Timmy de Goeij - The Philosophical World Disclosure of the Hellenistic Philosophical Communities

Introduction 21 Heidegger’s Idea of World Disclosure and Dilthey’s Account of Philosophical Worldviews 9 1.1 Heidegger’s Idea of World Disclosure 11 1.2 The Communal Nature of our World

The Philosophical World Disclosure of

the Hellenistic Philosophical Communities

-An Investigation into the Conditions for the Possibility of

a Philosophical Transformation of our World Disclosure

“When brothers agree, no fortress is so strong as their common life” – Antisthenes1

1 Quoted by Laertius in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers: Volume II,

London: The Loeb Classical Library, translated by R.D Hicks, VI, p 7 (Diels edition 6)).

First Supervisor: Prof Dr Paul Ziche Second Supervisor: Dr Teun Tieleman

When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing, - then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing And if you do this, I and my sons will have received justice at your

hands (Plato, Apology, 42b, translated by Benjamin Jowett)

For my parents, Tony and Jacqueline, for having brought me to the highest

point of ordinary life, where I found happiness and education

&

Sylvia, my life partner, for the unordinary roads that lie ahead of us

With this thesis I finish my life as a student, and in some way make my first steps into delayedadulthood It, thus, provides the perfect occasion to reflect on the past stages of my life, and tothank those that have played a significant role in my upbringing

My teenage days were mostly spend in the company of friends And it is only recently that I became to understand the importance that some of these friends played in my

development Most notably: Ismael, Aaron, Hussein, Dennis and Detlev I still remember those days without anxiety and worries, wherein we lived in a world that had its own rules and measures, a world that revolved around friendship and loyalty, humor and support,

contrast and identity With Aaron and Ismael I shared the indifference towards wealth and social status, and, while I have experienced that such indifference might become dangerous in the absence of other measures, it is an indifference that I still hold dear However, like the world with its seasons life has its stages, and after summer fell so did our friendships I have never known true friendship after that And it has left a gap in my life ever since It may well

be that my ideal of ethical communities, wherein friends share a world and idea of the good life, might have its first roots in that perished friendship between reckless, and sometimes even lost and corrupted, but essentially good-hearted youngsters

After I got expelled from the high school Oostvaarders College at the age of sixteen, life changed drastically Thanks to financial support of my parents, I was able to redo

secondary school at Luzac private school In this institution students were obliged to do homework from 9 am till 5 pm in absolute silence, which were definitely more hours than needed It was sheer boredom which brought me to read books, something I had never done before However, at first these were mere science-fiction and phantasy books It was not until

my aunt Fleur brought me into contact with Aristotle’s Ethics that philosophy was brought

into my life It was then that I found my calling From Aristotle’s works I turned to Plato’s, and from these to Kant’s Philosophy motivated me to finish secondary school, continue to

work my way through the propaedeutic year of high school, so that I could then finally find

my way into the university to study philosophy

During the process of detaching myself from my earlier reckless life, the hospitality of Jolanda, Rob, Cindy, and Sylvia has been crucial Jolanda has shown me the importance of perseverance, and as for many others, she has been a point of stability in my life during those days Rob with his humor and openness always brought about a good atmosphere in places where it was most needed I always enjoyed the moments that we spent together in the garden,and cherish those in Luxembourg I consider it highly unlikely that I will ever find someone

as caring and sweet as Cindy We have been through a lot, and have experienced both the disastrous and beautiful effects of the fiery glow of affection In those days she was, without adoubt, my best friend And as for Sylvia, well, she has become the love of my life ever since Together these four have shown me the importance of a dynamic family life They provided

me with a place of love and joy, confrontation and sadness, the perfect environment for reinterpreting myself anew I regard the late nights that I shared with them at the fire place in the garden as some of the most precious moments of my life But time passes and leaves its marks, it destroys bonds that existed and creates new ones Families and households are torn apart so that new are synthesized And the surrounding world changes, for better or worse

During the past years that I have spent in the university, there are two persons in particular that have supported me and shown me the importance of the history of philosophy

We no longer live in a world wherein one is educated and brought to maturity in its profession

by a single teacher The institute of the University has replaced this role of the teacher in the domain of science and philosophy However, if times were different, I would certainly have chosen Paul Ziche as my teacher, if he had consented In addition, I consider myself fortunate

to have gotten the opportunity of getting to know his college Ernst-Otto Onnasch Who not only showed concern for my future, but also challenged my character with the soft stroke of his kindness Paul Ziche and Teun Tieleman have been of enormous support in writing this thesis Especially the structure of the thesis would have been disastrous if it wasn’t for their advice

Arriving at the key persons in my life as a whole, I wish to thank first of all my sister Denise She has taken care of me in times when it was most needed After I got expelled from high school, she was the one who arranged the meetings with other schools And especially at times when family ties were under pressure, we have always managed to find each other

Moreover, she has the admirable character trait of parrhêsia, that is, the courage to tell people

the truth about themselves even if this might result in the loss of social bonds There is no question that our lives will forever be intertwined Since so much of who we are is determined

by how we relate to each other As for my parents, Tony and Jacqueline, they have certainly been the most important persons in my life My mother has always shown me unconditional love and care I always enjoy our midday conversations about life with its many obstacles And there is no doubt in my mind that I have inherited and received my conscience from her This silent voice against all injustice has been a constant guide throughout the whole of my life It kept me from crime and brought me to philosophy It is my father from who I inherited

my intelligence and received my love for reason And whenever I found myself confronted with difficult problems in life, my father has been the one to who I turned if this was possible

He beliefs so strongly in me that he has always trusted my judgment, and never lost faith in

me I have received the best upbringing from my parents I could wish for One’s self-love, self-respect and self-esteem, which constitute the basis for an autonomous existence, rests on the recognition of others, and mine certainly rests on that of my parents They have been the most important persons of my past

As time progressed so the orchestration of my social life changed Sylvia has been in

my life for eight years now She is the happiness and love of my life It is in dialogue that two souls meet And nowhere do I feel more at home, than in conversation with her Together we speak about the past, look out at the future and live the present She has touched my soul, and

it has forever changed my perception of the world I admire her love for nature and life, in all its varies forms Just as life, love has its finiteness And it is this that makes it unique We understand and respect this It is on this thread that we together live In our common life we built our fortress within the flowing river of life Let’s grow old and grey: I love you, forever

Introduction 2

1

Heidegger’s Idea of World Disclosure and

Dilthey’s Account of Philosophical Worldviews 9

1.1 Heidegger’s Idea of World Disclosure 11 1.2 The Communal Nature of our World-Disclosure 22 1.3 Dilthey’s Account of Philosophical Worldviews 28

2

The Nihilistic Crisis of the Present Age 35

2.2 The Abandonment of Being as the Ground of

3

The Shortcomings of Heidegger’s Religious

3.1 Heidegger’s Analysis of Everyday Existence 60 3.2 The Shortcomings of Heidegger’s Religious

4

The Hellenistic Philosophical Communities and the Possibility of a Philosophical Transformation

4.1 The Hellenistic Conception of Philosophy as the

4.2 Philosophical Discourse and the articulation of

4.5 The Arrangement of Power Relations in a

The Ethical Model of a Post-Nihilistic

revitalization of Christianity in an individualistic world, making it the

existential task of the individual instead of the mere object of rationalized thought or of a religious discourse that is detached from everyday life But,

as we know, history had it otherwise In an interview of 2005 with Harry Kreisler, of the series Conversations with History, Hubert Dreyfus notes that he always urges his students of philosophy to find their own

philosophical question: “you can’t write good papers or theses if you

haven’t got a question.” He received his life-changing question while he was teaching at MIT, where there was an atmosphere of naive optimism in the Artificial Intelligence department, which still conceived of intelligence

as consisting of following rules Of course, questions are not hard to come

by, and during the course of my studies I have occupied myself with

numerous questions in the form of articles and papers But these

questions were determined by numerous factors, like, for example, the themes of the course, the books I had already read, the scope of the

article, the need of being creative, and such – but not, as with Kierkegaard,

by the actual world wherein I live In reflecting upon my previous

unconstrained philosophical activities and sketches, I found a continual struggle to uphold the idea of philosophy as a way of life against, both, thefragmented everyday modern life that is without higher purpose and

worldview, and the actual current institutional manifestation of philosophy

in the universities, where it has become the object of detached abstracted thought Being thrown in an age that Nietzsche characterized as “the age

of meaninglessness” and from whose ordinary streets philosophy has long since vanished, I found myself again and again confronted with the

question: how to live a meaningful philosophical life?

In the form in which this question is posed, it is hard to see how one should go about answering it Drawing on some of the insights and

conceptual tools of Martin Heidegger, we might reformulate the question.2

From my studies of Heidegger I learned that how we relate to the world, others and ourselves is in large part determined by our perception and understanding3 of them And that these are essentially determined by an intersubjective unified understanding or disclosure of the world that is embodied in our social practices and institutions This background whole ofpractices and institutions constitutes the source of the different ways in which beings might be perceived by us in their being Heidegger calls it

‘being’, and, as is custom in Heidegger scholarship and critical theory, we will call it ‘world disclosure’ Such a unified disclosure of the world

embodies a worldview or decision with regard to what it means to be and what is highest Thus, the significance and meaning of the things that we perceive in the world wherein we live derive, ultimately, from an embodiedworldview It is clear that to live a philosophical life is to relate to the

world, others and ourselves in a philosophical way And this requires that

2 The following claims will be elaborated in more detail in the first chapter of the thesis, and are to be regarded as a summary of that chapter This means that the following reformulation of the leading question of the thesis, rests upon the elaboration of the

concepts of world disclosure and philosophical worldview that is conducted in the first

chapter.

3 The concepts of perception and understanding will play an important role in this thesis

These concepts will be elaborated in the first chapter However, since they are already earlier put to use, it might be helpful to give a preliminary explication Our perception of the beings in the world is first and foremost bodily and pre-propositional It is not clearly delineated, but rather ambiguous It is founded upon the background social practices and institutions of our community, which are appropriated by us in our bodily and intellectual

habits Moreover, we always perceive beings as something Understanding is the faculty that projects beings in a way that they manifest themselves as what they are Thus,

perception is always a form of understanding The background practices and form of life that are appropriated in our habits and determine our perception and understanding, embody a unified understanding of what it means for something to be, and this

understanding is prior to our perception of the particular beings in the world, including ourselves It is only within such a unified disclosure of the world that we can turn our attention at the particular beings in order to conceptually clarify and define them Thus,

we perceive and understand beings in the space of a unified world disclosure The

structure of perception, understanding and world disclosure is discussed in the first chapter of the thesis

we perceive them in terms of a philosophical worldview Heidegger’s

analysis of world disclosure, thus, gives us the conceptual tools to

rephrase the question in the following way: what are the conditions for the possibility of a transformation of our world disclosure in terms of a

is best to distinguish them at the outset These are:

(I) The ethical model of a post-nihilistic philosophical existence(II) An argument for a holistic approach to the Hellenistic

philosophical schools(III) A criticism of Heidegger’s religious account of world disclosure

I will shortly give an overview of each of these

The main theme that runs through this thesis is the existential

theme of the possibility of a post-nihilistic philosophical existence The question concerning the possibility of a transformation of our world

disclosure arises from a sense of crisis “It arises from the need to rethink our commitments to certain ideals and practices, perhaps to break free of them, by imagining previously untried or uncovering previously

suppressed possibilities This very particular need is the need to begin anew – a need marking one’s time as a time of need.” (Kompridis, 2006, p.3) From the consciousness of crisis emerges the need to begin anew, that

is, to bring about “a new cultural and political beginning that gives

meaning and purpose to our cultural traditions, social practices, and

political institutions.” (Ibid., p 6) Whether and to what extent a

transformation of our world disclosure is needed, is, of course, dependent

on how deep the roots of our state of crisis are rooted in the world

disclosure of the present age In keeping with a tradition that goes back to

Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, Heidegger, and many

others, this thesis diagnoses nihilism as the greatest threat and crisis of

our age Nihilism will be elaborated in the thesis as the current state of ourworld disclosure, wherein the social practices and institutions are no

longer oriented and unified by means of a comprehensive worldview The concrete account of a philosophical transformation and preservation of ourworld disclosure, thus, constitutes an ethical model of a post-nihilistic philosophical existence However, if the proposed ethical model is to be of any significance for us, it must relate to the present order of our political and social situation in a way that it strives towards a possible future for us,which at the same time shows respect for the plurality of cultural

traditions and identities that is inherited from the past In keeping with thetradition of liberalism we must not surrender the many different cultural worldviews, which constitute different perspectives on the world and are the result of the hard labor and sacrifices of the predecessors of those cultures; we must cultivate them and make them effective again The envisioned ethical model must, thus, be able to accommodate ethical pluralism within a liberalistic political framework

But where should we look for a concrete account of a philosophical transformation of one’s world disclosure? As far as I know, the best source for such an account can be found in the philosophical schools of the Greco-Roman world Anticipating the investigations that will take place, we can say that these schools, most importantly Stoicism and Epicureanism, were

in fact concerned with a philosophical transformation and preservation of the everyday world disclosure A thorough analysis of the cohesion,

practices, discourses, and everyday life of these philosophical

communities, will result in a preliminary indication of the essential factors and mechanisms that are in play in a philosophical transformation of worlddisclosure The resulting account constitutes the ethical model of a post-nihilistic world disclosure, and, thus, completes the first theme However,

it is during the analysis of the Hellenistic schools that we encounter the second theme that runs through this thesis Our account of the

philosophical transformation of everyday life that was present in these schools will show that a school’s philosophical discourse, exercise

practices, and organization of power relations4, are all co-determinative of each other and essentially intertwined There is a general tendency in Hellenistic scholarship to extract these elements from their unity; to

discuss either the theory, the practice, or the social organization of such a school in isolation Accordingly, some regard these philosophical schools essentially as philosophical systems, others as sets of spiritual exercises all devoted to lead a concrete life in accordance with reason, while there are even those that regard these schools as concrete hierarchical

communities dedicated to the preservation of a certain tradition that goes back to its founders and role-models In contrast to such approaches, I would like to plea for a holistic approach towards understanding these philosophical schools as philosophical communities, an approach which

centers around the school’s fundamental poles of alêtheia, êthos, and

politeia My thesis is that the school’s conception of truth (alêtheia), which

manifests itself in the philosophical discourse, and its conception of moral

character (êthos), which finds its embodiment in the exercise practices,

together with its conception of the ideal organization of power relations

(politeia), are inseparably intertwined Thus, an adequate account of a Hellenistic philosophical school will need to grasp the alêtheia, êthos, and

politeia of such a community in their unity The accounts that separate

certain of the school’s doctrines or exercise practices or power relations from this unity - often to relate them to contemporary discussions and problems - are, of course, extremely valuable in themselves However, if

my analysis of the relations between a school’s philosophical discourse, exercise practices, and organization of power relations is correct, they provide at best a limited, at worst a distorted, understanding of this

philosophical school However, it should be clear that it is not my intention

in this thesis to provide such holistic accounts of these philosophical

communities It will merely be shown how the philosophical discourse, exercise practices, and organization of power relations of a Hellenistic philosophical school are all intertwined, such that an adequate account of such a community must grasp these three in their unity

4 I borrow this concept of power relations from Foucault For an explication of this concept

see the fourth chapter, note 68.

The third theme that runs through the course of this thesis is a

critical dialogue with Heidegger While I consider Heidegger’s account of world disclosure to be one of the greatest achievements in twentieth

century philosophy, it is not without some fundamental shortcomings First, in devaluing everyday existence and the mass, Heidegger was led to connect the idea of philosophy with a life outside of, and even in hostile opposition to, the everyday existence of the community of which it is a part But, while it is certainly true that there has been an opposition

between philosophy and everyday existence ever since philosophy

emerged in ancient Greece, this opposition was never one of hostility and suppression, but a productive one, one devoted to synthesizing philosophywith everyday existence As will be shown in our account of the Hellenistic philosophy, the ancient philosophers were far from being hermits or

potential suppressors; they were always in a critical and respectful way concerned with the everyday existence of the community of which they were a part Heidegger’s account of world disclosure makes him blind for the possibility of this constructive opposition between philosophy and everyday existence Second, Heidegger’s devaluation of rational argumentand worldviews, ultimately, comes down to a devaluation of philosophy as such Unless we are willing to break with the whole tradition of philosophy,

it is clear that a commitment to rational argument and the conceptual construction of worldviews are part of the essence of philosophy In order for a transformation and preservation of our world disclosure to be

philosophical, it must be connected with a commitment to rational

argument and a reflection on ourselves and the changing world wherein

we live, a reflection that results in a comprehensive philosophical

worldview The third and most fundamental shortcoming of Heidegger’s account, from which the previous two derive, is that it lacks an essential part, namely a concrete account of how essential transformations of one’s world disclosure are brought about If we are to follow Heidegger’s own indications, which we will certainly discuss in more detail during the course

of this thesis,5 it seems that such an essential transformation simply

5 Namely in the third chapter.

requires the grace of a god During his last interview in the Spiegel

Heidegger famously proclaimed: “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.” And while it is certainly true that “Heidegger’s work has nothing to do with preparing for Christian revelation and grace,” and that the “‘god’ that

Heidegger’s philosophy awaits is simply the epiphany of world in

Heidegger’s sense of the term, as the utterly groundless source of all meaning” (Sheehan, 2010, p 2), his accounts do not get us far, since, ultimately, they merely seem to tell us that we must await the “arrival of such a world within the lives of human beings” (Ibid.), while our question isprecisely directed at understanding the conditions for the possibility of such an arrival itself Once we look for historical examples of such

essential transformations of the phenomenon of world disclosure, it will become clear that such a transformation requires not a solitary life that is detached from the everyday existence of one’s community, but a

transformation of this communal everyday existence itself And while Heidegger is certainly right in emphasizing that rational argument and propositions can never represent our world disclosure, the right way of relating to our world is by transforming and preserving it instead of trying

to represent it; and, as we will see, rational argument and the construction

of worldviews – under the condition that they are coupled with what we will later analyze as exercise practices and a certain general organization

of power relations – constitute the philosophical way of relating thus

The ethical model of a post-nihilistic philosophical existence is

developed in the form of a general account of the Hellenistic philosophical communities, which shows, on the one hand, that the philosophical

discourse (alêtheia), exercise practices (as the formation of êthos), and organization of power relations (politeia) of such a community are

inextricably intertwined, and, on the other hand, that Heidegger’s religiousaccount of world disclosure is incorrect in so far as it assumes that

transformations of one’s world disclosure lie beyond the power of the social-political animal called man Thus, the three themes come together

in our account of the Hellenistic philosophical communities The general structure of the thesis consists of four chapters As noticed earlier, the

need for the ethical model of a post-nihilistic philosophical existence

primarily arises from a sense of the nihilistic crisis of the present age Accordingly, an account of the nihilistic crisis of the present age should precede the development of our account of the philosophical

transformation of one’s world disclosure that we find present in the Roman world However, since our own account of the possibility of a post-nihilistic philosophical form of life functions at the same time as a criticism

Greco-of Heidegger’s religious account, a discussion Greco-of the latter should precede the presentation of the first Moreover, all three of these accounts draw extensively from the concepts of world disclosure and philosophical

worldview In particular, nihilism will be defined as the state of our world

disclosure wherein it is no longer determined and unified by a worldview

that makes a decision with regard to what is highest And it will be shown that the Hellenistic philosophical communities were in fact concerned with

transforming the world disclosure of their members in terms of an adopted

philosophical worldview Thus, an explication of the concepts of world

disclosure and worldview must precede our discussions of nihilism,

Heidegger’s religious account, and the Hellenistic schools This means thatthe attempt to answer the question of the essential conditions for the possibility of a philosophical transformation of our pre-unified world

disclosure, follows the following main structure:

1 Heidegger’s Idea of World Disclosure and Dilthey’s Account of Worldview

2 The Nihilistic Crisis of the Present Age

3 Heidegger’s Religious Account of World Disclosure

4 The Hellenistic Philosophical Communities and the Possibility of a Philosophical Transformation of Our World Disclosure

The structure of the fourth chapter on the Hellenistic schools is determined

by the second theme, which consists of an argument for a holistic

approach for investigating these schools The theme of the criticism of Heidegger’s religious account is treated in the third and fourth chapter The three themes are disentangled again in the conclusion, and an

overview is given of the main argument of each of these

Heidegger’s Idea of World Disclosure and Dilthey’s Account of

Philosophical Worldviews

This chapter is concerned with appropriating the concepts of world

disclosure and philosophical worldview These concepts are employed in the leading question of this thesis: what are the conditions for the

possibility of a transformation of our world disclosure in terms of a

philosophical worldview? However, they are not only central for

understanding this question, but also figure prominently in both the

account of nihilism, which is developed in the second chapter, and the account of the philosophical transformation of world disclosure that we find present in the Hellenistic philosophical schools, which is developed in the fourth chapter I will shortly explicate how these concepts relate to both these chapters

As with regard to the second chapter The claim of the doctrine of nihilism that our age is without higher values and purposes that transcend our desires of pleasure and pain, seems to contradict the obvious fact that

we live in a world that is characterized by a great variety of different

worldviews, and, thus, by a great variety of sets of higher values and purposes However, and this is crucial for an adequate understanding of our present condition, worldviews might become ineffective Anticipating some of the insights of the second chapter, we can say that when

Nietzsche exclaims ‘God is dead’ he doesn’t mean to say that people no longer assent to a Christian-moral worldview or any other transcendent one, but that these worldviews themselves have become ineffective in the

daily practices of our lives And, as we shall see, this is so because they are no longer embodied in our world disclosure Thus, if we do not

distinguish clearly between the phenomena of worldviews and world

disclosure it becomes impossible to adequately grasp the nihilistic

problematic of the present age

The fourth chapter is devoted to developing an account of the

Hellenistic schools in Greece and Rome These schools will be analyzed as communities that were devoted to transforming the routines and world disclosure of its members in terms of a certain philosophical worldview It

is in this pursuit for the good life that the fundamental poles of the school,

namely, that of alêtheia (expressed in the philosophical discourse), êthos (developed in the exercise practices), and politeia (reflected in their

organization of power relations), are gathered and united The concepts of world disclosure and worldview are, thus, employed to get a grip on the unity of a philosophical school Moreover, since nihilism is analyzed as the fragmented state of our world disclosure that is without a unifying

worldview, the account of the Hellenistic schools, as communities devoted

to transforming the world disclosure of its members in terms of a

philosophical worldview, thus, presents us with the ethical model of a nihilistic philosophical existence

post-It should, thus, be clear that, whereas the following conceptual

clarifications might at first seem out of place in discussions about the possibility of a philosophical existence, the nihilistic crisis and the

Hellenistic conception of philosophy, they in fact play an indispensable role

in the accounts of these that are developed in this thesis Moreover, as mentioned earlier in the introduction, the thesis consists of three

intertwined themes, and the concepts of worldview and world disclosure also figure prominently in each of these With regard to the first theme thisshould already be clear since the chapter division reflects this theme As for the second theme: As was just mentioned, the concepts of world

disclosure and worldview are employed in order to get a grip on the

communal pursuit of happiness of a Hellenistic school, a pursuit that

unifies the school’s poles of alêtheia, êthos, and politeia And it is this

account of the intertwined unity of these poles that constitutes an

argument for a holistic approach to understanding these schools Finally, the third theme, that is, the criticism of Heidegger’s religious account of world disclosure, consists of showing that the Hellenistic schools in fact effectuated transformations of the everyday existence and world

disclosure of their members in terms of philosophical worldviews

1.1 Heidegger’s Idea of World Disclosure

Although the concept of world disclosure figures prominently in

contemporary critical theory, mostly under the influence of Heidegger, it isHeidegger’s philosophy itself to which we must turn for the most extensivetreatment of this concept Since the beginning of Heidegger scholarship animportant topic has always been the change in Heidegger’s thinking, which happened during the 1930s.6 However, the current paradigm in Heidegger scholarship agrees on this point: the phenomenon of world disclosure has always been the central concern of Heidegger’s thinking

“Heidegger’s various analyses of the phenomenon of world disclosure – of

In-der-Welt-Sein, Lichtung, Gestell, and Ereignis – represent his central

contribution to twentieth-century philosophy.” (Kompridis, 2006, p 33)

“Heidegger’s one and only topic from beginning to end – what he called

the issue of philosophy – was the kinetic structure of the disclosure of

entities, that is, the movement that constitutes the analogical unity (or meaning) of the being of entities.” (Sheehan, 1984, p 178) “For

Heidegger, the essence of truth is always understood in terms of

unconcealment, and Heidegger never stops inquiring into unconcealment Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any work in Heidegger’s vast corpus that does not have some discussion of unconcealment.” (Wrathall, 2011,

p 12) “The great achievement of Heidegger’s earlier philosophy, the profound and elaborate analysis of the ontological structure of human existence, of Dasein, was undertaken only in order to prepare the way for

6 This ‘change in thinking’ (Die Wendung im Denken) must not be confused with the turn (Die Kehre) where the later Heidegger often refers to This confusion is often present in

Heidegger scholarship But the turn of which Heidegger speaks is not the change in his thinking but names the structure of world disclosure As Thomas Sheehan notes: “The

Beiträge thus clarifies another crucial matter: the Kehre is not the change that

Heidegger’s thinking underwent in the 1930’s There is no doubt that Heidegger's

approach shifted during that decade (…) But we now know that the proper name for that

shift is not die Kehre but what Heidegger called die Wendung im Denken or “change in

thinking” (…).” (Sheehan, 2001, p 13)

a more direct approach to the problem of Being While Heidegger’s

philosophy after its much discussed ‘turn’ (Kehre) differs in many ways from his earlier thought, no feature of the later philosophy is more

pronounced than its growing tendency to regard Being (das Sein) as an

‘event’ or ‘occurrence’ (Ereignis) The Being-event takes place when there occurs an unveiling of beings (das Seiende), a disclosure not only of what beings there are but of how these beings are, i.e., of the manner of their existence and of their relationship to one another When there occurs unveiling of beings, of what-there-is in its totality, a ‘world’ may be said to have happened.” (Lee Bartky, 1979, p 213) This means that the following explication of the concept of world disclosure can draw from both

Heidegger’s earlier and later work Sein und Zeit clearly constitutes the

most extensive and penetrating analysis of the structure of world

disclosure and how it figures within our lives, and we will, thus, mainly concern ourselves with this work in our explication However, it is in the

Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) and Der Ursprung des

Kunstwerkes that we can find Heidegger’s most extensive treatment of the

insight that one’s world disclosure embodies a decision with regard to what it means to be and what is highest It should be clear beforehand that it is certainly not my intention to uncritically adopt Heidegger’s

account of world disclosure In fact, especially in the third and fourth

chapters of this thesis, I will argue against the devaluation of everyday existence, the devaluation of worldviews and rational argument in

philosophy, and, most importantly, the appeal to a man transcending pseudo-sacral power, that are all central to Heidegger’s account of world disclosure I think that it has been mainly these aspects of his account of world disclosure that has made it unattractive to many philosophers However, we will postpone discussions and criticisms of these aspects of Heidegger’s account to later chapters, and will restrict ourselves for the moment to an explication of the concept of world disclosure In the

remainder of this paragraph we will describe the structure of world

disclosure, from which it becomes clear that our understanding and

perception of beings is determined by our world disclosure and that this

world disclosure itself embodies a decision with regard to what it means to

be and what is highest Then, in the second paragraph on Heidegger’s idea

of world disclosure we will discuss the intersubjective nature or sharedness

of our world disclosure As essentially cultural beings we are brought up into a unified set of interpretive and evaluative schemes that we share with our community This unified understanding determines how we first and foremost relate to the innerworldly beings, to others and ourselves This suggests two thinks: first, that if transformations of our world

disclosure are possible by human hands, it would require a transformation

of our inherited intersubjective interpretive and evaluative schemes, and, second, that this should, thus, be a communal undertaking.7

7 It should be noted that Heidegger himself would have objected to these two claims, since he regards a transformation of one’s world disclosure to be outside the reach of both the individual and the community But while I agree with Heidegger that such

transformations are beyond the reach of the individual, it will be shown in the second and third chapter that they can be enacted by man in the context of a community

The phenomenon of world disclosure cannot be grasped in a definition,

since as Heidegger explains in the introduction of Sein und Zeit

(Heidegger, 2001, p 4), definitions only apply to beings whereas world disclosure is not a being, nor is it even articulated in a way that it can be grasped in propositions We will first give a rough sketch of the

phenomenon of world disclosure, by contrasting Heidegger’s account of world-disclosing human beings with that of the Cartesian subject, a

thinking substance that imposes mental concepts on things in order to grasp and control them Once we have a preliminary grasp of this

phenomenon we will explicate its structure by clarifying Heidegger’s

analysis of it

The main concern of the first division of Sein und Zeit8 is the

destruction of the Cartesian subject and the reinterpretation of the being

of man in terms of its relation to what Heidegger calls the truth of being, where this is analyzed as the phenomenon of world disclosure When Descartes employed his method of methodological skepticism, in his endeavor to achieve the ultimate form of certainty and knowledge that one finds in mathematics and physics, he was led to the self-certainty of the thinking subject as the ultimate principle However, Descartes

interpreted this subject as a thinking substance that is only indirectly related to the extended material world by means of representations This made it possible for him to doubt the existence of the outside world and other people, since the essence of the thinking subject was thought to be independent of their existence, and we already know from hallucinations and dreams that we can have representations without there being

something represented Descartes’ own solution, which rests on the belief

in an innate idea of God and a scholastic conception of the ‘objective

8 Originally the project behind Sein und Zeit was meant to consist of two parts, each of

which consists of three divisions However, the work as it was published contains merely the first two divisions of the envisioned first part The first division with which we will concern us at present is titled “Division One: Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of

Dasein”

reality’ of ideas, was found unsatisfying by later philosophers And the problem of the existence of the external world has been a recurrent theme

in philosophy ever since According to Heidegger, this problem and the underlying view of the thinking subject, was the result of neglecting to question the phenomenon of the being of human beings in its own terms,9

which gives free way to the tendency to misinterpret human existence in terms of the essence of the objects that we encounter within the world.10

Contrary to, for example, non-human animals, plants, equipment, works ofart, and pure things like stones, human beings are concerned with their own existence.11 During our lives we make choices that will determine who

we are Our being is an issue for us during our existence, and never

something predetermined This means that we cannot be characterized as present-at-hand objects (substances) with various properties; on the

contrary, the characteristics of our being must always be understood in terms of possible ways for us to be.12 We determine who we are by taking

up possible ways of existence For instance, one might become a doctor orlawyer, a father or a bachelor, a moral saint or a criminal, etc Such

possibilities of existence are only encountered and understood within the shared world wherein we live our lives, that is, the world of institutions, social roles and practices This means that we manifest our existence

9 This is what Heidegger means when he says: “In historischer Orientierung kann die

Absicht der existenzialen Analytik also verdeutlicht werden: Descartes, dem man die

Entdekkung des cogito sum als Ausgangsbasis des neuzeitlichen philosophischen Fragens zuschreibt, untersuchte das cogitare des ego – in gewissen Grenzen Dagegen läßt er das

sum völlig unerörtert, wenngleich es ebenso ursprünglich angesetzt wird wie das cogito.”

begegnet.” (Heidegger, 2001, p 58) Heidegger later analyzes this tendency to interpret

one’s existence in terms of the innerworldly beings in terms of falling (Verfallen) (see our

discussion of falling in 3.1).

11 “Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden [Dasein] in seinem Sein geht, ist je meines

Dasein ist daher nie ontologisch zu fassen als Fall und Exemplar einer Gattung von

Seiendem als Vorhandenem Diesem Seienden ist sein Sein ‘gleichgültig’, genau besehen,

es ‘ist’ so, daß ihm sein Sein weder gleichgültig noch ungleichgültig sein kann.”

(Heidegger, 2001, p 42)

12 “Das ‘Wesen’ des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz Die an diesem Seienden

herausstellbaren Charaktere sind daher nicht vorhandene ‘Eigenschaften’ eines so und so

‘aussehenden’ vorhandenen Seienden, sondern je ihm mögliche Weisen zu sein und nur das.” (Heidegger, 2001, p 42)

within this shared world, and that we cannot understand our being withouttaking it into account However, the world as the space of our possibilities

of existence must not be understood as merely a stock of present-at-hand possibilities of existence, as if we lived our lives within a space filled with independent social roles The lived world embodies some decision with regard to what it means to be, what matters, what is divine, what is

beauty, what is good, in short, a decision with regard to beings as such and as a whole13 This decision underlies or, more precisely, is embodied inthe social practices and institutions that we encounter within this world The world gathers the institutions and practices by relating them to its decision with regard to beings as such and as a whole, and this determinesthe sense of these institutions and practices By means of institutions, media, parenting, and such, we are integrated within our environment by being brought up into a sense of this decision (the world), so that we

perceive beings as such and as a whole as they are understood in that decision, thereby participating in this shared world disclosure.14 We, thus, live our lives within an inherited shared world disclosure that orients the present social practices and institutions towards some future Not only in beliefs, but, more importantly, in our actions, moods, and attitudes we reflect this understanding of being We are not present-at-hand beings whohappen to be situated in a ‘world’, as a set of present-at-hand objects (or substances), wherein we make autonomous choices on the basis of our beliefs and desires Our existence is tangled up with our shared historical world-disclosure (understanding of being) within which we determine who

we are

13 The expression ‘beings as such and as a whole’ is borrowed from Heidegger ‘Beings as such’ refers to the most general characteristics or conceptual parameters of beings and determine what beings are and what it means to be (their essence) ‘Beings as a whole’ refers to the divine and highest values that unite the manifold of beings and serves as a paradigm for life In traditional philosophy both have been conceived of in terms of beings: the first in terms of the most general properties and the latter in terms of highest beings But, as we will see, Heidegger thinks this to be a mistake and analyzes it in terms

of world disclosure and what we will later in the paragraph describe as decisions A decision with regard to beings as such and as a whole, thus, determines what it means for something to be and what is highest and divine Such a decision discloses the totality of beings in a certain way.

14 For a preliminary explication of the concept of understanding see note 3 We will clarify

the structure of our understanding in what follows.

The reason why philosophers like Descartes passed over the

phenomenon of world-disclosure, and conceived of our relation to objects merely in representational terms, is that they tend to understand our relation towards the objects outside of us in terms of knowing.15 In knowingbeings we encounter them as substances with various properties, that is,

as objectively present It seems that such substances exist independently outside of us, and that we are related to them by forming mental

representations of them in perception The strategy of Heidegger’s

destruction of the Cartesian mental representational way of thinking aboutthe relation between human beings and the world contains two important steps First, Heidegger shows that our representational comportment

towards the beings outside of us is merely an extreme derivative form of our practical comportment.16 Second, he reveals that the intentionality of our practical comportment presupposes the world of institutions and

practices, which embodies a certain understanding of being.17 Theoretical

15 “Soll sie nun erkannt werden, dann nimmt das in solcher Aufgabe ausdrückliche

Erkennen gerade sich selbst – als Welterkennen zur exemplarischen Beziehung der ‘Seele’

zur Welt Das Erkennen von Welt (noein) (…) fungiert deshalb als der primäre Modus des

In-der-Welt-seins, ohne daß dieses als solches begriffen wird Weil nun aber diese

Seinsstruktur ontologisch unzugänglich bleibt, aber doch ontisch erfahren ist als

‘Beziehung’ zwischen Seiendem (Welt) und Seiendem (Seele) und weil Sein zunächst verstanden wird im ontologischen Anhalt am Seienden als innerweltlichem Seienden, wird versucht, diese Beziehung zwischen den genannten Seienden auf dem Grunde dieser Seienden und im Sinne ihres Seins, d.h als Vorhandensein zu begreifen.” (Heidegger,

2001, pp 58/59)

16 The following passage should serve as an explanation of the concept of comportment:

“Comportment (Verhalten) is a very broad term that is meant to include every instance in

which we experience something, and everything that we do Excluded from comportment, then, are physiological or merely causal events or behaviors When I grow hair or hiccup, there is no sense in which I am comporting myself Unlike such causal events or

behaviors, comportments have a meaningful structure But comportment is broader than the class of deliberate actions (although, naturally it includes them), because

comportment involves things I do or experience without an occurrent mental state in which I intent to do it or register the experience Thus comportment includes automatic reflexes, for example, which reflect a responsiveness to the meaning of a situation.” (Wrathall, 2011, p 22)

Moreover, for empirical support of this thesis of Heidegger see Dotov, D.G., Nie, L.,

Chemero, A., and Brezina, V “A Demonstration of the Transition from Ready-to-Hand to

Unready-to-Hand”, in PloS One, Vol 5, Issue 3, March 9 2010, pp 1-9 In addition, on the

basis of this thesis of Heidegger, Hubert Dreyfus was led in the sixties to the view that the cognitive science would necessarily fail since it still understood our relation towards the outside world in terms of representations and implicit principles As time progressed it turned out that Dreyfus was right For an overview of Dreyfus’ critical dialogue with the scientists of AI and how they slowly came to see that Dreyfus was right, see Dreyfus,

“Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More

Heideggerian”, in Philosophical Psychology, Vol 20, Issue 2, April 1, 2007, pp 247-268.

17 We will discuss the second step in more detail below.

or representational intentionality towards beings within the world is merely

a derivative form of our practical comportment within a certain historical disclosure of the world We first of all encounter beings within the significant whole of institutions and practices, and it is only by

cultural-abstracting from this context of significance, by means of complex

practices, that we come to experience beings in their independency as substances We don’t have an intermediate representation of the world in our minds; we are directly interacting with the world and other people As Habermas observes:

There belongs to situated, bodily-historical existence a

comprehension, however diffuse, of a world, from the horizon of which the meaning of the entities later capable of being objectified

by the sciences is always already interpreted (Habermas, 1987, 143-144)

For a clarification of the phenomenon of world disclosure and its structure Heidegger takes the surrounding world of the work-place as his starting-point In our practical dealings within a workplace we encounter beings in their ready-to-handness as equipment that is essentially

‘something in order to …’ – e.g., we encounter the hammer for (in order to)hammering, and the pen in order to write We use such equipment in order

to produce or fix some work, which in turn is also equipment in the sense that it is something in order to … - e.g., we use the hammer for

hammering in order to produce a wooden closet, which in turn is to store clothes.18 In such production we always use materials, like leather, thread, and so on These materials are ultimately themselves produced from

animals or other products of nature, like steel, iron, stone, wood Thus, in our practical dealings we also encounter animals and nature in their ready-to-handness.19 The equipment is, thus, encountered within a referential

18 “Das herzustellende Werk als das Wozu von Hammer, Hobel, Nadel hat seinerseits die

Seinsart des Zeugs Der herzustellende Schuh ist zum Tragen (Schuhzeug), die verfertigte Uhr zur Zeitablesung Das im besorgenden Umgang vornehmlich begegnende Werk – das

in Arbeit befindliche – läßt in seiner ihm wesenhaft zugehörigen Verwendbarkeit je schon

mitbegegnen das Wozu seiner Verwendbarkeit.” (Heidegger, 2001, p 70)

19 “Das herzustellende Werk ist aber nicht allein verwendbar für …, das Herstellen selbst

ist je ein Verwenden von etwas für etwas Im Werk liegt zugleich die Verweisung auf

totality wherein every being in its ready-to-handness refers to other beings

in their ready-to-handness The material that is used in the work also refers to its maker – e.g., the leather that is used in the production of shoes refers to the relevant tanner or tanneries In addition, the work has

a reference to those who will use it – e.g., the car that is parked in front of the house of my neighbors refers to my neighbors as its users or owners Even in mass production these references remain, although more or less undetermined – e.g., the male jeans of Armani are manufactured by the employees of Armani for the use by men This means that the surrounding world of the work-place refers to the wider public world, wherein one

encounters other persons as makers or users.20 In this public world we not only encounter natural resources as ready-to-hand but also, and more importantly, the surrounding nature – e.g., a marquise serves to protect against rainy weather, streetlights exist for the purpose of providing sight

in darkness, and so on.21 As noticed earlier, we manifest our existence in the public world by taking up certain possibilities of existence and

disregarding others The equipment that we encounter in our practical

‘Materialien’ Es ist angewiesen auf Leder, Faden, Nägel u dgl Leder wiederum ist

hergestellt aus Häuten Diese sind Tieren abgenommen, die von anderen gezüchtet warden Tiere komen innerhalb der Welt auch ohne Züchtung vor, und auch bei dieser stellt sich dieses Seiende in gewisser Weise selbst her In der Umwelt wird demnach auch Seiendes zugänglich, das an ihm selbst herstellungsunbedürftig, immer schon zuhanden ist Hammer, Zange, Nagel verweisen an ihnen selbst auf – sie bestehen aus – Stahl, Eisen, Erz, Gestein, Holz Im gebrauchten Zeug ist durch den Gebrauch die ‘Natur’

mitentdeckt, die ‘Natur’ im Lichte der Naturprodukte.” (Heidegger, 2001, p 70)

20 “Das hergestellte Werk verweist nicht nur auf das Wozu seiner Verwendbarkeit und das Woraus seines Bestehens, in einfachen handwerklichen Zuständen liegt in ihm zugleich die Verweisung auf den Träger und Benutzer Das Werk wird ihm auf den Leib

zugeschnitten, er ‘ist’ im Entstehen des Werkes mit dabei In der Herstellung von

Dutzendware fehlt diese konstitutive Verweisung keineswegs; sie ist nur unbestimmt, zeigt auf Beliebige, den Durchschnitt Mit dem Werk begegnet demnach nicht allein Seiendes, das zuhanden ist, sondern auch Seiendes von der Seinsart des Menschen, dem das Hergestellte in seinem Besorgen zuhanden wird; in eins damit begegnet die Welt, in der die Träger und Verbraucher leben, die zugleich die unsere ist Das je besorgte Werk ist

nicht nur in der häuslichen Welt der Werkstatt etwa zuhanden, sondern in der öffentlichen

Welt.” (Heidegger, 2001, pp 70-71)

21 “Mit dieser [der öffentlichen Welt] ist die Umweltnatur entdeckt und jedem zugänglich

In den Wegen, Straßen, Brücken, Gebäuden ist durch das Besorgen die Natur in

bestimmter Richting entdeckt Ein gedeckter Bahnsteig trägt dem Unwetter Rechnung, die öffentlichen Beleuchtungsanlagen der Dunkelheit, d.h dem spezifischen Wechsel der An- und Abwesenheit der Tageshelle, dem ‘Stand der Sonne’ In den Uhren ist je einer bestimmten Konstellation im Weltsystem Rechnung getragen Wenn wir auf die Uhr sehen, machen wir unausdrücklich Gebrauch vom ‘Stand der Sonne’, darnach die

amtliche astronomische Regelung der Zeitmessung ausgeführt wird Im gebrauch des zunächst und unauffällig zuhandenen Uhrzeugs ist die Umweltnatur mitzuhanden.” (Heidegger, 2001, p 71)

dealings refer to such possibilities of existence – e.g., the streetlights are

in order to provide sight in darkness and this, for example, for the sake of safely finding one’s way home in the middle of the night.22 This is where Heidegger stops his phenomenological investigation into the surrounding world, namely, at the point where it refers not only to the public world and the surrounding nature, but also, and more importantly, to possible ways for us to be

The previous phenomenological explication of the surrounding world provides us with the occasion to uncover the structure of the world.23 The equipment is in-order-to do some work, and it is produced by its maker out

of materials that, ultimately, are made-of animals and natural resources, and while this work is most of the times in-order-to-do some further work, this chain will eventually refer to a possibility of existence as its for-the-sake-of-which Thus, the reference totality of the surrounding world

contains the following essential references: in-order-to (serviceability of the equipment), what-for (work), whereof (materials, animals, and nature),the maker and user, and the for-the-sake-of-which (a possibility of being of man).24 It is in our directedness at certain possibilities of existence that wedisclose the work that is for the sake of that possibility, and the equipmentand materials that are needed for such work These references not only constitute the structure of the surrounding world of the workplace, but of the phenomenon of world as such When we examine the public world, we

22 “Mit dem Wozu der Dienlichkeit kann es wiederum seine Bewandtnis haben; zum

Beispiel mit diesem Zuhandenen, das wir deshalb Hammer nennen, hat es die

Bewandtnis beim Hämmern, mit diesem hat es seine Bewandtnis bei Befestigung, mit dieser bei Schutz gegen Unwetter; dieser ‘ist’ um-willen des Unterkommens des Daseins, das heißt, um einer Möglichkeit seines Seins willen.” (Heidegger, 2001, p 84)

23 Heidegger calls this structure ‘worldhood’ (Weltlichkeit) and ‘significance’

(Bedeutsamkeit).

24 These relations remind us of Aristotle’s four causes or explanatory conditions According

to this doctrine of Aristotle the being of a being is determined by the matter of which it

consists (the causa materialis), the form that arranges that matter (the causa formalis), the cause that brings this being into existence (the causa efficiens), and the thing’s aim

or purpose, that is, its for-the-sake-of-which (the causa finalis) Heidegger’s analysis

shows that the beings that we encounter first and foremost refer to the material of which they consist (the whereof), their purpose (in-order-to) that ultimately refers to a certain possibility of existence (the for-the-sake-of-which), and their makers who brought them into existence From an understanding of the purpose of the produced being the maker

forms the matter so that it appears as the thing that it is See also in this regard

Heidegger’s own treatment of Aristotle’s doctrine of four causes in Die Frage nach der

Technik (Heidegger, 2000, pp 7-13)

also encounter references between equipment, work, materials, animals, nature, and possibilities of existence The public world contains

possibilities of existence in the form of social roles – e.g., lumberjacks, teachers, students, salesmen, but also being-a-woman, being-a-child, etc Such a social role comprises many different social practices – e.g., in the case of the student: exams, lectures, reading books of a certain

disciplines, writing papers Within such practices we encounter equipment – e.g., in lectures we encounter the audience chairs, the chalkboard, the notebook, etc These practices refer to each other – e.g., we read so as to prepare for the lecture or exam, etc The social roles also refer to each other – e.g., the student of economy studies under a teacher, within a university with student counselors, secretaries, doctors, etc., and he

studies to become, for example, a director of a company in automation so

as to manage other salesmen, technicians, etc., in order to supply for his children and wife In the public world we take on social roles wherein we manifest our existence in shared practices wherein we deal with beings as equipment The world, then, is a field of meaning-giving social practices and roles by and for beings like us with our bodies, desires, interests, and purpose

We, thus, see that our perception and understanding of beings is determined by our unified disclosure of the world, wherein an

interconnected totality of beings is disclosed in the light of certain

possibilities of existence In the remainder of this paragraph I will continue

to clarify this phenomenon by the following three claims: first, world

disclosure is not a mental phenomenon but the structure wherein we

bodily comport ourselves; second, world disclosure hides itself in

disclosing beings; and, third, world disclosure is the embodiment of a certain decision with regard to what it means to be and what is highest

One completely misunderstands Heidegger’s account of the

structure of world disclosure if one regards these relations as relations wherein we structure our representations of the outside world, whether consciously or unconsciously They are pre-propositional relations in which

we (first and foremost bodily) comport ourselves towards the innerworldly beings and ourselves As long as our comportment towards the purpose of

a piece of equipment runs smoothly – i.e., the equipment is not damaged,

we do not make a serious mistake, we already possess the required skills, etc – the equipment is transparent in the sense that it does not enter our mind This is why our mind can concern itself with other things than the work at hand – e.g., while driving, our mind might be occupied with eventsthat happened earlier that day Routines and habits make up our everyday life, and, as William James already recognized, these get a grip on the practices that we encounter in our world by delegating them to our bodies:

I believe that we are subject to the law of habit in consequence of the fact that we have bodies The plasticity of the living matter of our nervous system, in short, is the reason why we do a thing with difficulty the first time, but soon do it more and more easily, and finally, with sufficient practice, do it semi-mechanically, or with hardly any consciousness at all Our nervous systems have (…)

grown to the way in which they have been exercised, just as a sheet

of paper or a coat, once creased or folded, tends to fall forever

afterward into the same identical folds (James, 1962, Chapter 8)

These habits are organized by a certain form of life, and, thereby, display acertain style, which is characteristic of the community in question “All our life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits, - practical,

emotional, and intellectual, - systematically organized for our weal or woe,and bearing us irresistibly toward our destiny, whatever the latter may be.” (Ibid.) The structure of our world-disclosure is, thus, not a mental structure, but the structure wherein we (mostly bodily) comport ourselves towards beings and ourselves It is only by comporting ourselves within

this structure that we perceive and understand beings as something – e.g.,

as equipment, as human beings, as works of art, etc

It is important to notice that the disclosed world tends to hide itself behind the beings that are disclosed within it It is precisely because of this

tendency, that it required phenomenological effort to uncover it, so that

we can then name it, speak about it, and interpret it further That the world hides itself behind the beings it discloses is simply a brute

phenomenological fact; if the world didn’t hide itself behind beings, we couldn’t perceive beings at all, just as it is a brute phenomenological fact that light hides itself behind the perceivable objects that it lights up In a certain sense we need to look through the medium of the semantic

structures and sources of our world disclosure, through the institutions andsocial practices, to perceive the innerworldly beings The world conceals itself in disclosing beings, and this is why Heidegger later characterizes it

as concealing-unconcealing This will be of importance in the second

chapter on nihilism, since, as Heidegger argues, it is this characteristic that underlies the fact that we concern ourselves exclusively with beings and neglect the world disclosure wherein these are disclosed

In investigating the relations of the surrounding world we saw that this world is incorporated into and refers to the broader public world Now

it is also important to see that if we continue to trace the references to broader contexts of significance, we will eventually stumble upon the world of beings as such and as a whole wherein these “relations are

interlocked among themselves as a primordial totality.” (Heidegger, 2001, 87:81) Heidegger calls this disclosure of beings as such and as a whole the

understanding of being (in Sein und Zeit) or the truth of being (in Beiträge

zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)) Our inherited understanding of being

constitutes a decision with regard to what it means to be, what matters and makes sense to do, what is holy and what unholy, what is noble and what is fleeting And this inherited decision gathers the social practices and institutions, the beings and our lives, and orients them towards a

certain future He later analyzes such decisions in terms of god(s) In Der

Ursprung des Kunstwerkes Heidegger discusses how works of art come to

disclose a world “Das Tempelwerk eröffnet dastehend eine Welt und stellt diese zugleich zurück auf die Erde, die dergestalt selbst erst als der

heimatliche Grund herauskommt.” (Heidegger, 1977, p 28) Essential to this disclosure of a world is the appearance of a god:

Das Bauwerk umschließt die Gestalt des Gottes und läßt sie in dieserVerbergung durch die offene Säulenhalle hinausstehen in den

heiligen Bezirk Durch den Tempel west der Gott im Tempel an DieseAnwesen des Gottes ist in sich die Ausbreitung und Ausgrenzung desBezirkes als eines heiligen Der Tempel und sein Bezirk verschweben aber nicht in das Unbestimmte Das Tempelwerk fügt erst und

sammelt zugleich die Einheit jener Bahnen und Bezüge um sich, in denen Geburt und Tod, Unheil und Segen, Sieg und Schmach,

Ausharren und Verfall – dem Menschenwesen die Gestalt seines Geschickes gewinnen Die waltende Weise dieser offenen Bezüge ist die Welt dieses geschichtlichen Volkes (Ibid., pp 27-28)

The world is disclosed in the light of the god “Der Tempel gibt seinem Dastehen den Dingen erst ihr Gesicht und den Menschen erst die Aussicht auf sich selbst Diese Sicht bleibt so lange offen, als das Werk ein Werk ist,

so lange als der Gott nicht aus ihm geflohen.” (Ibid., p 29) When

Heidegger speaks about god(s) he doesn’t mean to speak about divine

beings, like the Christian or Muslim God The god(s) constitute decision(s)

with regard to beings as a whole, that is, with regard to what is highest and divine It is in terms of this decision of beings as a whole that beings

as such are disclosed “In der Tragödie wird nichts auf- und vorgeführt, sondern der Kampf der neuen Götter gegen die alten wird gekämpft

Indem das Sprachwerk im Sagen des Volkes aufsteht, redet es nicht über diesen Kampf, sondern verwandelt das Sagen des Volkes dahin, daß jetzt jedes wesentliche Wort diesen Kampf führt und zur Entscheidung stellt, was heilig ist und was unheilig, was groß und was klein, was wacker und was feig, was edel und was flüchtig, was Herr und was Knecht (…).” (Ibid.,

p 29) The poetized fight between gods is not an actual fight between divine beings; it is a fight between standards, on which the greatness of every culture depends “Was ist, wenn der Kampf um die Maßstäbe

erstirbt, wenn das gleiche Wollen keine Größe mehr will, d.h keinen Willen zur größten Verschiedenheit der Wege mehr aufbringt?” (Heidegger, 1989,8:28) The god(s) are such decisions and standards, and not something outside of them “Würde und Glanz sind nicht Eigenschaften, neben und

hinter denen außerdem noch der Gott steht, sondern in der Würde, im Glanz west der Gott an Im Abglanz dieses Glanzes glänzt, d.h lichtet sich jenes, was wir die Welt nannten Er-richten sagt: Öffnen das Rechte im Sinne des entlang weisenden Maßes, als welches das Wesenhafte die Weisungen gibt.” (Heidegger, 1977, p 30) Our world disclosure is always determined in one way or another by the god(s) as a decision with regard

to what is highest and divine While the original disclosure of the world requires the presence of god(s), once such a world is disclosed it is

possible that it becomes the site or clearing from which the god(s) flee, that is, the clearing wherein beings as such become indifferent and no longer shine in terms of a decision with regard to what is highest and divine “Auch das Verhängnis des Ausbleibens des Gottes ist eine Weise, wie Welt weltet.” (Heidegger, 1977, p 31) From now on I will refer to what Heidegger calls ‘god(s)’ in terms of ‘decisions’, so as to avoid the

misunderstanding that we are speaking of divine beings instead of

decisions that grant beings inherent and pleasure-transcending

significance Such a decision or the absence of such a decision is

embodied within one’s world disclosure, that is, in the whole of the social practices and institutions of one’s community The inherited decision

gathers these practices and institutions and orients them towards some future In the absence of such a decision with regard to what is highest and divine the social practices and institutions, and the lives of the

members of that community, become fragmented In the following two chapters we will see that our nihilistic world disclosure is precisely

determined by such an absence of decision with regard to what is highest, while the Hellenistic schools offer us a post-nihilistic model of communitiesdedicated to a critical agonism between different conceptions of what it means to be and what is highest and divine