NGO_Government-Dialogue-on-Provincial-Reconstruction-Teams

NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRTs in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance Table of Contents Context Setting: the political and secu

4 December 2003

FINAL REPORT

Coordinated by the Peace Operations Working Group of the

Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee

NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance

Table of Contents

Context Setting: the political and security situation in Afghanistan 3

Civil society discussion on possible recommendations and actions 11

In February, 2003, the United States Army initiated the first Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Gardez, Afghanistan, followed shortly thereafter by PRTs in Kunduz and Bamyan and a British-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif New Zealand and German-led models have also since been established The stated objectives of the PRTs are to advance the central government’s presence throughout Afghanistan and to provide direct support to the reconstruction effort

Many civil society organizations active in Afghanistan have expressed concern over the establishment of PRTs and the type of work they are carrying out While it is broadly recognized that PRTs can make a significant contribution to improving security and security sector reform, there is significant unease over the role which PRTs have been playing in providing emergency assistance and engaging in humanitarian-type projects It is feared that such military-led interventions put humanitarian agencies at risk by blurring the line between military activities and neutral or impartial humanitarian action

Recently, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence sent a joint fact-finding mission to Afghanistan Part of this mission’s mandate was to make an assessment of PRTs with a view to delineating a Canadian position on their value and potential

In order to enable Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to examine these issues in greater detail and formulate recommendations related to their own work and to the government, the Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee hosted a one-day government/NGO dialogue on PRTs in Afghanistan and, more broadly, on the militarization of humanitarian assistance The seminar took place on December 4th, 2003, at Carleton University

The following report is a summary of the presentations and discussions which took place during the dialogue In accordance with Chatham House Rules, points raised during the dialogue are not attributed to individuals in this report The recommendations contained within the report were derived from discussions amongst civil society representatives only These are also reflected in a separate document, entitled “Key Civil Society Recommendations.”

The Peace Operations Working Group would like to thank the World Federalist Movement-Canada, CARE Movement-Canada, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre for their generous financial and in-kind contributions towards this dialogue

The NGO/Government dialogue was coordinated by Steve Mason, who also wrote the present report Copies of the package of documents distributed to all dialogue participants can be made available electronically through the World Federalist Movement-Canada

NGO/Government Dialogue on PRTs in Afghanistan Final Report

Context Setting: The Political and Security Situation in Afghanistan

The context in Afghanistan today is completely unlike other post-conflict scenarios, such as Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, or Kosovo – Afghanistan is unique, and the tools used to address it from a humanitarian and reconstruction perspective must also be unique There are more reasons

to be worried about security now than in the days of the Taliban, due to the lack of government control and the degree of lawlessness

There are two crucial elements hindering development and reconstruction in Afghanistan: the lack of international funding and the lack of security

Lack of international funding: Afghanistan has been treated less generously than other

post-conflict situations For example, much less money has flowed into Afghanistan than into Iraq, which has fewer people, less pressing need and is more self-sufficient The lack of funding primarily impacts the ability for reconstruction to take place: of the initial $4.5 billion (US) that was allocated internationally for reconstruction, most of it went to humanitarian assistance instead Reportedly, less than $0.5 billion (US) went towards reconstruction last year – much less than in Iraq or East Timor Reconstruction and extension of the transport infrastructure are essential because it is extremely difficult to get supplies to remote regions – there are few passable roads

Lack of security: NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops are currently

confined to Kabul In the rest of country, coalition forces are present under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and, in many areas, warlords are in control The best estimate available indicates that over 100,000 people belong to militias, which are fighting each other in the north and west of the country In the south and east, remnants of the Taliban remain The lack of security makes it possible for the warlords to maintain and spread their influence and carry out personal agendas, including poppy production

Poppy production is a major inhibitor to re-establishment of the agriculture sector and reconstruction Since poppies can grow anywhere, and the value of a crop of poppies is approximately ten times the value of a crop of wheat, farmers with little water or resources grow poppies The estimated street value in Europe of the heroin that originates in Afghanistan is $100 billion (US)

What is needed is a major international security force that is active throughout the country, and not just in Kabul There are major reconstruction and economic development needs, but no security in which to meet them Such a force would not only enable international NGOs to venture outside Kabul, but would also facilitate the impressive work which Afghans are doing by and for themselves

A Government Perspective on PRTs and their Implications

The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) sent a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan in October The rationale for the mission was to acquire a better understanding of PRTs in view of developing an option for Canadian Forces after August 2004, when the Canadian contingent’s NATO mandate comes to an end

PRTs are a recent phenomenon Lessons are being learned on how best to organize and deploy them.They have changed considerably over the last year, and will likely continue to change It is important that PRTs and NGOs find the right balance for the sharing of work The success of the reconstruction effort and of a viable exit strategy depends considerably on NGO work and the work of government development departments

PRTs were first launched, as a concept, in November 2002 with the goal of doing reconstruction work as a part of Phase IV of the operations of coalition forces1 But because the reconstruction phase has not been fully launched, the objectives of PRTs have become less clear-cut: they now carry out a mix of offensive and reconstruction operations Although this may seem to be contradictory, both types of operation in fact share the same goal – the creation of a stable government

There are various PRT models currently being implemented, and a considerable difference between how PRTs are run by the US, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Germany They vary in both focus and size The UK model has an emphasis on security, with the desired impact being a large circle of security surrounding a small circle of reconstruction In the US model, there is an effort to develop an “optimal” PRT by 2005 An optimal PRT has a much stronger government presence than current models

NATO is also developing a PRT model, and has launched a pilot project in Kunduz, where the Germans are currently operating Pending resources and mandate, this PRT is intended to be transferred completely to ISAF by June 2004 The lessons learned from this will be applied to other PRTs, and NATO will then look to take on others The model may change again

While different PRT models need to be tailored to the needs of different regions, the basic role remains the same: to help stimulate development of security sector reform and to aid in the reconstruction effort They serve as platforms through which the government can become engaged in a region The objective is to accomplish this while leaving only a small footprint – PRTs are not to be seen as an army of occupation Only 60-100 people are typically associated with a PRT

In the event that Canada decides to become involved in a PRT, it is important to understand the mix of military/civilian components, how NGOs fit in and how PRTs can assist in furthering the peace process

1 Phases I and II were periods of active conflict to remove the Taliban and Al Qaeda from power Phase III refers to stabilization , and Phase IV to reconstruction.

NGO/Government Dialogue on PRTs in Afghanistan Final Report

In a potential Canadian model, it could be envisioned that representatives from a wide variety of government departments and agencies – the RCMP, Canada Customs, Health Canada, Canadian Heritage, for example – would work with the military and with their Afghan government equivalents It could serve as a platform from which the Afghan government can move out into a region and develop its institutions

From a military point of view, there is no intention or desire for PRTs to result in the militarization of humanitarian assistance Any humanitarian assistance projects conducted by military forces are civil/military activities that are designed for force protection and to ensure that the locals and the military are friendly These are small scale activities only, and the military does not want to be involved in larger scale humanitarian work

When representatives from DND and DFAIT met with CARE and Oxfam before the fact-finding mission, they were asked why a similar approach to the one taken in Bosnia cannot be taken in Afghanistan The problem is that NATO has had trouble generating sufficient forces for the mission in Kabul There are currently only 5,000 troops, and it is not likely that there will be many more in the future So PRTs may be an effective way to extend ISAF’s reach and results with limited numbers of troops

When thinking about PRTs, it is important to keep in mind what they are not:

• PRTs have an ambiguous mandate under Operation Enduring Freedom They are not traditional peacekeeping operations: they do not have a Chapter VI or a Chapter VII mandate under the UN Charter An ISAF-led PRT would have a Security Council mandate, but the UN mandate in Afghanistan is assistance-oriented only (through the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)) PRTs have as their fundamental concept the assistance component: to build the capacity of the Afghan government

• they are not a substitute for the national government They have a facilitative role, and offer civil/military expertise in a particular region They are meant to determine what is impeding security and work with the central government to address these specific factors through a combination of incentives and coercion

• they are not capable of solving all conflicts, but are capable of mitigating some conflicts

PRTs are capable of mobilizing limited international resources, and making maximal use of these resources

The international community is attracted to the PRT concept for a number of reasons First, because there will never be large numbers of forces in Afghanistan, especially compared to Kosovo or Bosnia Second, because a large force is not universally seen as the best approach for Afghanistan Third, because aid effectiveness criteria stress putting Afghans up front in the reconstruction effort PRTs are designed to build capacity, put Afghans up front and draw lessons from them It may not be working as well as envisioned, and it would be easier if there were larger numbers of troops in the short-term, but PRTs are an innovative solution to try to realize desired objectives with existing resources

An NGO Perspective on PRTs and their Implications

Afghanistan today is much less safe than under the Taliban regime The context has changed: westerners are seen as an enemy, Afghans who work with them are seen as collaborators

Initially after the fall of the Taliban, there was relative calm in Afghanistan and a grace period for reconstruction This is now over In the past year, the security situation has worsened from a rate

of one violent attack on an aid agency each month to one a day Twelve aid workers have been killed and dozens wounded The development costs of insecurity are mounting, and these were not factored into the calculations made at the Tokyo conference on Afghan reconstruction Aid to over 600,000 Afghans has been delayed or cancelled because of insecurity

Many people feel disenfranchised by the new government and the way in which local and national government representatives were selected Militias draw financial support from a variety

of sources, including the coalition forces and Pakistan

The value of the opium trade is significantly greater than the total reconstruction package To date, the primary response of the international community to the security crisis has been the coalition campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda This does not take into account the security threats against ordinary Afghans by militias and warlords Impunity flourishes in Kabul and the countryside, and justice is not available to most Afghans

PRTs, as initially conceived, are inadequate for the reconstruction effort, let alone the security needs of Afghans To date, PRTs are being set up in relatively secure areas, for example Herat Energy and resources invested in PRT reconstruction projects divert those inputs from much-needed security sector reform

Despite this, PRTs have had some success The British-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif has defused a crisis between two northern warlords This is a good example of what a well-designed ISAF mission should be able to achieve

A more appropriate name for a PRT would be an “ISAF security support team”(ISST) – this would be clearer in terms of mandate These teams should be set up in the most insecure parts of the country They should train and conduct joint operations with the police and the Afghanistan National Army They should disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former militias and fill the security gap They should remove heavy weapons from urban areas, especially Kabul ISSTs should help the Afghan government address the drug problem, which cannot be contained without international assistance They should also help rehabilitate government buildings, roads and bridges

ISSTs will need to be properly selected for their mediating, peacebuilding, policing and training skills The cultural sensitivity and discipline of foreign troops is very important Sufficient numbers of troops will be needed One hundred individuals involved in a particular PRT is too few, especially when half are civilians

NGO/Government Dialogue on PRTs in Afghanistan Final Report

In summary:

1 The role of the UN is vital in facing the daunting challenges in Afghanistan It should serve as the coordinating body for all reconstruction and security sector reform operations

2 PRTs are not an adequate or proportionate response to the severity of the current security situation in Afghanistan

3 PRT resources flowing into reconstruction projects are a diversion of resources away from the more crucial element of security sector reform

4 There is continuing confusion with the name and mandate of PRTs The emphasis on reconstruction in “PRT” implies a competition with aid organizations ISAF Security Support Team is a preferable name

5 A division between ISAF-run PRTs in the North and coalition-run PRTs in the South can further divide Afghanistan It is better if all PRTs are under the same mandate – ISAF’s

Discussion Points

During the discussion period, participants further elaborated on the current context in Afghanistan, issues related to the amount of international resources devoted to the country’s reconstruction, the structure and role of PRTs, the shape of a potential Canadian-led PRT, and the role and work of NGOs in Afghanistan The key discussion points are summarized below

General Context-Setting Points

When discussing the situation in Afghanistan, it is important to keep the political context in mind The Afghan government is not looking at reform and reconstruction from a single viewpoint There is a real struggle within the cabinet over the future direction of the country When people refer to extending the authority of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), they are really talking about extending the authority of some key elements within the ATA

The strategy of opposition groups in Afghanistan, such as the Taliban and other militias, is to confine the central government to Kabul and stop or delay the reconstruction and development process They do not want people to see the benefits of reconstruction, which would maintain or expand the influence of the ATA The aid community has been a target because of this, and because they are “soft targets” – identifiable and easy to hit

Resource Issues

Many participants expressed concern about the limited resources being dedicated to Afghanistan

by the international community, and particularly the disparity between the amounts of resources that have gone towards assistance and reconstruction in other countries and that which has gone towards Afghanistan There is no justifiable argument for this It was noted that Canada has been

a leader in terms of the resources it has devoted to Afghanistan – in 2003, Canada made the single largest country pledge that it has ever made ($250 million (Canadian)), which is over and above the $100 million (Canadian) pledged in 2002 Canada could leverage this fact to pressure other countries into increasing their contributions NGOs also have a role to play in advocating for greater funds to be committed to Afghanistan

Issues related to making PRTs work better should not be allowed to divert the focus from the underlying problem of lack of resources The international community made a lot of commitments for Afghanistan that should be upheld Canada can make this case at NATO meetings: we cannot afford to have Afghanistan fail The public is able to understand this message

Role and Structure of PRTs

The political context, coordination among existing PRTs, and reconstruction work should be part

of an overall plan that does not duplicate the work being carried out by aid organizations The military effort should focus on what the military can do best – the provision of security According to the background paper on PRTs produced by UNAMA, there is broad consensus within the assistance community that PRTs could make their best contribution by focusing on security sector reform, especially in the areas of weapons collection and supporting and training local police If this is indeed what the assistance community is saying and where UNAMA is leaning, this should be given close attention and efforts should be devoted to deciding how best the military can address the security situation

There is a possibility that PRTs will be brought under ISAF NATO wants to wait and see what will happen with the pilot PRT in Kunduz, then draw some lessons from that Merging coalition forces with NATO forces is being looked at, but will be difficult because NATO is not currently prepared to take on an offensive role Deploying to more insecure regions in Afghanistan requires a substantially larger force contribution than NATO nations are currently willing to contribute

Plans are in place to set up regional training programs for police coordinated by PRTs – an example of PRTs being used as a facilitating base of operations There is an effort to avoid having military personnel train civilian actors, but PRTs can provide facilitation for this to happen There is a need to speed up the deployment of the new Afghanistan National Army (ANA) PRTs can be of assistance in this process

PRTs could play a more significant role in the development and training of the ANA The goal is

to have an army that is 70,000 troops strong army by 2007 Currently, there are about 7,000 soldiers There is a high level of attrition within the ANA because of lack of pay and the fact that many of those being trained are deployed with OEF forces and risk being seen as collaborators Development of the ANA is not proceeding as quickly as people would like There are limited incentives for people to leave a militia to join the ANA

NGO/Government Dialogue on PRTs in Afghanistan Final Report

PRTs also need to focus on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) effort Within the context of the DDR process, people should get a choice of a civilian job or joining the ANA when they turn in their weapons There is, however, not a sufficient balance between demobilization and reintegration possibilities There are not enough reintegration opportunities for all those turning in weapons Another problem with the DDR process is that people are turning in older weapons but keeping newer ones at home

Several participants expressed concern over the issue of coalition forces using PRTs to gather intelligence for offensive military operations While it is difficult to imagine soldiers ignoring security threats they hear from local people, intelligence gathering endangers all actors who are part of PRTs or who deal with them This has already happened in the south, but would not likely happen under ISAF-run PRTs that would be non-combat oriented

An example of a PRT approach to dealing with the drug problem can be found in the British-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif In that region, the preponderance of drugs produced are moving out of Afghanistan through Tajikistan The British effort at reducing drug production is concentrated on alternative livelihood development and not interdiction A war against drug production would be more destabilizing than productive This is a workable example of an innovative solution around the margins of drug production that will result in incremental rather than wholesale change

NGO involvement with PRTs

Most NGOs active in Afghanistan are not comfortable with the prospect of working in conjunction with PRTs, especially when this involves participating in assessment missions with uniformed military personnel There are a lot of NGOs, both Afghan and international, present in communities where PRTs are present, but most NGOs have limited their involvement with PRTs and advocate PRTs only for security reasons It is mainly only private business contractors that are coordinating with PRTs

Canadian Priorities for PRTs

The Canadian government may decide to support a PRT in Afghanistan in 2004 This model may also be used in other parts of the world, depending on its success

How these operations cooperate with NGOs will be crucial to their success If the government is

to develop and support PRTs, it is important to look not only at cooperation between the three

“Ds” (diplomacy, development and defence) but to expand this notion to include NGOs as well

as other departments (Public Safety, Heritage, etc) This interface has not been looked at in detail from a Canadian perspective

The Department of National Defence will be sponsoring a “peace-gaming” simulation exercise in January as part of the process to determine the level of Canadian support for and involvement in PRTs This learning seminar will involve representatives from a variety of different government