A.. CCU’s “Christ-centered
CCU’s “Christ-centered” educational program is no less qualifying
any more ideological than the educational program of any other qualifying institution
CCU is a fully accredited higher educational institution offering a comprehensive, Christ-centered undergraduate and graduate program rooted in the arts and sciences Its Christ-centered education is grounded in a distinctly Christian understanding of the nature of knowledge and learning, delivering an educational program provided from a distinctly Christian viewpoint.
The Christian viewpoints integrated into the educational programs offered by CCU expand upon the “secular” aspects of these programs CCU aims to
1 CCU currently offers over 20 majors, which include accounting, biology, computer information systems, education, English and mathematics CCU
Profiles of the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities (CCCU) are available at http://www.cccu.org and http://www.ccu.edu/friends/press.pdf Member institutions collectively offer more than 350 undergraduate majors and over 140 graduate majors, and CCCU aims to produce graduates who are not only competent in their fields but also equipped to analyze the knowledge they have gained from a Christian perspective, reflecting a commitment to Christ-centered educational programs.
“secular,” in the sense that they produce graduates with the requisite knowledge and skills to contribute to society, and “religious,” in the sense that they equip graduates to analyze knowledge and make life choices based on core Christian principles.
CCU’s “Christ-centered” educational program integrates Christian
Christian viewpoints into the teaching of the “secular” subjects offered by the program
CCU provides its educational program within a distinctly Christian environment which nurtures Christian spiritual maturity – the ability to live in accordance with what students understand to be reality But the concept of a
Christ-centered education extends beyond a nurturing environment; it reaches to the core philosophical underpinnings of the program
CCU's Christ-centered educational program is reflected in its stated purposes, with the first goal being to integrate biblical concepts with the arts, sciences, and professional fields This emphasis demonstrates CCU's commitment to weaving faith and learning across disciplines, ensuring biblical perspectives inform study and professional preparation across arts, sciences, and professional tracks.
Similarly, each Council member institution must offer curricular and extracurricular programs that reflect the integration of scholarship, biblical faith, and service For the Criteria and Application for Membership, see http://www.cccu.org/about/about.asp?contentID=7.
Joint Appendix [hereinafter “J.A.”] 87) One such core biblical concept is the relationship set forth in the Bible between God and the material world 3
Applying this relationship, the teacher of a “Christ-centered” chemistry course might have the following objective for the course:
Chemicals behave the same for Christians and non-Christians; at the fundamental level, there should be no difference between a Christ-centered chemistry course and a secular one But I want more for our students: I want them not only to be fascinated and delighted by the intricacies of chemical behavior, but also to recognize that their study reveals the handiwork of the Lord Jesus Christ I want them to delight in what they learn about chemistry, and as Christians to see at every moment what these discoveries say about the One they know as their Savior, so that in the end they are lifted up to Him, even through a chemistry course.
Duane Litfin, Conceiving the Christian College 76-77 (Wm B Eerdmans Publg
3 Although there are obviously many different views of this relationship, one description is as follows:
Only God is truly independent; every created thing—including the chemical elements chemists study—depends utterly on him, relying on his existence and power at every moment Thus the chemicals we study are Christ’s handiwork, and if we allow it, they will declare his glory (Psalm 19:1).
Duane Litfin, Conceiving the Christian College 160 (Wm B Eerdmans Publg
This example shows that Christ-centered education is defined by courses and curricula rooted in and permeated by a Christian worldview, rather than a secular worldview often disguised as neutral In practice, this means instruction is designed to embed faith across subjects, shaping students' understanding of knowledge, ethics, and purpose Stephen V Monsma has described this Christian educational approach as distinct from secular models precisely because it centers faith in the curriculum.
Worldview in Academia,” Faculty Dialogue 21 (Spring-Summer 1994): 146) Put another way, a Christ-centered education provides a distinctly Christian viewpoint on all of the “secular” subjects in the curriculum.
CCU’s graduates are fully-qualified in their chosen fields and
CCU satisfies all of the nonreligious requirements of the student aid programs
CCU delivers secular and social value on par with other higher education institutions, even as it remains Christ-centered In a Christ-centered program, students still study the laws of science, the techniques of education, the theorems of mathematics, and the algorithms of computer science This coexistence shows that faith and rigorous academic inquiry can reinforce one another, and indeed, one of CCU’s purposes is to integrate spiritual formation with scholarly excellence.
Council member institutions strive to equip students with the essential educational credentials required to enter major vocations and leading professional schools They also serve as hubs for scholars who regularly read papers at academic conferences, review books for professional journals, and engage in ongoing research.
C Ringenberg, The Christian College A History of Protestant Higher Education in America 33 (Baker Academic 2 nd ed 2006)
5 For example, CCU’s general chemistry class covers atomic structure, stoichiometry, chemical bonding, and gas and solution chemistry Academic Catalog 2007-2008, available at http://www.ccu.edu/catalog/2007-
According to the program detailed at 08/courses/chm.asp, it is designed to prepare students for leadership and service within their chosen careers and communities Upon graduation, students earn degrees from an accredited institution and are fully qualified to begin their careers in their chosen professions The inclusion of integrated religious viewpoints within the program does not alter this outcome.
The Colorado Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) explicitly found that Colorado Christian University (CCU) qualifies to participate in student aid programs in every respect except for the restriction on “pervasively sectarian” institutions CCU’s Christ-centered approach to higher education does not undermine its eligibility for these programs.
6 Prominent alumni of the Council member institutions include U.S
Representative Dennis Hastert, a Wheaton College alumnus, and U.S Senator John Thune, a graduate of Biola University In addition, U.S Representative Roy Blunt formerly served as president of Southwest Baptist University James
A Patterson, Shining Lights and Widening Horizons A history of the Council for
Christian Colleges & Universities 2001-2006 22 (Council for Christian Colleges
& Universities 2006) In addition, former U.S Senator William Armstrong currently serves as the president of CCU
Colorado Christian University (CCU) strives to sustain a community of faculty, administrators, and staff who exemplify excellence in their professional fields More than three-quarters of CCU’s faculty hold postgraduate degrees, underscoring the institution’s commitment to advanced scholarship The CCU Profile and related press materials (http://www.ccu.edu/friends/press.pdf) outline these credentials CCU’s faculty includes professors with doctorates from renowned institutions such as the University of California, Berkeley; Harvard University; and the University of Wisconsin–Madison, among others.
University of Colorado, the University of Denver, Colorado State University and Oxford University (among others) Academic Catalog, available at http://www.ccu.edu/catalog/2007-08/faculty/faculty.asp
CCU’s accreditation status nor its eligibility with respect to the nonreligious requirements of the student aid programs.
CCU’s “Christ-centered” educational program is no more “ideological” than any other educational program
The District Court’s interpretation of Art IX, § 7 mandates religious
discrimination against CCU’s Christ-centered educational program in violation of the First Amendment
The district court correctly recognized that the “pervasively sectarian” exclusion is presumptively unconstitutional because it discriminates on the basis of
10 In recognition of the principle that academic freedom should apply to institutions as well as professors, the American Association of University
Professors’ policy on academic freedom states that any limitations on academic freedom arising from the institution’s religious or other aims must be clearly stated in writing at the time of appointment, ensuring transparency and setting explicit expectations for new faculty from the outset.
Academic freedom in religious colleges and universities involves both institutional and individual dimensions, and the Colo Christian Univ v Baker case illustrates how a state court’s interpretation of the Colorado Constitution can produce discriminatory outcomes against religious higher education In that case, the district court relied on an unconstitutional reading of Art IX, § 7 to exclude CCU’s Christ-centered educational program, discriminating in the same way as a “pervasively sectarian” exclusion The court’s analysis hinges on whether CCU’s program provides sufficient secular educational value, which the Commission acknowledged, but the decisive factor is whether the program is deemed too religious In other words, the discrimination read into Art IX, § 7 is presumptively unconstitutional and cannot be justified by reference to the state constitution itself or to any federal constitutional interest.
The District Court interprets Art IX, § 7 to prohibit state
of “religious education,” which it broadly defines to include educational programs that teach secular subjects from a religious perspective
Without explanation, the district court interprets Art IX, § 7 to prohibit the use of public funds for “religious education” or “religious instruction.” Slip op at
Interpretation of Art IX, § 7 is not obviously supported by its wording On its face, the Art IX, § 7 language speaks to sectarian institutions or, more generally, to who the institution is The court, however, leaps to construe the provision as referring to religious activity or to what the institution does This leap is not required by the plain language of Art IX, § 7.
The district court may have relied on the Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis in Americans United for Separation of Church and State v Colorado, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo 1982), which upheld Regis College’s participation in student‑aid programs despite its sectarian status In that decision, the court asserts—without explanation—that Art IX, § 7 permits aid to sectarian institutions where there is only a limited risk of religion intruding into the secular educational function, or where there is not the type of ideological control over the secular function that Art IX, § 7, at least in part, addresses (Americans United, 648 P.2d at 1084) The Americans United opinion provides no authority for either of these statements It is also notable that the result in Americans United would have been the same.
11 The district court quotes the relevant portions as follows:
No public funds may be appropriated by the General Assembly or any other government body to support any church, sectarian organization, or for any sectarian purpose, including funding for any college or university controlled by a church or sectarian denomination.
Slip op at 17 interpreted Art IX, § 7 narrowly to apply only to exclusively religious education (i.e., religious vocational training for clergy)
The district court expands the reach of its unexplained interpretation of Art IX, § 7 by broadly defining "religious education" to include not only exclusively religious content—such as religious vocational training—but also secular topics taught from a distinctly religious perspective, as noted in Slip op at 30 In developing this sweeping exclusion of religious education, the district court also relied heavily upon other considerations described in that opinion.
Locke v Davey, 540 U.S 712 (2004) is cited in the slip opinion at page 17, but relying on Locke in this context is misplaced The district court erred by treating Art IX, § 7 as essentially identical to the Washington constitutional provision involved in Locke.
In fact, the Washington provision, which prohibits the use of government funds for
The opinion clarifies that “religious worship, exercise or instruction” refers to religious activity, not sectarian institutions It notes that in Locke, the Court narrowly interpreted the Washington constitutional provision to apply only to the narrow state interest in not funding the religious training of clergy By contrast, the district court’s interpretation of Art IX, § 7 would extend much farther to cover not only explicitly religious content, such as religious vocational training, but also secular topics taught from a religious perspective.
A broad construction of “religious education” is presumptively unconstitutional
A broad construction of religious education constitutes
Courts that have reviewed governmental restrictions on private religious expressive activity have consistently treated those restrictions as viewpoint discrimination In Good News Club v Milford Central School, the Supreme Court held that excluding religious expression from access to public forums constitutes a discriminatory viewpoint-based restriction.
In the 2001 Supreme Court decision Good News Club v Milford Central School (533 U.S 98, 103), the Court struck down an elementary school's community-use policy that prohibited use "by any individual or organization for religious purposes." It noted that the policy permitted a broad range of uses, "including events pertaining to the welfare of the community," and that, under the policy, "any group that promotes the moral and character development of children was eligible to use the school building."
The school argued that the Bible club’s program—which included singing religious songs, praying, memorizing Bible verses, and discussing a Bible lesson with life application—was religious in nature and distinct in kind from other activities permitted on campus It maintained that the club introduced an additional layer of distinctly religious practices aimed at teaching students how to grow in their relationship with God through Jesus Christ By making this distinction, the school sought to separate these activities from what it called pure moral and character development.
The Court rejected these arguments and held that the club was addressing a subject permitted under the rule—the teaching of morals and character—from a religious standpoint It concluded that excluding the club because of its religious nature constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination The Court expressly disagreed with the proposition.
Labeling something as quintessentially religious or decidedly religious in nature does not justify describing it as the teaching of morals and character development from a particular viewpoint.
[club] and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to provide a foundation for their lessons.” Id
Similarly, in Lamb’s Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.,
In 1993, the Supreme Court held that allowing community use of school facilities for social, civic, or recreational purposes while excluding religious purposes amounts to viewpoint discrimination, as applied to a film series about family and child-rearing issues facing parents today The Court concluded that such a policy discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by permitting all views on family issues and child rearing except those presented from a religious perspective The ruling underscored that restricting access to school property in this way while permitting other viewpoints on the same topics violates the principle of viewpoint neutrality in publicly available facilities.
In Rosenberger v Rectors of the Univ of Virginia, 515 U.S 819 (1995), the Supreme Court struck down a public-university student club funding policy that denied funding to a religious student publication, because the restriction excluded activities that “primarily promote[] or manifest[] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” (Id at 825) The Court noted that the policy treated religious speech differently from other viewpoints in a public forum, thereby burdening free expression and undermining neutrality in university funding decisions.
Religion is not excluded as a subject, but student journalism that presents religious editorial viewpoints can receive disfavored treatment Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, yet it also provides a specific premise and standpoint from which a range of subjects can be discussed The issue is the prohibited perspective, not the subject matter, and this perspective led to refusals to make payments for pieces that would otherwise fall within the approved category of publications.
Taken together, these cases establish that when the government excludes private religious expression that is within the scope of a government program—by denying government resources for such expression—it amounts to viewpoint discrimination This is precisely what occurs when the district court’s broad construction of religious education is applied to the student aid program Even if CCU’s “Christ-centered” education program is an “essentially religious endeavor,” as the district court asserts, it remains the teaching of secular subjects from a particular viewpoint, just as the “quintessentially religious” Bible club activities in Good News Club were described by the Court as the teaching of morals and character development from a particular viewpoint.
Building on Club, 533 U.S at 111, Colorado College embeds its commitment to the value of all people and environmental sustainability into its educational programs, while CCU includes its views on God’s role in nature in its own curricula Under the district court’s broad construction, denying funding to a Christ-centered education in this context constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
Religious viewpoint discrimination is presumptively
unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause
Under the Free Exercise Clause, government action must be neutral with respect to religion and generally applicable This principle was reaffirmed in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah (1993), citing Employment Division, Ore Dept of Human Resources v Smith (1990) When a law is not neutral toward religion, it is subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.
As discussed below the case law identifies several different ways to evaluate religious neutrality Because the district court’s broad construction of religious education fails to comply with each of these forms of neutrality, it is presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause
The district court’s broad definition of religious education is not facially neutral with respect to religion because it necessarily uses religious criteria to determine whether or not a particular educational activity may be funded The Court in Lukumi stated that “the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.” 508 U.S at 533 The Court noted that “[a] law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context.” Id In this case, the district court’s broad interpretation of religious education requires the exclusion of religious viewpoints in secular education programs Because the religious character of the program is the basis upon which the exclusion turns, there is no secular meaning for the exclusionary criteria Therefore, a broad construction of religious education does not satisfy the minimum requirement of facial neutrality 12
The lack of neutrality is evident when religious viewpoints are excluded from an otherwise qualifying educational program, a move unrelated to the interests advanced by the student aid program and instead a distinction between favored and unfavored expression Such exclusion does not protect or promote the aims of student aid; it merely signals bias in what counts as legitimate discourse In Lukumi, the Court emphasized that government actions must be neutral toward religion, warning against policies that privilege particular points of view over others.
The Court held that several city ordinances banning ritual animal sacrifices were not neutral in part because they were drafted to suppress religious conduct without reference to the legitimate ends asserted in their defense It acknowledged that the ordinances address concerns unrelated to religious animosity, such as public health and the prevention of cruelty to animals However, when read together, the ordinances were found to collectively target religious practice.
“disclose an object remote from these legitimate concerns.” Id Specifically,
“although [religious] sacrifice is prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all other circumstances are unpunished.” Id at 536
By contrast, a narrow definition of religious education—limited to strictly religious content such as seminary theology—could be excluded under secular criteria from programs that fund only secular educational activities.
Within a broad approach to religious education, excluding religious viewpoints is not linked to ensuring that government funding goes only to activities that advance official objectives In fact, a law that imposes gratuitous restrictions on religious conduct does not serve the stated governmental interests; it seeks to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation, a principle the Supreme Court affirmed in Lukumi (508 U.S 538).
A law also lacks neutrality if it intentionally favors certain types of religious organizations over others In Larson v Valente, 456 U.S 228, 246 (1982)
The Court emphasized that the fullest realization of religious liberty requires government neutrality, avoiding favoritism among sects and not deterring any religious belief In Larson, the state law offered a religious exemption, but only for organizations that received more than half of their total contributions from members or affiliated organizations.
In striking down the exemption, the Court held that the criteria “effectively distinguishe[d] between well-established churches that have achieved strong but
Although Larson was decided under the Establishment Clause, the Court applied the same strict scrutiny standard once it determined that the law at issue did not treat all religious denominations equally (Id at 247) This approach underscores the Court’s insistence on equal treatment of religious groups in subsequent rulings and signals that strict scrutiny can apply when denominational neutrality is at issue.
Larson explicitly argued that the constitutional prohibition on denominational preferences is inextricably linked to the ongoing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause He also pointed out that religious groups do not rely solely on total financial support from their members; new churches or those without an established constituency, or those that may favor public solicitation as a matter of policy, illustrate funding models that diversify support beyond member contributions while respecting religious freedom and constitutional constraints.
245 n.23 (internal citation and quotation omitted)
The favoritism prohibited in Larson applies with even greater force when the distinctions turn upon expressly religious criteria In University of Great Falls v
The D.C Circuit in NLRB v Great Falls struck down the NLRB’s “substantial religious character” test used to decide whether a religious employer falls outside NLRB jurisdiction, ruling that exempting religious institutions that deliver education in a less religious manner while excluding those that take a more religious approach creates an unconstitutional preference; the same flaw appears when a government-funded program excludes religious organizations that pursue a more religious delivery of education, a point the district court echoed regarding the pervasively sectarian exclusion in the student aid program and which applies to a broad construction of religious education under Art IX, § 7 (slip op at 28–29); thus, institutions like CCU that educate from a distinctly religious perspective are excluded, whereas institutions like Regis with a more objectively secular—though still covertly religious—approach are included.
Locke's modifications to the free exercise neutrality requirement, as applied to government funds, show that a broad construction of religious education cannot satisfy these modifications This broad reading does not apply merely to a distinct category of instruction such as religious vocational training (Locke, 540 U.S at 713); instead, it extends to all categories of instruction when delivered from a particular religious viewpoint The broad construction thus excludes a "prohibited perspective," not the general subject matter.
To enforce the neutrality requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court must survey the circumstances of government classifications with meticulous care to root out religious gerrymanders This approach, echoed in Lukumi v City of Hialeah, calls for a careful, contextual examination of how laws and policies are framed so that they do not create hidden advantages or burdens for religious practice.
Evaluating a broad interpretation of religious education reveals that, by its own terms, its link to student aid program objectives and its explicit favoritism violate the neutrality principles articulated in Lukumi, Larson, and Locke.
C Applying a broad construction of “religious education” to the student aid program is not required by the Establishment Clause
There is a well-documented history of religious hostility behind the adoption of state constitutional amendments, including Art IX, § 7 This historical pattern shows how religious bias and political considerations shaped the drafting and passage of these provisions Scholars like Douglas Laycock argue that the core ideas of separation of church and state and government neutrality are deeply intertwined in this record Examining these debates helps explain how religious influence affected constitutional language and the ongoing interpretation of state liberties Laycock’s analysis, in particular, illuminates the dynamics between religious concerns and the principle of neutrality that underpins these amendments.